OSCE

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission heard small-arms fire 100m from its position near Kriakivka. Small-arms fire hit an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle which fell to the ground near Vesela Hora.* The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in Avdiivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area and explosions assessed as rounds of multiple launch rocket system near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Buhaivka, Novoamvrosiivske and Khlibodarivka. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, at a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske, as well as at two compounds near Pavlopil and Myrne.* It continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station to assess damage and facilitate repair works; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka. The SMM monitored gatherings in Chernivtsi, Dnipro and Odessa.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 580 explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 280 explosions).

On the evening of 20 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons and about ten shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 2-4km south-west. In the early hours of 21 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 230 undetermined explosions and about 310 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north. During the day, it heard 19 explosions assessed as outgoing rounds (four 2-4km south-west and the remainder 1-4km south-east), as well as 110 undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km west-north-west and north-west.

On the evening of 20 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 4-6km south-west. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 220 undetermined explosions 4-7km south and south-west.

On the evening of 20 May, positioned 2km north-west of Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled), the SMM heard 14 explosions (seven assessed as outgoing rounds and the reminder as impacts) and bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 4-8km north-west.

During the day on 21 May, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about ten shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km west and north-west. The same day, positioned at the railway station in Yasynuvata for about two hours, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 20 shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-5km south-south-west and west.

Positioned on the north-western edge of Vuhlehirsk (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions 8-12km west and north.

Positioned 2km south-east of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 14 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (38 explosions).

During the day on 21 May, positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire about 100m south. The SMM immediately left the area. (See SMM Spot Report 21 May 2018.)

On the morning of 21 May, positioned on the southern edge of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard about five shots of small-arms fire 0.8-1km north, assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying 1.2km north. Following the second shot, the Mission saw the UAV lose altitude and fall to the ground 1.2km north. The SMM immediately left the area.*

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by recent shelling in a residential area of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk). At 4 Vesniana Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in soft soil 6m south of a one-storey house, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an east-south-easterly direction. The owner of the house told the SMM that she had heard a loud sound at around 05:00 on the morning of 20 May and seen the abovementioned crater outside her house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded 73 tracer rounds in flight from west to east 1-2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion 400-500m west-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), six undetermined explosions 1-3km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area), 36 tracer rounds in flight from south to north 0.5-3km west (assessed as inside the disengagement area), four tracer rounds from west to east 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and two undetermined explosions 2-4km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 19 May, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near a treeline inside the Petrivske disengagement area about 2km east from its western edge and 1.2km south from its northern edge. (See SMM Daily Report 21 May 2018.)

On the evening of 20 May, the SMM camera near Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded three explosions assessed as rounds of multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (probable BM-21 Grad, 122mm) 3-5km south-east, six explosions assessed as impacts of MLRS (probable BM-21) rounds 0.5-2km east and an undetermined explosion 4-8km north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 20-21 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded five undetermined explosions 2-8km south-east, south-south-east and south (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 20 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three undetermined explosions 5-12km at directions ranging from east-south-east to south (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 21 May, positioned near all three disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) south-east of Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area the UAV spotted about 60 armoured combat vehicles and other hardware). The following day, the SMM saw four MLRS (BM-21) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

In a government-controlled area, the SMM saw four stationary MLRS (BM-21) in a compound near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 21 tanks (T-64), four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and seven mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Buhaivka (at the same location of the abovementioned weapons).

In a government-controlled area, the SMM saw five stationary towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) in a compound and an additional four stationary towed howitzers (2A36) in a training area near Khlibodarivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 122mm), and noted that two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were again missing. It also noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned with nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two an anti-tank guns (MT-12) missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 19 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Vodiane (15km north-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) near Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) and three IFVs (one BMP-1 and two BMP variants) as well as an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-3 Val) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and an ACV (BTR variant) in residential areas of Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk). On 20 May, the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Pervomaiske. On 21 May, the SMM saw an APC (MT-LB) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP variants) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-80) in Luhansk city, an APC (BTR variant) near Novosvitlivka (16km south-east of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 21 May, an electric company’s staff member told the SMM that power supply lines leading to the DFS along road M04 on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata were damaged. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above and ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 12 cars (licence plates not visible) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians entering Ukraine. After 15 minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for half an hour, the SMM saw nine pedestrians exiting Ukraine and two pedestrians entering Ukraine.

In Chernivtsi, the SMM monitored gatherings of activists of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) community. On 17 May, the SMM observed a flash mob at the central square in Chernivtsi city entitled “Campaign against homophobia”. The SMM saw seven people (six women and a man, all in their twenties) who identified themselves members of the Chernivtsi regional branch of a non-governmental organization (NGO). The SMM also saw four young people (two men and two women) nearby handing out stickers offensive of the LGBTI community. While present, the SMM noted negative comments made by people passing by. About 30 police officers were around the participants in the gathering and another 30 police officers were present in the area. On 19 May, the SMM monitored another event organized by the same NGO in support of LGBTI rights at a media centre at 2 Kobylianskoi Street. At the entrance to the centre, the Mission saw about 80 protesters (mostly men, aged around 25), some of whom were wearing balaclavas and camouflage clothes and holding flags with the message “Ukraine for family”. About 170 police and National Guard officers were present. Later, the SMM saw the participants of the event leaving the centre under police escort due to what they said was a bomb threat. It also saw minor scuffles between some protesters and the police and that a protestor sprayed police officers with a chemical irritant assessed as tear gas. The SMM did not observe further incidents.

In Dnipro, the SMM monitored a protest by representatives of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church. The SMM saw about 60 people (men and women aged 30-60) gathered at 2 Oleksandra Polia Street. Some of them said that they were protesting against the recognition of a different canonical, autocephalous Orthodox church in Ukraine. The SMM also saw another group of about 40 people (men and women aged 30-60) nearby chanting “Glory to Ukraine. Glory to heroes.” The SMM noted verbal exchanges between the two groups. About 30 police officers were present. Later, the first group started moving towards the regional state administration building while the second group lined up and were loudly expressing criticism of the first group. The gathering later dispersed without any incidents.

The SMM monitored a protest in Odessa. The SMM saw about 50 people (mostly men, aged 18-35) gathered in front of the office building of a private company on 16/8 Fontanska Street in Odessa, some of them wearing insignia of groups such as the State Initiative of Yarosh (DIYA), National Corps and the Council for Public Security. The SMM saw what seemed to be private security guards in front of the building and about 60 police officers in riot gear cordoning off the area in front of the building. Some of the participants were throwing plastic bottles of water and other objects towards the private security guards and shouting slogans critical of the owner of the company. The SMM saw that one of the vehicles of the company parked nearby had broken windows and later it saw some of the protestors smashing the windows of another vehicle belonging to the company. The SMM saw the police bringing a man out of the office building and putting him inside a police vehicle. Shortly thereafter, the gathering dispersed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv and Kyiv.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• Three members of the armed formations (two armed) denied the SMM access to parts of a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• At a checkpoint in Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint.
• At a compound near Pavlopil (government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the compound, stating that prior permission from his superior was required.
• At a compound on the northern edge of Myrne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Mariupol), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer denied the SMM access to the compound, citing orders from his superior.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

Other impediments:

• While flying its mini-UAV near Vesela Hora, the SMM heard shots of small-arms fire 0.8-1km north, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM saw the UAV fall to the ground and immediately left the area (see above).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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382300 Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day discussion-based tabletop exercise on how to respond to a simulated wildfire in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, in close partnership with the Global Fire Monitoring Center, was held on 17 and 18 May 2018 in the city of Gomel in Belarus near the border with Ukraine.

The exercise brought together the authorities from Belarus and Ukraine responsible for emergency, forest and fire management, and management of the territories affected by the Chernobyl Nuclear Plant accident as well as border guard and customs agencies.

Wildfires in the Chernobyl-affected areas are likely to become more frequent and intense as a result of climate change. Wildfires respect no borders and responding to them effectively requires joint action and transboundary co-operation.

“This joint exercise contributes to the implementation of management decisions, crisis management and the improvement of cross-border procedures in wildfire suppression in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone,” said Sergiy Dichkovsky, Head of the Gomel Oblast Department of the Emergency Situations Ministry of Belarus.

Sergiy Savinsky, Deputy Head of the Department of the Fire Rescue Organization of Ukraine’s State Service for Emergency Situations commended the initiative: “This exercise will strengthen co-operation between Belarus and Ukraine in jointly addressing wildfire management risks.”

Johan Goldammer, Head of the Global Fire Monitoring Center, underlined the importance of sharing experiences and best practices in wildfire management. “The Global Fire Monitoring Center and the Regional Eastern European Fire Monitoring Center are ready to offer their support for enhancing cross-border co-operation on wildfire management between Belarus and Ukraine,” he said.  

“This event is an example of how the OSCE commitments related to disaster risk reduction are translated into action” said Hanna Plotnykova, National Project Officer in Ukraine.    

The exercise was organized within the framework of the project Improving Radiological and Environmental Awareness in Territories Affected by the Chernobyl Accident in Belarus and Ukraine with a Focus on Wildfire Management, one of a set of projects the OSCE is conducting in co-operation with Belarus. It is funded by Austria, Germany and Liechtenstein.

 

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs. On 16 May, a delegation of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs visited the Mission area.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

On 16 May, a delegation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, accompanied by representatives of the regional authorities, visited the Gukovo and Donetsk BCPs and the BOM office in Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,569 to 10,996 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 516 to plus 203 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.7 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 53 at both BCPs compared to 54 last week; 25 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 28 into Ukraine. Approximately 85 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when four such families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and six into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 407 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 353 observed during the previous week), 218 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 189 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk-Kyiv; Kyiv; Luhansk – Kharkiv and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a significant increase in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 559 to 1,008 (327 at the Gukovo BCP and 681 at the Donetsk BCP); 585 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 423 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                          

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks almost doubled, from 46 to 90 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 108 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 59 trucks (55 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 49 trucks (45 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 112 to 189; 91 crossed into the Russian Federation and 98 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the train tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 46 occasions, compared to 40 last week; the OTs assessed that 25 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 21 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Georgia and Poland. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

During the reporting period, four ambulances were observed on two separate occasions.

On 16 May, at 10:42, the OT at the Gukovo BCP observed three ambulances with Russian Federation licence plates entering the BCP area from the Russian Federation. The vehicles, without undergoing border formalities, quickly reached the area behind the BCP facilities, which meant that the OT was unable to observe if any activities were carried out. At 11:16 all vehicles crossed back into the Russian Federation.

On 17 May, at 12:27, the OT at the Donetsk BCP noted an ambulance with Russian Federation licence plates entering the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked inside the BCP area and crossed back into the Russian Federation at 12:40.

On each occasion, the OTs observed only the driver inside the medical vehicles.

In addition, on 16 May, at 11:56, the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed a military helicopter flying at a distance of about 500m to the north-east from the BCP. The aircraft flew along the border at an altitude of approximately 100m within Russian Federation territory and left in an easterly direction.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 17 April to 22 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                    

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KYIV, 22 May 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group, Ambassador Martin Sajdik, issued today the following statement:

“The recent surge in combat activity along the line of contact in eastern Ukraine is causing more and more victims and destruction. It puts at risk essential local infrastructure, such as water supply, on which hundreds of thousands of people rely for their basic needs. I call strongly upon the sides to immediately stop the fighting, in line with their earlier public commitments, and do their utmost to protect the civilian population, allow for the repair and smooth operation of civilian infrastructure, and facilitate the crucial work of the Special Monitoring Mission.”

 

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Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The public presentation of the Report on the Activities of Kazakhstan’s Commissioner for Human Rights (Ombudsman) in 2017 took place with OSCE support on 22 May 2018 in Astana.

Some 80 parliamentarians, government officials, legal scholars, representatives of non-governmental organizations and media discussed the activities of the Ombudsman institution, which serves to protect the rights of different groups of the population, including children, people with disabilities, prisoners and other socially vulnerable groups.

The report contains a comprehensive summary of the main areas of activity of the Ombudsman in 2017, including statistics and analysis of complaints handled, recommendations to government bodies, as well as interaction with civil society, international organizations and foreign human rights institutions.

The translation and publication of the report into English, Kazakh and Russian was supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

The presentation was organized by the Ombudsman’s Office in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the Regional Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. It is part of the Programme Office’s long-standing activities to support national human rights institutions and promote human rights awareness in the host country.

 

 

382246 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Representatives of Turkmenistan’s State Committee for Television, Radio and Cinematography, lawmakers, journalists and officials from relevant ministries and research and educational institutions discussed broadcasting regulation and new models of broadcasting at an OSCE-supported seminar. The event took place in Ashgabat on 21 and 22 May 2018.

International experts presented different models of broadcasting, focusing on the respective advantages and challenges of public service, private and commercial television. Special attention was paid to best international practices and national experiences of the countries with transitional models.

“In January, the Mejlis of Turkmenistan passed the Law on Television and Radio Broadcasting. The adoption of this law is an important step towards enhancing the national media legislation and bringing it into compliance with international standards and the requirements of the modern media environment,” said Ambassador Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

She also noted that the seminar provided an opportunity to share best practices of transition to new models of broadcasting and facilitate discussions on efficient mechanisms of broadcasting regulation to promote the pluralism of broadcast media.

The seminar included interactive group discussions on possible models of broadcasting at the national and regional level and issues pertinent to the establishment of private broadcasting companies, including the development of the business model and identification of the audience and content. The participants exchanged views on private television and competition, highlighting the importance of the company’s organizational structure and strategy.

The seminar was organized as part of the OSCE Centre’s Project “Co-operation in the area of enhancing media legislation and promoting freedom of expression”.

381715 Kunduz Rysbek

A roundtable discussion on the implementation of Advance Passenger Information (API) in Kyrgyzstan, organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the Kyrgyz State Committee for National Security, was held on 15 and 16 May 2018, in Bishkek.

The event brought together representatives from Kyrgyz state agencies involved in passenger information processing, including national security authorities, civil aviation, border and customs control officials, and IT service providers. One important purpose of the meeting was to present and discuss the draft National Roadmap to implement an API system in Kyrgyzstan.  

An API system analyses biographic information about travellers before they arrive at international borders. Airlines collect API data and transmit it to the authorities in countries requiring API. The information is then analysed by the authorities in the destination country to pre-screen travellers before they arrive. This allows customs, border services, and other authorized agencies to react to incoming passengers who may be of interest. Legitimate travellers are subject to less stringent controls upon arrival as checks relating to their admissibility have already been completed using API.

At the event, the representatives of IT service providers presented their proposals for the most efficient implementation of an API system. Representatives from state authorities of the Netherlands and the United States Customs and Border Protection shared their experience and expertise in API system implementation in their respective countries. Overall, the roundtable discussion helped the Kyrgyz authorities to collect best practices and practical recommendations on an effective implementation of API.

As a signatory to United Nations Security Council Resolution 2178, the 2016 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on Enhancing the Use of Advance Passenger Information, and Amendment 26 to the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Chicago Convention, Kyrgyzstan is obligated to implement an API system. Kyrgyzstan has demonstrated its willingness to implement an API system and enhance its airport and border security checks to meet its international obligations, especially in preventing the movement of terrorists and terrorist groups.

Previously, during April-May 2018, a feasibility study assessing the national system of external migration management and legal framework related to API was conducted. Its key findings provided the basis of the draft National Roadmap. 

382240 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Preventing torture and the role of Poland’s national preventive mechanism was the focus of a roundtable event organized in Warsaw by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland on 22 May 2018.

Representatives from various ministries and state institutions, as well as experts from international and regional human rights bodies, national and international civil society organizations and academia, discussed European jurisprudence related to cases of torture in Poland. They also elaborated on states’ responsibilities under international treaties to prevent torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and to ensure the right to rehabilitation for survivors.

“The Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights of Poland has a clear mission: We aim for a state without torture, and we will not cease in our efforts until torture is eradicated in our country,” said Hanna Machinska, Deputy Commissioner for Human Rights in Poland. “The National Preventive Mechanism has achieved a lot in the past ten years, but there is still a lot to do and we will continue our dialogue with the authorities and civil society on the local and on the international level.”

Participants identified ongoing challenges in the fight against torture in Poland, including the lack of a clear definition of acts of torture in legislation and the limited resources of the national preventive mechanism.

“Empowering national preventative mechanisms in the OSCE region to strategically and effectively implement their mandate is one of our Office’s key priorities,” said Katarzyna Gardapkhadze, ODIHR First Deputy Director. “Independent monitoring of all places of detention, including by civil society monitors, has proven to be one of the most effective tools to prevent torture and other ill-treatment. Moreover, all states have an obligation to define and criminalize acts of torture within their legal systems, in line with international human rights obligations and OSCE commitments.”

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 11:57 on 21 May, an SMM patrol consisting of five SMM members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on the western edge of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). Four patrol members were inside the vehicles and one member was outside when the patrol members heard four shots of small-arms fire approximately 100m south. The patrol could not determine the direction of fire.

The patrol immediately left the area and returned safely to its base in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces at the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination about the incident and requested follow-up.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 18 and 19 May compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, it recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk regions compared with the previous 24 hours. The SMM observed damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Pikuzy and Kriakivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it heard an explosion inside the Zolote disengagement area 300-500m from SMM patrols. The SMM observed military hardware and positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area. The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line near Vidrodzhennia, Oleksandro-Kalynove, Kostiantynivka and Sofiivka. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in Dovzhanske near the border with the Russian Federation.* The Mission continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station to assess damage and facilitate repair works; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. Small arms were fired towards an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle near the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and a water pipeline near Obozne. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, including about 420 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 250 explosions). Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 280 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the night of 18-19 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from south to north 1-3km west. On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from south to north, an undetermined explosion and 16 projectiles in flight from south to north, all 1-4km west. During the day on 19 May, positioned at the DFS for about an hour and a half, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 2-3km south-west. During the day on 20 May, the SMM heard four bursts of small-arms fire 1-2km north-north-east.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 40 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 0.5-1km west, as well as 135 explosions (85 assessed as tank rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 100 shots and bursts (four assessed as infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm) fire and the remainder as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire), all 3-7km at directions ranging from west to north-west. During the day on 19 May, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 12 shots and bursts of IFV cannon and small-arms fire 1-5km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard about 225 explosions (46 assessed as tank rounds, 84 as artillery rounds, and the remainder undetermined) and about 230 bursts and shots of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), IFV (BMP-2) cannon, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

On the evening and night of 18-19 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 96 explosions (55 assessed as artillery rounds, three as rounds of a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG-7), three as rounds of a recoilless gun (SPG-9, 73mm) and the remainder undetermined) and about 570 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-15km at directions ranging from south-east to south-west. During the day on 19 May, the SMM heard 11 shots and bursts of small-arms fire 4-6km north-west. On the night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard two explosions (one assessed as outgoing, the other undetermined) and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km east and south-east. On the evening of 20 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 32 shots and bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and small-arms fire 2-5km south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations between the evenings of 18 and 19 May, including eight explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). Between the evenings of 19 and 20 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 38 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On 20 May, positioned 2km west of Orikhove-Donetske (government-controlled, 44km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven explosions (six assessed as artillery rounds, and one undetermined) and four bursts 4-7km south and north-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of damage to civilian properties in residential areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). In Pikuzy, at 34 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the west-facing outer brick wall of a residential house and assessed it as caused by an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) round fired from a westerly direction. The SMM observed that the round had not penetrated inside the house and had not caused damage other than the crater. The owner of the house (man, aged 30-40) told the SMM that gunfire had occurred at around 14:30 on 18 May, while he had been in his house.

In Kriakivka, at 73 Naberezhna Street, the SMM saw a hole surrounded by cracks (which the SMM assessed as recent) in the glass pane of a south-facing window of a residential house. The owner of the house (woman, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that around 22:00 on 18 May while she had been inside the house with her mother, she heard a whistling sound above her head followed by the sound of glass breaking.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and military positions inside and near the Petrivske disengagement area (for previous observations in this area, see SMM Daily Report 28 March 2018 and SMM Daily Report 3 May 2018). On 18 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a probable IFV inside the disengagement area 1.2km from its western and northern edges (previously observed on 10 March, see SMM Daily Report 14 March 2018), and 600m-long tracks some of which appeared to be leading to a military position in a tree line with an IFV (BMP-2). The same UAV spotted for the first time Ukrainian Armed Forces positions with firing positions and tracks leading to the west about 600m further north, all inside the disengagement area. The same UAV also spotted a recently dug 100m-long trench just north of a road between Bohdanivka (non-government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Viktorivka (non-government-controlled, 42km south-west of Donetsk) about 200m north of the disengagement area and a recent 30m-long extension of a 300m-long trench system 600m further north – none of which were visible in imagery from 1 February 2018 – as well as a nearby IFV (BMP-2).

On 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded three undetermined explosions 1km west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On 19 May, positioned in Petrivske for about 35 minutes, the SMM heard 36 bursts of small-arms fire 3-4km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the morning of 19 May, positioned in Bohdanivka for about 15 minutes, the SMM heard 120 undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east-north-east (assessed as outside the Petrivske disengagement area).

On the evening of 18 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five undetermined explosions 1-3km at directions ranging from east to south-west (it assessed two as outside the disengagement area and was unable to assess whether the other three were inside or outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 19-20 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a muzzle flash, a projectile in flight from north to south, and a muzzle flash, followed by totals of ten explosions (three outgoing and the remainder undetermined), four projectiles (three from north to south, and one from north-west to south-east) and 21 airbursts, all 3-8km at directions ranging from north-east to south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 20 May, positioned near Zolote close to a checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north of its position (assessed as inside the disengagement area on its southern edge). (See SMM Spot Report 20 May 2018.)

On 18 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and 15 bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-3km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the night of 19-20 May, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-4km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 18 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk). On 19 May the SMM saw a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) on a flatbed truck travelling north-west near Oleksandro-Kalynove (47km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S3) on a flatbed truck near Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) and six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Sofiivka (40km north-east of Donetsk)

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 16 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) on the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka. On 20 May the SMM observed 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Kremenivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 27km north-west of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 20 May the SMM saw a tank (type unknown) being towed on a flatbed trailer about 1.5km north-east of Malomykolaivka (36km south-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. On 20 May, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) and 12 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and noted as missing a surface-to-air missile system (9K35).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and a fire control vehicle (MT-LB 1VXX-variant) in a residential area of Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk). On 18 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) in Druzhba (76km west of Luhansk) and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and a probable APC (BTR-70) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk). On 19 May the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk). On 20 May, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five APCs (MT-LB) near Sofiivka, three IFVs (BMP-1) near Lohvynove (59km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-2) and an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk) on 16 May; and four APCs (BMP variant) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk) on 18 May. On 19 May the SMM observed an IFV (BMP-1) on the main street in Bohdanivka.

The SMM observed demining activities and mine hazard signs. About 10m south of the junction approximately 700m north-west of Bila Hora (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk), the SMM on 19 May observed for the first time a small wooden sign with “mines” written on it in Ukrainian language. On 20 May while on the M03 road, 2km west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw one explosion, around 1km south of its position which it assessed as a controlled explosion, part of demining activities. It observed two unarmed men in military-style clothing and a KAMAZ truck stationary 300-400m south-east of the explosion site.

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company representatives and others to the DFS to assess damage and facilitate repair works. On 19 May, the SMM observed cut power supply lines as well as damaged electrical transformers at the DFS. Voda Donbassa representatives informed the SMM that since the DFS has been shut down due to damage caused to the electrical infrastructure by shelling during the night of 17 May (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018), no water has been reaching Avdiivka and Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk) and water available to residents of Donetsk and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) has been reduced respectively by about 20 and 50 percent. On 20 May residents of Avdiivka told the SMM that water had not been available since 19 May. On 20 May, the SMM facilitated access of Voda Donbassa employees to repair the electrical infrastructure of the DFS. A Voda Donbassa representative informed the SMM that, as a result, electricity power had been restored at the DFS. On 19 and 20 May, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard explosions and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees. On 19 May, positioned in Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk) while the SMM was conducting a long-range UAV flight near the DFS, the SMM heard uncountable shots of small-arms fire 200-800m south-west of its position assessed as directed at the UAV; the SMM completed the UAV flight and landed it safely.

On 19 and 20 May, the SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the water pipeline near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk) and the power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). On 19-20 May, positioned in areas near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka, the SMM heard explosions as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 19 May, at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 26 trucks, two buses and 22 cars (including one with Georgian and one with Latvian licence plates, and one with "LPR" plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The SMM continued to monitor the situation of civilians living near the contact line. On 18 May, on road M03 between the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and a checkpoint in Horlivka, a group of about 50-80 women prevented the SMM from driving through by standing on the road. They told the SMM that they were worried about their security as they were blocked between the checkpoints due to the absence of a public bus that was supposed to come from Horlivka. About ten minutes later, the SMM was able to proceed. Positioned 1.1km south-east of the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and small-arms fire 1-2km north-east and south-east. (See SMM Daily Report 19 May 2018.)

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in the city centre. On 19 May, the SMM saw about 300 people (mixed gender and age), some of whom are known to the Mission as members of C14 (Sich) and Sokil, gathered at Independence Square. Some of them were wearing C14 insignia and Sokil T-shirts, as well as holding banners and posters with political messages. The SMM then saw them walking from the square to Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard and noted that the number of the participants had increased to 800. Later, participants walked to the office of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine at 16 Striletska Street; by then, the number of participants had decreased again to 300 participants. Five police officers were present; the gathering ended without incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

 

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example see SMM Daily Report 23 April 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denial of access:

• On 19 May, while present at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske, a member of the armed formations demanded that the SMM leave the area.

 

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]
• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.4
• On 19 and 20 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 21 May 2018 – Today the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed the dropping of defamation claims against the now-defunct Kyrgyz media outlet Zanoza.kg, and its journalists Dina Maslova and Naryn Ayyp, by the former president Almazbek Atambaev.

“I am pleased that this positive move may herald a new, constructive relationship between the media and authorities in Kyrgyzstan. Disproportionate fees in civil defamation cases have a chilling effect on media freedom and may bring about the closure of outlets and thus, endanger media pluralism,” Desir said.

An online news and current affairs outlet, Zanoza.kg, along with its editors and the two journalists, faced up to 5 million Soms (500,000 EUR) in damages, following a defamation suit launched by the general prosecutor on behalf of the president in March 2017. Although Kyrgyzstan decriminalised defamation, failure to pay damages may lead to a criminal prosecution. Following an unrelated legal claim by the former owner related to a trademark dispute, Zanoza.kg ceased to exist in August 2017 and was relaunched as Kaktus Media.

“I appreciate the role civil society played in settling the dispute, in particular, those of the legal clinic, Adilet, the Media Policy Institute and Internews Kyrgyzstan,” added Desir.

The Representative raised the case of damages payable by Zanoza.kg in a public statement in April 2018 (https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/379015).

 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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381982 OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan

The first in a series of training courses on anti-trafficking for investigators and operative agents of Uzbekistan police forces was held in Urgench from the 14 to 18 of May 2018.

The course, organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, brought together 25 participants from Khorezm, Bukhara and Navoiy regions, and the autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan.

The training’s objective was to increase knowledge and develop police skills and attitudes to identify victims of human trafficking and labour exploitation and refer them to the appropriate assistance.  

“Since trafficking is a common challenge transcending national boundaries, I hope that this course will help to promote effective government and civil society partnership,” said Juergen Becker, Senior OSCE Project Officer. “Uzbekistan can only benefit from the sharing of expertise from international law enforcement practitioners. The United Kingdom experts delivering the course have a vast amount of expertise in investigating human trafficking, international organized crime and terrorism.  It is a valuable resource to have the participation of police professionals who have the common goal of adequately protecting and strengthening respect for the human rights of trafficked persons and sharing good practices in combating human trafficking.”  

The course participants were familiarized with the PEACE (Preparation and Planning) interview model, designed to stem the proliferation of false confessions that can result from an accusatory style of interviewing. The model promotes a more psychological approach towards conversation management, based on reciprocity between the interviewer and the witness. It is equally applicable to interviewing a suspect and designed to give structure to get to the facts.

Particular attention was given to the new forms and methods of recruitment of potential victims of human trafficking through new technologies. This year`s training took an innovative approach by exploring the link between human trafficking and terrorism.

The course, developed by the Specialist Policing Consultancy was unique in comparing elements of human trafficking to the methods of modern terrorist groups. The training clearly showed that some terrorist groups use the same strategies of recruiting, transporting, coercing and exploiting men, women, boys and girls into committing terrorist acts. It was also explored if investigators could use human trafficking laws to combat or disrupt terrorist activities.

Bernie Gravett, the Director of the Specialist Policing Consultancy, said: “I cannot stress the importance of sharing knowledge and experience between law enforcement officers in the UK and in Uzbekistan. During my time as a police officer investigating international organized crime, the biggest challenge was working together across international borders and legal systems. The growth of human trafficking and the challenges in combatting modern terrorist groups requires us to share experiences, build partnerships and gain an understanding of individual working methods, with the aim of combatting crime and protecting all our citizens.”                                                                                                               

Ulugbek Gaynazarov, Head of Department at the Ministry of Internal Affairs, stated that trafficking in human beings, along with crimes such as drug trafficking or terrorism, has become a global phenomenon and requires urgent action. “The organization of such a training course will not only facilitate the exchange of practical experience, but will also allow police investigators to gain new knowledge and skills. He also stressed that the acquired experience will be very valuable for the further development of international co-operation.”

The training is part of a longstanding commitment of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan to assist the country in combating trafficking in human beings. 

This report is for the media and the general public.

At 11:04 on 20 May, two SMM patrols consisting of ten members and four armoured vehicles positioned themselves about 20m south of a checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) on its southern edge. All patrol members were outside the vehicles, five of whom were speaking with two unarmed members of the armed formations, and saw an additional five to eight members of the armed formations (one armed with an assault rifle (AK-type), the remainder unarmed) walking around the checkpoint inside the disengagement area. At 11:06, the patrol members heard an undetermined explosion 300-500m north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). (The SMM had previously observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) about 10m north-west of the abovementioned checkpoint inside the disengagement area. See SMM Daily Report 3 May 2018.)

Both patrols immediately left the area and returned safely to their bases in Sievierodonetsk (government-controlled, 74km north-west of Luhansk) and Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), respectively. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas in Luhansk city, Sakhanka and Svitlodarsk. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near all three disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including in Shevchenko.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Vidrodzhennia and Klynove. The Mission facilitated access to assess damage to the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to a water pipeline in Obozne. In Kyiv and Kharkiv, the Mission monitored gatherings marking the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars. 

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 250 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period(about 900 explosions). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the area west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

On the evening and night of 17-18 May, while in Horlivka, the SMM heard about 140 undetermined explosions (including about 40 assessed as artillery fire and about 60 assessed as tank fire) as well as bursts and shots of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-7km at westerly directions. The following afternoon, while in the same location, the SMM heard about 30 explosions (including one assessed as artillery fire and three assessed as tank fire), all 3-5km south-west.

On the evening and night of 17-18 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east and about 20 undetermined explosions 5-10km south-west and south-south-west, as well as about 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-5km south-east. The following day, the SMM recorded two undetermined explosions 8-10km south-west and four undetermined explosions 4-7km south-east and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 80), compared with the previous reporting period(15 explosions).

The SMM saw fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Luhansk city, Svitlodarsk and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). The SMM saw a 10-15cm wide-hole in the ceiling of a two-storey shed 10m west of a house at 26 Vyshneva Street in Luhansk city, and another 40-50cm hole in the shed’s west-facing wall at ground level. The SMM assessed that the shed had been struck by a projectile fired from an easterly direction.                                                                                      

On the grounds of School No. 11 at66a Molodizhnyi Boulevard in Svitlodarsk, the SMM observed a 55cm-deep crater 15m west of the school building and fresh shrapnel scarring to a tree 9m north-west of the crater. 

In Sakhanka, the SMM assessed seven fresh impact sites. At 14 Konstytutsii Street, the SMM observed two fresh craters: one in a garden 15m south of a single-family house and the other 15m south-east of the house. About 10m north of the second crater, the SMM observed shrapnel fragments embedded in the wooden wall of a nearby shed. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round. About 10m west of a house at 18 Konstytutsii Street, the SMM saw a bent metal fence post and several holes through the fence’s chain-links. The SMM assessed the holes to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. About 5m west of the house, in a garden, the SMM saw another fresh crater and two shattered west-facing windows. The SMM assessed the crater to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round. North of the house, the SMM saw two more fresh impact sites – one on a road and the other on a piece of farming equipment – the first of which it assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from an undetermined direction, the second from a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-westerly direction. Lastly, the SMM saw that the lower half of the north-west-facing corner of a house at 20 Konstytutsii Street had been destroyed, with fragments of brick and masonry scattered about; the lower half of a nearby doorframe was also destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. Seven residents of the village told the SMM that shelling had occurred between 09:30 and 11:00 on 17 May and had caused only property damage. 

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.* 

In the early morning of 9 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded three projectiles in flight from east to west, 5-10km south and assessed as outside the disengagement area.

In the early morning of 18 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded a burst of heavy machine-gun fire fired in a southerly direction 4.5-8km south-south-west and 14 explosions assessed as impacts (including 12 assessed as impacts of artillery rounds) 4-7km south-south-east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 18 May, positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions of mortar rounds and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2km south-south-east, as well as one undetermined mortar round explosion 7-10km south, all assessed as outside the disengagement area. The same day, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted eight self-propelled howitzers (three 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm, and five 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near Vidrodzhennia (66km north-east of Donetsk) on 17 May. On 18 May, the SMM saw an anti-tank guided missile system (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites on 18 May, the SMM observed nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, government-controlled, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk) and a possible armoured personnel carrier near Vidrodzhennia on 17 May. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Prychepylivka as well as an IFV (BMP-1) and two probable IFVs near Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk). On 18 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) in Novobakhmutivka (28km north-west of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) being transported on a flatbed near Svitlodarsk and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe unexploded ordnance (UXO). On 18 May, the SMM saw an 82mm mortar round protruding from the pavement approximately 300m south-east of an armed formation checkpoint on road T-0513 at the northern edge of Horlivka.                                                                                                                                      

The SMM facilitated the access of Voda Donbassa water company representatives and others to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) to assess damage. On 18 May, representatives of Voda Donbassa told the SMM that the DFS had been shut down due to damage to its electrical infrastructure from shelling during the night of 17 April (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018); the SMM facilitated access for workers of the local electrical company to assess the damage to the DFS’ power station. According to the representatives, there were no Voda Donbassa workers at the station besides a security guard. The representatives also told the SMM that shutting down the station has left Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) without water and led to cuts in available drinking water in Donetsk and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees. 

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). 

At Sofiivska Square in Kyiv, the SMM saw around 500 people – some of whom were holding Crimean Tatar flags with black ribbons and Ukrainian national flags – commemorating the 1944 deportation of the Crimean Tatars. The SMM saw around 100 National Guard members around the square; those entering the event were required to pass through a metal detector. The SMM saw the Ukrainian President address the crowd, saying that there is a need to amend the Ukrainian Constitution to ensure the rights of Crimean Tatars. The event ended without incident. SMM observed 30 people gathered in front of the Regional State Administration building at 64 Sumska Street in Kharkiv listening to speeches about the 1944 deportation of Crimean Tatars and the current situation in Crimea in commemoration of the same event. The SMM did not observe police present.

On 18 May in Odessa, SMM observed that red paint had been applied over the inscription on a monument at Kulykove Pole (“To the fighters who died for the power of the Soviets in Odessa. From the labourers of Odessa. 1960.”) and the words “Occupiers” and “Invaders” in Ukrainian had been written on the monument. 

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance, and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a compound near Shevchenko (government-controlled, 19km north-west of Mariupol), a soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM it could not enter without special permission from his unit commander.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO: 

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC. [3]

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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KYIV, 18 May 2018 – The deteriorating security situation in the wider area around the Donetsk Filtration Station poses a threat to the facility, its workers and monitoring officers of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), said the SMM’s Chief Monitor Ertugrul Apakan today.

In a letter he addressed to the signatories of the Minsk agreements on 15 May, he had noted how he was following the developments with great concern. He said that despite the sides having provided explicit security guarantees – essentially promises not to fire in the wider area around the Donetsk Filtration Station – there has been continuous violence. He warned that the use of multiple launch rocket systems, recorded by the SMM on Tuesday evening, marked a sharp escalation.

The Chief Monitor said that without full adherence to the ceasefire, the SMM will need to reconfigure its operations at the Donetsk Filtration Station. 

The Mission has been facilitating access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees for several weeks to keep the station operational. More than 300,000 people on both sides of the contact line depend on the Donetsk Filtration Station for drinking water. 

“These ceasefire violations must stop immediately,” said Apakan. 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period; it recorded explosions assessed as impacts of multiple launch rocket system rounds near the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS). The Mission heard an explosion less than 300m from its forward patrol base in Svitlodarsk. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Mykolaivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas and it was also restricted at a checkpoint near Debaltseve, as well as near Izvaryne and Sievernyi at the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in Luhansk city. The Mission continued to facilitate access to the Donetsk Filtration Station for Voda Donbassa water company employees to keep the station operational and heard ceasefire violations in the area despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and to a water pipeline in Obozne. In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering near the venue of a pre-announced public discussion organized by a non-governmental organization. In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for the editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine. In Lviv, the Mission observed three gatherings in front of the Regional Council building.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including more explosions (about 900), compared with the previous reporting period (about 460 explosions). Most of the ceasefire violations were recorded in the area between Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk).

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, while in Svitlodarsk the SMM heard about 50 explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 3-6km east, south-east and west; 370 undetermined explosions (mostly assessed as artillery rounds) and about 860 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-10km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-west; and about 60 undetermined explosions 3-6km at directions ranging from north-north-west to north-east.

On the morning of 17 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an airburst of a probable artillery or mortar round about 200-300m from its forward patrol base on the south-eastern edge of the town. SMM staff members immediately took cover in the base’s shelter. The SMM informed representatives of the Ukrainian Armed Forces as well as members of the armed formations of the incident and urged cessation of further fire.

On the evening of 16 May, while in Debaltseve, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 5-8km north-north-west and about 240 undetermined explosions 5-10km north-north-west.

On the evening of 16 May, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, over a two-minute period, 21 muzzle flashes assessed as a salvo of outgoing multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rounds as well as their subsequent projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west 5-10km north-west. During the same period of time, the SMM in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) recorded 26 projectiles in flight from south to north assessed as rounds of MLRS (BM-21), all 3-3.5km south-east. Immediately thereafter, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 25 explosions assessed as impacts of rounds of MLRS (BM-21), followed by two projectiles in flight from south-east and north-west, all 2-4km west-south-west. (The SMM assessed that the three cameras above recorded the same instance.)

During the day on 17 May, positioned on the western edge of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and about 260 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-west, west-south-west and west. 

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions and about 60 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-10km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west. During the day on 17 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard about ten undetermined explosions and about 20 shots and bursts of automatic-grenade-launcher, heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km at directions ranging from south to west.

On the evening of 16 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 18 projectiles in flight from west to east, followed by eight projectiles from east to west, all 1-3km south.

The following morning, while in Mariupol city centre (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions at undetermined distances and directions.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions).

During the day on 17 May, positioned in Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 5-7km south.

Positioned in Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 200 shots of small-arms fire 1-1.5km east-south-east, assessed as probable live-fire training inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group as of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone.

Positioned in Malomykolaivka (non-government controlled, 36km south-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions 10-20km north-north-west.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk). On 17 May, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the yard of a one-storey house at 17 Shyiana Street, assessed as caused by a round of an anti-tank guided missile fired from a northerly direction. The Mission also saw that four windows on the south- and west-facing sides of the house were broken (assessed as caused by the wave of an explosion), that the east-facing part of the concrete base of a wooden fence, 50m west of the house, was cracked, and that one of the slats of the fence of an adjacent house was cleaved in half. The owner of the house told the SMM that she had heard an explosion at around 12:30 on 16 May.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 16-17 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded six projectiles in vertical flight, followed by an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-4km south-east and south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). The same camera subsequently recorded, in sequence, 11 undetermined explosions, five projectiles in flight and a burst from north to south, three projectiles from north-west to south-east, a projectile in flight from north to south and 15 tracer rounds in flight, a projectile and a burst from north-north-west to south-south-east, as well as two undetermined explosions, all 1-7km at directions ranging from east-north-east to south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

In the early morning of 17 May, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). During the day, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a shot fired 1-1.2km north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 17 May, positioned near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 16 May, the SMM saw two tanks (T-64) loaded on transporter trailers heading south-west on road T1301 in Luhansk city.

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 16 May, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted 21 tanks (T-64), seven mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); 11 tanks (T-72) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 24 tanks (T-64) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). Aerial imagery revealed the presence on 15 May of 33 tanks (type undetermined), 12 towed howitzers (or mortars) and two surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report of 15 March 2018).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government‑controlled areas, the SMM observed five towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four anti-tank guns (MT-12) for the first time and noted that 46 towed howitzers (38 2A65 and eight 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and 45 anti-tank guns (42 MT-12 and three D-48, 85mm) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region and noted that two MLRS (BM-21) were again missing. At the same site, it also observed an additional weapon.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[2] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 16 May, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80), an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) and four infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1 and two BMP variant) near Popasna, and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Serednoteple (28km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk) and three IFVs (BMP-2) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 17 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to observe anti-tank mines. On 16 May, an SMM mini-UAV spotted at least 25 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a field on the southern edge of Avdiivka (see SMM Daily Report of 17 May 2018). 

The SMM continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS to keep the station operational. On 17 May, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repair works to high-voltage power lines near Almazna and the water pipeline in Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk). Positioned near Almazna, the SMM heard small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM visited two border areas outside of government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 52 cars (21 with Ukrainian, 17 with Russian Federation and two with Georgian licence plates, and 12 with “LPR” plates), a bus with Ukrainian licence plates and five covered cargo trucks (two with Russian Federation and two with Belarussian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates) in a queue to exit Ukraine.  A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (seven with Ukrainian licence plates and four with “LPR” plates) stationary in a nearby parking lot. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering near the venue of a pre-announced public discussion organized by a non-governmental organization (NGO), following an incident on 10 May when the same discussion was prevented from taking place by a group of people. (See SMM Daily Report 12 May 2018.) On the evening of 16 May, the SMM saw a group of at least 65 people (all men, aged 18-30), including at least three wearing C14 (Sich) insignia, in front of the Peremoha Space meeting centre at 62 Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard, where the public discussion was taking place. It noted that some of them were also present at the incident site on 10 May. The SMM heard the group of people expressing their opposition to homosexuality and chanting “Glory to Ukraine, Glory to the nation”. About 85 police officers, including 40 in riot gear, were present both inside and outside the centre. After the public discussion, some of the participants and a representative of the NGO told the SMM that most of the participants had left through the back door of the centre under police escort. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

In Kherson, the SMM monitored a court hearing for Kyrylo Vyshynskyi, the recently arrested editor-in-chief of RIA Novosti Ukraine. (See SMM Daily Report 16 May 2018.) At Kherson City Court (6/29 Maiakovskoho Street), the public prosecutor accused Vyshynskyi of assisting a foreign state in its activities against Ukraine, as per Article 111 of the Criminal Code (high treason) in relation to materials published online by RIA Novosti Ukraine. After hearing the arguments of prosecution and defence, the judge remanded Vyshynskyi to custody for 60 days without bail. (In Kyiv, the SMM saw that the office of the RIA Novosti Ukraine (16 Shota Rustaveli Street) was closed; it also attempted to contact its employees without success.)

In Lviv, the SMM monitored three public gatherings in front of the Regional Council building at 16 Vynnychenka Street. The first gathering comprised around 30 people (mostly women, aged 45-60) whom the SMM heard expressing discontent with what they said were plans of closing a hospital in Lviv. The second one comprised around 50 members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (mostly men, aged 40-60) whom the SMM heard expressing support for coalminers from the Lviv region. The third gathering comprised around 200 people who said they were veterans (all men, aged 50-70), some of whom were carrying the Ukrainian national flags. The SMM saw about 35 law enforcement officers present nearby. Throughout the gatherings, it observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint near Debaltseve, armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint.
• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that it could not be present in the “service zone”.
• At the border crossing point near Sievernyi, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, saying that it could not be present in the “service zone”.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Karen Gainer

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Police Academy of Montenegro held a three-day seminar on the management of contemporary security systems, police leadership qualities, from 14 to 16 May 2018 in Podgorica.

The Contemporary Security Management course is designed to provide relevant training on modern-day practices to run a security department efficiently and effectively. It addresses vital themes such as leadership in management, employee relations, risk management, terrorism, information security, access control, investigations, substance abuse, workplace violence, and emergency management.

The seminar was delivered by experts from the Centre for Strategic Prognosis (CSP) in Belgrade. The curriculum was developed co-operatively with experts from the Police Academy and tailored to address the results of a training needs assessment of the Montenegrin Security Sector Agencies.

Eleven senior officials of the Internal Affairs Ministry and the Police Directorate, Foreign Affairs Ministry, Defence Ministry, the Institute for Execution of Criminal Sanctions, the Maritime Safety Administration, Customs Administration and National Security Agency were introduced to the management of the systems in light of the changing geopolitics and balance of global powers in the world today.

Professor Violeta Rašković Talović, Dean of the Faculty for Diplomacy and Security and Director of the CSP, talked about globalization and challenges posed by the emerging “Fourth world”. Contemporary security problems of small countries, changing alliances and rivalries of great powers within the Balkan and EU discussed were also discussed.

Security topics such as High-Tech crime and private intelligence were elaborated by Ivan Petrović, professor at the Faculty for Diplomacy and Security Migrations.   

The fundamental session of the seminar was the discussion on psychological aspects of leadership as elaborated by the psychologist Slobodan Spasić. His presentation encompassed communication techniques, social engineering, and the psychology of manipulation and principles of sanctioning.

Participants emphasized the significance of security system management and the importance of maintaining it on the agenda of the Montenegrin Police Academy and security sector institutions in the forthcoming period.  

Sharing experiences in the field of in-service training and the training of legal professionals was the focus of an international conference organized by the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan in co-operation with the Lawyer’s Training Centre of the Ministry of Justice on 17 and 18 May in Tashkent and Samarkand.

Around 50 national and international experts from the judicial, law-enforcement and educational sectors participated in the first day of the event in Tashkent. The second day of the conference, held in Samarkand, brought together over 150 legal professionals from the Samarkand region for further presentations by international experts.                  

Over the course of two days, participants were familiarized with the experiences of different countries across the OSCE region in improving the skills of legal professionals. They engaged in in-depth discussions on how to achieve the highest level of professionalism in the legal sector. Specific topics in this regard were the use of modern technologies and other innovations when training legal professionals and the development of feedback mechanisms, models for which were presented by experts from Belgium, Turkey, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan and Germany.

In his opening speech in Samarkand, Juergen Becker, Senior Project Officer at the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan, stated: “The importance of training legal professionals cannot be overstated. An effective judiciary system benefits a society in all its aspects. It establishes trust of a society in the state and is a very important factor in the social, economic and political stability of a country.”

The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan has been supporting the Lawyer’s Training Centre in Uzbekistan since 2009. This partnership intensified after the introduction of President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s reform agenda and the signing of the decree “On the Strategy of Actions to Further Develop Uzbekistan in Five Priority Areas in 2017-2021”. The strategy specifically highlights the need to further strengthen legality in the judicial and legal system.“The on-going reforms require the establishment of a quality-based new system to train legal professionals, in particular in the most required and specialized fields, the introduction of innovative forms of training in the field of jurisprudence as well as providing opportunities for internships at leading foreign institutions,” noted the Director of the Lawyer’s Training Centre, Mirzatillo Tillabaev.

The conference was conducted within the framework of the Project Co-ordinator’s project Support to the Lawyer’s Training Centre under the Ministry of Justice of the Republic of Uzbekistan – Phase IV.

Karen Gainer

Conflict management for the parliamentary services of Montenegro in focus of a training workshop organized by the OSCE Mission to Montenegro was held on 17 and 18 May in Podgorica.

Twelve participants from the parliamentary services who already underwent a series of specially designed workshops attended the training course. Last year, they completed the first segment of the programme, which focused on business culture, communication and presentation skills.

Within this module, special attention was paid to new practices and approaches in conflict management, hierarchy in public administration, and analysis of typical sources of conflict in public administration, new directions and approaches, conflict management styles, as well as strategies for solving conflicts.

The goal of the programme is to support the development of the parliamentary services in their role as embodiment of the institutional memory of the parliament, leading to the steady advancement of its professionalism and efficiency.

The next training, on change management, will be held on 31 May and 1 June in Podgorica.

 

381964 Communication and Media Relations Section

A three-day workshop on anti-corruption draft legislation review for 30 representatives of government institutions, law enforcement agencies, civil society and the business community of Kyrgyzstan concluded on 18 May 2018 in Bishkek.

Aimed at strengthening the capacities of relevant anti-corruption stakeholders in identifying potential corruption risks in the legislative drafting process, the workshop was organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek.

The workshop provided participants with theories and practical tools on sound legal drafting and transparent analysis of draft legislation. Participants also learned how to identify corruption risk factors and to produce final review reports. 

“This workshop is a joint practical anti-corruption activity, which gives representatives of the public sector, business community and civil society of Kyrgyzstan an opportunity to co-operate more closely in anti-corruption matters,” said Kurban Babayev, Associate Anti-Corruption Officer at OCEEA.

Eni Gjergji, Acting Regional Development Officer at the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek said that corruption remains one of the most pressing challenges of our time. “Promotion of good governance and the fight against corruption are high on the agenda of the OSCE and our Programme Office in Bishkek.”

The workshop is part of an OSCE-led regional extra-budgetary project on fostering a participatory approach to preventing corruption in Central Asia. The project is designed to assist governments, as well as civil society and business sector, in developing and implementing national corruption prevention policies. It is funded by Austria, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Serbia and Liechtenstein.