OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to residential buildings in Yasynuvata and Dokuchaievsk.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and military hardware inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• A civilian car driven by men in military-style attire drove aggressively toward an SMM patrol twice.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and the highest number of explosions were recorded south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 25 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-easterly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), and north-westerly and south-westerly directions of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

A car driven by men in military-style attire drove aggressively toward an SMM patrol twice

On 2 April, while traveling near Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), a vehicle with civilian licence plates traveling in the opposite direction abruptly pulled into the SMM’s travel lane, forcing the first SMM vehicle to swerve to avoid a collision. The vehicle then manoeuvred in the same manner toward the second SMM vehicle and drove away. Approximately one hour later, the SMM patrol was stationary in the vicinity of Zaichenko when it again observed the same civilian vehicle with two men in military-style attire driving directly towards it. The vehicle stopped short of hitting the first SMM vehicle and then reversed and performed the same manoeuvre toward the second SMM vehicle, again stopping short of colliding before it reversed and drove away.

Fresh damage to residential properties in Yasynuvata and Dokuchaievsk

At 45 Hoholia Street in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw fresh shrapnel damage (holes and scratches) to the north-  and west-facing sides of a one-storey inhabited house as well as small fragments of shrapnel in the adjacent garden and on a nearby table. A resident of the house told the SMM that in the evening of 1 April he had heard a loud explosion when the house had been struck by shrapnel.

On the same day, at 20 Radianska Street on the western edge of Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw two fresh holes in a double-paned west-south-westerly-facing window, assessed as caused by a single bullet. The SMM also observed two fresh scratches on the interior wall near the window and saw a bullet (12.7mm calibre) on the ground outside beneath the broken window. The owner of the apartment (male, late 50s) said that he was in another room with his daughter on the evening of 1 April when they had heard the sound of shattering glass and then entered the room to find the broken window and a bullet on the floor.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 1-2 April, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a burst and four projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1.5-3.5km south-south-east, all assessed as inside the disengagement area. It recorded an additional burst at an assessed range of 1.5-3.5km east-south-east which was unable to be assessed as inside or outside of the disengagement area. The same camera also recorded eight projectiles at an assessed range of 1.5-3.5km (six east and two east-south-east), all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 1 April, near residential houses inside the disengagement area near Zolote, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and a modified military truck with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted in the rear near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 500m south of the area’s northern edge and 1.4km east of the area’s western edge. At a distance of about 1km north-east of the abovementioned positions and south of the railway tracks, the same UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) as well as two to four people. Approximately 1.3km north-east of the abovementioned positions, the same UAV spotted another IFV (BMP-1) as well as an additional two to four people.

On 2 April, positioned near the northern edge of Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-4km south (unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

2 April

The SMM saw:

• six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being loaded onto a train in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) and
• two anti-tank guns stationary (MT-12) near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

31 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a probable tank (T-72) about 1.5km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

1 April

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four multiple launch rocket systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Hrechchyne (48km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

2 April

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Zaliznianske (79km north of Donetsk) and
• eight mortars (PM-38, 120mm) being transported by a military utility truck headed south-west near Kostiantynivka.

Non-government-controlled areas

On 1 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 23 tanks (type undetermined) and four surface-to-air missile systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019);
• seven tanks (type undetermined) and six pieces of towed artillery/mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 26 March 2019); and
• 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 12 March 2019).

Other weapons observed:[4]

On 1 April, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of seven pieces of self-propelled artillery/mortars (types undetermined) and 16 pieces of towed artillery/mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

1 April

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

27 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1K), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB-S ambulance variant) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk).

30 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted three armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

1 April

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk);
• seven armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an ACV (type undetermined) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk); and
• four ACVs (type undetermined) south-east of Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-2), two APCs (MT-LB) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

2 April

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (two BMP-1, two BMP variant) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk). (for previous observations, see SSM Daily Report of 31 March 2019);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy machine gun next to civilian houses used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) in Novhorodske; and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and three IFVs (BMP-1) near Romanivka (government-controlled, 41km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 April

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (BTR-80) at the Luhansk airport.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-1) near Hrechchyne.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two ACVs (type undetermined) near Zhovte (17km north-west of Luhansk) and
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) near Pryvitne (11km north of Luhansk).

2 April

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) in Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk).

Automatic jamming system spotted near Luhansk city

On 1 April, an SMM mini-UAV spotted an automatic jamming system (R-330Zh Zhitel) in a compound approximately 2km south-east of Luhansk city.

Demining activities

On 1 April, the SMM saw 12 members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities on the eastern side of road T-1314, about 3km north of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk).

Presence of unexploded ordnance

On Stratonavtiv Street in Donetsk city, approximately 700m south of the Donetsk airport, the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) assessed as a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rocket embedded in soft ground approximately 1m outside of a residential house. The SMM did not assess the UXO as recent.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to a power transmission line near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 1 April, while at a border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw two pedestrians (males, over the age of 40) entering Ukraine.

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw five cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as three “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 11 cars (eight Ukrainian and one Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 2 April 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) prevented the SMM from continuing onwards through the check point to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons.”

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• During a meeting with a local representative in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of   Donetsk), an armed man in military-style clothing interrupted the meeting and ordered the SMM to leave the building citing “the risk of imminent shelling” and stated that the SMM could only remain near the Cultural Centre in the centre of the village.
• Near Zaichenko, a vehicle with civilian licence plates twice manoeuvred toward the SMM patrol in an aggressive manner. For more information, see above.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and Maiorsk were not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited; thus, the review of the camera footage may take place days later.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

GENEVA, Switzerland, 3 April 2019 - The 47th round of the Geneva International Discussions (GID) took place today.

In Working Group I, the Co-Chairs (UN Representative Cihan Sultanoğlu, Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Rudolf Michalka and EU Special Representative Toivo Klaar) noted that the security situation on the ground had been challenged especially by the death of Georgian citizen Irakli Kvaratskhelia in the custody of Russian Federation Border Guards in the Gali district on 10 March 2019, as well as the temporary restrictions and closures of crossing points imposed in January 2019.

Regarding the death of Kvaratskhelia, the Co-Chairs called on the relevant participants to share all existing information in a timely manner.

On the restrictions and closures, the Co-Chairs and Co-Moderators reiterated that these measures were not justified as a means to providing public health benefits. They stressed that both the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanisms (IPRMs) and the hotlines should have been used.

Participants highlighted the importance of the IPRMs and the work of the Ergneti IPRM was positively assessed. The necessity of resuming the Gali IPRM without preconditions and further delay was stressed.

Concerns regarding military activities in the region were expressed. The Co-Chairs underlined the importance of providing advance notice on this and other sensitive issues.

Participants exchanged views on the agenda item on “non-use of force and international security arrangements,” benefiting from a corresponding information session.

In Working Group II, the participants reviewed the humanitarian situation on the ground, including the impact of the temporary restrictions and closures of crossing points. They also discussed issues relating to documentation, freedom of movement, missing persons, public health, education, livelihoods and environmental challenges. Unfortunately, due to a walkout by some participants, the issue of internally displaced persons/refugees could not be addressed. The Co-Chairs and Co-Moderators renewed their call for participants to engage constructively on all agenda items.

The participants agreed to hold the next GID round on 2-3 July 2019.

VIENNA, 3 April 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his disappointment over the court verdicts handed down today to a number of journalists and writers in the Özgür Gündem trial in Turkey.

Thirteen journalists and writers who participated in a solidarity campaign organized by the now closed Kurdish media outlet Özgür Gündem stood trial on charges related to terrorist propaganda. The Istanbul 14th High Criminal Court convicted Faruk Eren, Ertuğrul Mavioğlu, Fehim Işık, Celal Başlangıç, Öncü Akgül, İhsan Çaralan, Celalettin Can and Dilşah Kocakaya to 15 months in prison. All the sentences, with the exception of those against Can and Kocakaya, were deferred. In addition, former Chief Editor Hüseyin Aykol was sentenced to three years and nine months in prison.

“Sentencing journalists to prison for showing solidarity with a prosecuted newspaper greatly damages the freedom of the media and freedom of expression in Turkey, by shrinking the space for a vibrant and pluralistic media environment. Solidarity of journalists with their colleagues is not a crime; the journalists are not terrorists,” Désir said.

The Representative also noted that Mehmet Şirin Taşdemir, Ömer Ağın, Veysel Kemer and Yüksel Oğuz, who were accused of sending letters to the newspaper, were acquitted.

“I urge the Turkish authorities to stop sentencing journalists to prison as punishment for their views. I repeat my call on Turkey to release all journalists who are behind bars for their work,” the Representative said.

Earlier statements on Turkey by the Representative can be found at www.osce.org/fom.

BRUSSELS, 3 April 2019 – The Return Policy of European Union Member States and Belgium’s practices in this area were the focus of a visit by members of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Ad Hoc Committee on Migration to Brussels on Tuesday, led by Chair Nahima Lanjri (Belgium).

The delegation of parliamentarians stressed that both solidarity towards people in need of protection and the return of irregular migrants are key issues for a balanced and effective migration policy, and that return policies should be based on the principle ‘voluntary if possible, forced if necessary.’ With the proposals for a reformed EU Directive on Returns currently being debated in the European Council and the European Parliament, the delegation called for an emphasis on promoting alternatives to detention.

The delegation also stressed the importance of safeguarding the dignity and fundamental rights of all migrants, with special regard for vulnerable categories of migrants, especially children and families with minor children.

“Whether we are talking about ‘regular’ or ‘irregular’ migrants, accompanied or unaccompanied minors, refugees or asylum seekers, or any other category, we must remember that we are first and foremost talking about people and that the best interests of the child must always be given primary consideration. In any decision affecting children, including the implementation of return policies, it is vital that certain principles are upheld, such as the right to family unity and education.”

She stressed that unaccompanied minors should never be detained and children should be granted access to adequate education and, as far as possible, be allowed to finish the school year before being repatriated. In that context, she also drew attention to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, as it is celebrating its 30 years anniversary this year.

Lanjri also called for a more rigorous monitoring of forced returns to ensure that the principle of non-refoulement is not violated. Furthermore, she noted that voluntary returns should always be given preference, and preferably with prior preparatory groundwork through a social work approach. The experience of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) also clearly points to increased sustainability of returns when reintegration assistance is provided. Indeed, she called for re-examining the criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of returns which currently relies to a great extent on statistics on the number of persons returned without further follow-up.

Members expressed concern that the detention of children with families was now a reality both on paper and in practice in Belgium. Taking note of legislative changes in July 2018 and the construction of closed family units, they emphasized that these should be used only as a measure of last resort. Members also called for limits on periods of detention to be counted on a cumulative basis rather than on individual periods, in order to prevent abuse.

The first part of the programme consisted of briefings on the current status of discussions within the EU on how to make returns more effective as well as on the basic principles which should underpin return policies. The OSCE parliamentarians met with officials from the IOM, the European Commission, the European Parliament, the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and non-governmental organizations working with vulnerable children. The second component of the programme examined current practice in Belgium, seeking to identify lessons learned and examples of good practice.

In the afternoon, the delegation visited the Steenokkerzeel repatriation centre in the vicinity of Brussels airport which is an immigration detention centre which, since the summer of 2018 also includes a number of ‘family units’ intended for the detention of families with minor children.

The delegation included members Margareta Cederfeldt (Sweden), Alfred Dubs (United Kingdom), Sylvie Goy-Chavent (France), Roman Haider (Austria) and Kyriakos Kyriakou-Hadjiyianni (Cyprus).

For more information on the work of the OSCE PA's Ad Hoc Committee on Migration, please click here.

VIENNA, 3 April 2019 – Violent attacks or the threat of violence against journalists will be the focus of an international conference organized by the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna on 12 April 2019. The event will bring together many journalists who have experienced violence, or relatives and co-workers of victims of such attacks, including the son of killed Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia and the Chief Editor of Aktuality.sk, where murdered Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak worked.

The conference will provide a forum for journalists to share their experiences and to contribute to discussions on how OSCE participating States can better protect the right to freedom of expression and of the media. In December 2018, the OSCE participating States adopted a landmark decision on the safety of journalists at the Ministerial Council meeting in Milan.

The event will also be attended by international media experts, academics and policy makers from over 30 countries. Key media participants will include, among others:

• Matthew Caruana Galizia, Investigative journalist and son of killed journalist Daphne Anne Caruana Galizia (Malta)
• Peter Bárdy, Chief Editor of Aktuality.sk, where killed journalist Ján Kuciak worked (Slovakia)
• Katya Gorchinskaya, Journalist/Media Manager and friend of killed journalist Pavel Sheremet (Ukraine)
• Svetlana Lukić, Editor-in-Chief of the Peščanik online portal (Serbia)
• Elif Akgül, Freelance journalist (Turkey)
• Lukpan Akhmedyarov, Chief Editor of the Uralskaya Nedelya newspaper (Kazakhstan)
• Tatyana Felgenhauer, Deputy Editor-in-Chief and presenter at Ekho Moskvy radio station (Russia)

The discussions are expected to focus on how journalists continue to investigate while their profession comes under increasing assault; on how to deal with threats and self-censorship; and the challenge to media freedom caused by the impunity for murders of journalists.

The agenda and more information about the event can be found here: www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/415115.

Representatives of the media are invited to attend the event from 9:00 to 18:30 on 12 April 2019 in the Neuer Saal of the Hofburg Conference Centre. Please register by sending an email to nicolas.ebnother@osce.org by 12:00 noon, Wednesday, 10 April 2019. For interview requests, please contact Jennifer Adams at jennifer.adams@osce.org.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on facebook.com/osce.rfom. 

Contacts

Alexander Nitzsche
Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media 
Wallnerstrasse 6
1010 Vienna
Austria
Mobile: +43 676 511 84 04
alexander.nitzsche@osce.org

Joana Karapataqi, OSCE Presence in Albania OSCE Presence in Albania

The OSCE Presence in Albania and the Albanian Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative signed on 2 April 2019 a co-operation agreement on joint activities to raise local capacities, promote transparency and strengthen anti-corruption efforts at local level.

In the course of this year, the Presence and the Albanian EITI Secretariat will organize four regional events that will involve the municipalities of Patos, Bulqiza, Burrel, Kukës, Përrenjas, Selenicë and Mallakastra. The events aim to raise the awareness of authorities, civil society, local communities and business community about the need to increase public benefit in the development of natural resource projects.

“The development of natural resources should go hand in hand with the benefits shared by the government, investors and the community. This development can only be effective when communities are involved. Lack of public information and community participation in development projects inevitably creates mistrust and problems even in the soundest projects”, said Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, during a meeting with AlbEITI Director Ardit Kamberi.

The 2012 OSCE Dublin Declaration on Good Governance acknowledges the importance of transparency and takes note of the activities of multi-stakeholder partnerships and initiatives in this sphere, such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). Albania became a member of EITI in May 2013.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of a man killed in Sakhanka due to shrapnel injuries, as well as a man and a woman injured in Pikuzy due to shelling, all in March.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to residential buildings and a school in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• It also observed fresh craters near Kalynove-Borshchuvate and Novotroitske.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area and near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance near Novobakhmutivka, unexploded ordnance and anti-tank mines near Marinka, an improvised explosive device near Olenivka and mine hazard signs near Kreminets and Verkhnotoretske.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, it was restricted at checkpoints near Zaichenko, Verkhnoshyrokivske  and Tavrycheske, as well as at a border crossing point and railway station near Voznesenivka, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 200 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 75 explosions). The highest number of ceasefire violations was recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening of 31 March, among other ceasefire violations, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded seven projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 300-500m south-south-west.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 25), compared with the previous 24 hours (nine explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Man killed in Sakhanka due to shrapnel injuries, as well as man and woman injured in Pikuzy due to shelling

In Sakhanka and Pikuzy, the SMM corroborated cases from March. The SMM followed up on reports of a man killed in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) from shrapnel injuries. On 12 March, staff at a morgue in Starobesheve (non-government-controlled, 32km south-east of Donetsk) told the SMM that on 5 March the body of a 59-year-old man who had died due to shrapnel injuries to the head had been brought to the morgue. On 6 March, a resident of Sakhanka (man, 50 years old) who said he was the man’s neighbor told the SMM that on the morning of 4 March, after shelling had occurred he had found the man lying inside the summer kitchen of his house with injuries to his head. 

The SMM followed up on reports of a woman and a man injured by shelling in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) at two locations where the SMM previously saw fresh craters and damage to residential houses (see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019). At 112 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a resident (woman, 75 years old) with a bandage stained with blood and bruises on the right side of her chest who told the SMM that she had been injured while inside her home when shelling occurred in the early morning of 22 March. About 300m further east-south-east, at 92 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw a resident (man, 79 years old) with a scratch on the right side of his head who said that he had been injured while inside his house when shelling occurred in the early morning hours of 22 March.

Fresh damage to residential buildings and a school in Zolote-2/Karbonit and Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 30 March, on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit (government-controlled, 62km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM observed six fresh craters: two in a field on the western side of a bridge that connects Zolote-2/Karbonit with Hirske (government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), three in a field on the eastern side of the bridge and one on the tarmac road on its south-eastern edge, all at a distance of 1-30m from the road. The SMM assessed the craters as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from an undetermined direction.

Also on the north-eastern edge of Zolote-2/Karbonit, at 43 Molodizhna Street, the SMM saw three shattered east-facing windows, two on the ground floor and one on the fifth floor of a five-storey apartment building. At 44 Molodizhna Street, the SMM saw a shattered east-facing window pane and five fresh holes in five east-facing windows on the ground floor of a five-storey residential building. At both locations, the SMM assessed the damage as caused by shrapnel. Two residents (men, aged 30-60) of the damaged flats on the ground and fifth floors told the SMM that they had been at home with their families in the afternoon of 29 March at around 17:00 when shelling had occurred. At Lunacharskoho Street, the Mission saw five fresh holes, assessed as caused by shrapnel, in five north-facing windows of a two-storey building of an operational school.

In the centre of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), at 6 Poshtova Street, accompanied by members of the armed formations, the SMM saw 20 fresh holes in a wall and four shattered windows on the north-facing side of a one-storey house, as well as glass shards on the ground, assessed as shrapnel damage. It saw more than 100 fresh holes in the metal gate and fence about 4m north the same house, 20 fresh holes in the north-facing side of a barn, as well as 20 fresh holes in the north-facing wall and metal gate of a garage located about 6-8m north of the house, all assessed as shrapnel damage. The SMM also observed a cut power line about 1m north from the house. About 15m north of the house, the SMM saw a fresh crater in the tarmac road. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire. The SMM also saw a cut power line and fresh scorch marks on the grass within a 5m-radius of the house. A resident of the house (male, aged 60-70) told the SMM that he had heard explosions nearby at around 17:30 on 29 March.

At 8 Poshtova Street, the SMM observed 20 fresh holes in a wall and two freshly shattered windows on the north-facing side of a one-storey house, as well as glass shards on the ground, and at least ten fresh holes in a wooden fence about 4m north of the same house, all assessed as shrapnel damage. The Mission also saw a hole in an above-ground gas pipe, assessed as shrapnel damage. The SMM also saw a fresh crater in a field about 10m north of the house and another on a tarmac road about 10m further north. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

At 9 Poshtova Street, the SMM saw a crater with a metal tube in it assessed as a remnant of ammunition (OG-9 or OG-15 grenade) next to a broken wooden fence (pieces of which were on the ground) about 7m north of a single-storey residential house. The SMM also saw a crack in the north-facing wall of a barn and broken bricks on the ground about 2m north of the residential house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon used or direction of fire.

On the same street (about 20m north of the previous house), about 3m north of an abandoned single-storey house, the SMM saw in a tree line a fresh crater with three aluminium fragments inside it, assessed as remnants of ammunition (OG-9 or OG-15 grenade), and another fresh crater 7m further north. About 150m east of the abandoned house, the SMM saw two other craters near the road, 15m north of another abandoned house. The SMM also observed that all windows on all sides of the house had been shattered. The Mission was unable to assess the weapon type or direction of fire.

On 31 March, at 2 Pervomaiska Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM saw a fresh hole in the north-facing part of the roof of a single-storey house. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire.

Fresh craters near Kalynove-Borshchuvate and Novotroitske

On 31 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three impact craters assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar and eight impact craters assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds (not visible in imagery from 26 March) in a field near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

On 1 April, about 200m north of the entry-exit checkpoint near Novotroitske (government-controlled, 36km south-west of Donetsk) and west of road H-20, the SMM saw 13 fresh craters in a field marked with mine hazard signs. The SMM could not assess the type of weapon or direction of fire.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 31 March, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded eight explosions, assessed as airbursts, at an assessed range of 2-4km west-south-west, near the disengagement area.

On the evening of 31 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 16 projectiles in vertical flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as six projectiles near the disengagement area. On the next morning, the same camera recorded a projectile near the disengagement area. During the day on 1 April, positioned in Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 4.5-6km west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned on the eastern edge of Berezivske, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 4-6km west, assessed as inside the disengagement area. Positioned 1km east of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds near the disengagement area.

On 31 March, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 15 anti-tank mines (type unknown) laid out in a 10m-long row inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), approximately 450m south of its northern edge and approximately 100m west of its eastern edge.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

30 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

1 April

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 April

The SMM saw a piece of heavy artillery (type undetermined) under a tarpaulin loaded on a truck on road T-1321 near Uspenka (23km south-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

30 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) as well as an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Prychepylivka (50km north-west of Luhansk).

31 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Bila Hora (54km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) near Myrne (63km south of Donetsk).

1 April

The SMM saw:

• four IFVs (three BMP-1 and one BMP variant) in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) and
• an APC (MT-LB variant) at a compound in Yurivka (35km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

30 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) in Luhansk city and
• two APCs (MT-LB) in Katerynivka.

31 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• an APC (MT-LB) near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk) and
• 21 IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk)

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

Presence of mines, unexploded ordnance, improvised explosive device and mine hazard signs

About 20m north of highway H-15 at the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.8km south-south-east of the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) rocket. About 500m further north-north-west, the SMM observed for the first time 24 anti-tank mines (TM-62M) in a fenced field. At the same location, it saw for the first time a red mine hazard sign (with “Stop mine” written on it in Russian language and “Danger mine” in English) attached to a wooden stick about 20m north of highway H-15.

About 150m south-west of a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a black plastic bottle with a fuse, assessed as an improvised explosive device, and a metal trip wire next to a concrete block on the median strip between two lanes of a road used daily by civilians and the SMM.

About 2km north-east of Novobakhmutivka (government-controlled, 28km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a piece of UXO, assessed as the remnants of a missile tube (type undetermined), embedded in a road used daily by civilians and the SMM.

About 280m west of a checkpoint near the Kargil plant in Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk) and about 20m south of highway H-15, the SMM saw for the first time a red plastic sign (with “ Stop mines” written in Russian and “Danger mines” in English) attached to a wooden stick in the ground.

In Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed for the first time two white boards with “Mines” written in black in Russian language attached to sticks in a field next to a road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). It also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw eight cars (one with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 16 cars (one with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation and one with Polish licence plates, as well as nine with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (four with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw 11 cars (six with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “LPR” plates) and seven pedestrians entering Ukraine, and four cars (one with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and 16 pedestrians exiting Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw two trains (one with fuel bowsers and one with coal transportation wagons, with their cargo not visible). After two minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks to the security of the patrol as the reason for the denial.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM that it had to leave the area, citing the lack of “instructions for the SMM to be present there”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that he was not aware of any demining activities having taken place during the previous seven days and that the road north of the bridge was still mined.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM and allowed it to pass only after about 35 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, citing the need to obtain “permission” from their “superiors”.

At a checkpoint north of Tavrycheske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Mariupol), four members of the armed formations (two of them armed) stopped the SMM and allowed it to pass only after about 20 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint, without providing any reason.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

PODGORICA, 2 April 2019 - OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger concluded today a two-day visit to Podgorica, during which he met with Montenegro’s highest officials and highlighted the significant progress achieved in fulfilling strategic reforms in the country.

“Strong institutions are the pillars of a consolidated democracy and all political actors should contribute to their strengthening. Parliament is the key institution in a democratic system.   The peaceful, democratic nature of political discourse needs to be preserved and political dialogue must take place within the parliament and state institutions,” said Greminger.

“I have to commend the work of the Committee on further reform of electoral and other legislation. There is a definite need for thorough and timely reform,” said Greminger. “The only way to achieve progress is through mutual dialogue and compromise in order to implement recommendations that reflect international standards. The political will of all sides is crucial to ensure full implementation of proposed recommendations.”

In his meetings with Montenegro’s senior officials, Greminger noted that protests are part of the democratic process, as long as they stay peaceful. “While the region made considerable progress towards peace and stability and in strengthening democratic institutions and the rule of law, recent events show that these achievements cannot be taken for granted and need to be further consolidated.”

During his separate meetings with media and NGO representatives, Greminger reaffirmed the OSCE’s support for free, independent, and pluralistic media, stressing the importance of ensuring the safety of journalists. He also pointed out that the active participation and commitment of civil society representatives in the country’s reform agenda is important, especially in the youth, gender and democratic development spheres.

In a meeting with opposition party leaders, Greminger stressed that strong opposition is necessary to safeguard democracy. “It is important to hear critical voices. Peaceful protests are part of democracy, but differences should be debated in Parliament.” 

Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro Maryse Daviet said: “Thanks to the close partnership that the Mission has forged with the government, institutions, civil society and other stakeholders, it is well positioned to continue to support Montenegro in meeting their long-term strategic goals in line with OSCE commitments and principles.”

Greminger met with President of Montenegro Milo Ɖukanović, President of the Parliament Ivan Brajović, Prime Minister Duško Marković, Deputy Prime Minister for the Political System, Internal and Foreign Policy Zoran Pažin, Minister of Culture Aleksandar Bogdanović, Minister of Sports and Youth Nikola Janović, opposition party leaders, as well as representatives of NGOs and the media in Montenegro.

During his visit, the Secretary General also met with the staff of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro. The OSCE Mission to Montenegro was established in June 2006.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 9,935 to 9,562 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 76 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 35 this week compared to 29 last week: 19 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and 16 into Ukraine (91 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and eight were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when no families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and three into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (339 compared to 333 observed during the previous week). There were 180 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 159 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 748 to 854 (324 at the Gukovo BCP and 530 at the Donetsk BCP); 467 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 387 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 47 (compared to 41 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 194 to 109: of the total number of trucks scanned, 71 trucks (65 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 38 trucks (35 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 132 to 156 vehicles; 82 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 74 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 30 occasions, compared to 28 last week; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 16 to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. In addition, some cars with Georgian licence plates and “DPR” plates were also observed.

On 27 March at 11:24, an ambulance with licence plates from the Russian Federation registered in the Rostov Region, arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The ambulance bore the inscription “112 – urgent medical help” (in Russian). After it parked near the border checking area, two paramedics exited the vehicle carrying a medical suitcase and went towards the vehicles which were crossing into Ukraine. At 11:38, same day, the ambulance returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 29 March at 15:11, a Russian Federation police van with two police officers arrived at the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation side. The OT noticed one person in the rear of the car which had its flashing lights turned on. It underwent border control procedures and left behind the main building. At 15:35, the same vehicle returned to Russian Federation. Inside the car were two police officers and two persons in the rear of the van which had its flashing lights turned on. When leaving the BCP, the police vehicle used its siren.

On 1 April at 10:12, a police vehicle with Russian Federation licence plates entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The OM observed that the vehicle did not proceed to the Ukrainian side. At 10:29 on the same day, the vehicle returned to the Russian Federation. The OT noted that on its return, one additional passenger was inside the vehicle.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 12 February to 2 April 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

415706 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A four-day training programme on the Prevention of Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Heritage (PITCH), organized by the World Customs Organization (WCO) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) with the support of the Border Management Unit of the OSCE Project Office in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, drew to a close on 29 March 2019.

Twenty-one officers from the customs administrations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan participated in the training, aimed at improving the knowledge and skills of customs officers in preventing offences related to the illicit trafficking of cultural heritage.

The training was conducted as part of an OSCE project that aims to position this phenomenon higher on the agenda of the national services of OSCE participating states, with a focus on further capacity building, in a systematic manner, in accordance with identified best practices.

This approach is also in line with the WCO’s global deployment strategy for the PITCH training for customs administrations, as set out in the WCO Council’s 2016 Resolution on the Role of Customs in Preventing Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects as well as in United Nations Security Council Resolution 2347/2017. The WCO PITCH training is specifically aimed at enhancing the operational capacities of frontline customs officers who act as the first line of defence in the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural objects.

“This joint WCO-OSCE initiative serves as an example of partnership, synergy and mutual support resulting in rapid deployment of the standard PITCH training for the benefit of Central Asian customs administrations,” stated Ana Hinojosa, WCO Director of Compliance and Facilitation. She added that “the WCO reaffirms its readiness to build on this success and continue providing the necessary support to its Members in this critical region.”

“We do believe that shared expertise and knowledge will contribute towards protection of the unique and extremely rich cultural heritage of Central Asian countries,” said Goran Stojkovski, Customs Adviser at the OSCE Secretariat’s Border Management and Security Unit.

“Bringing representatives of Customs administrations of participating Central Asian states together to benefit from the WCO PITCH training promotes the principles of confidence building and co-operation, as well as the sharing of resources and knowledge in the prevention of and fight against this specific phenomenon,” said Stojkovski, adding that “this is a great example of the implementation of the core commitments of the OSCE Border Security and Management Concept, which has proved its efficiency since its adoption in 2005.”  

The deployment of the PITCH training for Central Asian Customs administrations was the first joint effort by the WCO and OSCE, based on the Working Arrangement that both Organizations signed in 2018, providing a framework for co-operation in areas of mutual interest.

The training was supported by experts from French Customs and the Netherlands, who covered modules on the identification, handling and documentation of cultural objects, the international legal framework, investigation sources and operational exercises. A working visit to the National Museum of Tajikistan was also organized as a part of the training.

Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

An OSCE-supported one-day gender assessment workshop focusing on ways to strengthen women’s participation in the parliament took place in Skopje on 2 April 2019.

The workshop gathered some 30 participants, including Members of Parliament from the Committee for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men, the Women Parliamentarians’ Club, as well as other staff of the parliament. The event was organized in close co-operation with the National Democratic Institute.

“Gender equality is not simply about the number of women and men represented. It is also about gender-sensitive law making, gender-responsive oversight and gender-sensitive Parliament Service policies and practices,” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje, Clemens Koja.

Member of Parliament Daniela Rangelova, Chairperson of the Parliament’s Committee for Equal Opportunities of Women and Men, said: “The Parliament is undertaking important activities related to the empowerment of women and establishment of efficient gender institutional mechanisms and public policies in the country.”

“This workshop provided us with new insights and it will inform future activities to be undertaken. It is already clear that there is a need for a more systematic approach related to gender mainstreaming in our parliament. We are looking forward to working with the OSCE on the challenges identified throughout today’s discussion.”

The Mission will analyse the data collected during the assessment workshop and prepare a detailed report with an action plan for the parliament’s consideration.

Marina Živaljević

In order to promote gender equality at the local level, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, in co-operation with the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, organized a two-day workshop on gender equality for municipal gender focal points on 28 and 29 March 2019 in Podgorica.

Seventeen participants from 15 Montenegrin municipalities learnt about the National Action Plan for Gender Equality as well as how to plan and measure the achievement of gender equality at the local level and apply a gender perspective in the development of municipal budgets. The workshop was an opportunity to exchange good practices, evaluate accomplishments and activities, and share challenges and views on gender-related issues.

In welcoming the participants, Lia Magnaguagno, OSCE Democratization Programme Manager, said that the Mission supported the establishment of the Municipal Gender Focal Point Network in 2013 and continues to support the development of its capacity as an important tool for promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women at the local level. “We are well aware that you are facing numerous challenges in your daily work, but we are also convinced that, as a network, you can come up with innovative solutions and ideas,” said Magnaguagno.

Biljana Pejović, Head of the Department for Gender Equality at the Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, presented a draft National Action Plan for achieving gender equality and an overview of the implemented activities in the past year. She emphasized the importance of gender-responsive budgeting, and an allocation of resources in order to meet the needs of women.

Human rights expert Slavica Striković said that even a superficial analysis of both local and state budgets shows that taxpayers’ money is spent in a way that deepens gender differences. Therefore, it is necessary to undertake more concrete steps in order to introduce gender-responsive budgeting, she concluded.

The OSCE Mission will continue reinforcing the endeavours of the network by providing expertise, facilitating training events and co-ordinating between stakeholders, said Magnaguagno.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 29 and 30 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 30 and 31 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of an injured man in Verkhnotoretske.
•  It observed fresh damage near and in residential areas in Dokuchaievsk and Hlybokyi.
• The Mission saw military presence inside the Petrivske disengagement area and recorded ceasefire violations in the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. In addition, the Mission was denied access at a checkpoint near Zaichenko.*
• The SMM observed a calm situation in several regions in Ukraine during the Presidential Elections.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 29 and 30 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 75), compared with the previous reporting period (70 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded south and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On the evening of 29 March, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 25 ceasefire violations including an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 200-500m south from the camera.

Between the evenings of 30 and 31 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions (about 75), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly directions of Chermalyk and at south-westerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 29 and 30 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 215 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 500 explosions). About two thirds of the ceasefire violations were recorded west and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 30 and 31 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including nine explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded near the disengagement area close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas east-north-east of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

During the day on 31 March, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 1.5km south-west of the SMM’s position.

On the same day, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 20 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 1km south-west of its  position.

Also on the same day, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV which was flying about 1km north-west of its  position. The Mission landed all UAVs safely.*

Man injured reportedly due to gunfire in Verkhnotoretske

On 31 March, the SMM followed up on reports of a man injured by shrapnel on 29 March in Verkhnotoretske (government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). At a hospital in Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk), the SMM saw a man (aged 30) with five bandaged wounds: to his face, neck, right thigh and abdominal area. Medical staff told the Mission that the man had been admitted to the hospital on 29 March with five shrapnel wounds. The man told the SMM that in the afternoon hours of 29 March while outside his house at 25 Vyshneva Street in Verkhnotoretske, he had heard gunfire and an explosion and had subsequently seen blood on his face.

Fresh damage to a residential building in Dokuchaievsk

On 31 March, at 104 Lenina Street in Dokuchaievsk (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a fresh hole in the lower section of the west-south-west-facing window pane of a flat on the third floor of a four-storey residential building. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by a bullet from an undetermined weapon. The SMM also saw a flower pot with damage to its side, assessed as caused by an impact from a bullet. The owner of the flat (woman, aged 30-40) said that she and her family had been at home when the damage had occurred in the afternoon of 25 March.

Fresh damage to residential buildings in Hlybokyi

The SMM observed damage to three residential buildings in Hlybokyi (non-government-controlled, 55km west of Luhansk).

On 28 March, at 5 Krylova Street, the SMM saw 25 shattered west-facing windows, 27 shattered north-facing windows and 27 shattered south-facing windows, with shattered glass found up to a meter south from the building. The SMM also saw more than 40 holes in the middle of the south-facing side of the second floor and ten holes in the middle of the north-facing side of the second floor, assessed as caused by small-arms fire (7.62mm). It also saw 13 fresh craters at a distance of 50-150m south-east, north and north-north-east of the building. The SMM also observed a smashed windshield assessed to be from a possible heavy utility truck (KamAZ variant) in the yard west-south-west of the building. Two residents of the building (a man and a woman, aged 45 years old) told the SMM they had been present inside the building when shelling took place.

About 15m east from the above-mentioned location, at 6 Krylova Street, the SMM saw four freshly broken windows and more than ten fresh holes in the north-facing side of the building, assessed as caused by a small-arms fire (7.62mm). The SMM also observed 12 fresh craters at a distance of 70-150m north-west of the building and an additional five fresh craters 150-150m north-east.

About 150m north-east from the above-mentioned second location, at 8 Krylova Street, the SMM saw four freshly broken east-facing windows.

On 29 March, in Hlybokyi, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three heavily damaged buildings at 5, 6 and 8 Krylova Street. In a field about 150m west-north-west of the damaged buildings, the same UAV spotted 13 fresh craters assessed as impacts of artillery (122mm) rounds fired from a north-westerly direction and seven fresh impact craters (weapon(s) and direction of fire undetermined), all at a distance of 50m of the closest residential houses. In a field about 150m east-south-east of the damaged houses, the same UAV spotted five recent impact craters (weapon(s) and direction of fire undetermined), at a distance of 70m of the closest residential houses. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On 29 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two muzzle flashes at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). While in Kadiivka, the SMM heard about 90 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-15km north-west, near the Zolote disengagement area. On 29 March, while in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw five bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 5-9km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area). On 30 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 50 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 31 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded 130 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east and east-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).  Positioned 1km north of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a burst of heavy-machine-gun fire 600m west-north-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area). Positioned in two locations near the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion and five shots and bursts of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 29 March, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) near previously reported positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 1.2km east of the area’s western edge and about 900m north of its southern edge.[3] On 31 March, positioned near the Petrivske disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 30 and 31 March, positioned near the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

30 March

The SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) (one stationary and one moving from west to east) about 4km south-west of Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

31 March

The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) next to the entry-exit checkpoint near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

29 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk);
• two IFV (BMP-1) near Slavne (26km south-west of Donetsk);
• two APCs (BTR-60 and BTR-70) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB-S ambulance variant) near Novohnativka (40km south of Donetsk).

30 March

The SMM saw:

• a trench digger (undetermined variant) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (MT-LB ambulance variant) and five IFVs (three BMP-1 and two BMP variants)  near Popasna.

31 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB ambulance variant) and four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP variant) near Popasna (see above);
• an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (MT-LB) near residential houses in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (BTR variant) near Novotroitske.

Non-government-controlled-areas

29 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and an artillery reconnaissance vehicle (PRP-4 Nard) near Petrivske (21km south of Donetsk), and
• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk).

Presence of mine hazard signs 

On 30 March, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden square sign (grey with “Mines” written in Cyrillic) located about 4m east of a local road on the southern edge of Kalynove-Borshchuvate.

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

On 30 and 31 March, the Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of the DFS and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 29 March, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates) and four trucks with covered cargos (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates), 23 cars (two with Ukrainian, 11 with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, as well as nine with “DPR” plates) and seven trucks with covered cargos (three with Ukrainian and two with Belarusian licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

On 30 March, while at a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (40km east of Mariupol) for 30 minutes, the SMM saw eight cars (one with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as two with “DPR” plates) and two trucks with covered cargos (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM also saw six cars (three with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates) and a covered cargo truck (with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

The SMM monitored a calm situation in several regions of Ukraine during the Presidential Elections

On 31 March, on the occasion of the Presidential Elections in Ukraine, the SMM observed calm situations in Kyiv, Kherson,Mykolaiv, Odessa,  Lviv, Rivne, Ivano-Frankivsk, Zakarpattia, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Chernivtsi, as well as government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The SMM observed an increased presence of law enforcement officers in urban areas in most of the abovementioned regions. The Mission also observed a calm situation and at entry-exit checkpoints in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

In Kyiv, the SMM observed a calm situation outside the Parliament and in front of the Central Election Commission (CEC) at 1 Lesi Ukrainky Square, where it also saw a group of 350 people (mostly men, aged 18-50) standing in front of the CEC building throughout the day.

On 30 March and 31 March, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson), Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 30 March 2019 ). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 30 March, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• On two occasions on 29 March, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again stopped the SMM on two occasions and allowed it to pass, without providing any reason, only after about 23 and 16 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.

Conditional access:

• On 31 March, at a checkpoint 5km north-east of Horlivka (non-government-controlled 39km north-east of Donetsk), three members of armed formations again allowed the SMM to proceed only after inspecting the trailer of its vehicle.

Other impediments:

• On 31 March, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 12 shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).
• On 31 March, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the Mission heard five shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).
• On 31 March, while conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire, assessed as aimed at the UAV (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

415751 Communication and Media Relations Section

A four-day train-the-trainer course on appropriate and effective responses to gender-based violence for officials from Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania was held from 25 to 29 March 2019, at the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL) Headquarters in Budapest, Hungary.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department/Strategic Police Matters Unit, in partnership with the Swedish Institute of Police Education at Linnaeus University and in co-ordination with the OSCE Gender Section. The four-day course for police and prosecutors was followed by a one-day workshop where judges and social workers joined in.

Delivered by experts from the Institute, the course aimed at consolidation of soft skills, mutual learning, identification and exchange of good practices and working methods, including referral methods, which are transferable to other countries.

Built on a victim- and rights-centred approach, the course promoted the EU-legislation on wide protection of victims of violence. The process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases.

Complementary to the course, the one-day workshop highlighted the importance of a co-ordinated and integrated approach when fighting gender-based violence cases. The workshop strengthened the participants’ understanding of how improving multidisciplinary co-operation and interaction on gender-based violence cases can contribute to better meeting the needs of victims and highlighted best practices that could significantly improve the ability to counter gender-based violence crimes.

The 23 participants in the course from interior ministries, police academies and schools and general prosecutor’s offices, together with the 9 additional participants in the adjacent workshop from the regional courts and victim support services of the three beneficiary countries, will transfer the acquired knowledge and skills in a series of national specialized courses to be organized by the OSCE in Hungary, from 6 to10 May, in Romania, from 27 to 31 May and in Bulgaria, from 10 to 14 June.

The OSCE commended the excellent gender balance of the group of trainers and participants at the workshop, with a total of 16 male and 16 female.

The project titled “Effective Criminal Justice Strategies and Practices to Combat Gender-based Violence in Eastern Europe” is financially supported by the European Commission and the government of Austria.

415697 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe held the fourth co-ordination meeting dedicated to the implementation of Tajikistan’s 2020 National Strategy and Action Plan on Prevention of Violent Extremism in Dushanbe on 29 March 2019. It was organized together with Tajikistan’s General Prosecutor’s Office.

The meeting brought together both national and international high-level stakeholders to discuss the implementation of the National Action Plan on countering violent extremism (CVE). The participants identified further support areas for civil society and government institutions, in line with international human rights standards and best practices.

As part of the implementation efforts, the findings of OSCE’s professional development courses for public councils on police reform and CVE in the framework of community policing efforts were also presented.

“The OSCE recognizes that in the contemporary security environment the scale and complexity of terrorist threats is ever-changing. Therefore, the Organization promotes a co-operative and co-ordinative approach at all levels and in all forms,” emphasised Fejzo Numanaj, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe.

Manuchehr Mahmudzoda, Head of the International Co-operation Department of the Office of the Prosecutor General, equally underlined that the co-operation between government, civil society, and international actors in this field is crucial.

“Our understanding of the issue is based on the tenets that the drivers of violent extremism and terrorism are context-specific, and require a multi-stakeholder approach to effectively counter this phenomenon,” stated Ambassador of the United States of America to Tajikistan John Marc Pommersheim.

Navruz Odinaev, a civil society representative and member of Public Council on Police Reform said: “It is very important to have a co-ordination mechanism between civil society and government actors on the issues related to preventing and countering terrorism. Imposing restrictive measures, be it in cyberspace or elsewhere, will exacerbate the terrorist radicalization of youth.”

The participants of the meeting further shared their ideas on implementation modalities of the Strategy and agreed to co-ordinate their efforts on a bi-monthly basis.

KYIV, 1 April 2019 – Sunday’s presidential election in Ukraine was competitive, voters had a broad choice and turned out in large numbers. While the existing legal framework offers a sound basis for holding democratic elections, it was often not implemented in good faith by many stakeholders in the run-up to election day. This negatively impacted trust in the election administration, the enforcement of campaign finance rules, and the effective resolution of election disputes, the international observers concluded in a preliminary statement released today.

Fundamental freedoms were generally respected, and candidates could campaign freely, but numerous indications of vote-buying and the misuse of state resources undermined the credibility of the process. The media landscape is diverse, but campaign coverage lacked in-depth analysis and was often biased, the observers said. 

“This competitive election has laid the groundwork for a vibrant second round,” said Ilkka Kanerva, Special Co-ordinator and leader of the short-term OSCE observer mission. “I hope that this will encourage Ukraine to continue on its path of democratic development, at peace and secure within its internationally recognized borders in our community of European values.”

Election day was assessed positively overall, and paves the way to the second round. Still, some procedural problems were noted during the count, and conditions for tabulation were at times inadequate, the statement says.

“We were pleased to see that the campaign was competitive but believe, nevertheless, that there are key legal issues that should be addressed as a matter of priority,” said Angela Smith, Head of the delegation from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE). “PACE and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission hope to continue their close co-operation with Ukraine in the field of democratic development.”

Doris Barnett, Head of the delegation from the OSCE Parliamentary Delegation, said: “Despite earlier concerns, election day was well administered and without disturbances. The Ukrainian people deserve praise for the conduct of these elections” she said. “I have high expectations that the results, once confirmed, will be recognized, and that the second round will be just as peaceful, orderly and efficient.”

The election is taking place in the context of ongoing armed conflict and other hostilities in the east of the country and the illegal annexation of the Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation. As a consequence, the election could not be organized in Crimea and certain parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions that are controlled by illegal armed groups.

"What I observed was a free choice by free people. Ukrainians demonstrated their strong commitment to democratic and Euro-Atlantic values. I saw the enthusiasm of citizens of all ages participating in the election process in impressive numbers,” said Michal Szczerba, Head of the delegation from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly. “However, I sincerely regret that not all could vote because Russia has illegally annexed Crimea and continues its military aggression in eastern Ukraine. The NATO PA will continue to assist Ukraine’s path of reforms and support its aspiration to join our Alliance.”

The election campaign was competitive and generally peaceful. However, there was lack of genuine political debate among the contestants. The overwhelming majority of the 39 candidates did not conduct any campaign activities, casting doubt on their intention to genuinely compete in the election.

Several candidates, on the other hand, campaigned throughout the country. Incumbent President Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko were most active, with Poroshenko’s extensive tours around the country blurring the line between his official position and campaign activities. Volodymyr Zelenskyi, who received the most votes in the first round, did not hold a single traditional campaign rally.

There was widespread criticism that the incumbent president used social assistance programmes, salary increases and other financial incentives as campaign tools. At the same time, ODIHR election monitors observed the abuse of state resources at the national and local levels by several candidates. More than 80 criminal investigations into alleged vote-buying have been launched, including two alleged nationwide schemes focusing on the campaigns of Poroshenko and Tymoshenko, respectively.

Rights and freedoms that underpin democratic elections are guaranteed in the constitution. The legal framework remains largely unchanged since the 2014 presidential election. Efforts at electoral reform were inconclusive, and most previous recommendations by ODIHR and the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, including the crucial need to codify electoral legislation, remain unaddressed. Positively, the right of individuals to lodge constitutional complaints, introduced in 2016, allowed citizens and political parties for the first time to challenge election-related legislation.

“We have been here for eight weeks now, looking at all aspects of the election. There are loopholes in the laws, and these should not be abused,” said Ambassador Peter Tejler, Head of the election observation mission from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. “It is important that stakeholders now implement the law in good faith. This will help build trust in the election administration and help to ensure a fair campaign.”

The Constitution guarantees freedom of expression and prohibits censorship. Nevertheless, the government has introduced a number of restrictive measures affecting the activities of the media and journalists, citing threats to national security. The media landscape is diverse but largely divided along political lines. The business and political interests of the owners affect the autonomy of private media outlets and the general trust in them. The public broadcaster is severely underfunded, which affects its ability to fully perform its public-service role.

There was also criticism of hastily adopted changes to the law on the Central Election Commission, particularly from civil society, which claimed that the amendments exclusively benefited the current president. This led to doubts from many sides about the Commission’s impartiality.

The State Voter Register contains the records of some 35.6 million voters. Despite some concerns about difficulties to adequately capture data on internally displaced persons (IDPs), internal labour migrants and citizens living abroad, there was general confidence in the accuracy of the voter lists.

The law provides for election observation by international and citizen observers: candidate and party observers were seen in almost all polling stations, and citizen observers in around one half. However, in light of the designation by parliament of the Russian Federation as an aggressor state, a recent amendment to the election laws effectively prohibited citizens of the Russian Federation and or people whose nomination was initiated or submitted by the Russian Federation from observing elections in Ukraine. This is at odds with OSCE commitments.

For further information, contact:

Nat Parry, OSCE PA, +380 98 046 71 82 or +45 60 10 81 77, nat@oscepa.dk

Thomas Rymer, ODIHR, +380 67 339 62 93 or +48 609 522 266, thomas.rymer@odihr.pl

Bogdan Torcatoriu, PACE, +380 96 429 48 91 or +33 6 50 39 29 40, bogdan.torcatoriu@coe.int

Henrik Bliddal, NATO PA, +32 475 75 27 25, hbliddal@nato-pa.int

415739 Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje Ilona Kazaryan

SKOPJE, 1 April 2019 – A co-ordinated response to existing and emerging transnational threats is the focus of an OSCE-supported regional conference taking place today and tomorrow in Skopje. The event was opened by Zoran Zaev, Prime Minister of North Macedonia, and Ambassador Clemens Koja, Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje.

During the conference, representatives of border and customs agencies of North Macedonia, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece, and Romania will share best international practices pertinent to Integrated Border Management (IBM). Participants from Kosovo are also taking part in the event. The two-day event will promote enhanced co-operation through better real-time data exchange between law enforcement agencies in the region.

“This conference is one of a series of practical discussions we have organized focusing on border security and management in the region. These activities are aimed to develop common goals and best practices to counter the threats of transnational organized crime and terrorism,” said Koja.

He added that the OSCE is committed to achieving a balance between the need to maintain security in the face of cross-border threats on the one hand and freedom of movement for persons, goods, services and commerce on the other.

Prime Minister Zaev said: “Illegal cross-border activities require an adequate response. In today’s globalized world, in order to make free movement of people and goods maximally efficient, we must double our efforts to fight organized crime, including corruption and illegal migration, weapons proliferation, drug smuggling and human trafficking.”

VIENNA, 1 April 2019 - OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovak Foreign and European Affairs Minister Miroslav Lajčák yesterday met in Bratislava with Minsk Group Co-Chair Andrew Schofer, of the United States of America, acting also on behalf of Minsk Group Co-Chairs Igor Popov of the Russian Federation and Stéphane Visconti of France, and Personal Representative of the Chairperson-in-Office Andrzej Kasprzyk. The Chairperson-in-Office was briefed on the results of the meeting between President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev and Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia Nikol Pashinyan on 29 March in Vienna, the first meeting of the two leaders under the auspices of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs.

The Chairperson-in-Office welcomed the constructive atmosphere of the talks, and the leaders’ commitment to taking further, tangible steps to find a peaceful solution to the conflict. “We remain positive about, and fully supportive of, this process and the leaders’ commitment to strengthening the ceasefire and to undertaking measures in the humanitarian field,” Lajčák said.

VIENNA, 1 April 2019 – Ahead of the first OSCE Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting under the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, which will focus on tolerance and non-discrimination in Vienna, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovak Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák called for more dialogue, respect and closer co-operation in combating intolerance, discrimination and hate crimes.

“Our organization is built on the concept of comprehensive security. This means that dialogue, tolerance and respect for cultural diversity and human rights are not just good for humanity, but can also act as key drivers of peace. In times where political and religious intolerance is rising, I believe dialogue is key. It can foster tolerance and solidarity among diversity. It can enable us to prevent conflicts. And it can help us to achieve a culture of lasting peace.” said the Chairperson-in-Office.

The event in Vienna, organized in co-operation with the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), will bring together more than 150 representatives from OSCE participating States, intergovernmental organizations, educational institutions, religious or belief communities and civil society from across the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation to discuss the progress  made by participating States in implementing OSCE commitments on upholding the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination, including in the promotion and protection of  freedom of religion or belief. 

“The continuing reports from religious or belief communities of racism, intolerance and discrimination manifested in various forms, including hate crimes, should trouble us all. These violations of the most basic human rights, including the freedom of religion or belief, are a threat to security and stability both within countries and at the regional level,” added ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “As a priority, we must work together to understand and dismantle the systemic root causes of these terrible phenomena.”

Noting that the principles of tolerance and non-discrimination and the right to freedom of religion or belief are inseparable and interrelated, and under severe stress in the OSCE region, Professor Ingeborg Gabriel, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Racism, Xenophobia and Discrimination, also focusing on Intolerance and Discrimination against Christians and Members of Other Religions, pointed out that “to counter any form of intolerance -  also against Christians and members of other religions - and to achieve lasting social peace, we need concerted efforts, including from civil society institutions and religious communities, to strengthen these principles and to stand up for a decent society based on mutual respect”.

Ambassador Mehmet Paçacı, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Intolerance and Discrimination against Muslims, warned that according to official and civil society reports, cases of intolerance and discrimination against Muslims in the OSCE region are on the rise. “Despite many recent good practices, monitoring and reporting the cases of intolerance and discrimination against Muslims are still at a very low level in our region," he warned.

“Freedom of religion is surely predicated on the basic safety and security of its practitioners to gather in prayer and fellowship. They must also be free to engage in the religious observance and practice that shape their identity.”, stressed Rabbi Andrew Baker, Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office on Combating Anti-Semitism. “Thus, we need to flag the dangers of a growing secular environment that is hostile to religion more generally,” he added.

The event in Vienna also aims at discussing how best to prevent and respond to intolerance and create an appreciation for diversity. Various lessons learned will be exchanged, with focus placed on initiatives and tools such as education policies and awareness-raising strategies. Co-operation between different communities, groups and organizations will be discussed as a key element in tackling discrimination and intolerance.

Following up on the commitments made by all 57 participating States, including from the Basel Ministerial Council in 2014, the Supplementary Human Dimension Meeting’s goal is to take stock of the implementation of commitments in the area of tolerance and non-discrimination. The event also provides a forum for identifying and discussing promising practices and challenges in this respect in the OSCE region.

Ultimately, this could be conducive towards potential Bratislava OSCE Ministerial Council decisions in the area of freedom of religion or belief. The meeting follows up on and complements the Conference on Combatting Anti-Semitism in the OSCE Region, which took place in Bratislava in February 2019.  

Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Nur-Sultan

Promoting rural entrepreneurship for women was the focus of a two-day training seminar and roundtable discussion co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office that concluded on 29 March 2019 in Shymkent, Kazakhstan.

The event was conducted in partnership with the Union of Women Entrepreneurs of Kazakhstan for some 45 participants from the parliament, the local administration, the National Chamber of Entrepreneurs – Atameken, civil society and women entrepreneurs from the rural areas of the Turkestan Region.

Participants discussed current government-supported business programmes, challenges faced by women in pursuing business projects and the importance of gaining financial and managerial skills to obtain credit resources. The discussion was complemented by a  visit to companies run by women entrepreneurs of the Turkestan Region, which provided the opportunity to consider key challenges and opportunities in doing business locally.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s longstanding efforts to promote gender mainstreaming and economic empowerment initiatives in the host country.