OSCE

An Information Resource Centre for Public Environmental Awareness and Culture and Improving People’s Ecological Knowledge was opened by the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan, with the support of the Group of Ecological Movement Deputies within the Legislative House of Uzbekistan’s parliament, the Oliy Majlis, and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, on 17 July 2018 in Tashkent.

The Centre, which is the second of its kind in Uzbekistan, aims to promote the right of access to information, public information sharing and transparency in environmental issues. Similar to Aarhus Centres, of which the OSCE supports 60 in 14 different countries, the Centre will promote dialogue and consultation in the field of environmental governance and offer a platform to engage all relevant stakeholders, including civil society and individual citizens.

“Better environmental security improves people’s lives, but environmental initiatives can only be truly effective through broad engagement, which is why this Centre is so important,” said the OSCE Project Co-ordinator Ambassador John MacGregor in his opening speech. “With the Centre we have built another part of the foundation on which Uzbekistan’s environmental future will be built.”

The Centre aims at increasing citizens’ knowledge of local environmental issues in order to enhance their sense of ownership of these issues and counter potential tensions stemming from ecological problems within communities.

Overcoming environmental challenges and increasing the country’s sustainability are both addressed in Uzbekistan’s Five-Area Development Strategy for 2017-2021, which entered into effect by a decree from President Shavkat Mirziyoev last year.  The OSCE Project Co-ordinator supports these efforts through its work with the Ecological Movement, which is one of its closest partners.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe organized a series of awareness-raising discussions on requirements of UN Security Resolution 1540 and its implementation by Tajikistan.

The meetings were held from 26 June to 13 July 2018 in Dushanbe and outside the capital in the regions Khorog, Rasht, Khujand and Bokhtar.  

Some 150 national participants representing local government administrations, branches of agencies dealing with chemical, biological, radiation and nuclear materials, emergency services and national border and customs services took part in the events.

Six national experts representing Tajikistan’s working group on implementation of the country’s National Actions Plan for Resolution 1540 introduced the participants to provisions of UN Resolution 1540 and informed them about Tajikistan’s progress in its implementation.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM heard explosions (assessed as outgoing mortar rounds) and small-arms fire about 100m from its position in a residential area of non-government-controlled Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; its access remained restricted in all three areas.* It was again restricted in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as in Voznesenivka, an area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Artema, Novotoshkivske, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, as well as in Zalizne and Horlivka. In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against journalists.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 70 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions).

During the day of 16 July, positioned on Tsentralna Street, in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard five explosions, assessed as outgoing mortar rounds, and 40 bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire about 100m west. Thereafter, the SMM saw that about ten people, whom the SMM had previously seen walking along the same street, had begun running to seek shelter in nearby buildings. Later during the day, positioned about 4km east of Dokuchaievsk, the SMM heard and saw uncountable undetermined explosions 3-7km south-west and west, as well as two columns of white and black smoke, respectively, emanating from areas in and near Dokuchaievsk. Positioned about 3km south-east of Dokuchaievsk, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-west and west. At the same location, the SMM heard and saw an airburst and an undetermined explosion 3-7km south-south-west and it heard three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 5km west.

On the evening and night of 15-16 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile and a flare in flight from west to east and six projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by a total of 35 projectiles (12 in vertical flight, eight from east to west, 11 from north-west to south-east and four from north-north-west to south-south-east) and one undetermined explosion, all 0.7-5km south.

On the evening and night of 15-16 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, six illumination flares in vertical flight and a projectile in flight from west to east, followed by a total of ten undetermined explosions, 61 projectiles (seven from north to south, 17 from east to west, one from south to north, two from west-north-west to east-north-east and 34 from west to east), five illumination flares in vertical flight, a muzzle flash and a burst, all 2-5km north.

On the evening and night of 15-16 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, 18 projectiles in flight from east to west, two projectiles from west to east and 11 projectiles from east to west, all 4-9km south.

During the day on 16 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw three undetermined explosions 2-4km south-west and west-south-west, and heard four undetermined explosions 2-4km south-west and north-north-west, as well as 23 bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km south-west and west-south-west.

During the day on 16 July, positioned on the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 22 undetermined explosions and 24 shots of small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from north-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 15-16 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, eight bursts and two undetermined explosions all 3.5-7km south-east, south-south-east and south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 16 July, positioned in and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, on 14 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Keramik (28km north-west of Donetsk). On 15 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Putylyne (44km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three tanks (one T-64 and two possible T-64) in a residential area of Verkhnoshyrokivske (85km south of Donetsk) and 12 tanks (type undetermined) about 2km north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 14 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four tanks (possible T-72) west of Markyne (94km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 14 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (one BMP-2 and three BMP variants) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). On 14 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four IFVs (two BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk). On 16 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR variant) near Zolote-2/Karbonit (62km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP variant) and a newly dug trench in Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), an APC (MB-LB) in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), as well as seven APCs (BTR-80) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 14 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three APCs (two BTR-80 and an MT-LB) and four IFVs (BMP-1) in Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), six IFVs (BMP-2) in Khreshchatytske (86km south of Donetsk), a probable TORN radio intelligence system in a residential area of Maiorove (formerly Krasnyi Oktiabr, 57km south-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report of 9 June 2018) and an APC (BTR-80) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed the presence of mines and mine hazard signs. An SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 300 anti-tank mines laid in two rows near Nelipivka (see SMM Daily Report of 29 June 2018). On the side of a road leading from Solodke (government-controlled, 33km south-west of Donetsk) to Olhynka (government-controlled, 40km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a rectangular mine hazard sign (with “No entry, demining activities” written in Ukrainian).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw 41 cars (one with Georgian, 21 with Ukrainian and 16 with Russian Federation licence plates, and three with “LPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM saw eight cars with Ukrainian licence plates and six pedestrians (five women and a man) entering Ukraine and eight cars with Ukrainian licence plates and nine pedestrians (all women) exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Odessa, the SMM followed up on reports of an attack against journalists. On 16 July, a journalist from the online media outlet Nerozkryti zlochyny (“Unsolved Crime”) told the SMM that, while he had been at the intersection between Hoholia Street and Nekrasova Lane, two people, who he identified as members of the Municipal Guards, had approached him and sprayed pepper spray on his and another journalist’s face; they also beat the latter. Police told the SMM by phone that in the aforementioned incident three people had been injured, while two members of the Municipal Guards had been charged under article 296 of the Criminal Code (hooliganism).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and again denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security reasons (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 14 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report of 16 July 2018).
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne, armed members of the armed formations stopped again the SMM and denied it passage, citing orders from superiors not to let the SMM through the checkpoint. (See SMM Daily Report of 14 July 2018 and SMM Daily Report of 16 July 2018.)
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• At an armed formations checkpoint south of the bridge near Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that he had no information about demining activities in the area. Due to the possible presence of mines, the SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Delay:

• A member of the armed formations initially again denied the SMM access to the Molochny settlement of Lozove (nongovernment-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk); he allowed the SMM through after 30 minutes (see SMM Daily Report of 14 July 2018).

Other impediments:

• In Oleksandrivka (nongovernment-controlled, 63km south-east of Luhansk), a woman who introduced herself as a community representative said that she could not provide information to the SMM without the permission of senior members of the armed formations.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Vienna, 13 July 2018 – Slovakia’s Foreign and European Affairs State Secretary Lukáš Parízek will address the OSCE Permanent Council on 19 July 2018. In his address, Parízek will discuss the priorities of Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2019.

Slovakia will take over the OSCE Chairmanship from Italy on 1 January 2019.

Media are invited to cover the address by State Secretary Parízek on Thursday, 19 July, at 10:00 am at the Hofburg Congress Centre’s Neuer Saal (2nd floor). 

A short briefing for media representatives by State Secretary Parízek will take place after his address to the PC, at 12:45 in front of the Neuer Saal. 

Media wishing to attend the address and briefing are kindly requested to register by sending a message to press@osce.org by Wednesday, 18 July 2018 at 18:00.

For admittance to the Hofburg Congress Centre, please bring a valid press card to the security desk (main entrance from the Heldenplatz) and a document with a photo.

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Karen Gainer

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in co-operation with the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, organized a co-ordination meeting with municipal gender focal points on 11 July in Podgorica. The participants evaluated accomplishments and activities carried out by the municipalities in the last period and discussed and co-ordinated future activities.

Lia Magnaguagno, the Democratization Programme Manager of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, highlighted the importance of the network of municipal gender focal points as an informal mechanism for information sharing, mutual support and further empowerment of women at the local level.

“Through the co-operation between the Ministry, the OSCE Mission and the municipalities, practices for achieving equal opportunities policy at the local level have been improved. This has provided an incentive for further improvement of normative and institutional mechanisms,” said Biljana Pejović, Head of the Department for Gender Equality in the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights.

The OSCE Mission, in partnership with the Ministry, will continue supporting the work of the network through training, expertise and co-ordination.

UDINE, Italy, 16 July 2018 – Where states focus on efforts to integrate majority and minority communities on their own territories, societies become more resilient and national minorities are less likely to be at the centre of inter-State issues, said participants at the conclusion of today’s conference in Udine, Italy, marking the 10th anniversary of the OSCE High Commissioner’s Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations.

The conference brought together representatives of OSCE participating States, international organizations and experts to discuss important developments and emerging challenges related to state engagement with national minorities abroad. In particular, they highlighted the impact of benefits afforded to national minorities, as well as approaches and mechanisms for the resolution of disputes arising in this context.

“While ‘kin-States’ may have legitimate concerns about national minorities abroad, their policies should not jeopardize or complicate the sustainable integration of those minorities in their home state,” said the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier.

The Italian 2018 OSCE Chairmanship Co-ordinator, Vinicio Mati, recalled that the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations “continue to be a fundamental tool to ensure good neighbourly relations, with communities that transcend national borders and serve as bridges between countries, promoting dialogue between them.”

In his keynote speech, the former President of Slovenia, Danilo Türk, stated that “the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations require the responsible exercise of state sovereignty, both by the home states to all of its citizens, and by ‘kin-States’ to minorities abroad. The Recommendations elegantly encapsulate the responsible approaches needed to deal with these sensitive issues, including where possible through the establishment of bilateral commissions.”

Launched by the HCNM in Bolzano/Bozen, Italy, in 2008, the Recommendations serve as an important tool to address national minority issues of relevance across state borders. This is even more relevant today, noted the Conference participants, when geopolitics are impacting the OSCE agenda.

Acknowledging that state sovereignty and territorial integrity remain the fundamental principle of inter-State relations, the Recommendations outline a framework for states to work co-operatively to prevent disputes concerning the status of national minorities.

Related links:

https://www.osce.org/hcnm/383205

https://www.osce.org/hcnm/384960

https://www.osce.org/chairmanship/387695

https://www.osce.org/hcnm/bolzano-bozen-recommendations

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Dragana Nikolic-Solomon Iryna Korobko Daily updates from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Thematic Reports from the Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine -- The Facts

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) is aware of the reporting of the ARD programme «Fakt» on Tuesday, 17 July.  The Mission is concerned about any alleged breach of its security and is determined to examine all the allegations thoroughly in accordance with established procedures.

The SMM is the largest field operation within the OSCE, focused on monitoring and reporting on security situation in Ukraine. In particular, SMM’s monitors in Ukraine are gathering facts on the ground, reporting on ceasefire violations, facilitating dialogue and monitoring the violations of OSCE’s fundamental commitments and principles.

Our work has been and will continue to be transparent. We report the facts on the ground as we see them; those facts are reported to OSCE participating States and published in our daily reports on the OSCE website. Since the very beginning, SMM has taken relevant steps to implement appropriate data protection measures, as well as to stave off various cyber-attacks against the Mission.

Without proper verification, the OSCE SMM cannot comment or speculate on documents of unknown origin. However, the Mission is concerned that alleged breaches may carry a potential risk for its staff, compromising their privacy and security. The OSCE SMM will continue to implement its mandate by fostering peace, stability and security in Ukraine and contributing to the reduction in tensions.

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VIENNA, 16 July 2018 – The effectiveness of current drug control policies and strategic and innovative approaches to reducing the supply and demand of illicit drugs are the focus of the two-day OSCE-wide anti-drugs conference that opened in Vienna today.  The conference brings together some 130 representatives of OSCE participating States and OSCE Partners for Co-operation.

Organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, the event will see representatives of government authorities and experts from drugs-related agencies as well as international, regional and civil society organizations and the private sector develop practical proposals on how the OSCE can enhance its assistance to participating States and Partners for Co-operation in tackling the world drug problem.

“While focusing on both supply and demand reduction of illicit drugs, prevention remains the most important step in combating the world drug problem,” said Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE and Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council Alessandro Azzoni. “We should never forget the human dimension of the drug problem, namely, the men, women and children negatively affected in many ways by drug use and addiction. Devastating health and social consequences should be always at the forefront of our minds as a reminder that this is not just a theoretical debate.”

“It is not possible to win the fight against drugs on our own. International co-operation is the crucial pillar in the fight against illicit trafficking,” he said. “We need to give priority to the exchange of information and distribution of data related to new trends and development in the area of drug trafficking, specifically in those areas where we face more problems.”

During the conference, participants will discuss the benefits of complementary and mutually reinforcing programmes for reducing supply and demand of illicit drugs; explore the links between drug control policies, security and human development; discuss a way ahead, particularly for prevention efforts, such as early intervention and education initiatives; and consider existing gaps of the current international drug control system.

This event is taking place amid growing calls from experts who recommend that the international community should find – when possible – entry points for designing and implementing effective and long-term drug policy reforms, investing both in law enforcement and treatment measures.

“The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime works with partners to support them in tackling the world drug problem  through balanced, health-centered and human rights-based approaches in line with the international drug control conventions and other international commitments, including those of the UNGASS 2016 outcome document, the UNODC 2009 Political Declaration and Plan of Action, and the Sustainable Development Goals,” said Yury Fedotov, UNODC Executive Director. “The OSCE is an important regional partner for UNODC in promoting co-operative, co-ordinated and balanced action to address the world drug problem.”

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger said: “With its comprehensive toolbox and extensive expertise, the OSCE provides tailored anti-drug support to our participating States. We draw on our comparative advantages including our comprehensive approach to security, our specialized units and our network of 16 field operations. We focus on capacity-building and training, as well as legislative support. We reach out to law enforcement agencies and civil society, and put special emphasis on prevention.”

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388235 Participants in the first ECPR/ODIHR Summer School on Political Parties and Democracy. Warsaw, 12 July 2018. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The first Summer School on Political Parties and Democracy, organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR), took place in Warsaw from 9 to 15 July 2018.

The Summer School brought together MA and PhD researchers, practitioners and civil society leaders in the field of political parties and democratic governance from selected OSCE participating States. Throughout the week, 13 experts (seven women and six men) and 20 participants (14 women and six men) discussed a wide range of analytical perspectives on the study of political parties, party systems, elections, representative democracy and related areas, and the practical implications of these for democracy support efforts.

Marcin Walecki, Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department, stressed the vital importance of supporting the creation of a network of scholars and assistance providers working in the field of political parties and democracy.

“Improving mutual understanding between academics and practitioners working in the field of political party support is essential to reaching more effective outcomes and strengthening the quality of our democracies,” Walecki said. “By organizing the Summer School on Political Parties and Democracy, ODIHR helps establish platforms for collaboration between researchers and practitioners in the field. We look forward to continuing this work in the years to come.”

Topics discussed during the Summer School covered some of the core areas of ODIHR’s work, such as political party regulation, political corruption, elections and campaign financing, as well as the political participation of women, youth and persons with disabilities. 

“Participants have certainly benefited from the innovative approach and unique design of the ECPR/ODIHR Summer School,” said Karolina Leakovic, a participant and leader of the Social Democratic Women's Forum in Croatia. “Discussions stemming from diverse experiences, practitioners’ case studies as well as academic research proved to be timely and relevant. In present times democracies across the OSCE participating States need people committed to advancing democratic values, and so do political parties.”

The Summer School was organized in partnership with Cardinal Stefan Wyszynski University in Warsaw and the Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy at the University of Nottingham in the United Kingdom.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and the same number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; its access remained restricted in all three areas.* It was also restricted in areas of Donetsk region outside government control, including again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, and in Horlivka.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Novozvanivka. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 20 explosions). About 70 per cent of all the ceasefire violations occurred in areas south-east to west of Svitlodarsk. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 19 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and 115 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east and south. During the day on 14 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 3-5km south-south-east.

On the evening of 13 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 14 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west and seven projectiles from north-west to south-east, followed by a total of 106 projectiles (83 from south-east to north-west and 23 from north-west to south-east) and 20 undetermined explosions, all 2.5-5km east-north-east. On the night of 14-15 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion and seven projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east, followed by a total of three undetermined explosions and eight projectiles (seven from south-south-east to north-north-west and one from north-north-west to south-south-east), all 2-5km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 13-14 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from east to west and two projectiles from west to east, followed by a total of 22 projectiles (11 from east to west and 11 from west to east), all 1-5km south.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 13 and 14 July, the SMM recorded three ceasefire violations, including two explosions, more than the previous reporting period in which no ceasefire violations were recorded. Between the evenings of 14 and 15 July, the SMM recorded the same number of ceasefire violations as in the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early morning hours of 14 July, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 4-5km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On 15 July, the SMM saw the tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7), assessed as recent, in a field 2.5m east of a road about 100m north of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ forward position near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, inside the disengagement area.

In the early morning hours of 14 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a projectile in flight from east to west and an undetermined explosion, both 6-9km south-east and south, assessed as outside the disengagement area. On the night of 14-15 July, the same camera recorded two undetermined explosions and a burst from an undetermined weapon, all 0.5-6km east, south-east and south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 15 July, positioned in the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a black car with military licence plates and three men in military-style clothing inside, exiting the disengagement area.

On 14 July, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske for an hour, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 37 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 1-5km south-south-west and west, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 15 July, positioned in or near all the disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, on 13 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Novozvanivka (government-controlled, 70km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, the SMM saw three tanks (T-64) near Velyka Novosilka (74km west of Donetsk) on 14 July and  a tank (type undetermined) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) on 15 July.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.* In government-controlled areas, beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), nine mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) present. It noted that 23 MLRS (BM-21), eight towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variants) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Novozvanivka and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka, six IFVs (five BMP variant and one undetermined) near Zolote, two ACVs (type undetermined) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). Also on the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP variants) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and an IFV (BMP variant) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk). On 14 July, the SMM saw a stationary armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Zolote-2 (62km west of Luhansk), a stationary IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and a stationary IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 15 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina, an APC (BTR variant) near Zolote-2, and an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-CH) near Popasna.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 13 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a military-type truck (KamAZ-4310) with an antenna assessed as belonging to the TORN radio intelligence system parked next to a civilian property near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Novolaspa (50km south of Donetsk). On 14 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) near Slovianoserbsk (28km north-west of Luhansk) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk). On 15 July, the SMM saw a stationary IFV (BMP variant) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area in Dovhe.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire on 14 and 15 July. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

On 14 July, the SMM noted 50-60 unarmed Ukrainian Armed Forces members and two military trucks and two military cranes that were being used to repair a broken bridge south-west of Popasna on road T0504. (See SMM Daily Report 12 July 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report of 13 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 15 July, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing security reasons. The SMM saw several vehicles, with people in military-type clothing inside, pass through the checkpoint.
• On both 14 and 15 July, at a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage, citing orders from superiors not to let the SMM through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC[4] on both occasions.
• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC5 on both occasions.
• On 14 and 15 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• On two occasions on 15 July, armed members of the armed formations allowed the SMM passage through a checkpoint in Horlivka only after inspecting the SMM vehicle trunks.

Delay:

• On 14 July, Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region after the SMM patrol members refused to show their national passports. The SMM informed the JCCC and then was allowed to access the area 25 minutes later.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

An OSCE-organized national seminar on professional integrity and ethical standards in law enforcement took place on 12 and 13 July 2018 in Ashgabat. Officials from the national security, interior, justice and defence ministries, the Supreme Court, the State Service to Combat Economic Crimes, the State Migration Service and other law enforcement bodies of Turkmenistan participated in the event.

The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized the seminar to contribute to an enhanced understanding of professional integrity and current ethical standards for the conduct of law enforcement.

The two-day seminar was delivered by an international expert from Lithuania and OSCE experts from the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), the Secretariat’s Gender Section and the Mission in Serbia. The topics addressed included international standards and initiatives in combating and preventing corruption, codes of conduct for law enforcement structures and measures to identify fraud and corruption in law enforcement.

“The professional and moral potential of law enforcement staff is the capability of officials to combat criminality and corruption, to counter challenges in their routine work and the negative impact of factors weakening the sense of duty and responsibility, honour and professional dignity,” said Natalya Drozd, the Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

The participants looked at the forms and patterns of corruption and discussed in groups real cases related to corruption in law enforcement and conflict of interests in government structures. The experts stressed the importance of strengthening officers’ integrity and internal control in law enforcement.

“Promoting good governance and countering economic crimes, including corruption, are high on the OSCE agenda. The Organization has accumulated significant experience underpinned by effective legal instruments and mechanisms to prevent and counter corruption,” said Andrei Muntean, who heads the Economic Governance Unit of the OCEEA. “However, to eradicate corruption, governments should take efficient action to change the attitude of all society members to corruption so that they perceive corruption not only as a crime, but also as an immoral and unethical phenomenon,” he added.

The seminar also highlighted Serbia's experiences in applying both preventive and repressive measures to fight corruption and covered gender mainstreaming in law enforcement.

Communication and Media Relations Section

A five-day training course aimed at strengthening the capacity of government officials from Kyrgyzstan to counter terrorist financing was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)’s Global Programme against Money Laundering, from 10 to 15 July 2018.

The training course, held in Kyrgyzstan, was led by international experts together with four local government officials who were trained last year in Vienna in a train-the-trainers course organized by the OSCE and UNODC. It was conducted to assist Kyrgyzstan in countering terrorist financing in line with international standards, in particular UN Security Council Resolutions, the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF)’s standards and OSCE commitments.

The course helped the participants to understand how improving inter-agency co-operation can help to disrupt terrorist financing.  Based on localized scenarios, it included sessions on national, regional and transnational threats, sources of information, money flows, tackling financial intelligence and strategic analysis. The participants were familiarized with specific instruments and techniques that could significantly improve their effectiveness in countering the financing of terrorism.

The training course was delivered to Kyrgyz officials from the capital Bishkek and from the country’s Chui, Naryn, Batken, Issyk-Kul, Osh and Jalal-Abad regions as a follow-up to the training delivered in 2017 by the OSCE and the UNODC to Kyrgyz officials working in the headquarters of the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Ministry of the Interior, the General Prosecutor’s Office and the State Committee for National Security. It is part of a comprehensive multiannual capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

TBILISI, 16 July 2018 – Media professionals, government, civil society, renowned international experts and journalists will gather for the 15th OSCE South Caucasus Media Conference (SCMC) in Tbilisi to discuss quality journalism for trustworthy and credible information.

Six expert panels will address the following topics at the event: digital transformation of the media industry and its effects on the practice and quality of journalism; quality of information in the age of “fake news” and disinformation; regulation and self-regulation in the digital era; latest media freedom developments in the South Caucasus; countering hate speech and protecting freedom of expression.  

Journalists are invited to cover the 15th SCMC, a two-day conference organized by the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will open the conference, together with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Georgia, David Zalkaliani; the President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, George Tsereteli; and the Head of the OSCE Division at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of Italy, Antonino Maggiore, (on behalf of the OSCE Chairmanship), starting at 10:00 am on Wednesday, 18 July, at Radisson Blu Iveria Hotel (Rose Revolution Square, 1).

Journalists wishing to report on the conference are required to send an e-mail of confirmation to nicolas.ebnother@osce.org no later than Tuesday, 17 July, 17:00. The presentation of a valid ID is required for accreditation at the venue.

Please send all requests for interviews during the event to deniz.yazici@osce.org or call +43 664 859 0956.

A detailed agenda and biographies of speakers in English and Russian can be accessed here.

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BERLIN, 13 July 2018 – An OSCE Parliamentary Assembly seminar held this week in Berlin, Germany, focused on how to prevent ethnic conflicts through law and the exchange of best practice, notably through the protection of national minorities and accommodating ethnic diversity. The participants discussed in an informal setting the central role which parliamentarians could play in forming government policy towards national minorities and in promoting legislation that can protect the rights of national minorities. 

OSCE PA President George Tsereteli opened the seminar on Wednesday, noting that entrenched positions and nationalist rhetoric as well as unilateral actions which run contrary to the founding principles of the OSCE have threatened to undermine trust in the Organization’s ability to find common ground. 

“History has taught us that intolerance and discrimination, a failure to accommodate diversity and the politicization of minority issues are the first steps down a slippery slope towards tremendous human suffering,” Tsereteli said. “In reality, minorities should be seen as an asset for OSCE countries, where they can serve as a bridge in inter-state relations, in particular in border areas”.   

Bringing together more than 20 Members of Parliament from 12 countries, the Leinsweiler seminar included the participation of German parliamentarians representing areas where minorities live, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the President of the Federal Union of European Nationalities, as well as representatives from the Advisory Committee of the Council of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and a number of minority associations. 

Noting that there are few examples of truly homogenous states, President Tsereteli underlined the importance of accommodating ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, and cautioned participants not to become complacent and underestimate the potential for renewed conflict in the OSCE region. He also recalled the provisions of the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document which emphasizes that questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a democratic political framework based on the rule of law, with a functioning independent judiciary. 

President Tsereteli also commended the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, Ambassador Lamberto Zannier, for his effective work in the area of developing guidelines for states, such as the Bolzano/Bozen Recommendations on National Minorities in Inter-State Relations, which were adopted ten years ago. In her opening remarks, OSCE PA Treasurer and Head of the German Delegation Doris Barnett stressed the need for dialogue on potential ethnic conflicts and national minorities. This includes an exchange of good practices, an analysis of the effects on state structure and on conflicts on the existing security framework. “Minorities are a sensitive and often an emotional issue,” Barnett said. “Being able to live together in a meaningful way is the only way in which the potential of every human will fully express itself.” 

The seminar examined a number of cases of best practice in countries across the OSCE region, including Germany, Switzerland, the Åland islands in Finland, and South East Europe, with participation by OSCE parliamentarians from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Georgia, Hungary, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Romania, and Sweden. 

OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities Lamberto Zannier delivered the keynote speech on early intervention and protection of minority rights, especially in the area of education as a means of preventing ethnic conflicts, highlighting the importance of integration as a means of building resilient societies, and emphasising the key role which parliamentarians can play in influencing legislation. 

The seminar, entitled “Addressing potential ethnic conflicts through law and good practices” was the fourth of a series of OSCE PA seminars organized by the Delegation of Germany to the OSCE PA and supported by the German Foreign Ministry. The first three were held in the French-German border region of Leinsweiler, in March 2015, April 2016 and May 2017 and were dedicated to considering parliamentary contributions to OSCE efforts in addressing conflicts.

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​​KYIV, 14 July 2018 – Concluding a two-day visit to Kyiv, the OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues, Dr. Hedy Fry (MP, Canada) underlined the need for greater equality between women and men to fully exploit Ukraine’s reform agenda and conflict-resolution efforts.

“Armed conflicts have a tendency to reinforce traditional gender roles and the situation in Ukraine is no different,” Dr. Fry said. “But more equality is necessary to unlock Ukraine’s full potential and guarantee that all Ukrainians, no matter their gender, take part in rebuilding their country.

”Discussions centered on Kyiv’s efforts to promote the participation of women in public life and to combat domestic violence. They also revealed the extent to which the conflict in Ukraine had exacerbated human trafficking in the country, including trafficking of women for sexual and labour exploitation.

Dr. Fry met with a wide-range of government officials, including the Deputy Prime Minister for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration, Ms. Ivanna Klympush-Tsyntsadze, the Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, Ms. Tetyana Kovalchuk, the Deputy Minister of Social Policy, Ms. Natalia Fedorovych, and the Ombudsman of Ukraine, Ms. Liudmyla Denisova. She also met with representatives of the parliamentary caucus “Equal Rights”, the Office of the Government Commissioner for Gender Policy, and a wide range of non-governmental organizations.

“I was pleased to see that Ukrainian officials are committed to gender equality and are working with international partners and the OSCE to achieve this goal,” said Fry.

As part of her visit, Dr. Fry also met with the Head of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, Ambassador Ertugrul Apakan, and his Deputy Aleska Simkic, as well as staff from the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine.

Earlier this week in Berlin, the OSCE PA adopted a resolution on “Preventing and Combating Gender-Based Violence” which requests the OSCE to assist participating States in preventing sexual violence in armed conflict situations and encourages the OSCE and its Parliamentary Assembly to exchange best practices and training materials to combat gender-based violence.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Lozove and at an SMM long-range UAV near Sakhanka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it again observed military presence inside the Zolote disengagement area and saw a white signal flare fired near a checkpoint south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas.* It was also restricted in areas of Donetsk region outside government control near Lozove, Zaichenko and Bezimenne.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. An SMM long-range UAV recorded outgoing explosions and impacts close to a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sakhanka, while a position of the armed formations was only about 260m away. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Zaitseve, Novotoshkivske, Zhovte and Stanytsia Luhanska.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 300 explosions).

On the evening and night of 12-13 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard three undetermined explosions and 24 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 13 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 2-8km at directions ranging from south-south-east to west.

During the day on 13 July, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and four bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-4km south-east and south, as well as ten bursts of small-arms fire at undetermined distances east-south-east.

Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 300-400m north-west.

On the evening and night of 12-13 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, two projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east and a muzzle flash, followed by totals of an undetermined explosion, 44 projectiles (20 from north-north-west to south-south-east, 13 from east-north-east to west-south-west, eight from north-east to south-west, two from east to west and one from north-west to south-east), four muzzle flashes and five illumination flares (three in vertical flight and two from north-east to south-west), all 0.1-3km at directions ranging from south to south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.[2] In the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded ceasefire violations in the region, including about 15 explosions.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[3], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 12 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted a 20m-long trench (assessed as a firing position) emerging from a tree line on the southern side of the railway line (see SMM Daily Report of 9 June 2018). The same UAV also spotted fresh vehicle tracks and footpaths leading from the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) – where the SMM had previously observed infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) and a member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (see SMM Daily Report 14 June 2018) – to the aforementioned trench. 

During the day on 13 July, positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a green van with military licence plates and two people in military clothing on board; the van exited the disengagement area and headed north towards a government checkpoint north of the disengagement area. About three minutes later, the SMM saw the same vehicle with only one person in military clothing on board travelling back along the same route (entering the disengagement area and heading toward Katerynivka). Approximately two hours later, positioned at the same location on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka, the SMM saw a blue car with military licence plates with a man in military clothing and a woman on board exiting Katerynivka and heading north towards the government checkpoint north of the disengagement area.

Positioned on both ends of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a white signal flare fired by members of the armed formations near a checkpoint south of the bridge. They told the SMM that the flare had been launched to indicate readiness to disengage.

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 13 July, the SMM saw 12 stationary multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Poltavka (54km north-west of Donetsk). On 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) travelling south-west near Illinka (38km west of Donetsk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four stationary tanks (T-64) in Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 13 July, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) loaded on a tank transporter on road H-20 near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk) heading north.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a government-controlled area, beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM noted that four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) were missing for the first time. It also noted that four towed howitzers (D-30) and 20 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), an anti-aircraft gun[4] and military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), as well as two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and two APCs (BTR-70) near Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk). On 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three ACVs near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an ACV near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk), two ACVs near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), three ACVs near Talakivka (90km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) and an ACV near Pyshchevyk (84km south of Donetsk), as well as four IFVs (BMP-2) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk) and a fire control vehicle (1VXX variant) near Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six ACVs near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). On 13 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) and an APC (BTR-80) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk).

On the evening of 12 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a military position, assessed as an Ukrainian Armed Forces position, in a field about 1km north-west of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). About 260m north-east of the aforementioned position, the UAV spotted another position, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. At the Ukrainian Armed Forces position, the UAV recorded, in sequence: an explosion assessed as an outgoing round of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) fired in a north-easterly direction; an explosion assessed as an impact of automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) round fired from a north-easterly direction (from the position of the armed formations); an explosion assessed as an outgoing RPG round fired in a north-easterly direction; three explosions assessed as impacts of AGS-17 rounds fired from a north-easterly direction (from the armed formations position). Near the Ukrainian Armed Forces position, the UAV also spotted eight Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers along a treeline; three of them fired bursts of small-arms and machine-gun fire in a north-easterly direction. While the UAV was flying away from the location, it recorded a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier aiming a weapon and shooting in the direction of the UAV. (The SMM landed the UAV safely.)* The same UAV also spotted a burning house in Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), to a power line near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk) and to a water pipeline near Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable the exhumation of human remains near Pankivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report of 13 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On a street in a residential area of Molochny, 3km south of Lozove (nongovernment-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage further into the village. Thereafter, the SMM launched a mini-UAV flight over the area. While it was flying the UAV, it heard small-arms fire, assessed as directed at its UAV (see below).
• On two occasions, at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), and southward to Sakhanka. 
• At a checkpoint on road E58 north-west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM and denied it passage. The SMM noted cars passing through the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in governmentcontrolled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.

Conditional access:

• At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (nongovernment-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an unarmed member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after checking its trailer.

Other impediments:

• Positioned about 3km south of Lozove, the SMM heard ten bursts of smallarms fire in an area where it was flying a mini-UAV, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the mini-UAV and left the area (see above).
• While an SMM longrange UAV was flying over a position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Sakhanka, it spotted a soldier shooting at the SMM UAV (see above). The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• The SMM temporarily lost communication with its longrange UAV flying over an area close to Lebedynske (governmentcontrolled, 30km east of Mariupol), assessed as due to jamming.[6] The SMM landed the UAV safely.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[]5 The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Krasnohorivka and Zoria. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko and near Dovzhanske, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Muratove and Kreminna. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Zaitseve, Novotoshkivske, Raivka and Stanytsia Luhanska. The SMM monitored a court hearing in Kherson and a gathering in Kyiv.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 300 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, five projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, a projectile from north-north-west to south-south-east and a projectile from north-west to south-east, followed by totals of 51 projectiles (24 from east to west, nine from south-east to north-west, seven from south-south-east to north-north-west, seven from north-north-west to south-south-east, two in vertical flight, one from west to east and one from north-west to south-east), all 0.5-3km south.

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 38 undetermined explosions, a burst from north to south and a burst from south to north, followed by totals of ten undetermined explosions, a burst from south to north and six projectiles in flight (four from west-north-west to east-south-east and two from south to north), all 1-6km east.

On the evening and night of 11-12 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 38 undetermined explosions and about 480 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-5km south-south-east. On the following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-east.

During the day on 12 July, positioned 1.1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts 3-4km south-west and heard 29 undetermined explosions 2-8km south-south-west and south-west.

Positioned 1.6km south-east of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions and two shots of small-arms fire, all 1-6km south-east, south-west and west.

Positioned about 2km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw 62 explosions assessed as impacts of undetermined weapon rounds and heard 32 explosions (22 assessed as undetermined, eight as outgoing rounds and two as impacts of undetermined weapon rounds) and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 5-12km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north-west.

Positioned in the south-eastern outskirts of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from north-east to south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[2], including about 15 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no ceasefire violations).

During the day on 12 July, positioned in Kapitanove (government-controlled, 50km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 explosions assessed as mortar rounds 5-7km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. On 12 July, at a hospital in Kurakhove (government-controlled, 40km west of Donetsk), a 60-year-old man told the SMM that on 10 July he had gone to visit his house which was damaged at the beginning of the conflict and is located at 6 Chaikovskoho Street in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) and at around 09:30 he had been hit in the groin by a bullet while in front of the house. He added that after receiving first aid at the hospital in Krasnohorivka, he had been taken to the hospital in Kurakhove where he underwent an operation. Medical staff at the hospital in Kurakhove told the SMM that the man had been admitted around 12:30 on 10 July and that the wound had been caused by a bullet.

On 3 July, medical staff at a hospital in Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk) told the SMM that a 16-year old boy  had been admitted on 1 July with injuries consistent with an explosion of a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), and had been transferred to the Kharkiv regional children’s hospital on 2 July. On 4 July, at the Kharkiv regional children’s hospital, medical staff told the SMM that the boy had lost his left hand and right eye and had sustained shrapnel injuries to his brain. On 6 July, the boy’s mother (aged 50) told the SMM that on the evening of 1 July she had found her son lying on the floor of her apartment in Zoria (government-controlled, 40km north-west of Donetsk) and that on 5 July the boy had successfully undergone surgery at the Okhmatdyt National Children’s Specialized Hospital in Kyiv. On 10 July, a police officer in Kostiantynivka  told the SMM that the boy had been injured in Zoria on 1 July after a piece of UXO that he had found in a wooden area near the village exploded in his hands at his mother’s apartment in Zoria.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk) , as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned in Petrivske for about an hour, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions 5-8km north-west and a shot of small-arms fire 2km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum. In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk) and a multiple launch rocket system (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) moving west in Kreminna (97km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 11 July, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-2 and a BMP-1) near Nelipivka (40km north-east of Donetsk). On 12 July, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BRDM variant) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk). In a non-government-controlled area, on 12 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Debaltseve.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline near the non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), to a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), to a power line near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to a fibre optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), four cars (licence plates not visible) and ten pedestrians exiting Ukraine, and a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates), a covered cargo truck (with “LPR” plates), two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) and two pedestrians entering Ukraine. After 30 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM continued to monitor a gathering (see SMM Daily 12 July 2018). The Mission saw about 500 people (mostly men, 30-60 years old) in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street and about 700 cars (mostly with foreign licence plates)  blocking Hrushevskoho Street from Kriposnyi Lane to Shovkovychna Street, as well as yellow flags with “Auto Euro Power” written on them. It heard protestors calling for a draft law related to the registration of cars with foreign licence plates to be rejected. It saw about 50 police officers in front of the Parliament building as well as 15 police buses nearby. Around 16:00, the number of protestors increased to about 2,000 and the SMM saw about 250 police officers. The SMM saw protestors trying to block the exits of the Parliament. The protest ended around 20:00.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for Kyrylo Vyshynskyi, the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine arrested in Kyiv on 15 May (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018). At the Kherson city court, Vyshynskyi was charged under Article 263(1) of the Criminal Code (unlawful handling of weapons, ammunition or explosives), in addition to the previous charges under Article 111 (high treason). After hearing the arguments of the prosecution and the defence, the judge extended the existing detention order by 60 days. The SMM observed a calm situation around the court.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Three armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). (See SMM Daily Report 12 July 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An unarmed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] TPlease see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. he SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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BISHKEK, 12 July 2018 - The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) co-organized a seminar on Central Asia-Afghanistan policy partnership. The purpose of the event was an exchange of views on establishing policy partnerships at the expert-analytical level and deepening ties among researchers in the region.

The discussion took place at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic, and gathered 40 participants representing the OSCE, the UN, international development and government institutions and think-tanks from Central Asian countries and Afghanistan.

In his opening remarks, the Head of the Programme Office in Bishkek, Ambassador Pierre von Arx, noted: “The OSCE and UNAMA are making sure this initiative is anchored locally in the region and provides a neutral and open platform for discussions.”

Highlighting the importance of this gathering, the Director for Political Affairs at UNAMA, Scott Smith, said: “Afghans are increasingly interested in and capable of conducting analytical research on their country. We see a real necessity to build on the potential in the region in this field.”

The participants discussed the recent trend towards increased co-operation between the region’s countries and Afghanistan. They also explored common approaches towards security and research on development issues.

The Head of the Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the OSCE in Vienna, Ambassador Khojesta Fana Ebrahimkhel, said: “None of our countries can achieve prosperity on its own. Afghanistan fully acknowledges the importance of co-operation with its neighbours and is ready to nurture it further.”

Ensuring the full support of his country, Kyrgyz Deputy Foreign Minister Nurlan Abdrakhmanov said: “Kyrgyzstan has been providing assistance to Afghanistan for a long time and we have been offering to establish a permanent expert platform focusing on peaceful resolution of the conflict.”

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387800 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe completed its activities aimed at building community resilience against terrorist radicalization and violent extremism at grassroots level in the Sughd region on 12 July 2018.

The activities commenced on 2 July with training courses for local teachers on preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization leading to terrorism (P/CVERLT) among youth. Four one-day training courses involved 80 local teachers and educators on P/CVERLT issues in Konibodom, Spitamen, Jabbor Rasulov, and Zafarobod towns of the Sughd region. The courses were organized following a training course for teachers on preventing violent extremism in close co-operation with the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) in May 2018.

Similarly, the Office organized four one-day training courses for 120 grassroots citizens of the towns Isfara, Asht, Panjakent, and Istarafshan in the Sughd region. The courses were based on the OSCE handbook Preventing Terrorism and Countering Violent Extremism and Radicalisation Leading to Terrorism (VERLT): A Community Policing Approach, and aimed at improving the understanding of this complex issue among local communities. The activities also included receiving feedback from grassroots citizens on how to prevent and counter VERLT from their perspective.

“We are thankful to the OSCE for bringing these issues up, since the topic is very relevant and complex,” said Khalil Sharipov, a parent from Isfara. He also added that he and other parents are very much eager to disseminate the knowledge gained among their families and communities.

The community resilience activities are part of the OSCE Programme Office’s project on assisting the Government of Tajikistan in implementing its National Strategy and Action Plan on Preventing Violent Extremism and Terrorism by 2020.

VIENNA, 12 July 2018 - Co-operation between the OSCE’s participating States and role of public-private partnerships in enhancing cyber stability between States was the focus of today’s OSCE Permanent Council meeting in Vienna.

Opening the meeting, Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE and Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council, welcomed the contribution that the private sector can bring to ongoing discussions on measures to reduce the risk of conflict stemming from ICTs.

“When it comes to cybersecurity, public-private partnerships between governments and business are essential. In the current cyber domain, along with governmental actors, global tech companies are exploring interesting ways to contribute to boosting security, transparency and safety,” he said.

John Edward Frank, Vice President of EU Government Affairs at Microsoft, said: “The risk to our society is greatly increased by rising nation-state cyber offenses.Global technology companies have the first responsibility to respond to nation-state cyber actions against civilians, but it is a responsibility that must be shared across the entire technology sector, civil society and governments. Only collectively can we better protect and defend citizens.”

The contributions of the private sector to inter-state cyber stability have been recognized by the OSCE as essential since the private sector owns and operates most of the ICT infrastructure that would be targeted during cyber incidents that could lead to tensions between States.

Ambassador Azzoni also underlined the pioneering role of the OSCE in the area of cybersecurity and the organization’s contribution to reducing the risks stemming from the use of Information Communication Technologies (ICTs).

“The OSCE is the regional security organization with the most advanced toolbox to reduce potential risks of conflict stemming from the use of cyber capabilities,” said Ambassador Azzoni. “Italy, as 2018 Chair of the OSCE, is deeply committed to their implementation.”

Since 2013, OSCE participating States have adopted 16 confidence-building measures in the area of cyber/ICT security. They have established, among other things, official contact points and communication lines to prevent possible tensions resulting from cyber activities, and focused on further enhancing co-operation between States — including, for example, to effectively mitigate cyberattacks on critical infrastructure.

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