OSCE

415364 Lyudmila Makarina-Kibak, Chairperson of the Standing Committee on Health, Physical Culture, Family and Youth Policy at the Belarusian National Assembly's House of Representatives, participating in the meeting on gender-sensitive legislation. Minsk, 27 March 2019. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The importance of gender–sensitive legislation was the topic of a meeting with Belarusian women parliamentarians organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in collaboration with the House of Representatives of the National Assembly of Belarus, on 27 March 2019 in Minsk.

The meeting was organized as part of the two-year, European Union-funded project “Promoting Democratization and Human Rights in Belarus”.

The twelve participants – women parliamentarians, parliamentary staff and government officials – exchanged experiences with ODIHR and other international experts on the legislative process and gender equality in the National Assembly, highlighting the importance of addressing gender aspects in all legislation. Steps taken to introduce mechanisms for advancing gender equality and women’s leadership in the National Assembly were among the issues discussed.

“We are glad to exchange experiences with women parliamentarians from Belarus,” said Tiina Kukkamaa-Bah, Chief of the Democratic Governance and Gender Equality Unit at ODIHR. “Women are often at the forefront of efforts to advance gender equality and women’s rights in their countries. All legislation should be inclusive of women and drafted with consideration for the impact on all the country’s citizens, as this makes the laws better for everyone.”

Lyudmila Makarina-Kibak, Chairperson of the Standing Committee of the House of Representatives on Health, Physical Culture, Family and Youth Policy, said: “The legislative process provides a unique opportunity for a broad discussion of various issues that are of major importance for society, and therefore an opportunity for the expression of various opinions and interests. In this regard, the legislative process is an effective instrument for affirming and implementing gender equality values and principles, strengthening the position of women, expanding their rights and enhancing their social status.”

VIENNA, 26 March 2019 – Economic connectivity in the OSCE region, trade facilitation, co-operation between state bodies and the private sector were the focus of a workshop hosted by the Office of the Co‑ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) today in Vienna.

“The objective of today’s discussion is to find ways to reduce costs and burdens on trade transactions, improve and harmonize information flows within and between countries, and to enhance alignment with international standards, in order to increase good-neighborly relations and trust,” said Lorenzo Rilasciati, Acting Deputy Co-ordinator/Head of Economic Activities at OCEEA.

More than 50 participants from Central Asia, Moldova, and Belarus, as well as from OSCE participating States, exchanged best practices in co-ordinating trade facilitation policies. A concluding document reflecting outcomes of the discussions was agreed upon by the participants. 

“We will focus on generating new ideas and suggestions for the improvement of domestic co-ordination of trade facilitation and cross-border co-operation by exchanging best practices and experiences from Central Asia and Eastern Europe,” said Rilasciati. “Engaging relevant government authorities and the private sector – strengthening dialogue – is the path to take.”

“The OSCE, its field operations and other partners will continue to use this platform to strengthen regional co-operation in the area of trade facilitation,” he added. 

Violane Konar-Leacy, International Finance Corporation (IFC) Manager for the European and Central Asia Trade Facilitation Support Program, highlighted the importance of high-level focus and structured co-ordination by all stakeholders in moving the trade facilitation agenda forward in order to reap the benefits from its implementation.

Gordana Tosheva from the USAID Regional Growth Project explained some of the common challenges and solutions to effective national trade facilitation committee operations.

The OSCE Ministerial Council Decision 4/16 on "Strengthening Good Governance and Promoting Connectivity” encourages participating States that are members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) to support full implementation of its Trade Facilitation Agreement. “WTO members must provide a series of notifications that reflect the needs and implementation time frames of all the relevant agencies,” said Sheri Rosenow, from the WTO. “National committees of the countries must co-ordinate with all relevant agencies and the private sector to prepare these notifications, as well as to implement them and monitor progress.” 

Today’s event was supported by the OSCE Programme Offices in Bishkek and Dushanbe, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat and the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Uzbekistan. It was part of the project on Promoting Economic Connectivity in the OSCE, funded by the governments of Germany, Switzerland and Austria.

LUXEMBOURG CITY, 26 March 2019 – OSCE PA President George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia) and Secretary General Roberto Montella are visiting the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg to finalize with the Chamber of Deputies the agreement to hold the Parliamentary Assembly’s 28th Annual Session in Luxembourg City.

The PA delegation met with Grand Duke Henri, members of Standing Committee of the Chamber of Deputies, the Delegation of Luxembourg to the OSCE PA led by Eugene Berger, and the Committee on Foreign and European Affairs, Cooperation, Immigration and Asylum chaired by Marc Angel.

“Luxembourg hosting our Annual Session is another demonstration of the valuable contribution of small and large countries alike when it comes to Europe’s security and stability,” said President Tsereteli. “I appreciate the full commitment of the authorities in Luxembourg for the successful organization of this event.”

Meetings were held today with Foreign Minister Jean Asselborn and members of the Consultative Human Rights Commission of Luxembourg.

Topics of discussion included major international issues, particularly the crisis in and around Ukraine, protracted conflicts, the situation in Georgia, human rights, OSCE PA activities, and the future co-operation between Luxembourg and the PA.

Meeting with Prime Minister Xavier Bettel and Speaker Fernand Etgen, Tsereteli and Montella voiced appreciation for Luxembourg’s steadfast support to the OSCE.

At the Standing Committee, the PA delegation discussed priorities on security issues in the OSCE region. Luxembourg was praised for its model of consensus-based parliamentary democracy and high standards of human rights.

The OSCE PA’s Annual Session will be held this year under the theme “Advancing Sustainable Development to Promote Security: The Role of Parliaments.” The event will bring together some 300 parliamentarians from North America, Europe and Asia at the European Convention Center Luxembourg on 4-8 July.

It will culminate in the adoption of the Luxembourg Declaration, which will contain recommendations to national governments, parliaments, and the international community in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, environment and human rights.

Photos of the visit to Luxembourg are available on Flickr.

Marina Živaljević

The OSCE Mission to Montenegro participated in a ceremony to hand over keys of 94 newly built housing units to families in the Municipality of Berane on 26 March 2019. The construction, worth 3.9 million euro, is part of the Regional Housing Programme (RHP).

Speakers at the event included Kemal Purišić, Minister of Labour and Social Welfare; Aivo Orav, Head of the Delegation of the European Union to Montenegro; Judy Rising Reinke, United States Ambassador to Montenegro; Robert Weber, Ambassador of Germany to Montenegro; Stephan Sellen, Deputy Director of the Council of Europe Development Bank; Dragoslav Šćekić, President of the Municipality of Berane.

On behalf of the OSCE and UNHCR, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet commended the good work and commitment of the Government of Montenegro and said that the Regional Housing Programme is not only about the provision of housing, but also about giving a new opportunity to live in dignity.

“This is indeed a tangible result of an ambitious regional programme that, despite its challenges, is a successful example of joint efforts to assist the most vulnerable people with decent and durable accommodations,” said Daviet. She added that “housing is only one part of the equation; more needs to be done to secure access to other rights”.

The main donor was the European Union and significant financial contributions were made by the governments of the United States, Italy, Germany, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, and Turkey. The regional housing programme has been strongly supported by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, which supported national authorities in selecting beneficiaries for this project under the Regional Housing Programme.

With the completion of this phase of the project, 395 housing solutions to 1,504 most vulnerable persons have been provided in Montenegro so far.

Through the Regional Housing Programme for Montenegro, funds have been provided to build more housing units in the coming years, which will bring the total number of most vulnerable people provided with housing to more than 6,000.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

 OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

 OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 9,601 to 9,935 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to the Russian Federation, with an average net flow of plus 94 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. 

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 29 this week compared to 19 last week: fourteen of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and fifteen into Ukraine (93 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, no families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and three were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when eight families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and five into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight decrease in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (333 compared to 336 observed during the previous week). There were 186 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 147 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the route “Rovenky – Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 707 to 748 (251 at the Gukovo BCP and 497 at the Donetsk BCP); 394 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 354 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.                                                                                        

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 41 (compared to 57 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly decreased from 205 to 194: of the total number of trucks scanned, 130 trucks (67 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 64 trucks (33 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 155 to 132 vehicles; 68 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 64 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 28 occasions, compared to 17 last week; the OTs assessed that seventeen trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and eleven to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

 Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. Cars with Polish and Georgian licence plates were also observed.

On 19 March at 09:49, three ambulances arrived at the Donetsk BCP from Ukraine, underwent border control procedures for around 10 minutes and left towards the Russian Federation at 10:00. One of the ambulances bore the inscription in Russian “Children intensive care” (Детская Реанимация) on the side of the vehicle. The flashing lights on the ambulances were turned off.

On the same day at 19:17, an ambulance with the same inscription as above arrived at the BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle underwent border control procedures and left towards Ukraine. Because of the high traffic during the shift, the OT was unable to notice any other details. The flashing lights were turned off.

On 20 March at 10:31, a minivan with the inscription “Police” with a crew of three people arrived at Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle drove next to the main building and was partially visible to the OT. A fourth person, an adult male, was taken into the rear part of the van, alongside a crew member. At 10:43, the vehicle returned towards the Russian Federation.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 19 February 2019 to 26 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                       

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Heavy machine-gun fired in the direction of an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle flying near non-government-controlled Dovhe. The UAV was not damaged.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to a residential house due to shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• It observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure and an assessment of residential houses damaged by shelling in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko and in Horlivka.*

Heavy machine-gun fired in direction of SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)

At 16:30 on 20 March, an SMM long-range UAV was flying over an area about 3km south-east of Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk), about 3.5km south of the contact line. Subsequent analysis of imagery recorded by it has revealed a heavy machine-gun (type undetermined), 1.4km west-north-west of the ground location over which the UAV was flying, firing at least 14 bursts assessed as aimed at the UAV. The UAV was flying at an altitude of approximately 2,500m at the time of the incident and was not damaged. The SMM had, per established procedure, given notice of the UAV flight in the general area.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 160 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (about 65 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and near the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 30 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (four explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in northerly directions of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and south of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63 km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage to a residential house due to shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 24 March, at 6 Turhenieva Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a broken window (covered with a wooden plank) on the south-facing side of a one-storey house, as well as a fresh crater 2m south of it. The Mission assessed the damage as caused by a mortar (type undetermined) round fired from a southerly direction. The owner of the house (a woman, about 65 years old) said that on the morning of 21 March, while inside the house, she had heard an explosion in her yard.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 24 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) and again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (probable BMP-1) near the road bridge west of road T-1316, both assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same UAV again spotted about 34 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a field near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces just north of the disengagement area.

The UAV also again spotted about 70 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in nine rows in the southern part of the Zolote disengagement area, assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

During the day on 25 March, positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, the SMM heard about 25 undetermined explosions and about 70 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun fire at an assessed range of 3-5km north-north-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

On 25 March, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk),[3] the SMM saw two IFVs (BMP variants), a Ukrainian national flag and a red-and-black flag near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces about 600m south of the northern edge of the disengagement area and about 2.5km east of its western edge.

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

25 March

The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) (see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• eight multiple launch rocket systems (type undetermined) in a training area near Miusynsk (62km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019) and
• two tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 15 March 2019). 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

19 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk), as well as 58 armoured combat vehicles (ACVs) (type undetermined) [4] in the same training area (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019), and
• 20 tanks (type undetermined) and 23 pieces of artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), as well as 73 ACVs (type undetermined) in the same training area.

20 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• four tanks (type undetermined) and five pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Miusynsk (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019);
• 12 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019); and
• 24 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 20 March 2019).

Other weapons observed:[5]

On 19 March, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 20 pieces of towed artillery or mortar and seven pieces of self-propelled artillery in a training area near Buhaivka (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 19 March 2019).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

23 March         

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an APC (MT-LB) near Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk).

25 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and
• two IFVs (BMP-2) in Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk) in the yard of a house where seven Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers (three of them armed) were present, about 50m from the nearest house inhabited by civilians.

The same day, the SMM also saw a helicopter (MI-8) flying from east to west at an altitude of 100m about 4.5km north of Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk) and three Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers flying a black mini-UAV on the north-western edge of Stanytsia Luhanska. In the area of the entry-exit checkpoint of Marinka, the SMM observed a newly-built wooden structure surrounded by sand bags on the southern side of road H-15 about 10m south-east of the most forward checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Non-government-controlled areas

23 March

An SMM-mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

25 March

The SMM saw an APC (probable MT-LB variant) near Stare (formerly Chervonyi Prapor, 58km west of Luhansk).

Presence of explosive devices

On 25 March, the SMM saw for the first time 11 blocks assessed as explosive reactive armour components of a tank 2m south of the road between the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and the checkpoint of the armed formations near Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol).

SMM facilitation of operation and inspection of civilian infrastructure

The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission also facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an assessment of residential houses damaged by shelling in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 February 2019) as well as to enable demining activity near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk). During the demining activity, the SMM recorded about 20 ceasefire violations in the area, despite security guarantees (see the ceasefire violations table below).

Hardship for civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At 10:15, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 20 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas. At 11:10, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the bridge, the SMM saw about 400 people queuing to exit and about 500 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. At the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces north of the bridge, the SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC). They told the Mission that their presence was related to possible repairs at the bridge.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 25 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and west to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol).
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations on road T0513 on the north-western edge of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), four members of the armed formations (three of them armed) denied the SMM access to the area of the checkpoint, saying that the SMM was not allowed to pass without permission from their superiors. The Mission intended to monitor the security situation and passage of civilians crossing the checkpoint on the road leading to the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• Analysis of imagery recorded by an SMM long-range UAV while flying over an area near Dovhe (non-government-controlled, 22km north-west of Luhansk) on 20 March showed a heavy machine-gun firing bursts, assessed as aimed at the UAV.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 26 March 2019 - The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will organize tomorrow in Prishtinë/Priština a conference on preventing and combating high-level/grand corruption for representatives of Kosovo institutions, agencies, and civil society working on anti-corruption issues.

Prominent experts from the Transparency International will elaborate on the concepts of high-level and grand corruption and its global effects. Furthermore, the conference is planned as a kick-off event, to sensitize the participants – the decision-makers – on the reasons why preventing and combating such high corruption matters at international level.

Opening remarks will be delivered by President Hashim Thaçi and the Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo, Ambassador Jan Braathu.

Media representatives are invited to attend the conference tomorrow, Wednesday, 27 March 2019, at Hotel Emerald in Prishtinë/Priština, starting at 09:00 hrs.

415022 Marina Živaljević SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

23 border and customs officers from Montenegro’s Podgorica and Tivat airports, the Civil Aviation Agency and the Intelligence Agency of Montenegro attended a national training course on risk analysis and management, from 19 to 21 March 2019 in Podgorica.

Organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in co-operation with the OSCE Mission in Montenegro, the interactive course was conducted with the support of an intelligence expert from the United Kingdom.  It focused on topics such as the objectives of risk analysis, intelligence cycles, critical thinking, information sources as well as threat, impact and vulnerability measurement. Participants were engaged in practical exercises during the training.

“All countries, including Montenegro, should be aware that terrorist ideas can develop and complex attacks can be launched anytime, anywhere,” said Head of OSCE Mission in Montenegro Maryse Daviet. “The way terrorist attacks are now planned and conducted has changed and the threats are evolving. The risk analysis based approach related to border security and management is applied by most OSCE participating States and is considered to be an effective tool against security threats at the borders and beyond.”

This activity is part of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department’s project on airport security in Montenegro, launched in co-operation with the OSCE Mission in Montenegro in 2017.

The project aims to develop and implement the Border Community Security Programme of Montenegro, designed to improve information exchange and co-operation between law enforcement and private sector personnel in order to reduce the risk of criminal and terrorist acts, particularly those related to the cross-border movement of  foreign terrorist fighters s through Montenegro’s airports.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 22 and 23 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 23 and 24 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The SMM saw fresh damage to residential houses due to shelling in Pikuzy.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas.
• The SMM followed up on the announcement by the Ukrainian authorities that they would open the entry-exit checkpoint near Zolote for civilian passage on 24 March. It saw that vegetation surrounding the checkpoint had been burned and mine hazard signs removed at the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area. The SMM did not see any civilians crossing the checkpoint.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including in areas near non-government-controlled Molodizhne, Zaichenko and Dovzhanske, close to the border with the Russian Federation.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a public gathering organized by National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny.
• The SMM monitored gatherings in front of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyiv and the Consulates-General in Kharkiv, Lviv and Odessa.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 45 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 275 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south-east and south-south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the evening of 22 March, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded a projectile in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 100-900m. No damage to the camera was recorded.

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 65 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded south and south-east of Chermalyk and at westerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 22 and 23 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 95 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 380 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded west and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled 50km west of Luhansk) and inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Between the evenings of 23 and 24 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including four explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the Zolote disengagement area.

Fresh damage to residential houses due to shelling in Pikuzy

The SMM followed up on media reports of shelling in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On 23 March, at 112 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw fresh damage to two windows on the west-facing side of a one-storey house: one shattered and the other cracked. About 50m south-south-east of the house, the SMM observed two fresh craters. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a north-north-westerly direction.

About 300m further east-south-east, at 92 Akhmatovoi Street, the SMM saw two recently shattered windows on the western side of a one-storey house, as well as fresh holes in the west-facing metal doors of a barn 4m north-north-west of the house. In the yard of the house, approximately 10m west of it, the SMM saw a fresh crater. The SMM assessed the damage as caused by rounds of undetermined weapons fired from a northerly direction. A resident of the house told the SMM that he had been at home with his wife on the morning of 22 March when shelling occurred.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 22 March, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same evening, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 0.1-1km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On the morning of 23 March, positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard four shots of cannon fire at an assessed range of 2-3km north-north-west, assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area. On the same day, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded three projectiles near the disengagement area. On the same morning, positioned at two different locations near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and about 35 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire near the disengagement area. During the day on 24 March, positioned on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard five shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north, assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as four undetermined explosions and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

On 23 and 24 March, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and near the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Follow-up on announcement by Ukrainian authorities that they would open the entry-exit checkpoint near Zolote for civilian passage

The SMM followed up on the announcement by the Ukrainian authorities that they would open the checkpoint 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote for civilian passage on 24 March (see SMM Daily Report 1 April 2016 and SMM Daily Report 21 October 2017). On 23 March, the SMM observed that vegetation surrounding the checkpoint had been burned. At the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM observed a pile of about six mine hazard signs lying on the ground.

On 24 March, at 08:28 at the checkpoint 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM saw ten civilians (three women, seven men, 40-60 years old) and around 35 personnel, including Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers, members of the military press and police officers. While present between 08:28 and 15:00, the SMM did not see any civilians passing the checkpoint to proceed further south. A Ukrainian Armed Forces representative of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that civilians had not been allowed through the checkpoint, as the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area remained closed. The SMM saw two Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel launch an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) which then flew at a low altitude over the checkpoint. Later on, the SMM observed an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near the checkpoint (see below). At the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM observed senior members of the armed formations talking to media representatives. At this checkpoint as well as that of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed laminated signs warning people against crossing the line of contact in the Zolote area due to “security concerns”.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

23 March

The SMM saw:

• two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) (SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019) (seen also on 24 March) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) heading south-west, approximately 4km north-east of Vesela Dolyna (64km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) in Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three surface-to-air missile systems (9K37), one near and two in Vesele (87km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

23 March

The SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (probable BMP-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk).

24 March

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near the Zolote disengagement area and a UAV flying at a low altitude over the area (see above).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted surveillance and acquisition radar (P-19) on top of a slag heap near Fashchivka (61km south-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 12 February 2019).

23 March

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) mounted on a truck near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.

Demining activities

On 23 March, the SMM saw six persons standing next to a vehicle with the name of an international demining organization on it, conducting demining activities about 3km north of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and unexploded ordnance

On 24 March, the SMM again saw at least seven anti-tank mines in a field about 25m west of road H-20, near a checkpoint of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk). On the same day, the SMM again saw a mortar shell (82mm) embedded in the middle of the road, approximately 1.2km south-east of a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), between the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and of the armed formations.

SMM facilitation of operation and inspection of civilian infrastructure

On 23 and 24 March, the Mission continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of water wells at the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 24 March, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation licence plates) entering Ukraine, and two cars (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine. After about ten minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

On the same day, while at a border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw no cross-border traffic.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv on 23 March, from 12:00 to 15:30, the SMM monitored a public gathering by National Corps and Natsionalni Druzhyny at Independence Square (see SMM Daily Report 18 March 2019). The Mission saw about 3,000 people (70 per cent men and 30 per cent women, 13-70 years old), some of whom were holding banners with messages critical of the government and alleging corruption amongst officials. The SMM saw about 50 dialogue police and about 25 National Police officers in uniform present. The protestors marched from the square to the building of the Presidential Administration at 11 Bankova Street, where the SMM observed 500-1,000 National Police and National Guard officers in riot gear. The SMM saw an additional 50 National Guard and 50 National Police officers in front of the National Bank at 11 Instytutska Street. At 16:00, the SMM saw about 400 people with their faces covered and wearing black clothing gathered at 6 Instytutska Street, and then walking up the same street. No incidents were observed.

Gatherings in front of the Embassy and Consulates-General of the Russian Federation in Kyiv, Kharkiv, Lviv and Odessa

On 24 March, in front of the buildings of the Embassy of the Russian Federation in Kyiv and of the Consulates-General in Lviv, Kharkiv and Odessa, the SMM monitored gatherings in support of a Ukrainian prisoner reportedly held in the Russian Federation. At all four locations, the SMM saw between six and 12 people assembled, as well as about 20 law enforcement agents. All gatherings ended without incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 23 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) denied the SMM passage, citing a “mine threat”.
• On 24 March, at a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage south to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing “orders from their superiors”.
• On 24 March, while at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (non-government-controlled, 84km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

BRATISLAVA, 25 March 2019 – The recurring message at today’s opening of the annual OSCE-wide Counter-Terrorism Conference in Bratislava was clear: Strengthening co-operation among states and fostering partnerships between governments and civil society are key to countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism.

More than 400 political representatives, national counter-terrorism co-ordinators, senior policy experts, practitioners and representatives of civil society, business and academia from across the OSCE’s participating States and Partners for Co-operation gathered in Bratislava for a two-day conference to take stock of efforts to prevent and counter terrorism as well as violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (VERLT) in the OSCE area.

“Actions of violent extremists and tragic acts of radicalized individuals have become a virus infecting our societies, harming people and hindering peaceful development,” opened Lukáš Parízek, State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic/Special Representative for the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship, recalling recent incidents in Christchurch, New Zealand and Utrecht, the Netherlands.

“Countering terrorism and preventing violent extremism and radicalization is a key security commitment of OSCE participating States and remains one of the top priorities for Slovakia’s 2019 OSCE Chairmanship,” Parízek continued. “The OSCE is developing powerful, human-rights compliant counter-terrorism programmes, as well as platforms and mechanisms for government and civil society co-operation to disengage individuals from violent extremism and terrorism. This conference itself is an opportunity for representatives of participating and Partner States, together with parliamentarians, experts, civil society and business to foster multi-stakeholder approaches to preventing violent extremism and radicalization.”

Paul Bekkers, Director of the Office of the OSCE Secretary General, underlined that the conference provides an opportunity to discuss current trends such as home-grown terrorism, the rise of right-wing nationalist violence, and the return of foreign terrorist fighters and their family members. “These trends challenge existing policies and we must be frank and agile in our responses while retaining commitments to our values,” he said.

“We will discuss the pressing issue of rehabilitation and reintegration of former terrorism offenders and returning foreign fighters. After all, individuals are often returning back into the same environments which enabled their radicalization to terrorism in the first place. It is imperative that we find the right mix of responses to protect society and to help those willing to redeem themselves,” said Bekkers.

A more comprehensive and holistic approach is needed to preventing and countering terrorism stressed Michèle Coninsx, Assistant Secretary-General and Executive Director of the UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), as she highlighted the Committee’s support to states and its co-operation with the OSCE.

“Terrorism must be fought on multiple fronts: Our policies and methods must also employ a broader perspective that is focused on developing close partnerships with civil society and private industry. Community engagement and resilience are also essential in responding to, and countering, the spread of violent extremism that leads to terrorism,” Coninsx noted.

The opening speakers’ remarks were followed by keynote speeches by Oleg Syromolotov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation;

Oleg Kravchenko, Deputy-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Belarus; Artak Apitonian, Deputy Foreign Minister of Armenia; Dragan Pejanović, State Secretary at the Ministry of Interior of Montenegro; Chris Harnisch, Deputy Co-ordinator for Countering Violent Extremism at the United States State Department and John Gatt-Rutter, Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division at the European External Action Service.

The discussions will conclude tomorrow with closing remarks by Vladimir Voronkov, Under-Secretary-General of the UN Office on Counter-Terrorism, Thomas Greminger, OSCE Secretary General, and State Secretary Parízek.

VIENNA, 25 March 2019 -  The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, published today a legal review of proposed amendments to the “Law on Free Access to Information of Public Character” in North Macedonia. The review was previously officially sent to the Minister of Justice, Renata Deskoska.

“Access to information is a key component of media freedom and of a well-informed citizenry. I welcome the draft law and the ambition of the government of North Macedonia to ensure better access to information on state and administrative activities and finances. The general message of the review is that the proposed amendments will help to improve clarity, provide better time frames, and improve the oversight and reporting process, as well as provide new sanctions for failing to meet deadlines and non-compliance with the decisions by the Commission for the Protection of the Right to Free Access to Information of Public Character, but we propose some improvement and clarifications,” Désir said.

Main recommendations include:

• To strengthen the definition of the scope of the Law on Free Access to Information by adding clearly that it applies to bodies operating largely with public funds.
• To take political parties out from the draft as the information about public funding by public bodies should be obtained in accordance with the law directly from the relevant public bodies.
• To conduct a revision of the exceptions to bring them into line with international standards.
• To conduct a review of the information to be published proactively and to establish a protocol for ensuring the publication of information that is in the public interest while ensuring that in certain cases the privacy of individuals is protected.
• To require that public bodies report to the Commission on the time taken to respond to requests, with relevant details on time for acknowledgements, clarifications, refusals, and so forth.

The review was prepared by Helen Darbishire, Executive Director of Access Info Europe and an international expert on access to information law.

“As regards the political parties, the recommendation to remove them from the draft was not intended to advocate for less transparency. My Office fully supports citizen’s right to be informed about the way public funds are spent, including public funding for political parties. However, this issue should be handled through other laws such as the laws on Financing of Political Parties and on Prevention of Corruption,” Désir said.

“I hope that this legal analysis will be a useful document in the debate concerning the proposed amendments on access to information in the country,” Désir said.

The Representative encouraged authorities to take steps toward open government, which would guarantee more access to open sources, and reiterated his continued readiness to provide assistance on media-related issues in North Macedonia.

The full text of the legal review is available at: https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/415145

VIENNA, 25 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today published the legal review of the draft amendments on the right of reply to the Statute on Periodic Press and News Agencies of Slovakia, which was sent to the Slovak authorities on 5 March.

Based on the OSCE and other international standards the review recommends keeping provisions of Article 8 that restrict the right of reply of political leaders and public figures. It also recommends preserving the right only in response to “false, incomplete or truth distortive” factual statements as it is today. The current provision reinforces the concept that public officials must be more tolerant of criticism than private persons.

The review also recommends revising other parts of Article 8 in line with previous recommendations and international human rights standards. For example, for the reply to be granted, the individual concerned should demonstrate the existence of a legitimate interest in the request. The right of reply can be refused if the contested information is part of a truthful report on public sessions of the public authorities or the courts. It can also be refused if it is not limited to a correction of the facts challenged.

The full text of the legal review is available here:

https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/414362?download=true 

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

VIENNA, 25 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today reiterated his call for Ukrainian authorities to allow foreign journalists to pursue their professional activities unimpeded. His call followed a denial of entry to Marc Innaro, the Moscow correspondent of the Italian Public Service Broadcaster (RAI), and his colleague, who is a camera operator.

According to reports, on 24 March, the crew was denied entry to Ukraine by the State Border Service of Ukraine at an airport in Kyiv. Reportedly, the journalists planned to cover the upcoming elections and film several interviews, including with President Petro Poroshenko.

“I am concerned by the denial of entry to RAI journalist Marc Innaro to Ukraine” Désir said.

“Marc Innaro, like other foreign journalists, came to Ukraine to cover the presidential election. I recall that OSCE participating States are committed to facilitating the entry of journalists from other participating States when the purpose is to engage in journalism activities. I call on the authorities to abstain from creating obstacles preventing journalists from entering the country in this important time. Such obstructions may impede the free flow of information and are an obstacle to freedom of the media,” the Representative added.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

Challenges and positive practices that could facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities in political parties were the focus of a meeting in Tbilisi on 25 March 2019.

The event was organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in co-operation with the Coalition for Independent Living in Georgia, the Eastern European Centre for Multiparty Democracy (EECMD), the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), the International Republican Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI).

“Everyone benefits from full and effective inclusion of persons with disabilities in political and public life,” said Anete Erdmane, Associate Democratic Governance Officer at ODIHR. “Political parties have a key role in ensuring that persons with disabilities can contribute to decision-making in their communities on an equal footing with others.”

More than 50 members of political parties, parliamentarians, politicians with disabilities, representatives of political party support organizations and disabled people’s organizations, and disability rights activists (25 men and 25 women) participated in the event.

"Persons with disabilities may be some of the most motivated voters in Georgia as the country's social and economic development has an instant and direct influence on their ability to enjoy life,” said Giorgi Dzneladze, the Chairperson of the Coalition for Independent Living. “The level of their participation is an indicator of democracy in any country. And let us not forget that they constitute almost one-fourth of Georgia's electorate.”

The discussion focused on raising awareness about the under-representation of persons with disabilities in political life, including different political party structures. The participants noted the benefits of more inclusive political parties and shared their views on possible steps for improvement, in line with the relevant OSCE commitments and the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.

The side event was organized as part of the ODIHR project “Our Right to Participate – Promoting the Participation of Persons with Disabilities in Political and Public Life.”

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Elections experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) met with electoral stakeholders in Tbilisi on 21 and 22 March 2019 to present the ODIHR final report on last year’s presidential election in Georgia.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Central Election Commission, among other officials, as well as to the Chairperson of the Parliament. ODIHR experts also presented the report at an election-related conference organized by the Council of Europe and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), which gathered 60 participants from relevant state authorities and civil society. 

“We consider the commitment at the highest political levels to discuss ODIHR's recommendations an indication of the importance placed on improving the electoral process,” said Ambassador Geert-Hinrich Ahrens, who headed the ODIHR Election Observation Mission for the election. “This is an opportune moment for adopting an inclusive approach to enhancing electoral legislation and practice in Georgia, and ODIHR continues to stand ready to support such efforts.”Discussions focused on the report’s recommendations to review the electoral legislation, ensure a clear separation between party and state during election campaigning and improve regulations to prevent and respond to hate speech during the campaign. The experts also highlighted the recommendation to establish an effective and timely mechanism for addressing complaints before an impartial and competent authority.

Other recommendations discussed included aligning the number of commission members at each level to the actual need, introducing expedited deadlines to address campaign finance violations and publishing all decisions and legal opinions of the media regulator, as well as ensuring that voters cast their ballot free of fear of retribution.All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations.

415082 Kunduz Rysbek

Representatives of the security sector of Kyrgyzstan concluded a five-day training course on “Violent Extremism and Radicalization leading to Terrorism as a Threat to National Security” on 22 March 2019, in Bishkek.

The event was organized with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and in partnership with the State Commission on Religious Affairs of the Kyrgyz Republic and the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Kyrgyz Republic.

Participants included employees of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Kyrgyz Republic, the State Committee for Defence, the State Border Service, the General Prosecutor’s Office, the Ministry of the Interior, and the State Service for Execution of Punishments.  The training course aimed to enhance their knowledge of current Kyrgyzstan state policies in the religious sphere, of the causes and conditions of radicalization and features of extremist ideology prevention.

The knowledge and skills gained through the training course will contribute to increased professionalism among Kyrgyz security sector staff involved in the implementation of nationwide policy documents on countering terrorism, extremism and preventing radicalization.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed damage to functioning schools in Holmivskyi and Donetsk city.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission observed long queues of people, up to 1,500, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas and elsewhere, including near non-government-controlled Zaichenko.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however more explosions (about 275), compared with the previous reporting period (about 190 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at north-westerly and north-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and north-easterly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) (including 122 explosions), as well as at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 380 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 700 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north and north-west of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) (230 explosions), as well as in and near the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Damage to functioning schools in Donetsk City and Holmivskyi

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre) at 1 Samarska Street, the SMM saw a fresh impact (15cm hole) 30cm above ground in the north-west facing side of a functioning school building, assessed as having been caused by heavy-machine-gun fire. School staff told the SMM that shooting had occurred on 21 March in the early morning, and that pupils had been in attendance at the time, but refused to answer any further questions without permission from senior members of the armed formations.

At 13 Shkilnyi Avenue in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a 1cm hole and several cracks in the second-floor window on the northern side of a functioning school. As the SMM was not allowed to enter the school, it could not assess the type of weapon or the direction of fire. School staff told the Mission that the damage had been caused by a bullet in the late afternoon of 20 March and that there had been no pupils in the school at the time. The school staff member added that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, they were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the evening of 21 March, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded 11 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.7-2km north-west, all assessed as inside the disengagement area, as well as 22 impact explosions at an assessed range of 1.5-3km north-west (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned at several locations near the Zolote disengagement area during the day of 23 March, the SMM heard 74 undetermined explosions, as well as 20 shots of small arms fire, all assessed as outside the disengagement area.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

22 March

The SMM saw two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Non-government-controlled areas

21 March

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a tank (T-64) near Lutuhyne (20km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) and five mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[3]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

22 March

The SMM noted that six multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), one towed howitzer (2A65 MSTA-B, 152mm) and 12 mortars (11 PM-38, 120mm and one 2B11, Sani, 120mm) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

21 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) near Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).

22 March

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (Kozak) in Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 March

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP variant) in Boikivske (67km south-east of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Donetsk City

The SMM observed, for the first time, two pieces of UXO, assessed as MLRS (BM-21) rockets, partially hidden in shrubbery in soft ground on the northern side of Stratonavtiv Street in a residential area in non-government-controlled Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, 25m apart from each other. The Mission did not observe any fencing or mine hazard signs near the UXO.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to the high voltage Mykhailivka-Almazna power line near Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Situation at entry-exit checkpoints

At the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw around 450 people queuing to exit and around 1,000 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas. A Ukrainian State Border Guard Service officer told the SMM that the increase was due to the fact that some people believed that the entry-exit checkpoint would be closed for ten days starting from 25 March. He said that he was not aware of any such plans. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed around 500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and around 150 people queuing in the opposite direction. At the same checkpoint, a member of the armed formations told the SMM that the increase in people was due to the fact that some people believed that the exit-entry checkpoint would be closed on 25 March.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 22 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) two armed members of armed formations again denied the SMM passage to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “risks to the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• North of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining activities had taken place in the past 24 hours and that the road south of the bridge was still mined.

Other impediments:

• At a school in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of city centre) school staff told the SMM that it needed prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to talk to the school staff (see above).
• At a school in Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) school staff told the SMM that, according to instructions received from senior members of the armed formations, the staff were neither allowed to let the SMM enter the school nor to talk to the SMM (see above).

[1]           For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that three such sites continued to be abandoned.

[4]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations and saw military hardware, fresh craters, unmanned aerial vehicles and mines seen for the first time inside the Zolote disengagement area; it also saw military hardware inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, in Voznesenivka, close to the border with the Russian Federation, and elsewhere near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Staropetrivske.*  

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 190), compared with the previous reporting period (about 560 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 700 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 290 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded north-north-east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), north of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk), north-east and east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and north-north-west of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

 

Disengagement areas[2]

Positioned inside the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), while monitoring adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to power lines allegedly damaged by shelling on the evening of 20 March, the SMM saw 22 fresh craters, assessed as caused by 122mm artillery rounds, near damaged power lines about 50m north of the road and adjacent to trenches of the armed formations. Within 25 minutes, the SMM saw a black unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) (probable mini-UAV) overhead on two occasions, one time circling the repairs site and again flying from south to north over the repairs site.    

On 20 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) 600m south of its northern edge and about 1km east of its western edge, and again spotted four IFVs (three BMP-1 and a BMP-2), all assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 20 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) inside the Zolote disengagement area, ten metres south of its northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The same UAV again spotted 34 anti-tank mines (type undetermined) about 150m south-west of the aforementioned 20 anti-tank mines and 80m south of the disengagement area’s northern edge and about 2km east of its western edge. The same day, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 130 anti-tank mines (see SMM Daily Report 21 March 2019 and SMM Daily Report 11 April 2018).

On the evening of 20 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same evening, positioned in Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard about 15 undetermined explosions 8-10km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). The next morning, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard about 100 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 10-12km north-east (assessed as outside the Zolote disengagement area).  

On the morning of 21 March, positioned about 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 15 bursts of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 5-7km north-east (all assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area). In the afternoon of the same day, at the same location, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions and about 25 bursts of undetermined weapons at an assessed range of 3-5km south-south-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the morning of 21 March, positioned about 1.5km north-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate, the SMM heard about 80 undetermined explosions and 170 bursts of undetermined weapons, all at an assessed range of 5-7km north-north-east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On the same morning, positioned in three areas around the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 135 ceasefire violations (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the evening of 20 March, two cameras in areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) recorded 12 undetermined explosions (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 21 March, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-5km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area), and saw an IFV (BMP variant), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, inside the disengagement area, about 900m south-west of Petrivske near the eastern edge of the disengagement area[3].

Heavy smoke observed in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) while following up on allegations of shelling on the morning of 20 March, the SMM saw heavy smoke in the Maryivka area, a northern neighbourhood of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. Due to security restrictions, the SMM was unable to access the site for further assessment. A resident of the area (woman, about 45 years old) told the SMM that she had heard explosions and gunfire on the evening, night and morning of 20-21 March. On the morning of 21 March, positioned in five locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard more than five hundred ceasefire violations in the area of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (see Disengagement areas).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

21 March

The SMM saw:

• a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) moving west in the north-western outskirts of Avdiivka (17 km north of Donetsk) and
• two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) near the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) near Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk).

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk) and
• two MLRS (BM-21) and an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Vilkhivka (40km east of Donetsk).

21 March

The SMM saw 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites:

Government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• four tanks (T-72) near Lozuvatske (35km north-west of Donetsk) and
• five tanks (type undetermined) near Tymofiievka (39km north-west of Donetsk).

Weapons storage sites

At a heavy weapons permnanent storage site in non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

21 March

The SMM noted the presence of all weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk);
• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Zolote; and
• five IFVs (four BMP-1 and a BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) inside the Zolote disengagement area (see Disengagement areas).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (BMP-1) about 2km north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina.

21 March

• the SMM camera in Avdiivka recorded an armoured recovery vehicle (possible BREM) and an IFV (BMP-2) about 150m south-south-east of the camera and
• the SMM camera in Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) recorded an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) on road H-20.

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk) and
• Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers digging trenches near a checkpoint near Verkhnotoretske (23km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-2) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) as well as approximately 100 ammunition crates nearby near Sukhodil (21km west of Luhansk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on top in Katerynivka (former Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• six IFVs (four BMP-1 and two BMP variant) and a probable armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk).

21 March

The SMM saw:

• a black UAV (probable mini-UAV) inside the Zolote disengagement area on two occasions (see above) and
• an IFV (BMP variant) inside the Petrivske disengagement area (see above).

Mines seen near Orikhove and Vesela Hora

On 20 March, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted at least 82 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows in a field south of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk).

The same day, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted at least ten anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of dual-lane road H-21 leading to the Shchastia bridge, about 2km north-east of Vesela Hora. About 500m south-east of the aforementioned anti-tank mines, it also saw four anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid across the western lane of the same road and large potholes present in the eastern lane. On the same day, the same UAV again spotted at least 40 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field 50m south-west of the aforementioned four anti-tank mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to water pipelines in Horlivka, to power lines in Zaitseve (62km north-east of Donetsk) damaged from reported shelling on 17 March and to power lines inside the Zolote disengagement area between Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and the southern edge of the disengagement area.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw three cars with Ukrainian licence plates and one pedestrian entering Ukraine, and two cars (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw at least 100 wagons stationary; however, the contents were not visible. After about five minutes, two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

SMM monitored the security situation south-east of Kherson

On 20 March, the Mission observed calm situations at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and between Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 6 March 2019).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• While at the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), two armed members of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area, citing that the visit was not agreed upon with their superiors.
• While at a border crossing point in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• While at a checkpoint north of Staropetrivske (non-government-controlled, 35km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations refused the SMM passage, citing lack of “safety and security” related to a live-fire exercise in the area. While present, the SMM heard and saw ceasefire violations nearby assessed as live-fire training in the security zone, in violation also of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training (exercises) in the security zone as described in the Addendum to the Package of Measures (see table).
• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 85km south of Donetsk), four armed members of the armed formations demanded the SMM show their patrol plan and then refused to allow the Mission to pass through the checkpoint when it did not comply.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational. Due to heavy fog, the SMM camera in Zolote experienced reduced visibility during this reporting period.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

ERGNETI, 22 March 2019 - On 22 March 2019, the 92nd meeting under the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) was held in Ergneti. The gathering was conducted in an open and constructive atmosphere.

Erik Høeg, Head of the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, Special Representative for the South Caucasus of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, co-facilitated the proceedings.

Høeg provided an overview of events since the last IPRM meeting on 8 February 2019 and stated that the overall security situation had remained relatively stable. He highlighted concerns over recent developments related to activities along the administrative boundary line and urged all participants to continue using the EUMM managed hotline to prevent incidents and exchange information.

The co-facilitators noted the reopening of controlled crossing points on 15 March and encouraged participants to take into account the humanitarian perspective on freedom of movement for the conflict-affected population. The co-facilitators recalled the statement of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions on the matter.

The case of Archil Tatunashvili and David Basharuli's tragic death were again discussed.

The use of irrigation systems by local communities and co-operation in wildfire prevention were explored.

The next IPRM meeting will take place on 16 May 2019.

415016 Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department held meetings with North Macedonia’s Minister of Interior Oliver Spasovski and his Task Force on the International Civil Aviation Organization’s Public Key Directory (ICAO PKD), from 21 to 22 March 2019 in Skopje.

This country visit aimed at facilitating North Macedonia’s participation in ICAO PKD – a secure and cost-effective central repository for exchanging the public keys of ePassports and allowing for their fast and safe authentication at the borders.

“North Macedonia is now in the accession process with NATO and moving towards EU membership. Improving its border security will increase the country’s credibility and move it one step closer to EU,” said Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the OSCE Border Security and Management Unit. He highlighted the regional approach of the PKD initiative: “If all countries from the region join, the benefits of the PKD system will increase for all.” 

Maria-Esther Hernandez Crespo, Deputy Chair of the ICAO PKD Board, emphasized that the PKD system helps all nations to work together in combating passport fraud and contributing to domestic and international security.

Minister Spasovski thanked the OSCE for facilitating the process of joining ICAO PKD for North Macedonia. He noted that this is the right time for PKD implementation in the region, considering the challenges South-East Europe faces, and stressed that improving border security is the main priority for his country.  

OSCE officials also met with the members of the Task Force on ICAO PKD and discussed step by step guidelines on technical and administrative requirements for joining the PKD, as well as the OSCE’s support during the entire process. The Task Force consists of representatives from the Civil Affairs Department, the Information Technology and Security Sector, and the Border Police and Migration Departments of the Interior Ministry.

This was the fourth country visit on ICAO PKD to the Western Balkans as a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-East Europe on ICAO PKD, which was organized in Montenegro, in November last year. At the workshop, representatives of North Macedonia presented an overview of its ePassport system and together with recommendations from experts drafted a road map on how to join the ICAO PKD.