OSCE

KYIV, 27 December 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and to the Trilateral Contact Group, Martin Sajdik, and the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, welcomed today the sides’ recommitment to the ceasefire on the occasion of the New Year/Christmas festivities.

The recommitment, which is due to come into effect at 00:01 (EET) on 29 December 2018, requires that the sides take concrete measures, said Ambassador Sajdik. “A meaningful, sustainable and long-lasting ceasefire requires that orders to cease fire are issued, discipline is maintained and the safe and secure access of the OSCE SMM throughout Ukraine is ensured in accordance with its mandate,” he said. “Promises made to people in eastern Ukraine must be kept.”

Ambassador Apakan said that the recommitment was specifically made to minimize risk to the civilian population. “This time of year is a time for hope and healing, when families come together and the gift of life is renewed and embraced,” he said. “They want and deserve peace.”

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Vienna, 26 December 2018 - Following the publication, on 24 December 2018, of the interview conducted by the German newspaper Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung with OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, several incorrect translations and out of context quotes have been published in various media outlets.  In order to avoid any misinterpretation of Secretary General Greminger’s words, we would like to share the original article, which is the only correct version:

INTERVIEWOSZE-Chef: "Die Sicherheitslage in Europa ist besorgniserregend" - Von Thomas Ludwig 

For any further information, please contact the OSCE Communication and Media Relations Section.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• It observed damage caused by gunfire to civilian properties in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• It continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Marinka.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Novolaspa and Izvaryne, an area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (85), compared with the previous reporting period (about 150 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 110 explosions), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-easterly and southerly directions of Svitlodarsk, including about 70 explosions.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 21 and 22 December, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, a similar number of explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (45 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west of Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 22 and 23 December, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 60 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Slovianoserbsk (non-government controlled, 28km north-west of Luhansk), including about 40 explosions assessed as impacts of mortar rounds at an assessed range of 5-15km north-west, and west-north-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk), including about 20 bursts of anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) fire.

Damage caused by gunfire in Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district

On 23 December, the SMM saw fresh damage to four civilian properties in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), all assessed as caused by 23mm or 30mm rounds. At 24 and 26 Bilorichynska Street, the SMM saw holes and shattered windows on the west-facing sides of two two-storey apartment buildings. At 6 Kosareva Street, the Mission saw a shattered west-facing window of a two-storey apartment building. At 70 Udachna Street, the SMM saw two shattered west-facing windows of a two-storey apartment building. Four civilians (men and women, aged 50-70) each residing in these apartment buildings told the Mission that their buildings had been damaged on the evening of 20 December.

Disengagement areas[2]

On 15 December, on the south-eastern edge of Zolote-4 (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk), about 40m north of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted recent damage to the roof of a four-storey building, assessed as caused by small-arms fire and possible 82mm mortar rounds. The UAV also spotted recent damage to the east-facing side of the building, assessed as caused by undetermined weapons, as well as nearby trenches and Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel. The SMM was not able to determine the direction of fire.

On the night of 22-23 December, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight (one from north-north-east to south-south-east and the other from north-east to south-west) at an assessed range of 1.5-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

During the day on 22 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-3km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and about 30 bursts and shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-3km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3] The following day, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 23 December, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard six undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 4-5km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same day, positioned at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM heard 18 bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

22 December

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (eight 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and six 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• two self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

23 December

• Ten self-propelled howitzers (six 2S3 and four 2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Non-government-controlled areas

22 December

• 22 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) 

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• A surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north-east of Donetsk)

22 December

• Four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Beyond the withdrawal lines

A heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 December

• 14 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), ten towed howitzers (nine D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm and one 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and four MLRS remained missing.

Weapons that the SMM was unable to verify as withdrawn:[4]

A heavy weapons holding area beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

23 December

• Three mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) were present and
• 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30) and 28 mortars (15 2B11, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• A probable armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk) and
• Six infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

22 December

• An IFV (BMP variant) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk)
• An armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pravdivka (38km north of Donetsk)
• Four APCs (MT-LB) near Keramik (28km north-west of Donetsk)
• Two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

23 December

• An APC (MT-LB) near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk)
• An IFV (BMP-1) near Zolote

Non-government-controlled areas

On 22 December, the SMM saw five members of the armed formations digging two trenches on either side of road M03 about 1km north-north-west of Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission also observed freshly dug 300m-long trenches connected to road T0519 near Zaichenko (26km north-east of Mariupol).

Presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO)

On 22 December, the SMM saw for the first time two metal objects assessed as mortar tailfins on the northern side of road H15, about 500m south of the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Marinka

On 22 December, on road H15 about 50m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka, the SMM saw about 200-300 people queuing at a bus stop. Six of them (men and women in their fifties and sixties) expressed concern to the Mission that people have to wait up to eight hours for a bus, which according to them arrives once an hour or less frequently, to cross the area between the abovementioned Ukrainian Armed Forces position and the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 22 December, the SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station. Ukrainian Armed Forces representatives of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that workers from Voda Donbassa water company had not been able to complete assessments of water pipelines near Zalizne due to gunfire nearby (the SMM heard 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire in the area and facilitated the departure of the workers from there). On 22 and 23 December, the SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for 15 minutes, the SMM saw 28 cars (11 with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one Lithuanian licence plates, and five with “LPR” and two with “DPR” plates) and 34 covered cargo trucks (19 with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, three Georgian and four with Belarusian licence plates, and four with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates) queuing to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw a car (with Ukrainian licence plates) and 14 pedestrians entering Ukraine and four pedestrians exiting Ukraine. A member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw 22 cars (17 with Ukrainian and five with Russian Federation licence plates) and five pedestrians exiting Ukraine and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM did not observe anyone operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for 25 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians exiting Ukraine and four pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM did not observe anyone operating the border crossing point in Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 22 December, at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage.
• The same day, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM followed up on reports of a man injured due to gunfire in Chermalyk.
• The Mission observed damage to a house caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and by small-arms fire to a post office in Holubivske.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• It monitored public gatherings in Odessa and Lviv.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), including about 75 explosions. Positioned in the eastern outskirts of Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard one undetermined explosion and five bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 0.5-1km south-east of its position.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 45 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east-south-east of Novoaidar (government-controlled, 49km north-west of Luhansk) (all assessed as live-fire exercise outside the security zone).

Man injured by gunfire in Chermalyk

The SMM followed up on reports of a man (in his fifties) wounded by small-arms fire in Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol). On 17 December, at a military hospital in Mariupol (government-controlled, 102km south of Donetsk), medical staff told the SMM that a man (in his fifties) had been admitted on 16 December with a gunshot wound in his left thigh which they assessed as caused by a 5.45mm bullet. According to the medical staff, the man was still in hospital. In Chermalyk, the wife of the wounded man told the SMM that on the morning of 16 December, while inside their house on the north-east edge of Chermalyk, she had heard her husband shouting that he had been shot, immediately after he had left the house.

Damage caused by shelling in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On 21 December, at 9 Poshtova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw two shattered windows and numerous holes (assessed as caused by shrapnel) on the north-facing wall of a one-storey residential house.  A west-facing fence 6m north-east of the house was missing six wooden planks and broken parts of the planks were lying on the ground nearby. The Mission observed a tailfin of a recoilless-gun (SPG-9, 73mm), or infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) cannon round on the ground next to the fence. The SMM saw a fresh crater covered in snow, around 6.5m north of the house. A gas pipe running along the aforementioned damaged fence had been fixed with tape. The SMM assessed that the damage was caused by a self-propelled gun or IFV (BMP-1) cannon fired from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the house (man, in his sixties) said the damage had been caused by shelling in the afternoon of 14 December.

Damage caused by gunfire in Holubivske

On 21 December, at 1A Cooperativna Street in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) the SMM saw a fresh hole and a 5.45mm bullet lodged in the north-west-facing wall of a one-storey building of a functioning post office. An employee of the post office (woman in her forties) told the SMM that when she had left the post office at about 16:00 the previous day, she had not observed any damage to the wall.

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 21 December, positioned on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 14 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 2-4km north-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and three bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-2km north (assessed as inside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60 west of Luhansk), the SMM recorded 11 projectiles in flight from north-west to south-east at an assessed range of 2-4km east (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area).  

During the day on 21 December, positioned about 2km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area) and eight undetermined explosions as well as 15 shots of small-arms, all at an assessed range of 1-4km west-south-west (unable to determine whether inside or outside the disengagement area). [3]

On the same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• 22 self-propelled howitzers (19 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and three 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)
• A self-propelled howitzer (2S1) near Bakhmut, heading north-west
• Nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)
• An anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) being towed by a military truck about 2km east of Spirne (96km north of Donetsk), heading south
• Three tanks (T-64) about 2km south-south-west of Bila Hora (67km north-west of Luhansk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• Four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka

Indications of military presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

21 December

• Two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LB) near Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)
• Three APCs (BTR-70), an IFV (BMP-2)  and an APC (MT-LB) towing an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

• Five IFVs (BMP-1) and a mine layer (GMZ-3) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk)
• A IFV (BMP-1) in Zolote-1/Soniachnyi (60km west of Luhansk)
• An APC (BTR-60) and three IFV (BMP-2) near Vesele (21km north of Donetsk)
• Two IFVs (BMP-2) and two APCs (BTR-70) near Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk)
• An APC (BTR-70) near Romanivka (41km north of Donetsk)

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 10:15 on 21 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM again saw about 1,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and about 400 people queueing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw another 500 people queuing at a nearby bus stop. At about 12:15, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 800 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 300 people queuing in the opposite direction. Two elderly women told the SMM that it had taken them five hours to cross from non-government- to government-controlled areas.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and near Zalizne, as well as to damaged houses in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Other developments

In Odessa, the SMM saw about 70 people (men and women, aged 20-30) in front of the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. About 40 participants were holding flags and wearing clothing with insignia of the National Corps. The SMM saw also ten individuals known to it as members of Automaidan. Participants also carried banners displaying photos of alleged illegal constructions in Odessa and messages in Russian criticizing politicians and constructions. An individual gave a speech and several participants poured red ink and tore the flag of a political party and then placed several pieces of the torn flag on the main door of the prosecutor’s office and on the pavement in front of the door. The SMM observed 15 police officers.

In Lviv, the Mission saw about 500 people (mainly men aged 20-55) in front the Regional Prosecutor’s Office. It observed four individuals known to the SMM as members of Right Sector and others participants holding banners critical of corruption, authorities and their alleged inability to investigate crimes against pro-Maidan activists. The Mission saw that the participants marched to the Regional State Administration. During the march, they were chanting slogans, and at both locations the Mission saw several individuals holding lit smoke flares. Four police cars and about 20 law enforcement officers were moving with the participants and another 30 law enforcement officers were in front of each of the above mentioned buildings. The Mission observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 21 December 2018 ). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint near Pyshchevyk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 22 December 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed serious concern following a court decision in Azerbaijan ordering a well-known investigative journalist Khadija Ismayilova to pay a high fine for an alleged tax debt.

“It is deeply worrying that Khadija Ismayilova continues to face difficulties by state institutions, which hinder her professional activity as a journalist. In recent years, she has had to endure numerous cases of harassment and intimidation for her critical reporting,” Désir said. “I call to end these practices, as they are detrimental to freedom of expression in the country.”

On 21 December, the Baku Economic and Administrative Court, upon the claim filed by the Ministry of Taxes, ordered Ismayilova to pay fine of over 23 thousand euros for alleged failure to pay taxes while she worked as the local bureau chief for Radio Free Europe.

In her defence, Ismayilova claims amongst other things that she was not responsible for RFE financies and that there RFE and the Tax administration are in dispute over this issue as there is an agreement between Azerbaijan and RFE on tax exemption.

Earlier in December 2017, the Representative raised his concern regarding the suspension of Ismayilova’s bank accounts and called on the authorities to ensure that the journalist has access to all finances and can resume unrestricted travel (see: https://www.osce.org/fom/363206).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The Mission observed convoys of trucks marked “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. The SMM was also restricted near Izvaryne, an area of Luhansk region close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 200), compared with the previous reporting period (about 350 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas south, south-east and south-west of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 130 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (six explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east of Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), west and north of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk), as well as in areas south-west of Khoroshe (non-government-controlled, 36km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the night of 19-20 December, while on the north-eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 1-2km south-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 20 December, positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

20 December

• A mortar (probable 2B16 Nona-K, 120mm or M120-15 Molot, 120mm) on the western edge of Orlivka (22km north-west of Donetsk), heading west
• 24 self-propelled howitzers (17 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm and seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at a railway station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk)
• An anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) about 1.5km south-east of Zolotarivka (85km north-west of Luhansk), heading south

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

20 December

• Two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm), 14 tanks (T-64) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) parked at a railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk); two additional anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148), heading south-east from the railway station
• Three anti-tank guns (MT-12) and seven tanks (T-64) in Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

19 December

• An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:
  • four infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (BTR-70), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured ambulance (MT-LB S) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)

20 December

• An APC (BTR-60) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
• Four IFVs (BMP-2) near Vrubivka (72km west of Luhansk)
• Two IFVs (one BMP-1 and one BMP-2) near Kamianka (20km north of Donetsk)

Non-government-controlled areas

20 December

• Two APCs (type undetermined) in a compound on the north-eastern edge of Luhansk city
• An SMM mini-UAV spotted:
  • an APC (MT-LB variant) on the eastern edge of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 09:40 on 20 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM again saw about 1,500 people queuing to travel toward government-controlled areas and people crossing but no queue in the opposite direction. At about 12:15, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, it observed about 700 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and people crossing but no queue in the opposite direction. A woman (in her forties) told the SMM that it had taken her and her family about three and a half hours to cross from non-government- to government-controlled areas. According to her, the length of the queue and the waiting times were unusual.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna and near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk), the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne, as well as to damaged houses in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk). The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection of power lines near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw 42 cars (26 with Ukrainian and 12 with Russian Federation licence plates as well as four with “LPR” plates), 45 covered cargo trucks (17 with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation, 17 with Belarusian licence plates as well as six with “LPR” plates) and 20 people (mixed ages and genders) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw five pedestrians (four males and a female aged 30-60) entering Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw seven pedestrians (five men aged 40-60 and two women aged 30-50) exiting Ukraine and one pedestrian (male, aged 60-70) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Sievernyi (50km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw three pedestrians (women, aged 35-60) entering Ukraine and no traffic in the opposite direction.

Convoys marked with “Humanitarian Aid from the Russian Federation” in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions

On the morning of 20 December, in Donetsk city, the SMM saw a convoy of 30 white cargo trucks (all with Russian Federation licence plates) with “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” written in Russian on their trailer canopies, as well as a car with “DPR” plates and seven vehicles marked “MChS” (with white-on-black “DPR” plates), entering a warehouse on Baumana Street. A few hours later, the SMM saw a convoy, assessed as the same one previously observed in Donetsk city, on road H20 about 5km east on Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) heading east.

On the same morning, on the southern outskirts of Luhansk city, the SMM observed a convoy arriving from a southerly direction. The convoy consisted of two cars (with Russian Federation licence plates), a white van (no markings, undetermined licence plates), two white trucks (with Russian Federation licence plates), 17 cargo white trucks, of which many had “Humanitarian aid from Russian Federation” written in Russian on the trailer canopies (with Russian Federation licence plates) and two cars marked “MChS” (with Russian Federation licence plates). The SMM saw the convoy entering a compound at 2a Rudnieva Street in Luhansk city. The SMM also observed the same convoy earlier on the same morning in Izvaryne, heading north. (For previous observations of a similar convoy, see SMM Daily Report 26 October 2018.)

Other developments

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a gathering of about 1,000 people (mostly women, aged 40-70) in front of the Parliament building at 5 Hrushevskoho Street. The SMM observed some of the people praying and others holding banners critical of certain draft laws proposed to introduce changes on how certain religious organizations would be named. The SMM also saw at least 250 National Guard officers and 200 police officers in front of Parliament, as well as 12 National Guard trucks, four police buses and six police cars parked nearby. It observed no incidents during its presence.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoints near Pyshchevyk and Maiorsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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VIENNA, 21 December 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, organized on 19 December in Bishkek the first Central Asia Judicial Dialogue, to discuss how to protect freedom of expression while combating violent extremism.

During the event, judges representing higher and appellate courts from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan discussed national approaches, current legal trends and best practices in cases involving freedom of expression and freedom of the media, including online content, and policies for countering terrorism and violent extremism. The event was opened by Chairman of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court Erkinbek Mamyrov, representative of the Cabinet of Ministers Chingiz Esengul, and Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek Pierre von Arx, together with Harlem Désir.

“This was the first important step towards establishing information exchange between members of the judiciary on issues relating to safeguarding freedom of the media while countering extremist narratives. I hope in the future the circle of participants can be expanded to include journalists and media lawyers,’ said Désir.

Willem Frederik Korthals Altes, a judge from the Netherlands, and Leonid Nikitinskiy, member of the Human Rights Council of the Russian Federation, gave presentations at the event, moderated by Otabek Rashidov, Programme Officer in the OSCE Transnational Threats Department/Action against Terrorism Unit.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published an online database of election-related recommendations for the Western Balkans.

The database, which went online on 21 December 2018, provides a centralized and searchable collection of electoral recommendations to support institutions, stakeholders and civil society across the Western Balkans in their follow-up efforts.

“From its very beginning, ODIHR’s mandate has included not only the observation of elections, but also work with authorities, political parties and civil society to bring elections in line with OSCE commitments and other international obligations,” said Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir, ODIHR Director. “This database builds upon our Office’s support in following up on election-related recommendations, and will also serve as a useful co-ordination instrument for stakeholders working on electoral reform.”

The database contains the texts of recommendations from previous observation reports and takes into account ongoing activities towards implementing the recommendations. The evaluation of such efforts will be conducted by subsequent election observation missions.

All OSCE participating Sates have committed to promptly following up on ODIHR election assessments and recommendations.

The database was created as part of the project Support to Elections in the Western Balkans, funded by the European Union and the Austrian Development Agency. The project provides assistance to five OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. The project is also providing assistance in Kosovo.

407528 OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

More than 25 seaport security and law enforcement officials completed a five-day practical training course on port security management and procedures on 21 December 2018. The course, held at the Turkmenbashi International Seaport on the Caspian Sea, was organized by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

International experts from the United States and the United Kingdom presented the concepts of maritime security and border and borderlands, layers of risk, and key examples of transnational threats at marine borders such as drug trafficking, piracy and maritime terrorism. The participants discussed port security assessment and planning, emergency preparedness and security control administration.

“In May 2018, Turkmenistan inaugurated a new seaport on the Caspian Sea, which will become a regional hub connecting Europe and Asia,” said Dmitry Zagrotskiy, Officer-in-Charge of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The increased capacity of the new port will require advanced training on modern port control and maritime security procedures, including marine border checkpoints, for the personnel of the port administration, and law enforcement agencies represented at the port,” he said.

“It is symbolic that guided by the priorities of Turkmenistan’s transport policy, the Centre organized this training course as a successful accomplishment of its activities in 2018, the year in which the Government proclaimed that ‘Turkmenistan is the heart of the Great Silk Road’”, concluded Zagrotskiy.

The training programme offered practical exercises and case studies addressing maritime security control and port security management procedures. It also included a visit to the port area to demonstrate methods of cargo and passenger control as well as vessel registration and management procedures.

The participants stressed the importance of using advanced screening techniques and equipment to efficiently counter transnational threats at marine borders.

SKOPJE, 21 December 2018 – A helpline for reporting threats, attacks and violence against journalists - 0800-11-011 – presented at the press conference today in Skopje by the OSCE Mission to Skopje in co-operation with the Independent Union of Journalists and Media Workers (SSNM).

The free helpline will operate 24/7 providing assistance and support to journalists and media workers in case of intimidation, threats, verbal or physical attacks, online harassment, gender-based violence, blackmail, and any other security related issue.

The operator will advise the journalists and media workers on how to act in specific situations by informing about them on available complaint mechanisms.

“An attack on a journalist is an attack on democracy. Threats and intimidations often lead to self-censorship, thus limiting the space for flow of ideas and opinions,” said Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Jeff Goldstein.  “The OSCE, with its comprehensive approach to security, is working towards ensuring that media can operate more freely and that journalists can conduct their work without fear of intimidation or threats, and stay safe.”

Acting president of SSNM Zvezdan Georgievski said: “Quality journalism is not possible without conditions for safe operation of journalists and media workers. It is, therefore, crucial to provide our colleagues with the needed assistance when facing any kind of violence.”

As part of its efforts to increase the safety of journalists, during the press conference, the Mission also delivered a donation of vests and protective caps for the members of the Association of Journalists.

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407420 Kunduz Rysbek

The Secretary General of the World Customs Organization (WCO), Kunio Mikuriya, and the First Deputy Chairman of the State Customs Service of the Kyrgyz Republic (SCS), Shamil Berdaliev, signed a Memorandum of Understanding at the WCO Secretariat in Brussels on 19 December, thereby accrediting the SCS’s Training Centre as a WCO Regional Training Centre.

The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek helped the SCS to achieve this outcome within the framework of its long-term programmatic support to the SCS Training Centre. The newly acquired status of the WCO Regional Training Centre will provide for an increased geographic reach and quality of training for customs officers of the OSCE region and beyond.

Since 2009, the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek has assisted in enhancing the capacity of the SCS to facilitate cross-border trade, combat trafficking of illicit goods, and adopt modern information and customs technologies. With OSCE support, the SCS Training Centre has implemented a number of international standards in capacity-building activities, which have allowed the Training Centre to include a regional component.

Since 2009 the SCS Training Centre has trained over 1,000 Kyrgyz and 250 Afghan customs officers, and more than 100 training modules have been developed with the OSCE’s support. The SCS Training Centre’s regional status was approved unanimously at the meeting of WCO Heads of European Regional Customs Administrations in Vienna in April 2017.

In addition to regional capacity-building activities, the SCS Training Centre will now also be able to organize conferences, expert meetings, and roundtable discussions at regional and international levels. The OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek remains committed to assisting Kyrgyzstan in enhancing its ability to fulfil its OSCE commitments in these areas, further contributing to regional co-operation.

This report is for the general public and the media

SUMMARY

On 20 December at 08:20 (Moscow time), the eighty-second[1] Russian convoy arrived at the Donetsk Border Crossing Point (BCP). A total of 22 vehicles were checked by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers prior to their crossing into Ukraine. All 22 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation by 20:57 on 20 December.

DETAIL

Leaving the Russian Federation

On 20 December at 08:20, the Observer Mission observed the arrival of a Russian convoy at the gate of the Donetsk BCP. A Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations (MES) team co-ordinated and led the movements of the convoy. The convoy consisted of 16 cargo trucks and six support vehicles, including one ambulance. Only some cargo trucks bore the inscription “Humanitarian aid from the Russian Federation” (in Russian). Support vehicles had the sign of MES on the side doors. At 08:20 the vehicles entered the customs control area and queued in three lines. Once the convoy arrived, the vehicles were visually checked from the outside by Russian Federation border guards and customs officers. The Russian MES staff rolled up/opened the tarpaulins of the trucks and the border guards and customs officials performed a visual observation from the outside.

Four Ukrainian border guards and two customs officers were observed accompanying their Russian counterparts; they also performed a visual observation of the vehicles from the outside (without entering the trucks’ cargo space). They had clipboards in their hands and were taking notes. Two service dogs were present during the procedure. By 08:57 all of the vehicles had left the BCP towards Ukraine.

Returning to the Russian Federation

At 20:38, the convoy returned and queued in the customs area. The tarpaulins of the trucks were opened and Russian Federation border guards and customs officers visually checked the returning convoy from the outside. Ukrainian representatives – three border guards and one customs officer – were present during this check. The Ukrainian officials also performed visual checks of the opened trucks from the outside. By 20:57 all 22 vehicles had crossed back into the Russian Federation.

[1]According to the statement of the Russian Federation officials, this convoy is considered to be the eighty-fourth Russian convoy which was sent to Ukraine. As two of these convoys did not cross through the “Donetsk” or “Gukovo” BCPs, the Observer Mission did not record them. Hence, based on the Observer Mission’s counting, this convoy is considered the eighty-second convoy that has crossed into Ukraine.

15439/18mf

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VIENNA, 20 December 2018 – Wolfgang Benedek, OSCE Moscow Mechanism rapporteur, presented to the OSCE Permanent Council today his report on alleged human rights violations and impunity in the Chechen Republic of the Russian Federation.

Benedek, a professor of international law at the University of Graz, was appointed rapporteur by the 16 OSCE participating States that invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism in November.

The Mechanism, agreed by consensus by the OSCE participating States, allows for an investigation to be launched without consensus and independently of the OSCE Chairmanship, institutions and decision-making bodies if one State, supported by at least nine others, "considers that a particularly serious threat to the fulfilment of the provisions of the [OSCE] human dimension has arisen in another participating State".

The Permanent Council, one of the OSCE’s main regular decision-making bodies, convenes weekly in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and to make appropriate decisions.

The report with related recommendations can be found here.

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Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Novotoshkivske.*
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Bakhmut, Kostiantynivka and Lysychansk.
• The Mission continued to observe long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure and damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 350 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 80 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas between Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and Kamianka (government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk), including about 280 explosions, and in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including six explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (nine explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-west of Kriakivka (government-controlled 38km north-west of Luhansk).

On the morning of 19 December, while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight west of Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km south, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was about 1 km south-south-east of the patrol’s position. The Mission recalled the UAV, which landed safely.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 18 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 16 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 19 December, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

19 December

• 26 self-propelled howitzers (nine 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and 17 2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) at the railway station in Bakhmut (67km north of Donetsk)
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) moving south-west 4km south-west of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk)
• a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) moving south-west in Kostiantynivka
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk)

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

19 December

• two anti-tank guided missile systems (9P148 Konkurs, 135mm) in Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[3]

Government-controlled areas

19 December

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Zolote
• an IFV (BMP-1) and two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (MT-LBs, one towing an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm)) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk)
• an IFV (BMP-2) and an APC (BTR-60) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk)

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three APCs (MT-LB) near Vynohradne (10km east of Mariupol); and
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske

Non-government-controlled areas

19 December

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• seven IFVs (BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted atop a military-type truck near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

New mine hazard signs

The SMM saw for the first time two improvised mine signs (with “ATTENTION MINES” written in Russian on white sheets of paper attached to wooden stakes) in front of an agricultural facility, next to a road about 1km south-west of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 40km south-east of Donetsk).

Long queues of civilians travelling across the contact line near Stanytsia Luhanska

At 09:20 on 19 December, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 700 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and no people queueing in the opposite direction. The Mission also saw another 120 people waiting at a nearby bus stop. About four hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, it observed about 750 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 150 people queuing to travel in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), water pipelines near Popasna and near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to damaged houses in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) and Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), as well as to enable an inspection of power lines near government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk). The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight west of Novotoshkivske, the SMM heard a single burst of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km south, assessed as aimed at the UAV.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoints in Pyshchevyk and Maiorsk were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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CHISINAU, 20 December 2018 - Accessing new markets by improving digital skills was the focus of a three-day training course held for the representatives of small and medium-sized enterprises, which concluded today in Chisinau.

Built around e-commerce, a rapidly emerging trend that offers opportunities in enhancing connectivity, the course was organized and moderated by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA) and the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Moldova. More than 30 business representatives from different sectors and regions, among them many owners and directors, attended the course.

“The OCEEA has not only supported trade facilitation for e-commerce, but also brought together the business community from both banks of the Dniester,” said the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, Vuk Žugić, commenting on OSCE’s engagement for e-commerce in Moldova. “This serves to highlight the confidence-building potential of economic connectivity.”

Diana Levcenco, Economic Consultant at the Economic Council to the Prime Minister of Moldova stressed the importance of the course in the context of the National Action Plan for Trade Facilitation. “The support of the OSCE has been crucial in raising the capacity of businesses to engage in cross-border e-commerce.”

The aim of the training course, says Jonas Grätz, Economic Adviser at OCEEA, is to help build a stronger economy as well as the formation of new business partnerships and enhanced confidence.

“This activity has been designed to strengthen the voice and the capacity of businesses to use the new possibilities that e-commerce holds – to access new markets, form new networks, win new customers and ultimately grow their business,” said Grätz.

During the course, business strategies and policy experiences from other countries were shared by an expert of the International Trade Centre, Geneva.

Representatives of the Moldovan Economic Council, the National Bank, the Customs Service and financial private institutions spoke about new possibilities for businesses to make themselves heard, online payment options, export-import procedures, online marketing and social media promotion and integration within the existing e-commerce platforms. 

This activity follows a national workshop on trade facilitation for e-commerce organized by the OCEEA in Chisinau from 1 to 4 October this year. It is a part of the OSCE extra-budgetary project Promoting Connectivity in the OSCE, funded by Germany, Switzerland and Austria. Moldova is one of the beneficiary countries alongside Belarus and Kazakhstan.

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407432 Mirvete Islam, OSCE Mission to Skopje

The OSCE Mission to Skopje presented today a Legal Commentary on the Law on Criminal Procedure, the first of its kind, prepared by a group of legal experts that will help lawyers, judges and prosecutors apply the Law in a better and more uniform fashion in the courts.

The Mission has been working on the Commentary for the past three years, in co-operation with the Law Faculty “Iustinianus Primus” in Skopje.

“I can say without any doubt that this Commentary will be of great use for legal practitioners and other actors interested in the field of criminal justice” said the Head of the OSCE Mission to Skopje Clemens Koja. “Through its daily use, the commentary will provide valuable guidance and contribute to making the application of law more predictable and more consistent.”

The Dean of the ‘Iustinianus Primus’ Law Faculty Goran Koevski said: “The commentary is an exceptional product that will greatly contribute to proper implementation of the Law on Criminal Procedure and will contribute to overcoming the unbalanced judicial practice.”

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day train-the-trainer course aimed at strengthening the capacity of Albania to disrupt the financing of terrorist networks was held on 18 and 19 December 2018 in Vienna.

The course was organized by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML), in co-operation with the OSCE Presence in Albania. Attended by seven senior Albanian experts and practitioners, the course was led by OSCE and UN experts.

This course was the first of a series of progressively advanced training courses on countering the financing of terrorism for officials of the General Directorate for the Prevention of Money Laundering, the Counterterrorism Directorate of the State Police, the Counter Intelligence Analytical Directorate and the Training Centre of the State Intelligence Service (SHISH) as well as from the Prosecutor’s Office for Serious Crimes.

The participants were acquainted with complex analytical and operational planning methods through a training process focused on localized scenarios based on real-life cases. They learnt how inter-agency co-operation can contribute to disrupting terrorist financial networks and how to strengthen their skills in the use of instruments and techniques for countering terrorist financing.  

The seven participants in the course will deliver training courses for local government officials upon their return to Albania, together with OSCE and UNODC/GPML international experts.

The OSCE-UNODC train-the-trainer course will be followed by more train-the-trainer and training seminars for Albanian officials in 2019.

MINSK, 19 December 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 19 December 2018:

“Today the TCG convened for the last time this year.

Assessing the outgoing year, I would like to stress an important aspect. From the beginning of this year until 17 December, the number of civilian casualties decreased by half compared with the same period of last year, and the number of injured fell by 52%, thereby reaching its lowest level since the beginning of the conflict. Against the background of this notable tendency, I would like to reiterate that any human victim is one too much.

At the same time, there have also been disturbing trends. According to non-governmental organisations, approximately seven thousand square kilometres in eastern Ukraine are mined and contaminated by mines and unexploded ordnance, which makes it one of the most densely mined areas in the world.

Today, the key issues for the TCG and its Security Working Group were general security and the cessation of fire.

The sides renewed their previously declared recommitment to a sustainable and comprehensive ceasefire. To agree on its final modalities in the New Year and Christmas holiday period, the TCG tasked the Security Working Group to hold an extraordinary meeting in videoconference format on 27 December 2018.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued its discussion on the issues related to the exchange of detainees and the search for missing persons. In addition, the transfer of detainees not related to the conflict from certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR) to the territory controlled by the Ukrainian government was considered in detail.

As you know, the transfer of such detainees from CADR and CALR, forty-two and thirteen persons respectively, took place on 12 and 13 December 2018. I would like to note that for the first time ever, such a transfer from CALR was made possible. In this regard, I want to express my sincere appreciation to Ambassador Toni Frisch. I welcome this step and hope that this process will successfully continue in the future.

Participants of the Economic Working Group discussed topics such as water deliveries in the "Karbonyt" and "Voda Donbasa" supply systems on both sides of the contact line. Payments of pensions to the residents of CADR and CALR as well as improvement of the Vodafone-Ukraine mobile network were also considered.

The Political Working Group took forward its exchanges on the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and the modalities of local elections in CADR and CALR as stipulated by the Minsk agreements.

We will meet gain in four weeks, already in the New Year, on Wednesday, the 16th of January 2019. In the meantime, I wish all of you and your loved ones beautiful, bright and, most importantly, peaceful Christmas and New Year holidays.”

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This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations near the Stanytsia Luhanska and Zolote disengagement areas.
• It observed demining activities near government-controlled Shyrokyi and Krasna Talivka.
• The SMM continued to observe hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure as well as damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka. It continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering related to gender issues.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 80 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and south-east of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 20 ceasefire violations, including an explosion assessed as an impact at an assessed range of 30-50m south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 200 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-west of Kriakivka (government-controlled, 38km north-west of Luhansk). 

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 17 December, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded eight projectiles in flight from north to south at an assessed range of 2-4km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

A member of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that a previously observed mine (TM-62 variant) next to road T1316 (see SMM Daily Report 14 December 2018) had been removed on 17 December. However, on 18 December, the SMM saw the mine still present at the previously observed location. (This was the second time that the SMM observed the continued presence of the same mine after having been told of its removal. The Mission had informed the armed formations of the presence of the mine several times.)

On 18 December, the SMM observed a remnant of a probable RPG-27 grenade 2m east of road T1316, about 1km north-west of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area.

In the late afternoon of 18 December, the SMM camera at the Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 3-6km north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

During the day on 18 December, positioned near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation in the disengagement area.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of the withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

18 December

• Three self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk) 

Beyond the withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

18 December

• A self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) near Kostiantynivka
• Nine surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka
• Four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Rivnopil (86km west of Donetsk)
• Five tanks (T-64) at the railway station in Rubizhne (84km north-west of Luhansk)

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

18 December

• An anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk) 

Non-government-controlled areas

17 December

An SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1) near Nadarivka (64km west of Luhansk). 18 December

• An armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) near Smile (31km north-west of Luhansk)
• Four to five armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined) in Luhansk city 

Demining and mine hazard signs

The SMM saw eight members of an international demining organization (all in protective equipment) preparing for demining along a road on the northern edge of Shyrokyi (government-controlled, 38km north-east of Luhansk). The Mission saw three additional de-miners from the same organization in protective equipment preparing for demining along a road on the northern edge of Krasna Talivka (government-controlled, 51km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM followed up on reports of demining conducted by the Ukrainian Armed Forces in areas on the eastern side of the road between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk). The Mission observed the areas marked off with sticks with vinyl ribbons attached to them.

The SMM observed two mine new hazard signs with a skull and crossbones and “Stop Mines” written in Russian on both sides of a road on the south-western edge of Kruta Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and four similar signs on both sides of road P-66 about 3km north-west of Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 16km west of Luhansk).

Hardship faced by civilians at checkpoints along the contact line

At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, at 09:40, the SMM saw about 1,500 people queuing to travel towards government-controlled areas and about 30 queuing in the opposite direction. The Mission saw another 150 people queuing at a nearby bus stop. About four hours later, at the entry-exit checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed about 350 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and about 1,000 people queuing in the opposite direction. Three people (two men and a woman in their seventies) told the Mission that they had waited two and a half hours to pass through the checkpoint of the armed formations and another hour and a half to cross the entry-exit checkpoint.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), to a water pipeline near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to the Krasnohorivka gas distribution station between Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk) and Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and to damaged houses in Marinka and Krasnohorivka (government-controlled, 21km west of Donetsk). It continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Public gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering of about 100 people (mostly young men) in front of the Cabinet of Ministers building. Some of them were holding flags of Sokil, Tradition and Order and Volunteer Movement OUN, as well as banners with messages critical of the Government’s approach on certain gender issues. The SMM saw some of the participants light at least five smoke or light canisters and about 30 law enforcement officers in front of the main gate of the building. The gathering dispersed peacefully.

Other observations

On 17 December, the SMM observed a calm situation at the crossing point in Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 18 December 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

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407300 Communication and Media Relations Section

The South East Europe regional workshop on landscape fire management concluded on 19 December 2018 in Skopje.

The two-day workshop brought together fire management and forest management authorities from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia.

“Wildfires represent a serious challenge for most of the countries in the South-Eastern Europe region, which is becoming increasingly affected by climate change and socio-economic changes,” said Goran Stojkovski, representative of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Economy of the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.

Johann Georg Goldammer, Director of the Global Fire Monitoring Center, said fires are becoming more intense and more difficult to control due to the increasing accumulation of combustible materials in different landscapes abandoned by people, mainly agricultural lands. A comprehensive and holistic approach is needed to address this threat”.

Nikola Nikolov, Head of the Regional Fire Monitoring Center for South-Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, said: “Significant progress has been made in the region on sharing information, knowledge and best practices in fire management across borders and this workshop provides an opportunity for planning next steps.”

“Disaster risk reduction is a priority for the OSCE in its comprehensive approach to security. Strengthening national and regional capacities on wildfire management is among our main activities in this context,” said Christian Melis, Environmental Governance Officer at the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. 

Organized by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities with the support of Global Fire Monitoring Center and the Regional Fire Monitoring Center for South-Eastern Europe and South Caucasus, the workshop allowed for an exchange of best practices and lessons learnt on wildfire management and identified synergies and opportunities for co-operation among the countries of South Eastern Europe.