European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

The Treaty of Lisbon established the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) which substituted the former European Security and Defence Policy. The main aim of the CSDP is the promotion of security and peace. One of its key goals is to establish common European defence capabilities, but not necessarily a European army, as is often rumoured.

In 2012 the global and regional geopolitical environment began to change. Terrorism, violent extremism, and hybrid threats all presented new risks to security, peace and stability. This brought the European Union into a new mind-set about the future of its security and defence. Two of the main realizations were that it had to increase defence spending and that Member States needed to coordinate their defence capabilities. As a result, in December 2017, 25 members of the European Union decided to launch Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence, which is also known as PESCO.

Elena Lazarou from the European Parliamentary Research Service is here to answer three key questions on EU defence.

See also our Peace & Security Outlook 2018.

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

Blockchains are a remarkably transparent and decentralised way of recording lists of transactions. Their best-known use is for digital currencies such as Bitcoin, which announced blockchain technology to the world with a headline-grabbing 1000% increase in value in the course of a single month in 2013.

Despite the digitalisation of several important aspects of modern life, elections are still conducted largely offline, on paper. Since the turn of the century, e-voting has been considered a promising and, perhaps, inevitable development that could speed up, simplify and reduce the cost of elections. It has been seen as a potential means of increasing engagement and turnout, and even restoring links between citizens and political institutions. Using blockchain technology for e-voting could increase transparency while allowing more fluid and decentralised decision-making. It could even introduce new functionality such as ‘self-implementing manifestos’. Certainly, this could be useful for decision-making in many organisations, but could it work on a larger scale, for example, in the European elections?

Listen to Philip Boucher, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on blockchain voting.

Or read more about “How blockchain technology could change our lives” in this in-depth analysis

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

 

The techniques used by anti-democratic state and non-state actors to disrupt or influence democratic processes are constantly evolving. The use of algorithms, automation and artificial intelligence is boosting the scope and the efficiency of disinformation campaigns and related cyber-activities. In response, the EU is stepping up its efforts to protect its democratic processes from manipulation ahead of the European elections in May 2019.

Listen to Naja Bentzen, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on Disinformation and democracy.

Or read more in our publications:

• Computational propaganda techniques
• Foreign influence operations in the EU
• From post-truth to post-trust?:
• Understanding conspiracy theory

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

 

Some companies use monopoly situations or join forces with other companies to fix prices in order to overcharge. The European Union punishes this kind of unfair behaviour and the European Commission has the power to issue what are known as competition fines.

Listen to Sidonia Mazur, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on Competition Fines.

Or read more in our publications: EU competition policy: key to a fair Single Market.

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

 

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Jens Van Steerteghem,

© Worldpics / Shutterstock

With the help of cells from a single cow, scientists can produce 175 million hamburgers. When fully commercialised, this type of technology could greatly impact the way we produce and consume meat.

Today, meat is produced in an inefficient way. A whole living, breathing, feeling, moving animal is grown and only a fraction of the energy given through food is recovered in edible body parts. From an evolutionary point of view, the animal is intent on reproduction, not meat production. Scientists are working to avoid this detour in order to increase efficiency and improve animal welfare. The idea is to grow the meat directly in a petri dish or bio-reactor.

Scientists start by taking special cells from the animal of interest, suspend them in an adequate growth medium in which they can divide and grow, and provide a scaffold to which the cells can attach and the cell culture can take structure. The type of starter cells is important because they determine on the one hand how fast the cells divide, and on the other hand how similar they are to a muscle cell, which is what meat mainly consists of. Stem cells divide rapidly but must be induced to differentiate into muscle cells, whereas muscle cells are already differentiated but hardly proliferate at all. The solution is to start with ‘in-between’ cell types such as myoblasts, which are acceptable on both fronts. These starter cells can be extracted from animals painlessly. The growth medium needs to contain all nutrients the myoblast cells require to grow, while being cost-effective and without animal ingredients. So far, scientists use foetal calf serum for research purposes only, and are still investigating ethical substitutes to be used for commercial purposes. The scaffold needs to be edible and flexible enough to move and provide the muscle cells with periodic contractions, providing a ‘workout’ of sorts. Alginate, chitosan or collagen derived from non-animal sources fulfil these requirements, periodically stretching under changes in temperature and acidity. Globally, several companies have plans to enter the market (Finless Foods, Mosa Meats, Memphis Meats). The first cultured meat products are expected to appear in supermarkets as early as 2021.

A joint Oxford and Amsterdam University study shows that, compared to conventional meat, the environmental impact of cultured meat is potentially very small, with ‘up to 96 % lower greenhouse gas emissions, 45 % less energy, 99 % lower land use, and 96 % lower water use’. Taking into account that the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) estimates global meat demand will increase by 73 % by 2050, and that livestock farming is responsible for 18 % of all greenhouse emissions, 30 % of land use, and 8 % of water use, efficiency increases could be crucial for achieving sustainable meat production.

Potential impacts and developments

The obstacle to rolling out cultured meat production is the price – in 2008, it was speculated that 250 grammes would cost about US$1 million. However, this cost is rapidly decreasing. In 2015, Mark Post, Lead Researcher at Maastricht University, said the marginal cost could fall to about €8 for one burger. When the technology of large-scale production in bioreactors is mature, prices should decline even further. It is estimated that such burgers could eventually be produced for €3 500 euro per tonne, which is around 1.5 times the current cost of conventional European beef production.

Additional advantages of cultured meat include the possibility of adding nutritional value, omega-3 fatty acids for example, less exposure to pathogens and chemicals such as pesticides, and reduced use of antibiotics. This latter point is important, considering that 70 % of all antibiotics are used in agriculture, which causes antibiotic resistance in human pathogens.

While cultured meat can be used for making processed meat products such as sausages, burgers and nuggets, creating meats with a lot of structure, such as steak, is not yet in sight. In order to acquire the appearance, taste, smell and texture, cultured meat must consist of both small and large muscle fibres with connective tissue and fat cells. This will to a large extent determine whether cultured meat is commercially viable. On the other hand, the possibility of engineering meat for optimal nutrition, or even customisation on an individual basis, may prove to be a large advantage ­– especially considering that the consumption of processed meat is linked to heart disease, digestive tract cancer, and type-2 diabetes.

The artificiality of cultured meat, as well as the high price, is certain to deter some consumers. But it is conceivable that lower prices and consumer environmental and health concerns could arguably eventually win out. A market for high-quality animal meat that is difficult to culture will probably be around for longer. Religious dietary restrictions will also determine the popularity of cultured meat in large parts of the world: religious scholars continue to disagree on whether it is kosher, halal, or violates the position of cows in Hindu culture.

If cultured meats were to take over the market, general tolerance for animal suffering might decrease, and any suffering might be seen as unnecessary, even to meat-eaters.

It is likely that, if cultured meat were to become the future standard, dairy and egg prices would increase, because the meat produced as a by-product would be less profitable. However, substitutes are also being researched for all these products; in the future, cultured dairy and eggs could be more cost-effective and cheaper.

Anticipatory policy-making

Once cultured meat companies wish to enter the EU market, they will have to comply with the Novel Food Regulation. This defines novel foods as those that had not been consumed to a significant degree by humans in the EU before 15 May 1997, and lays down that novel foods must undergo pre-market authorisation evaluating the food as safe for consumers, that their consumption is not nutritionally disadvantageous, and that they are properly labelled, so as not to mislead consumers. The labelling of cultured meat therefore also needs to be investigated, as well as the question as to whether cultured meat can be considered ‘meat’ according to the EU definition of meat as ‘edible parts of the animals […], including blood’.

Finally, cultured meat will inevitably have an impact on the meat market, with consequences for conventional meat producers. However, as even conventional farming increasingly involves the use of new technologies, some farmers might be able to reorient their businesses to also incorporate this type of food production. To apply this new technology for the production of cultured meat, guidelines for best practices in its production and the processing will certainly be required.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we didn’t need cows for our beef?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if we didn’t need cows for our beef?‘.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

The President of the European Commission has taken on an ever more prominent leading role within the College of Commissioners, with the increasingly presidential system eclipsing the principle of collegiate decision-making. With the European Parliament now more involved in the appointment, the Presidency has not only become a much more politicised office, but the President has also gained greater influence vis-à-vis the other members of the Commission.

The Commission President plays a crucial role in relations between Parliament and Commission. Presenting his or her priorities to Parliament prior to election sets the course for the whole term, on which the President will be called to account by Parliament. Building on this, Parliament has an increasingly prominent role in political agenda-setting, shaping the EU’s legislative programming together with the Commission and the Council.

At the end of President Barroso’s second term as Commission President, many had criticised the lack of ambitious initiatives undertaken, whereas others believe that the economic and institutional difficulties which the EU faced made this inevitable. The legacy of President Juncker’s mandate can claim, on the one hand, to show progress in trade and defence, although some maintain that more ambition could have been displayed in other areas, for instance on the digital market or monetary union. On the other hand, the Juncker Commission introduced some significant changes in the College’s working methods and a more political role for the Commission.

Whereas Jean-Claude Juncker had been a Spitzenkandidat (lead candidate) in the European elections, Ursula von der Leyen, nominated as candidate for the Commission presidency by the European Council on 2 July, was not. As none of the Spitzenkandidaten were seen to have a clear majority in Parliament, it remains to be seen whether an ‘outsider’ from that process can muster the support of the required majority of Parliament’s component Members at the time of the election, currently planned for the July II plenary session.

This is an updated edition of a 2014 briefing drafted by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Role and election of the President of the European Commission‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© tanaonte / Fotolia

On 23-26 May, 2019, European Union citizens elected a more fragmented European Parliament than its predecesor, with the two main political groups – the European People’s Party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats losing some ground, and the Liberals, now known as Renew Europe, and the Greens-European Free Alliance strengthening their representation. Gains made by Eurosceptic and populist groups proved more limited than had been predicted.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on European elections and its aftermath.

The threats to the European Union’s economic sovereignty
Bruegel, July 2019

Time for deputy prime ministers for European affairs
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Was uns der Streit um die Besetzung der EU-Spitzenposten lehrt
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, July 2019

Spitzenkandidaten poker
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Can Ursula von der Leyen save the Transatlantic relationship?
Carnegie Europe, July 2019

Europa und der Westen
Hanns Seidel Stiftung, July 2019

How to govern a fragmented EU: What Europeans said at the ballot box
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Juncker ou la plus-value européenne. Le bilan positif de la Commission européenne (2014-2019)
Fondation Robert Schumann, June 2019

Europe according to Jacques Delors
Institut Jacques Delors, June 2019

Comparative trends in EU governance
Clingendael, July 2019

A strategic agenda for the new EU leadership
Bruegel, June 2019

The seven qualities of a European Commission
Notre Europe, June 2019

EU security ambitions are hostage to the Brexit process
Chatham House, June 2019

Untapped potential: How new alliances can strengthen the EU
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

A redefinition of ‘Spitzenkandidaten’
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019

Democracy after the European Parliament elections
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Democracy after the European Parliament elections
Carnegie Europe, June 2019

Keine Entwarnung nach der Europawahl
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, June 2019

The European Parliament elections: No grounds for complacency
Centre for European Reform, June 2019

Après les élections du 26 mai, la ‘doctrine Macron’ à l’assaut de l’Europe
Institut Thomas More, June 2019

After the European Parliament election: Another chance to bridge Europe’s divides
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

The importance of building a European democracy
Friends of Europe, June 2019

European elections: Promoting a coalition agreement between four political families
Notre Europe, June 2019

Europe: Is the system broken?
German Marshall Fund, June 2019

Europe’s citizens say they want a more political EU
Bruegel, June 2019

The EU: The chance for a fresh impetus
Real Instituto Elcano, June 2019

Time for strong new EU leaders
Carnegie Europe, June 2019

EU parliamentary democracy: How representative?
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2019

A democratic celebration for more Europe
Bertelsmann Stiftung, May 2019

European Parliament election results: The long view
Bruegel, May 2019

What Europeans really feel: The battle for the political system
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019

European elections: Quest for unity in the diversity of winners
Notre Europe, May 2019

Parlement européen: Un nouvel équilibre… mais pas eurosceptique
Fondation Robert Schumann, May 2019

The end of monogamy in Europe?
European Council on Foreign Relations, May 2019

Do these European Parliament elections matter?
Centre for European Reform, May 2019

The European elections: Signs of things to come for Brexit
Federal Trust for Education and Research, May 2019

Around the halls: Brookings experts analyze the European Parliament election results
Brookings Institution, May 2019

The new European Parliament
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2019

The European election in Germany
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 2019

Europe’s smaller parties win big in European Parliament elections
Atlantic Council, May 2019

Read this briefing on ‘The European elections and thereafter‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2015 – European Parliament

The European Parliament resumes business on Monday, with a relatively light agenda (although with some rather major decisions to be made), ahead of the summer recess.

The new, ninth Parliament (2019-2024), with a majority of new Members (435), 40.4 % of whom are women, will need to decide on the appointment of the replacement for Jean-Claude Juncker as President of the European Commission. From the outset, Juncker, a Spitzenkandidat, transformed the presidential role, setting the agenda for his term in office prior to his 2014 election and pledging to make a difference for citizens. While the Commission has indeed tabled more than nine in ten of the planned legislative proposals, however, the end-of-term assessment is more nuanced: whereas some legislation was adopted rapidly, in other cases negotiations were lengthy, and disagreements between or within institutions blocked progress. In some areas, the Commission transformed such difficulties into opportunities; in others, proposals were insufficiently robust to meet the challenges, were tabled too late, or advanced unevenly.

The key debate of the session, scheduled for Tuesday morning, therefore, is a statement by the candidate for President of the Commission; Ursula von der Leyen (proposed by the Council, following disagreement regarding where the impetus for the nomination lies under the Treaty provisions). Although a mixed level of support has been indicated during meetings with Parliament’s political groups, the election of the President of the Commission is scheduled to be held on Tuesday evening. It remains possible, however, that the vote be postponed, if further consultations with the political groups were seen to be advantageous. Should the Parliament support her candidacy, despite her not having been a Spitzenkandidat, von der Leyen would become the first female President of the European Commission (although not the first German – the first-ever Commission President, and also the last German to hold the post, was Walter Hallstein in 1958). The new President-elect’s first tasks will be to set guidelines for the work and the organisation of their Commission, and to match portfolios to nominee Commissioners from the Member States. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP), who will also hold a Vice-Presidency of the Commission, is an exception, as the Council plans to nominate Josep Borrell Fontelles. There may also be time for a vote on replacement of outgoing Commissioners Andrus Ansip and Corina Creţu (both elected to Parliament) for the remainder of their term of office.

The Council and Commission will make statements on Tuesday afternoon reviewing the Romanian Presidency of the Council, and on the situation regarding humanitarian assistance in the Mediterranean in the light of continued migration flows in the region. The current HR/VP, Federica Mogherini, will also attend the session on Tuesday afternoon to report on foreign affairs and security matters, including implementation of the EU global strategy. The Council and Commission return on Wednesday morning to make the customary statement on the priorities of the Finnish Presidency of the Council, which began on 1 July, and to make statements on clean air zones in EU cities in the afternoon.

Now that the political groups, Parliamentary bodies and committees are in place, Members will complete the organisation of the new Parliament when they decide on the numerical strength of interparliamentary delegations, and the Members appointed to each delegation are then to be announced on Wednesday. Debates and motions for resolutions concerning breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law are tabled for Thursday.

Work in Parliament should therefore really begin in earnest after the summer break, when committees will hold hearings with all the Commissioners-designate, and decisions may be taken on the ‘unfinished business’ remaining to be tackled from the eighth parliamentary term. Once voted into office, the new Commission can be expected to set out its priorities and its work programme for the coming year.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

In May 2019, European citizens voted on their representatives in the European Parliament for the next five years, to defend their interests in the EU. This year’s election had a turnout of 51%, an increase of 8.3 percentage points from the previous election in 2014. It is also the first time since 1999 that more than half of adult citizens voted. The 751 MEPs elected have an average age of 50 years (with the youngest being 21 and the oldest 82). There is a majority of new MEPs(435). Women represent 40.4% of all MEPs.

Members of the European Parliament, 2019-2024

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Members of the European Parliament, 2019-2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso (1st edition),

© magele-picture / Fotolia

On 20 June 2019, the European Council examined the progress of work in the Council on the Commission proposal for the long-term design of the post-2020 EU budget. The European Council now aims to reach an agreement among Heads of State or Government before the end of 2019. Elements for consideration in the draft regulation, which is part of a broader package of proposals, include the following features of the new multiannual financial framework (MFF): total resources, structure, priorities, flexibility provisions, and revision clauses. The European Parliament has already detailed its negotiating position in November 2018, with a view to contributing to a smooth transition to the next MFF and its related EU spending programmes as of 2021.

Versions

• June 2019:  ‘Multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027: The future of EU finances‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a Council regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027 Committee responsible: Budgets (BUDG) COM(2018) 322, 2.5.2018. Rapporteurs: Jan Olbrycht (EPP, Poland)
Isabelle Thomas (S&D, France) 2018/0166(APP) Shadow rapporteurs: Gérard Deprez (ALDE, Belgium)
Liadh Ní Riada (GUE/NGL, Ireland)
Marco Valli (EFDD, Italy) Special legislative procedure (APP) (Consent – Unanimity in the Council. The Parliament has the power to accept or reject the Council’s position on the proposal) Next steps expected: Agreement of Council position and request for Parliament’s consent to its adoption

Written by Milan Remáč,

© Fotolia

Like the majority of national parliaments, the European Parliament also carries out a scrutiny and oversight function in relation to the executive – the European Commission. The European Parliament’s powers with regard to the European Commission are varied and wide-ranging. This document is an update of the original European implementation assessment (EIA) prepared in 2018 to accompany the drafting by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) of an implementation report on ‘the Treaty provisions on Parliament’s power of political control over the Commission’. It covers the last two full legislative terms of the European Parliament (2009 to 2014 and 2014 to 2019).

The objectives of the EIA were threefold:

• first, to investigate and report on the status of the Parliament’s powers in scrutinising the European Commission, which are based on the Treaty provisions;
• second, to assess the implementation of these Treaty provisions in specific areas in which Parliament can carry out its scrutiny prerogatives; and
• third, to draw conclusions and suggest a direction for reflection on the exercise of the existing prerogatives.

The study briefly describes the background to the development of the European Parliament’s prerogatives with regard to the scrutiny of and political control over the executive. The methodology used to carry out the analysis included recourse to desk research and supporting data provided by the internal services of the European Parliament, as well as publicly available information. However, given that the assessment fed into the preparation of the AFCO implementation report on ‘the Treaty provisions on Parliament’s power of political control over the Commission’, analysis was limited to Parliament’s powers in relation to the Commission alone. In view of the time constraints involved, the cut-off date for the research is December 2009, date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, and the Treaty provisions researched have been clustered around certain specific topics.

The study analyses the European Parliament’s powers of scrutiny over the European Commission, based on the text of the Treaties, concentrating on the following ten areas:

• electoral and institutional issues,
• motion of censure and withdrawal of confidence in individual Commissioners,
• parliamentary questions,
• inquiry committees and special parliamentary committees,
• reporting, consultation and provision of information,
• budgetary issues,
• legislative procedure,
• delegated acts,
• legal proceedings,
• external relations.

The analysis concludes that Parliament is well aware of the Treaty provisions allowing it to scrutinise and control the Commission. However, Parliament’s actual application of these prerogatives in individual areas varies as to their number, frequency and impact on the Commission and its work. The study notes that the Commission tries to fulfil its obligations towards the Parliament in areas where the Treaties oblige it to do so.

The study also notes that the impact of Parliament’s scrutiny prerogatives could be improved with regard to some of the fields, such as committees of inquiry, special parliamentary committees, and legislative procedures linked to Article 225 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).

In conclusion, the study argues that only a limited number of the scrutiny competences currently afforded to Parliament by the Treaties can have a lasting impact on the executive, since Parliament’s powers to influence the Commission are rather limited, both in terms of when they can be used and the nature of their consequences. Beyond the text of the Treaties, provisions contained in the framework of interinstitutional agreements can only strengthen Parliament if its counterparts agree to abide by them.

Finally, when assessing the Parliament’s prerogatives of control over the European Commission, it is important to bear in mind the main reason behind their original inclusion in the text of the Treaties, i.e. to provide for the democratic scrutiny of the executive. Similarly, the European Parliament’s role as representative of the EU citizens, and as the only directly elected EU institution, must be taken as the starting point when it comes to its scrutiny of the European Commission.

Read the complete study on ‘Parliamentary scrutiny of the European Commission: Implementation of Treaty provisions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Lațici,

© WrightStudio / Fotolia

The internet has transformed the world into a global village transcending physical borders and palpable distances. Often described as ‘fog’ or a ‘globalised network of networks’, cyberspace is extremely complex, accessible to everyone and difficult to pinpoint. While thanks to these characteristics cyberspace has opened countless social, economic and political opportunities, it has also become a source of disruption, conflict and geopolitical rivalries. The European Union has recognised that cyber-security and cyber-defence are critical for both its prosperity and security, and is emerging as an increasingly capable cyber player.

Deciphering the cyber realm

Nowadays, ‘cyber’ (meaning ‘of, relating to or involving computers or the internet’) is used in combination with words such as security, defence, attacks and deterrence. Cyber-associated terms have numerous definitions and interpretations. For instance, even though often used interchangeably, cyber-security and cyber-defence signify different activities. Cyber-security includes information and communication security, operational technology and the IT platforms required for digital assets. Cyber-defence is usually understood as including cyber-security, and consisting of threat analyses and strategies to protect against threats directed at citizens, institutions and governments. As for cyber-attacks, these are deliberate activities to disrupt or destroy computer systems and networks. Cyber-deterrence refers to measures for dissuading potential perpetrators through robust systems, sanctions mechanisms and cyber-diplomacy.

Significance of the cyber threat

As society’s dependence on the internet grows, so does the number of cyber-threats and the sophistication of cyber-attacks. Estimates suggest that by 2030, there will be 125 billion devices connected to the internet, and 90 % of individuals older than 6 will be online. Such connectivity also gives rise to vulnerability. Given the accessibility and relatively low cost of operations, anybody, be they individuals, professional criminals, state or non-state players, could become a perpetrator. Worldwide, countries are actively developing offensive cyber capabilities in the pursuit of geopolitical goals. The global cost of cybercrime is estimated at about €530 billion. Attacks are fast increasing in terms of number, disruptive potential and financial damage, outstripping governments’ capacity to deal with them. In 2017, Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker said that cyber-attacks pose more danger to democracies and economies than guns and tanks.

Cyber-attacks can be damaging not only to the economy of the EU but also to its democratic foundations. When deployed together with other offensive actions, such as disinformation, economic pressure and conventional armed attacks, cyber can be part of a hybrid operation. Risks from the digital realm can destabilise governments and political systems, sow societal divisions and increase the risk of internal and external conflict. The World Economic Forum’s 2019 global risks report places cyber among the top five likely risks and top 10 most impactful risks. One of the most notable examples is the WannaCry attack, which spread to 300 000 computers in 150 countries, and the Petya and NotPetya attacks, which caused financial losses worth hundreds of millions. These attacks illustrate the growing trend of actions targeting strategic sectors and critical infrastructure, causing enormous disruption and provoking interstate tensions. Cyberspace is an increasingly contested political space and a potential source of international tensions. A key challenge faced by law enforcement bodies lies in the difficulty of attribution and in tracing perpetrators. Another is the legal and ethical dimension regarding the appropriate state response.

Possible solutions

It is increasingly accepted that resilience to cyber-threats requires a collective, collaborative and wide-ranging approach. An example in this regard is the new initiative for establishing common international norms for tackling cyber threats, the ‘Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace‘, launched by French President Emmanuel Macron in November 2018. Though not legally binding, the Paris Call is a high-level declaration for cooperation in cyberspace that was endorsed by 64 countries, as well as NGOs, universities and hundreds of private companies. Another example is the Tallinn Manual – an evolving document examining conflict in cyberspace from an international law perspective, written by a group of independent experts. Besides resilience, prevention is also a key pillar of cyber-defence. Two possible approaches to prevention are deterring and dissuading adversaries. The objective is to make a cyber-attack so financially unfeasible, as to discourage potential perpetrators from launching it. A group of experts have also developed three scenarios for strengthening the EU’s cyber-defence: 1) full implementation of the cyber package to increase operational capabilities; 2) creating a ‘cyber-defence coordinator’ with advisory and oversight powers and the task to decrease intra-EU fragmentation; 3) building on the first two, creating a ‘cyber-defence agency’ to add a strategic and operational mandate at the EU level.

In 2018, the United Nations General Assembly adopted two resolutions on cyber: on creating a working group to study cyber norms and possible dialogues, and on creating a group of government experts to study the applicability of international law to states in cyberspace. Again in 2018, UN Secretary General, António Guterres, also created a High-level Panel on Digital Cooperation to strengthen cooperation between all stakeholders, from governments to the private sector, in the digital sphere. American political scientist, Joseph Nye, argues that the diffusion of power from governments to non-state actors is one of the great shifts of this century. In a recent article, Foreign Policy magazine observed that even though ‘cyberwarfare does have rules … these rules are not intuitive to generals used to fighting conventional wars’. The academic and industrial consensus points to the need for creating rules for the cyber realm.

The EU as an emerging cyber actor

Over eight in 10 (87 %) EU citizens see cybercrime as an important challenge, in line with the EU’s 2016 global strategy, which says that ‘our Union is under threat’, including cyber-threat. The strategy emphasises that the EU needs to become a ‘forward-looking cyber player’ engaged in cyber-diplomacy and in building its partners’ capacity. The evolution of the threat landscape since the EU’s 2003 global strategy is obvious, as the earlier strategy made no mention of cyber. Since its first cyber-security strategy adopted in 2013, the EU has gradually developed cyber ambitions and tools to manage the challenge. The year 2017 was a landmark one for cyber in the EU, with the launch of the Commission’s cybersecurity package. It includes, among other things: a permanent mandate to the EU Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA); an EU cybersecurity certification framework; full implementation of the ‘NIS’ Directive; a blueprint for rapid emergency response; establishing EU-wide cyber-research centres; improving law-enforcement response; and improving the overall political response and deterrence. Since the Commission does not have operational capabilities of its own, it is supported by agencies and bodies, such as ENISA, Europol (especially its European Cyber Crime Centre), the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (eu-LISA), the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-EU) and the Intelligence and Situation Centre (INTCEN). As for the Council, its 2017 conclusions established a framework for a joint EU diplomatic response to malicious cyber activities. On 17 May 2019, the Council established an autonomous sanctions framework for cyber-attacks, meaning that the EU is now able to impose sanctions on perpetrators or accomplices.

Cyber-defence aspects have also been included in the 2016 European defence action plan, prioritised in the European Defence Agency’s 2018 capability development priorities, addressed through several projects under permanent structured cooperation (PESCO), and listed as one of the seven concrete areas of EU-NATO cooperation. Cyber-defence also has implications for the EU’s solidarity and mutual assistance clauses as well as for the functioning and protection of EU missions and operations. The EU also holds numerous cyber-dialogues with international organisations, such as the UN, the Council of Europe, the OSCE and the OECD, and with partners such as the United States, Canada and Japan, to name a few.

The European Parliament welcomed the Commission’s cyber package, emphasising the EU’s and NATO’s ‘special responsibility and capacity’ to address cybersecurity and defence and calling on EU Members to prioritise their cyber-defence capabilities. In March 2019, Parliament approved the proposed cybersecurity act, establishing the first EU cyber-certification scheme and giving ENISA a permanent mandate.

Ensuring effective cyber-deterrence of malicious actors remains a challenge for the EU, and pan-European efforts for resilience, deterrence and defence should be strengthened and streamlined further. Experts have argued that deeper engagement by EU countries can hone a more systematic approach to fixing weak links and gaps, and can generate more robust and effective EU action on cyber.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Cyber: How big is the threat?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

Within the European Parliament, Members (MEPs) sit in political groups, whose members come from several countries and come together on the basis of political affinity. Our table shows the number of MEPs in each political group in the European Parliament, broken down by Member State, as well as the non-attached (NI) Members who are not in any group.

At the moment, there are seven political groups in the Parliament, and many of those were also present in the last term:

EPP – Group of the European People’s Party (Christian Democrats)

S&D – Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament

Renew Europe Group

Greens/EFA – Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance

ID – Identity and Democracy Group

ECR – European Conservatives and Reformists Group

GUE/NGL – Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left

The figures are supplied by our colleagues from the Members’ Administration Unit. Please note that these figures are subject to change and as a result we will update this table periodically throughout the five years of  the current parliamentary term

© European Union, EPRS

To find out more about the rules for forming a political group, see this EPRS briefing. To see the table of political groups in the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, see our previous blogpost.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Size of Political Groups in the EP (2019-2024)‘ in PDF.

Written by Nikolina Šajn (1st edition),

© vegefox.com / Fotolia

On 11 April 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a new directive on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. Currently, consumer organisations or independent public bodies can bring actions in the name of consumers in courts or before administrative authorities to stop infringements of consumer legislation. According to the proposal, they would be able to demand compensation for consumers as well. While work on the proposal is ongoing in the Council, the European Parliament adopted its first-reading position on 26 March 2019. It added safeguards to protect companies against abusive litigation, and deleted a precondition that consumers should wait for a final injunction order establishing the existence of an infringement before being allowed to demand compensation.

Versions

• April 2019:  ‘Representative actions to protect the collective interests of consumers: A new deal for consumers‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers, and repealing Directive 2009/22/EC Committee responsible: Legal Affairs (JURI) COM(2018) 184, 11.4.2018. Rapporteur: Geoffroy Didier (EPP, France) 2018/0089(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Mady Delvaux (S&D, Luxembourg)
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria)
Jens Rohde (ALDE, Denmark)
Kostas Chrysogonos (GUE/NGL, Greece)
Heidi Hautala (Greens/EFA, Finland)
Laura Ferrara (EFDD, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Launch of trilogue negotiations

Written by Ionel Zamfir,

© Sergey Nivens / Fotolia

The practice of linking human rights with trade liberalisation has gained ground among many trade partners. Not only the EU, but also other important trade powers, such as the US and Canada, embed human and labour-rights provisions in their new trade agreements. For the EU, this ensues inevitably from the normative vision underlying all of its external policies, as enshrined in the Treaties. Accordingly, the EU has committed to respecting and promoting human rights and democracy through its external action.

The main mechanism for incorporating human rights into the EU’s bilateral agreements consists of an ‘essential elements’ human rights clause that enables one party to take appropriate measures in case of serious breaches by the other party. The clause, which also covers democratic principles and often the rule of law, is more than just a legal mechanism enabling the unilateral suspension of trade commitments in times of crisis. It enshrines the parties’ commitments to human rights and thus puts EU relations with third countries on a solid regulatory base, opening the path to dialogue and cooperation on human rights issues. So far, the EU has clearly preferred a constructive engagement to more restrictive measures, and has not activated the clause to suspend trade preferences under any of its trade agreements. Civil society and the European Parliament have, on the other hand, encouraged the European Commission to use the clause in a more robust way in order to respond to serious breaches of human rights and democratic principles.

This briefing focuses exclusively on the EU’s bilateral and regional free trade agreements. EU unilateral human and labour rights provisions in trade arrangements are addressed in a separate briefing. A forthcoming EPRS paper will provide more information about labour rights (many of which also form part of the human rights enshrined in international conventions) in EU bilateral agreements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Human rights in EU trade agreements: The human rights clause and its application‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson.

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

The first parliamentary session of the ninth legislature took place in Strasbourg from 2-4 July 2019. The Members of this new Parliament (sitting from 2019 to 2024), dealt with elections of their peers to the most important offices in Parliament – the President, Vice-Presidents and Quaestors. Under Rule 14 of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the outgoing President opened this first, constituent session, during which Members also adopted a decision on the numerical strength of the standing committees and debated the outcome of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 June 2019, and the follow-up meeting earlier this week.

Election of the President of the European Parliament

In a secret ballot that ran to two rounds (under Rule 16 of the Rules of Procedure), the newly elected Members first voted on a field of candidates, put forward by the political groups (or individual Members amounting to 1/20th of the whole Parliament), for the position of President. David‑Maria Sassoli (S&D, Italy) was elected for the next two and a half years, by 345 votes, out of the 667 valid votes cast.

Election of Parliament’s Vice-Presidents

In three rounds of voting, Members then elected 14 Vice-Presidents. The Vice-Presidents, who also serve for a two-and-a-half year term, chair debates when the President cannot, and each Vice-President is responsible for specific aspects of parliamentary business.

New parliamentary committees

Parliament adopted a decision, tabled by the Conference of Presidents (of the political groups) under Rule 206, concerning the numerical strength of the standing committees, i.e. the number of Members to sit on each of Parliament’s 20 standing committees and 2 sub-committees. Following that vote, the nominations of individual members to committees were announced. The committees will hold their constituent meetings next week, during which they will elect their chairs and vice-chairs. These appointments are generally the subject of an informal accord among the political groups, based on the d’Hondt method, with an eye to reflecting the plurality of Member States and a fair representation of political views. Among the first issues to be dealt with by the new committees will be to consider their approach to ‘unfinished business‘ from last term. The IMCO and REGI committees are likely to hold hearings this month, for the replacements of the two Commissioners that have taken up seats in Parliament following the elections: Andrus Ansip (digital single market) and Corina Creţu (regional policy).

Election of parliamentary Quaestors

Members elected Parliament’s five Quaestors, who are responsible for any administrative and financial matters that directly concern Members and their working conditions, by acclamation, since there were only five nominations. Together with the President and Vice-Presidents, the Quaestors complete Parliament’s Bureau, in which they participate in an advisory capacity.

Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 20 and 21 June 2019

Members debated the outcome of the European Council and Euro Summit meetings on 20-21 June 2019, at which leaders adopted the Strategic Agenda for 2019 to 2024, setting four priority areas for EU action. They also discussed appointments to high-level EU positions and finally agreed to elect, nominate or propose candidates for high-level EU positions (Presidents of the European Council, European Central Bank, and European Commission, and the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy), during a further meeting between 30 June and 2 July. Parliament is due to vote on the candidate for Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, at the next plenary sitting, from 15 to 18 July 2019

ty / Fotolia

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about staff working for Members of the European Parliament.

Members are free to choose their own staff, although they may not employ close relatives. To cover the costs of hiring staff, Members have a monthly budget of about €25 000 at their disposal. However, the Parliament does not simply give these sums to the Members. Parliament pays their staff salaries directly – and contributes to the relevant tax and social security authorities.

Three categories of staff work for Members: ‘accredited parliamentary assistants’, ‘local assistants’ and trainees.

Members choose their accredited parliamentary assistants. The European Parliament then hires them under a direct contract. They assist Members in the exercise of their functions in the Parliament’s premises at one of its three places of work (Brussels, Luxembourg or Strasbourg). Members of the European Parliament can recruit a maximum of three accredited assistants or, in certain circumstances, four. At least a quarter of the total budget must be used for the employment of accredited assistants.

Members hire local assistants to work for them on EU matters in the country where they were elected, under employment contracts governed by national law. A maximum of three quarters of the total budget can be used for these local assistants.

Trainees have a traineeship agreement with a Member. They can work either in the Parliament’s premises or in the country of election.

Several Members can pool together to recruit one or several accredited or local assistants.

Staff working for Members carry out a wide range of tasks, which are determined by the Member, based on his/her official functions within Parliament (such as Vice-President or Quaestor), his/her interests, as well as his/her personal style.

Common tasks carried out by Members’ staff include administration (such as organising meetings, answering calls or managing the Member’s agenda and mailbox); parliamentary work (such as drafting amendments, following the activities of committees, preparing plenary sessions or negotiating with other Members’ assistants); policy (for instance building expertise on files where the Member is active); and communication (for example drafting speeches or managing the Member’s social media accounts). The names of staff of Members of the European Parliament are published on the Parliament’s website.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Staffing arrangements: parliamentary assistants, Frequently Asked Questions put to Parliament’s Spokesperson’s Department, European Parliament
• About MEPs, European Parliament

Written by Wolfgang Hiller,

© Architectes : Vandenbossche SPRL, CRV S.A., CDG S.P.R.L., Studiegroep D. Bontinck, ©Façade et Hémicycle – Arch M. Boucquillon Belgium – European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Better law-making is at the same time both a policy objective and a process. As a methodology, its purpose is to design and to decide on regulation that is fit for purpose.

This is achieved through a set of measures applied at all stages of the policy cycle, starting from agenda-setting, policy design and consultation, through to the actual moment of decision-making by the co-legislators, and finally to ex-post evaluation, when, after a period of transposition and implementation, the laws and regulations are evaluated to determine whether they have fulfilled their purpose or if they require adaptations to better meet evolving needs.

The responsibility for better law-making is shared between the European Union (EU) institutions. At European level, this was confirmed by the entry into force of the current Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making in April 2016, which has provided a new impetus to the joint efforts of the EU institutions to boost evidence-based policy-making at the various stages of the legislative and policy cycles. The aim is to generate European legislation of the highest possible quality for the benefit of European citizens.

The way forward: Better law-making in the future

To evaluate past experience of better law-making in practice, the European Commission undertook a comprehensive stock-taking exercise in early 2019, to find out what has worked well and what needs to be improved in this regard in the future. The European Parliament and its Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value contributed to this exercise in various ways and have made their own reflections on the Parliament’s work in this field. The exercise confirmed that the use of better regulation tools in the European law-making process are, by international comparison, well established and largely appreciated by stakeholders. Nevertheless, to improve its effectiveness and to achieve its objective of better laws for European citizens in future, work needs to continue at all levels. To this end, the Parliament’s Directorate for Impact Assessment and European Added Value stands ready to support parliamentary committees in this process.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Impact Assessment and European Added Value work during the eighth legislative term, 2014-2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© fotolia

After a lengthy meeting, lasting from 30 June to 2 July with interruptions, the European Council agreed on a package of candidates for the EU high-level positions. The German Defence Minister, Ursula von der Leyen, was proposed as candidate for European Commission President, now subject to election by the European Parliament.

The package of candidates proposed by the European Council

The special European Council meeting started late on 30 June and went on, with interruptions for individual discussions (bilaterals) and a break for reflection, until early evening on 2 July.

The package the European Council finally agreed upon includes:

• Ursula von der Leyen (Germany) for European Commission President;
• Charles Michel (Belgium) for European Council President;
• Josep Borrell (Spain) for High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy
• Christine Lagarde (France) for President of the European Central Bank

Figure 1: Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 EP elections

Treaty-based roles of the European Council and the European Parliament for high-level appointments

The offices of President of the European Commission and of the European Central Bank would, for the first time, be held by women (see Figure 1). The office of President of the European Council will for the second time go to a Belgian national, but for the first time to the Renew Europe (ex ALDE) political family.

The President of the European Council, Donald Tusk underlined that, although Germany abstained on the candidate for Commission President, the package of EU high-level positions was agreed on without a dissenting vote and moreover achieves ‘a perfect gender balance’. At the informal meeting in Sibiu on 9 May, when outlining a procedure for the appointments, he had stressed that these nominations should reflect the EU’s demography and geographical balance, but also gender and political balances. He had also indicated that these decisions were to be taken by consensus, if possible, but that he ‘would not shy away from putting [them] to the vote’ if needed.

Addressing the European Council, the outgoing President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, reiterated the Parliament’s position in support of the Spitzenkandidaten principle. However, earlier proposals for a package, taking into account the ‘lead candidate’ process, did not gather the necessary qualified majority support (i.e. at least 72 % of the Member States representing 65 % of the EU’s population). President Tusk recalled that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure was not a legal obligation, but that the European Council had attempted to respect the process in its reflections. He also stressed that ‘the European Council took note of Ursula von der Leyen’s intentions to nominate Frans Timmermans and Margrethe Vestager as highest ranking Vice-Presidents of the Commission’.

Regarding the election of the Parliament’s President, Antonio Tajani, had pointed out that the choice was completely independent from the proposals made in the European Council. This notwithstanding, President Tusk did indicate that the EU leaders had recommended the election of a European Parliament President coming from the S&D family, and also suggested a person from central and eastern Europe, who would then be followed in the second half of the term by someone from the EPP group. However, on 3 July, the European Parliament finally elected an Italian, David-Maria Sassoli (S&D), as its new President. The other candidates were Ska Keller (Greens/EFA, DE), Sira Rego (GUE/NGL, ES) and Jan Zahradil (ECR, CZ).

Specific procedures for each appointment

The procedures set out in the Treaties for appointing the various high-level office-holders differ according to the position concerned (see Table 1). The only person having been effectively ‘elected’ on 2 July was Charles Michel, whose two-and-a-half-year mandate (renewable once) as European Council President will begin on 1 December. He was also elected, by the Heads of State or Government of the contracting parties to the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union whose currency is the euro, as President of the Euro Summit for the same term.

The candidate for President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, was ‘nominated’ by the European Council, and still needs to be elected by the European Parliament, by a majority of its component members (Article 17(7) TEU). Regarding the other positions, the conclusions of the European Council only mention that the European Council ‘considers Josep Borrell Fontelles to be the appropriate candidate for the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy’, since the choice needs to be formally agreed by the President-elect of the Commission. Similarly, for President of the European Central Bank, the European Council ‘considers’ Christine Lagarde to be the appropriate candidate. Before formally appointing her, it needs to receive a recommendation from the Council, after consultation of the European Parliament and the Governing Council of the European Central Bank.

Table 1: Treaty-based roles of the European Council and the European Parliament for high-level appointments

Position Treaty article European Council role European Parliament role President of the European Commission 17(7) TEU Propose candidate Elect candidate President of the European Council 15(5) TEU Elect None High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 18(1) TEU Appoint (with agreement of the President of the Commission) Part of the approval of the college of Commissioners President of the European Central Bank 283(2) TFEU Appoint Consulted Next steps

The European Parliament is expected to vote on the candidate for Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, on 16 July. At this stage, her election is not guaranteed, as some political groups have reiterated the European Parliament’s attachment to the Spitzenkandidaten process, under which she was not a candidate.

If she does not obtain the required majority, Article 17(7) TEU provides that ‘the European Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall within one month propose a new candidate who shall be elected by the European Parliament following the same procedure’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 30 June-2 July 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Laura Tilindyte,

© Nmedia / Fotolia

Having been elected to the European Parliament, two current members of the College of Commissioners have resigned as Commissioners in order to take up their seats. As a general rule, a vacancy caused in this way needs to be filled by a new Commissioner of the same nationality – unless the Council unanimously decides otherwise. On 16 June 2019, given the short duration of the remainder of the current Commission’s mandate, the Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, proposed not to replace the departing Commissioners.

European Commission proposal

The College of Commissioners currently consists of one national per Member State. Any Commissioner elected to the European Parliament who decides to take up their seat is required to resign, as the two offices are incompatible (Article 245 TFEU and Article 7(1) of the Electoral Act). This is the case for two Commissioners (Andrus Ansip, Estonia, and Corina Creţu, Romania) following their election to Parliament in May 2019. The EU Treaties require, as a general rule, that a vacancy caused by such resignation is filled for the remainder of the Commission’s term of office by a new member, of the same nationality, appointed by the Council. However, the Council may, acting unanimously, on a proposal from the President of the Commission, ‘decide that such a vacancy need not be filled, in particular when the remainder of the Member’s term of office is short.’ Such a Council decision has been taken once before, in July 1999.

Against this backdrop, on 12 June 2019, Jean-Claude Juncker announced that he would propose not to replace the departing Commissioners, and later made this proposal formally. He noted that, as the current Commission’s term in office ends on 31 October 2019, during the remaining four months, the Commission’s focus will be on completing pending proposals instead of proposing new initiatives. Moreover, pointing to the financial burden entailed by such replacements, Juncker suggested that, given the current practice of working in ‘project teams’, other Commissioners would be ‘fully capable’ of stepping in for departing colleagues. The proposal, if adopted, would also entail there being no member of the College of Estonian or Romanian nationality until a new Commission takes office.

Procedure and Parliament’s role

The proposal was considered by Coreper on 3 July. Without unanimous support for the proposal, new Commissioners would need to be appointed by the Council, in common accord with Juncker, and after consulting the European Parliament (Article 246 TFEU). Such appointments are different from the ‘regular’ procedure, due in autumn 2019, in which the Commission is subject as a body to a vote of consent by Parliament before being formally appointed by the European Council. Although the ‘replacement’ procedure only requires Parliament’s consultation, the 2010 Framework Agreement on Relations between Parliament and the Commission (pt. 6) commits the Commission President to ‘seriously consider‘ the result of Parliament’s consultation before giving their accord to the Council’s appointment. In July 2014, after the last European elections, Parliament approved the appointment of five new Commissioners. Rule 125(9) calls for hearings of any replacement Commissioner, or indeed of existing Commissioners taking over a portfolio.

Article 246 TFEU (second and third paragraphs)
A vacancy caused by resignation, compulsory retirement or death [of a Member of the Commission] shall be filled for the remainder of the Member’s term of office by a new Member of the same nationality appointed by the Council, by common accord with the President of the Commission, after consulting the European Parliament and in accordance with the criteria set out in the second subparagraph of Article 17(3) of the Treaty on European Union.
The Council may, acting unanimously on a proposal from the President of the Commission, decide that such a vacancy need not be filled, in particular when the remainder of the Member’s term of office is short.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘(Non-)replacement of Commissioners elected to EP‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.