OSCE

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

The OSCE Programme Office in Astana supported the international roundtable "Exchanging experiences and best practices in combating human trafficking and illegal migration" held in Shymkent, Kazakhstan on 31 May 2018.

Some 40 officials from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan representing governmental departments on combating organized crime, border control, migration control and finance will discuss and exchange best practices in combating human trafficking as well as ways to promote co-operation. Border officials from Belarus and UK will present the best practices of their countries on ways of counteracting organized crime on human trafficking in their respective countries.  

The event aims to increase the effectiveness of co-operation among law enforcement agencies from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in the field of countering transnational organized crime, specifically human trafficking and illegal migration, as well as identifying and seizing illicit proceeds from these crimes.

The Deputy Head of the Criminal Police Department of the Interior Ministry of Kazakhstan, Sagat Madiyev, said: “Nowadays, our country has built a sufficient system of counteracting trafficking in human beings, which is constantly being improved. A set of legislative and organizational measures aimed at preventing the detection of the suppression and disclosure of crimes related to trafficking in persons was carried out.”

The Deputy Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Diana Digol, said: “The process of protecting victims of human trafficking requires early identification and a thorough knowledge of how traffickers operate, so that the involved authorities can best co-ordinate and detect organized criminal groups. As this crime can be very complex in nature, it is crucial to learn from other countries and international experts how their experience has helped them to combat this modern form of slavery”.

“Helping victims is a key component in combating trafficking in human beings. I know that 11 state shelters for affected people were opened in Kazakhstan – this is a huge achievement,” said Paul Jukic, Political Counsellor, Chief of Political Section at the US Embassy in Astana. “Since Kazakhstan is a country of destination, where the overwhelming majority of victims are foreign, I hope that the next step will be the development of regulations that allow placing them in public shelters, too.”

The event was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in co-operation with the Interior Ministry and the United States Embassy in Astana. It is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-standing efforts to support the host country in implementing the OSCE Action Plan to Combat Trafficking in Human Beings.

Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day practical workshop on anti-corruption screening of legal acts for government experts concluded on 25 May 2018 at the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Fifteen representatives from the Agency for State Financial Control and the Fight against Corruption, the Ministry of Justice, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the State Committee for National Security, the Agency of civil service and the Institute for Public Administration, the latter both under the jurisdiction of the President of the Republic of Tajikistan, took part in the event. They learned how to formulate recommendations to eliminate potentially corruptive provisions in the Law on Pension Provision to Citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan as a part of the anti-corruption screening exercise.

The workshop was opened by Fabio Piana, Deputy Head of the Programme Office, who stressed the importance of inter-agency co-operation in the fight against corruption.

“Corruption has not been fully eliminated in any country and it can be found in any society. However, the level of corruption can be reduced to the stage when this phenomenon cannot interfere with the development of society and prosperity of the state,” said Denis Primakov, an international expert who delivered the workshop. “Anti-corruption screening of legal acts helps to identify provisions in the acts that potentially could lead to corruption and help to reduce the level of corruption in the country”.

Participants shared their experiences on anti-corruption screenings during the seminar to streamline inter-agency co-operation and information exchange in the framework of corruption prevention activities.

MINSK, 31 May 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 30 May 2018:

“I have repeatedly stressed that one of the main tasks of the Trilateral Contact Group is to ensure the security and decent living conditions for civilians in the conflict zone. With this regard, I would like to draw your attention to some alarming trends.

For the last two months, the number of civilian casualties has dramatically increased as compared to early 2018. Among them, child fatalities are of particular concern. The day before yesterday a 15-year-old girl was killed near Toretsk as a result of a mortar attack. On 22 May, a 14-year-old boy was killed and three children were injured in Debaltseve as a result of a grenade explosion in a bus.

This is unacceptable. The warm season has started and school holidays are ahead. With this in mind, I call on the sides to do their utmost to avoid civilian casualties and pay particular attention to the safety of children.

The situation around civilian infrastructure remains tense as well.

As you know, the situation around the Donetsk Filtering Station (DFS) was discussed at the previous TCG meetings. Unfortunately, despite the sides’ security guarantees and the reinforced patrolling of OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, further ceasefire violations have occurred near the DFS.

I also want to mention two recent incidents: the shelling of medical facilities in the government-controlled Toretsk and the undermining of Shterovsky road bridge in certain areas of Luhansk region.

In this regard, the security of civilians and critical infrastructure in the conflict zone and in particular, in the area of the Donetsk Filtering Station, were the focus of today's discussions in the Working Group on Security. At the same time, the Coordinator of the Working Group, Ambassador Ertuğrul Apakan, stressed that the withdrawal of heavy weapons, especially from the populated areas, is a key prerequisite for the cessation of fire in the conflict zone.

The Working Group on Economic Issues continued to discuss further steps to be taken to recover and improve mobile communication of Vodafone-Ukraine in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR). The current issues related to water deliveries in the supply systems "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbassa" as well as pension payments and environmental safety were duly considered, too.

The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues continued its discussion on the exchange of detainees and the conditions of their detention, as well as on the issue of missing persons.

The participants of the Working Group also discussed the improvement of conditions for crossing the contact line via checkpoints, in particular in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The Working Group on Political Issues continued to discuss issues related to the sequence of implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’ and the modalities of the local elections in CADR and CALR”.

 

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At 10:22 on 30 May, an SMM patrol consisting of six members and two armoured vehicles arrived at the SMM camera site just outside the disengagement area near Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk). At 10:58 the patrol members were stationary in two vehicles with the doors open when they all heard a whistling sound followed by an explosion, and saw dark grey smoke coming from behind an abandoned brick farm building, 200-300m south-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area. The SMM assessed that the explosion was caused by an impacting mortar round (82mm). The patrol left the area immediately and returned safely to its base in Donetsk city.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission heard and saw an explosion about 200m away near Nelipivka. The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zaitseve. The Mission observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area in Chermalyk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas and elsewhere, including near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled part of Donetsk region. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Boikivske, Miusynsk, Myrne, Donetskyi and Sentianivka. It continued to facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and monitor the security situation as well as facilitate repair works and demining activities in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 215 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 115 explosions).

On the evening of 28 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 45 undetermined explosions and small-arms fire, all 2-5km north-west. On 29 May, while on the northern edge of Horlivka, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km north and a shot of small-arms fire 500m north.

On the evening and night of 28-29 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard eight explosions assessed as outgoing mortar rounds 2-6km south-east, eight explosions assessed as impacts 4-5km south-east and about 100 explosions (six as outgoing rounds of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon (73mm) fire, one as an artillery round and the remainder undetermined) and about 400 bursts and shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), automatic grenade-launcher and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-6km east and south-east. On 29 May, while at the same location, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 3-5km south-east.

On 29 May, positioned on the southern edge of Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 explosions (two assessed as outgoing artillery rounds, one as an impact and the remainder undetermined), all 2-3km south-east.

Positioned at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-3km north-north-west and three bursts of small-arms fire 400-500m north-north-east.

Positioned about 3km north-east of Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion and saw a smoke column about 200m north, assessed as a probable ground-based explosion. The patrol also saw two cars (a possible 4x4 and a pickup truck) with four people in military-style clothing (two in each car) driving past the SMM patrol and away from where the explosion occurred. The SMM immediately left the area.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. On 24 May, a woman told the SMM that on 11 May her son (aged 36) had sustained shrapnel wounds to his neck and shoulder when two explosions had occurred near the yard of his house on 38 Artemivska Street in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk). Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka told the SMM by telephone that a man (aged 36) from 38 Artemivska Street had been admitted on 11 May and treated for shrapnel wounds to his neck and shoulder. A community representative in Zaitseve relayed the same information to the SMM by telephone. The SMM has been unable to visit the injured man’s house in Zaitseve due to security reasons.                                                                                                  

The SMM followed up on reports of damage caused by shelling in a residential area in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). Accompanied by a Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC), at 18 Haharina Street, the SMM saw two shattered windows and minor shrapnel scarring on the north-facing wall of a one-storey house, as well as a fresh crater 8m north of the house. The SMM assessed all damage to have been caused by a 73mm cannon round fired from an easterly direction. A resident of the house (aged 40-50) told the SMM that she had been at home with her husband on the night of 28-29 May when the sound of glass breaking had woken them up and that they had sought shelter in the basement.

At 20 Haharina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the soft soil about 4.5m south-east of a barn which had minor shrapnel damage to its south-east facing wall, assessed to have been caused by a 73mm cannon round fired from an easterly direction. Residents of 21 Haharina Street (a woman, aged 40-50 and her son, aged 20-30) told the SMM that they had been at home when they had heard shelling in the early morning hours of 29 May.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening and night of 28-29 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded totals of three undetermined explosions, 23 projectiles in flight (14 from south-west to north-east, four from south to north, three from north-west to south-east and two from west to east) and an airburst, all 3-9km east-north-east and east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as a projectile from east-north-east to west-south-west 1-2km south-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 28 May, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a green truck (KamAZ-4310) inside the Zolote disengagement area on its southern edge (see SMM Daily Report 3 May 2018), three rows of previously spotted anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 600m inside the southern edge of the disengagement area and a previously spotted trench system and footpath leading to a probable military position 1km further north (see SMM Daily Report 26 April 2018).

Positioned near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three towed howitzers (or mortars) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk) and eight multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (type undetermined) near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 17 May 2018). On 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted seven MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) about 6km south-east of Miusynsk and seven MLRS (BM-21) in Myrne (28k south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 18 May 2018). On 28 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) and a tank (T-64) in Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk), as well as three mortars (2B11) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 29 May the SMM saw 18 self-propelled howitzers (nine 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and nine 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) travelling north on a road between Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk) and Malynivka (82km north of Donetsk) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) on the north western outskirts of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 57 tanks (type undetermined) about 4km south-east of Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 28 February 2018); 34 tanks (type undetermined) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); 19 tanks (type undetermined), eight self-propelled mortars (or howitzers) and 24 towed mortars (or howitzers) near Myrne; 13 tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk); eight tanks (type undetermined) and seven towed mortars (or howitzers) near Miusynsk; as well as 24 tanks (type undetermined) and four surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). On 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted 34 tanks (24 T-72 and ten T-64) about 4km south-east of Ternove; nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1), seven towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), seven tanks (T-64) and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) 6km south-east of Miusynsk; as well as 21 tanks (11 T-64 and ten T-72), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 15 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm) near Myrne.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and noted that 12 mortars (11 PM-38 and one 2B11) continued to be missing.

The SMM revisited permanent storage sites whose locations were beyond the respective withdrawal lines in areas outside government control in Donetsk region and noted that 18 tanks (ten T-72 and eight T-64), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12) continued to be missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACVs)[2] and indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 28 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR-70) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-variant) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk) and two APCs (BTR-80) near Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) and the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 29 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) near Sartana (15km north-east of Mariupol).

In non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed on 26 May the presence of 20 ACVs near Boikivske. On 27 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk) and three IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). On 28 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and an IFV (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk). On 29 May, the SMM saw freshly dug trenches and firing positions near Ohulchansk (25km east of Luhansk), as well as five people in military-style clothing digging trenches between Zolote-5 (Mykhailivka) (61km north-west of Luhansk) and Berezivske (53km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed a mine hazard sign for the first time at the crossroads between roads T1315 and T1303, about 2.5km north of Stepove (non-government-controlled, 27km west of Luhansk), reading “Stop Mines, Danger, Don’t leave the road, in case of danger call 101” in Russian and bearing the logo of an international organization.

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the DFS as well as repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation table below), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and facilitated demining as part of an international organization’s construction projected located between Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) and Horlivka. 

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine as well as two cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and 21 pedestrians entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (five with Ukrainian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and six cars (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, three members of the armed formations told the SMM it could not enter the site.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka told the SMM that they could not provide any information about civilian casualties without written permission from senior members of the armed formations in Donetsk.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka and the SMM camera at entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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382924 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Office in Dushanbe’s Water Management and Energy Security Unit delivered a training seminar on Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) to students of the Master’s programme in Economic Governance and Development at the OSCE Academy in Bishkek from May 14 to 23.

It was attended by 24 students from Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.

The seminar gave a broad overview of different topics related to IWRM and water sector reforms. The discussion focused on management of water resources boundaries, irrigation management transfer and water pricing as well as transboundary water management and the water energy nexus.

The participants also discussed case studies from Central Asia and Afghanistan to highlight current regional policy translations and practices on water resources governance. 

383002 Edita Buçaj

The OSCE Mission, in cooperation with the Press Council and the Radio Television of Kosovo, is starting this evening a series of eight TV programs on media and information literacy titled “EduMedia.”

The aim of the series which combines studio debate, interviews and features, is to inform the general public about the importance of media and information literacy, the needs and challenges for its further promotion and introduction in the formal education system and at grass-roots level in Kosovo.

Moderated by Imer Mushkolaj, Chairperson of the Press Council of Kosovo, debates will feature media experts, university professors, and representatives of institutions, the civil society and international organizations. They will discuss challenges that media present nowadays to the public and the need to further develop critical thinking and analysis for deconstruction of media content.

“Through these series, we want to inform the public that media and information literacy is not only about developing their critical thinking skills but also about equipping them with the knowledge to assess, analyse and deconstruct complex media messages online and offline,” said Dane Koruga, Chief of Media Section in the OSCE Mission in Kosovo. “A better informed public is better prepared to counter fake news as a rising global phenomenon.”

The initiative is part of wider Mission efforts to increase the knowledge on media and information literacy. Since 2016, the Mission has been promoting media and information literacy through presentations to the representatives of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology, media institutions and journalist associations, and teacher trainings and presentations to schoolchildren, parents and teachers in 2017.

In addition, the OSCE Mission is planning to expand its scope of work and team up with public universities and private colleges to promote and hold practical courses on media and information literacy for university students and teachers.  

The first program airs on RTK 1 tonight at 20:10. The debate will be subtitled in Serbian language and broadcasted on RTK 2 on 3 June 2018 at 20:00. Other debates will follow on monthly basis.

The OSCE Mission in Kosovo is mandated with human rights protection and promotion, democratization and public safety sector development. It helps safeguard freedom of media and freedom of expression and supports media development.

Communication and Media Relations Section

Thirteen representatives from six NGOs, working in different regions of Belarus, received practical training and exchanged experiences with Serbian experts on women’s empowerment during a workshop from 28 to 30 May 2018 in Belgrade. The main focus of the training was to provide hands-on tools and approaches to establish mentor networks for women, in order to enhance their economic participation. The event was organized by the OSCE Gender Section.

In his welcoming remarks Joseph Mellot, Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Serbia, highlighted the importance of mentorship in helping women to overcome challenges they face in different social settings. Participants had an opportunity to hear personal experiences of successful mentees of the European Movement’s Mentor Programme “Share your Knowledge”, supported by the OSCE Mission in Serbia. “Mentoring is a great tool to promote gender equality and to support women from marginalized groups to be active members of the society,” stressed the lead trainer from European Movement, Svetlana Stefanovic.

During the highly interactive working group sessions participants learned new practical skills on how to conduct recruitment and mentor-mentee matching procedures. They received direct support in developing goals and objectives for their mentor programmes. The participants also had an opportunity to hear Serbian experiences and success stories in promoting gender equality and combating violence against women from the Adviser to the Deputy Prime Minister for Gender Equality, Ljiljana Loncar, and representatives from civil society organizations.

VIENNA, 30 May 2018 – In a special session to mark the 100th year since the end of the First World War, the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation (FSC), meeting today in Vienna under Slovenia’s Chairmanship, explored the impact of the so-called “Great War” and the lessons it holds for modern international relations and European security.

Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič, Permanent Representative of Slovenia to the OSCE and Chairperson of the Forum, opened the session by reminding participants that the First World War affected the entire OSCE region and all the participating States.  

“Some, like Slovenia, still deal with unexploded ordnance from this period,” said Ambassador Andrej Benedejčič. “In light of its profound impact, it is important to address the origins of one of the deadliest conflicts Europe has ever witnessed, as well as to consider its consequences and possible lessons for the current security context. As one of the surviving Slovenian soldiers wrote in his memoirs, ‘We never imagined such a war!’”

Dr. Božo Repe, Professor of Contemporary History at the Faculty of Arts of the University of Ljubljana, said that historians have been unable to pinpoint when a conscious decision about the war was made, because there wasn’t one.

“The world drifted into it step by step, until it became unmanageable. The war began with local conflicts over territories and geostrategic influence,” he said. “Since its horrors had to be justified, modern propaganda was born. The war divided Europe into a multitude of nation-states with poorly demarcated borders and numerous minorities, setting the scene for processes of ethnic cleansing. The main difference between then and now is that today there are international mechanisms in place, which may prevent a new catastrophe. The role of an organization like the OSCE is therefore extremely important.”  

The First World War can be seen as the result of the failure of political powers to solve crises at the beginning of the 20th century, said Dr. Christian Ortner, Director of the Museum of Military History in Vienna.

“At that time national actors believed in their military supremacy and in war as a means to solve outstanding problems in Europe,” he said. “War not only resulted from political discrepancies, but also from different socio-economic developments. Military planning and posture, as well as demographic developments, also influenced the decision to wage war. Just like it started, the war also ended in an unstructured and contradictory manner. The First World War can also be seen as the first industrialized war in Europe,” Ortner said.

Dr. Catherine Horel, General Secretary of the International Committee of Historical Sciences, spoke about "the end of empires" and the new map of Europe after the First World War, focusing in particular on the changes in Central and South-Eastern Europe.

Later in the day, the Slovenian Chairmanship of the OSCE Forum for Security Co-operation will welcome representatives of OSCE participating States to a reception at the Museum of Military History in Vienna, where a documentary film about the First World War battles along the Isonzo Front will be screened. In co-operation with the Museum, guests will be invited to guided tours of the Museum’s extensive exhibits from the First World War era. 

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ROME, 30 May 2018 – All aspects of the “package of eight” will be finalized by the end of the year: this was the historic outcome of the 5+2 talks on the Transdniestrian settlement process held in Rome on 29 and 30 May under the Italian OSCE Chairmanship. The commitment is reflected in the Rome Protocol (available in Russian and English) signed by the Sides, mediators and observers. The Protocol outlines clear timelines and mechanisms to ensure the rapid finalization of the outstanding issues from the “package of eight” priorities identified by the Sides in 2017.

“Agreements followed by implementation through local ownership and leadership have become the new norm of the Transdniestrian settlement process. The Protocol signed by the Sides today gives me confidence that the remaining priorities related to telecommunications, criminal cases and the freedom of movement will be achieved by the Sides by the end of the year if not sooner,” said Franco Frattini, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for the Transdniestrian Settlement Process. “The commitment to finalize all aspects of the ‘package of eight’ further builds trust and makes this year a historic one for the settlement process and most importantly for Chisinau and Tiraspol.”

The mediators and observers welcomed the adherence to the results-oriented approach called for by the 57 participating States in OSCE Ministerial Council Statements in 2016 and 2017. They also applauded the Sides for the remarkable achievement of concluding in April 2018 a complex agreement on the participation of vehicles from Transdniestria in international traffic.

“Over the past months, Chisinau and Tiraspol have demonstrated a genuine commitment to advance the settlement process. This was evident at all levels of the negotiations starting from the intense series of meetings of the working groups lead by the Chief Negotiators, to the personal engagement of the Moldovan and Transdniestrian leadership,” said Ambassador Michael Scanlan, Head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the OSCE mediator in the 5+2 format. “I am confident the Sides will continue this results-oriented approach over the coming months, as the direct negotiations between the Sides in Chisinau and Tiraspol facilitated by the OSCE Mission move beyond the ‘package of eight’ to ensure continued progress in the settlement process.”

The 5+2 meeting in Rome follows remarkable progress made by the Sides on the ground with the breakthrough signing of five agreements from the “package of eight” in November 2017. This year Chisinau and Tiraspol have engaged in an active dynamic to implement three of the November agreements, related to the opening of the Gura-Bicului-Bychok Bridge, to the apostilization of diplomas and to the functioning of Moldovan Latin-script schools. The Sides have reconfirmed timelines to finalize the agreement on the use of farmlands in the Dubasari district by 1 August and to launch by 1 September the implementation of the so-called “licence plate agreement” signed by the Sides on 24 April 2018.

The 5+2 format includes representatives of the Sides, mediators and observers in the negotiation process – Moldova, Transdniestria, the OSCE, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the European Union and the United States. The goal of the 5+2 talks is to work out the parameters of a comprehensive settlement based on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its internationally recognized borders with a special status for Transdniestria within Moldova, as reconfirmed annually in Ministerial Council Statements by all the 57 OSCE participating States.

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Karen Gainer

On 29 May 2018 in Podgorica the OSCE Mission to Montenegro organized the first in a series of training courses on hate crime for around 30 judges and prosecutors from across Montenegro. The event was organized in co-operation with the the Centre for Training in Judiciary and State Prosecution.

The training introduced the participants to the definition of and international legal provisions relating to hate crime. The participants examined the practices and precedents of the European Court of Human Rights and the work of the United Nations Human Rights Committee in comparison with their experiences in prosecuting hate crime in Montenegro.

“Thanks to support of the OSCE Mission, important knowledge was gained by our prosecutors on the methodology of prosecuting hate crime and by our judges on assessing and weighing evidence in adjudicating hate crime,” said Masa Adzic, Head of the Department for In-service Training from the Centre for Training in Judiciary and State Prosecution. Adzic underlined the effectivity of the OSCE Mission’s support to prosecutors in reviewing evidence and prosecuting hate crimes. She welcomed the next series of training courses scheduled for the second half of the year.

The Mission’s Security Co-operation and Governance Programme Manager, Robert Kucharski, emphasized that this training course responds to operational needs identified by justice practitioners. He also noted that it serves to enhance their capacity to prosecute hate crimes in Montenegro and protect basic human rights.

The event is part of the Mission’s cross-programmatic project to raise public awareness and support the improvement of the ability of law enforcement and judicial institutions to properly respond to the phenomena of hate crime.

OSCE Representative strongly condemns murder of journalist Arkadiy Babchenko in Ukraine and calls for swift and complete investigation

VIENNA, 29 May 2018 – OSCE media freedom representative Harlem Désir today strongly condemned the murder of a well-known Russian journalist and writer Arkadiy Babchenko in Kyiv, Ukraine.

This evening, Babchenko, a journalist with ATR television channel and a founder of the project Journalism Without Intermediaries, was shot dead in front of his apartment.

“I am outraged by this horrific act," said Désir. "I call on the authorities to swiftly and thoroughly investigate the circumstances of this assassination and to bring the perpetrators and those who ordered it to justice.”

“My sincere condolences go out to Babchenko’s family, friends and colleagues,” concluded Désir.

Babchenko worked as a journalist and a war correspondent for various media outlets, including Moskovskiy Komsomolets and Novaya Gazeta newspapers, during his career. He has also published in The Guardian. After receiving threats he left Russia in 2017 for Prague and then Kyiv.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in Myrnohrad, Pivdenne and Horlivka. The Mission observed damage as a result of shelling near Dokuchaievsk. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Buhaivka. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and repair works and demining activities in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to high-voltage power lines near Almazna, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Veselohorivka. In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], however more explosions (about 115), compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions).

During the evening of 27 May, the SMM camera at Oktiabr mine (non-government controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, an undetermined explosion, a projectile in flight from west to east and 15 undetermined explosions, followed by totals of 21 undetermined explosions, six projectiles (five in vertical flight and one from east to west), two bursts assessed as heavy-machine-gun fire and an illumination flare, all 3-6km north-east.  

On the evening of 27 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions, seven bursts assessed as anti-aircraft gunfire and seven shots of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-9km north and west. Positioned the next day on the northern edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and about 100 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-north-west.

On the evening of 27 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar (120mm) round 2-3km south-east, 16 explosions (ten undetermined, six assessed as outgoing rounds) and 20 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east.

During the evening and night of 27-28 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, three projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, two projectiles from south-east to north-west and one undetermined explosion followed by totals of three undetermined explosions, 22 projectiles (ten from south-east to north-west, five from south-west to north-east, three from north-west to south-east, two from west to east, one from east to west, one from south to north), nine illumination flares and three bursts assessed as anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) rounds, all 1-5km east and east-north-east.

Positioned in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) during the day on 28 May, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and 12 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, 2-4km in directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however fewer explosions (about 25), compared with the previous reporting period (about 35 explosions).

Positioned in Nyrkove (government-controlled, 77km west of Luhansk) during the day, the SMM heard 17 explosions assessed as outgoing and 20 bursts of small-arms fire, all 4-6km north-north-west and assessed as part of live-fire training exercise outside the security zone.

The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties. In Myrnohrad (formerly Dymytrov, government-controlled, 52km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (55 years old) outside his apartment and saw two bandages and several small wounds on his upper body that he said were the result of an explosion on 22 May that had also killed his wife (55 years old) at their summer home at 10/16 Pivdennyi Street in Myrnohrad. He added that they were both working in the garden of their summer home when his wife found what he described as a small green-blueish package on the ground. The man said he advised his wife to throw it away and then heard a loud explosion and the blast forced him back three to four metres onto the ground. The man told the SMM that he then saw his wife moaning loudly and bleeding. He told the SMM that both himself and his wife were taken that day to the Myrnohrad Central hospital, where the wife died on 23 May. Medical staff at that hospital told the SMM that the abovementioned couple had been admitted on 22 May: the man with minor injuries to his limbs and the woman unconscious with shrapnel injuries in different parts of her body. The staff added that the woman had died in the hospital on 23 May. Local police told the SMM that a woman had died and a man was injured in line with the details shared by the injured man and the medical staff. 

At the Trauma hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk) on 28 May, the SMM saw a man (70 years old) with small bandages covering wounds to his torso, legs and head and a large bandage from his right arm to elbow. The man told the SMM that he lived at 28 Poltavska Street in the Chyhari area of Pivdenne (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). According to the man, he was fixing electricity lines 10-15 m from his house when an explosion occurred as he was moving tree branches. Medical staff told the SMM that a man was admitted on 27 May with wounds to the torso, legs, arm and head from a “booby trap”, however ruled out that it could be from an unexploded ordnance or landmine. Staff at a non-governmental organization’s office in Toretsk told the SMM that on 27 May a man (about 70 years old) sustained injuries as a result of an explosion.

On 26 May, at Horlivka Children’s Hospital, medical staff told the SMM that two boys had been admitted on the evening of 25 May. Medical staff said one boy (11 years old) had sustained shrapnel injuries to his mid to lower back and left leg and the other boy (10 years old) had sustained shrapnel injuries to his jaw and had been discharged the same day. The SMM spoke on 28 May to two neighbours (male, about 50-60 years old, female 60-70 years old) of the boys who resided on Pavlika Morozova Street in the Mykytivskyi district of Horlivka. They told the SMM the boys were wounded on 25 May at an abandoned park at the end of the street where they were playing together and encountered a grenade. Both neighbours told the SMM they only saw the aftermath of the incident, and the woman said that she later saw the ten year old boy wearing bandages on his head and about six bandages across both his arms.

The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling. In Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) on 26 May, the SMM was led to 1 Druzhby Street by a member of the armed formations where it saw a fresh crater south of the gate to the house. The SMM assessed that it was caused by a mortar (82mm) round but could not determine the direction of fire. About 15m west of the gate, on the southern side of Druzhby Street, the SMM saw a second fresh crater. The Mission assessed that it was caused by a mortar (82mm) round fired from a westerly direction.

On 26 May, an SMM long-range unmanned-aerial-vehicle (UAV) spotted three fresh craters about 2km south of Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and 4.3km from the contact line, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds fired from a west-south-westerly direction. The same UAV spotted three fresh craters, assessed as caused by mortar rounds, on the south-western edge of Dokuchaievsk and about 5km from the contact line, one of which was spotted in the garden of a residential house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded seven airbursts and two projectiles in vertical flight, 3-8km south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the evening and night of 27-28 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, seven projectiles in flight from north to south, three projectiles in vertical flight, 18 projectiles north to south and ten projectiles north-west to south-east, all 3-9km in directions ranging from east to west-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).   

Positioned at the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM observed a civilian car with black and white military licence plates and two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on board entering the disengagement area from the northern edge and moving in a westerly direction assessed as travelling to or from houses or positions inside the disengagement area. The same day, the SMM saw the same car inside the disengagement area, this time with three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel on board, coming from the west moving towards the Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint on the northern edge of the disengagement area.

On 28 May, positioned in Petrivske, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 1-3km south (unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Further review of imagery revealed that an explosion recorded by the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska at 04:03 on 22 May 1-2km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) had been an explosion assessed as an impact of an automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) round. (See SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018.)

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted 14 towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), an anti-aircraft gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in government-controlled areas on 28 May, the SMM saw eight tanks (T64) being offloaded from trucks at the side of road M03 near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted: 18 tanks (eight T-72 and 10 T-64), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1), 18 towed howitzers (12 D-30 and six 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and nine mortars (2B-11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk); 32 tanks (21 T-64 and 11 T-72) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk); and 21 tanks (type undetermined), eight mortars (2B-11), and four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Buhaivka. (see above weapons in violation); the same UAV also spotted 30 infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) in the area.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft guns[2]  in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) within 100m of the main hospital in Toretsk and an IFV (BMP-variant) within 100m of the psycho-neurological hospital in the south-east area of Toretsk. The same UAV also spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Toretsk; two IFVs (BMP-variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) near Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk); two APCs (type undetermined) and an IFV (BMP-2) near Lobacheve (17km north-west of Luhansk); three IFVs (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk); as well as an APC (MT-LB) and two IFVs (BMP-2) near Svitlodarsk. On 28 May, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in Avdiivka.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 26 May an SMM long-range UAV spotted eight IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk); as well as two APC (type undetermined), four IFV (three BMP-1 and one undetermined type) and an anti-aircraft gun (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk). On 28 May, the SMM saw one IFV (BMP-2) moving in a southerly direction on road T0519 between Ukrainske (80km south of Donetsk) and Prymorske (76km south of Donetsk).

The SMM observed mine hazard signs. On the road T-1303 at the junction towards Zhovte (non-government controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM again saw a large mine hazard sign with a white background with “Stop Mines! Danger” written on it in Russian language and in smaller font in English. On the same day, on road T-1303 at the junction towards Dovhe, the SMM again observed a mine hazard sign with same format and content as mentioned above. Both mine hazard signs were previously seen by SMM on 9 May 2018.

The SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) as well as repair works to the DFS and demining activities around the station. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 19 cars (ten with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates”) entering Ukraine, and 17 cars (six with Russian Federation, four with Ukrainian licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates), eight cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses (both with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

In Kharkiv, the SMM monitored a gathering in front of the Consulate General of the Russian Federation. The SMM observed 80 people (mixed ages and genders) holding a portrait of Oleh Sentsov and carrying two Ukrainian flags as well as posters with “Free Sentsov” and “Free Kolchenko”, written in English on them. The SMM saw about ten police and six National Guard personnel near the consulate. This was the third similar gathering in Kharkiv observed by the SMM in the month of May. Participants dispersed without incident. (See SMM Daily Report 25 May 2018.)

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of Access:

• Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM accessing a crossing point between mainland Ukraine and Crimea on the southern edge of Syvash (162km south-east of Kherson). Despite the SMM having routinely visited the position in the past three years and having obtained permission from the border guards to enter, a man identifying himself as a Ukrainian Armed Forces commander denied the SMM access.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia in a southerly direction due to the presence of mines. A member of the armed formations said there were mines on the road towards the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs. On 24 May, the seventy-fifth Russian convoy of 16 vehicles crossed into Ukraine and returned through the Donetsk Border Crossing Point.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                         

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;

2. Persons in military-style outfits;

3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 10,966 to 11,482 per day for both BCPs compared to last week. The average net flow for both BCPs went from plus 203 to plus 113 (i.e., more entries into the Russian Federation).

The Donetsk BCP continues to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for 36.4 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region[1].

Persons in military-style outfits                                                                                                                                         

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions was 58 at both BCPs compared to 53 last week; 29 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, 29 into Ukraine. Approximately 79 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continue to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, no families were observed, compared to the previous reporting period when three such families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continue to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed 417 buses crossing the border at both BCPs (compared to 407 observed during the previous week), 210 of them were bound for the Russian Federation and 207 for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Kyiv; Luhansk-Kharkiv; Luhansk-Kyiv; Luhansk-Kyiv-Moscow; Luhansk-Sevastopol and Rovenky-Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a decrease in the number of trucks crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 1,008 to 955 (302 at the Gukovo BCP and 653 at the Donetsk BCP); 550 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 405 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.                                                                                           

Among them, the OTs continued also to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased from 90 to 64 (compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks. At the Donetsk BCP the OTs observed 120 X-ray checks: out of the total number of trucks scanned during the reporting period, 72 trucks (60 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 48 trucks (40 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.

As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans slightly increased from 189 to 190; 95 crossed into the Russian Federation and 95 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions, compared to 46 last week; the OTs assessed that 18 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 12 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. In addition, the OTs also observed vehicles registered in Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Lithuania and Poland. A number of vehicles with “LPR” and “DPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions.

Convoy

On 24 May at 06:31 (Moscow time), the seventy-fifth[3] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk BCP. A total of 16 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 16 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 14:33 on the same day (see the OM Spot Report of 24 May 2018: https://www.osce.org/observer-mission-at-russian-checkpoints-gukovo-and-...).

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 24 May to 29 May 2018, please see the attachment here.

 

[1] Based on data received from Rostov-on-Don region Border Guard Service

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

[3]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-seventh Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” border crossing points, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-fifth convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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Željka Šulc

A workshop on the Central Voter Registry, organized by the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), concluded on 29 May 2018 in Vlašić.

Some 40 participants from the BiH Central Election Commission, Municipal/City Election Commissions, centres for voter registries, the Agency for Identification of Documents, Registries and Data Exchange, local register offices and the Interior Ministries of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Republika Srpska, analysed the current state of the Central Voter Registry in BiH and discussed obstacles and problems related to regularly updating the Registry, with the aim of adding transparency to the election process. 

Ahmed Rifatbegovic, Political Officer at the OSCE Mission to BiH, said: “Accuracy of the Central Voter Registry is important for strengthening public trust in the integrity of the election process. We hope that this event contributed to enhancing co-ordination between responsible actors for accuracy as well as its regular updating to improve the election process.”

The President of the BiH Central Election Commission, Irena Hadžiabdić, highlighted the significance of this workshop and said: “Events like this contribute to improvements and more effective data updating in voter registries.”

The workshop is a part of a three-year project, funded by the European Commission and the Austrian Development Agency, and implemented by ODIHR. The project supports the Western Balkans countries in their efforts to follow up on election observation recommendations in areas related to election management, voter registration and media coverage during election campaigns.

TIRANA, 29 May 2018 – OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger today concluded a two-day visit to Tirana during which he met with Albania’s highest level officials, emphasizing the importance of broad political commitment to the country’s essential reforms and offering OSCE’s continued partnership. 

“The fight against corruption remains of paramount importance for the country, and the OSCE Presence in Albania is ready to help establish a solid track record of proactive investigations, prosecutions and convictions,” said Greminger. The OSCE Presence continues to support the government in shaping and implementing the National Strategy against Corruption 2015-2020.

“Albania has made considerable progress on the reform agenda,” said Greminger. “Electoral reform has made a positive start thanks to cross-party political will, but this must be sustained. The recommendations of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights should be addressed before the next elections.” 

In his meetings with the country’s senior officials, Greminger welcomed Albania’s constructive role in sustaining good neighbourly relations and supporting regional co-operation. “Albania is a full partner in OSCE’s work against the common security challenges facing our community, including organized crime and extremism,” he said.

Greminger met with Albania’s President Ilir Meta, Assembly Speaker Gramoz Ruçi, Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs Ditmir Bushati and Interior Minister Fatmir Xhafaj. He also met the leader of the Democratic Party, Lulzim Basha, representatives of international community and civil society.

During the visit, the Secretary General signed a co-operation agreement between the Albanian Parliament, the OSCE and the Swiss Government on a new project, ‘Support to the Albanian Parliament and Civic Education’. The project aims to increase public awareness and to empower Albanian citizens to participate in their country’s decision-making processes.

During his visit, the Secretary General also met with the staff of the OSCE Presence in Albania. 

OSCE Head of Presence Bernd Borchardt said: “The OSCE Presence in Albania will remain a strong supporter and partner of Albania’s institutions and citizens as they tackle their highest priority challenges.”

On behalf of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Italian Ambassador to Albania, Alberto Cutillo, accompanied the Secretary General during his visit.

The OSCE Presence in Albania was established in 1997.

 

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In its final report on the 25 March 2018 parliamentary elections in Turkmenistan, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) said that the elections lacked important features of a genuinely democratic electoral process.

The report, published on 30 May 2018, notes that the political environment is only nominally pluralist and the exercise of fundamental freedoms was severely curtailed. Despite measures to demonstrate transparency, the integrity of the elections was not ensured, leaving the veracity of results in doubt. To this end, ODIHR recommends that the authorities ensure the integrity of the electoral process by preventing proxy voting, multiple voting, ballot box stuffing and inflation of voter turnout figures.

The report underlines that the lack of media pluralism and independence in the country deprives voters of access to the variety of views necessary to make informed choices. To overcome this issue, the report recommends creating an environment that enables the establishment of independent media, encourages the exercise of free speech and ensures access to information.

By law, all candidates have equal rights to participate in campaign meetings and to deliver their message via mass media. In practice, the report says, any campaigning other than that organized by the authorities was effectively prohibited during the campaigning period. The report recommends that candidates be allowed to freely pursue their own methods of campaigning.

The administration of elections generally lacked transparency, in spite of efforts made by the Central Election Commission. The report encourages the election administration to comply with the principles of transparency, professionalism and impartiality. It also calls on the authorities to ensure that election commissions are independent from the government.

With respect to voter registration, the report calls for the accuracy of the voter lists to be improved, possibly through the introduction of a permanent, centralized voter register. It also recommends putting in place safeguards against multiple registration of voters.

The report highlights the lack of follow-up to previous ODIHR election-related assessments and recommends that electoral reform address key issues from previous reports. They concern the formation of election commissions, the compilation of voter lists, the system for complaints and appeals, and campaign and campaign finance regulations. Other recommendations to be considered include the elaboration of detailed procedures on counting and tabulation of results, the facilitation of women’s participation in elections and on campaign financing.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions between the evenings of 25 and 26 May compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zhovanka. The Mission observed fresh damage as a result of shelling in Toretsk and Bohdanivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. It recorded ceasefire violations in the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as in Pikuzy, Sosnivske, at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and near Leonove, near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station and of demining activity in order to keep the station operational; it heard ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees. The SMM also continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and high-voltage power lines near Almazna, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Veselohorivka.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1] between the evenings of 25 and 26 May, including fewer explosions (about 170), compared with the previous reporting period (about 660 explosions). Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, as compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 55 undetermined explosions and about 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-7km west, north-west, and north-north-west and eight explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of artillery fire and two explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapon(s) 2-4km south-east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and 80 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 3-6km south-east and south-west. The following day, while at the same location, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions and about ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-6km south-east and south-west.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, 15 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, two muzzle flashes, three projectiles from south-east to north-west and an undetermined explosion followed by totals of two undetermined explosions, 73 projectiles (16 from north-west to south-east and 57 from south-east to north-west), ten illumination flares, and eight muzzle flashes, all 2-4km east-north-east.

Continuing on the evening and night of 26-27 May, the same camera recorded, in sequence, one illumination flare, four projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east, one projectile from south-east to north-west, and two undetermined explosions, followed by totals of nine undetermined explosions, 213 projectiles (115 from north-west to south-east, 59 from south-east to north-west, and 39 from west to east), four illumination flares, and three bursts, all 0.2km-2km east-north-east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station[2] (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, two projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, three projectiles from north-west to south-east, nine projectiles from south-east to north-west, three muzzle flashes, and 13 projectiles from south-east to north-west, all 0.15km-5km west.

On 26 May, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 28 undetermined explosions, all 2-4km south-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 10), compared with the previous reporting period (60 explosions). Between the evenings of 26 and 27 May, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, as compared with the previous 24 hours. 

On the evening of 26 May, while in Kadiivka (non-government-controlled, formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 21 undetermined explosions 10-12km north-north-west.

On 27 May, positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and five bursts of small-arms fire, all 5-6km north-east.

The SMM continued to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty in Zhovanka. On 26 May, in the intensive care unit in a hospital in Bakhmut, the SMM spoke with a woman (60 years old) who said she had a piece of shrapnel removed from her abdomen. She said that around 19:30 on 21 May, she was leaving her house located at 32/2 Zhuravskoho Street in the government-controlled neighbourhood of Zhovanka in Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) when she heard an explosion and saw blood on her abdomen. She said she was later taken by military ambulance to the hospital in Bakhmut. On 25 May, while at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, a woman (in her fifties) told the SMM that she was a resident of Zhovanka and knew the injured woman and that shelling had taken place near 32/2 Zhuravskoho Street around 19:30 on 21 May. (See SMM Daily Report 24 May 2018.)

The SMM observed fresh damage as a result of shelling. On 26 May in Toretsk (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM followed up on reports of damage to two hospitals.

At the Tuberculosis Hospital at 25 Haidara Street the SMM saw broken windows on the eastern side of the building on all three floors. Six patients (men, aged 40-50) told the SMM that they had been present when the shelling took place around 04:45 on the morning of 25 May.

Approximately 200m west of the Tuberculosis Hospital, the SMM observed broken windows, about 20 overall, on all three floors on the southern side of the building, damage to the southern side of the roof, and dents and holes in the outer southern wall of the Psychological Hospital. The SMM observed an impact, 2m wide, about 4m south of the building, near the entrance. The SMM observed that Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel had been staying in part of the hospital building, including before the shelling.

On 26 May, imagery from an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) revealed an impact on the eastern end of the roof of the Psychological Hospital, which the SMM assessed was caused by a 122mm artillery round. Damage to the southern-facing wall of the building and windows was also visible, along with debris on the ground. Imagery also revealed an impact 100m east of the hospital, which was assessed as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a south-easterly direction.

At 14 Rimskoho-Korsakova Street, the SMM saw a hole in the external upper eastern wall of an apartment building (about 650cm in diameter), on the third floor between two windows. At apartment no. 22 on the third floor, the SMM saw a hole about 30cm in diameter in the ceiling and a hole about 20cm in diameter in the floor. Three residents of the building (women, aged late thirties to sixties) told the SMM that the damage was caused by shelling around midnight on 25-26 May.

On 25 May, in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM observed three impact sites. At the first impact site on 1 Lenina Street, the SMM saw at least 25 fresh holes from 4cm to 20cm wide on the south-facing concrete, garden wall, on the east-facing wall of a barn and a shattered window, all assessed to be caused by shrapnel. The SMM saw a crater about 10m south-east of the barn’s southern wall and assessed it as caused by a 122mm artillery round fired from a north-easterly direction. A female resident (eighties) who showed signs of shock said that the shelling had happened on 24 May around 21:30 and that she had been at home at the time.

At 52 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater about 2m east of a house. The SMM saw 15 holes, up to 7cm in diameter in the north- and south-facing sides of an ambulance parked about 4m east of the house. The driver’s side window had been destroyed. The SMM assessed the damage to be caused by an artillery round (122mm) fired from a north-easterly direction.

At 56 Lenina Street, the SMM saw a fresh crater located about 15m south of a house. The SMM assessed that the crater was caused by an artillery round (either 122mm or 152mm) fired from a north-easterly direction.

On 26 May, at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk, a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer showed the SMM a hole on one of the modules used for checking the passports of civilians crossing the contact line. The SMM could see both an entrance and an exit hole and assessed that it was caused by a round of small arms fired from a southerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded four undetermined explosions and 18 muzzle flashes, all 2-4km south-east (all unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).[3]

On the night of 25-26 May, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded, in sequence, ten projectiles in flight from west to east, one projectile in vertical flight, one undetermined explosion, two projectiles in vertical flight, and six undetermined explosions, all 3-8km at directions ranging from east to south (unable to assess four explosions as inside or outside the disengagement area, the rest assessed as outside).

During the day on 27 May, positioned in about 300m north of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west. From another location within Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard 14 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km north. Positioned on the north-eastern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard six explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and five shots of small-arms fire, all 4-5km south-south-east. All ceasefire violations were assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 16 May, the SMM camera in Petrivske recorded five undetermined explosions 500-800m north-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 17 May, the same camera recorded four undetermined explosions 1.5-3km west-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On 24 May, the same camera recorded 24 projectiles in flight from south to north 1-2km west and north-north-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area). On 25 May, the same camera recorded one undetermined explosion 500-800m west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and four projectiles from south-west to north-east and one airburst, 1-3km west and south-west (all assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 25 May, while driving south from Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) toward Petrivske, the SMM observed a fresh crater 8m east of the road. Twenty metres south, the SMM observed another fresh crater 1m east of the road, which was about 2m wide and 1m in depth. The SMM could not make further assessments due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 25 May an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two probable self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) under camouflage netting north of Zoria (40km north of Donetsk) and again spotted one towed howitzer (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) under camouflage near Petrivka (43km north of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 26 May 2018.) On 27 May, the SMM observed 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) on railway flatbed cars at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a tank (T-64) under camouflage netting in a residential area near Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk) and seven tanks (T-72) and one self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted four tanks (T-64) under camouflage near Novohryhorivka (33km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 21 April 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas on 27 May the SMM saw two tanks (T-72) being loaded onto flatbed trucks near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk), a tank (T-72) being transported on a flatbed truck north-west of Selidove (41km north-west of Donetsk), and three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Kostiantynivka.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw a tank (T-64) being transported on a flatbed truck near Heorhiivka (15km south of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. At three such sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on 26 May, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and noted that two sites were abandoned and that 11 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area in Donetsk region on 26 May, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64s and seven T-72s) were again missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region on 26 May, whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines, and noted that seven towed howitzers (D-30) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles and an anti-aircraft gun[4] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (three BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk),  an IFV (BMP-2) and probable command vehicle (BMP-1) near Hladosove (51km north-east of Donetsk), an APC (MT-LB variant) near Svitlodarsk, five IFVs (four BMP-1 and one BMP-2) and one anti-aircraft gun loaded on a truck under camouflage netting near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Troitske (69 km west of Luhansk), one IFV (BMP-1) under camouflage netting, and an APC about 5km south of Krymske. Also on 25 May, the SMM saw an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch), and two IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). On 26 May, the SMM saw four armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) near Halytsynivka (29km north-west of Donetsk) and one IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna.

     

In non-government-controlled areas, on 25 May, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Sosnivske and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A), and four IFVs (one BMP-1 missing its main gun, three undetermined variants under camouflage) in a training area near Sofiivka.

On both 26 and 27 May, the SMM continued to monitor and facilitate the access of Voda Donbassa water company employees to the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), as well as demining on roads leading to the station. On both 26 and 27 May, the SMM facilitated demining of the eastern side of road H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from the Ukraine State Emergency Services and the demining of the intersection of roads M04 and H20 up to the gate of the DFS by sappers from the armed formations. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard undetermined explosions as well as small-arms fire (see ceasefire violation section above), despite explicit security guarantees.

On 26 and 27 May, the SMM continued to monitor and facilitate repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and high-voltage power lines near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Almazna (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk) and Veselohorivka (non-government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk). From both sides of the contact line, the SMM also monitored and facilitated demining activities near the Maiorsk entry-exit checkpoint and a checkpoint in Horlivka to support construction by an international organization of facilities for civilians crossing the contact line.

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 27 May, while at a border crossing area near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.  

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 25 May, two armed men in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from accessing a location to assess a possible camera installation in Pikuzy (non-government-controlled, formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk).
• On 26 May, an armed man in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from entering Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk).
• On 26 May, two armed men in military-style clothing in a border area near Leonove (formerly Chervonyi Zhovten, 82km south of Luhansk) prevented the SMM from proceeding and said that “restrictions” were still in place “prohibiting” the SMM from monitoring the border area. They also said that demining was ongoing in the area.
• On 27 May, two armed men in military-style clothing prevented the SMM from entering a heavy weapons holding area, citing the need for “special approval” from their “superior”.

Related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• On 26 and 27 May, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• On 26 May, from Bohdanivka, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Petrivske disengagement area because of the possible presence of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 26 May, at a checkpoint of the armed formations north of Horlivka, two armed men in military-style clothing allowed the SMM to go through the checkpoint only after checking the trunks of its vehicles.

 

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoints in Marinka and Maiorsk were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Addendum: Further review of imagery revealed that on 21 May 2018 at 20:55 and 20:56, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station recorded three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of automatic-grenade-launcher (AGS-17) fire 20-50m west-south-west, rather than explosions assessed as impacts 20-50m west-south-west as reported in the SMM Daily Report 23 May 2018. At 20:55, it also recorded an explosion assessed as the impact of one of the outgoing rounds, about 250-500m west-north-west.

 

[3] Addendum: On 24 May, the SMM did not register a freedom of movement restriction in non-government-controlled areas of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area as originally reported in the SMM Daily Report 25 May 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 28 May 2018 – Greater co-ordination among states in their work to combat trafficking in children, with a focus on those at particular risk, is needed to effectively combat this form of human trafficking, participants said today at the opening of a two-day OSCE meeting in Vienna.

The meeting, organized by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and in co-ordination with the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, brings together representatives of governments and of civil society organizations to address the prevention of child trafficking and the related protection of minors, including specific measures for unaccompanied minors.

“Combatting the trafficking of children remains a priority for the OSCE, but further efforts are required to eradicate this unacceptable human rights violation and heinous crime. Strong attention must be dedicated to children at risk and particularly to unaccompanied minors, especially exposed among the vulnerable,” said Ambassador Alessandro Azzoni, Chairperson of the OSCE Permanent Council and Permanent Representative of Italy to the OSCE. “The discussions at this meeting will provide a solid foundation on which participating States can build to strengthen the OSCE commitments in addressing the special protection needs of unaccompanied minors and secure their right to be children.”

Madina Jarbussynova, OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings, said: “The 2017 Alliance conference on ‘Trafficking in Children and Best Interests of the Child’ highlighted the need to better co-ordinate governmental efforts to protect children and confirmed that effective and functional child protection systems can significantly reduce the risks of trafficking and create favorable conditions for identifying and assisting child victims. I remain convinced that adopting a multi-disciplinary and inclusive approach to combating child trafficking, including in crisis-inflicted scenarios that directly or indirectly affect children’s security and welfare, is the only way for us to succeed in combating the scourge of child trafficking.”

Noting that more than two-thirds of child trafficking victims in the OSCE region are girls, Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of ODIHR, stressed that combatting trafficking in children had to include efforts to directly target demand.

“The power of the recent and galvanizing #MeToo movement, and the impact it is having in ending impunity for sexual harassment and sexual violence against women and girls, is particularly important to integrate into combating the trafficking in girls,” the ODIHR Director said. “We would not be here today if there was no demand generated for children by paedophile ‘buyers’ or demand for cheap goods produced by trafficked children, who are often invisible in supply chains. Efforts to prevent child trafficking should prioritize impactful strategies to address demand.”

In a keynote video address, United States Member of Congress Christopher Smith, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Special Representative on Human Trafficking Issues, told participants that better sharing of information would make such efforts more effective.

“It is the duty of government to protect the weakest and most vulnerable, especially children who are at risk or who are victims of trafficking,” Smith said.  “Child predators thrive on secrecy – a secrecy that allows them to commit heinous crimes against the weakest and most vulnerable.  We can prevent child trafficking by keeping track of known child predators, and by notifying destination countries when they are traveling abroad.”

The Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting is aimed at providing guidance on how to design and implement sustainable mechanisms to ensure a victim-centred and child-friendly human rights-based approach in countering human trafficking, including through multi-agency approaches and partnerships. The event will also provide a forum for identifying and discussing promising practices and challenges in this respect in the OSCE region.

“May 2018 is a good opportunity to take stock of what has been achieved for children and what has not – and to note the urgent need to tackle obstacles that prevent essential action being taken to protect children from exploitation,” Mike Dottridge, independent human rights expert, said in his keynote address at the event.

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OSLO, 28 May 2018 – OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) Lamberto Zannier, Representative of the Italian 2018 OSCE Ch­airmanship and Ambassador of Italy to Norway Alberto Colella, UN Special Rapporteur on Minority Issues Fernand de Varennes, Chair of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Experts of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages Vesna Crnić-Grotić, former HCNM and former Norwegian Foreign Minister Knut Vollebaek and other experts will address the conference Language Policy and Conflict Prevention in Oslo on Thursday, 31 May.

The event marks the 20th anniversary of the HCNM’s Oslo Recommendations regarding the Linguistic Rights of National Minorities. While reviewing best practices for a balanced language policy in OSCE participating States, the more than 100-participant event will also turn towards contemporary challenges, such as the accommodation of diversity in times of resurgent nationalism and divisive rhetoric.

At the event HCNM staff will launch the book Language Policy and Conflict Prevention published by Brill Publishers, which reviews the work of the HCNM in this field and includes a foreword by Zannier.

A livestream video of the event will be available from 9:30 to 10:15 and from 11:15 to 12:15 (CEST) at www.osce.org/live. Follow the discussion on Twitter using the hashtag #OsloRecommendations.

The event will be open to the media from 9:00 to 13:00. Journalists are invited to the Gamle Festsal, Domus Academica, Karl Johans gate 47, 0162 Oslo. 

Media representatives should register by Wednesday, 30 May, 18:00, by sending their name, contact details and the name of the media they represent to Anastasia Rybachenko, Communications Assistant at HCNM, anastasia.rybachenko@osce.org.

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