OSCE

VIENNA, 15 October 2017 – On the eve of the first anniversary of the horrific murder of Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia, the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir recalled the need to better ensure the safety of every journalist in the OSCE region, and called on the Maltese authorities to ensure that all those involved in this killing face justice.

“One year later I am still deeply shocked and outraged by the killing of Daphne Caruana Galizia. When an independent, investigative journalist is targeted with violence, our democracy is also targeted,”, said Désir. “Daphne has become a symbol for all journalists who investigate, report, criticize, express dissent and hold the powerful accountable. She has become a symbol of courage.”.

Daphne Caruana Galizia died on 16 October 2017 when a bomb in her car was detonated as she was driving from her home in Bidnija, Malta.

“We must honour her memory by continuing her work – following the example set by her colleagues with the Daphne project. This is a powerful pledge that nothing will stop the work of courageous journalists like Daphne. By honouring her memory we defend the safety of journalists and demand that authorities investigate each threat, combat impunity and respect media freedom everywhere,” said Désir.

In December 2017 Désir welcomed the arrest and bringing of charges against three suspects in Caruana Galizia’s murder investigation.

“To honour her memory, justice must be served and all those responsible for her death must be brought to justice and convicted. This is paramount to defeat intimidation and corruption and to preserve a free and open society.”.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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SKOPJE, 13 October 2018 – Students from 27 schools throughout the country gathered for a day of interaction, fun and entertainment as part of the Building Bridges Fund annual event in Skopje today, organized by the OSCE Mission to Skopje.

The schools all benefited from the Building Bridges Fund, which allocates small grants for joint activities in schools with different languages of instruction.

“We at the OSCE, believe that making connections between students from different communities is extremely important. For this reason, we continue to support the Building Bridges Fund, together with the Ministry of Education and Science, through our newly-established co-operation with the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy,” said Ambassador Clemens Koja, Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje,

Minister of Education and Science Arber Ademi added: “The project has been a success for four years now. It aims to familiarize young generations with the basic ethics and values of tolerance, respect and understanding of differences in the culture, religion and traditions of ethnic communities. The objective is for these values to be assimilated by each and every young person. It is the only way to ensure the unity of society, as one of the foundations of a stable, strong and prosperous state.”

The “Building Bridges Together” event is a joint project of the Ministry of Education and Science, the OSCE Mission to Skopje, the Embassy of the Netherlands, and the governments of the United States, Austria and Italy. It supports joint activities at schools involving students from all communities and linguistic backgrounds in order to increase their interaction, understanding and integration in the schooling environment.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. It observed a fresh crater caused by shelling in a residential area of Sakhanka. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske, and observed ceasefire violations near the Petrivske and Zolote disengagement areas. An SMM patrol heard and saw an explosion near Pervomaisk, approximately 300m west of its location. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Siedove, Novoazovsk and Voznesenivka, near the border with the Russian Federation.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Pidlisne. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles, including a truck carrying an armoured personnel carrier, entering and exiting Ukraine via an unpaved road in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Sakhanka, Artema, Donetskyi, Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and Krasnyi Lyman, as well as to enable demining in Zolote‑2/Karbonit. In Kharkiv, the SMM observed a protest at an event hosted by an organization advocating for the rights of the LGBT community.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 235 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 310 explosions).

On the evening and night of 11-12 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 56 explosions (32 assessed as impacts of rounds of undetermined weapons, one as an airburst and 23 as undetermined) and 52 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east and from east to west), all 0.5-3km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 11-12 October, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) recorded three undetermined explosions, about 240 projectiles in flight (mostly west-north-west to east-south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 2-4km at directions ranging from north-north-west to north-north-east.

On the evening of 11 October, the SMM camera in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, 105 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south and south to north), two muzzle flashes and three bursts of undetermined weapons, all 2-4km east, east-south-east and south-east.

On the evening of 11 October, while in Svitlodarsk, the SMM heard 58 undetermined explosions and 22 bursts (17 assessed as small-arms fire and five undetermined), all 2-6km south-east. On the morning of 12 October, while in the same location, the SMM heard 37 undetermined explosions and five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-6km at directions ranging from north to south-east.

During the day on 12 October, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 16 undetermined explosions and eight bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-3km south-east, south-south-east and south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 270 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions).

On the morning of 12 October, as it was driving south on road T-1316 near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled 58km west of Luhansk), an SMM patrol heard and saw an explosion followed by a black cloud of smoke, approximately 300m west of its location, assessed as the impact of an artillery round fired from a northerly direction. The SMM immediately left the area safely.

During the day on 12 October, positioned near Nyzhnie (government-controlled, 56km north-west of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and about 80 bursts of undetermined weapons, all 3-5km south-east.

During the day on 12 October, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 30 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-10km north-east and east-north-east. Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions and six shots of small-arms fire, all 3-15km south-east and north-east. Positioned on the south-south-eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 27 undetermined explosions, 18 bursts of undetermined weapons and what it assessed as an outgoing multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) salvo, all 4-12km north-east.

During the day on 12 October, positioned about 2.5km south-south-east of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five undetermined explosions and eight bursts of small-arms fire, all 5-6km north-east.  Positioned on the south-eastern edge of Holubivske, it heard 48 undetermined explosions and about 150 bursts of small-arms fire, all 3-6km at directions ranging from north-west to north-north-east. Positioned on the north-western outskirts of Holubivske, it heard six undetermined explosions 5-6km north-east.

The SMM observed a fresh crater caused by shelling in a residential area of Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). On 12 October, at 39 Oktiabrska Street, the SMM observed a fresh crater (1.5m in diameter and 50cm deep) in the garden of an abandoned house, assessed as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. A resident of Sakhanka told the SMM that shelling had occurred in the village on the evening of 11 October.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the morning of 12 October, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about five minutes, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-7km north-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Positioned 2km north of Pervomaisk for about 20 minutes, the SMM heard four explosions assessed as outgoing rounds of undetermined weapons 2-3km south-south-west, as well as heard and saw an explosion assessed as the impact of an artillery round 300m west (see above), all assessed as outside the disengagement area. Positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area for about 50 minutes, the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions 10-13km east-north-east and 38 bursts and shots (16 assessed as shots of infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) cannon (30mm), ten as bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire and 12 as small-arms fire) 2-4km east-north-east, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the morning of 12 October, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske for about an hour, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire 0.5km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines, in a government-controlled area, on 10 October an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted three tanks (T-64) in a treeline west of Pidlisne (70km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites, in government-controlled areas, on 11 October an SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-72) at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk), four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35, Strela-10) and three anti-tank guided missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) in Peredove (68km south-west of Donetsk). On 12 October, the SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Spirne (96km north of Donetsk) and three tanks (two T-72 and a T-64) at the railway station in Rubizhne.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV) and an anti-aircraft gun[3] in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 11 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Leonidivka (41km north of Donetsk) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk). On 12 October, the SMM saw two stationary IFVs (BMP-1) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 12 October, the SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Pervomaisk.

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted vehicles, including a truck carrying an armoured personnel carrier (APC), entering and exiting Ukraine in the middle of the night via an unpaved road in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities. Between around 22:20 and 01:40 on the night of 11-12 October, the UAV spotted two trucks (probable Ural) parked along an unpaved road 500m south of the centre of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk). The UAV observed three separate groups of vehicles driving eastward and park at a location near the border with the Russian Federation where the SMM has previously observed convoys of covered cargo trucks entering Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 9 August 2018). The vehicles included two sedans, two tractor trailers, seven KamAZ trucks, four Ural trucks, a heavy-equipment transport trailer (KamAZ) carrying an APC (MT-LB), three sport-utility vehicles and a minivan. Several people were seen standing and walking between the vehicles. The UAV observed two sedans travelling westward from the border with the Russian Federation, which parked on the side of the road and established a makeshift checkpoint about 100m north-east of the location where the three groups of vehicles had parked and 3.5km east-north-east of Manych. A sport-utility vehicle departed the area where the three groups of vehicles were parked and travelled eastward toward the border with the Russian Federation, stopping at the makeshift checkpoint. The other vehicles, except the minivan, two sport-utility vehicles and a sedan, then proceeded in pairs to approach the makeshift checkpoint and interact with the people present, and continued travelling eastward. At 01:22, the two parked sedans that had established the makeshift checkpoint turned around and travelled eastward in the direction of the border with the Russian Federation. At 01:34, the UAV spotted a KamAZ truck with a twin axle trailer, two Ural trucks and a KamAZ truck as well as a sport-utility vehicle traveling westward on the same road from the border with the Russian Federation in the direction of Manych.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to gas distribution pipelines near Sakhanka, to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk) and to water distribution infrastructure in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM visited three border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw five cars (two with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and three cargo trucks (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also observed 15 cars (two with Russian Federation and three with Ukrainian licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates) and a bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for about 35 minutes, the SMM saw five cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates, and two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and a tanker-truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a man and a woman (both aged 20-30) entering Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kharkiv, on 11 October, the SMM saw about 30 people known to the SMM as members of Freikorps (men, 20-35 years old), five of them in uniforms with a white and black emblem, standing in a courtyard outside the building of an art centre at 2 Pletnevskyi Lane where an event hosted by a non-governmental organization (NGO) advocating for the rights of the LGBT community was ongoing. One of the men gave a speech to media present expressing opposition to the NGO’s activities. The SMM saw the Freikorps protestors block a group of about 25-30 people (mixed gender, 18-40 years old) attempting to join the event while both groups shouted slogans at each other. Approximately 20 police officers (12 of them equipped with helmets and flak jackets) separated the two groups. The SMM did not observe any other incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint north-west of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the town saying that a “special forces operation” was ongoing in the area.
• Two members of the armed formations again prevented the SMM from passing through a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, saying that a “special forces operation” was ongoing.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka two members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing “orders from their superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC said there were mines on the road south of the bridge. The SMM informed the JCCC.5

Other impediments:

• On four separate occasions, SMM mini-UAVs temporarily lost their GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming[5], near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk), Novohnativka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk), Lebedynske (government controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol) and Mykolaivka (government-controlled, 40km south of Donetsk). The SMM landed the UAVs safely.
• Staff at the hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk) again requested the SMM to obtain permission from senior members of the armed formations in order to provide information on a civilian casualty.
• A senior staff member at a school in Chornukhyne (non-government-controlled, 64km south-west of Luhansk) told the SMM it would need to submit an authorization from the armed formations in order to be provided information.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. It observed fresh bullet impacts at a forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and again observed military positions inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as again near Zoria and Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles (including one carrying an anti-aircraft gun) in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region moving on a dirt road towards the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities; the SMM recalled the unmanned aerial vehicle due to multiple instances of GPS signal loss assessed as jamming. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Marinka, Artema, Vesela Hora, Donetskyi, Krasnyi Lyman and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, as well as to enable demining in Zolote‑2/Karbonit. The SMM observed gatherings in protest of low salaries and high utility costs in Lviv, Dnipro and Ivano-Frankivsk and an evacuation caused by a bomb threat in Kherson.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 310 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (305 explosions).

On the evening and night of 10-11 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 60 undetermined explosions, an airburst, 20 muzzle flashes, about 130 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from north-west to south-east) and two illumination flares, all 0.5-5km at directions ranging from south-east to west.

On the evening of 10 October, while in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard about 20 undetermined explosions and about ten bursts and shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-5km south-south-west. The following morning, from the same location, the SMM heard about 50 undetermined explosions and six bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-5km north-west.

During the day on 11 October, positioned on the north-western edge of Horlivka, the SMM heard about 60 undetermined explosions 4-7km at northerly directions and two undetermined explosions and a shot of small-arms fire 1-3km south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 40 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 120 explosions).

On 11 October, positioned near Pidlisne (government-controlled, 70km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and, several seconds later, saw dark smoke rising, 8-10km south-west. Later the same day, positioned in Loskutivka (government-controlled, 72km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions and, several seconds later, saw dark smoke rising, 7-9km south-west.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

The SMM saw 30-40 fresh bullet holes in the concrete blocks and sandbags fortifying the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area. The SMM assessed the damage to have been caused by the impact of heavy-machine-gun rounds fired from south-south-east; the damage was not apparent to the SMM on 10 October. A Ukrainian Armed Forces Officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co‑ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the checkpoint had come under fire between 02:00 and 04:00 on 11 October.

On the evening of 10 October, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). In the early morning of 11 October, the SMM, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska, heard two undetermined explosions and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms fire 3-5km south-south-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 11 October, the SMM saw an armed soldier of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the Zolote disengagement area, near observed positions south of the road T1316 railway bridge (see SMM Daily Report 11 October 2018). The same day, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) approximately 500m and 700m, respectively, north-east of the railway bridge (also inside the disengagement area). Approximately 1.2km north-east of the railway bridge, also inside the disengagement area, the same UAV spotted another IFV (BMP-1) (see SMM Daily Report 11 October 2018). The SMM assessed the vehicles and positions as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

In the early morning of 11 October, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion 4-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). Later the same day, positioned on the northern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard three undetermined explosions 5-6km north-west (also assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.*

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines on 11 October, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw seven tanks (T-64) near Pidlisne. In non-government-controlled areas, on 10 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

Beyond the respective withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites on 11 October, in government-controlled areas, the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM‑21 Grad, 122mm) in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk), a towed mortar (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), 20 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) near Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and a tank (T-72) near the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 10 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and four IFVs (BMP variants) near Zolote, including three in the disengagement area (see above).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 10 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three IFVs (BMP-1) and the ongoing construction of an underground shelter near Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR-80) near Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe mines. On 10 October, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in three rows across road H-21, about 2km north of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2018).

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted vehicular activity in the middle of the night in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region along an unpaved road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities. Between 23:00 and 24:00 on 10 October, the UAV spotted two trucks (one Ural and one Kamaz) and four sport-utility vehicles driving east along an unpaved road near Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk) to a location near the border with the Russian Federation where the SMM has previously observed convoys of covered cargo trucks entering Ukraine (see SMM Daily Report 9 August 2018). During the same period, the UAV spotted two Ural trucks (one mounted with an anti-aircraft-gun (ZU‑23, 23mm)), a minivan and a car in a field along the same dirt path, approximately 2km from the border. At 23:45, the SMM recalled the UAV from the area due to multiple instances of signal interference assessed as jamming.*

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk) and to water distribution infrastructure in Vesela Hora, Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and Krasnyi Lyman (non-government-controlled, 30km north-west of Luhansk). It also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire.

The SMM observed gatherings in protest of low salaries and high utility costs. In Dnipro, on 10 October, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Regional State Administration building at 1 Oleksandra Polia Avenue, where it saw about 500 people (men and women, 30-50 years old) protesting what they said were poor living standards, low salaries and high utility prices. On the site, the Mission saw about 20 police officers and 30 soldiers and no security incidents. In Lviv, on 9 October, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Ivan Franko National University at 1 Universytetska Street, where it saw about 3,000 people (men and women, different age groups) demanding better living conditions for teachers. The Mission saw six police officers and one police car and no security incidents. Also on 9 October, in Ivano-Frankivsk, the SMM monitored a public gathering in front of the Regional State Administration building at 21 Mykhaila Hrushevskoho Street, where it saw approximately 850 people (men and women, different age groups), several of whom were carrying banners and flags of state administration employees’ trade unions, protesting proposals to increase gas and electricity prices before winter. It heard protestors express dissatisfaction with low salaries. On the site, the SMM saw about 12 police officers and no security incidents.

About 150 people were evacuated from a forum at Kherson Regional Art Museum at 34 Soborna Street in Kherson. According to organizers of the event, the evacuation was due to a phoned-in bomb threat. The SMM observed members of the police, State Emergency Service and fire brigade and a police bomb squad enter the premises. The audience was able to return after about an hour, and the forum continued without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations (three visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).
• At an agricultural compound also used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Zoria (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Mariupol), a security guard denied the SMM access. (See SMM Daily Report of 11 October 2018.)

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its signal, assessed as due to jamming, near Manych, an area near the border with the Russian Federation. The SMM landed the UAV safely.
• The SMM long-range UAV temporarily lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming 6 in non-government-controlled areas near Ilovaisk (30km south-east of Donetsk) and Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk).
• On two occasions, signal interference6 prevented the SMM from launching a mini-UAV near Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk). The UAV was not damaged.
• A senior staff member at a school in Teple (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 33km south-east of Luhansk) told the SMM it would need to submit a letter of approval from the armed formations in order to be provided information.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

COPENHAGEN, 12 October 2018 – Following a wave of detentions in Turkey in recent days, the leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s human rights committee expressed concern that authorities were targeting political opponents in advance of local elections scheduled for March 2019.

Some 90 people were reportedly detained by Turkish police on Tuesday over suspected links to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). The People’s Democratic Party reports that more than 200 people have been detained over several days, including dozens of party administrators and members.

Following these reports, the officers of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s General Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Chair Margareta Kiener Nellen (MP, Switzerland), Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (MP, Germany), and Rapporteur Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (MP, Cyprus) issued the following statement:

“The widespread detentions and harassment of political opponents in Turkey must stop. Particularly with local elections coming next year, it is crucial that parties and candidates can present their views and qualifications free of pressure from the government. The very real security concerns faced by Turkey must not be misused by the authorities to target their opponents,” they said.

They continued: “Already there are dozens upon dozens of municipalities that are run by trustees installed by the government in place of their duly elected mayors. It is simply unacceptable that voters’ will is overturned in this way, and we call on the authorities to stop this practice.”

The officers noted that in the OSCE’s 1990 Copenhagen Document all participating States, including Turkey, agreed to “ensure that candidates who obtain the necessary number of votes required by law are duly installed in office and are permitted to remain in office until their term expires or is otherwise brought to an end in a manner that is regulated by law in conformity with democratic parliamentary and constitutional procedures.”

Kiener Nellen, Link and Hadjiyianni expressed their hope for continued constructive engagement with Turkish parliamentarians within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly on all challenges facing Turkey and the OSCE.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A presentation of a new report commissioned by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) that examines the effectiveness of gender equality mechanisms at the regional level in Ukraine, was hosted by the Equal Opportunities Caucus of Ukraine’s parliament on 12 October 2018 in Kyiv.

The “Study of the Effectiveness of Regional-Level Gender Equality Mechanisms in Ukraine: The Way Forward” identifies several key challenges impacting the effectiveness of national instruments for gender equality and offers recommendations to address these shortcomings. The recommendations include institutionalizing the positions of regional gender advisers, introducing further capacity-building measures and strengthening the monitoring of gender equality standards at the regional level.

“The report represents the continuation of ODIHR’s assistance towards strengthening democratic institutions in Ukraine and the OSCE region,” said Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah, Chief of the ODIHR Democratic Governance and Gender Unit. “Strengthening mechanisms for gender equality and gender mainstreaming efforts are key to ensure that democratic institutions equally serve both women and men. This is of great importance for Ukraine, as women still face challenges affecting their enjoyment of equal opportunities and rights.”

Mariia Ionova, Co-chair of the Equal Opportunities Caucus, said: “Regional gender equality mechanisms are important vehicles for advancing gender equality in everyday lives of women and men in Ukraine. A better understanding of the needs and challenges at the regional level, which this study can provide, is essential for effective policy-making.”

The study is part of an ODIHR project launched in 2015 to enhance effective mechanisms for dialogue among civil society and key government stakeholders to address human rights issues in the country, in line with OSCE commitments and other international standards. The study also contributes to ODIHR’s efforts to support the implementation of the 2004 OSCE Action Plan for the Promotion of Gender Equality. The Action Plan mandates ODIHR to provide know-how to participating States and support the development of democratic institutions for advancing gender equality at the local and national levels. 

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

Officials from Turkmenistan's Presidential Administration and the Ministry of Defence discussed best practices in enhancing ammunition stockpile security during an OSCE-organized study visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina that concluded on 12 October 2018.

The visit began with introductory presentations by representatives of the European Union Force (EUFOR) and the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina that gave a general overview of their activities in the field of small arms and light weapons (SALW) and conventional ammunition (CA) management.

The delegation visited the ammunition site at Doboj where a newly established laboratory is located. Delegation members observed how chemical and thermal analysis of gun powder is made, as well as three methods of ammunition disposal. The participants also visited the weapons storage site in Visoko and the ammunition storage site in Krupa where they were shown warehouses recently refurbished in accordance with international standards of ammunition and weapons storage management.

“Small arms and light weapons and conventional ammunition continue to represent a serious threat to security in the OSCE region. In this regard, the OSCE participating States have adopted a number of key documents to regulate their production, transfer, storage, collection and destruction," said Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat. She added that the Office remains committed to providing further support to the government of Turkmenistan in this field.

As part of the visit, delegation members held meetings with their counterparts at the Defence Ministry of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Discussions focused on the management of weapons and ammunition in the country’s armed forces and capacity building of life-cycle management of ammunition.

The study visit was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, in close co-operation with the OSCE Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Forum for Security Co-operation Support Unit at the OSCE Secretariat.

399470 Anna Vorobeva OSCE Mission to Moldova

Sixty-five prosecutors and judges improved their skills in investigating and prosecuting cybercrimes that target children during two workshops held in Vadul-lui-Voda, Moldova from 9 to 12 October 2018. The workshops were organized by the National Institute of Justice (NIJ) in partnership with the OSCE Mission to Moldova and the US Embassy in Moldova.

Participants were familiarized with the national and international legal norms on investigating and prosecuting cases involving online child abuse and child pornography as well as manipulation techniques used by offenders such as cyberbullying, sexting and online grooming (luring children into conducting illegal activities).

A special session of the workshop was devoted to the best practices of child interviewing techniques led by a professional phycologist. During the session, participants were sensitized to the specifics of children’s behaviour online, the psychological profile of online abuse victims, as well as behavioural disorders of potential abusers. It was highlighted that prosecutors and judges must be aware that child victims of online abuse may offer confusing testimonies due to the trauma they have experienced.

“The Internet is an unavoidable part of modern life, presenting implications for children as both victims and offenders of cybercrime. Therefore this topic is of high interest to prosecutors and judges in Moldova,” said Boris Talpa, a judge and a training co-ordinator at the NIJ. “The participants truly appreciated the practical sessions of the workshop and noted that a simulation exercise on investigating cybercrimes could be a theme of a potential summer school for judges and prosecutors.”

The workshop is part of a series of similar educational activities organized by the OSCE Mission to Moldova in co-operation with NIJ under the Mission’s human rights programme. The programme‘s goals is to provide advice and expertise on human and minority rights and democratic transformation in Moldova.

Željka Šulc

The Head of the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Bruce G. Berton, leading a delegation of Mission staff, lay a wreath of flowers at a memorial for civilian war victims in Žepče on 12 October 2018, and paid respect to all civilians who lost their lives in the 1992-1995 war in the country.

The memorial was built as a result of efforts of the Žepče Association of Civilian War Victims and its construction was supported by the local municipal authorities.

Ambassador Berton also met with the Mayor of Žepče, Speaker of Žepče Municipal Council and other city officials to mark the “Day of the Municipality of Žepče”, which is held annually on 14 October.

“Žepče represents a community whose citizens and leaders have invested tremendous efforts towards reconciliation and co-existence after the tragedies of the 1990s,” said Ambassador Berton. “Last year’s decision by the authorities here to build a memorial to the civilian victims of war symbolizes these efforts and we commend the local authorities for jointly paying their respect to the victims.”

He added that the OSCE Mission remains a reliable partner of the country in its efforts to achieve full reconciliation, for the benefit of all of its citizens.

VIENNA, 12 October 2018 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, welcomed the progress in the investigation of the brutal murder of the Bulgarian journalist Viktoria Marinova.

“I welcome important steps in the investigation of the murder of Viktoria Marinova, the arrest of a suspect in Germany on 9 October and today’s German court decision to extradite him to Bulgaria,” said Désir. “I praise the swift action of the police and judiciary and the international co-operation, which led to this arrest. It is essential that the ongoing investigation establishes all the circumstances of this horrible crime.”

Viktoria Marinova was a TV anchor and administrative director of the TVN television station in Ruse, a regional centre 300 kilometres north of Sofia. She was brutally murdered there on 6 October. The suspect was detained in Germany three days later.

The Representative called for justice and thorough investigation on 7 October: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/398888

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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COPENHAGEN, 12 November 2018 – Election monitoring by members of parliament helps to emphasize the importance of democratic processes, said OSCE Parliamentary Assembly Vice-President Isabel Santos (MP, Portugal) Thursday at a high-level conference on the Future of Election Observation in Brussels.

The conference was organized by the European Parliament and included broad participation by international organizations, national parliamentarians and civil society representatives from across Europe and beyond.

Vice-President Santos led a delegation on behalf of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, including Secretary General Roberto Montella, which was strengthened by participation from several senior Assembly Members including OSCE PA Vice-Presidents Margareta Cederfelt (Sweden) and Victor Dobre (Romania), and Barbara Bartus and Lucian Romascanu, the Heads of the Polish and Romanian delegations to the OSCE PA, respectively.

Speaking on the topic of the role and best practices of parliamentary observation, Vice-President Santos stressed that the OSCE PA’s balanced approach of observing in both consolidated and developing democracies helps to reinforce that election observation should be seen as an opportunity to strengthen all democracies. She also underlined the advantages of parliamentary work in observation.

“Put simply, oversight and advice of democratic processes needs input from people chosen through democratic processes. Observation is fundamentally about bringing additional transparency to election processes, so transparency of how observers are selected is critical,” said Santos. “Parliamentarians’ opinions and work is transparent by nature of being publicly elected officials.”

Vice-President Santos described OSCE PA procedures that help to ensure continued credibility and accountability of OSCE PA election observation missions. She also noted concerns related to ‘rogue’ or ‘fake’ observers that do not work on transparent and systematic methods. Such projects should not undermine the important work of credible internationally-mandated observation missions, she said.

Secretary General Montella, while recognizing the importance of a strict code of conduct for parliamentary observers in order to preserve the integrity and impartiality of election observation missions, also encouraged civil servants and experts to exercise maximum independence and called for a more transparent and accountable policy of recruitment of the experts involved in electoral assessments.

The high-level conference included remarks by Antonio Tajani, President of the European Parliament, and Federica Mogherini, High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission, among other dignitaries.

OSCE PA work in the field of election observation dates back to 1993, since which time the Assembly has observed over 150 electoral processes in more than 30 countries. In conducting election observation work, the OSCE PA works particularly closely with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, as well as the European Parliament, the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly and the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.

The interventions of Santos, Montella, Dobre and Cederfelt are available to watch at the OSCE PA’s YouTube channel.

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VIENNA, 11 October 2018 – With one billion citizens of the OSCE area – or 15 per cent of the world’s population – relying on diplomacy to succeed in creating a world free from oppression, discrimination, poverty and violence, political will must be generated to ensure full implementation of OSCE commitments, Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) said today in Vienna.

Addressing the OSCE Permanent Council, comprised of the ambassadors of 57 participating States, Tsereteli noted that 2018 marks 100 years since the end of the First World War, which serves as a reminder of the possible consequences of what happens when diplomacy fails.

“There is always a danger that history will repeat itself. At times where there is a lack of constructive political dialogue, we must be mindful of this lesson,” Tsereteli said.

Regretting that the state of health in the OSCE has not improved since the last time he addressed the Permanent Council earlier this year, he stressed that through dialogue, progress can be made in these times of uncertainty and instability.

It is an integral duty of the OSCE to ensure that democracy and the rule of law are respected in all participating States, Tsereteli said, stressing that the PA takes this responsibility seriously.

“We continue to be very worried about the deteriorating human rights situation in several countries and, in particular, about the situation of the media, which are confronted with multiple threats,” Tsereteli said.

He noted that the consensus-based decision-making procedure that the OSCE relies on has its strengths but cautioned that the consensus model can be a weakness when the single-country veto is misused.

The President highlighted the important role that the OSCE plays in the field, expressed the PA’s appreciation for the work done by the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine, and noted that the South Caucasus would benefit from reopening OSCE field presences.

“It is the OSCE’s paradox that in the South Caucasus, where each of our three participating States have suffered from war and where the OSCE is most needed, the OSCE is absent,” he said.

Tsereteli described his diplomatic visits carried out as President, noting that he has been to Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom. “All these high-level meetings are useful to remind of OSCE commitments and deepen our partnerships,” he said.

He discussed his trip to Ukraine, which included a visit to the contact line, where the PA delegation heard moving testimonies from those living in the area immediately impacted by the hostilities. He reiterated the need to improve conditions for civilians in the area who are directly affected by ceasefire violations and mine explosions.

The PA President also took the opportunity to highlight recent activities of the Assembly, including the Autumn Meeting that was held last week in Bishkek and the PA’s participation in the OSCE Human Dimension Implementation Meeting last month in Warsaw, as well as upcoming election observation missions to Georgia and the United States.

He expressed gratitude to the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the OSCE Secretariat, Institutions and Missions, for the close co-operation and support of the PA, and expressed high hopes for Slovakia’s Chairmanship of the OSCE next year.

During the question and answer session, exchanges with OSCE ambassadors echoed concerns over the general state of the Organization, and the inability to achieve progress in solving conflicts in the OSCE area.

Permanent Council delegates underlined President Tsereteli’s proactive leadership to promote OSCE principles and values. They also recognized the value of the OSCE PA in fostering exchanges and generating the political will to uphold OSCE commitments, and thanked OSCE parliamentarians for their advocacy on behalf of the Organization and its field missions, in particular.

President Tsereteli and OSCE ambassadors also discussed the PA's internal reforms, election observation activities and co-operation with the ODIHR, and perspectives for stronger OSCE PA engagement in the South Caucasus.

While he was in Vienna, the President also participated in the Inter-Parliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, where he spoke this afternoon at the workshop “OSCE a Key Partner in the East West Dialogue.” In his remarks, he noted that the OSCE’s inclusiveness is one its strongest assets.

“All its members, whether major players or micro-States, are on an equal level when it comes to OSCE decision-making,” said Tsereteli.

For President Tsereteli’s full remarks to the Permanent Council, please click here.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station; it heard small-arms fire overhead, despite security guarantees having been provided. The SMM followed up on reports that a man had been injured by an explosion while handling an explosive device in Lutuhyne. The Mission observed damage caused by gunfire in residential areas of Oleksandrivka and in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district. It recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Verkhnoshyrokivske, Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Zoria.* The SMM observed weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Dokuchaievsk and Vilkhivka. An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle again spotted vehicles moving on a dirt road towards the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to critical civilian infrastructure near Zalizne, Artema, Vesela Nora, Donetskyi and Mykhailivka, as well as to enable demining in Zolote-2/Karbonit. In Kyiv region, the Mission followed up on reports of an explosion at an apartment of a C14 member and monitored a public gathering in relation to the explosion.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations,[1] including 305 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 520 explosions).

On the evening and night of 9-10 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 60 undetermined explosions, seven airbursts, 22 muzzle flashes, about 70 projectiles in flight (mostly from west to east and from north-west to south-east) and an illumination flare, all 0.5-4km at southerly directions.

On the evening and night of 9-10 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded about 60 undetermined explosions and about 40 projectiles in flight (mostly from north to south, from south to north and from west-south-west to east-north-east), all 1-4km at easterly directions.

During the day on 10 October, positioned on the northern edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four explosions (two assessed as impacts and two undetermined) 1-2km south-west, 12 undetermined explosions 2-5km at south-easterly directions, and about 40 undetermined explosions and a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire 1-5km at directions ranging from west-north-west to north-north-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions).

On the evening of 9 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded an explosion assessed as an impact 2-4km south-south-west, as well as six undetermined explosions, 15 muzzle flashes, about 90 projectiles in flight (mostly from east-south-east to west-north-west and from west-north-west to east-south-east) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 1-5km south-south-west and south-west.

The following day, positioned about 2km south of Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 90 explosions assessed as rounds of automatic grenade-launcher(s) and infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) cannon fire and 85 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 2-7km east-south-east.

The SMM heard small-arms fire overhead while monitoring the security situation in the area of the DFS to facilitate repair works and rotation of workers at the station. Positioned on road H20, about 1.5km south of Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), SMM patrol members heard the whistling sound of two bullets flying 10-50m over their heads, despite security guarantees having been provided for adherence to the ceasefire. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire. The SMM left the location safely. It notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) and the armed formations about the incident and requested follow-up. (See SMM Spot Report 10 October 2018.)

The SMM followed up on reports that a man had been injured by an explosion while handling an explosive device. In Lutuhyne (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Luhansk), on 10 October, medical staff at an emergency centre told the SMM that they had received an emergency call at around 10:15 on 3 October that a man who had been injured by an explosion in the town while handling an explosive device. They said that the man had been transferred by an ambulance to a hospital in Luhansk city. In Lutuhyne, a man and a women (both in their fifties) separately told the SMM that the explosion had occurred on Administratyvna Street. At 7/1 Administratyvna Street, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the fence and gate of a house but it was unable to assess whether the damage was recent. A guard of a factory about 50m from the house told the SMM by telephone that at around 10:00 on 3 October, he had heard an explosion from the house and had seen a man (in his fifties) in front of the gate, who had been injured with a part of his left arm and several figures of his right hand missing.

The SMM observed damage caused by gunfire in residential areas. In Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk), at 344 Horkoho Street, the SMM saw a fresh gouge and shrapnel damage on the west-south-west-facing side of a garage in the courtyard of a house. At 346 Horkoho Street, the SMM saw eight fresh holes in the west-south-west-facing fence around a house and a shattered west-south-west-facing window. The SMM assessed that all above damage had been caused by a 30mm round fired from a west-south-westerly direction. Residents of the houses at 344 and 346 Horkoho Street separately told the SMM that they had had been at their homes when they heard an explosion at around 19:45. About 300m further north-west, at 336 Shkilna Street, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-facing side of a garage, assessed as caused by a 30mm round fired from a west-south-westerly direction.

In the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), at 11/1 Vyborzkyi Lane, the SMM saw a broken south-west-facing window of a house and shrapnel damage to the window sill, as well as a fresh hole in the south-west-facing part of the roof. Residents (a man and a woman in their late sixties) of the house told the SMM that the damage had occurred on 8 October at around 18:45. At a neighbouring house, at 12/1 Vyborzkyi Lane, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the south-west-facing side of the roof. The SMM assessed that all damage had been caused by rounds of anti-aircraft cannon (ZU-23, 23mm) fire from a south-westerly direction.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 8 October, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2), near previously observed positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 150m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1km west of its eastern edge (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 9 June 2018).

During the day on 10 October, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard 25 shots of small-arms fire 1km north-north-west, followed by nine shots of small-arms fire 1km north-north-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. The same day, the SMM saw two men (one in camouflage clothing) in a previously observed position (bunker) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south of the railway bridge inside the disengagement area (see SMM Daily Report 1 September 2018 and SMM Daily Report 10 October 2018).

During the day on 10 October, positioned 1.8km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard five minutes of uncountable and overlapping shots of small arms 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), followed by two undetermined explosions 2km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (one T-72 and one undetermined variant) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) and a towed howitzer (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), two anti-tank guided missile systems (undetermined variant) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, the SMM saw two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) moving east in the northern outskirts of Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk). On 10 October, the SMM saw 24 tanks (T-72) in and near Rubizhne, as well as 24 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM saw a tank (undetermined variant) about 3km south-east of Rozkishne (9km south of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region, the SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11 Sani, 120mm) were again missing. The SMM also noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were missing for the first time.

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and noted that 11 tanks (four T-64 and seven T-72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles (ACV)[3] and other indications of military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 9 October, an SMM mini-UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs (type undetermined) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk), an ACV (type undetermined) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk) and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Troitske (30km north of Donetsk). The same day, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1 variant) just north of the Zolote disengagement area, an IFV (BTR-4) near Kamianka, three IFVs (two BMP-2 and one BMP-1) near Sopyne (16km east of Mariupol) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted three new trench systems (30m, 25m and 15m in length) north of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk)  (all not visible in imagery from 29 August 2018), one of them in the yard of a house. On 9 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured recovery vehicles (BTS-4A), an armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) and an IFV (BMP-1) in Kalmiuske (42km south-east of Donetsk) as well as new trenches (not seen in imagery from 17 July 2018) about 30m in length south-east of Dokuchaievsk. The same day, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 55 craters in a field about 650m south-west of Petrovenky (40km west of Luhansk), assessed as caused by 122mm or 152mm artillery rounds probably fired from a northerly direction (not visible in imagery from 19 June 2018). An SMM mini-UAV spotted two craters in a field about 1km north-west of Zarichne (44km west of Luhansk), assessed as probably caused by 152mm artillery rounds fired from a north-north-westerly direction (not visible in imagery from 9 July 2018).

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted vehicles move north-east on a dirt road near the border with the Russian Federation where there are no border crossing facilities in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. At around 23:00 on 9 October, the UAV spotted five covered cargo trucks (four Ural and one Kamaz) and four cars (three SUV and one sedan), all stationary, as well as about 20 persons walking between the vehicles on an unpaved dirt road near a treeline, all about 3.5km east-north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk). By 00:30 on 10 October, the UAV spotted all people enter the vehicles and four trucks (three Ural and one Kamaz) and three cars (two SUV and one sedan) moving further north-east towards the border with the Russian Federation while the fifth truck (Ural) and the fourth car (SUV) travelling south-west towards Manych.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk), to a power line in Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), to water distribution infrastructure in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and to power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. In Luhansk region, the SMM monitored the security situation to reportedly transfer funds from non-government to government-controlled areas in relation to a water utility debt. It monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable demining in the area of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire (see above).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 40 minutes, the SMM saw five cars and a van, all with Ukrainian licence plates, and 11 covered cargo trucks (nine with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates) exiting Ukraine, and six cars and four covered cargo trucks (all with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine.

In Boryspil (32km south-east of Kyiv), the SMM followed up on reports of an explosion at the apartment of a member of C14 (Sich) on the night of 9-10 October. At 52 Momota Street, the Mission saw a broken window on the second floor of a building and broken glass on the street. It saw that the area was cordoned off and that ten police officers and an investigation team were present. The Ministry of Internal Affairs later announced that that an investigation into the incident had been launched under Article 15 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine (attempted murder).

In relation to the abovementioned explosion, the SMM monitored a public gathering outside the Ministry of Internal Affairs building at 10 Akademika Bohomoltsia Street in Kyiv, where it saw approximately 60 protesters (mainly men, 20-50 years old), some of whom were wearing jackets with the C14 (Sich) insignia. The Mission saw that the street in front of the building was blocked by a police car and about 60 police officers, including some in riot gear, securing entrances to the building. The SMM heard a member of C14 (Sich) say that the abovementioned explosion had occurred at his apartment. The Mission then saw three men splash a bottle of dairy product over the head of a female journalist and police intervene. The SMM saw the right arm of another male protester bleeding. The Mission did not observe further incidents.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.
• At an agricultural compound in Zoria (government-controlled, 22km north-east of Mariupol), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers said that the SMM could access only some parts of the compound.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[4]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.5
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• At three schools in Luhansk city, staff refused to provide information to the SMM, citing the need for prior permission from members of the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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399428 Meeting of the OSCE Political Directors, Rome, 8 October 2018 Communication and Media Relations Section Giovanni Davoli

The Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation hosted, on 8 October 2018 in Rome, a meeting of the Political Directors of the OSCE's 57 Participating States.

Ambassador Sebastiano Cardi, Political Director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation opened the meeting with introductory remarks.  Three working sessions were respectively dedicated to: the priorities of the Italian OSCE Chairmanship, the Organization’s three security dimensions (politico-military, economic-environmental and human rights), and the proposals to reform the organization, with the aim of stimulating a common reflection among Participating States in line with the objectives set for the OSCE Ministerial Council scheduled in Milan on 6 and 7 December.

In his address, Ambassador Cardi reaffirmed the importance of strengthening the Mediterranean dimension of the OSCE, managing migration flows and combating human trafficking. Remarks were also made by the Secretary General of the OSCE, Ambassador Thomas Greminger, and by the Special Representatives of the Italian OSCE Chairperson-in-Office.

399374 Communication and Media Relations Section SDGs SDGs:  5 - Gender equality

At an event on 10 and 11 October in Vienna, the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department launched an online training course on mainstreaming gender in the security sector.

During the event Gender Focal Points from 11 OSCE participating States were guided through the e-learning course, learned how to benefit most from this programme and how to disseminate the acquired knowledge within their respective services.

Participants discussed existing challenges to mainstreaming gender in the field of border security and management. They also, shared good practices and success stories on how to integrate a gender perspective in their work.

Alessandra Scalia, Advisor for the Politico-Military Dimension of the 2018 Italian OSCE Chair said: “Inclusion of women increases the operational effectiveness of border security and management activities. Therefore, given the many challenges modern border management agencies face, the need to hire more women and support their career development has never been more urgent.”

On the second day of the event the Gender Focal Points engaged in discussions with the Vice Chair of the Institute for Inclusive Security on why women’s participation in the security sector is vital to preventing and resolving conflicts. Fully involving women in all efforts for the safeguarding and promotion of peace and security was also discussed. Participants also engaged in an exercise on drafting National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security as one of the new tools to translate commitments on promoting gender equality into concrete actions.

The online training course was developed under an extra-budgetary programme and made possible by the contributions of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Norway.

GENEVA, Switzerland, 11 October 2018 – The 45th round of the Geneva International Discussions took place on 10 October 2018.

On the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Geneva International Discussions (GID), the Co-Chairs acknowledge the participants’ continued commitment to this unique mechanism, which allows them to meet and to address important issues and concerns in order to reach tangible results.

Throughout the years, the GID have contributed to improved stability and accountability on the ground. A key achievement has been the establishment of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and the related hotlines, which enable local security actors to address incidents on the ground. However, the Co-Chairs regret the current difficulties surrounding the IPRMs. While taking note of the positions of the participants, the Co-Chairs call on them to resume the regular meetings of the IPRMs without further delay.

Despite some achievements, core issues on the GID agenda remain to be resolved. While the principle of the non-use of force is largely being adhered to, efforts to agree on a joint statement on the non-use of force and to work towards steps implementing this commitment have so far been inconclusive. Further work is required to provide sustainable security.

While there has been progress, challenges also remain regarding the needs and rights of conflict-affected communities. To address those, a broad range of humanitarian issues are being extensively discussed, such as livelihoods, documentation, freedom of movement as well as missing persons. Positive steps have been undertaken on archives and environmental threats, but much more needs to be done. Unfortunately, substantial discussions on IDPs and refugees have not been possible in recent years, due to repeated walkouts by some participants.

As we mark the 10th anniversary of the GID, the Co-Chairs call on the participants to adopt a forward-looking and more constructive approach that will allow this unique format to fulfil its mandate. The primary responsibility for making effective use of this format lies with the participants.

The Co-Chairs remain fully committed to do their utmost to facilitate this process.The participants agreed to hold the next round on 11-12 December 2018.

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SARAJEVO, 11 October 2018 –The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) supported the Faculty of Political Sciences of the University of Sarajevo and unions of social workers of the Federation of BiH and Republika Srpska at a conference dedicated to the education of social workers that concluded today in Sarajevo.

The focus of the conference, that gathered more than 200 social workers from across the region, was on international standards and current practices in the education of social workers.

Mirnes Telalovic, President of the FBiH Association of Social Workers, said that BiH’s social protection system requires further development and improvement toward international standards. “BiH is in need of qualified social workers. Education and professional development of social workers is the only way to achieve this goal,” said Telalovic.

The conference was also an opportunity to mark the establishment of a state-level association of social workers. “This was one of our major goals in the social work sector in BiH,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH Ambassador Bruce G. Berton. “Now, the BiH Social Workers Union will be able to co-operate with other national associations and submit its application for membership in the International Federation of Social Workers (IFSW). This will make a significant contribution to the status of social workers in BiH as well as the provision of services to BiH’s most vulnerable people.”

Srdjan Baralic, President of the Republika Srpska Association of Social Workers, said that challenges in the area of social protection are common across BiH: “This is why it is important for us to unite our efforts and capacities, as well as to strengthen co-operation with other national associations to address these challenges. We are glad that the OSCE Mission to BiH recognized the importance of the establishment of the BiH Social Workers Union and supported this initiative.”

The OSCE Mission to BiH continues to enhance the capacities of social protection professionals to improve the reach and effectiveness of their services as well as their capacity to advocate for needed legislative and policy changes.

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COPENHAGEN, 11 October 2018 – OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) has appointed Austrian parliamentarian Roman Haider to serve as the Assembly’s Special Representative on Central Asia.

The position will help support the active participation of Central Asian countries in the work of the Assembly, encourage expanded parliamentary dialogue among countries in the area, promote the values of parliamentarism, and increase contacts with OSCE field presences and other organizations in the region.

“What happens in Central Asia is felt throughout the OSCE area, which is why this region has always been one of the Parliamentary Assembly’s top priorities. It is vital that we in the OSCE and the broader international community pay close attention to developments in Central Asia, and work to not only assist these countries in their democratic development, but also learn from the close co-operation they have developed in the region,” Haider said in accepting the appointment.

“I look forward to closely working with the Central Asian countries, with their parliaments and members of civil society, as well as with the OSCE governmental side in Vienna and of course the OSCE field presences in Central Asia, to promote more active engagement within the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly,” he added.

The Special Representative on Central Asia is mandated to:

• Encourage active participation by parliamentarians from Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), in the work of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly to strengthen parliamentarism in the region;
• Liaise with and support the work of the OSCE field presences in the region, as well as relevant OSCE institutions, international and regional organizations and diplomatic missions;
• Encourage closer contacts between the parliaments in the region to promote greater intra-regional co-operation in all three OSCE dimensions;
• Report to the President of the Assembly on developments in the region, including opportunities for enhanced parliamentary dialogue and further inter-parliamentary co-operation among the Central Asian States.

Haider has been a member of the Austrian Parliament since 2008, where he serves as Deputy Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee and is a member of the Austrian-Central Asia parliamentary Friendship Group, among other responsibilities.

There are currently six other OSCE PA Special Representatives. Each holds a mandate pertaining to a specific issue within the Assembly’s work or to a specific geographical area represented in the Assembly. Click here for a full listing.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

At 8:59 on 10 October, an SMM patrol consisting of five members and two armoured vehicles was positioned on road H-20 approximately 1.5km south of Kamianka (government‑controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), and 3km north of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The patrol was monitoring the security situation in the area of Donetsk Filtration Station to facilitate repair works and the rotation of workers at the station. Three patrol members were standing next to the vehicles and the others were inside the vehicles when, despite security guarantees having been provided, they heard the whistling sound of two bullets flying 10‑50m over their heads. The SMM could not assess the direction of fire, and at 09:03, departed the location safely. The SMM notified the Ukrainian Armed Forces side of the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination and the armed formations about the incident and requested follow‑up.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region but fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region, compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission followed up on reports of casualties in Maiorove and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It continued monitoring all three disengagement areas, where its access remained restricted. The SMM’s access was also again restricted near Yuzhna-Lomuvatka and Verkhnoshyrokivske.* The SMM saw weapons in violation of the agreed withdrawal lines near Ocheretyne, Smolianynove and Metolkine. The Mission observed newly laid mines on both sides of the contact line. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station. The SMM also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations,[1] including about 520 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 240 explosions).

On the evening and night of 8-9 October, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 17 explosions assessed as impacts 0.1-1km south, as well as about 185 undetermined explosions (including about 20 explosions within 100-500m of the SMM camera), 54 projectiles in flight (mostly west to east and north-west to south-east), a burst and an illumination flare, all 0.1-4km at directions ranging from south-south-east to south-west.

On 9 October, positioned about 3km south-west of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard and felt shockwaves of two explosions, after which it saw smoke in the sky, and then heard two additional explosions, all assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 1-2km south. About 20 minutes later, from a nearby position in Avdiivka, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-4km south-east and south.

Positioned about 1km north of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two undetermined explosions and heard five undetermined explosions, as well as three bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 1-4km south-west.

On 9 October, positioned about 2km south-west of Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) to monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs, the SMM heard 35 undetermined explosions and 50 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire 3-4km south-east and south-south-east and six undetermined explosions 2-3km north-west.

On the evening and night of 8-9 October, the SMM camera 1.5km north-east of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol) recorded 23 undetermined explosions, about 325 projectiles in flight (almost half from northerly to southerly directions and half from southerly to northerly directions), 12 bursts and five muzzle flashes, all 2-4km at directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 50 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (210 explosions).

On the evening of 8 October, the SMM camera in Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk) recorded eight explosions (five assessed as impacts and three undetermined) and about 75 projectiles in flight (mostly from west-north-west to east-south-east), all 2-5km south, south-south-west and south-west. The following day, the same camera recorded three explosions assessed as impacts 2-4km south-west.

The SMM followed up on reports of casualties. A community member in Michurine (non-government-controlled, 61km south of Donetsk) told the SMM that a man (55 years old) had lost his left foot as the result of an explosion on 24 September. In Maiorove (formerly Krasnyi Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 57km south-east of Donetsk), three local residents (two women in their forties and sixties, respectively, and one man in his fifties) separately told the SMM that a 55-year-old local resident had lost his foot on September 24 in a landmine explosion on the bank of a nearby river and that he had been taken by ambulance to a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk). At the hospital in Boikivske, medical staff refused to provide information about the civilian casualty.* Staff at a local ambulance station in Boikivske told the SMM that the ambulance service had transported a man who had lost his foot in an explosion from Maiorove to Boikivske at the end of September.

In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) a woman (in her forties) told the SMM that a boy (nine years old) had received shrapnel injuries to the his head during shelling on the evening of 7 October and that three houses had also been damaged (see below). At a hospital in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), medical staff told the SMM that a child from Zolote-5/Mykhailivka had been admitted with injuries to his scalp on 7 October and had received stitches. The SMM was unable to access the area in order to speak with the boy or his parents due to security considerations.

The SMM observed damage as a result of shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. At 39 Kotovskoho Street, the SMM saw three broken south-south-westerly windows of a single-storey house and a hole in the roof of a garage located east of the house. The SMM assessed that the damage to the garage was recent and caused by a projectile fired from a southerly direction.

At 10 Korchahina Street, the SMM observed that about 1.5m of a fence constructed of roofing material had been shattered into small pieces as well as two impact sites inside the garden, between the fence and a single-storey house. The SMM assessed that the impacts were fresh and caused by projectiles fired from a northerly direction. Inside the house, the SMM observed three broken south-facing windows and a damaged mirror on the east-facing wall, all assessed as caused by shrapnel from a projectile fired from a northerly direction.

About 30m west of 10 Korchahina Street, the SMM saw an impact in the middle of a road, which it assessed as fresh and caused by a projectile fired from a northerly direction. The SMM could not conduct further assessments due to security considerations.

The SMM continued to monitor and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske[2] (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Inside the Zolote disengagement area, at a recently established Ukrainian Armed Forces position south of the railway bridge, the SMM observed a visibly armed soldier. About 300-400m south, between the forward positions of the sides, the SMM observed for the first time a discarded anti-tank missile tube.

During the day on 9 October, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk). On 9 October, the SMM observed ten self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and a towed howitzer (D-20, 152mm) near Smolianynove (61km north-west of Luhansk) and a towed howitzer (D-20) near Metolkine (69km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM long-range UAV spotted five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk), 12 tanks (T-64) near Tymofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk), a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Kalynove (31km north-west of Donetsk) and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35) in a residential area of Oleksandropil (43km north of Donetsk) (the same UAV also spotted an armoured personnel carrier and eight military cargo trucks nearby in Oleksandropil[3]). On 9 October, the SMM observed five anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) at a train station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk) and four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12) near Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, the SMM observed a tank (T-64) on a transporter 3.5km south of Luhansk city.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[4] and other indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1KSh and a BMP variant) near Zolote-4/Rodina (60km north-west of Luhansk) as well as about 60m of new trenches not visible in imagery of 6 October 2018. On 9 October, the SMM saw an IFV (BTR-4) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) in Taramchuk (29km south-west of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) mounted on a truck about 9km east of Plotyna (28km north-east of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM variant) near Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk) and two IFVs (BMP-1) south-east of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted six firing positions in and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, two of which are within 100m of residential houses, and 40m of trenches not visible in imagery of 28 September 2018. It also spotted 50m of trenches not visible in imagery from 29 September 2018 and a fortified position under construction by three men wearing camouflaged clothing, assessed as members of the armed formations.

The SMM observed newly laid mines. On 8 October, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four newly laid anti-tank mines (TM-62) in front of a house in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, which were not visible in imagery of 4 October 2018. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four anti-tank mines near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Zolote-4/Rodina, which were not visible in imagery of 4 October 2018.

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne and to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north-west of Luhansk).  

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned near Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), the SMM observed an 82mm mortar tailfin assessed as fired from a south-easterly direction embedded in the ground.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Coordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 8 October 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations (two visibly armed) again stopped the SMM and denied it passage southward to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint in Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to the village, citing “demining in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[5]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.6
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A member of the armed formations informed the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM on 8 October temporarily lost communications with a long-range UAV, assessed as due to signal interference[6] near Svyrydonivka (government-controlled, 41km north-west of Donetsk) and Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).
• Medical staff at a hospital in Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, non-government-controlled, 67km south-east of Donetsk) refused to provide the SMM with information about a reported civilian casualty without prior approval from members of the “regional administration.”
• At a school in Rodakove (non-government-controlled, 22km west of Luhansk), staff told the SMM it was not permitted to enter the school and said that all school personnel have been told to “watch out” for the OSCE and that it should get permission from the armed formations to speak with them.
• At a school in Sorokyne (formerly Krasnodon, non-government-controlled, 43km south-east of Luhansk), staff told the SMM to leave and said that they had been given instructions not to allow it on school premises.
• At a school in Novosvitlivka (non-government-controlled, 16km south-east of Luhansk), staff told the SMM that it could not access the school, based on instructions from the armed formations.
• In Khriashchuvate (non-government-controlled, 10km south-east of Luhansk), a community member told the SMM that it could not access the school in the village, based on instructions from the armed formations.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera on the northern edge of Popasna was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC withdrew from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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