OSCE

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Representatives of the State Environmental Committee on Environmental Protection and Land Resources of Turkmenistan, the Mejlis (parliament), Ministry of Justice and other relevant agencies of Turkmenistan discussed the development of national environmental legislation at an OSCE-organized seminar held on 30 and 31 July 2018 in Ashgabat.

The seminar aimed to provide insights into international legislative provisions and standards in the area of environmental protection and to discuss possible steps for further development of national legislation in this area.

International experts elaborated on strategies and policies in the area of environmental protection, resources management and climate change and shared best practices in the OSCE region and EU countries. The seminar addressed the legal regulation of waste management, access to drinking water and sanitation. Best national practices of the implementation of relevant international commitments were also discussed.

National experts provided an overview of Turkmenistan’s environmental legislation and of the relevant international documents that Turkmenistan is party to.  They exchanged views on approaches and further steps to enhance national environmental legislation. The importance of the legislative framework for promoting environmental awareness was stressed.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat welcomes Turkmenistan's initiatives aimed at promoting sustainable development and rational use of resources on the basis of accumulated successful experience and close co-operation with relevant international organizations,” said Ivana Markovic Boskovic, Economic and Environmental Officer of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“This seminar marks a successful co-operation between the Centre and the government of Turkmenistan in addressing environmental issues in line with the best practices of the OSCE region.”

The seminar was held as part of the Centre’s project “Strengthening co-operation with the host country in the area of environmental protection and ecological security.”

389294 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE regional meeting of heads of law enforcement departments in Central Asia took place on 24-25 July 2018 in Dushanbe. The meeting was co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the Strategic Police Matters Unit of Transnational Threats Department of the OSCE Secretariat.

The event brought together some 30 participants from OSCE Secretariat and field operations in Central Asia, Tajikistan’s law enforcement agencies, embassies accredited in Tajikistan, UNDP, UNODC and other international organizations.

Tuula Yrjölä, the Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats and Umarzoda Ikrom, the Deputy Interior Minister delivered opening speeches at the event.

“This meeting will allow the heads of law enforcement departments working in the OSCE field operations in Central Asia to reinforce co-operation and to exchange information and best practices at the regional level and between the Secretariat and the field operations,” said Tuula Yrjölä.  “It will also help to exchange information between the OSCE, representatives of participating States and international organizations in transnational threats-related matters.”

Representatives of the OSCE from field operations in Central Asia briefed about the achievements, challenges and future plans in implementing law enforcement-oriented programmes and projects. Co-operation at the regional level was discussed in relation to issues such as fight against radicalization, protection of human rights and gender aspects in police activities and the role of police in preventing domestic violence.

On the second day of the event, participants travelled to Gissar where they attended the opening of a pilot model police station built with OSCE support in order to assist in developing the Community Policing Concept recently adopted by the Tajik Ministry of Interior.

389357 Kunduz Rysbek

A scientific conference titled Current challenges of human trafficking, attended by representatives of scientific and education organizations of Kyrgyzstan, was held in Bishkek on 30 July 2018, on the occasion of World Day against Trafficking in Person.

The conference was organized by the Kyrgyz Ministry of Education and Science, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the International Labour Organization and the association El Agartuu.

Various research findings on human trafficking in Kyrgyzstan showing that the country serves as the origin, transit or destination for victims were presented at the conference.

"Labour and sexual exploitation of people is an invisible but serious issue across the world, including in Kyrgyzstan,” said Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek Pierre von Arx.“As a counteraction, OSCE supported the development of the National Action Plan on anti-trafficking, which addresses four main areas of combating human trafficking: prevention, prosecution, victims protection, and partnership between state bodies, civil society and international organizations.”

Nurzhan Tulegabylova, the head of El Agartuu, said that international reports suggest that over 80 per cent of victims of transnational trafficking are women and children, 70 per cent of which are sold to another country for the purpose of sexual exploitation. “However, precise statistics of trafficked victims in Kyrgyzstan are not yet available, because trafficking is still unfortunately treated as a latent problem.”

A collection of the articles and reports presented at the conference will be published and disseminated to universities, schools and other education organizations nationwide.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 27 and 28 July compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 28 and 29 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous 24 hours, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. Small arms were fired 600m from the SMM near Chornukhyne, assessed as directed at an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle. The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Mala Yurivka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. Its access remained restricted in all three areas, as well as near Bezimenne, Zaichenko and Horlivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Ocheretyne. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a procession of up to 70,000 people organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to commemorate the adoption of Christianity.

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (about 160), compared with the previous reporting period (about 105 explosions). Between the evenings of 28 and 29 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 15 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 27-28 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, 13 projectiles from east to west and an undetermined explosion, followed by a total of 32 explosions (one assessed as an impact and the remainder undetermined), two airbursts, 84 projectiles (the majority from east to west) and four muzzle flashes, all 0.5-1.5km south. On the evening and night of 28-29 July, the same camera recorded, in sequence, a muzzle flash, seven projectiles in flight from east to west and a projectile from north-west to south-east, followed by a total of three undetermined explosions, 50 projectiles (the majority from east to west) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.5-2.5km south.

On the evening and night of 27-28 July, the SMM camera 1km south-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 63 projectiles in flight (the majority from south-south-west to north-north-east), all 2-3km east. During the day on 28 July, positioned 1km north-north-west of Pyshchevyk for about ten minutes, the SMM heard 15 undetermined explosions and 65 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km north-east.

On the evening and night of 27-28 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds 2-3km south, as well as six undetermined explosions and about 240 shots and bursts of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-4km south-east, south-south-east and south.

During the day on 28 July, positioned about 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre (non-government-controlled) for about 40 minutes, the SMM heard 19 undetermined explosions and about 40 minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-5km north-north-east.

During the day on 28 July, positioned on the south-western edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north Donetsk), the SMM heard about 60 explosions assessed as impacts of automatic grenade-launcher rounds, six explosions assessed as outgoing (and their subsequent impacts), two undetermined explosions and 11 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-4km east-north-east.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 27 and 28 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous reporting period (ten explosions). Between the evenings of 28 and 29 July, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations.

On 28 July, positioned about 3km east of Chornukhyne (non-government-controlled, 64km south-west of Luhansk) while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire 600m south-east of its position, assessed as directed at the UAV.* The SMM landed the UAV and safely left the area.

The SMM followed up on reports that a man died after a hand grenade he was handling exploded. On 28 July, on Liubovi Shevtsovoi Street in Yasenivskyi (non-government-controlled, 46km south of Luhansk), a woman (aged 25) told the SMM that at around 20:00 on 25 July, an intoxicated man (aged 30) had sat in the garden of her property and begun threatening her and her children (boy and girl, aged three and five) with a hand grenade. She said that as she had been leaving the property with her children, she had heard an explosion and, when she returned, she saw that the man had died. At the property, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the outer wall and to a metal fence in the garden. At another property on Liubovi Shevtsovoi Street, the mother of the deceased man (aged 60-70) and his cousin (male, aged 30-40) told the SMM that the deceased had been involved in military-type activities.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Mala Yurivka (non-government-controlled, 34km south-west of Luhansk). On the main street, the SMM saw a single-storey house with two shattered east-facing windows, a collapsed roof and several fragments of wooden beams 3m west of the house. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a tank round; however, it was unable to assess the direction of fire. A resident of the village (woman, aged 70) told the SMM that the damage had occurred on 19 July and that nobody had been injured. The house is located in an area between training areas near Buhaivka (non-government-controlled, 37km south-west of Luhansk) and Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), where the SMM had recently observed a total of about 40 tanks (type undetermined) (see SMM Daily Report 25 July 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 28 July, positioned about 1km north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 2-3km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM again saw a tailfin of a rocket-propelled grenade (RPG-7) in a field about 2.5m east of a road approximately 100m south of the Ukrainian Armed Forces forward position about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the same location, the SMM had previously seen a tailfin of the same type (see SMM Daily Report 20 July 2018).

On 28 July, positioned about 3km north of Petrivske for about half an hour, the SMM heard about 150 shots of IFV (BMP-2) cannon fire and four bursts of heavy-machine gun fire, all 2-5km south-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). While at the same location, the SMM saw two men in military-style clothing approximately 800m west of its position, one of whom was armed. On 29 July, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard six undetermined explosions and three shots of small-arms fire, all 2-5km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 27 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a previously observed trench inside the Petrivske disengagement area, about 5m from its eastern edge and 500m from its northern edge, as well as a previously observed trench outside the disengagement area, about 100m north of its northern edge.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 27 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) 200m south-east of a residential area of Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). (See SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018.)

On 28 July, the SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that a tank (T-64) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft weapon[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 27 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), eight IFVs (six BMP-2 and two BMP variants) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk), two IFVs (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk), four IFVs (three BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk) and 14 IFVs (13 BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near Bohdanivka (41km south-west of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in the front yard of an abandoned house in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk). On 28 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-70) near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk) and four IFVs (BMP-2) near Starohnativka. On 29 July, the SMM saw a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (ZU-23-4 Shilka, 23mm) near Novotroitske.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 27 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) and trenches near Styla (34km south of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP-1) and a trench near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR-70 and an MT-LB) near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

The SMM observed demining activities. On 28 July, on the eastern outskirts of Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), from a distance, the SMM observed the controlled detonation of 14 mines by sappers near a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint at the junction of roads E58 and T0519. Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) were also present.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS on 28 and 29 July, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works, on 29 July, to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

On 28 July, the SMM monitored a railway station near Oleksandrivsk (non-government-controlled, 10km west of Luhansk) and saw a train with about 40 wagons carrying coal travelling from east to west.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a procession of up to 70,000 people (mixed gender and age) organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate to commemorate the adoption of Christianity by the Kyivan Rus (see SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018). The SMM assessed that about 5,000 police officers secured the route and did not observe any incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

-   On 28 and 29 July, at a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “security reasons”. (See SMM Daily Report 28 July 2018.)

• On 28 July, at a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne, three armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for SMM’s safety due to ongoing operations in Sakhanka”.    
• On 28 July, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM that it could only monitor 50m away from the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 28 and 29 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.[4]
• On 28 and 29 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC both times.5
• On 28 and 29 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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Vienna, 30 July 2018 –Austrian Federal Minister for Europe, Integration and Foreign Affairs Karin Kneissl met today with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger at the headquarters of the organization in Vienna.

Pointing to the strong partnership between Austria and the OSCE, Kneissl stressed the importance of the OSCE as a valuable platform for dialogue and  effective multilateralism.  She recalled Austria’s Chairmanship of the OSCE in 2017, and its continued active engamenent in the Troika (together with the current and future Chairs, Italy and Slovakia).

Foreign Minister Kneissl expressed her strong support for Secretary General Greminger’s reform agenda which is designed to make the OSCE more “fit for purpose”.  At the same time, she underlined the need for adequate human and financial resources in order for the OSCE to maintain its effectiveness and efficiency.

“In order to guarantee security and stability in the long term, there is no alternative to the path of dialogue. This dialogue will be critical and controversial. But it always has to remain constructive. For Austria, the OSCE is a key partner to that end.” That's why we have to  provide our organization with the means – both personal and material – that it needs. As the OSCE’s host country, we stand by our substantial contribution to the benefit of the people between Vancouver and Vladivostok,” said Kneissl.

Secretary General Greminger thanked Austria for its support as host country of the OSCE and for its longstanding and constructive engagement with the organization. He emphasized his appreciation in particular for Austria’s extra-budgetary contributions, most recently for the establishment of a Strategic Policy Support Unit within his office. The Unit is expected to provide greater support to future OSCE Chairmanships, and greater continuity in the strategic direction of the organization.

“The OSCE is part of what makes Vienna a security hub”, said Greminger.  “We share the approach of Austria and the international organizations based in Vienna that complex challenges require multilateral responses”, said the Secretary General. “Working together is essential, not an extra”, said the Secretary General.

Secretary General Greminger and Minister Kneissl exchanged views on current issues and challenges in the OSCE area including the Western Balkans, conflict prevention, transnational threats, and the OSCE’s response to the crisis in and around Ukraine. They also discussed how to strengthen cooperation between the OSCE and the EU, particularly during Austria’s current EU Council Presidency.

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WARSAW/ VIENNA, 30 July 2018 – Effective policies to combat trafficking in human beings, including the trafficking of children, must focus on both the effects and the roots of this terrible crime, OSCE senior officials said today, on the occasion of the World Day against Trafficking in Persons.

Such policies need to include a focus on a survivor-centred approach, tailored to the needs of both adults and children, as well as on measures to eliminate the ability of traffickers to profit from their crime, the officials said.

“A survivor-centred approach that is gender and culturally sensitive can be achieved by strengthening national referral mechanisms to include survivors’ voices and a focus on their needs in all aspects of policy development and implementation. This is important to guarantee that rehabilitation of, and assistance to human trafficking survivors is rooted in international human rights standards,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, Director of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR). “At the same time, disruption strategies should be in place to ensure that this crime becomes unprofitable, by curbing demand, inhibiting financial flows to organized criminal networks and empowering survivors to prevent re-trafficking and re-victimization.”

According to the 2016 UNODC Global Report on Trafficking in Persons, 27 per cent of reported global trafficking cases occur within the OSCE region. More than half of those trafficked worldwide are women, and one in five is a child.

OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger noted that UNODC had chosen responding to the trafficking of children and young people as the focus for this year’s World Day and stressed that in recent years, there has been an increased focus within the OSCE on combatting the trafficking of children in particular.

“With the adoption of a comprehensive Ministerial Council decision against child trafficking as well as other forms of sexual exploitation, the OSCE unequivocally reiterated that there is no place in our region for the abuse of children,” Greminger said. “While maintaining close attention to persistent forms of child exploitation, both transnational and internal, our Organization is committed to helping countries engage partners, including civil society, the business community, the travel and tourism industry, the technology industry, and international organizations across the full spectrum of anti-trafficking efforts to prevent harm, protect victims and hold traffickers accountable.”

Valiant Richey, the OSCE Acting Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, stressed that the Organization’s efforts to address trafficking in children directly benefit from such engagement.

“Mindful that the best interest of the child is a primary consideration, and that a trauma-informed approach should take into account the respective gender-specific concerns of girls and boys, the OSCE is aiding in the promotion of innovative, partnership-oriented and informed responses from policy to practice,” said Richey. “Through our research on technology, our ground-breaking training programmes and our workshops on migration, we are working to enhance the protection, safety and health of all children, while building more effective and efficient criminal justice systems to investigate and prosecute traffickers.” 

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM followed up on three civilian casualties from unexploded ordnance near Hranitne and Horlivka. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and observed new firing positions and a freshly dug trench inside the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Oleksandrivske, Starolaspa, Bezimenne and Siedove, and again in Zaichenko. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vershyna, Zolote-3/Stakhanovets and Donetskyi. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Popasna and Artema. In Luhansk city, the SMM observed over 100 large boxes being offloaded from trucks labelled “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation”. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a procession organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of up to 70,000 people to commemorate the adoption of Christianity.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 105 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 65 explosions).

On the evening and night of 26-27 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west to east, eight projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, four projectiles in vertical flight and two bursts of undetermined weapons, followed by totals of two explosions assessed as impacts of 120mm mortar rounds, 17 undetermined explosions, 111 projectiles (the majority from east-north-east to west-south-west) and two illumination flares in vertical flight, all 0.5-6km south-south-west and south-west.

On the evening and night of 26-27 July, the SMM camera 1km south-west of Shyrokyne (20km east of Mariupol) recorded about 75 projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west (62 assessed as heavy-machine-gun fire) and an illumination flare, all 4-6km north-east. 

On the evening of 26 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 55 explosions (ten assessed as impacts of mortar rounds and the remainder undetermined) and about 210 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-4km south-south-east. The next day, at the same location, the SMM heard five undetermined explosions 2-5km south-east.

During the day on 27 July, positioned about 1km north of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw an explosion assessed as an impact of an undetermined weapon 1.5km west and heard nine undetermined explosions and 225 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire 2-4km at directions ranging from south-east to west. About 65 of the above-mentioned shots and bursts were assessed as part of live-fire training inside the security zone, 2-4km south-south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including ten explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (57 explosions).

The SMM followed up on media reports of a civilian casualty near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk) of a man injured by the detonation of unexploded ordnance (UXO) while on his tractor. On 25 July, medical staff at military hospital No. 5 in Mariupol told the SMM that a man (40-50 years old) had been admitted on the evening of 24 July with injuries to his left foot and left eye, and had then been transferred to a hospital in Dnipro on 25 July. On 27 July, the head of Hranitne village council told the SMM that the incident had occurred on 25 July in a field not known for containing mines, approximately 5km south of the village, and that a man (47 years old) was injured by metal from the tractor and glass from its windshield. The interlocutor added that there are many locations near the village where UXO is known to be present and requested assistance in facilitating demining activities.

The SMM also followed up on reports of two civilian fatalities in the Michurina settlement near Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) related to a landmine explosion on 25 July. At the residence of one of the victims (male, 17 years old) two neighbours (women, 60-70 years old) told the SMM that they were preparing for the funeral of the deceased young man. They said a landmine incident had taken place on 25 July, when the young man and a young woman (18 years old) had been walking near a cemetery close to the settlement of Shakhta 6-7. A female relative (30-40 years old) of the young man said the incident had happened when the two had walked into a field not marked with mine hazard signs. Three other family members present told the SMM that armed formations were in the area and minefields remained unmarked. The SMM again visited Hospital no. 2 in Horlivka to follow up, however no further information was available, as interlocutors were not present to speak. (See SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018)  

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 26 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted for the first time two firing positions extending from a tree line inside the Zolote disengagement area about 200m north of its southern edge and about 2km east of its western edge (not visible in imagery from 18 June 2018), as well as a recently maintained firing position about 800m from its south-eastern edge (previously reported on 26 June 2018). The same UAV spotted a recently excavated 40m-long trench inside the disengagement area, about 600m south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 26 July, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018), and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 27 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three mortars (probable 2B11/2S12 Sani) in firing positions on the southern edge of Donetskyi (49km west of Luhansk). (For previous observations see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018.)  

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that two tanks (one T-72 and one T-64) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 26 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted five infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (two BMP-1, two BMP-2 and a BMP-variant), an armoured command vehicle (BMP-1Ksh Potok-2) and four armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km north-west of Luhansk) as well as an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and new positions (not visible in imagery from 24 July 2018) near Zolote-3/Stakhanovets. Also on the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (BRM-1K) and an APC (MT-LB) near Ozarianivka (formerly Pershe Travnia, 52km north of Donetsk), as well as two IFVs (BMP-2) and an APC (MT-LB) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk). On 27 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-60) near Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the railway station in Popasna and the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates), a minivan (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine, as well as six cars (one with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 26 July, at a warehouse on Darkhomyzhkoho lane in Luhansk city, the SMM saw 15 workers unloading at least 100 large cardboard boxes (150 x 150 x 120cm) wrapped in blue tape from ten white trucks labelled “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in Russian. The SMM saw that some boxes were placed inside the warehouse and others piled up outside. The SMM also observed an unarmed member of the armed formations filming an interview with another unarmed member of the armed formations and one unarmed man with a “Ministry of Emergency Services of the Russian Federation” insignia visible on his jacket. Later that day, the SMM saw 17 white covered cargo trucks, with ten containing the same labelling on the sides as the above-mentioned trucks, travelling south-east through Samsonivka (non-government-controlled, 31km south-east of Luhansk), accompanied by four cars labelled “police” and two ambulances.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a procession of up to 70,000 people (about 75 per cent women) organized by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to commemorate the adoption of Christianity by the Kyivan-Rus state. The SMM assessed that about 5000 police officers secured the route as people walked between Volodymyrska Hill and Pechersk Lavra. The SMM did not observe any incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

-    At a checkpoint 1km south of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, 90km south-east of Donetsk), an unarmed member of the armed formations in military-style clothing denied the SMM passage east, citing an ongoing live-fire exercise in a nearby training area.

-     At a checkpoint 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing orders from their superiors (see SMM Daily Report 27 July 2018).

-     At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk), two unarmed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, stating that an “anti-terrorist operation was ongoing in the village”.

-     At a checkpoint 2.5km west of Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of        Mariupol), five armed members of the armed formations in military-style clothing denied the SMM passage, claiming that “it was for SMM’s security”.    

-     At a checkpoint north-west of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations wearing “police-style” clothing denied the SMM passage, saying that a “special ‘police’ operation was ongoing in the village”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that mines on the road south of the bridge were still present. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• An SMM midrange UAV experienced a loss of signal assessed as due to jamming during launch near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk). The UAV was recovered safely.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]    The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as, again, in Zaichenko in southern Donetsk region and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vershyna, Bakhmut and Pikuzy. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Popasna, Stanytsia Luhanska, Artema and Naberezhne. In Odessa, the SMM again saw ethnic slurs and swastikas spray-painted on buildings. In Chernivtsi, the SMM observed two gatherings.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions).

On the evening of 25 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and about 150 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 1-5km south and south-south-east.

During the day on 26 July, positioned north-north-east of Marianivka (non-government-controlled, 13km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions 10-15km north-east.

On the evening and night of 25-26 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded five explosions (an outgoing explosion, an impact explosion, an airburst and two undetermined explosions), 30 projectiles in flight (most from south-south-west to north-north-east), five illumination flares and 24 bursts of undetermined weapons, all 1-7km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations including, however, more explosions (about 60), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions).

On 26 July, positioned near Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded about 30 undetermined explosions 8-10km south.

On 26 July, positioned near Yasnodolsk (non-government-controlled, 41km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 18 undetermined explosions, 15-20km south-east.

A member of the armed formations threatened to shoot down an SMM unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). On 25 July, positioned about 3km north-west of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM was preparing to conduct a mid-range UAV flight when a member of the armed formations in a military-type truck verbally approached and threatened to shoot down the SMM’s UAV. The man then departed, driving north-west. The SMM flew its UAV without interference and landed it safely (for similar incidents, see SMM Daily Report 28 August 2017 and SMM Daily Report 31 August 2017). The UAV spotted a recently dug trench near a house in the Molochny neighbourhood of Lozove (non-government-controlled, 52km north-east of Donetsk) (see below).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 25 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles in flight from north-east to south-west 4-6km south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 25 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in Vershyna (63km north-east of Donetsk) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S3) near Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk). On 26 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a tank (T‑72) in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 92km south of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 July 2018).

The SMM visited sites in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region where it had previously observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted the following weapons missing: 24 towed howitzers (18 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and six D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) (including one missing for the first time), 13 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm; 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm; and a BM-37, 82mm).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 25 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Vershyna. On 26 July, the SMM observed an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) north-west of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and an APC (BTR-80) in Shchastia.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 25 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 15m-long trench about 50m from an inhabited house in the Molochny neighbourhood of Lozove (not visible in imagery from 27 May 2018). Near Pikuzy, on 26 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted 100m of trenches (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018) and eight craters assessed as impacts of artillery shells fired from a north-westerly direction (not visible in imagery from 27 July 2018). Also on 26 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three 15m-long trench extensions connecting to a house (assessed as being used as an observation post) on the western edge of Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 4 July 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the railway station in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a fibre-optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska, the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and power lines in Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol).

The SMM visited a border area outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw three women, two men and a child exiting Ukraine as well as three cars (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), two women and two men entering Ukraine.

The SMM followed up on reports of spray-painted ethnic slurs and swastikas in Odessa city. The Mission saw graffiti using an ethnic slur calling for the killing of people from the Caucasus region next to a swastika on the side of a shawarma stand at the intersection of Fontanska and Akademichna Streets and, on the wall of a nearby bakery, the Mission saw graffiti calling for the death of people from Central Asia, again using an ethnic slur, next to a swastika. The graffiti was similar in size and style to anti-Semitic messages the SMM observed in the city on 23 July (see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2018). Police told the SMM by telephone that an investigation would be opened under Article 161 of the Ukrainian Criminal Code (violation of citizens’ equality based on racial, ethnic, or religious bias).

In Chernivtsi, on 26 July, the SMM saw about 50 men and women – half of them wearing insignia of groups such as Pobratymy Ukrainy and Nationalny Druzhyny – gathered near the entrance of the city hall, which was surrounded by 50 police officers. Inside the city hall, the SMM observed a heated debate between council members, the mayor and local citizens in support of and opposition to the city’s mayor, after which the city council voted to dismiss the mayor.

Also in Chernivtsi on 26 July, the SMM saw about 80 people (mostly men) gathered in the city’s central square carrying posters critical of the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex communities.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At the border crossing point near Izvaryne, a man in militarystyle clothing told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying that it was “for the security of the SMM.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• An SMM midrange UAV experienced a loss of signal assessed as due to jamming while being flown over Pikuzy. The UAV was not damaged.
• Medical staff at a hospital in Horlivka (nongovernment controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM with information regarding reported civilian casualties without permission from armed formation members in the city.

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

*    Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]     Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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389219 Legislationline.org homepage Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Legislationline.org - ODIHR´s Legislative Database

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) launched a new version of its free legislative database Legislationline.org on 27 July 2018.

Created in 2002, the online database is designed to assist OSCE participating States in bringing their legislation into line with OSCE commitments and other international standards in various areas, including independence of the judiciary, gender equality and counter-terrorism. It has served as a reference tool for a variety of users – law drafters, legal professionals, government officials, parliamentary staff and members of civil society.

The new, more user-friendly website is available in English and Russian. It contains a compilation of national legislative acts, a selection of international standards on human dimension issues, legal reviews, assessments and guidelines prepared by ODIHR, and a collection of documents providing insights into legislative processes in OSCE participating States.

The database also provides access to constitutions and criminal codes of all OSCE participating States. All documents can be searched by keywords or filtered by topic or country.

"We are pleased to announce that the new version of the Legislationline database is now available, and we hope that it will benefit even more people who are interested in legislation and human rights,” said Marcin Walecki, Head of the ODIHR Democratization Department.

389165 Fotima Sokhibova

Senior trade and customs officials from five Central Asian countries, Afghanistan, and their main trading partners – Russia and Turkey, received practical guidance on trade facilitation at a three-day annual training workshop on 26 July in Dushanbe. The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe. The OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe hosted the workshop.

This interactive and practice-oriented workshop aimed at equipping participants with knowledge on various tools and approaches for trade facilitation implementation in the region and engaging them in discussions on policy instruments for enhancing efforts to achieve trade facilitation in Central Asia.

The workshop was attended by 26 participants from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Turkey, and Uzbekistan. It covered current activities in the implementation of the World Trade Organization’s Trade Facilitation Agreement and the practical steps towards facilitating procedures on borders with Uzbekistan.

Mario Apostolov, the Regional Adviser for UNECE Economic Cooperation and Trade Division, noted that “the participation of Uzbek counterparts in the workshop is an important breakthrough in our work on regional trade facilitation. “We now have the opportunity to discuss the current state of trade routes in the five Central Asian countries and make recommendations on further facilitation of co-operation and collaboration between the respective agencies,” Apostolov said.

In addition to classroom sessions, a field-trip was organized to the Dusti border-crossing point on the Tajik-Uzbek border where participants were able to assess the cargo transit process in a comparative perspective in relation to previous visits. 

Larisa Kislyakova, Chairman of the Board at the Union of Professional Consultants of Tajikistan, noted that the renewed openness of Uzbekistan allowed Tajikistan and other countries to use Uzbekistan’s infrastructure and gain access to markets outside the region. “This growing co-operation needs to be supported. In this regard it is also crucial to simplify the trade procedures on Tajikistan’s end so as to create a comfortable environment for transit, including the creation of roadside services in accordance with international standards for transit,” Kislyakova said.

This report is for the general public and the media. 

SUMMARY

On 26 July at 06:35 (Moscow time), the seventy-seventh[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 21 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 21 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 15:55 on 26 July.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 26 July at 06:35, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of 16 cargo trucks and five support vehicles, including one ambulance. Thirteen out of the 16 cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian help from the Russian Federation” (in Russian language). In addition, three trucks and all support vehicles bore the MES sign on the side doors.

At 06:35 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Three Ukrainian border guards and two customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). The Ukrainian officials had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. One service dog was present during the procedure. A man dressed in civilian clothing took pictures at the beginning of the check.

By 07:00 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 15:30 the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and three customs officers – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. Also on this occasion, a photographer was present and took pictures.

By 15:55 all 21 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the seventy-ninth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the seventy-seventh convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous reporting period. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske and recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as in Starolaspa.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vesele, Svobodne, Khrustalnyi, Novoamvrosiivske and Starolaspa. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Stanytsia Luhanska and Novotoshkivske, as well as in Popasna.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including about 100 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions).

On the evening and night of 24-25 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 12 explosions (seven assessed as impacts and the remainder undetermined) 600-800m south and south-south-west, as well as three bursts from west to east 5-7km south.

On the night of 24-25 July, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk) recorded 38 undetermined explosions 5-7km south-east.

On the evening of 24 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds, seven undetermined explosions and about 100 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east. During the day on 25 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 4-5km south-east.

During the day on 25 July, positioned about 2km north of Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions, about 180 shots and bursts of small-arms fire and about ten minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots of undetermined weapons, all 1-7km at directions ranging from south-west to north-north-east.

Positioned about 1km north-north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard 17 explosions (13 assessed as outgoing and the remainder undetermined) at undetermined distances at directions ranging from north-east to south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, compared with the previous reporting period.

During the day on 25 July, positioned on the southern edge of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 60 shots of small-arms fire 1-2km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 24 July, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard three bursts of small-arms fire 3-4km south-south-west, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 25 July, positioned near the Zolote disengagement area and in Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), west of the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled-areas, on 24 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a towed howitzer (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) near Vesele (28km north-east of Mariupol) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122m) and 13 tanks (T-72) about 1.5km north of Svobodne (73km south of Donetsk), all were located in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. On 25 July, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122m) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk), ten MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (D-30) being towed by a truck on the eastern edge of Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk).*

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled-areas, on 24 July, aerial imagery from 23 July revealed the presence of 30 tanks (type undetermined) near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 8 June 2018).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM observed six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1), and noted that seven towed howitzers (2A65) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

The SMM revisited a heavy weapons permanent storage site in an area of Luhansk region outside government control whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that six towed howitzers (one 2A65 and five D-30), four MLRS (BM-21) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing. The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in an area of Donetsk region outside government control whose location was beyond the withdrawal lines and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) remained missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 24 July, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three armoured personnel carriers (APC) (two BTR-70 and an MT-LB) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk), and an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). An SMM mid-range UAV also spotted two 200m-long trenches and an 80m-long trench in areas south and south-east of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, 42km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB), an ACV (BMP variant), a 50m-long trench and multiple positions near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk) (not visible in imagery from 30 May 2018), as well as shelling marks around a position along a tree line about 2km south-east of Novotoshkivske, the pattern of which indicates the use of cluster munition assessed as fired from a south-easterly direction between 7 and 18 June 2018.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted trenches about 250m in length in the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 23 May 2018) and an SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured recovery vehicles (a BTS-4A and a BREM-1) about 1.5km north of Svobodne. 

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 350 anti-tank mines laid out in two rows about 2.5km north of Novhorodske (see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works at the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, the railway station in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the water channel near Stanytsia Luhanska and to water pipelines near Novotoshkivske.

The SMM visited two border areas outside government control. While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw 47 cars (18 with Ukrainian, 15 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and 13 with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian and one with Belarusian licence plates) and a van (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and two cars (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM observed no traffic or pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Starolaspa, two armed members of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding, saying that “a census is being conducted in the village”. The SMM saw a towed howitzer (D-30) in violation of withdrawal lines (see above).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

[1] Please see Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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MINSK, 25 July 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 25 July 2018:

“Today, first of all, I would like to note that the “Harvest Ceasefire” agreed by the TCG is bringing results. On behalf of the TCG, I would like to note the following positive trends.

Firstly, according to the preliminary data provided by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), since 1 July, 2018 the number of ceasefire violations has significantly dropped, as has the number of casualties among the civilian population. In particular, according to the SMM, no civilian deaths have been recorded since the cessation of fire entered into force.

Secondly, I would like to remind you that the total number of civilian casualties this year has dropped by more than half compared to the same period of the previous year. I hope that these notable trends shall continue, and I call on the sides to strictly adhere to the ceasefire in the future.

These issues were discussed today in the Security Working Group. While addressing them, the Co-ordinator of the Working Group, Ambassador, Ertugrul Apakan, emphasized the importance of disengagement of forces and hardware as well as withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of further steps to restore and improve the mobile communication of Vodafone-Ukraine in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR, respectively).

The issue of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbassa" supply systems were also duly considered.

The Co-ordinator of the Working Group, Per Fischer, welcomed the extension of the agreement on water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" supply system for a year ahead.

The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues continued its discussion on the exchange of detainees. Another topic was the improvement of conditions for crossing the contact line, including possibilities for proper repairs of the pathway to the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CARL.

As you know, tomorrow (26.07.2018) Berlin will host Normandy Four meeting on the level of Political Directors. In the spirit of my previous statements, I would like to welcome the fact that the possible involvement of UN forces to resolve the conflict in the east of Ukraine will be the tomorrow's topic of discussion”.

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MINSK, 25 July 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 25 July 2018:

“Today, first of all, I would like to note that the “Harvest Ceasefire” agreed by the TCG is bringing results. On behalf of the TCG, I would like to note the following positive trends.

Firstly, according to the preliminary data provided by the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM), since 1 July, 2018 the number of ceasefire violations has significantly dropped, as has the number of casualties among the civilian population. In particular, according to the SMM, no civilian deaths have been recorded since the cessation of fire entered into force.

Secondly, I would like to remind you that the total number of civilian casualties this year has dropped by more than half compared to the same period of the previous year. I hope that these notable trends shall continue, and I call on the sides to strictly adhere to the ceasefire in the future.

These issues were discussed today in the Security Working Group. While addressing them, the Co-ordinator of the Working Group, Ambassador, Ertugrul Apakan, emphasized the importance of disengagement of forces and hardware as well as withdrawal of heavy weapons.

The Economic Working Group continued its discussion of further steps to restore and improve the mobile communication of Vodafone-Ukraine in certain areas of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR, respectively).

The issue of water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbassa" supply systems were also duly considered.

The Co-ordinator of the Working Group, Per Fischer, welcomed the extension of the agreement on water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" supply system for a year ahead.

The Working Group on Humanitarian Issues continued its discussion on the exchange of detainees. Another topic was the improvement of conditions for crossing the contact line, including possibilities for proper repairs of the pathway to the bridge in Stanytsia Luhanska.

The Working Group on Political Issues further considered the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and modalities of local elections in CADR and CARL.

As you know, tomorrow (26.07.2018) Berlin will host Normandy Four meeting on the level of Political Directors. In the spirit of my previous statements, I would like to welcome the fact that the possible involvement of UN forces to resolve the conflict in the east of Ukraine will be the tomorrow's topic of discussion”.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous reporting period and one ceasefire violation in Luhansk region. The Mission followed up on reports of a civilian casualty in Dokuchaievsk and observed fresh damage in one of its residential areas. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The Mission recorded a ceasefire violation near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and again observed military-type presence in the Zolote disengagement area. Its access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas, as well as in Yasne and again near Zaichenko. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Bolotene, Stanytsia Luhanska and Novotoshkivske, as well as in Popasna.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (about 50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening of 23 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded a projectile in flight from east to west 2-4km south-south-west, followed by 11 projectiles from north-north-west to south-south-east 100-200m west. About one hour later, the camera recorded, in sequence, a projectile from north-west to south-east and four projectiles from east-north-east to west-south-west, followed by totals of four projectiles (two from north-north-west to south-south-east, one from east to west and one from east-north-east to west-south-west) and four bursts, all 0.7-7km south.

The following day, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and 60 shots and bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-3km at directions ranging from south-west to north-west.

On the evening and night of 23-24 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, six projectiles in flight from south-west to north-east and a projectile from north-east to south-west, followed by an undetermined explosion and 12 projectiles (mostly from south-west to north-east), all 2-4km south-east.

On the evening and night of 23-24 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from south-east to north-west, a projectile from south to north and two projectiles from south-west to north-east, followed by an undetermined explosion, an illumination flare in vertical flight and 21 projectiles (11 from south-west to north-east and ten from south-east to north-west), all 2-3km north.

On the evening and night of 23-24 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from east to west, five airbursts, two illumination flares in vertical flight, three projectiles from east to west, and four projectiles from west to east, followed by totals of two explosions (one assessed as outgoing and the other undetermined), an illumination flare in vertical flight and 55 projectiles in flight (38 from east to west and 17 from west to east), all 5-7km south.

During the day on 24 July, positioned about 1km north-north-west of the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk, the SMM heard 14 explosions (one assessed as an airburst and the remainder undetermined) and about 30 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all at undetermined distances north-east. The SMM also heard an explosion assessed as an impact of a mortar round 3-4km south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded one ceasefire violation (explosion); it had recorded five ceasefire violations in the previous reporting period (one explosion).

The SMM followed up on reports of a civilian casualty. At a hospital in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that on the evening of 23 July a woman (aged 31) had been admitted with light shrapnel injuries to her right leg. They said that she had been injured earlier that day while at home on Komunalnyi Lane in the town. The woman told the SMM by telephone that between 19:00 and 19:30 on 23 July, while she had been near her house on Komunalnyi Lane, she had heard “something exploding in the air” nearby and had been injured by shrapnel. The SMM was unable to visit the house due to security concerns.

The SMM observed fresh damage caused by shelling in a residential area of Dokuchaievsk. At 6 Zhovtneva Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole (15cm in diameter) in a west-south-west-facing window of a first-floor apartment in a residential building, assessed as caused by a round (possibly 30mm) of an undetermined weapon fired from a west-south-westerly direction. A female resident (in her seventies) of the apartment told the SMM that a “large metal object” had penetrated the window at around 19:30 on 20 July when she had been at home with her husband and that she had heard “gunfire.”

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (41km south of Donetsk)[2], as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 17 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a member of the armed formations digging a trench in the Zolote disengagement area, about 900m north of the disengagement area’s southern edge and about 1.4km west of its eastern edge, which the Mission had previously observed (see SMM Daily Report 6 June 2018).

Near the Zolote disengagement area, on 23 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a recently dug trench in a residential area of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), about 1.3km west of the disengagement area’s western edge.

On the morning of 24 July, positioned near the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 300m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 1-3km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 24 July, positioned near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM did not observe ceasefire violations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled-areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted, on 23 July, a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) under camouflage netting in a residential area of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (61km west of Luhansk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled-areas, on 22 July, aerial imagery revealed the presence of three multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). On 23 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) and six tanks (T-64) near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk). On 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a probable tank (type undetermined) in a south-eastern residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 92km south of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 11 July 2018).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled-areas, on 24 July, the SMM saw a convoy consisting of three towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm) towed by trucks travelling east near Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk), 19 stationary tanks (T-64), eight of which were loaded on flatbed trains, at the railway station in Zachativka and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by a truck moving west in Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled-areas, on 21 July, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 25 probable towed howitzers (type undetermined), four probable self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) and 22 tanks (type undetermined) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk). On 22 July, aerial imagery revealed the presence of 21 towed howitzers (type undetermined) and 17 tanks (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) and eight probable self-propelled howitzers (type undetermined) and six tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk). On 23 July, aerial imagery revealed the presence of seven tanks (type undetermined) near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk). On 24 July, the SMM saw seven tanks (T-72) in firing positions, as well as at least 100 armed persons in military-style clothing, some of them assessed as engaged in training, at a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV), anti-aircraft weapons[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, an SMM long-range UAV spotted, on 23 July, an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk) and three IFVs (one BMP-2 and two BMP variants) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk). On 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a recent 250m-long extension of a trench about 1.5km north of Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018). The same day, the SMM saw an APC (MRAP Varta) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP variant) in the southern area of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk) and two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-Ch) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled-areas, on 22 July, aerial imagery revealed the presence of an ACV (type undetermined) near the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (15km south-west of city centre). On 23 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1), an ACV (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near Novoselivka. On 24 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five probable IFVs (BMP-1) and a probable APC (BTR variant) near Pikuzy. About 800m north-east of the abovementioned trench near Vodiane, the same UAV also spotted a recent 200m-long extension of a trench about 150m east of the nearest house in Pikuzy (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM observed unexploded ordnance (UXO) and demining activities. The SMM saw for the first time the fresh tailfin of an 82mm mortar round about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), assessed as fired from a northern direction. The tailfin was protruding from an asphalt road 300m west of a checkpoint of the armed formations.

About 500m north of Nikishyne (60km north-east of Donetsk), from a safe distance, the SMM observed six sappers from non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region marking areas in a field about 50m from a road with red-and-white tape.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations despite explicit security guarantees (see above and the table below).

The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works at the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), water intake station boreholes in Bolotene (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Luhansk) and the railway station in Popasna, as well as of a fibre optic cable near Stanytsia Luhanska and water pipelines near Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited a border area outside of government control. While at the pedestrian border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about half an hour, the SMM saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates, and six with “DPR” plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine and ten cars (four with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 19 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 24 July, when the SMM arrived in Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk) to follow up on reports of damage caused by shelling in the village, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing security reasons. Shortly thereafter, two cars (Lada) arrived and four men in military-style clothing (one armed) exited the cars. They told the SMM that it was not allowed to visit the location where the damage had occurred due to the proximity of “military positions”. The SMM was then escorted out of the village by one of the cars.
• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations (both armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage westward to Pikuzy and southward to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), saying that it was “for the security of the SMM”. The SMM was unable to follow up on reports of damage caused by shelling in residential areas of Pikuzy due to the restriction.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by telephone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed. 

Conditional access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after checking its trailer. Other impediments: 
• At the forward position of the armed formations near the wooden ramps of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, a member of the armed formations did not allow the SMM to photograph vegetation on the sides of the road between the forward position and the bridge.
• Medical staff at a hospital in Luhansk city (non-government-controlled) refused to provide the SMM information regarding civilian casualties by telephone, citing the need for permission from the armed formations.

[1] Please see Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.

[2] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited; therefore, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 25 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, and the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, welcomed today the latest efforts by the Montenegrin Technical Working Group on Self-Regulation in developing guidelines for moderating online comments in Montenegro.

“Media self-regulation is an important mechanism to promote quality information, to safeguard editorial freedom, and to strengthen credibility. I praise the efforts of Montenegrin journalists to develop self- regulation through their Code of Ethics and the future adoption of the Guidelines for Moderating Online Comments. This is a good example of how different models of self-regulation can coexist and work together based on shared principles. I believe that this document will be very useful to online media platforms, as well as to the wider media community,” said Désir.

Representative Désir hosted today a meeting in Vienna with the members of the Working Group on Self-Regulation composed of the Media Council for Self-Regulation, the Ombudspersons of the daily newspapers Dan and Vijesti and of the weekly newspaper Monitor. They presented the draft Guidelines for Moderating Online comments, which is a new important step in the implementation of the Montenegrin Journalists’ Code of Ethics. The Guidelines are a result of several months of co-operative work undertaken by the members of this Working Group. They include concrete steps and rules for news outlets and online media to deal with various kinds of comments on their websites. The Guidelines aim to tackle illegal and unethical content, threats, calls to violence and hate speech, while preserving the freedom of expression of online commentators.

“The OSCE Mission to Montenegro strongly supports joint efforts of members of the Technical Working Group for Self-regulation and will continue to do so,” said Ambassador Daviet.

Representative Désir welcomed the close co-operation between his Office, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, and the Technical Working Group on Self-Regulation, noting that the official presentation of the draft Guidelines discussed today is scheduled for September this year.

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VIENNA, 25 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, said today he was saddened by the tragic death of journalist Denis Suvorov in Nizhny Novgorod, Russian Federation.

Suvorov’s body was reportedly found with signs of violent trauma at a construction site in the city on 23 July. The journalist worked as a presenter at the Nizhny Novgorod State Television and Radio Company.  

“The tragic death of Denis Suvorov is terrible news for Russian journalism and I extend my deepest sympathy and condolences to his relatives and colleagues,” Désir said.

“I call on the authorities to swiftly investigate the crime and its motives and circumstances. All perpetrators must be identified and brought to justice,” he added, noting that law enforcement agencies have launched an investigation into the case.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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KYIV, 25 July 2018 – OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger will hold a press briefing on Friday, 27 July, in Kramatorsk.

As a part of Greminger’s visit to eastern Ukraine, he will talk about the OSCE’s role and activities in and around Ukraine.

Journalists are invited to attend the press briefing on Friday, 27 July 2018, at 15:15 (Kyiv time) at the OSCE office in Kramatorsk (41 Kramatorsk boulevard).

Journalists wishing to attend are required to send an e-mail confirming their attendance to smm-press@osce.org no later than 15:00, 27 July 2018.

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SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs).

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO) and one first responder[1]. The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                     

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

During the reporting period, the OM did not receive the usual data on persons crossing at the two border checkpoints from the Rostov-on-Don Regional Administration.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs increased to 52 persons (compared to 24 last week); 22 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 30 into Ukraine. Forty-seven of these crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP, while the other five occurred at the Gukovo BCP. They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and another eight into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when five families were observed crossing the border into the Russian Federation and another three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                        

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period the OTs observed an increase in the number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (432 compared to 401 observed during the previous week). There were 211 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 221 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted:  Luhansk-Kharkiv; Rovenky-Kyiv; and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period the OM observed a general decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 786 to 756 (275 at the Gukovo BCP and 481 at the Donetsk BCP); 428 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 328 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Among them, the OTs continued to also observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks remained 48 (unchanged compared to the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP went from 85 to 127: out of the total number of trucks scanned, 93 trucks (73 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 34 trucks (27 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. As compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased by around 34 per cent (from 153 to 205 vehicles); 90 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 115 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 37 occasions, compared to 36 last week; the OTs assessed that 20 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 17 to Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 5 June to 10 July 2018, please see the attachment here.

[1] First responders are OSCE staff or mission members deployed to another mission for a short period of time.

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

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VIENNA, 24 July 2018 - OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed today the recent agreement between the authorities and the media community in the Netherlands to counter threats and violence against journalists. The move comes against the background of the deteriorating safety climate for media workers.

A survey of Dutch journalists in 2017 showed that a majority have been the target of threats and abuse, both on and offline. In addition, some crime reporters in the Netherlands have been assigned police protection, after receiving a number of serious threats.  And, in June of this year, two violent attacks were carried out against the editorial offices of the daily newspaper De Telegraaf and weeklies Panorama and De Nieuwe Revu.

The agreement was reached between the national police, the public prosecutor’s office, the Dutch Association of Journalists (NVJ) and the Dutch Society of Chief Editors. Its aim is to improve awareness raising among law enforcement services on the issue of safety of journalists and to offer training and concrete guidelines for law enforcement to better respond to threats against the media. The police and the public prosecutor have agreed to give priority to incidents concerning journalists.

The agreement extends to media outlets and employers who will provide training for journalists on safety and set up security plans in the event of an attack or threat. Journalists will contribute to the agreement by systematically reporting any security-related incidents and filing complaints with law-enforcement. Moreover, a ‘Violence Against Media’ application will be developed, offering practical guidelines and information for journalists confronted with threats and violence.

“Threats and violence against journalists are unacceptable in any democracy. This important initiative, agreed upon jointly by the Dutch law enforcement authorities and the media community, shows how constructive dialogue involving all stakeholders can lead to significant improvements for the entire community,” Désir stated. “I very much look forward to seeing similar initiatives in other OSCE participating States. In every part of the OSCE region, journalists must be free to work, without fear of violence or intimidation.”

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter:@OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

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