European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Izabela Bacian with Fernando Hortal Foronda,

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The October European Council meeting will represent an important point on the timeline of negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, as leaders will be taking stock of the situation heading up to the end of the extension period on 31 October 2019. This Briefing provides an overview of European Council guidelines and decisions taken to provide direction to the negotiations since the UK’s formal notification of withdrawal on 29 March 2017.

1. Background

Following a referendum on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9 per cent of participants voted to leave the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) submitted the formal notification of its intention to leave to the European Council on 29 March 2017. According to the procedure laid out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), this notification triggered a two-year period during which the EU and the UK were to negotiate the terms of the UK’s withdrawal. The European Council, meeting without a UK representative (termed ‘European Council (Article 50)’ meetings), outlined the general direction for the negotiations in a series of sets of guidelines.

Guidelines of 29 April 2017: In its first set of guidelines, the European Council (Article 50) decided that the negotiations would be divided into two phases. The first phase would set the terms of the withdrawal and clarify the impact of UK’s withdrawal on three critical issues: 1) citizens’ rights, 2) finances, and 3) the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The second phase would focus on negotiating the EU’s future relationship with the UK as well as agreeing any necessary transitional arrangements. Based on the European Council guidelines of 29 April, the Commission adopted a recommendation and Council (EU-27 format) a decision authorising the opening of negotiations.

Guidelines of 15 December 2017: Informed by a joint report from the EU and UK negotiators of 8 December 2017, the European Council (Article 50) decided at its December meeting that sufficient progress had been made on phase one, and adopted additional guidelines for the second phase of negotiations. All the commitments made during phase one would have to be respected and ‘translated faithfully into legal terms’. A transition period was agreed for a period of two years, during which the UK would ‘no longer participate in or nominate or elect members of the EU institutions, nor participate in the decision-making of the Union bodies, offices and agencies’. It would have to respect the whole body of EU law, including new law, budgetary commitments, and judicial oversight, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU. Moreover, the UK would continue to participate in the customs union and the single market (with all four freedoms) as well as comply with EU trade policy until the end of the transition period, but not beyond. The framework for the future relationship would be elaborated in a political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement.

On 29 January 2018, the Council (EU-27 format) adopted supplementary negotiating directives concerning a transition period, which would apply from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, and not last beyond 31 December 2020. Commitments made by both parties in the December 2017 joint report were translated by the Commission into legal terms in a draft withdrawal agreement released on 28 February 2018. By 19 March 2018, full agreement had been reached on many issues, including citizens’ rights, the financial settlement and the transition period.

As regards the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, negotiators agreed that a solution would be found in line with the three scenarios detailed in the December 2017 joint report: 1) first, the UK commits to avoid creating a hard border on the island and proposes a solution in the context of the future EU-UK relationship; 2) if this were not possible, it would then propose a specific solution to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland; 3) in the absence of agreed solutions, the UK would continue to ‘maintain full alignment with those rules of the internal market and the customs union which support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the Good Friday Agreement of 10 April 1998’. While discussion on all options continued, scenario three, known as the ‘backstop’, was included in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the draft agreement.

Guidelines of 23 March 2018: The European Council (Article 50) issued guidelines in March 2018 outlining the EU’s position on the future relationship with the UK. The EU-27 restated the EU’s determination to have ‘as close as possible a partnership with the UK in the future’. Regarding economic cooperation with the UK, the European Council stated its readiness to initiate work on a free trade agreement (FTA) and outlined the issues to be addressed therein. Such an agreement would have to be based on a balance of rights and obligations, ensuring a level playing field, whilst preserving the integrity of the single market. In addition, the guidelines concentrated on several areas where the EU expressed an interest in maintaining strong relations with the UK, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.

As for the implementation of the backstop, a compromise was reached based on the UK’s June 2018 proposal for a temporary customs partnership. A single customs territory would be established between the EU and the entire UK (not just Northern Ireland) covering all trade in goods except fisheries and aquaculture. While the UK would harmonise its commercial policy with the EU’s to the extent necessary for the functioning of the single customs territory, including alignment with the EU’s common external tariff, Northern Ireland would have to apply EU customs law. In addition, Northern Ireland would remain aligned with EU law related to the internal market in a number of areas, including agriculture and environmental protection and regulation, technical regulations on goods, state aid, EU VAT and excise, and other areas of North-South cooperation.

2. Ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement

On 25 November 2018, at a special meeting of the European Council (Article 50), EU leaders endorsed the withdrawal agreement and approved the political declaration, on the basis of the future relationship. Three protocols, on Ireland/Northern Ireland, on Gibraltar, and on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, are included. The decision to sign the agreement was subsequently adopted by the Council on 11 January 2019, although the signature has not taken place. The Council in the meantime forwarded the decision on the agreement’s conclusion to the European Parliament for its consent.

In accordance with section 13 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the agreement was submitted to the House of Commons for approval. It was rejected a first time on 15 January 2019, the main concerns revolving around the nature of the backstop. This led then UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, to ask for additional clarifications. A legally binding instrument related to the withdrawal agreement, providing clarification and legal guarantees on the nature of the backstop, was agreed at a meeting in Strasbourg on 11 March 2019, between Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and May, accompanied by a joint statement supplementing the political declaration. The ‘Strasbourg package’ was approved by the March 2019 European Council. The backstop is to serve as an ‘insurance policy’, with the aim being to replace the backstop by 31 December 2020, as previously underlined by the European Council in its conclusions in December 2018. Should the backstop be triggered, this would be on a temporary basis only until such time as an alternative arrangement avoiding a hard border is put in place. The withdrawal agreement allows for a one-time extension of the transition period, for one or two years.

Despite these additional assurances from the EU, the agreement was rejected in the UK Parliament a second time, on 12 March. The House of Commons voted two days later to call for an extension of the two-year period under Article 50. A third vote, before the European Council meeting on 21 March, was not possible, since, as stated by the Speaker, John Bercow, the House of Commons could not vote again on the ‘same proposition or substantially the same proposition’. Consequently, on 20 March, May formally asked the European Council for an extension until 30 June 2019.

Responding to May’s request, the March 2019 European Council (Article 50) adopted a decision extending the period, but not to the date requested. It agreed to an extension until 22 May 2019, on the condition that the UK Parliament were to approve the withdrawal agreement by 29 March. If not, the extension would run until 12 April 2019 and the UK would have to indicate the way forward. By that date, the UK would need to announce the holding of European elections, considering its obligation to do so if it were still a Member State on 23-26 May 2019. On 29 March 2019, the UK Parliament held a third vote on the agreement along with the ‘Strasbourg package’ resulting in a third rejection. Following up on a second request by May for an extension until 30 June 2019, a special meeting of the European Council was held on 10 April 2019, at which EU leaders discussed the feasibility of granting a short or a longer extension. The compromise decision granted the UK a six-month extension of the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 at the latest.

Following this third rejection and a breakdown in cross-party Brexit negotiations aimed at finding common ground for a deal, Theresa May announced her resignation as party leader on 24 May, with effect from 7 June 2019. On 23 July, Boris Johnson won the Conservative Party leadership, thus replacing Theresa May as Prime Minister. In his first letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, on 19 August 2019, Johnson underlined the UK’s commitment to achieve an agreement with the EU in full respect of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. However, he stressed that ‘the backstop cannot form part of an agreed Withdrawal Agreement’ given that it ‘locks the UK, potentially indefinitely, into an international treaty which will bind us into a customs union and which applies large areas of single market legislation in Northern Ireland’. He added ‘the Government will not put in place infrastructure, checks or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland’.

Following Johnson’s decision to prorogue the UK Parliament from 9 September until 14 October 2019 (later deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court), on 4 September the House of Commons approved the EU Withdrawal (No 2) Act (known as the Benn Act). This legislation requires the UK government to seek an extension of the Article 50 period until 31 January 2020, unless the House of Commons approves a deal with the EU or agrees to a no-deal Brexit by 19 October 2019.

3. Way forward

Two weeks ahead of the planned Brexit date, the 17-18 October 2019 European Council meeting is expected to be dominated by Brexit. EU-27 leaders will discuss the most recent developments, and notably Johnson’s proposal of 2 October 2019 for a new Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to replace the backstop (detailed in Table 1), as well as potentially explore the feasibility of a further extension. While the June 2019 European Council stated that the withdrawal agreement was not open for renegotiation, EU leaders remained open for talks regarding the content of the political declaration if the UK position were to evolve. The EU’s reaction to the proposal has been expressed in detailed terms by EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier during the European Parliament’s plenary part-session on 9 October 2019. He expressed three main concerns regarding the new proposals.

First, despite a strong commitment from the UK to avoid customs and regulatory checks as well as any physical infrastructure at the border, many questions remain as to the means of implementation, which had not been addressed in the text. Not only would this create uncertainty but would rely on technology not yet developed or tested; it would also require exemptions from the Union Customs Code and changes to the Common Transit Convention. Second, the current Protocol creates a legally operational safety net available immediately, while the new proposal, applicable only as of the transition period, would add uncertainty. In addition, as underlined by the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group, the Parliament’s consent would be required in a context where the full implications of the new arrangements could not be known.

The third issue concerned consent for Northern Ireland. While the current text includes a mechanism allowing for Northern Irish representation – which could still be improved – the new proposal would allow Northern Ireland institutions to decide unilaterally not to activate the agreed solution. And, were it to enter into force, it would allow them to review it every four years. As the Northern Ireland Assembly has not sat for almost three years, and its ability to reconvene is questioned, making application conditional on its consent would render an agreed solution hypothetical and provisional. Finally, Barnier added that the UK’s plan to diverge in areas such as social, environmental and tax rules, on which the current political declaration provides for a level playing field, would not be acceptable.

Table 1: Proposals from Prime Minister Boris Johnson of 2 October 2019

Issue Proposal Good Friday Agreement Commitment to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and avoid a ‘hard border’ between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Regulatory compliance for goods Creation on the island of Ireland of a single regulatory zone. Northern Ireland maintains alignment with EU single market rules on food safety, animal and plant health as well as with rules relevant to the placing on the market of manufactured goods. Regulatory checks will be conducted on goods moving from the UK to Northern Ireland where necessary, but there would be no checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from Ireland. Consent of Northern Ireland Consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive to the all-island regulatory zone required every four years. Should consent be withheld, arrangements would default to existing rules. Customs Two differentiated UK and EU customs areas after the transition period. Northern Ireland is part of the UK’s customs territory. The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be a customs border, but no customs controls will be performed near or at the border. Instead, movements of goods must be declared to the relevant customs authorities, with provisions made for small traders and with no entry or exit summary declarations. The UK would no longer be subject to EU VAT and excise legislation. Arrangements for level playing field measures (state aid, taxation, social, labour and environmental standards) are no longer needed given that the UK will be leaving the customs union.

The Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group stated in early October that it did not consider the latest proposal ‘a basis for an agreement to which the EP could give consent’, as it did ‘not address the real issues, namely the all-island economy, the full respect of the Good Friday Agreement and the integrity of the Single Market’. In September, the Parliament warned that it could ‘not give consent to a Withdrawal Agreement without a backstop’.

EU-27 unity has endured throughout the three years of negotiations and this is also due in no small part to the role that the European Council President has played at critical times in finding agreement among the 27 leaders and leading the way forward. In recent statements, Donald Tusk has emphasised yet again the seriousness of the issues at stake, although in a rather straightforward manner. He welcomed the positive signals of the meeting between Taoiseach Leo Varadkar and Johnson, and emphasised that ‘a no deal Brexit will never be the choice of the EU’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 17 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

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The meeting of Heads of State or Government on 17-18 October is expected to be dominated by Brexit. The EU-27 leaders will probably meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the most recent developments in the negotiations, and deliberate on possible consequences. At its formal meeting, the European Council will discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 and the priorities of the new Commission in the presence of the incumbents as well as the incoming Presidents of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and of the European Council, Charles Michel (current Prime Minister of Belgium). EU Heads of State or Government will also exchange views on the current state of play on the MFF negotiations in the Council, where differences in opinion remain significant on certain issues, not least on the overall size of the 2021-2027 budget. Finally, the European Council will discuss the external dimension of climate policy and consider the possibility of opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. The meeting could also discuss foreign policy issues, notably the evolution of the situations in Ukraine and Syria, where a Turkish military operation has commenced in the northern part of the country.

1. Implementation: Follow-up on previous European Council commitments

As announced in the June 2019 European Council conclusions, EU Heads of State or Government will return to the issues of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-27 and the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, as reflected in the annotated draft agenda.

At the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, will address the European Council meeting for the first time in his mandate. Antti Rinne, Prime Minister of Finland, which currently holds the rotating six-month presidency of the Council of Ministers, will provide an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Policy area Previous commitment Occasion on which the commitment was made MFF The European Council will hold an exchange of views in October 2019, aiming for an agreement before the end of the year June 2019 Strategic Agenda The European Council will discuss the follow-up to the Strategic Agenda in October 2019 June 2019 Climate The European Council will finalise its guidance before the end of the year with a view to the adoption and submission of the EU’s long-term strategy to the UNFCCC in early 2020 June 2019 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework

On 17 October 2019, EU Heads of State or Government will hold an exchange of views on the next MFF. The discussion will be based on a paper by the Finnish Presidency informing EU leaders on the state of play in the negotiations. The most recent exchange of views between Member States on the main elements of the MFF took place in the General Affairs Council (GAC) of 16 September. Both the GAC discussions and the content of a draft ‘Negotiating Box’ (i.e. a document indicating the progressive completion of the negotiation, used by successive GAC meetings to prepare the final deliberation in the European Council), show that the differences of opinion on many sensitive aspects remain significant (see EPRS Legislative Train Schedule: MFF – 2021-2027). Some Member States continue for instance to advocate an EU budget equivalent to 1.0 per cent of total EU GNI, while others support a higher figure. Another point of contention is the size of the allocations to the common agriculture policy and cohesion funds.

With a view to its next meeting in December, the European Council is expected to invite the Finnish Council Presidency to update, based on the results of the discussions between EU leaders, the June 2019 Negotiating Box, including numbers. Thus, in December 2019, EU leaders would only for the first time discuss concrete numbers for the MFF, making the aim of ‘reaching an agreement in the European Council before the end of the year’ difficult to achieve.

On 10 October 2019, the new European Parliament adopted a resolution on the MFF reiterating that ‘Parliament will not rubber-stamp a fait accompli from the European Council’ and calling on the European Council to refrain from adopting detailed and purportedly binding conclusions based on the MFF negotiating box, as this would amount to direct interference in the legislative sphere’.

The next institutional cycle

This meeting is the first European Council since EU Heads of State or Government agreed on a package of candidates for the EU high-level positions (see Figure 1), and the subsequent election of the new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, on 16 July by the European Parliament. President-elect von der Leyen will outline her priorities for the new Commission, and discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 with EU Heads of State or Government.

Figure 1: Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 EP elections

The European Council is also expected to adopt a decision appointing Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank, with her nomination part of the package agreed by the European Council on 2 July. Her appointment follows a hearing in the European Parliament and the subsequent positive recommendation. This meeting is the last scheduled European Council to be presided over by Donald Tusk, who will be replaced as European Council President by Charles Michel (currently Prime Minister of Belgium) as of 1 December.

Climate

For the third meeting in a row, the European Council will discuss climate, with a focus on its external dimension. EU leaders are expected to reiterate their support to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, to discuss the outcome of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit held in New York in September 2019, and to prepare for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) to be held in Santiago de Chile in December 2019. They could also discuss the guidelines for the EU’s long-term strategy on climate change that they had committed to finalise by the end of 2019.

A group of eight EU states has recently called ‘to increase the EU’s emissions-cut target from 40 per cent to 55 per cent by 2030’, in line with a Dutch proposal made by Prime Minister Mark Rutte as part of the Future of Europe debate in the European Parliament plenary. Earlier this year, divergent views on the way forward to a carbon-neutral EU economy were particularly noticeable. In June 2019, a group of Member States (initially eight, later expanding to 18) as well as the European Parliament have expressed support for the European Commission’s communication ‘A Clean Planet for all’, pleading for an ambitious and timely climate policy promoting EU carbon-neutrality by 2050. Due to a lack of consensus on the target date for achieving carbon neutrality, the June 2019 European Council conclusions mention the objective of a transition to carbon neutrality, but specify in a footnote that ‘For a large majority of Member States, climate neutrality must be achieved by 2050’. The countries reluctant at that time to commit to a date to achieve climate neutrality were Czechia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland.

External relations

EU leaders are expected to discuss several foreign policy issues, notably the situation in Ukraine and in Syria. As regards Syria, they will most probably consider both the in-country situation, as well as the regional situation, including the ongoing Turkish military operation in the northern part of Syria. Several Member States, including France and Germany, have already expressed their concern about Turkey’s ‘unilateral military operation’ in the northern part of Syria, warned about its possible humanitarian consequences, including a possible increasing influx of migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route, and urged Turkey to end its offensive. The Foreign Affairs Council on 14 October noted that some Member States have decided to stop arms-exports licensing to Turkey but did not decide on ‘a formal EU-wide arms embargo’.

Enlargement

Although agreement was not reached at the General Affairs Council of 15 October 2019, the European Council will most probably consider whether or not to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia.

Whilst the Commission had given a positive recommendation, the decision to open or not accession negotiations with the two countries was postponed from June 2019 to October 2019 at the latest, due to persisting diverging views among the Member States, including France and the Netherlands which oppose the opening of accession negotiations. A possible solution, based on a German proposal, would consist of green-lighting the opening of accession negotiations with both countries whilst only North Macedonia would be given a clear date to start negotiations.

Enlargement gained momentum following the joint letter of the leaders of the EU’s institutions – the European Council President Donald Tusk, the European Parliament President David Sassoli, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and the European Commission President-elect Ursula Von der Leyen. In their letter, they outlined that the EU ‘stands before a strategic choice’ on whether or not to decide to open accession negotiations with the two Western Balkan countries which have fulfilled their share of the bargain and complied with the requirements set upon them so far. Prior to this, during his September 2019 visit to Albania and North Macedonia, Donald Tusk said that he has ‘always thought that the EU should open accession talks with both Albania and North Macedonia, in line with the positive recommendations from the Commission,’ whilst a similar position was also expressed by the Visegrad Four (V4) group.

Other Items

Standing by their earlier commitment, EU leaders will most probably once again condemn Turkey’s drilling activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and reaffirm their solidarity with Cyprus.

3. European Council (Article 50) meeting

On Friday 18 October 2019, EU-27 leaders will possibly also meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the latest developments in the process following the United Kingdom’s notification of its withdrawal under Article 50 TEU.

On 2 October 2019, the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, made a new proposal, including a differentiated EU-UK customs regime with no controls at or near the border which aims to replace the current ‘backstop’. The objective of the backstop, which was agreed upon by the previous UK government, is to prevent the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland; it envisages that the UK would leave the single market but remain in a single EU-UK customs territory. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker confirmed ‘that while the UK has made some progress, a number of problematic points remain in the proposal, on which further work is needed by the UK’. This sentiment was also shared by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, whose message to the UK Prime Minister was that the EU ’remains open but [is] still unconvinced’. A meeting between Johnson and his Irish counterpart, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, on 10 October concluded that both ‘could see a pathway to a possible deal’. Following a meeting between EU and UK negotiators the following day, the Commission announced that ‘the EU and the UK have agreed to intensify discussions over the coming days’.

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, informed the General Affairs Council (Article 50) of 15 October, preparing the European Council (Article 50), about the state of play in Brexit negotiations and assessed that an agreement before the summit would be very difficult but still possible.

It is not excluded that the UK Prime Minister could – at the European Council meeting or shortly after – request a further extension to the Article 50 negation period. The recently adopted European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 requires the UK government to request a three-month extension, if it has not secured the approval of the House of Commons for either: 1) a withdrawal agreement, or 2) leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement, by the end of 19 October.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 17-18 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

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The European Union (EU) has developed many legislative measures related to climate change, and is on track to meet its 2020 targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the improvement of energy efficiency and the increased use of renewables. However, analysts estimate that more demanding targets in the medium- and longer-term require significant financial investments in mitigation and adaptation measures. Public resources can play an important role in financing such investment needs, not only directly but also in attracting funding from other sources.

In the broader field of EU finances, three main categories of climate-related initiatives can be identified: relevant projects and activities across a broad range of funding instruments in the EU budget; programmes for the demonstration of innovative technologies, funded by the EU’s Emissions Trading System; and climate finance from the European Investment Bank. While the EU budget represents only 2 % of public spending in the Union, it has features that can amplify its impact and make it particularly relevant for climate-related objectives, including the greater predictability of long-term investments ensured by its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

In the 2014-2020 MFF, the EU decided to step up the contribution that the EU budget makes to action on climate change, by committing to spending 20 % of its financial resources on relevant measures. This political objective sets the broader framework for mainstreaming of climate in the EU budget, which consists of the incorporation of climate considerations and objectives across the major EU funding instruments. Climate mainstreaming takes place at different levels: a political objective and a tracking methodology for the overall budget; the design and implementation of specific funding instruments; and monitoring, reporting and evaluation, both for the overall budget and for specific instruments. Decision-makers and actors involved differ, depending on the phase.

According to the latest data, the EU should almost be able to reach the objective of spending 20 % of its 2014-2020 resources on climate by the end of the programming period. Some of the largest EU programmes under shared management with Member States are also the largest contributors to the climate target in absolute figures: agricultural funds, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. However, some smaller instruments have significant climate-relevance.

Assessments of the tracking methodology and of its impact have identified both achievements and shortcomings. The creation of a broad political objective is deemed to have triggered ambitious work and a greater focus on climate. Climate spending in instruments such as the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, other areas such as the common agricultural policy have not shown significant progress, despite the emergence of some good practices. Criticisms have included: the absence of a common mechanism to assign sub-targets to individual instruments; some inconsistencies in the methodology with over-estimations in some areas and under-representation in others; and a performance framework more focused on outputs than on results and impact.

The adoption of an overall objective for climate expenditure in the EU budget contributes to the establishment of a general framework against which to assess progress and areas for improvement in climate-related activities. For the post-2020 MFF, the European Commission has proposed to raise the objective to 25 % of the EU budget, while the European Parliament has called for an even more ambitious approach. Elements in the MFF proposals, such as the creation of some links to National Energy and Climate Plans, could reinforce the effectiveness of climate mainstreaming. The revenue side of the EU budget also has the potential to contribute to climate objectives, but its reform is considered extremely difficult due to the requirement for unanimity in the Council.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Mainstreaming of climate action in the EU budget: Impact of a political objective‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafal Manko,

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In May 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for amending the existing Regulation on Cross-border Service of Documents in civil proceedings. The proposal aims, above all, to replace the existing mechanisms of paper transmission with an electronic system. National information technology (IT) systems would be connected into one network, and the use of paper transmission would become an exception, available only in the event of a failure of the electronic system. Within Parliament, a draft report was prepared by the Legal Affairs Committee in October 2018, and in February 2019, the institution adopted its first-reading position on the proposal.

Within Council, following an exchange of views between delegations and work at technical level, a policy debate is envisaged. Once Council reaches a general approach, trilogue negotiations will be able to start.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘Reform of the Service of Documents Regulation‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) Committee responsible: Legal Affairs (JURI) COM(2018) 379, 31.5.2018. Rapporteur: Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D, Italy) 2018/0204(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria);
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria);
Jean-Marie Cavada (ALDE, France);
Kostas Chrysogonos (EUL/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of general approach by Council and opening of trilogue negotiations

Written by Klemen Zumer with Paul Anton Kindermann,

Chief Economist of the World Bank (WB), Penny Goldberg, presented an exclusive snapshot of the 2020 World Development Report in the Library Reading Room at the European Parliament on 1 October 2019, discussing the economic challenges and perspectives of global value chains (GVCs) for economic development: what can policy makers do to facilitate sustainable growth through GVCs? This question is particularly pressing in the wake of continuous trade conflicts that dampen expectations for further growth. The high-level event with Penny Goldberg and EP Vice President Pedro Silva Pereira kicked off intensified EPRS cooperation with the World Bank that will spark many follow up initiatives.

GVCs constitute a central layer of today’s unprecedentedly interconnected world economy. In a GVC, countries do not simply trade products. They produce together, as different steps of a single production process are distributed to different locations around the world, and the parts produced in each place are shipped across the globe often crossing borders multiple times. GVCs extend the division of labour to an international scale. In the contemporary world economy, almost all countries participate in GVCs; at different stages of the economic chain, they export raw materials, semi-finished goods, or eventually goods ready for consumption. The steady emergence of these GVCs over four decades has powered an economic revolution that boosted economic growth.

In general, the World Bank finds comprehensive empirical evidence that GVCs facilitate major income growth in manufacturing countries. And in developing countries, GVC firms have contributed to significant poverty reductions. On the other hand, Penny Goldberg identifies two major problems that come as costs of participating in GVCs. First, the economic gains that result from GVCs are distributed unequally across and within countries: participation in GVCs disadvantages unskilled workers, and women and youth are generally placed in lower value-added segments of production. Second, the high transportation costs are a strain on the environment. Thus, policy-makers are called upon to ensure that benefits are shared and the environment protected – e.g. by a carbon tax or stronger regulations on particular industries and polluters. Only then can globalisation ‘work for everyone’.

While these policies are needed urgently, the profound potential of GVCs for further, sustainable economic growth can only be harnessed if the rule-based international trade system is maintained and strengthened. Penny Goldberg warned that the continuation of protectionist measures could push more than 30 million people into poverty and crush global income. In concert with EP Vice President Pereira, she emphasised that international cooperation on trade is critical for the sustainable growth of all countries and suggested several criteria that new deep trade agreements should fulfil – such as stronger rules on subsidies. Vice-President Silva Pereira recalled the problems of trade agreements which lacked public support and came under heavy scrutiny. Here, he said, the EP should, among other things, push for prominent placement of sustainable development chapters in new, comprehensive agreements.

Following a lively question and answer session, Penny Goldberg promised to be back at EPRS soon to discuss the report in more detail.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

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The Sibiu Summit of 9 May 2019 and the subsequent adoption of the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda on 20 June 2019 constitute the end of the Future of Europe debate (at least in its current iteration), which was initiated following the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Five milestone moments marked three distinct phases in the Future of Europe debate: 1) diagnostics and reflection (June to mid-September 2016); 2) deliberation and proposals (mid-September 2016 to March 2017); and 3) delivery and vision (April 2017 to June 2019).

One of the main findings of this study is that throughout the Future of Europe process, EU Heads of State or Government reiterated three core messages that also featured prominently in all the milestone documents: the need for unity, priority to EU citizens, and focus on (policy) delivery. Moreover, the three policy priorities – migration, security and the economy – identified in the Bratislava Declaration, have been the focus over the entire period of the Future of Europe process (June 2016 to June 2019), forming the European Council’s ‘rolling agenda’ of policy priorities. Despite developments in the European Council composition in that same period (as a result of the arrival of 16 new Heads of State or Government), the core messages remained almost identical, even though, often, different players were involved in drafting the related declarations and statements.

Another finding of the study is that both the European Council and the European Parliament emerged stronger from the three-year Future of Europe debate. The introduction of the Leaders’ Agenda and of the new working methods allowed EU leaders to ‘take things into their hands’ and to concentrate on solving sensitive issues by debating them well in advance at leaders’ meetings. The Parliament was active throughout the Future of Europe debate. In addition to adopting resolutions and expressing its vision in specific documents, it solidified its role as a forum for open debate by holding a series of plenary debates with EU Heads of State or Government.

An examination of the most recent phase of the Future of Europe debate (April 2018-June 2019) showed that three more or less parallel processes – the activities under the Leaders’ Agenda, the debates in the Parliament, and the citizens’ consultations – lasted throughout that whole phase and shaped the Sibiu Declaration and the subsequent (new) Strategic Agenda 2019-24.

The study identifies strong continuity between the new Strategic Agenda and its predecessor with regard to some policy issues, while also noting that other significant policy issues have been added and there has been a shift in focus within the different policy areas. Both the Sibiu Declaration and the new Strategic Agenda strengthen the policy focus on the EU’s role as a global player in actions related to climate change.

When comparing the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda with other milestone documents that were issued during the Future of Europe debate, a certain degree of continuity on horizontal and institutional issues can be observed. However, the Strategic Agenda envisages that the different EU institutions should revisit their working methods, indicating that some institutional evolution can be expected in the near future. In the case of the European Council, for instance, this could lead to the operationalisation of the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda through a new Leaders’ Agenda under the next President of the European Council.

Read this ‘study’ on ‘Origins of the 2019-24 EU Strategic Agenda: The Future of Europe debate and the Sibiu European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beata Rojek,

© Julien Eichinger / Fotolia

On 1 July 2018, as part of the work on the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the European Commission proposed a package of three regulations with the aim of reshaping and modernising the common agricultural policy (CAP).

One of these proposals, the Amending Regulation, introduces changes to rules governing the common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products (including the rules on wine), the EU quality schemes (geographical indications) and the support measures for remote regions. The aim is to equip agricultural markets and support measures to face new challenges, update provisions, simplify procedures and ensure consistency with other regulations on the future CAP.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘CAP Amending Regulation (CMO): Amending regulations on the CMO for agricultural products, quality schemes and measures for remote regions‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, (EU) No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, (EU) No 251/2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products, (EU) No 228/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union and (EU) No 229/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in favour of the smaller Aegean islands Committee responsible: Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) COM(2018) 394, 1.6.2018. Rapporteur: Eric Andrieu (S&D, France) 2018/0218(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Anne Sander (EPP, France),
Jérémy Decerle (Renew Europe, France),
Maria Bizzotto (Identity and Democracy, Italy),
Petros Kokkalis (GUE/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Confirmation, under Rule 240, of scheduling of
debate in plenary on trilogue mandate

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the October I plenary session included statements and debates on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019, on greening the European Investment Bank (EIB), in the presence of the Bank’s president, and on how to prevent conflicts of interest in the EU. Parliament also debated statements made by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) on the situation in northern Syria and Ukraine. Debates took place on Council and Commission statements on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 and own resources. Finally, Members discussed Commission statements on United States tariffs on European goods following the World Trade Organization’s Airbus dispute decision, on authorisation of genetically modified organisms, and on the fight against cancer.

Statements by the High Representative

Federica Mogherini, as HR/VP, made statements on northern Syria and on the situation in Ukraine. With the election in Ukraine this year for both a new President and Parliament, increased efforts have been made to relaunch talks on settling the Donbass conflict, under the Normandy format. President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s room for manoeuvre remains limited, however, with little sign of follow-up on the Minsk Agreements commitments and the conflict in the country’s east continuing.

Post-2020 EU budget

Council and Commission outlined the progress made on narrowing the gaps between Member States’ positions on the post-2020 EU budget; nevertheless it is clear that the European Council is not yet close to finalising its position and thus the subject will remain on the agenda in the months ahead. In advance of EU leaders’ discussions next week, the Parliament adopted its position on both the MFF and the own resources system. The resolution adopted, on a motion tabled by four political groups (EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA), largely seeks to reiterate the positions adopted by Parliament during the last term.

Euro area employment and social policies

Members debated and adopted a report from the Employment & Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the employment and social policies of the euro area, a contribution to the annual European Semester process. Parliament’s position should feed into Council recommendations on euro-area policies, due to be adopted in November 2019. The committee’s report emphasises the need to strengthen social rights, ensure universal coverage, and to develop labour market and education policies to ensure adequate social protection and address skills mismatches more effectively.

Amending the EU budget for 2019

Parliament voted on a report on draft amending budget No 4 (DAB 4/2019), which amends the Council’s position, seeking to redeploy savings to other major EU programmes that currently lack funding. Parliament therefore calls on the Commission to present a new proposal along these lines.

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced 43 decisions by the ECON, ITRE, TRAN, ENVI, LIBE, REGI, EMPL, CONT, IMCO, AFET and DEVE committees to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 72. Parliament’s positions adopted earlier at first reading will provide the mandates for these negotiations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, October I 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Ionel Zamfir,

© paparazzza / Shutterstock.com

Thirty years since it was first awarded, the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought retains all its symbolic meaning, as human rights are continually under threat in many parts of the world. By awarding the 2018 Prize to the Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, Parliament aimed to increase the pressure on the Russian government to release him. The award also drew attention to all Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia and the annexed Crimean peninsula. On 7 September 2019, Sentsov was released as part of a major prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine. He is due to receive the award in person in Strasbourg on 23 October 2019.

This is an updated edition of an ‘at a glance’ note published in December 2018.

Sakharov Prize laureate 2018

Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian film-director, convicted in Russia to 20 years in prison for his opposition to the annexation of Crimea, is the 2018 laureate of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize. Parliament’s Conference of Presidents selected Sentsov (initially proposed by the EPP) from three finalists shortlisted by the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) Committees. The two other finalists were Non-governmental organisations protecting human rights and saving migrant lives across the Mediterranean Sea (proposed by S&D and the Greens/EFA Groups), and Nasser Zefzafi, the leader of a mass protest movement in the Rif region of Morocco, sentenced to 20 years in prison (proposed by GUE/NGL Group). The prize was awarded in absentia at a ceremony in the European Parliament during the December 2018 plenary session in Strasbourg, at which Sentsov was represented by a relative and his lawyer. Other laureates of the prize have also been prevented from attending because of detention, most recently Raif Badawi in 2015. Sentsov is the first laureate from eastern Europe since 2009, when the Russian human rights centre, Memorial, received the prize.

Significance of the prize

The European Parliament awards the Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought each year to individuals or organisations for their outstanding achievements in one of the following fields: defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly the right to free expression; safeguarding the rights of minorities; respect for international law; development of democracy and implementation of the rule of law. Created through a 13 December 1985 parliamentary resolution, the prize bears the name of prominent Soviet-era dissident, Andrei Sakharov, joint inventor of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize winner and campaigner for human rights and nuclear disarmament in the Soviet Union. The name of the prize illustrates his courageous defence of human rights, including the freedom of thought and expression, to the detriment of his professional career and personal freedom. The prize was awarded for the first time, jointly, in 1988, to Nelson Mandela and (posthumously) to Soviet dissident Anatoli Marchenko. Both Mandela and Marchenko embodied the bravery of the individual who stands up to the discretionary power of an oppressive regime and pays for it with their personal freedom. Mandela’s story is widely known. Marchenko was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He died in 1986 after a three-month-long hunger strike for the release of all Soviet dissidents. The public outcry his death provoked pushed Mikhail Gorbachev to authorise the release of political prisoners from Soviet jails. His courageous action prefigures the similarly brave position of the 2018 laureate.

Oleg Sentsov: Ukrainian filmmaker and symbol for political prisoners

Born on 13 July 1976 in Simferopol (Crimea), Oleg Sentsov studied marketing at Kyiv State Economics University. He did not particularly enjoy these studies, which he said ‘disillusioned’ him. After managing a computer club in Simferopol and playing online video games professionally for years – eventually becoming the Ukrainian champion – Sentsov became the leader of the Crimean gaming movement. This experience of the gaming world served as inspiration for his first feature film Gamer, which was released in 2011 and later screened at a number of international film festivals.

Euromaidan as a turning point for Ukraine — and for Sentsov

Sentsov’s work on his film Rhino, about children of the 1990s, was interrupted in 2013, when he joined the Revolution of Dignity (‘Euromaidan’) that broke out in Ukraine after pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovich decided to suspend talks on an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In February 2014, the protests paved the way for a new pro-European government and for Yanukovich’s ousting. When Moscow responded by illegally annexing Crimea and launching a hybrid war against Ukraine, Sentsov helped bring food to Ukrainian soldiers and organised rallies for a united Ukraine in Simferopol. The Russian Federal Security Service arrested Sentsov in Crimea in May 2014, and deported him to Russia. In what Amnesty International called a ‘cynical show trial’, a Russian military court convicted Sentsov to 20 years imprisonment for plotting terrorist acts in August 2015. Sentsov denies the charges, which he and human rights groups call politically motivated. Sentsov said he was beaten for 24 hours in an attempt to force him to confess. Russian authorities refused to investigate the allegations of torture. In May 2018, Sentsov began a hunger strike, demanding the release of all Ukrainians held on political grounds in Russia and annexed Crimea. Sentsov ended the 145-day hunger strike on 6 October 2018. In a handwritten statement, he explained that he had no choice but to halt the hunger strike to avoid being force-fed due to the critical state of his health.

International support, including from the EU and the European Parliament

The European Union, the United States, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights groups, filmmakers’ and writers’ associations and even Russian film-director Nikita Mikhalkov, who has close links to Russian President Vladimir Putin, had all requested Sentsov’s release. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) repeatedly underlined that Sentsov’s detention breached international law, and urged Russia to return Sentsov and fellow activist Oleksandr Kolchenko to Ukraine. In a June 2018 resolution, Parliament requested the immediate release of Sentsov and the 70 other Ukrainian citizens illegally detained in Russia and Crimea. Announcing the Sakharov Prize laureate in Strasbourg on 25 October 2018, then European Parliament President Antonio Tajani stated that Sentsov’s ‘courage and determination’ has made him ‘a symbol of the struggle for the release of political prisoners held in Russia and around the world’. With the award of the Sakharov Prize, Parliament is ‘expressing its solidarity with him and his cause’, Tajani said: ‘We ask that he be released immediately’.

Responses to the 2018 Sakharov Prize

While Russia’s Foreign Ministry criticised Parliament’s award of the prize to Sentsov as ‘absolutely politicised’, others hailed the decision. PEN America called it ‘a powerful statement in defence of writers, artists, political prisoners, and all those … actively fighting for free thought and free expression in a time of creeping – and not so creeping – authoritarianism around the world’. Human Rights Watch said the award would help increase the pressure on Moscow to release Sentsov. European Council President Donald Tusk renewed his call on Moscow to ‘free Sentsov and all other political prisoners following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea’. Then Prime Minister of Ukraine, Volodymyr Groysman, expressed gratitude to Parliament for the award, which he called ‘a strong message highlighting the necessity of democracy protection in the world’.

Sentsov’s release in a landmark prisoner swap

Moscow rejected Kyiv’s calls to swap Sentsov and Ukrainian journalist Roman Suschenko, arrested in Moscow in 2016 on espionage charges, for Russian prisoners, until 7 September 2019, when Ukrainian prisoners in Russia were exchanged for 35 prisoners held in Ukraine. The other Ukrainian prisoners released include Suschenko, as well as 24 Ukrainian sailors who were detained in November 2018, when Russia seized three Ukrainian Navy vessels off Crimea. Although the prisoner swap – in line with the 2014-2015 Minsk Peace Agreements – sparked questions about some of the prisoners released by Ukraine, the move was generally hailed by European leaders, including by the HR/VP. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, expressed ‘relief and profound joy’ at the release, adding that he looked forward to meeting Sentsov in person in Parliament and handing him the Sakharov Prize.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mark English and Nicole Scholz,

On 1 October, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) hosted the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC) for a policy roundtable on climate change and human health. EASAC brings together national science academies from across the EU, Norway and Switzerland.

With Greta Thunberg on the front pages worldwide, the urgent need to act on climate change is starting to capture the imagination of the public. Yet the specific threats that climate change poses to human health are less well-known, despite experts such as Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization, sounding the alarm.

Drawing inspiration from the main findings of EASAC’s own June 2019 report, the roundtable focused on identifying the major health effects of climate change in Europe, analysing who is most at risk and assessing how EU policy might help. Cristian Bușoi, MEP, Vice-Chair of the Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) – a physician as well as a politician – gave the opening speech.

Speakers (the full list and bios are here) emphasised the gravity and immediacy of the threat and called for urgent action. Climate change will bring about a diverse range of risks for human health, through different pathways. Projections in Europe show a geographical gradient that increases towards southern Europe (Mediterranean region), but also with greater effects at the highest latitudes (Arctic). Extreme heat exposure will be particularly pronounced in cities (‘heat island effect’).

Health effects may be direct – from heatwaves, wildfires, storms or floods. They may also be indirect, resulting in a higher risk of vector-borne diseases (dengue fever, for example), due to the spread of disease-carrying insects into previously temperate zones. Negative health impacts from air pollution are also projected to rise, as are allergies (for instance, to ragweed pollen).

Vulnerable people, such as the elderly, children and marginalised groups, will be at a higher risk. Mental health effects likely to arise from climate change are also of serious concern. Moreover, climate change will potentially affect agriculture, thereby weakening food security. There is also a growing risk of forced migration, with a rise expected in the number of climate refugees.

According to the EASAC report’s findings, the top priority is to stabilise climate and accelerate efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Addressing the current and future health effects of climate change can provide substantial economic benefits, and the health co-benefits of decarbonising the European economy are likely to save millions of lives. Recommendations include a ‘health in all policies’ approach.

The need to make better use of existing evidence, invest in research, and base policy more closely on the results was a recurring theme in the discussion. Speakers also stressed the importance of engaging the public in action on climate change and health, and the need to improve communication on health risks, including by doing more to counter misinformation.

The EU-funded INHERIT project (final conference on 10 December) was highlighted during the roundtable. The project explores the close links between climate change and social disadvantage and aims to identify ways of living, moving and consuming that protect the environment and promote health and health equity.

There was also a discussion on how focusing on health issues – which by their nature interest everybody – could help further raise awareness of climate change and widen participation in debate, for instance around the new European Green Deal.

Click to view slideshow. EPRS briefings related to the topic:

• EU policies – Delivering for citizens: briefings and podcasts on Agriculture, Environmental protection and Health and social security, June2019
• Hearings of the Commissioners-designate Frans Timmermans – Vice-President: European Green Deal, Stella Kyriakides – Health and Virginijus Sinkevičius – Environment and Oceans, September 2019
• Living in the EU: Climate change and energy infographic, April 2019
• The concept of ‘climate refugee’: Towards a possible definition, January 2019
• The EU, a world leader in fighting climate change, May 2018

Written by Jana Titievskaia,

© whitcomberd / Fotolia

The recent forest fires in the Amazon highlight the need for greater measures worldwide to attenuate tensions between resource needs, for example mining or grazing, that cause deforestation. European leaders have called for urgent action, including through trade policy. Policy-makers argue, for instance, for leveraging the negotiated European Union (EU)-Mercosur Trade Agreement to achieve compliance with the Paris Agreement. Since the Paris Agreement is binding only in part and aspirational concerning national emissions targets, there are calls to resort to trade policy instead.

Trade agreements as leverage for change?

During the recent massive Amazon fires, on which Parliament held a debate in September 2019, leaders of France and Ireland, as well as a number of civil society petitions, called for the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement to be frozen or rejected, to leverage stronger action to tackle climate and environmental concerns in partner countries. Halting negotiations or opposing the agreement is seen by some as a tool to elicit compliance with climate commitments, or penalise a trade partner that fails to comply. This is a political course of action, possible in the short term, when the EU has not (yet) made bilateral trade commitments vis-à-vis the trade partner. However, pulling out of a trade agreement at an advanced stage has drawbacks. Late-stage blocking of a trade deal can be seen as bowing to interest group influence (e.g. agricultural producers in the case of Mercosur), who rally behind public concerns to stop a deal if they expect competition to increase as a result of the agreement. In the case of a regional trade agreement, the condemnation of climate violations by one partner might also unfairly penalise other sectors or countries. Therefore, the European Commission has called for rapid adoption of trade agreements, as this would allow the EU to foster change through constructive political dialogue under the auspices of a deal. The Commission has defended the Mercosur agreement, arguing that deforestation is already happening and that in the long term, once the agreement applies, the EU could in theory invoke specific clauses of the agreement to challenge such misconduct as it includes ‘commitments to effectively implement the Paris Agreement’, e.g. under the sustainable development provisions.

However, the current form of trade agreements does not necessarily lead to an increase in the level of compliance with climate commitments. Firstly, for mixed agreements, such as the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, provisional application applies to the trade pillar (which is an exclusive EU competence), while the provisions for political dialogue and cooperation can potentially not be applied for many years, pending ratification by Member States. It may take a long time before the EU can leverage the political dialogue provisions of the agreement to motivate climate action. Secondly, in EU trade agreements, references to climate commitments, including the Paris Agreement and tackling deforestation, are included in the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters, which are arguably not enforceable in the same way as other parts of the trade deal. The TSD chapter, as well as competition and trade remedies provisions, is exempt from the general dispute settlement chapter. The general dispute settlement mechanism is modelled on that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and allows, in case of non-compliance, the EU to take punitive economic measures as temporary remedies, e.g. to suspend trade concessions in case of non-compliance with an arbitration ruling. In contrast, TSD chapters have separate procedures for disputes, which involve a request for consultation and the creation of a panel of experts. The first case of EU TSD dispute settlement is ongoing under the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (on labour issues). If the counterpart fails to comply, the panel will deliver a set of recommendations. The TSD Committee then monitors the situation. While punitive economic measures are not possible, the Commission argues that the consultations focus on finding a mutually acceptable solution and on exerting public pressure, and that this dynamic of political oversight and a risk of reputational damage incentivise the partner country to comply with the recommendations. One explanation for the separate dispute settlement process for environmental issues is the difficulty of establishing a causal link between economic injury and non-compliance with TSD provisions, which makes it difficult to make a fair estimation of remedies.

WTO rules and the climate waiver

EU trade agreements incorporate the general exception derived from WTO rules – Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The general exception lays down the conditions under which members may take trade-restrictive measures which are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, or relating to the exhaustion of natural resources. The measure (e.g. an import restriction or a ban) cannot be applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, nor can it be a disguised restriction on international trade (Article XX, chapeau). Recent EU trade deals, including the EU-Mercosur provisions on trade in goods, set out that ‘environmental measures, such as measures taken to implement multilateral environmental agreements’ fall within the general exception. This would suggest that in theory, the EU is not prevented from taking trade-restrictive environmental measures that aim to implement the Paris Agreement. However, the general exception has been successfully invoked only under very specific circumstances and conditions (e.g. US shrimp products). WTO rules also require a strong causal link between the measure and the environmental objective. With measures taken to address highly complex phenomena, such as climate change, the causality can only be assessed with the passage of time, as suggested by the WTO Appellate Body (Brazil retreaded tyre imports). Under current rules, therefore, a trade-restrictive measure to implement a multilateral environmental agreement – such as a carbon border tax, proposed by Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen – could potentially be challenged on several grounds as WTO-incompatible, unless it is deemed to qualify as a border tax adjustment. Due to the growing possibility of a clash between trade rules and climate action, commentators have called for a climate waiver. This could be possible under Article IX: 3 of the WTO Agreement, which allows the Ministerial Conference to waive an obligation in ‘exceptional circumstances’.

Trade preferences

The withdrawal of trade preferences can act as a sanctions-like measure. For some developing countries (not Mercosur countries), the removal of tariff preferences, under the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) scheme, is possible in case of serious and systemic violations of core conventions relating to human and labour rights (listed in Part A of Annex VIII) of the GSP Regulation.

However, under the GSP, the EU’s ability to influence the beneficiary in the protection of forests or sustainable management of natural resources is limited. Conventions related to the environment, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Part B of Annex VIII of the GSP Regulation) are not included under the provisions allowing for the temporary withdrawal of preferences (Article 19.1.). In practice, threats to withdraw preferences have been linked to labour or human rights concerns. A review of the current GSP Regulation, due to expire in 2023, should begin in 2020. In a March 2019 resolution, the European Parliament called for the addition of the Paris Agreement to the 27 conventions. It did not specify whether environmental conventions should be linked to preference suspension.

The menu of options to elicit climate action from partner countries through trade policy comes with benefits and drawbacks. Outside the trade toolkit, consumer behaviour and corporate social responsibility in companies can help foster climate action in trade partners. The Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) regulation, in combination with the EU Timber Regulation, also seek to ensure that only legally harvested timber is imported into the EU. In July 2019, the European Commission’s communication ‘Stepping up EU Action to Protect and Restore the World’s Forests’ proposed further measures. However, implementation of FLEGT is based on voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs), which to date exist with only a few trade partners, and so far only one country, Indonesia, has begun issuing FLEGT licences. Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Using trade policy to tackle climate change‘ in m$the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Lațici,

© naypong / Fotolia

Often labelled as one of today’s main disruptive technologies, drones have indeed earned this label by prompting a fundamental rethinking of business models, existing laws, safety and security standards, the future of transport, and modern warfare. The European Union (EU) recognises the opportunities that drones offer and sees them as opening a new chapter in the history of aerospace. The EU aviation strategy provides guidance for exploring new and emerging technologies, and encourages the integration of drones into business and society so as to maintain a competitive EU aviation industry.

Ranging from insect-sized to several tonnes in weight, drones are extremely versatile and can perform a very large variety of functions, from filming to farming, and from medical aid to search and rescue operations. Among the advantages of civil and military drones are their relative low cost, reach, greater work productivity and capacity to reduce risk to human life. These features have led to their mass commercialisation and integration into military planning. Regulatory and oversight challenges remain, however, particularly regarding dual-use drones – civil drones that can be easily turned into armed drones or weaponised for criminal purposes.

At EU level, the European Commission has been empowered to regulate civil drones and the European Aviation Safety Agency to assist with ensuring a harmonised regulatory framework for safe drone operations. The latest EU legislation has achieved the highest ever safety standards for drones. Another challenge remaining for regulators, officials and manufacturers alike is the need to build the trust of citizens and consumers. Given that drones have been in the public eye more often for their misuse than their accomplishments, transparency and effective communication are imperative to prepare citizens for the upcoming drone age.

Read this briefing on ‘Civil and military drones: Navigating a disruptive and dynamic technological ecosystem‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Aidan Christie,

© Architectes : Vandenbossche SPRL, CRV S.A., CDG S.P.R.L., Studiegroep D. Bontinck, ©Façade et Hémicycle – Arch M. Boucquillon Belgium – European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Once the last of the first round of hearings of the European Commission candidates put forward by Ursula von der Leyen concludes on Tuesday 8 October, the attention of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) will turn to the first plenary session of the new term to be held in Brussels. The focus will still be on the hearings process, however, with decisions to be taken by the political group leaders on possible additional hearings of certain candidates, as well as hearings of the replacement nominees from Hungary and Romania.

Among the highlights of the session will be debates following statements from the Council and Commission on the forthcoming European Council meeting, and on the next multiannual financial framework (MMF) and the own resources system. As regards the first of these, the 17-18 October European Council meeting is the last one scheduled under the current leadership, with Charles Michel taking over from Donald Tusk as President on 1 December, and Jean-Claude Juncker due to hand over to Ursula von der Leyen as President of the European Commission on 1 November. Von der Leyen has been invited to attend the European Council meeting and the leaders are expected to discuss the programming for the coming five years, on the basis of the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda agreed in June.

The other main subject to be discussed by the Heads of State or Government will be the EU’s post-2020 budget, with the Finnish Presidency of the Council outlining the progress made on narrowing the gaps between Member States’ positions on the MFF; the subject is nevertheless expected to return to the European Council’s agenda in December. The new Parliament will therefore be taking its first opportunity to outline its position on both the MFF and the own resources system in advance of the leaders’ discussion. A motion for a resolution tabled by four political groups (EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA) largely seeks to reiterate the positions adopted by Parliament during the last term.

On Wednesday evening, the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, is due to make a statement on the situation in Ukraine. With the election in Ukraine of a new president, and then parliament, earlier this year, efforts have been stepped up to relaunch talks under the Normandy format. President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s room for manoeuvre remains limited, however, and there is little sign of the commitments made under the Minsk Agreements being followed through; the conflict thus continues in the Donbass region.

On Thursday morning, there will be a debate on a report from the EMPL committee on the employment and social policies of the euro area, a contribution to the annual European Semester process. Parliament’s position is supposed to feed into the Council’s recommendations on euro-area policies, due to be adopted in November. The committee’s report emphasises the need to strengthen social rights, so that they stretch to all, as well as to develop labour market and education policies to ensure adequate social protection and address skills mismatches more effectively.

Parliament is due to vote on Thursday on draft amending budget No 4 (DAB 4/2019), in which the Commission is proposing to reduce commitment and payment appropriations for 2019, on the basis of updated needs and revenue forecasts. In its report, the Committee on Budgets voted to amend the Council’s position, seeking to redeploy savings to other major EU programmes that are currently lacking in funding. It is therefore calling on the Commission to present a new proposal along those lines. Parliament will also debate the issue of greening the European Investment Bank (EIB), with the Bank’s president taking part. This issue has gained in significance in the light of the Commission President-elect’s priority to develop a European green deal.

Written by Gregor Erbach,

© Kara / Fotolia

In February 2019, the Commission adopted a proposal to revise the EU system for monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions from maritime transport, in order to align it with the global data collection system introduced by the International Maritime Organization (IMO). The existing EU system requires ships above 5 000 gross tonnes using European ports to monitor and report fuel consumption and CO2 emissions per voyage and on an annual basis, starting with the year 2018. The IMO system requires ships above 5 000 gross tonnes on international voyages to report consumption data for fuel oil, hours underway and distance travelled. The system entered into force on 1 March 2018, and reporting starts with the year 2019. The proposed revision aims to facilitate the simultaneous application of the two systems, while preserving the objectives of the current EU legislation.

In the European Parliament, the ENVI committee has appointed Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany) as rapporteur for the file. The Environment Council discussed the proposal in June 2019.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘Monitoring, reporting and verification of CO2 emissions from maritime transport‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2015/757 in order to take appropriate account of the global data collection system for ship fuel oil consumption data Committee responsible: Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) COM(2019) 38 final, 4.2.2019. Rapporteur: Jutta Paulus (Greens/EFA, Germany) 2019/0017(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Jytte Guteland (S&D, Sweden)
Catherine Chabaud (Renew Europe, France)
Joëlle Mélin (ID, France)
Mick Wallace (GUE/NGL, Ireland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© David / Fotolia

The British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, has presented a draft text to replace the ‘Irish backstop’, with the aim of reaching agreement with the other 27 EU leaders on the United Kingdom’s orderly withdrawal from the EU in the coming weeks. While the UK withdrawal is currently scheduled for 31 October, the UK Parliament has adopted legislation obliging Johnson to seek a delay in that date, if no deal is reached by 19 October. But with British politics in turmoil, it remains unclear if the Prime Minister will comply, or, if he does, whether the EU will agree. Economists warn that the UK’s disorderly departure from the EU is likely to have damaging consequences for supply chains in trade and production, transport, the supply of medicines and many other areas.

This note offers links to a series of most recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on Brexit.

‘No deal’ Brexit and the EU budget: Beware the risk for EU unity
Institut Jacques Delors, September 2019

What does the UK’s Supreme Court ruling mean for Brexit
Carnegie Europe, September 2019

Deal or no deal? Five questions on Boris Johnson’s Brexit talks
Centre for European Reform, September 2019

Even a Commons majority for an EU withdrawal agreement doesn’t rule out a no-deal Brexit
Institute for Government, September 2019

A parliamentary majority without a policy and a government policy without a majority
The UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

Trick or treat? French and German views on ‘Brextension’
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2019

MPs should use their extra time wisely and scrutinise the government’s Brexit plans
Institute for Government, September 2019

Supreme Court case: Not the best way to go about things
The UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

Brexit and ‘peak populism’ in Europe
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Just a little Brexit? Alternative (customs) arrangements’ and the Withdrawal Agreemen
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Boris Johnson auf Kurs No-Deal Brexit
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, September 2019

Auto makers prepare to shut down again fearing no deal Brexit disruption
The UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

The impact on Europe of ‘make-believe’ Britain
Friends of Europe, September 2019

Brexit beyond Britain
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Bewitched by Brexit: Referendums and modern democracy
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2019

How Brexiteers are destabilising Ireland’s fragile peace
Carnegie Europe, September 2019

Brexit and the UK’s political implosion
Scottish Centre for European Relations, September 2019

The biggest obstacle to a workable backstop alternative lies not in the EU, but the UK
The UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

Weighing up alternative arrangements to the backstop
The UK in a Changing Europe, September 2019

Brexit: How was it for you?
European Policy Centre, September 2019

EU leaders signal desire for Brexit deal despite limited progress
Open Europe, September 2019

How Transatlantic foreign policy cooperation could evolve after Brexit
Carnegie Europe, September 2019

How would negotiations after a no-deal Brexit play out?
Centre for European Reform, September 2019

How would a second referendum on Brexit happen?
Institute for Government, September 2019

A no-deal Brexit is not inevitable
Centre for European Reform, August 2019

What would a no-deal Brexit look like?
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2019

Boris Johnson enters democracy’s twilight zone
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

Brexit banking exodus creates a dilemma for Dublin
Bruegel, July 2019

Preparing Brexit: No deal
Institute for Government, July 2019

Where Brexit goes, the law shall follow
Bruegel, July 2019

Deficiencies and omissions in the Brexit Agreement
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2019

Making global Britain work
Policy Exchange, July 2019

A power for the future? Global Britain and the future character of conflict
Chatham House, July 2019

What Brexit means
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Brexit: make it or break it?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan Van Lierop,

Drawing over 6 000 participants to Brussels for four days of discussion and discovery from 7 to 10 October 2019, the European Week of Regions and Cities is the world’s largest annual gathering of local and regional representatives. Already a firm fixture on the calendar of Europe’s regional movers and shakers, this year’s event looks set to be another showstopper, with well over 200 sessions planned as part of the official programme. Building on the success of last year’s move to downtown Brussels, the EWRC will once again be held at the Square conference centre – and the EPRS is thrilled to be taking part again this year.

Taking place under the headline banner of Regions and Cities: Pillars of the EU’s future, the 2019 EWRC provides a unique platform for EU regions and cities to share their ideas on how best to translate the Commission’s cohesion proposals into concrete projects. With discussions at this year’s event also covering topics such as a Europe closer to citizens, a greener Europe and a smarter Europe, among others, participants will certainly have plenty to talk about.

As in past years, the EPRS has also published a Topical Digest to tie in with the event. Prepared exclusively for the 2019 EWRC, the publication features a selection of briefings and studies published by the European Parliament on many of the key topics up for discussion at the EWRC, such as regional inequalities in the EU, the Urban Agenda or financial instruments in cohesion policy among many others. Our experts will also be present at a special information stand during the whole week to provide more information about EPRS research activities, and to distribute some of our specialist publications on regional policy and beyond.

But there’s much more to our participation than just swapping business cards with visitors. For the fifth year running, EPRS will also be organising a workshop on research as part of the European Week of Regions and Cities’ Master Class on EU cohesion policy for students and early career researchers. To help put participants in the picture, we will be looking at how EPRS supports the work of the European Parliament during the policy making process, and consider how closer links may be established between researchers in the academic world and policy-makers in the EU institutions. As in previous years, we will be encouraging participants to get actively involved in the discussions, which will also examine how to enhance the communication of cohesion policy and consider future trends and topics for cohesion policy research. Above all, we want to hear what they have to say – and this is no empty promise on our part. After the event, we will commit to publishing participants’ findings on our website, staying true to the words of our EPRS motto, ‘Empowering through knowledge’.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Beatrix Immenkamp,

© artjazz / Fotolia

For the past 40 years, Members of the European Parliament have been working at boosting Parliament’s role in EU foreign policy. These efforts have continued to be stepped up since the launch of the common foreign and security policy (CFSP) in 1993. Over recent decades, the European Parliament has significantly raised its profile as a credible moral force with strong focus on strengthening human rights, supporting democracy and enhancing the rule of law worldwide.

Perhaps less visible than the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought, the European Parliament’s democracy support activities are part of its ‘soft-power’ approach to international relations. Moreover, Parliament can convey messages through channels that are different from, and complementary to, those employed by the EU’s traditional diplomatic players; for example, through its parliamentary networks.

Parliament also enjoys Treaty-based information and consultation rights, which allow its Members to shape the EU’s external policies. In addition, the European Parliament has become a public forum for debating with representatives of partner countries and international organisations, as well as influential non-state actors. MEPs pro-actively engage in inter-parliamentary delegations and missions to third countries as well as joint parliamentary assemblies. Moreover, parties in different countries often share strong links via their political families.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Parliament’s evolving soft power – From back-door diplomacy to agenda-setting: Democracy support and mediation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

Introduction

© Kolonko / Shutterstock

The phenomenal growth in collaboration between scientists and institutions located in different countries began 30 years ago, when the bipolar world, in which most internationally active scientists belonged either to the Soviet block or to Western countries, collapsed. Today, international collaboration in research is the core of contemporary higher-education and science systems. While in 1970, only 2 % of articles indexed in Web of Science were internationally co-authored papers, in 1980 the share was 5 %, in 1990, it rose to 9 %, reaching 16 % in 2000, until in 2013, almost every fourth publication (23 %) was written by authors from more than one country.

STOA study on ‘Internationalisation of European Union research organisations’

A recently published STOA study on ‘Internationalisation of EU research organisations‘ examines the changing nature of academic knowledge production in the EU-28 Member States, and its development towards radically increasing internationalisation. The report combines theory on international research collaboration (IRC) with the collection and analysis of the most up-to-date empirical data. A number of policy options for the improvement of IRC at the European level are also presented.

The number of internationally co-authored papers is on the rise both across EU-28 countries and across the world more generally, with different dynamics of internationalisation in different countries and European regions, especially in EU-15 countries (that joined the EU before 2004) compared to EU-13 countries (that joined the EU after 2004). At the same time, there are significant differences across fields of science. While the world seems to collaborate in research mostly on a nation-by-nation basis, Europe is exceptional in its long-term, large-scale, intra-regional research collaborations, including collaborations funded by consecutive EU framework programmes for research.

Collaboration enables the sharing of knowledge, skills and techniques, exchange of different views, cross-fertilisation of ideas and intellectual companionship, helping to expand networks of contacts and enhance the visibility of research work. IRC tends to increase research productivity: in general, multiple-institution papers are more highly cited than single-institution papers, and internationally co-authored papers are more highly cited than those with domestic co-authors. The STOA study shows that researchers prefer to collaborate in fields where they can share basic ideas and fundamental knowledge, rather than in those where they may develop commercially viable results.

Types of research and international research collaborations

The STOA study explores different types of research collaboration: (i) IRC, in the sense of collaboration between academics located in different countries; (ii) national research collaboration, with multi-authored research outputs, where all authors are affiliated with more than one institution within a single country; (iii) institutional research collaboration, linked to a multi-authored research output, where all authors are affiliated with the same institution; and, finally, (iv) the ‘solo research’ mode in science, i.e. a single-authored research output, where the sole author is affiliated with an institution in a given country.

Not all sciences are equally driven by the internationalisation demand. The STOA study recognised four types of international research collaboration: (i) data-driven collaboration (as in genetics, demography, epidemiology); (ii) resource-driven collaboration (as in seismology, zoology); (iii) equipment-driven collaboration (as in astronomy, high-energy physics), and (iv) theory-driven collaboration (as in mathematics, economics or philosophy).

Barriers to research internationalisation

The personal decision to engage in international collaboration in research needs to be viewed in the context of a trade-off between collaboration investments and expected collaboration effects. Maintaining too many or too demanding relations with international collaborators in research can lead to high costs, resulting from, among other things, information overload, unclear responsibility, and communication constraints. The STOA study debates types of barriers to IRC: from macro-level barriers (geopolitics, history, language, cultural traditions, country research propensity, geographical distance), to institutional barriers (reputation, resources), and individual barriers (predilections, intellectual or financial attractiveness).

Empirical data from the STOA study

The STOA report analyses the macro-level of countries and the meso-level of flagship institutions to assess the cross-national and cross-institutional differentiation in IRC in 2007-2017. The aggregates of EU-28 results are analysed in the global context of China and the United States of America (USA), the two biggest academic knowledge producers.

Macro-level of countries

The number of articles written under international collaboration in the study period was 2 193 504 in the EU-28, 1 437 621 in the USA and 588 087 in China. In 2017, the share of internationally co-authored papers was 44 % for EU-28 (47 % for EU-15 countries and 39 % for EU-13 countries), 40 % for the USA and 22 % for China. The share of internationally co-authored publications in Europe is thus 4.6 percentage points higher than in the USA and 22.2 percentage points higher than in China. IRC has risen in every EU-28 country in the study period. In the EU-28, the largest number of articles published in international collaboration in 2017 was, by far, in the natural sciences, followed by the medical sciences, and the lowest number was in the humanities.

Meso-level of flagship research institutions

The analysis at the macro-level (countries) is accompanied in this report by an analysis at the meso-level for selected flagship research institutions. In the most general terms, collaboration trends over time are similar for EU-28 countries and for their flagship institutions; however, the internationalisation trends are more intense for flagship institutions than for countries. The percentage share of international collaboration is on average lower for flagship universities located in EU-13 countries than for those located in EU-15 countries. While no flagship universities located in EU-13 countries exceeded the level of 60 % of international collaboration, five flagship universities in EU-15 exceeded this level.

Policy options

The study identifies a number of broad policy options for supporting the internationalisation of EU research organisations. They can be briefly summarised as follows:

IRC should be at the centre of national research policies: Placing the internationalisation of research at the centre of national research policies refers to all levels of operation of higher education systems, from national to institutional, to departmental, to individual. Internationalisation-supportive research policies should promote international publication channels both in direct block funding to their institutions and in indirect, individual-level competitive research funding.

Large-scale funding should be provided for IRC: Internationalisation costs are increasing across all national systems in Europe. The rise of internationalisation-related costs needs to be noted and reflected in both budget size and its internal distribution.

Individual scientists should be at the centre of national internationalisation agendas: Today, the individual scientist matters greatly for IRC. A bottom-up approach, with maximum flexibility as to how, with whom, and on which topic to collaborate internationally in research, unreservedly combined with the hard line of research excellence as defined through top publications only, should always work better than any other set of recommendations for IRC programmes and should be strengthened.

Your opinion counts. Let us know what you think, get in touch via email stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by Naja Bentzen,

Members of the European Parliament form official groups – delegations – with ties to regions and organisations, as well as parliaments, in non-EU countries. Parliament has expanded its impact EU in foreign policy in recent decades, and its delegations are a key component of its diplomatic work.

Parliament delegations: parliamentary actors with a global reach

© artjazz / Fotolia

The European Parliament’s delegations are official groups of Members who build ties to countries, regions or organisations outside the European Union (EU). There are two main types of delegations: permanent (‘standing’) delegations and ad-hoc delegations, which Parliament can create on a case-by-case basis to focus on particular developments in a country or region. Standing delegations belong in three subgroups: parliamentary assemblies, interparliamentary committees, and other interparliamentary delegations (see below). Standing delegations meet regularly in Brussels and Strasbourg to assess and discuss the situation in their partner countries and on their respective ties to the EU. The delegations invite external experts to share their views: representatives from embassies or universities, or staff from the European Union’s External Action Service (EEAS), for example. The delegations also invite members of the political opposition or civil society in a given country, to give them a voice at their meetings. In addition, delegations hold meetings with parliaments from the relevant countries: ‘interparliamentary meetings’. These activities help form and further relations between Members and their counterparts in countries outside the EU.

Rules and responsibilities

According to Rule 223(5) of Parliament’s Rules of Procedure, the Conference of Presidents adopts the rules for the delegations on a proposal from the Conference of Delegation Chairs. The rules applying to the delegations are set out in the Conference of Presidents’ decision of 29 October 2015. The delegations maintain and develop Parliament’s international contacts and contribute to enhancing the role and visibility of the European Union in the world. The rules also specify that delegation activities shall aim at maintaining and enhancing contacts with parliaments of states that are traditionally EU partners. On the other hand, they shall contribute to promoting in third countries the fundamental values of the European Union: the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law (Article 6 of the Treaty on the EU). Parliament’s international contacts foster, wherever possible and appropriate, the parliamentary dimension of international relations.

The standing delegations: composition and work

The European Parliament currently – at the beginning of the ninth legislature (2019-2024) – has 44 standing delegations; the same number as in the previous legislature. Following the 2019 election, Parliament adopted a decision on the numerical strength of its interparliamentary delegations. It lists the delegations operating during this term, and the number of Members each one includes. The distribution and size of delegations may differ from one term to the next. For example, a single delegation covered Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Kosovo in the seventh legislative term (2009-2014). Since 2014, four separate delegations have dealt with relations with these countries.

The number of Members in a given delegation corresponds to the number of parliamentarians from the respective partner country/countries. The work of the delegations also varies according to the partner. For example, the Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) delegation is established under the Cotonou Agreement. In the ACP delegation, two plenary sessions with the entire joint assembly are complemented with regional meetings. In some delegations, the work is mainly based on invitation, where some countries are prioritised for visits. The voice of the delegations has major potential to amplify messages.

See also EPRS Briefings on ‘Connecting parliamentary and executive diplomacy at EU and Member State level’ and ‘The European Parliament’s evolving soft power’, September 2019.

What are the different types of standing delegations?

Parliamentary assemblies are regular, formal meetings of elected representatives from several parliaments. Currently, 5 of Parliament’s 44 delegations participate in parliamentary assemblies, namely the Delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (DNAT), the Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, the Delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly, the Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly, and the Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean. In most cases, Parliament’s delegation is the largest single delegation at the assembly. The number of Members constitutes approximately half the total number of delegates. One exception is the DNAT, where the delegation size is limited to ten Members.

Interparliamentary committees are mostly bilateral. European Parliament delegations meet their counterparts from a country/countries in formal meetings, held on a regular basis. Interparliamentary committees differ according to the type of bilateral agreement establishing them, between the EU and the respective country. These include Parliamentary Association Committees, Parliamentary Cooperation Committees, Joint Parliamentary Committees or Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committees. Parliament currently has 15 delegations participating in 23 parliamentary committees.

Other interparliamentary delegations form the largest group of delegations (25 out of the total number of 44 delegations), which work with relations with individual countries or a group of countries. The ‘interparliamentary meetings’ – in which the delegations meet with their counterparts – are not held on a regular basis, and do not have their own rules, although they follow the general provisions for delegations.

On 17 July 2019, Members voted on the composition of interparliamentary delegations. Following the approval of the nature and numerical strength of interparliamentary delegations, the political groups and non-attached Members appoint delegation members. The composition of these delegations must ensure that EU Member States, political views and genders are represented fairly. The constituent meetings of the delegations, on 26 September 2019, were held to elect chairs and vice-chairs. The interparliamentary delegations include:

Europe, Western Balkans and Turkey: EU-North Macedonia Joint Parliamentary Committee (JPC) (13 members); EU-Turkey JPC (25); Delegation for Northern cooperation and for relations with Switzerland and Norway and to the EU-Iceland JPC and the European Economic Area JPC (17); Delegation to the EU-Serbia Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (15); Delegation to the EU-Albania Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (PAC, 14); Delegation to the EU-Montenegro Stabilisation and Association Parliamentary Committee (14); Delegation for relations with Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo (13).

Russia and the Eastern Partnership: Delegation to the EU-Russia Parliamentary Cooperation Committee (31); Delegation to the EU-Ukraine PAC (16); Delegation to the EU-Moldova PAC (14); Delegation for relations with Belarus (12); Delegation to the EU-Armenia Parliamentary Partnership Committee, the EU-Azerbaijan Parliamentary Cooperation Committee and the EU-Georgia PAC (18).

Maghreb, Mashreq, Israel and Palestine: Delegations for relations with Israel (18); Palestine (18); the Maghreb countries and the Arab Maghreb Union, including the EU-Morocco, EU-Tunisia and EU-Algeria Joint Parliamentary Committees (18); the Mashreq countries (18).

The Arab Peninsula, Iraq and Iran: Delegations for relations with: the Arab Peninsula (15); Iraq (7); Iran (11).

The Americas: Delegations for relations with: the United States (63); Canada (16); the Federative Republic of Brazil (14); Central America (15); the Andean Community (12); Mercosur (19); Delegation to the EU-Mexico JPC (14); Delegation to the EU-Chile JPC (14); Delegation to the Cariforum-EU Parliamentary Committee (15).

Asia/Pacific: Delegations for relations with: Japan (24); the People’s Republic of China (37); India (23); Afghanistan (7); South Asia (15); Southeast Asia and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN, 26); the Korean Peninsula (12); Australia and New Zealand (12); Delegation to the EU-Kazakhstan, EU-Kyrgyzstan, EU-Uzbekistan and EU-Tajikistan Parliamentary Cooperation Committees, and for relations with Turkmenistan and Mongolia (19).

Africa: Delegations for relations with: South Africa (15); the Pan-African Parliament (12).

Multilateral assemblies: Delegation to the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly (78); Delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Union for the Mediterranean (49); Delegation to the Euro-Latin American Parliamentary Assembly (75); Delegation to the Euronest Parliamentary Assembly (60); Delegation for relations with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly (10).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Understanding European Parliament delegations‘ in m$the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© kamasigns / Fotolia

The European Central Bank will shortly see a ‘change of the guard’ at a time of stagnating economic growth and fears of recession sparked partly by global trade conflicts. Current ECB President, Mario Draghi’s eight-year term in office ends on 1 November, and he is to be replaced by Christine Lagarde, former head of the International Monetary Fund and previously Minister of Finance in France.

Some analysts say the the ECB’s recent decisions aimed at propping up faltering growth in the euro area will limit Lagarde’s room for manoeuvre as regards a possible change in policy direction. On 12 September, the ECB’s Governing Council cut interest rates deeper into negative territory and decided to extend its bond purchases, without giving any indicative end for the programme.

This note offers links to a series of some recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on the ECB and related issues.

ECB’s easing package is a call for European fiscal reform
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2019

The ECB’s half-baked supervision mandate or, how to get serious about shadow banking again
Fondation Européenne d’Etudes Progressistes, September 2019

Changing guard of the ECB
Institute of International and European Affairs, September 2019

The ECB’s deflation obsession
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

The role of the European Central Bank
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2019

The coming regime of the ECB: Radical centrism
Ludwig Von Mises Institute, August 2019

Preparing for uncertainty
Bruegel, July 2019

Why critics of a more relaxed attitude on public debt are wrong
Peterson Institute for International Economy, July 2019

Handlungsspielraum der EZB – von Zinspolitik bis Helikoptergeld
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, July 2019

Introducing dominant currency pricing in the ECB’s global macroeconomic model
Kiel Institute of the World Economy, July 2019

A pragmatic new European leadership team could supply tools to face the next downturn
Peterson Institute for International Economy, July 2019

ECB monetary policy in the post-Draghi era
Peterson Institute for International Economy, June 2019

The evolution of the ECB governing council’s decision-making
Bruegel, June 2019

The Eurozone 20 years from now: Utopia or dystopia?
Österreichische Gesellschaft für Europapolitik, May 2019

20 years of common European monetary policy: Reasons to celebrate
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung,

Vom ESM zum EWF – Klare Regeln bei der Weiterentwicklung vom Krisen- zum Vorsorgemechanismus für eine stabile Euro-Zone
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2019

Who’s afraid of low inflation?
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2019

The Economic and Monetary Union: Past, present and future
Center for Economic and Social Research, March 2019

For a geopolitics of the euro
Fondation Robert Schuman, March 2019

Monetary policy in the world of cryptocurrencies
LUISS School of European Political Economy, February 2019

20 Jahre Euro: Verlierer und Gewinner
Centrum für Europäische Politik, February 2019

Greening monetary policy: An alternative to the ECB’s market-neutral approach
Bruegel, February 2019

Whose (fiscal) debt is it anyway?
Bruegel, February 2019

Can the euro rival the dollar?
Centre for European Reform, December 2018

Rebalancing the Euro Area: A proposal for future reform
Wilfried Martens Centre for European Studies, December 2018

Holding the supervisor to account: The European Parliament and the European Central Bank in banking supervision
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2018

Comment la Banque centrale européenne a perdu son âme
Institut Thomas More, November 2018

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘End of the Draghi era at the ECB‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.