European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Over the next two weeks, the candidates for posts as European Commissioners, at the top of the European Union’s executive will face three-hour public hearings in the European Parliament. Each of the nominees, put forward by their national governments, but seeking to take up a portfolio crafted by President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, will face questions on their suitability for a post in the Commission in general, as well as on their specific competence for the portfolio allocated to them. Prior to their hearing, each candidate has to provide a declaration of financial interests and satisfy the Legal Affairs Committee (JURI) that their financial affairs present no conflict of interest.

From the very beginnings of the European Union, the Parliament has had the power to dismiss the European Commission as a bloc, by means of a motion of censure. However, in 1992, Parliament also gained a role in the appointment of a new College of Commissioners every five years. Under the Maastricht Treaty, Members of the European Parliament vote first on the candidate for Commission President, and subsequently to confirm the appointment of the Commission as a body.

The hearings are due to take place from 30 September to 8 October 2019, at the European Parliament in Brussels. Prior to the public hearings, each candidate is invited to respond to written questionnaires from the committee(s) that are to conduct the hearings.

Under the Treaties, Parliament may reject the nomination of the new College as a body, but cannot reject individual Commissioners-designate. However, based on their performance in the hearings, Parliament may exercise its influence on the selection of individual candidates or the allocation of portfolios, as it has done in the past.

Each briefing in this set provides an overview of one of the candidates whose hearings are expected to take place as scheduled, and of the key issues and recent developments in the portfolios of the nominated Commission.

Vice-Presidents

Frans Timmermans – European Green Deal

Margrethe Vestager – A Europe fit for the Digital Age

Valdis Dombrovskis – An Economy that Works for People

Josep Borrell Fontelles – A Stronger Europe in the World (High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)

Maroš Šefčovič – Interinstitutional Relations and Foresight

Věra Jourová – Values and Transparency

Dubravka Šuica – Democracy and Demography

Margaritis Schinas – Protecting our European Way of Life

Commissioners

Johannes Hahn – Budget and Administration

Phil Hogan – Trade

Mariya Gabriel – Innovation and Youth

Nicolas Schmit – Jobs

Paolo Gentiloni – Economy

Janusz Wojciechowski  – Agriculture

Elisa Ferreira – Cohesion and Reforms

Stella Kyriakides – Health

Didier Reynders – Justice

Helena Dalli – Equality

Sylvie Goulard – Internal Market

Ylva Johansson – Home Affairs

Janez Lenarčič – Crisis Management

Jutta Urpilainen – International Partnerships

Kadri Simson  – Energy

Virginijus Sinkevičius – Environment and Oceans

Overview of the parliamentary hearings

Read also

Overview of the parliamentary hearings, EPRS Infographic, September 2019

Parliamentary hearings of the Commissioners-designate: A decisive step in the investiture process [Policy podcast], EPRS Briefing, September 2019

Candidates for the new European Commission, European Parliament website, September 2019

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP / DAINA LE LARDIC

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about its role in the approval process of a new European Commission.

Under the Treaty on European Union, the European Parliament intervenes twice in the approval process of a new European Commission.

In a first phase, the European Parliament elects the President of the new Commission, based on a proposal by EU leaders in the European Council.

On 16 July 2019, the European Parliament elected, with 383 votes in favour, Ursula von der Leyen as President of the next European Commission. Individual governments of EU countries subsequently put forward candidate members of the European Commission. On 10 September 2019, President-elect von der Leyen presented her team, along with the proposed allocation of portfolios.

In a second phase, the European Parliament approves or rejects the new European Commission as a whole. Although it does not vote on individual Commissioners-designate, the threat to vote down the designated Commission has proven a powerful means to influence the composition of the European Commission.

To evaluate individual Commissioners-designate, the European Parliament organises hearings before the relevant parliamentary committees. Apart from initial hearings before the Legal Affairs Committee to examine any potential or actual conflict of interests of the Commissioners-designate, which are held in camera, these are held in public and are broadcast live. Hearings aim to evaluate Commissioners-designate on the basis of their general competence, European commitment and personal independence.

Hearings, which generally last three hours, start with an opening speech by the candidate, followed by up to 25 questions from Members of the European Parliament. The commissioner-designate can make a brief closing statement.

The public hearings on the commissioners-designate of the von der Leyen Commission will take place between 30 September and 8 October 2019.

Immediately after each hearing, the chair and leaders of political groups in the parliamentary committee responsible for the hearing meet in camera to evaluate the Commissioner-designate. If they are unable to reach a consensus, the chair will convene a committee meeting and, as a last resort, call a vote by secret ballot. The committee’s evaluation statement is made public within 24 hours of the hearing.

The European Parliament is expected to vote on the new Commission as a whole on 23 October 2019. After approval by the European Parliament, EU leaders in the European Council can formally appoint the new Commission. The term of the new European Commission starts on 1 November 2019.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• How Parliament votes the European Commission into office (infographic), European Parliament.
• Schedule: commissioner candidate hearings in Parliament, European Parliament.
• Parliamentary hearings of the Commissioners-designate: A decisive step in the investiture process, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019.
• The von der Leyen Commission: for a Union that strives for more, Press release, European Commission, 10 September 2019.

Written by Marketa Pape,

© biker3 / Fotolia

The maritime industry lacks qualified personnel. Traditionally male-dominated, women today make up about 2 % of the global maritime workforce. Onshore professions taken up by women include work in ship inspection, port services, logistics, research, legal and accounting services, ship classification and marine insurance. In comparison, few women are to be found among seafarers and most of these work in support services on ferries and cruise ships.

Sea-going jobs are very demanding, not least due to long hours and irregular rest periods. Once trained, women choosing to work at sea need to overcome difficulties linked to getting hired, gender stereotypes and isolation, but often also face sexual harassment, violence, discrimination and unequal employment opportunities. Nevertheless, sea-going experience is highly valued in the sector and opens further career opportunities.

Efforts led by two specialised United Nations agencies have opened the way for women into the maritime world: the International Maritime Organisation (IMO) has long encouraged and supported women to train for both shore-based and sea-going jobs. For its part, the International Labour Organisation (ILO) set the minimum standards for seafarers’ employment conditions, men and women alike, and for eliminating violence and harassment from the world of work. To affirm the importance of women to the maritime sector and of gender equality, IMO chose ‘Empowering Women in the Maritime Community‘ as the theme for the 2019 World Maritime Day.

Promoting gender equality in its policies, the EU began to pay attention to links between gender and transport only recently. In 2012, it funded a project under which transport trade unions prepared a ‘gender training package‘ to make transport a better place to work for both women and men. In 2017, the European Commission launched the Women in Transport – EU platform for change. Focusing on the barriers that prevent women from taking up and retaining jobs in transport, it also helps exchange information on measures that companies can adopt to improve their gender balance.

To attract more women, transport trade unions argue, working conditions for all seafarers need to improve. The global nature of shipping makes it difficult to enforce seafarers’ rights. Working conditions on board are determined by the country of registration, whose flag the ship flies. For cost reasons, many ships owned by EU companies trade in European waters while flying a flag of a non-EU country and, as such, do not have to respect EU labour laws. To eliminate the low labour standards, EU trade unions have proposed to set up a European Maritime Space, where all shipping companies operating in EU waters would have to follow EU rules.

In general, workers’ rights can be better enforced under EU law than under international instruments. That said, seafarers had been excluded from EU several labour laws and their rights were only recently aligned with those of workers based onshore. Somewhat inconsistently, the 2019 EU rules for transparent and predictable working conditions again treat them as a special category, to whom some provisions do not apply. Nevertheless, better working conditions at sea for all maritime workers would also benefit women in the industry.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© cristinn / Fotolia

Some 7 000 languages are spoken globally today. However, half of the world’s population shares just six native languages, and some 90 % of all languages may be replaced by dominant ones by the end of the century.

The harmonious co-existence of 24 official languages is one of the most distinctive features of the European project. Multilingualism is not only an expression of the EU countries’ cultural identities but it also helps preserve democracy, transparency and accountability. No legislation can enter into force until it has been translated into all official languages and published in the Official Journal of the EU. Crucially, the provisions relating to the EU language regime can only be changed by a unanimous vote in the Council of the EU.

The EU is committed to promoting language learning but has limited influence over educational and language policies, as these are the responsibility of the individual EU countries. A 2012 poll suggests that a slim majority of Europeans (54 %) can hold a conversation in at least one foreign language, but worryingly, nearly half of all Europeans (46 %) cannot, and only four in 10 pupils attain the basic level of competence allowing them to have a simple conversation in a foreign language.

The European Parliament is committed to ensuring the highest possible degree of multilingualism in its work. Based on the 24 official languages that constitute the public face of the EU, the total number of linguistic combinations rises to 552, since each language can be translated into the 23 others. Currently, over 1 000 staff employed in translation and over 500 in interpretation care for the translation and interpretation needs of the 751 Members of the European Parliament. Internally, the EU institutions mostly use just three working languages: English, French and German.

The overall cost for delivering translation and interpretation services in the EU institutions is around €1 billion per year, which represents less than 1 % of the EU budget or just over €2 per citizen.

Following the success of the European Year of Languages (2001), the Council of Europe designated 26 September as the European Day of Languages.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Multilingualism: The language of the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati,

This infographic presents an overview of the schedule of hearings of the Commissioners-designate of the von der Leyen Commission. The parliamentary committees take the lead for the hearings, with each Commissioner-designate invited to a single hearing of three hours duration. All the hearings are to be held in the József Antall building, in rooms 2Q2 and 4Q2, in the period from 30 September to 8 October 2019.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Overview of the parliamentary hearings‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vivienne Halleux and Ivana Katsarova,

© giorgos245 / Fotolia

Sport has a growing impact both on the European Union (EU) economy and on society as a whole. Over 7 million people work in sport-related jobs, and sport-related goods and services amount to nearly 3 % of total EU gross value added.

It was not until 2009, with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, that the Union received a clear mandate to build up and implement an EU-coordinated sports policy supported by a specific budget, and to develop cooperation with international bodies in the area of sport.

However, EU competence in sport is limited and only allows the EU to support, coordinate or complement sports policy measures taken by national governments. This rules out the adoption of legislation or any other legally binding measure. The EU has therefore opted to act via ‘soft’ policy tools, such as guidelines, recommendations and – most importantly – funding, to support its sport-related objectives.

Over the years, the EU has been actively involved in tackling transnational issues such as doping, match-fixing and lack of physical activity. In recent years, various health-related EU initiatives have grown increasingly popular. In 2018, the European Week of Sport attracted nearly 14 million people to over 50 000 events across Europe, with the Western Balkans and the countries from the Eastern Partnership joining the initiative in 2019. The #BeActive Night, a new feature first introduced in 2018, will continue encouraging participants to discover and try the different sports activities available in their area.

None of this would have been possible without the introduction of a specific budget for sport, in which the European Parliament played a key role. As the popularity of sport-related initiatives grows, so do the Commission’s plans and ambitions for the broader role of sport in society. The executive’s proposal for the 2021-2027 Erasmus programme confirms this ambition. Accordingly, the amount available for Erasmus would be doubled, to reach €30 billion, with €550 million dedicated to sport.

Listen to this podcast on YouTube.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU sports policy: Going faster, aiming higher, reaching further ‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Philippe Perchoc,

On 21 September, we celebrate ‘International Peace Day’, declared by the General Assembly of the United Nations. This is an important date for everyone, but especially for the European Union, which from its basis as a project of perpetual peace among its members, has become one of the main promoters of peace in the world.

A successful peace project

Almost 70 years after the launch of the original EU project, this ‘Pax Europeana’ has delivered a ‘European common good’ in terms of democracy and citizen participation, mobility, economic prosperity and security. Indeed, the EU’s very existence can be said to act as a guarantee of peace on the continent, through the creation of the world’s most integrated regional network of cooperation, as well as the strengthening of supranational institutions that represent European citizens, European states, and the European general interest.

The EU’s major contribution to peace was recognised when the Nobel Academy commended the EU for having ‘over six decades contributed to the advancement of peace and reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe’. The EU is the only international organisation outside the League of Nations/United Nations system to have been awarded the Nobel Prize (in 2012).

EU measures in favour of peace are driven by a positive understanding of peace: that is, as not merely an absence of conflict, but a sustainable multidimensional peace in which wellbeing and combating inequalities are also key. To reach this positive peace, the EU contributes through both internal and external policies. The EU was key in insuring a lasting peace in Northern Ireland, for example. Externally, the EU is an important global player in the field of peace and security. Two key goals of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy are the preservation of peace globally and the strengthening of international security.

Opinion polls show that EU citizens support this EU mission for peace, and a majority would like to see even greater EU engagement in policies related to peace and security.

Figure 1. Gap between expectations and evaluation of EU action in different policy areas relevant to peace and security

Measuring and mitigating threats to peace

In 2016, to support EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy with a shared understanding of the global security situation, the European Union defined a series of common objectives and threats to be faced by the Union through the ‘EU Global Strategy‘.

The recently released Normandy Index is a contribution to the evaluation of these threats to peace. The product of a partnership between the region of Normandy and the European Parliament, it was designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and developed by the Institute for Economics and Peace. The index provides a holistic picture of the world through the prism of the pursuit of peace measured against threats explicitly defined in the Global Strategy. It shows that, the European continent ranks highly for peace, with the EU the 8th least threatened player in the world (Norway ranks in first place, Switzerland second, and Iceland third).

Figure 2. The Normandy Index, 2019

The Normandy Index provides a tool to better understand the threats that challenge global peace. It can help policy-makers to evaluate the EU’s activities in different dimensions and to identify ways to act preventively and support countries and regions that are most threatened. It is not a ranking of countries according to their peacefulness, but rather a ranking of identified threats to peace, such as climate change, cybersecurity, terrorism, economic crisis or terrorism, for example.

The EU’s answer to the threat

Brussels is one of the busiest diplomatic capital cities in the world. The EU is already one of the largest humanitarian donors, as well as a key trade partner for most countries globally. In these fields, EU action complements EU Member State activities.

On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. A quarter of all European aid goes to the most fragile states.

In the larger field of peace promotion, the EU was and remains a key player in the negotiations over Iran and, more generally, on fighting the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The EU also provides assistance worldwide to mitigate the effects of global warming, or on securing nuclear installations, for example.

Two examples of EU contributions to peace: the Western Balkans and Colombia

In the Western Balkans, EU policy has shifted from one of stabilisation and containment to a much more ambitious policy of ‘positive peace’-building, embodied in the EU enlargement process. To restore normality after a period of dramatic destruction of human and economic capital and to promote the re-establishment of peace in the Western Balkans, the EU has gone beyond disarmament, repairing roads, re-establishing free flows of goods and helping refugees return home. Firstly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and then in the rest of the region, the EU has advocated a genuine and inclusive ‘positive peace’, comprising reconciliation, respect for the rule of law, free elections, equal political and social opportunities, a free press, civil society participation, economic growth – i.e. acting beyond mere declarations to actually put ideas into practice.

The EU has been present in Colombia since the late 1990s, when EU foreign policy first developed, coinciding with the internationalisation of the Colombian conflict. The EU approach to supporting peacebuilding in Colombia has been comprehensive, comprising a wide spectrum of soft (civilian) means, and favouring dialogue and cooperation for the resolution of disputes. It has involved a combination of political dialogue (at national, regional and local levels), financial aid (development cooperation and humanitarian aid), and trade relations.

From the beginning of its engagement, the EU has focused on addressing the root causes of the conflict – socioeconomic inequality; human rights violations; armed conflict and illegal activities – through reconciliation efforts (in the form of Peace Laboratories), economic territorial development (through rural integration), and multi-level political dialogue (also within the context of its trade relations). This EU support was key in reaching a peace agreement in 2016.

Promoting peace: the way forward

In 2019, European citizens elected a new European Parliament, which now proceeds to hear auditions of designated European Commissioners, including those responsible for Common Foreign and Security Policy, enlargement and neighbourhood policy. Together with the Council of the EU, the European Parliament and the European Commission will face the challenges of promoting peace globally in the next five years, against a background of  key environment and multilateralism issues.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Bits and Splits / Fotolia

The United Nations’ Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, will convene a special summit on climate change on 23 September, during the annual session of the UN General Assembly in New York. The meeting, entitled ‘Climate Action Summit 2019: A race we can win, a race we must win’, is meant to encourage world leaders to do more to limit emissions of greenhouse gases responsible for global warming. Guterres has said the meeting will seek to challenge states, regions, cities, companies, investors and citizens to step up action in the areas of energy transition, climate finance and carbon pricing, industry transition and nature-based solutions.

This note offers links to a series of recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on climate change and ways to mitigate it. Earlier reports on trade can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ published in April 2019.

Economic priorities for new EU leadership
Bruegel, September 2019

Opportunities to advance mitigation ambition in China: Non-CO2 greenhouse gas emissions
World Resources Institute, September 2019

Braver, greener, fairer: Memos to the EU leadership 2019-2024
Bruegel, September 2019

Advancing sustainable finance: Priorities for Europe
E3G, September 2019

The future of disaster risk pooling for developing countries: Where do we go from here?
World Resources Institute, September 2019

Dousing the sovereignty wildfire
Bruegel, September 2019

Nature: The forgotten solution to climate change
Friends of Europe, September 2019

Cities, climate change and chronic heat exposure
LSE, Grantham Institute on Climate Change, September 2019

An EU agenda for climate security
E3G, August 2019

The IPCC special report on land: We have to act now
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, August 2019

The coming clash between climate and trade
Bruegel, August 2019

The ambition call: European Union
New Climate Institute, August 2019

Planning for 2050: Shifting the focus towards long-term climate objectives
Ecologic Institute, August 2019

G7 coal scorecard – Fifth edition: Coal finance heads for the exit
E3G, August 2019

Border carbon tariffs: Giving up on trade to save the climate?
Bruegel, August 2019

The EU needs a bold climate strategy
Bruegel, August 2019

Global lessons for the UK in carbon taxes
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, July 2019

Carbon utilization: A vital and effective pathway for decarbonization
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, August 2019

Europe’s clean energy transition: An economic opportunity, an environmental imperative
Friends of Europe, July 2019

Global Energy Outlook comparison methods: 2019 update
Resources for the Future, July 2019

The overlooked side of the ecological transition
Friends of Europe, July 2019

Global trends in climate change litigation: 2019 snapshot
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, July 2019

Jobs and environmental regulation
Resources for the Future, July 2019

Increase climate ambition by making policy more inclusive
Chatham House, June 2019

Paris-proofing the next Multiannual Financial Framework
European Policy Centre, June 2019

EU urgently needs to reverse its climate neutrality failure
Bruegel, June 2019

Polluting for profit: The paradox of the EU’s emissions trading system
Istituto Affari Internazionali, June 2019

A brief guide to the Paris agreement and ‘rulebook’
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, June 2019

The future of the EU: Compromises for expanding ordinary legislative procedure and majority voting in climate and energy policies
Ecologic Institute, June 2019

The European Parliament and climate change: Past, present and future
EUROPEUM, June 2019

Better the devil you know: The importance of measuring climate risk
Chatham House, June 2019

EU climate diplomacy vis-à-vis Australia, Brazil and Mexico: Engaging difficult partners to enhance global ambition
College of Europe, June 2019

Good governance for long-term low-emissions development strategies
World Resources Institute, June 2019

Addressing the urgency of more stringent climate change policy
Resources for the Future, May 2019

Opportunities to integrate disaster risk reduction and climate resilience into sustainable finance
E3G, May 2019

A 100 percent renewable energy system in Europe is technically possible and economically rational
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, May 2019

Human migration in the era of climate change
Resources for the Future, May 2019

Pathways to 2050: Alternative scenarios for decarbonizing the U.S. economy
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, May 2019

Making climate neutrality the galvanising heart of a new economic agenda for Europe
European Policy Centre, April 2019

The global consumer incidence of carbon pricing: Evidence from trade
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, April 2019

How should the next EU Commission’s agenda on climate resilience look?
E3G, April 2019

Institutions, climate change and the foundations of long-term policymaking
LSE, Grantham Institute on Climate Change, April 2019

Hard or soft governance? The EU’s climate and energy policy framework for 2030
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Institute for European Studies, April 2019

What is climate resilience and why does it matter?
Center for Climate and Energy Solutions, April 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP / DAINA LE LARDIC

Highlights of the September plenary session included statements and debates on the preparation for the Climate Action Summit and the Sustainable Development Goals Summit in New York, on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe, and on the implementation of anti-money laundering legislation. A further debate on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU was held, Parliament’s first since the change of prime minister in the UK. Parliament also debated statements made on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the political situation in Hong Kong, Burkina Faso, Colombia and Kashmir. Debates also took place on Council and Commission statements on the fires in the Amazon, forests in the EU, and cases of breaches of human rights. Members voted to approve Christine Lagarde’s nomination as President of the European Central Bank, and voted on a series of reports on amendments to the 2019 budget.

Appointment of the President of the European Central Bank

Parliament approved Christine Lagarde’s nomination as President of the European Central Bank (ECB) by a comfortable majority, and her tenure will begin on 1 November 2019, following her formal appointment by the European Council. Parliament also approved the appointment of Yves Mersch as Vice-Chair of the ECB’s Supervisory Board. Parliament is consulted on the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank under the Treaties, while an interinstitutional agreement between the Parliament and ECB ensures it also has a say in the nomination of candidates for Chair and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board dealing with bank supervision.

High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy statements

Members debated statements made by Tytti Tuppurainen (President-in-Office of the Council), on behalf of the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, on recent developments in the political situation in Burkina Faso, Colombia and Kashmir. Although Colombia has received a range of EU support, implementation of the peace accord has had mixed results to date. Parliament also considered the situation in Indian-administered Kashmir, following the Indian Parliament’s withdrawal of the constitutional guarantee of political autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir, where the long dispute between India and Pakistan over the region has resulted in terrorism and ongoing violence.

Amending the EU budget for 2019

Parliament voted, by a large majority, to confirm its position in favour of a series of interinstitutional agreements on draft amending budgets for the 2019 financial year. The first of these, draft amending budget No 1/2019, proposes using the surplus €1.8 billion left over from the 2018 financial year (largely resulting from higher competition fines revenue and underspending), to reduce Member States’ contributions to the 2019 EU budget. On draft amending budget No 2/2019, Parliament confirmed the agreement to reinforce the Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ programmes with a €100 million increase in funding. Finally, Parliament also confirmed draft amending budget No 3/2019, which mobilises EU emergency solidarity funding to help Austria, Italy and Romania in their recovery efforts following flooding and extreme weather events.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, September 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega,

© Mopic / Fotolia

The discussion around artificial intelligence (AI) technologies and their impact on society is increasingly focused on the question of whether AI should be regulated. Following the call from the European Parliament to update and complement the existing Union legal framework with guiding ethical principles, the EU has carved out a ‘human-centric’ approach to AI that is respectful of European values and principles. As part of this approach, the EU published its guidelines on ethics in AI in April 2019, and European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, has announced that the Commission will soon put forward further legislative proposals for a coordinated European approach to the human and ethical implications of AI.

Against this background, this paper aims to shed some light on the ethical rules that are now recommended when designing, developing, deploying, implementing or using AI products and services in the EU. Moreover, it identifies some implementation challenges and presents possible further EU action ranging from soft law guidance to standardisation to legislation in the field of ethics and AI. There are calls for clarifying the EU guidelines, fostering the adoption of ethical standards and adopting legally binding instruments to, inter alia, set common rules on transparency and common requirements for fundamental rights impact assessments, and to provide an adequate legal framework for face recognition technology. Finally, the paper gives an overview of the main ethical frameworks for AI under development in countries such as the United States and China.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU guidelines on ethics in artificial intelligence: Context and implementation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nikolina Šajn,

© auremar / Fotolia

Repairing broken or damaged products can save consumers money by helping them postpone making replacement purchases, while also bringing benefits to the environment through lower waste production and use of resources. The EU’s circular economy strategy considers maintenance and repair to be important ways of both keeping resources from being thrown away and of prolonging the lifespan of products.

A 2018 European Commission behavioural study on consumer engagement in the circular economy showed that 64 % of consumers always repair broken or damaged products. The top reason for not repairing products was the high price of repair, followed by the preference to get a new product and the feeling that the old product was obsolete or out of fashion. As for repairers, especially independent ones, they often complain about having no access to original spare parts, technical information, diagnostic software and training, as manufacturers sometimes limit these to their own after-sales services or to recognised repairers of a specific brand.

EU consumer legislation regulates the right of consumers to have products repaired within the legal guarantee period, but not beyond its expiry or for defects not covered by the guarantee. Efforts to ensure access to repair are also included in EU environmental and product legislation. The upcoming ecodesign requirements for TV screens, refrigerators, lighting, household washing machines and dishwashers are expected to ensure that independent repairers have access to spare parts and repair information. The European Parliament has called for extending the ecodesign requirements to non-energy related products, including the reparability of products, more systematically in ecodesign legislation, and extending the duration of legal guarantees. Similar calls have come from a range of stakeholders.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Consumers and repair of products‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou with Francesca Braden,

© theevening / Fotolia

The debate on the participation and role of women in foreign affairs and international security is a timely and relevant one, and is being raised with increasing frequency at both national and international levels. In particular, there is growing attention to the imbalances in the representation of women in leadership and other key positions in the area of foreign and security policy, as well as to the growing body of evidence regarding the positive effect of including women in several key areas of foreign and security policy.

Among these issues, women’s role in peacekeeping receives particular attention, as research has repeatedly shown that gender equality contributes to peace, and that peace negotiations involving women have a better chance of being sustainable and effective. Gender-equal societies enjoy better health, stronger economic growth and higher security. The United Nations and the EU have put pronounced emphasis on the issue in the past two decades. UN Security Council Resolution 1325 established the women, peace and security (WPS) agenda in 2000. Since then, more WPS-related resolutions have been adopted, widening the scope and breadth of gendered peace and security. These resolutions have been instrumental in changing the philosophy and rhetoric focused on conflict and gender equality, thereby challenging the international community to do more. Several initiatives are also being implemented at EU level, including through the 2018 EU Strategic Approach to WPS. However, critics posit that a lot remains to be done, as women continue to be under-represented in the field of foreign and security policy across the world.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Women in foreign affairs and international security: Contours of a timely debate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel and Mihalis Kritikos with Rosanna Fanni,

©Rylsoft / Shutterstock

As of 2020, Facebook’s cryptocurrency project Libra promises to connect everybody to the global, digital world of banking. The introduction of a privately governed currency could fundamentally challenge the current EU financial framework, conflict with EU law and tax requirements, and violate consumer rights.

Could we abandon the euro and do financial transactions – receiving, transferring and paying money – in Libra? Libra, once launched, would operate as a global digital currency, meaning that users could access, pay and manage their accounts online. Facebook announced its project in June 2019 with a white paper, and envisages launching the cryptocurrency in early 2020. Libra’s ecosystem consists of three parts:

1. The cryptocurrency itself (hereafter called Libra);
2. Individual banking with Libra via Calibra, a digital wallet;
3. The Libra Association governing Libra.

The Libra Association would be responsible for ensuring price stability as well as for managing the assets and investments of the Libra Reserve. It currently comprises 29 members, such as payment operators (e.g. MasterCard, Visa, PayPal) and e-commerce businesses (e.g. booking.com, eBay, Spotify, Uber), as well as venture capital and non-profit organisations. Facebook expects this to rise to 100 members ahead of the launch. While two thirds of members are companies and commercial interest groups, notably no banks are part of the Libra Association. Indeed, its private governance structure has been compared to a de facto central bank. Facebook’s co-founder Chris Hughes confirmed this argument, stating that Libra will shift power from central banks to corporations. Put differently: its large-scale adoption could threaten the existence of national currencies.

The United States Securities and Exchange Commission is currently debating whether to allow trade in Libra on stock exchanges. If permitted, this would be subject to authorisation ahead of the launch. Jerome Powell, Chair of the Federal Reserve, expressed doubts about data privacy, money laundering, consumer protection and financial stability. President Donald Trump said Libra would have to comply with banking regulation and seek a new bank charter. Internationally, central banks and parts of the financial services industry are assessing potential impacts on the stability of financial markets. Due to EU-specific tax regulations, unforeseen issues for European consumers, and, particularly EU-based SMEs, may arise. The European Central Bank and Japanese, UK, French and German politicians have also announced closer investigation. Legal experts have even advocated calling a halt to the cryptocurrency project. Because of these challenges, it is unclear whether Libra will indeed launch as planned.

Potential impacts and developments

Libra’s stated mission is to create a fairer society by empowering unbanked people (adults without a bank account) in developing countries. However, e-commerce and online shopping for European consumers could also change significantly. In the digital ecosystem, users appear to prioritise convenient services over safeguarding individual privacy rights. Libra’s payment ecosystem is likely to gain popularity over time. Prominent Libra Association board members would be early adopters, allowing users to familiarise themselves with the Libra currency itself in a first phase. Low entry barriers and minimal costs appeal to convenience-oriented consumers, who would use Libra from time to time in a second step. The Calibra app would integrate payments with WhatsApp, Instagram and Messenger, probably exploiting personal network effects. Should both e-commerce operators and consumers become accustomed to Libra, intervening in the ecosystem would become increasingly difficult. In short, the cryptocurrency could become the largest bank and investment broker worldwide – without a single physical branch.

Widespread Libra use could pave the way towards a cashless society. Nevertheless, when around half of all adult Europeans did not use internet banking in 2017, it is likely that digitally illiterate, poor and elderly citizens would be particularly disadvantaged. Moreover, a cash-free economy depends on a stable electricity supply, an extensive communication infrastructure and robust security networks. However, Libra’s technical infrastructure is dependent on multiple nodes, such as mobile networks, devices, information technology infrastructure and data flows, operated by numerous stakeholders. These systems are vulnerable to malicious actors and cyber-threats. Pseudonymous transfers could favour money-laundering systems and trade in illegal goods. This poses questions as to what would happen if an account was blocked without prior notification, and which independent instances would help users to enforce their rights. In addition to requiring robust cybersecurity and oversight systems, the necessary increase in data centres and extended technical infrastructure would result in higher energy consumption and environmental contamination with e-waste.

Each member of the Libra Association contributes at least US$10 million to the reserve, backing financial assets and values to avoid price volatility. The incentives for investors include the revenues generated through transaction fees as well as savings as soon as users start exchanging money. Once the Libra Association members’ initial investments are reimbursed, the revenues would be invested in low-risk assets that generate dividends over time. In a hypothetical scenario, Libra would make around US$7 billion profits annually after five years. However, Facebook states that ‘Users of Libra do not receive a return from the reserve‘.

The exchange of transaction and personal data with Libra Association members gives these businesses unprecedented insight about consumers. This would not only conflict with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), but could also result in price-maximising algorithms or possible anti-competitive conduct, since board members could oversee the financial transaction data of smaller businesses. The pseudonymous – not anonymous – transaction process may enable data sharing between Facebook and third parties. This somewhat contradicts the ‘strong commitment to protecting customer privacy‘ stated in the white paper. Although it said it would not do so, Facebook has already sold user data, as seen with the Cambridge Analytica scandal.

The Facebook-owned Calibra application would integrate payments and transfers into Messenger, WhatsApp and Instagram. This would not only facilitate transfers but also automatically merge information about purchases with social media profiles. These demographic, behavioural and psychographic data combinations are highly attractive for businesses to anticipate consumer behaviour and enhance targeted advertising. Given that Facebook makes most of its revenue through advertising, the Calibra wallet would gather profitable data for the company. Finally, the introduction of Libra would fuel a new ecosystem, characterised by an unprecedented close relationship between private banking and commerce.

Anticipatory policy-making

The introduction of Libra raises a range of regulatory, legal and policy challenges, already extensively debated worldwide in the context of the optimal use of cryptocurrencies. Libra is an asset-backed cryptocurrency powered by a permissioned blockchain, to which only a specific group of organisations have access. Should Libra customers be affected by a technical mistake, fraud, or face data privacy problems, the lack of legal recourse and/or of a redeemer of last resort, and uncertainty about the responsibility of jurisdictions raises issues of forum shopping. Consequently, low-regulation extraterritorial jurisdictions, that do not have adequate money-laundering controls in place for example, may develop a significant advantage as service providers by hosting Libra operations. Additionally, Libra’s decentralised nature and its private-sector-led character trigger questions about their compliance with standard customer due diligence and financial reporting requirements at supranational level.

To set the legal status of the Libra coin/token and its classification, an international agreement is needed on harmonising existing rules for crypto tokens. This should acknowledge the changing nature of the concepts of money and liquidity, as well as the technological potential of such cryptographic currencies to be encoded in smart contracts. At the same time, data privacy, consumer protection and the security of transaction processes, including strict verification and capital requirements, will also have to be ensured. Co-regulatory oversight of the Libra operation scheme by both state-operators and stakeholders would be needed to prevent money laundering, illicit transactions and consumer fraud. Furthermore, any regulatory initiative in this field needs to focus on strengthening investor protection in view of the increased tokenisation of assets, as well as on substantially improving transparency in the global financial system. The European Banking Authority opinion on ‘virtual currencies’ puts forward a series of regulatory approaches, and cautions against drawing similarities between existing payment and payment-related services and some virtual currency-based services. As the first case study of blockchain banking, Libra’s adoption and use – if Facebook’s plans go ahead – would need to be closely monitored from a legal and institutional perspective, as it could have a serious impact on the integrity of existing financial governance schemes, and undermine the orderly functioning of financial markets.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if Libra disrupted the financial system?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Union – European Parliament

Parliament opens its doors for the first plenary session after the summer on Monday evening, with an agenda focused on climate issues and the EU budget. A Commission statement on the situation of EU forests scheduled for Monday evening will be followed on Tuesday morning with a statement on the Union’s common position ahead of the 23 September UN Climate Action Summit in New York. While the Commission has lately proposed to boost the share of EU spending that addresses climate change mitigation from 20 % to 25 %, the 2014-2019 Parliament sought a greater share, at 30 %. The new Parliament is likely to continue to prioritise more ambitious climate action targets, seeking to protect nature, improve air quality, promote the circular economy, and better control pesticide use. On Tuesday afternoon, Council and the Commission will also make statements on the devastating Amazon forest fires, which raise increasing concern among EU policy-makers and international environmental groups in respect of the potential environmental and climate change implications of the proposed free trade agreement with Mercosur.

Council representatives will be present in the chamber on Wednesday afternoon to present the Council position on the draft general EU budget for the 2020 financial year. Council and Parliament decide on the EU’s finances by means of an annual budgetary procedure, where Members can modify the annual budget draft through amendments to the Council’s position, before working out an agreement on the annual budget through negotiations consisting of trilogue meetings and conciliation.

However, as business regarding the 2019 budget is not yet completed, Parliament will firstly vote on a series of Committee on Budgets (BUDG) reports on draft amending budgets for the 2019 financial year on Wednesday lunchtime. The first of these, draft amending budget No 1/2019, concerns the surplus €1.8 billion left over from the 2018 financial year. The BUDG committee agrees to see this surplus, largely resulting from higher competition fines revenue and underspending during 2018, used to reduce Member State contributions to the 2019 EU budget. Members are then expected to vote on the BUDG report on the European Commission’s proposed draft amending budget No 2/2019, where a €100 million increase in funding is required to reinforce the Horizon 2020 and Erasmus+ programmes (key to the current EU push to increase competitiveness). According to BUDG, the proposal takes the agreement reached between Parliament and Council during the budget negotiations into account. The committee warns however that the Commission already needs to find a way to provide increased funding for the Erasmus+ programme this year. Members will also vote on the BUDG report on the proposed draft amending budget No 3/2019. This proposal seeks to mobilise the EU Solidarity Fund (available to all Member States struck by a natural disaster), to help Austria, Italy and Romania in their recovery efforts following flooding and extreme weather events resulting in landslides and damage to crops and infrastructure. The BUDG committee confirmed the decision to seek emergency funding, and underlined the urgent need for financial assistance in regions hit by natural disasters in 2018.

Under the Treaties, Parliament is consulted on the appointment of the President of the European Central Bank. Furthermore, an interinstitutional agreement between the Parliament and ECB ensures it also has a say on the candidates for Chair and Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board, dealing with supervision of banks. On Tuesday, Parliament will debate and vote on the favourable opinions delivered by the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee on the Council’s July recommendation to appoint Christine Lagarde to the post of ECB President and the Bank’s proposal to appoint Yves Mersch as Vice-Chair of the Supervisory Board.

On Tuesday afternoon, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (VP/HR) is to be present in the chamber to make a statement on recent developments in the political situation in Colombia. Although the EU has provided a range of support, including bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, humanitarian and development aid, and trade relations; implementation of the peace accord in Colombia has had mixed results to date, leading to frustration among the population. A statement will follow by the VP/HR on the situation in Indian-administered Kashmir, following the Indian Parliament’s withdrawal of the constitutional guarantee of high levels of political autonomy in Jammu and Kashmir. The long-running dispute between India and Pakistan over this mountainous region has resulted in terrorism and violence, exacerbated by a loss of rights and freedoms for the local population, as well as religious tensions, and leading to high levels of Indian troop movements in the area. Earlier, on Monday evening, the VP/HR is to make a statement on the volatile political situation in Hong Kong. The traditional debates on cases of breaches of human rights, democracy and the rule of law will take place on Thursday morning. During this session, these will cover the situation in Turkey, the Rohingya in Myanmar and the situation of women’s rights defenders and imprisoned EU dual nationals in Iran.

The key debate on Wednesday morning will consider Council and Commission statements on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, where, despite the current chaotic UK position, the withdrawal agreement and political declaration remain the only negotiated solution to date. On a, not unrelated, issue, a statement from the Council and Commission is expected on Tuesday afternoon on the increasingly concerning phenomenon of foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes, of which the Brexit referendum is seen as an example.

Finally, Council and Commission will also make statements on the importance of European remembrance for the future of Europe and on the state of implementation of anti-money-laundering legislation on Wednesday afternoon.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© tashatuvango / Fotolia

The escalating trade conflict between the United States (US) and China has dampened economic growth in the European Union and other regions of the world, analysts say, and poses a further question mark over the continuity of the post-Cold War rules-based order. The EU is seeking to position itself as a defender of the multilateral rules-based system in the context of growing economic nationalism. The EU will need to coordinate closely its trade and climate policies, and think clearly about how best to defend its economic interests in the challenging new geopolitical environment facing the incoming European Commission.

This note offers links to a series of recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on international trade policy. More reports on trade can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’ published in June 2018.

L’Europe dans la guerre commerciale sino-américaine
Fondation Robert Schuman, September 2019

Trump’s China tariffs: Lessons from first principles of classic trade policy welfare analysis
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Le ‘Green deal’ pour l’Europe commence par la transition énergétique !
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2019

The rise of economic nationalism threatens global cooperation
Peterson Institute for International Economics, September 2019

US-China trade war: The guns of August
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

Trump’s trade war timeline: An up-to-date guide
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

The economic losses from ending the WTO moratorium on electronic transmissions
European Centre for International Political Economy, August 2019

The coming clash between climate and trade
Bruegel, August 2019

The real cost of Trump’s trade wars
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2019

As the trade war worsens, the trade deficit increases
Brookings Institution, August 2019

The winners and losers of the US-China trade war
Atlantic Council, August 2019

The US-China trade dispute: What impact on the circular economy?
Chatham House, August 2019

Democratize trade policymaking to better protect human rights
Chatham House, August 2019

Should developing countries get preferential treatment on trade?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

The unravelling of the Shanghai ‘Deal’: US-China trade-cum-currency conflict comes to Europe
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, August 2019

Trump’s tariffs against China aren’t working, and there’s no quick resolution in sight
Rand Corporation, August 2019

Chinas Verschuldung und seine Außenwirtschaftsbeziehungen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019

Low risk, high reward: A Trans-Pacific Partnership for the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Isolation or integration: Why the EU Free Trade Agreement the Brexiters want is not deliverable
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2019

Who’s winning the US-China trade war? It’s not the United States or China
Peterson Institute for International Economics, July 2019

Transatlantic trade: The emergence of an EU geo-economic strategy?
German Marshall Fund, July 2019

A reflection on the Mercosur agreement
Bruegel, July 2019

Preference utilisation and customs data: The missing pieces of the FTA puzzle
European Centre for International Political Economy, July 2019

20 Years in the making: Mercosur-European Union reach trade deal
Atlantic Council, July 2019

Why is it hard for China and the US to cut a deal on trade?
Brookings Institution, July 2019

US-China trade war: Why the EU should take sides and favour the rules-based order
Istituto Affari Internazionali, July 2019

Fact-checking: Trump’s tariffs
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, July 2019

China and the World Trade Organisation: Towards a better fit
Bruegel, June 2019

The ‘seven’ ceiling: China’s yuan in trade talks
Bruegel, June 2019

Between partnership and punitive tariffs: Prospects for a new US-EU trade agreement in the new Congress
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2019

The future of UK services trade post-Brexit: Unlikely to be bright
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, June 2019

Transatlantic policy impacts of the US-EU trade conflict
Center for Transatlantic Relations, June 2019

From trade diplomacy to economic warfare: The international economic policy of the Trump Administration
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, May 2019

International trade: Rekindling interest in a multilateral rules-based approach
Institut français des relations internationales, May 2019

China and Europe: Trade, technology and competition
Observer Research Foundation, May 2019

European elections or: How to learn to stop worrying and be positive about trade in the future
European Centre for International Political Economy, May 2019

What is in store for the EU’s trade relationship with the US?
Bruegel, May 2019

Read this briefing on ‘International trade‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© PaulPaladin / Fotolia

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens on how translation and interpretation are organised in the European Parliament.

The European Union has 24 official languages: Bulgarian, Czech, Croatian, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Italian, Irish, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish and Swedish.

Under the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, citizens have the right to communicate with European Union institutions in any of these official languages. In addition, under the European Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, Members have the right to speak in Parliament in the official language of their choice, with these speeches simultaneously interpreted into the other official languages.

Using 24 languages creates 552 possible language combinations. To cope with these, the European Parliament uses a system of ‘relay’ languages: a speaker or a text is first interpreted or translated into one of the most widely used languages (English, French or German), and then into other languages. As a rule, each interpreter and translator works into his/her mother tongue.

Translating documents

The Directorate-General for Translation ensures that Parliament’s documents are available in all the official languages of the European Union, thus enabling Parliament to meet its commitment to its policy of multilingualism.

Under the European Parliament’s internal policies (known as the ‘Code of conduct on multilingualism’), priority for translation is given to documents to be voted on in plenary, documents for the President, documents for parliamentary committees, etc. As a result, it may be that some other types of documents are not translated in all official languages.

The European Parliament employs about 600 translators. To cope with the ever-increasing level of demand, the Directorate-General outsources the translation of some texts. The outsourcing of translation assignments is based on document type and workload. Documents of the highest priority, i.e. legislative documents and documents to be put to the vote in plenary are, as far as internal resources permit, translated in-house. Other types of documents, especially administrative texts, are frequently outsourced.

Interpreting debates

The Directorate-General for Logistics and Interpretation for Conferences is responsible for the linguistic, technical and logistical support for the organisation of parliamentary meetings and conferences. Besides plenary sittings, interpretation is also provided in committee and delegation meetings from and into the official languages used and requested by the Members.

Sign language interpretation is also provided in Parliament’s plenary debates, in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, ratified by the EU in December 2010.

The European Parliament employs approximately 270 interpreters and has a reserve of about 1500 external accredited interpreters at its disposal.

Ensuring the quality of legislative acts

The legislation adopted by the European Union affects over 500 million people in 28 countries and 24 official languages: so that everyone can understand, it must be identical and as clear as possible in all official languages. Verifying the linguistic and legislative quality of the texts is the job of Parliament’s team of 75 lawyer-linguists, working together with lawyer-linguists of the Council. They ensure, throughout the legislative procedure, the highest possible quality of legislative texts in all EU languages.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Multilingualism in the European Parliament, European Parliament website.
• Code of conduct on multilingualism, European Parliament website.
• European Strategy for multilingualism: benefits and costs, Policy Department, European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© VanderWolf Images / Fotolia

The European Union faces numerous challenges, both short and long-term, as it prepares to choose the new executive European Commission for the next five years, following elections to the European Parliament in May 2019. The most immediate task is for European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, to put together a college of Commissioners and secure the approval of the European Parliament for it. The EU is also engaged in tough negotiations on the terms of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, currently due on 31 October.

On the economic front, the EU needs to deal with the fallout of a trade conflict between the United States and China, and to boost its competitiveness, as the two other global powerhouses swiftly pursue the digitalisation of their economies. In the face of political volatility in the U.S., Europe should also consider enhancing its defence capabilities. Last, but not least, the Union must deliver on its pledge to remain the world’s leader in efforts to fight climate change.

This note brings together recent commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on challenges facing the EU. More papers analysing the outcome of the European Elections can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think-tank are Thinking’, published in July.

Institutions and politics

Setting course for the next five years: Three steps to start an effective EU Commission presidency
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2019

Europeans face the risk of democratic regression: What can be done
Notre Europe, September 2019

An EU budget in support of the next commission’s agenda
Notre Europe, September 2019

The political reform agenda of Ursula von der Leyen
European Policy Centre, August 2019

A new budget for the EU
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019

Von der Leyen’s bumpy road to becoming Commission President
Centre for European Reform, August 2019

Laying the foundations for a successful Commission presidency
European Policy Centre, July 2019

The nomination of von der Leyen: Towards institutional balance in a reformed lead candidate process
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Can citizen participation really revive European democracy?
Carnegie Europe, July 2019

Fixing the European social malaise: Understanding and addressing the grievances of European workers
Instituto Affari Internazionali, July 2019

La 9ème législature européenne, une nouvelle donne politique
Fondation Robert Schuman, July 2019

A more streamlined Commission structure
European Policy Centre, July 2019

Why did Italy fall out of love with Europe?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, July 2019

A strategic agenda for the new EU leadership
Bruegel, June 2019

2019: The year for a fresh start in Europe?
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, June 2016

Can regular replace irregular migration across the Mediterranean?
Centre for European Policy Studies, Mercator, June 2019

From Enlargement to the unification of Europe
Open Society Foundations, June 2019

The European Parliament and climate change: Past, present and future
EUROPEUM, June 2019

How to govern a fragmented EU: What Europeans said at the ballot box
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Juncker ou la plus-value européenne: Le bilan positif de la Commission européenne (2014-2019)
Fondation Robert Schuman, June 2019

A redefinition of “Spitzenkandidaten”: The next EU Commission needs a common political mandate
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019

The EU after the elections: A more plural Parliament and Council
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, June 2019

The European migration crisis: A pendulum between the internal and external dimensions
Instituto Affari Internazionali, June 2019

Brexit

How EU families in Britain are coping with Brexit uncertainty
UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

How are MPs planning to stop a no-deal Brexit on 31 October?
Institute for Government, August 2019

Brexit and prorogation: Constitutional outrage or parliamentary sovereignty?
UK in a Changing Europe, August 2019

Boris Johnson’s Brexit backstop face-off risks everything for nothing
UK in a Changing Europe, August 2019

Negotiating after no deal
UK in a Changing Europe, August 2019

What Europe thinks about three central Brexit issues
UK in a Changing Europe, August 2019

No-deal Brexit means trouble for Brits living in the EU
Centre for European Reform, August 2019

A no-deal Brexit is not inevitable
Centre for European Reform, August 2019

EU security ambitions are hostage to the Brexit process
Chatham House, June 2019

Economy, trade and energy

Why Europe needs a change of mind-set to fend off the risks of recession
Bruegel, September 2019

A new approach to euro zone reform
Notre Europe, September 2019

The coming clash between climate and trade
Bruegel, August 2019

Making the Single Market work: Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe
European Policy Centre, August 2019

The real cost of Trump’s trade wars
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2019

Den Bad Guys die Stirn bieten
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, August 2019

EU trade policy amid the China-US clash: Caught in the cross-fire?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

European champion-ships: Industrial champions and competition policy
Bruegel, July 2019

The European Union energy transition: Key priorities for the next five years
Bruegel, July 2019

Union de l’énergie : L’indispensable intégration
Confronatiations Europe, July 2019

Will Europe scare off Silicon Valley?
Chatham House, July 2019

Plugging Europe’s great tax leak
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

The capital markets union: Should the EU shut out the City of London?
Centre for European Reform, July 2019

The threats to the European Union’s economic sovereignty
Bruegel, July 2019

Machine politics: Europe and the AI revolution
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Paris-proofing the next Multiannual Financial Framework
European Policy Centre, June 2019

European economic democracy: A new path out of the crisis
Federation for European Progressive Studies, June 2019

5G and the US–China tech rivalry – a test for Europe’s future in the digital age: How can Europe shift from back foot to front foot?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019

The opportunities of the Modernisation Fund for the energy transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Between partnership and punitive tariffs: Prospects for a New U.S-E.U. Trade Agreement in the New Congress
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2019

Security and foreign policy

Bolstering EU foreign and security policy in times of contestation
Notre Europe, September 2019

Hostile ally: The Trump challenge and Europe’s inadequate response
Brookings Institution, August 2019

Europe’s paralysis, America’s disruption
Carnegie Europe, August 2019

The budgetary future of migration and development policy in the European Union
Instituto Affari Internazionali, August 2019

An EU Security Council and a European Commissioner for Security and Defence: The final pieces of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy puzzle?
Egmont, July 2019

The rise of China and the future of the transatlantic relationship
Chatham House, July 2019

Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power
European Policy Centre, July 2019

Low risk, high reward: A Trans-Pacific Partnership for the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Independence play: Europe’s pursuit of strategic autonomy
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Can Ursula Von Der Leyen save the transatlantic relationship?
Carnegie Europe, July 2019

From plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Europe and the digital arms race: Is winter coming?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

The EU’s Security Union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019

Building Europeans’ capacity to defend themselves
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Strategic sovereignty: How Europe can regain the capacity to act
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

The governance of the European Defence Fund: Sovereignty and integration issues
Groupe de Recherche et d’Information sur la Paix et la Sécurité, June 2019

The European China strategy: The pieces of the puzzle are slowly falling into place
Egmont, June 2019

Towards an EU security community? Public opinion and the EU’s role as a security actor
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2019

Read this briefing on ‘EU challenges at a time of transition‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Denise Chircop,

Erasmus+ is the EU’s single integrated education programme for improving young people’s skills and employability, and currently covers the 2014-2020 period. It also promotes the modernisation of education and training in the EU Member States, by facilitating transnational contacts amongst different players and across different sectors. Erasmus+ brings together the previous EU programmes in education, training and youth, and also includes sports.

Objectives and focus

© Syda Productions / Fotolia

Overall, Erasmus+ is intended to contribute towards the EU’s strategic objectives for education and training, in line with the Europe 2020 priorities, with special focus on addressing skills deficits and skills mismatch. In April 2019, there were 3.2 million unemployed people under the age of 25 in the EU, a 36% decrease from the nearly 5 million in 2015. Still, four in 10 EU employers find it hard to recruit staff with the necessary skills. Therefore, Erasmus+ continues to focus on increasing attainment in higher education, lowering early school drop-out rates and improving attainment in key skills such as knowledge of a foreign language. It seeks to bridge formal (schools, universities), non-formal (evening classes, clubs) and informal (voluntary work) education, by supporting certification tools so that skills recognition is not limited to school certificates. This is useful, as young people who have studied or trained abroad claim to gain additional skills such as communication, adaptability, the ability to work with people from different backgrounds and problem-solving. Others who follow unconventional learning paths would also find certification useful.

Beneficiaries

Participating countries fall into two categories: programme countries and partner countries. In addition to EU Member States, the group of programme countries currently includes Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein, North Macedonia, Serbia and Turkey. These countries were required to meet certain conditions and set up a national agency to manage the programme. Other countries from around the world can become partner countries by force of bilateral agreements granting them limited access to the programme.

In programme countries, members of accredited institutions, their students and staff, can participate in mobility exercises. Accredited institutions include institutions offering higher education, vocational education, training or adult education programmes, schools and youth organisations. Students can study and train abroad for periods adding up to a maximum of 12 months per degree level (undergraduate, master’s, doctorate). Grants vary depending on costs in the destination country (range: €300-350 per month). A student loan facility enables master’s students to borrow up to €18 000 for their degree abroad. However, uptake has been lower than expected due to delays in the launch of the facility and low participation among financial institutions. Students with special needs or from lower-income households receive additional support, which can be supplemented by funds from the national or regional budgets.

The European Commission estimates that from 2014 to 2020, the programme will have created mobility opportunities for over 4 million people, including 2 million higher education students, 650 000 vocational education and training students, 800 000 lecturers, teachers and other staff, 500 000 young people participating in volunteering or youth exchange schemes and over 25 000 joint master’s degree students. Between 2014 and 2018, over 2 million students and staff spent a period abroad under the programme.

A 2014 study commissioned by the European Parliament indicates that programmes such as Erasmus+ are very effective in engaging European citizens in European integration. However, it points out that relatively few EU citizens become their beneficiaries and that disadvantaged people are more difficult to reach.

Key actions

Erasmus+ is built on three key actions, which take up almost all of its budget. The first, Mobility of individuals (63 % of the budget), promotes learning opportunities for individuals within the EU and beyond, with a target of 20 % student mobility by 2020. The second (28 % of the budget) promotes cooperation for innovation and the exchange of best practices. By 2020, around 25 000 strategic partnerships will have linked 125 000 educational institutions, youth organisations and enterprises. Partners are expected to implement innovative practices and learn from each other. An additional 3 500 institutions, organisations and enterprises will have joined efforts to set up more than 300 sector skills alliances or knowledge alliances. Sector skills alliances address skills gaps by adapting vocational education and training to sector-specific labour-market needs. Knowledge alliances foster innovative and entrepreneurial capacity in higher education. Furthermore, this action helps higher education institutions to develop their international dimension, including that of partner countries. Support is also going to IT platforms developed as spaces for virtual collaboration. The third key action (4.2 % of the budget) supports policy development. It brings together young people and policy-makers in focused discussions, finances studies and information gathering, and encourages peer-learning by means of actions such as the exchange of best practices. It also supports tools, such as Youthpass, that help mobility by facilitating the recognition of qualifications.

Budget

Figure 1 – Erasmus+ 2014-2020 budget (€14.7 m); breakdown of the education and training budget by sector

Erasmus+ has a budget of €14.7 billion for the 2014-2020 period, which is a 40 % increase compared to the previous period but a decrease from the amount originally proposed by the Commission. An additional €1.68 billion is available for actions with third countries through the external action budget. The programme encompasses previous education programmes (notably Erasmus, Tempus, Comenius, Leonardo da Vinci, Grundtvig and Youth in Action), bringing an overall reduction in calls and actions and more efficient use of funds. The division of funds in the three key actions described above applies to the areas of ‘education and training ‘ and ‘youth’. Over two-thirds of the budget goes to education and training (see Figure 1). Within this category, higher education receives almost half of that amount.

Erasmus+ also contributes to sport, which receives 1.8 % of the global budget. Funds support collaborative partnerships that promote integrity in sport (such as anti-doping and the fight against match-fixing). Grants are also available for non-profit-making European sports events. Sport is additionally supported by studies and data collection to help policy-makers and stakeholders’ dialogue, particularly in the annual EU sports forum. Another 1.9 % of the budget finances activities under the Jean Monnet sub-programme. These activities aim to promote excellence in European integration studies in higher education worldwide, by supporting academic institutions, research and teaching activities. Another branch of the Jean Monnet sub-programme nurtures dialogue between academics and policy-makers to improve EU policy governance.

The Commission has programme guidelines and a work programme for 2019 on the basis of which it issues calls for proposals. In the meantime, the Parliament has adopted its position on the Commission’s proposal for the new 2021-2027 programming period. It favours the label ‘Erasmus+’ to signal continuity, a stronger emphasis on inclusion and an even bigger envelope than the one proposed by the Commission.

This is an update of an ‘at a glance’ note published in March 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Erasmus+: More than just mobility‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger,

© John Kehly / Fotolia

On 28 June 2019, the European Union (EU) and the four founding members of Mercosur (the ‘Southern Common Market’) – Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay – reached an ‘agreement in principle’ on a free trade agreement (FTA) as part of a wider association agreement (AA). However, spurred by massive destruction of the Brazilian Amazon through large-scale forest fires, EU policy-makers and international environmental groups alike have since become increasingly vocal in expressing concerns about the deal’s potential environmental and climate change implications. EU farmers’ associations with defensive interests have fiercely criticised what they have referred to as a ‘cars for cows’ deal.

On the other hand, the deal has been warmly welcomed by EU industry associations and several sub-sectors of EU agriculture with offensive interests. If tariff and non-tariff barriers are eliminated or substantially lowered, the potential for growth in bi-regional trade in goods, services and investment is significant. In addition, the FTA would be a strong signal in favour of the rules-based multilateral trading system and against power politics in trade.

After the agreement’s legal review and translation, it will be presented to the Council for signature. It will then be submitted to the European Parliament for consent. Once the Council has adopted the decision concluding the agreement, it will be presented to EU Member State parliaments for ratification.

Trade pillar of the Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Mercosur, of the other part Committee responsible: International Trade (INTA) Rapporteur: n.n.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The trade pillar of the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Simon Schroecker.

EU policy cycle

Since its establishment in 1975, the European Council, which is made up of the Heads of State or Government of EU Member States, has wielded considerable influence over the development of the European Union. According to the Treaties, the European Council’s primary role is to ‘define the general political directions and priorities’ (Article 15(1) of the Treaty on European Union). This role has rapidly evolved over the past decade, and today the European Council’s involvement in the EU policy cycle is much broader, covering tasks from agenda-setting to exercising scrutiny. In practice, its activities often exceed the role envisaged in the Treaties. This level of involvement has a significant impact both on the role of the other EU institutions within the policy cycle and the functioning of the ordinary legislative procedure.

EU policy cycle

The European Council uses the conclusions of its formal meetings to exercise its role in the different stages of the policy cycle.

In stage 1, it sets long-term objectives (agenda-setting); in stage 2, it calls for action by other EU institutions (policy formulation); in stage 3, it endorses actions of other EU institutions (affirming ownership); and in stage 4, it assesses policy implementation at European and national levels (scrutiny). As the stages influence each other, their dividing lines are often fluid.

Agenda-setting

The European Council has a strong Treaty-based role in setting the EU’s policy agenda. Article 15(1) TEU states that the European Council ‘shall provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and define its ‘general political directions and priorities’. Two key examples in this regard are the adoption by the European Council of the EU strategic agenda for 2014-2019 in June 2014, and the corresponding 2019-2024 agenda in June 2019.

In addition to this overall role, the European Council also has agenda-setting responsibilities in a number of specific policy areas. With regard to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), for instance, the European Council must ‘identify the EU’s strategic interests and define general guidelines’ (Article 26(1) TEU). Examples of how it has handled its strategic role in CFSP are its 2010 debate on strategic partnerships and its success in keeping the Member States united in their stance during the Ukraine crisis. Likewise, the European Council defines ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice’ (Article 68 TFEU). In line with this role, it set strategic guidelines for that area at its meeting of 26-27 June 2014. The next strategic guidelines for that area are expected as a follow-up to the 2019-2024 strategic agenda.

Legislative and policy formulation

Theoretically, no role is envisaged for the European Council in legislative decision-making as such. Article 15(1) TEU specifies that it ‘shall not exercise legislative functions’. Nevertheless, while not being involved in legislation per se, it has considerable say on legislative and policy formulation.

The European Council often uses its conclusions to invite the European Commission to draft policy strategies or legislative proposals, thereby influencing its right of (legislative) initiative. Examples include inviting the Commission ‘to prepare, as soon as possible, draft legislation enacting the proposals made by the High-level Expert Group on interoperability’ regarding information systems for migration and security, or inviting it ‘to put forward a European approach to artificial intelligence by early 2018’. Particularly in crisis situations, these invitations have a high degree of precision, as was the case when the European Council, through its specific task force, influenced the Commission’s ‘six-pack’ and ‘two-pack’ sets of legislative proposals. Later on in the legislative process, its conclusions are also used to influence the speed of adopting legislation that is being reviewed by, or negotiated, between the co-legislators (the European Parliament and the Council of the EU) e.g. inviting them ‘to agree, before the end of the current legislature, on as many of the pending proposals relevant for the Single Market as possible’; or asking EU legislators ‘urgently [to] adopt a strong and effective European Passenger Name Records directive with solid data protection safeguards’.

Another way for the European Council to determine the content of legislation in areas where the co-legislators have a strong Treaty-based role is through its implicit influence on the Council. While the European Council does not directly intervene in the routine business of the Council, the latter will often refer its most controversial items to the European Council. The Treaty provides for such referral in a number of cases. If a minister – for vital and stated reasons of national policy – vetoes the adoption of a decision to be taken by qualified majority within the CFSP, the Council can, acting by a qualified majority, ‘request that the matter be referred to the European Council for a decision by unanimity’ (Article 31(2) TEU). Other areas where the Treaty envisages this transfer of responsibility include certain cases of social security (Article 48 TFEU), judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Articles 82(3) and 83(3) TFEU), and police cooperation (Article 87(3) TFEU).

The European Parliament has repeatedly voiced its disapproval of the fact that ‘the Council, by not using qualified majority voting (QMV), has too often referred legislative matters to the European Council’. In 2018, the then-President of the Parliament, Antonio Tajani, asked the European Council ‘why the Council does not apply the qualified majority rule, but continues to insist on seeking a consensus instead’ with regard to the reform of the common European asylum system. In practice, such referrals can also be observed in areas not explicitly provided for by the Treaties, leading to accusations of ‘legislative trespassing’ on the part of the European Council. An example of such ‘trespassing’ are the negotiations on Banking Union legislation, held at the peak of the euro-area debt crisis, which the European Council justified by the urgency of the situation. Another example is the European Council’s direct interference in the June 2012 draft regulation on the European patent. As a result, when referred to the European Council, legislation falling under QMV is in fact decided upon by consensus in some cases.

Such ‘trespassing’ goes beyond the strictly legislative sphere, touching upon the competences of the two budgetary authorities, Council and Parliament. One of the most striking recent examples is the decision-making process for the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The European Council does not have a Treaty-based role in the procedure leading to the adoption of the MFF, yet in 2013 it approved detailed conclusions on the MFF defining its ceilings and the financial envelopes for all policy sectors for the seven-year MFF period. Parliament has deplored the fact that, despite its strong objections, ‘the European Council MFF agreement of 8 February 2013 contained a significant number of legislative elements that should have been decided upon under the ordinary legislative procedure’ (since the conclusions pre-defined the long-term programme features).

Affirming ownership

In the policy legitimisation stage, the European Council affirms its ownership of on-going processes in several ways. The Treaties assign the European Council a role in reviewing other institutions’ progress in certain policy areas, notably related to the economy and employment, where the Council and the Commission must report to the European Council (Article 121(2) TFEU, Article 148(1) and (5) TFEU). Beyond the areas provided for in the Treaties, the European Council also assumes ownership of specific initiatives. For instance, in its conclusions, it often welcomes or endorses other EU institutions’ policy activities (for example, welcoming ‘the agreement reached on the Facility for Refugees in Turkey’; welcoming ‘the establishment of ambitious and inclusive permanent structured cooperation (PESCO)’; or endorsing ‘the policy priority areas of the Annual Growth Survey’). Sometimes it even adopts other EU institutions’ policy initiatives (such as the European internal security agenda 2010-2014) in full. By endorsing or welcoming the policy activities of other European institutions, the European Council therefore legitimises the initiatives as well as their content.

Scrutiny of policy implementation

The European Council also plays a role in the scrutiny stage of the EU policy cycle by reviewing EU policy implementation. However, its role under the Treaty is rather limited, the only relevant provision in this respect being set out in Article 222(4) TFEU, which states that the European Council has the responsibility to ‘regularly assess the threats facing the Union …’.

Beyond this limited Treaty role, the European Council uses a number of procedures to scrutinise the implementation of its conclusions, which can be distinguished by period. With regard to short-term evaluation, the European Council has established the practice that the Head of State or Government of the Member State chairing the rotating presidency of the Council reports on the implementation of the conclusions of the most recent European Council meeting. Both short and medium-term evaluations can take the form of requests for implementation reports from other EU actors, which are often addressed to the Council presidency, the Commission or the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Comments in the European Council conclusions on whether EU agreements or EU legislation have been transposed and implemented at national level can be considered as a medium-term evaluation (for example, further action is required ‘to accelerate the implementation of the existing relocation and resettlement schemes’; calls upon Member States ‘to continue and step up their engagement under the Partnership Framework’). Finally, long-term evaluations can be seen in the assessments of its multiannual strategies (for instance, the 2014-2019 justice and home affairs strategy).

Regarding the scrutiny of its own work, the European Council sometimes commits to keeping certain unresolved issues under review, regularly revisits them, and even organises special meetings to address important ones. Examples include the Valletta Summit on migration, which brought together EU and African leaders to discuss challenges and cooperation on migration, and the EU‑League of Arab States Summit in Sharm El-Sheikh, which focused on regional developments and possibilities to strengthen the partnership between the two regions.

Conclusion

Since the coming into force of the Lisbon Treaty and the multiple crises experienced in the EU over the last decade, the European Council has consolidated its central position in the EU institutional system. The European Council is today involved at all stages of the policy cycle, with this involvement often going beyond what was envisaged in the Treaties. However, while the Treaties assign important responsibilities to the European Council at some stages of the policy cycle, first and foremost in setting the agenda, these responsibilities are more limited at others. Whilst policy formulation is the European Council’s most limited formal responsibility, its activities nevertheless exceed this remit and the correspondence between the European Council’s role under the Treaties and its de facto role is lowest at this stage of the policy cycle. Nevertheless, although the Treaties explicitly prohibit the European Council from performing legislative functions at the policy formulation stage, its role in legitimisation and scrutiny are more implicitly permissive. The European Council’s activities at all stages of the policy cycle therefore often impact on the work of the other EU institutions and consequently require careful scrutiny.

Download this briefing on ‘The European Council’s role in the EU policy cycle‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.