European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

Over the 2014-2019 legislature, the European Parliament has strongly condemned all forms of discrimination against lesbian, gay, bi-sexual, trans-sexual and intersex (LGBTI) people. Parliament has stressed the urgency of tackling increasing levels of hate speech and hate crime motivated by bias against a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity, and put forward concrete proposals for combating hate speech and harmful stereotypes in the media. Parliament has also drawn attention to the human rights situation of LGBTI people outside the EU on many occasions. In February 2019, it asked the Commission to make LGBTI rights a priority in its work programme for 2019-2024 and to adopt a new LGBTI strategy for this period, joining the 19 EU Member States who had already urged the Commission to ensure a strong follow-up to the EU’s current strategy.

Advocacy organisations are reporting diverging trends in the situation of LGBTI people, both globally and in Europe, with a worsening environment in some countries due to repressive and discriminatory legislation and spikes in hate crimes, contrasting with legal and social improvements in others.

This May, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), plans to launch a major survey of LGBTI people’s experiences across the EU. A follow-up to the agency’s first survey in 2012, it will ask about issues affecting people’s everyday lives, including discrimination, harassment and violence – and will be extended to cover the specific experiences of intersex people.

The FRA’s first survey of more than 93 000 people identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual or transgender painted a worrying picture of discrimination in schools, workplaces, healthcare settings and public places, and widespread experiences of harassment and violence. Almost half (47 %) of the respondents said they had felt personally discriminated against or harassed in the previous year because of their sexual orientation, with the figures highest for lesbian women and transgender respondents. One in two respondents said that they avoided certain places for fear of being harassed, threatened or assaulted because of being LGBT, whilst one in four said that they had been attacked or threatened with violence over the previous five years. However, only one in ten people had reported incidents of discrimination, and only one in five of the most serious incidents of violence were reported to the police, mainly because respondents believed that nothing would happen or change as a result. Some feared a homophobic or transphobic reaction from the authorities.

Hate speech committed by politicians
When considering the spread of hate speech, the European Court of Human Rights has insisted on the politicians’ particular responsibility to refrain from using language that contributes to fuelling intolerance, and has applied stricter standards to them.
Source: Countering Hate Speech in Elections: Strategies for Electoral Management Bodies, International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) White Paper, 2018

As we approach the European elections, it is worth flagging that almost half of all respondents to the first FRA survey believed offensive language about LGBT people by politicians to be widespread in their country of residence. Figures for individual countries varied from 1 % in Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg and the Netherlands, to 33 % in Poland, 42 % in Bulgaria, 51 % in Italy and 58 % in Lithuania. Monitoring reports by the Council of Europe’s Commission against Racism and Intolerance data (ECRI) confirm their concerns. Between 2014 and 2018, ECRI recorded incidents of homophobic and transphobic hate speech from politicians – and failures to counter them – in several EU Member States, along with more positive examples where hate speech was systematically condemned. The European network of Equality Bodies, Equinet, has also reported that a growing number of election campaigns in Europe are marred by scapegoating and discriminatory language or hate speech against certain groups.

During the campaigning for the 2014 European elections, ILGA-Europe, the European branch of the International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association, received reports of 42 incidents of hate speech against LGBTI people and other minority groups. For the 2019 elections, the organisation is uniting with a broad spectrum of civil society organisations to appeal for ‘No Hate’ campaigning, calling on all candidates, politicians, the media and people in the public eye not only to avoid engaging in, or amplifying, rhetoric that could incite discrimination, prejudice or hatred on any ground, but also to counter it actively. In addition, ILGA-Europe is encouraging candidates to sign a pledge to stand up for human rights and equality for all LGBTI people in the European Union and beyond, by committing to listen to their concerns and work proactively to close gaps in legal protection, strengthen EU policy and support human rights defenders.

Two EPRS briefings published to mark this year’s International Day Against Homophobia, Transphobia and Biphobia (IDAHOT), on 17 May, look in detail at the scope of the rights and protections against discrimination for LGBTI people within the European Union, the steps the EU and Parliament in particular have taken over the last term to further LGBTI rights, and EU external action in this area. EU external action focuses on Africa, where a majority of countries have legislation criminalising homosexuality and the public expression of sexual or gender behaviour that does not conform to heterosexual norms. For the EU, promoting LGBTI rights is complex, as in several African countries, the very notions of sexual orientation and gender identity as grounds for discrimination are contested, and seen as ‘un-African’.

For further reading:

• The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union (update 2019)
• LGBTI in Africa: Widespread discrimination against people with non-conforming sexual orientations and gender identities

Written by Wouter van Ballegooij,

© fotolia

Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1999, the EU offers its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ). In this area, the free movement of persons should be ensured, in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and migration, as well as preventing and combating crime. The European Parliament has gradually acquired equal legislative powers with the Council of Ministers, in an area that was previously intergovernmental. This contributes to better law-making, trust and legitimacy in the area of justice and home affairs. The policy agenda in the area of migration and security was, however, fundamentally reshaped following the rapid rise in the number of asylum seekers and irregular migrants arriving in the EU in 2015, and a string of terrorist attacks. Despite these challenges, surveys show that citizens expect the EU and its Member States to deliver an AFSJ, notably in the area of free movement, immigration and the fight against terrorism.

In October 2016, the European Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee requested the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) produce a ‘cost of non-Europe Report’ on the AFSJ. This blogpost introduces a briefing on the series of analyses produced by EPRS in response to this request, covering asylum, border control and visa policy (forthcoming), legal migration, the fight against organised crime and corruption, and terrorism, as well as procedural rights and detention conditions, equality and the fight against racism and xenophobia.

State of play

Substantial progress has been made since the EU declared its aim of creating an area of freedom, security and justice 20 years ago. In particular, the Schengen Borders Code abolishes internal border controls except under specific circumstances and provides EU Member States with common rules that govern external border controls and entry requirements. In addition, the EU has developed a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Furthermore, the EU aims at building a comprehensive immigration policy. Several EU directives have facilitated third country nationals’ admission and residence in an EU Member State. The EU also established security measures ranging from those coordinating crime prevention to police and judicial cooperation. Moreover, the EU supports operational cooperation between national law enforcement authorities through the exchange of information contained in a number of EU and national information systems. Beyond the right to asylum, the EU has developed common standards in other areas of fundamental rights. These standards include non-discrimination, data protection, the free movement and residence of EU citizens, and the rights of victims and suspected and accused persons. Finally, a number of EU agencies support national authorities in these areas.

Gaps, barriers and their impacts

However, the various cost of non-Europe reports point to a number of gaps and barriers. In particular, there is a lack of consistent monitoring and enforcement of EU values and norms. The root causes are to be found in weaknesses in the existing EU legal and policy framework on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights. Lower fundamental rights standards have a negative impact on mutual trust between Member States, which is based on the presumption that an independent judiciary enforces these standards and that the material conditions are in place that allow for the effective exercise of fundamental rights. In addition, respect for the rule of law presents a necessary condition for economic transactions. The lack of enforcement is also felt in the particular policy areas covered by the AFSJ.

Furthermore, the reports identify a number of outstanding gaps in the EU’s framework in certain areas:

• a permanent, robust and effective Union response regarding search and rescue operations at sea;
• a framework that would allow legal entry in the EU for the purpose of applying for international protection;
• a framework on legal migration covering all third country nationals;
• EU criminal policy preparation more comprehensively involving the European Parliament and national parliaments;
• EU legislation covering individuals who are discriminated against on the basis of their religion and belief, sexual orientation, disability and age outside employment;
• EU legislation protecting suspects throughout the criminal procedure, including during the pre-trial detention phase.

These deficiencies have a significant impact at individual level, notably in terms of preventing the effective exercise of fundamental rights by EU citizens and third country nationals alike. For example, negative impacts accumulate along the asylum journey, resulting in the tragic loss of life in the Mediterranean in the pre-arrival phase and further violations in the arrival, application and post application phases. Discrimination has serious impacts on individuals. A denial of rights, material and immaterial damage, health status, and a loss of earnings, among other impacts, are just a number of problems they face. These deficiencies also have a negative effect on budgetary spending, growth and tax revenue, which is estimated at at least €180 billion annually, with the lack of enforcement of EU values still to be assessed in more detail.

Policy options

Further EU action in four main areas would have significant benefits:

1. Monitoring and enforcement of EU values through an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights;
2. Creating safe legal pathways for migrants and asylum-seekers to enter the EU, respectively though a binding immigration code and EU legislation on humanitarian visas;
3. Instilling a European law enforcement culture; and
4. Completing the Union’s fundamental rights framework, notably through the adoption of the ‘horizontal’ anti-discrimination directive and a directive on the substantive criteria and procedural requirements related to pre-trial detention;

In particular, this could allow individuals to fully enjoy their fundamental rights and make EU society more secure, open, fair and prosperous. This would also foster trust in the EU on the basis of its ability to deliver on its aims.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Area of freedom, security and justice: Cost of non-Europe‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Kentoh / fotolia

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens on the election of the President of the European Commission and the process known as ‘Spitzenkandidaten‘ or ‘lead candidates’.

Under the Treaty on European Union, EU leaders in the European Council propose the candidate for the President of the European Commission. However, EU leaders need to do so while ‘taking into account’ the results of the European elections and ‘after having held the appropriate consultations’ (Article 17.7 of the Treaty). The European Parliament then elects the Commission President by a majority of its members (376 of 751 votes).

In 2014, European political parties appointed lead candidates for the European Parliament elections (sometimes referred to as Spitzenkandidaten, in German); with the presidency of the Commission going to the candidate from the largest political group in the European Parliament. This process led to the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President.

In 2019, the European Parliament is committed to repeating the lead candidate process, with the presidency of the Commission going to the candidate capable of gathering sufficient parliamentary support. The European Parliament made clear that it stands ready to reject any candidate who was not appointed as a lead candidate. While the Commission and its President have equally expressed strong support for the lead candidate process, the European Council has emphasised that it has the autonomous competence to nominate the candidate, and insisted that ‘there is no automaticity in this process’.

Ahead of the 2019 European elections, seven European political parties have put forward one or several lead candidates for the presidency of the European Commission. You can find out more on who they are on the European Parliament website.

Continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Further information

• Election of the President of the European Commission: Understanding the Spitzenkandidaten process, European Parliamentary Research Service, 2019.
• European Parliament position on the lead candidate process, European Parliament, 7 February 2018.

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

As a result of conflict and protracted crises, 200 million people are currently in need of international humanitarian assistance around the world. Providing timely and adequate assistance to everyone who needs it is an increasingly challenging task, due to the growing needs of people and the complex nature of the crises. To make things worse, billions of dollars are still needed to close the funding gap. All of this places the humanitarian system under considerable strain. Can technology help to do more with less?

Technological innovations are perceived as an enabler in preventing such crises and helping to reduce human suffering during crises. A new STOA study analyses the impact of technological innovations in humanitarian assistance as transformative tools for both people in need and humanitarian actors. Although humanitarian innovations go beyond ICT, such as new shelter, sanitation and water solutions, this study is oriented towards ICT-enabled improvements. The technologies are considered to be part of preparedness, response, and recovery, reconstruction and risk reduction activities. The study provides an overview of the current state-of-play and developments with regard to ICT-related innovation in humanitarian assistance, and lists a number of options for policy-makers to further technological innovation in humanitarian assistance.

overview of technologies assessed in the study

Technological innovation in humanitarian assistance

ICT technologies and digitalisation are not new to the humanitarian domain. Nevertheless, ongoing developments in the field and the ubiquity of technologies such as mobile devices, are fundamentally transforming humanitarian assistance. The availability and use of mobile phones and social media platforms by people affected by humanitarian crises; geospatial technologies and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs, drones) to detect crises; biometric identification to facilitate humanitarian support; a shift to digital payments with e-vouchers and mobile money as relief provisions, are just some examples. Embracing technological innovation is a way forward to better address the needs of those affected by crises and the challenges of providing humanitarian assistance. Interpretations of what this entails however vary among actors. For example, some may focus more on the ‘innovation process’, whereas others focus on ‘technology’ and its ‘adoption’. There is also an ongoing discussion on ethics, technical standards and responsible innovation, as well as ‘information as a right’ in the humanitarian domain. In addition, involving local communities and capabilities is important to foster local ownership and engagement.

Transformative nature of technologies and how to make the most of them

Technological innovation in humanitarian assistance is maturing and growing, and this has led to an increasing awareness of challenges and opportunities in the field. Innovation transforms the way in which humanitarian assistance is organised and executed, it redefines relationships between actors in the field and it affects financial flows. It can facilitate new ways of addressing the humanitarian funding gap. It also enables a shift of focus from response and recovery to prevention and preparedness and offers opportunities for increased local ownership and engagement. However, the use of technological innovation in humanitarian assistance raises serious concerns about inclusiveness and the protection of the most vulnerable due to privacy and cybersecurity issues, and it requires shared technological standards. Additionally, the use of technological innovation requires different ways of working, skills and capabilities of institutional and individual actors.

The study lists and explains a number of policy options to further technological innovation in humanitarian assistance. These are divided in three categories: (1) those related to ‘objectives’ of technological innovation; (2) those that focus more on the technological innovation ‘process’; and (3) those related to ‘implementation’ of technological innovation.

The above points are the main conclusions of the recently published STOA study on technological innovation in humanitarian aid. Requested by Enrique GUERRERO SALOM (S&D, ES) through the Committee on Development (DEVE), the study was carried out by Capgemini Netherlands, under STOA management. A list of sources complements the study, which draws on information and feedback collected during 11 interviews with various experts on the topic.

If you read the study, please get in touch via email to let us know what you think. Your opinion counts for us.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Simon Schroecker,

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Just two weeks before the European elections, EU-27 Heads of State or Government met on 9 May 2019 in the Romanian city of Sibiu, to discuss the Union’s common future. They adopted the Sibiu Declaration, recalling the achievements and values of the European Union. EU leaders reaffirmed their unity, and recognised the role they have to play to make the EU stronger and the future brighter. They also discussed the forthcoming Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024, which will outline policy priorities for the next five years. The European Council President, Donald Tusk, suggested a process for the forthcoming appointments to a set of high-level EU positions, and called a special summit for 28 May.

1. Background to the Sibiu Summit: The Future of Europe debate

The Sibiu Declaration and the preparation of the Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 at the Sibiu Summit constitute the final stage of the Future of Europe debate, launched after the UK referendum on EU membership in June 2016. This process has seen milestones, such as the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap in 2016 and the Rome Declaration in 2017, and also triggered the Future of Europe debates in the plenary of the European Parliament throughout 2018 and early 2019.

This summit in Sibiu has been on the political agenda since the 2017 State of the Union speech by the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker. His initial suggestion had been to schedule the meeting for 30 March, conceiving it as the first meeting after the UK’s departure. It would thus be an opportunity for EU leaders ‘to take first decisions by unanimity on the Future of Europe’, and to choose one of the five options outlined in the European Commission’s white paper. However, the Commission and the European Council had a different understanding of the purpose of the Sibiu Summit. For the European Council, the Sibiu Summit was essentially designed to assess the implementation of previously set objectives and to reflect on future EU policy action in the up-coming five years. In its contribution to the Sibiu Summit, the Commission, whilst recalling its white paper and the five scenarios, finally came into line with the European Council’s approach and made 10 policy recommendations for the new strategic agenda. Following the extension of the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 (at the latest) by the European Council (Article 50) on 15 April 2019, the UK remains a member of the EU although its prime minister did not attend this summit.

2. The Sibiu Summit

The 27 EU leaders adopted the Sibiu Declaration and discussed an outline for the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda prepared by President Tusk. Following the address by the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the first working session dealt with the EU’s external dimension, with the EU High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, participating. A second session addressed the EU’s internal dimension.

According to the Leaders’ Agenda, the Heads of State or Government were also due to look at the implementation of the Agenda at the meeting in Sibiu. In the end, EU leaders decided not to carry out such an assessment of past action. Analysis by EPRS shows that the Leaders’ Agenda can be assessed rather favourably, as it has enabled a more structured approach to work and better preparation by all actors concerned. However, it did not fulfil a core objective of enabling deadlocks on the most sensitive issues, such as migration and taxation, to be overcome.

High-level appointments

At the Sibiu Summit, President Tusk informed EU leaders on how he intends to proceed to reach agreement in a ‘swift, smooth and effective way’ on the new EU leadership. He underlined that the rules set in the Treaties were to be followed for the appointments of the President of the European Council (Article 15(5) TEU), the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (18(1) TEU) and the President of the European Central Bank (283(2) TFEU), as well as for the proposal of a candidate for the President of the European Commission (17(7) TEU). President Tusk added that the nominations for the new EU leadership should reflect the EU’s demography and geographical balance, but also gender and political balances. Finally, he stressed that these decisions were to be taken by consensus, if possible, but that he ‘would not shy away from putting [them] to the vote’ if needed. To conclude the process in time for the June European Council, he has called a meeting of all 28 EU leaders on 28 May, just after the European elections.

Situation in Cyprus

At the summit, the President of Cyprus, Nicos Anastasiades, informed EU leaders about the Turkish drilling activities within the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. Donald Tusk, speaking on behalf of the EU leaders, underlined that ‘the European Union stands united behind the Republic of Cyprus and expects Turkey to respect sovereign rights of the EU Member State. The European Council will continue to follow these developments closely.’

Views of the European Parliament President: Antonio Tajani stressed that, to be able to meet the challenges of tomorrow, the EU needed institutional reforms that make ‘decision-making processes more democratic and transparent and the EU and its institutions more accountable, as well as enhancing its efficiency and effectiveness’. The Parliament should be granted the right of legislative initiative, and its powers of scrutiny –in particular its right of inquiry – should be strengthened. The Council should be ‘made a genuine legislative chamber, on an equal footing with Parliament, and increased transparency be injected into its decision-making processes’. Moreover, unanimous voting in the Council ‘presents an almost insurmountable obstacle to major decisions at key times’ and ‘must be abandoned as soon as possible’. He also stressed that ‘the European Council has extended its own rights of political initiative in response to recent crises, sometimes encroaching into the legislative field’. Many of these reforms can be achieved by exploiting the Lisbon Treaty to the full, while other reforms would require Treaty changes. He reiterated the EP’s view that ‘the Union must tackle the challenges of its future with greater and better political integration’, and called on ‘Heads of State or Government to pursue this path in a renewed spirit of solidarity and collaboration’.

3. Sibiu Declaration

The Sibiu Declaration, adopted by the 27 EU Heads of State or Government, outlines ten commitments which should help EU leaders to make the EU ‘stronger and [the] future brighter, while recognising the European perspective of other European States’. The commitments are:

• Defending one Europe – from East to West, from North to South;
• Staying united, through thick and thin;
• Always looking for joint solutions;
• Protecting the European way of life, democracy and the rule of law
• Bringing the Union closer to its citizens;
• Reducing disparities [among Europeans];
• Providing the Union with the means to achieve its objectives;
• Safeguarding the future for the next generation;
• Protecting EU citizens;
• Being a responsible global leader.

The aim of the declaration was not to define specific objectives, but to list principles which summarise the spirit of European cooperation and integration. The Sibiu Declaration repeats pledges already part of the Bratislava Declaration and Roadmap and the Rome Declaration, without being specific on how they want to achieve them and therefore was perceived by some as ‘empty’.

The ten commitments also reflect some core messages expressed by EU Heads of State or Government in the framework of the Future of Europe debates in the European Parliament, notably the added value of being a Member of the EU; the need for EU Member States to face the major challenges together, the need to preserve EU unity, the significance of common European values; and the important role of European citizens and the need to better communicate with them.

4. The forthcoming Strategic Agenda 2019-2024

In accordance with the European Council’s role, as defined in Article 15(1) TEU, which is to ‘provide the Union with the necessary impetus for its development’ and to define its ‘general political directions and priorities’, the EU-27 Heads of State or Government intend to adopt the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda at their next meeting, on 20-21 June 2019. To that end, they had a first informal debate on the direction for future EU action at their Leaders’ Meeting in Sibiu. The new working method of the European Council, as introduced under the Leaders’ Agenda, promotes open and informal debates among EU leaders, stimulated by the use of Leaders’ Notes, with the aim of facilitating consensus on sensitive political issues. The outcome of these informal Leaders’ Meetings is then translated into formal European Council conclusions at a subsequent meeting.

The Leaders’ Agenda note, ‘Strategic Agenda 2019-2024 – outline’, provides a first overview of the topics which could be part of the Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024. It is organised around four policy clusters:

• Protecting citizens and freedoms;
• Developing our economic base: the European model for the future;
• Building a greener, fairer and more inclusive future; and
• Promoting Europe’s interests and values in the world.

Each policy cluster includes four general policy objectives, which again include two to four more specific policy objectives. But, as underlined by President Tusk, ‘this debate … will also be influenced by the European Parliament elections’. When comparing this outline with recent reflections by the Commission and the Parliament (see Table), one can see that the policy priorities outlined are quite similar, and reflect the concerns of EU citizens as emerging from recent Eurobarometer polls). Although many of these policy areas were already part of the Strategic Agenda 2014-2019 and among the Commission’s ten priorities, one can observe a shift in orientation, reflecting the changing and more unpredictable international environment. Whilst President Tusk stressed that ‘the rule of law will be in the centre of attention of the next strategic agenda’, eight Member States called for the fight against climate change to be the cornerstone of future EU policy. The eight spoke in favour of phasing out GHG emissions by 2050, and advocated that at least 25 % of EU budget spending be earmarked for projects contributing to that objective.

Table: EU institutions’ priorities for the forthcoming Strategic Agenda 2019-202

Read the complete Briefing: ‘Outcome of the informal meeting of EU-27 leaders on 9 May 2019 in Sibiu‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis and Ralf Drachenberg,

© European Union, 2019 – EP.

The debates held in the European Parliament on the Future of Europe offered a unique opportunity for Heads of State or Government to present their views on the future direction that the EU-27 should take. This exercise showed, on the one hand, that the question of which policy areas are of compelling importance differs among the speakers, and, on the other hand, that they have converging views on many issues. A premise on which all speakers agreed is the added value of EU membership, due to either the economic or the security benefits deriving from it. All the speakers considered that the challenges of the 21st century cannot be solved by Member States acting individually, regardless of their size or economic prosperity. In this sense, all speakers underlined the need for unity of the EU, referring also to EU values that need to be preserved, while the origin of such values is believed to come from different sources.

The will to recognise the EU’s added value brought some speakers to emphasise the need to strengthen the link between the EU apparatus and European citizens. Some speakers want to see citizens more involved in the EU decision-making process, others want to have them better informed of the EU’s achievements. The debates revealed little desire for Treaty reforms, therefore improvements should be based on the current legal set-up. When it comes to the identification of policy needs, speakers mostly mentioned migration, climate change and security as the three main areas of priority. Here, however, as in other policies too, the extent to which the EU should be involved diverges among speakers. Another contentious point remains whether to abandon the unanimity principle and if so, in which areas. The analysis also showed that sometimes the choice of topics (e.g. unemployment) was due not only to the specific political affiliations of the speaker but also to general international events (e.g. trade dispute with the US) or to the issue being on the agenda at EU level (e.g. Spitzenkandidaten). The debates also offered a platform for Heads of State or Government to put forward their own proposals. Indeed, new – albeit potentially contradictory – ideas came from speakers on policy-related fields as well as on broader institutional matters.

As for the key policy areas covered in this paper, in the field of EMU, divergences persist between risk-reduction approaches (i.e. balanced budgets and a healthy banking system), and positions emphasising the need for solidarity among Member States. Migration proves to be unanimously an area where a common EU strategy is needed, although differences persist on the reform of the common European asylum system (CEAS) and the dichotomy of positions stressing solidarity or flexibility. On the social dimension, the majority of speakers who spoke on the issue supported the European Pillar of Social Rights. While most said that social and welfare policies should be prioritised at EU level, some proposed an EU minimum wage or unemployment insurance. On trade, the majority of speakers addressing the issue highlighted the need to avert protectionism or nationalist approaches while better protecting EU strategic interests and preserving social and environmental standards. Regarding the multiannual financial framework (MFF), those who addressed the size of the EU budget were fairly balanced in wanting to reduce it, enlarge it or in general set it in line with EU needs. Here, again, speakers were divided on whether to maintain spending unchanged on structural and cohesion policies. On security and defence, the speakers showed a high degree of convergence on the need for security and defence, owing to the external threats the EU faces. While the transatlantic link and multilateralism remain significant factors, most leaders also highlighted the importance of permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF). The institutional aspects of security and defence remain contentious however. The leaders’ positions on climate change and energy testified to the supranational nature of these challenges. The reduction of carbon emissions and achievement of a carbon neutral economy by 2050 were debated together with the need to promote renewable energy, diversify supplies and boost energy efficiency. On institutional aspects, speakers prioritised the need for greater citizen involvement. Views on the need for ‘more’ or ‘less’ Europe were mixed.

Read the complete In-depth Analysis on ‘The Future of Europe debates in the European Parliament, 2018-19: A synthesis of the speeches by EU Heads of State and Government‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

© fotolia

The Leaders’ Agenda, adopted by the EU Heads of State or Government on 20 October 2017, was designed both as a contribution to the realisation of the objectives set out in the ‘future of Europe’ debate and as a concrete work programme for the European Council up to June 2019. The main feature of the Leaders’ Agenda is the introduction of new working methods to enable consistent follow-up on the policy objectives outlined in the Bratislava and Rome declarations, previous milestones in the future of Europe debate. It notably increased the number and formats of meetings, and introduced a new approach to the discussions among EU Heads of State or Government.

This method has allowed an open debate among EU leaders on sensitive political issues at informal Leaders’ meetings, with the aim of facilitating consensus, which would be followed up through the adoption of formal European Council conclusions at subsequent meetings. The informal debates were stimulated by the use of Leaders’ notes, which outline the main challenges and sticking-points on a specific topic. In this sense, the Leaders’ Agenda can be seen as the operational follow-up to the Bratislava and Rome declarations. Ahead of the expected discussion on the implementation of the Leaders’ Agenda at the 9 May 2019 Sibiu summit, one can conclude that the Leaders’ Agenda was a rather successful approach, which introduced a more structured framework to the proceedings in the European Council and generally improved decision-making, whilst also sustaining unity among EU leaders when the Union faced the unprecedented challenge of the departure of a Member State. This notwithstanding, it seems that the Leaders’ meetings and Leaders’ notes, the purpose of which was to serve as consensus-building tools, have not been used to their full potential. However, a follow-up to this Leaders’ Agenda would be advisable in the next institutional period, while taking the lessons learned into consideration.

At the core of the Leaders’ Agenda is the objective of preserving unity, which can be considered as the red line running through Donald Tusk’s term in office as European Council President, at least since the United Kingdom (UK) referendum on EU membership. This assessment distinguishes between achieving unity (on a piece of legislation or in a given policy area) and maintaining unity between Member States when the EU faces a major challenge. While the European Council was rather successful in maintaining this unity, in particular with respect to Brexit, it has a more mixed record in achieving unity on certain other topics, such as migration, where Member States have very different positions.

Moreover, the Leader’s Agenda emphasised the importance of taking account of citizens’ views when shaping a common future for Europe. The three policy areas – migration, security and unemployment – indicated by President Tusk as priorities under the Leaders’ Agenda, also reflected the three main concerns of EU citizens, as expressed in Eurobarometer surveys at the time.

Now that the end of the life-span of the Leaders’ Agenda is approaching, one can indeed observe that most of the policy priorities included in the Bratislava and Rome declarations have figured on the agenda of meetings of EU Heads of State or Government and been debated to varying degrees, either as part of the formal European Council, the Leaders’ Agenda meetings or the Euro Summits.

As we approach the 2019 European Parliament elections, EU leaders ought more than ever to be encouraged ‘to draw inspiration from new ideas’ that have arisen from citizens’ dialogues and consultations, in which, under the Leaders’ Agenda, they have voluntarily agreed to participate and to conduct. Whether and to what extent the citizens’ views will be reflected in the output of the Sibiu summit, and the European Council’s subsequent new strategic agenda, remains to be seen.

Read the complete In-depth analysis on ‘Assessing the Leaders’ Agenda‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot and Wolfgang Hiller,

© European Union, 2019; EP – Michel Christen

As the European Parliament reaches the end of its 2014-2019 mandate and the European Commission approaches the end of its term, it is timely to look back at the commitments made by the Juncker Commission when it took office in 2014 and assess to what extent it has delivered. Since 2014, this biannual publication has regularly assessed, quantitatively and qualitatively, the Juncker Commission’s performance on the basis of its own standards. This final issue in the series covers the past semester and before, reporting on the Juncker Commission’s term as a whole, examining what the EU institutions have been able – or not – to collectively enact.

The 2014 priorities

Prior to his election as President of the European Commission in July 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker set out the policy priorities that would serve as the political mandate for his term in office. The aim was to make a difference and deliver concrete results for citizens, on each of the following 10 priorities:

1. A new boost for jobs, growth and investment
2. A connected digital single market
3. A resilient energy union with a forward-looking climate change policy
4. A deeper and fairer internal market with a strengthened industrial base
5. A deeper and fairer economic and monetary union (EMU)
6. A reasonable and balanced free trade agreement with the United States
7. An area of justice and fundamental rights based on mutual trust
8. Towards a new policy on migration
9. Europe as a stronger global actor
10. A union of democratic change.

Changes and challenges every year

Since President Juncker and the college of commissioners took office in November 2014, every year has brought its share of changes and challenges, some unexpected in their extent, others in their nature. To name just a few, 2015 started with a series of terrorist attacks that were to spread during that year and in subsequent ones and lead to a strengthened focus on security. Later that year, the record-high number of migrants and asylum seekers arriving in the European Union had a significant impact on both policy delivery and political balances at national and European levels. In 2016, the result of the Brexit referendum on the one hand, and the election of a new administration in the United States on the other, compelled the European Union to adapt its priorities, both internally and externally, with major impact in several key areas, from security and defence to trade. While these developments have continued to unfold, they have been joined by additional challenges – such as ensuring energy independence, guaranteeing the respect of the rule of law in each Member State, or strengthening the economic and monetary union –each affecting many, if not all, of the others, and ultimately leading to a reshuffling of the agenda.

As a political player, the European Commission was faced with two imperatives: on the one hand, continue to deliver what it had announced and committed to tabling, and on the other hand, adapt its response and initiatives to an ever-changing environment. It did so through its annual work programmes and the announcements made in the State of the Union addresses. This publication assesses the Commission’s delivery with regards to both initial and subsequent sources of commitments.

To what extent has the European Commission delivered?

Overall, this in‑depth analysis reveals that while two thirds of the proposals tabled by the European Commission were adopted by the end of the legislature, almost one third had not reached agreement and one out of ten had been withdrawn. Progress varies from one policy field to another. With regard to the tabling of proposals, the rate is the highest in areas such as internal market, migration, and the union of democratic change. As for adoption of proposals by the co‑legislators, in some priority areas, such as the digital single market, the internal market, justice and fundamental rights, and Europe as a stronger global actor, almost three quarters of the proposals submitted have been adopted; in others, such as jobs, growth and investment, or trade, progress was much slower (around one third adopted). Overall, however, evidence suggests that, step by step, the European institutions have collectively enacted the ‘Juncker plan’.

Read the complete In-depth analysis on ‘The Juncker Commission’s ten priorities: An end-of-term assessment‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Martin Russell,

© krutenyuk / Fotolia

Among the Western Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership, Serbia is seen as a frontrunner in terms of its democratic institutions, level of economic development and overall readiness for accession. However, in November 2018 opposition politician, Borko Stefanović, was beaten up by thugs, triggering a wave of protests that has spread across the country. Week after week, thousands have taken to the streets, accusing Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of authoritarian rule, attacks on independent media, electoral fraud and corruption.

Although the protests only started recently, they highlight worrying longer-term trends. Press freedom has been in decline for several years, particularly since Vučić became prime minister in 2014. A large part of the media is now controlled either directly by the state or by pro-SNS figures. Independent journalists face threats and even violence, and perpetrators are rarely convicted.

In the National Assembly, the governing coalition uses its parliamentary majority to systematically block meaningful discussions of legislative proposals. In protest, the opposition started a boycott of plenary debates in February 2019.

The tone of verbal attacks by SNS politicians and their allies on independent media, the political opposition and civil society is often virulent. Criticising government policy is framed as betrayal of Serbian interests. The aim seems to be to marginalise critical voices while concentrating power in the hands of the SNS-led government. Elected to the mainly ceremonial role of president in 2017, Vučić nevertheless remains the dominant figure.

If Serbia’s drift towards authoritarianism continues, it could become a major obstacle to EU accession, for which 2025 has been mentioned as a possible date.

Read the complete Briefing: ‘Serbia at risk of authoritarianism?‘ on the Think Tank website of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

©Rashad Ashur/Shutterstock

The expected benefits of algorithmic decision systems (ADS) may be offset by the variety of risks they present for individuals (discrimination, unfair practices, loss of autonomy), the economy (unfair practices, limited access to markets), and society as a whole (manipulation, threat to democracy). A significant factor in the adoption of algorithmic systems for decision-making is their capacity to process large amounts of data sets, which are paired with machine learning methods to infer statistical models directly from the data. The same properties of scale, complexity and autonomous model inference, however, are linked to increasing concerns that many of these systems are opaque to the people affected by their use and lack clear explanations for the decisions they make. This lack of transparency risks undermining meaningful scrutiny and accountability, which is a significant concern when these systems are applied as part of decision-making processes that can have a considerable impact on people’s human rights (e.g. critical safety decisions in autonomous vehicles, or allocation of health and social service resources).

As a result, there is growing concern that, unless appropriate governance frameworks are put in place, the opacity of algorithmic systems could lead to situations where individuals are negatively impacted because ‘the computer says NO’, with no recourse to meaningful explanation, a correction mechanism, or recourse to compensation mechanisms. It is therefore necessary to establish clear governance frameworks for algorithmic transparency and accountability, to ensure that the risks and benefits are equitably distributed in a way that does not unduly burden or benefit particular sectors of society.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published two studies on algorithmic accountability and transparency, both requested by STOA Chair, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece). The first study, ‘Understanding algorithmic decision-making: Opportunities and challenges‘, was carried out by the French National Research Institute for the Digital Sciences (Institut national de recherche en informatique et en automatique – Inria), and managed by STOA. It focuses on the technical aspects of ADS, and reviews the opportunities and risks related to their use. Beyond providing an up-to-date and systematic review of the situation, the study sketches policy options for reducing the ethical, political, legal, social and technical challenges and risks related to ADS.

The authors argue that transparency should not be seen as the ultimate solution for users or people affected by the decisions made by an ADS, since source code is illegible to non-experts. ‘Explainability’ is shown to have different meanings and the needs vary considerably according to the audience. It is also important to note that the requirements for explainability vary from one ADS to another, according to the potential impact of the decisions made and whether the decision-making process is fully automated. Although transparency and explainability are essential for reducing the risks related to ADS, the study argues that accountability is the most important requirement as far as the protection of individuals is concerned. In fact, transparency and explainability may allow for the discovery of deficiencies, but do not provide absolute guarantees regarding the reliability, security or fairness of an ADS.

Accountability can be achieved via complementary means, such as algorithmic impact assessments, auditing and certification. The main virtue of accountability is to put the onus on the providers or operators of the ADS to demonstrate that they meet the expected requirements. Accountability cannot provide an absolute guarantee either, but, if certification is rigorous and audits are conducted on a regular basis, potential issues can be discovered and corrective measures taken. In this perspective, the study suggests that oversight agencies and supervisory authorities should play a central role and it is critical that they have all the means they need to carry out their tasks at their disposal, notably the right to access and analyse the details of the ADS, including their source code and, if necessary, the training data.

The second study, ‘A governance framework for algorithmic accountability and transparency’, was carried out by the University of Nottingham, and managed by STOA. The study uses a series of real-life case studies to illustrate how a lack of fairness can arise, before exploring the consequences that such a lack of fairness can have, as well as the complexities inherent to trying to achieve fairness in any given societal context. The study describes ways in which lack of fairness in the outcomes of algorithmic systems might result from developmental decision-making and design features embedded at different points in the lifecycle of an algorithmic decision-making model. A connection is made between the problem of fairness and the tools of transparency and accountability, while highlighting the value of responsible research and innovation (RRI) approaches to pursuing fairness in algorithmic systems. Central to RRI is enabling an inclusive, reflexive and accountable innovation process through the involvement of relevant stakeholders throughout the entirety of the innovation life cycle. In relation to the development of algorithms, this would likely involve a contextualised consideration of an algorithm to determine the most relevant stakeholders, including the establishment of mechanisms such as stakeholder workshops and focus groups.

The study develops policy options for the governance of algorithmic transparency and accountability, based on an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory challenges posed by algorithmic systems. It begins from a high-level perspective on fundamental approaches to technology governance, then provides a detailed consideration of various categories of governance options, and finally reviews specific proposals for governance of algorithmic systems discussed in the existing literature. Based on an extensive review and analysis of existing proposals for the governance of algorithmic systems, the authors propose a set of four policy options, each of which addresses a different aspect of algorithmic transparency and accountability: (i) awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistle-blowers; (ii) accountability in public-sector use of algorithmic decision-making; (iii) regulatory oversight and legal liability; and (iv) global coordination of algorithmic governance.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via STOA@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

©Jirsak/Shutterstock

The spread of false information is not merely a reputational threat for news providers in general, but is a risk factor for democratic order. People are increasingly concerned about the influence of fake news on elections in the USA and Europe.

The recent surge of advances in artificial intelligence (AI) has opened up new opportunities in a wide range of different fields, including developments that suggest that the technology can be leveraged to tackle the ‘fake news’ problem. Given the limited capacity of manual fact-checking, automated content recognition (ACR) technologies have been promoted as a solution to identifying disinformation, fake news and other threats. Across the European Union, Member States, public bodies and private entities are combining technology and human expertise to tackle fake news. As they are based on algorithms, however, these technological initiatives may affect freedom of expression and media pluralism, and strengthen centralised control of what can be published online, given that the notion of ‘fake news’ is too vague to prevent a subjective and arbitrary interpretation.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published two studies on disinformation and artificial intelligence. The first study, under the title ‘Automated tackling of disinformation’, was carried out by EU DisinfoLab and managed by STOA. The study, requested by STOA panel member María Teresa Giménez Barbat (ALDE, Spain), maps and analyses current and future threats from online disinformation, alongside currently adopted socio-technical and legal approaches to countering these threats. The study also discusses the challenges of evaluating the effectiveness and practical adoption of these approaches. Drawing on and complementing existing literature, the study summarises and analyses the findings of scientific studies and policy reports in relation to detecting, containing and countering online disinformation and propaganda campaigns. It traces recent developments and trends, identifies significant new or emerging challenges, and addresses the potential policy implications of current socio-technical solutions for the EU.

This study first defines the technological, legal, societal and ethical dimensions of the disinformation phenomenon, and argues strongly in favour of adopting the terms ‘misinformation’, ‘disinformation’ and ‘malinformation’, instead of the ill-defined ‘fake news’. Next, it discusses how social platforms, search engines, online advertising and computer algorithms enable and facilitate the creation and spread of online disinformation. It also presents the current understanding as to why people believe false narratives, what motivates people to share them, and how they impact offline behaviour (e.g. voting). Drawing on existing literature, the study also summarises state-of-the-art technological approaches to fighting online misinformation. A brief overview of self-regulation, co-regulation and classic regulatory responses, as currently adopted by social platforms and EU Member States, complements the study. In addition, the study summarises civil-society and other citizen-oriented approaches (e.g. media literacy). The authors have also compiled a roadmap of initiatives from key stakeholders in Europe and beyond, spanning the technological, legal and social dimensions. Three in-depth case studies on the utility of automated technology in detecting, analysing and containing online disinformation complement their analyses. The study concludes with the provision of policy options and makes reference to the stakeholders best placed to act upon these at national and European level. The options include support for research and innovation on technological responses; improving the transparency and accountability of platforms and political actors over content shared online; strengthening media and improving journalism standards; and supporting a multi-stakeholder approach, including involving civil society.

The second study, entitled ‘Regulating disinformation with artificial intelligence’ was carried out by Vesalius College, Brussels, and managed by STOA. The study, requested by Isabela Adinolfi (EFDD, Italy) and Stelios Kouloglou (GUE, Greece), looks at the consequences of the use of AI and ACR systems in the fight against disinformation for freedom of speech, pluralism and democracy, reviews some of the key ideas from the field and highlights their relevance to European policy. The study examines the trade-offs involved in using automated technology to limit the spread of disinformation online and presents (self-regulatory to legislative) options for regulating ACR technologies in this context. The opportunities for the European Union as a whole to take the lead in setting the framework for designing these technologies in a way that enhances accountability and transparency, and respects free speech, are a particular focus.

The authors emphasise that disinformation is best tackled through media pluralism and literacy initiatives, as these allow diversity of expression and choice, whereas source transparency indicators are preferable over (de)prioritisation of disinformation. They advise against regulatory action that would encourage increased use of AI for content moderation purposes, without strong human review and appeal processes. The study argues that introduction, as soon as feasible, of independent appeal and audit procedures is necessary when platforms moderate content and accounts. There is scope for standardising notice and appeal procedures and reporting, and creating a self- or co-regulatory multi-stakeholder body, such as a ‘social media council’, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Council. As the Special Rapporteur, in the first-ever UN report that examines the regulation of user-general online content, recommends: this multi-stakeholder body could, on the one hand, have competence to deal with industry-wide appeals; and, on the other, work towards a better understanding and minimisation of the effects of AI on freedom of expression and media pluralism. The study concludes that, given the lack of independent evidence or detailed research in this policy area, greater transparency in the variety of AI and disinformation-reduction techniques used by online platforms and content providers must be introduced.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by Tania Latici,

© donfiore / Fotolia

Despite the recent turmoil in Britain’s defence establishment, it is in both the European Union and the United Kingdom’s interest to continue to have a deeply interlinked defence partnership.

The 2018 British National Security Capability Review states ‘Europe’s security is our security’. The expected departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union will not alter geography, and the UK will remain a European country. The UK and the countries of the EU share the same strategic environment and, by default, the same threats to their peace and security. Historically, pragmatically and geographically, they remain deeply linked from a security and defence perspective, and there is political consensus on the need to nurture this linkage. Official documents from the British government also confirm this: the UK is exiting the EU, not Europe.

In legal terms, after leaving the EU, the UK will become a third country to the EU and cooperation will continue on that basis. While the EU’s common security and defence policy has an established precedent in cooperating closely with third countries on missions and operations, albeit without providing them with decision-making roles, the EU’s new defence integration initiatives are currently exploring third party cooperation. As the UK played a founding role in developing the EU’s security and defence policy, it is naturally deeply interconnected with the other EU Member States in this area. As one of the EU’s biggest military powers, the UK brings a particularly valuable contribution and know-how to the field.

Both parties have made commitments to ensure as close as possible a partnership in foreign policy, security and defence matters. Can cooperation in the area of security and defence result in a positive post-Brexit tale?

Read the complete Briefing: ‘What role in European defence for a post-Brexit United Kingdom?‘ on the European Parliament Think Tank website.

© European Union 2019 – Source: EP – Daina Le Lardic.

As the only European Union institution elected directly, the European Parliament is at the heart of representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. Since its creation, the Parliament’s power and influence have evolved significantly, transforming it into a full-fledged legislative body and forum of discussion and engagement, whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity.

First of all, the Parliament does what most parliaments do – it adopts legislation, mostly together with the representatives of the national governments of the Member States (the Council). The number of areas in which the Parliament co-legislates with the Council has expanded greatly over time, and now includes policies concerning the EU internal market, environment, consumer protection, food safety, justice and home affairs, cohesion policy, transport, energy and many others. Law-making is also about international action. When the EU enters into an international agreement with a third country, for example, the Parliament must give its consent.

Next, the Parliament has power over the EU budget. This power is also shared with the Council, and its extent varies according to the different aspects of the EU financial system. Its role is less developed when deciding about the revenue side of the budget (own resources system), stronger in shaping the EU’s long-term spending priorities included in the multiannual financial framework, and stronger still in the context of the procedure for approving the implementation of the budget, known as the discharge procedure. The Parliament decides on the EU’s annual budget on equal terms with the Council.

a mapping of EP powers

Another important set of EP prerogatives concerns the scrutiny and control of the executive, namely the European Commission. The latter regularly reports to and informs the Parliament of its activities and responds to parliamentary questions. Moreover, the Parliament plays a crucial role in the appointment and dismissal process of the Commission. The most recent prominent illustration in this regard is the Spitzenkandidaten process, which led to the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President in 2014. The Parliament remains firmly committed to repeating and consolidating the process in 2019, and many European political parties have selected their lead candidates for the position of the next Commission President. After the election of the Commission President, and following parliamentary hearings with individual Commissioners-designate, the college of Commissioners as a whole must be approved by the Parliament before it can take office. The next Commission investiture process, which will take place not long after the 2019 European elections, will offer a major opportunity for the Parliament to shape the agenda of the Commission over the coming five years (2019-24). Besides its role in the Commission’s appointment, the Parliament may also force the resignation of the Commission (by a motion of censure), which is one of its oldest prerogatives.

In addition to adopting laws and overseeing the executive, the Parliament also has powers relating to the very nature of the EU and its institutional/constitutional foundations. Parliament’s consent is required before any new country joins the EU, and its consent to the withdrawal treaty is required before a country can leave the EU. The Parliament may initiate a Treaty revision process and must give its consent before it is decided that an EU Member State is breaching (or is about to breach) the values of the EU.

Finally, besides its formal legislative and scrutiny powers, the Parliament functions as a forum for debate and engagement, putting matters on the political agenda, debating and raising awareness. For example, since January 2018, the Parliament has hosted a number of national leaders invited to debate and share their visions on the ‘Future of Europe’.

Read the complete In-depth Analysis on ‘The power of the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati (EPRS) and Caterina Francesca Guidi (Globalstat, EUI),

European societies face a variety of political, economic, social and cultural challenges. The multiple crises that challenge Europe, from within and without, have recently put considerable stress on the solidarity between nations, one of the fundamental pillars of European integration. In the final approach to the 2019 European elections, the main objective of the ‘Living in the EU’ series is to highlight the relevance of solidarity within and across European societies, shedding light on the multifaceted state of wellbeing in EU Member States, and adding a global perspective whenever meaningful.

In any multilevel system of interconnected relations that builds on shared interests and security, such as that of the European Union, solidarity between nations supports the endurance of states and their stability thanks to negotiation, balancing, integration, and redistribution. Solidarity between EU Member States, alongside the desire for lasting peace between nations, was one of the driving forces, values and principles of the EU’s founding fathers. However, internal and external pressures are eroding the original idea of European integration, endangering solidarity in Europe, both as a constitutional value and as an administrative principle. Adding to the challenges of economic and social crises, populism and contestation in politics are attacking democracy, in several EU Member States, from within.

Against this backdrop, the democratic functioning of the European Union and its Member States, as well as their capacity to respond to the aspirations and needs of future generations are of central interest to the 2019 European election campaign. The new GlobalStat-EPRS series on ‘Living in the EU’ aims to inform citizens and policy-makers in the run-up to the 2019 elections of the central features that shape life in the EU. The series presents statistical data based on EPRS and GlobalStat research on six main themes:

Climate change and energy:

Economic prosperity and environmental protection are interdependent. Monitoring how Member States perform in terms of emissions and energy supply represents a key element in deciding upon action to prevent climate change.

  European Elections and Democracy:

Many Europeans show an increasing attachment to the EU and to its democracy. Could this herald a turnaround in the hitherto declining electoral turnout in Europe?

  Demography:

The EU population is ageing dramatically. While population growth is slowing, increasing old-age dependency ratios and east-west movement have serious implications for the economy, labour market, healthcare and pensions.

Asylum and Migration:

Migration from third countries plays an important role in shaping demography in the EU, but whether this can mitigate demographic challenges remains an open question.

  Economy:

The EU coordinates economic policy with its Member States annually. Trade, taxes, social contributions and consumption-related household expenditure combine to provide a picture of citizens’ wellbeing.

Education and Health:

Health and education are the responsibility of EU Member States, with the EU providing complementary support, particularly on cross-border issues. These indicators therefore demonstrate a range of national differences, with consequences for citizens.

 

The European Parliamentary Research Service has prepared these publications, in cooperation with Globalstat and the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in preparation for the ninth edition of ‘The State of the Union’ address on 2-4 May 2019. Top leaders and thinkers will gather in Florence, just weeks before the pivotal European elections, to debate and reflect on the democratic functioning of the European Union, its Member States, and their capacity to respond to the aspirations and needs of future generations, with special emphasis on 21st-Century democracy in Europe.

Written by Joanna Apap,

LAFFAN, Brigid

On 4 April, EPRS hosted, in Parliament’s Library Reading Room, the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 2019 Lecture – ‘How the EU27 came to be’, this year delivered by Professor Dr Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence.

Following a warm welcome from EPRS Director General Anthony Teasdale, Dr Emanuele Massetti, Co-Editor of the JCMS Annual Review and moderator of the event, explained that the Annual Review is a key component of the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS). It shares the JCMS’ overall aim of publishing high quality, innovative and accessible articles that advance debates in European and comparative regionalism studies. Within this common endeavour, the specific role of the Annual Review is to provide rigorous analyses of the most important events and/or trends that emerge year by year in the context of the European Union, including an Annual Lecture delivered by a leading scholar or practitioner.

The Annual Review covers the key developments in the European Union, its Member States, and acceding and/or applicant countries in the previous year, including important developments in the domestic or external arena that shape the political debates in Europe. In line with the ethos and inspiring principles of the JCMS, the Annual Review is a multidisciplinary outlet, open to all methodological and theoretical approaches.

In her lecture, Professor Brigid Laffan explained how the ‘Brexit shock’ came at a time when the EU had endured a series of crises that had seemed too much for the weakened Union to bear. The evening of 23 June 2016, as Professor Laffan highlighted, was a momentous one in the history of European integration. The electorate of a Member State, the United Kingdom (UK), made the decision to leave the EU by voting 52 % ‘leave’ to 48 % ‘remain’. The Brexit shock came at a time when the EU had endured both the acute crisis in the euro area and the 2015 refugee crisis, and the immediate reaction from the media was that this third crisis might lead to the disintegration of the EU, representing a ‘final straw’ for the weakened Union. To the contrary, however, the EU responded to the Brexit shock with resolve and a determination to protect the polity.

The EU’s immediate responses featured:

• Speedy EU collective framing on 24 June 2016:
  • President of the European Commission,
  • Presidents of the EU institutions,
  • Informal European Council at 27 on 29 June 2016.
• Survival of the Union: ‘We will stand strong and uphold the EU’s core values of promoting peace and the wellbeing of its peoples. The Union of 27 Member States will continue’.
• Unity: President of the European Council, Donald Tusk declared that ‘Today, on behalf of the 27 leaders, I can say that we are determined to keep our unity as twenty seven’.
• Process and orderly withdrawal under Article 50,
• United Kingdom as an embryonic ‘other’: the EU would negotiate the future relationship with the UK as a third country, and negotiations had to involve a balance of rights and obligations.

Professor Laffan explored what the EU response revealed about the Union, what membership means and the crucial difference between differentiation within the Union and as an external partner. Her aim was to understand and explain the Union response. Professor Laffan argued that Brexit is very revealing of the DNA of the European Union and the Union’s resolve to use its full capacity. In addition, Professor Laffan examined what Brexit helped reveal, through the EU’s response, about the Union, and the EU27’s actions since 2016 to reinforce its own inherent resilience.

Brexit revealed that the EU has become much more polity-like, unafraid of deploying power through the challenges of the multiple crises it faces. According to Professor Laffan, the EU showed a formidable capacity and is capable of deploying it collectively and strategically, particularly when its interinstitutional and Brussels/capitals networks work well – this enhances capacity. Finally, yet importantly, methods do matter. Unity after 2016 was not accidental – it was hard-won.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Eamonn Noonan, with Atte Ojanen,

EPRS round table – Study visit

April 2019 marked the launch of the new European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) report: ‘Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe’. The report is a result of a multi-year joint effort by key European institutions. The collaborative nature of the ESPAS process was also reflected in the launch event, which featured variety of stakeholders as speakers.

Lead author of the report, Florence Gaub, from EUISS, highlighted the report’s structure, focusing on ‘mega-trends’, ‘catalysts’ and ‘game-changers’. ‘Mega-trends’ refer to decade-long trends, which are extremely hard to alter, such as climate change and increasing connectivity. ‘Catalysts’ on the other hand are short-term trends that are more easily influenced. These include trends like technological progress, increasing trade and migration. Finally, informed by mega-trends and catalysts, ‘game-changers’ are the key decisions that will shape our common future. The most pressing game-changers include responses to climate change and the populist threat to democracies.

ESPAS Chair, Ann Mettler, from EPSC, depicted the report as a call to action. Despite the somber challenges, we are still in a position to take action and shape the future for the better. Importantly, the ESPAS process has fostered the role of foresight and preparedness throughout European decision-making. Trends such as the decline of democracy, a global power shift towards China, and growth in connectivity, are now more widely acknowledged. The report helps frame the discussion concerning global challenges, which is crucial given the next institutional cycle. Not only can we shape our own future, but the European Union is also a normative superpower, standing for human rights, democracy and equality in an increasingly uncertain world.

The report lays the groundwork for a serious debate about the future, as expressed by Jim Cloos, Deputy Director-General for General and Institutional Policy at the General Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers. It forces us to discuss Europe itself and its role in the world, rather than being trapped in a discourse on internal politics. Foresight is not a matter of predicting the future, but rather about framing issues, building a shared narrative and understanding. One cannot tackle the most challenging issues of the future without first agreeing what the problems themselves are. It is central therefore that the ESPAS report is not only circulated within the foresight community, but also finds its way into the hands of heads of states.

In spite of the grave challenges, one can also find a positive and motivating tone in the report. As Christian Leffler of EEAS noted, the EU is well positioned to respond to these challenges and provide stability for the world. Many of the problems are recognised in the institutions and policies of the Union, especially when compared to other global actors. While preparation and adaptation are still needed, the structural framework for effective response is in place. This is important given the contested and fragmented global context. The rules-based international order and multilateralism are giving way to competitive multi-plurality. The response lies in the EU’s strategic autonomy, ensuring the Union’s capacity to choose its own path.

The launch event also generated lively discussion. The severity of climate change, ‘de-growth’, the potential of Africa, the future of trade, and gender-balance figured in the questions from the audience. The questions highlighted the essence of foresight – reconciliation and balancing conflicting views. Ultimately, foresight is not a mere intellectual exercise, as these challenges are already affecting us profoundly. The launch day of this second ESPAS report marked the beginning of a new discussion, which aims to strengthen the culture of preparedness and anticipation throughout Europe.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the April II plenary session (the last of the current legislature) included debates on the conclusions of the April 2019 European Council meeting on the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, and the final debate in the series on the future of Europe with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Kisjanis Karins. Important debates also took place on the rule of law in Romania; failure to adopt an EU digital services tax; protecting the European elections against international cybersecurity threats; and on the possible extradition of Julian Assange. Members debated a number of external relations situations: in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe after cyclone Idai; in Libya; in Sudan; and US recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory. The legislative proposals adopted included those on collective investment funds, banking reform, prudential requirements, covered bonds, CO2 emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles, and promoting clean, energy-efficient vehicles. Members voted on a number of legislative proposals (see below), including a partial agreement on the Horizon Europe programme.

Protection of whistle-blowers

By a large majority, Members adopted the agreement reached with the Council on the long-awaited proposal for an EU directive giving whistle-blowers greater protection when they report on breaches of EU law (such as money laundering, or contravening environmental or food safety regulations).

Collective investment funds

Members debated and voted on proposals on collective investment funds, which pool investment capital in collective securities portfolios. While the EU provides passporting to ensure a wide range of cross-border distribution of investment funds, the EU market remains both small and national. The proposals align national rules and harmonise verification, creating economies of scale and opening up the market.

Prudential requirements and supervision of investment firms

Parliament voted to agree to an update of the current complex and inefficient EU regulatory framework for prudential supervision and requirements of investment firms, which facilitates savings and investment in EU capital markets, to take account of the size and nature of investment firms and the risks involved.

Transparent and predictable working conditions

Members debated and approved an interinstitutional agreement on proposals to reform labour market rules, ensuring transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU, to end the unfair employment practices that have affected EU citizens in the wake of the financial crisis.

Horizon Europe

An EU success story – the key role played by the Horizon 2020 programme in the first ever observation of a black hole – underlines the importance of EU research funding. Members debated and approved a partial agreement to establish and implement Horizon 2020’s replacement, the Horizon Europe programme, which could generate 100 000 new jobs, and could see 35 % of its budget allocated to climate objectives.

Market surveillance and compliance of products

Members debated and voted to adopt proposals encouraging fair competition between businesses and protecting consumer health and safety, through the market surveillance and compliance of products, with greater coordination of rules on surveillance of harmonised industrial products in the single market.

Fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation platforms

After debating proposals for a regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, Members voted to adopt an agreement on the proposals, which seek fairer contractual relations between online giants (such as Amazon and Google) and other online businesses (such as hotels or restaurants).

Food chain risk assessment transparency

In a direct response to citizens’ demands for improved public access to the scientific studies carried out on sensitive products and substances, notably regarding a ban on glyphosate, Members debated and adopted an agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on a regulation concerning the transparency and sustainability of risk assessment in the food chain.

Supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products

Due to the lengthy testing and trials necessary to obtain EU market approval, pharmaceuticals firms can extend the patent protection on their products through a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) for medicinal products. Members debated and adopted a compromise on proposals to improve the intellectual property rights regime for the industry, which suffers from competitive disadvantage in export markets.

Coordination of social security systems

Parliament decided not to close the first reading procedure on a regulation on social security system coordination, but to leave it to the next Parliament. The European Commission proposal seeks to: ensure benefits do not overlap; secure equal treatment; allow for aggregation of insurance, work or residence periods; and ensure benefits from one country can still be received if the citizen moves to another country.

European Border and Coast Guard

Members debated and approved a provisional agreement to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard, including measures to engage 5 000 EU border guards (from January 2021), with a further 5 000 operational staff by 2027. The changes aim to ensure uniform border management standards throughout the EU, and to provide more support for national authorities involved in managing migration and the fight against cross-border crime at the EU’s external borders.

EU Visa Code

Parliament debated and approved an agreement on the revision of the EU Visa Code, which would increase the visa fee to €80, simplify the procedures for requesting visas and harmonise multiple-entry visa rules. The proposals also seek non-EU country cooperation in re-admitting their illegally staying nationals.

Adapting legal acts to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU

Members approved a revision that would adapt legal acts to the Treaty of Lisbon. The proposal aligns ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny‘ (RPS) measures, from 64 basic acts, with the delegated acts procedure, where European Parliament and the Council have the right of veto and may revoke the delegation. However, agreement on a further 104 acts, and on acts in the justice policy field, will have to wait until the new legislative term.

Digital tools and processes in company law

Members debated and approved an agreement on measures to improve the use of digital tools and processes in company law, which should make it easier to set up and register a business in the EU, including greater use of online submission for official company documentation.

Covered bonds

Finally, Members debated and approved a compromise on proposals on covered bonds – debt securities issued by credit institutions, secured by a pool of mortgage loans or public sector debt. Covered bonds provide vital long-term finance for many EU Member States, channelling funds to the property market and the public sector. However, both use and regulation of these bonds varies greatly between EU countries, and a common definition is lacking.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

Asking ‘Is artificial intelligence a human rights issue?’, the workshop co-organised by STOA with the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on 20 March 2019, gathered academic experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), practitioners and representatives of international organisations to share their perspectives on exactly how artificial intelligence (AI) affects the protection and enjoyment of human rights. Despite the speakers’ diverse experiences, there was a consensus that AI poses a wide range of new risks for human rights that need to be addressed immediately. The panellists also agreed that there are no established methodologies yet to track the effects on human rights and to assess the potential for discrimination in the use of machine learning.

The workshop opened with a welcome address from STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), who highlighted that the workshop followed up on the recently adopted European Parliament resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics, and that its conclusions should feed into efforts to shape a socio-ethical framework for a human-centric approach to AI. She also emphasised the need to assess the capacity of the current universal human rights and EU ethical frameworks, to confront emerging governance challenges when it comes to the deployment and application of AI, and argued that Europe has the opportunity to shape the direction of AI, at least from a socio-ethical perspective.

Following the Chair’s remarks, the first panel kicked-off with Ekkehard Ernst, Chief Macroeconomist at the International Labour Organization analysing the four AI inequality challenges. He argued that AI intellectual property rights should be addressed as a way to decrease the unsustainable concentration of data and AI development in the hands of a few mega-corporations. Representing the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Joanna Goodey, Head of the Research and Data Unit, presented the work of FRA in this field, highlighting that the protection of human dignity should be prioritised and arguing that use of AI in the area of law enforcement can lead to discrimination. Dimitris Panopoulos, Co-founder of Suite5 Data Intelligence Solutions, presented the initial findings of the EU-funded project ChildRescue – Collective Awareness Platform for Missing Children Investigation and Rescue, emphasising that AI can also be used to protect the human rights of vulnerable population groups such as children.

Click to view slideshow.

The second panel, which was moderated by Marietje Schaake (ALDE, the Netherlands) focused on the impacts of AI on human rights through the presentation of real life case-studies. The first panellist, Silkie Carlo, Chief Executive of Big Brother Watch, shared her experience of working on real case studies in the United Kingdom that undermine the protection of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and non-discrimination. She highlighted that flaws in biometric facial recognition used by the Police in the UK can lead to misleading judgments, especially for minorities and women, and recommended that decisions that engage individuals’ human rights must never be purely automated. Lorena Jaume-Palasi, founder of the Ethical Tech Society a non-profit organisation analysing and evaluating processes of automation and digitisation regarding their social relevance, noted that it is not the technology itself, but its use that matters and argued for the need for more reflective oversight structures. In her presentation, she called for a paradigm shift in our approach towards information platforms’ terms of operation and in the principles and values that determine the access to platforms and the degree of their commercial character.

Lofred Madzou, Project Lead, AI & Machine Learning at the World Economic Forum, presented the work of the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and analysed the policy concerns associated with AI, such as the erosion of privacy, algorithmic bias and the abuse of surveillance that could, in his opinion, ‘affect our rights to stand up and protest if AI remains unregulated’. Marietje Schaake noted that algorithmic oversight for AI is urgently needed and that it is essential to ensure that the process of embedding ethical principles and values in AI-based decision-making systems is transparent and inclusive.

The third panel focused on the possible measures and remedies for safeguarding the protection of human rights in the context of AI. The panel was moderated by Michał BONI (EPP, Poland), who noted that Member States are gradually adopting their national AI strategies, but that this could lead to regulatory fragmentation. He therefore argued for the need for ethical certainty and stability for AI. Professor Aimee van Wynsberghe of TU Delft and Member of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, presented the preliminary results of the ongoing STOA study on a new ethical framework for AI. She noted that context and practice matter in our ethical analysis of AI, and recommended the introduction of data hygiene certification, ethics impact assessment and accountability reports. Fanny Hidvegi of Access Now and Member of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, presented a case study examining the use of AI-powered facial recognition tools for law enforcement purposes and recommended the adoption of strict standards for government use of AI. She emphasised that the design, development and deployment of AI and any AI-assisted technologies must be individual-centric and respect human rights. Can Yeginsu a Barrister with 4 New Square Chambers, noted that we do not yet have the potential to leave AI without any human intervention, and may need to ensure individual access to justice and even consider the establishment of an AI ombudsman to handle individual complaints associated with the use/misuse of AI.

Following the panel presentations, the audience raised several interesting questions, in particular regarding how to establish connections between AI, consent, surveillance and human rights, as well as whether the various EU-level ongoing or planned policy initiatives (such as the ethics guidelines for trustworthy artificial intelligence produced by the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI, the Commission communication on artificial intelligence for Europe, and the European Parliament resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics), are sufficient to safeguard a human rights lens in the governance of AI. In response, the panellists advocated an ethics-by-design approach that will facilitate the embedding of values such as transparency and explainability in AI development. They also noted that legally binding norms are needed in the field of AI-based decision-making processes, rather than soft-law instruments, and that EU legislators should consider the possibility of integrating a requirement for systematic human rights impact assessments, or even developing new legal mechanisms for redress/remedy for human rights violations resulting from AI.

If you missed out this time, you can access the presentations and watch the webstream of the workshop via the STOA events page.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© millenius / Fotolia

Having been a part of the European Community since 1973 through Denmark’s membership, Greenland withdrew from the European Community in 1985 after the island secured home rule from Denmark. Since then, Greenland has been associated with the European Union as an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT). The purpose of this association is ‘to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole’.

Various documents cover Greenland’s relations with the EU, including the 2014-2020 EU-Greenland Partnership Agreement that aims to contribute to the diversification of Greenland’s economy. The explicit political ambition is to ensure policy dialogue on global issues of common interest. The main areas of cooperation include education and training, energy, climate, environment and biodiversity, natural resources, maritime transport and research and innovation, in addition to Arctic issues.

As part of the partnership, and taking Greenland’s needs into account, the focal point of EU-Greenland financial cooperation is education and training, with a special emphasis on boosting the pre-school and elementary school system, as well as on providing support for vocational education and post-elementary education.

The EU allocates an indicative amount of €217.8 million (current prices) for financial cooperation with Greenland for the 2014-2020 period. The overarching aim of this financial cooperation is to contribute to an inclusive and coherent education system, while specific objectives focus on reducing inequality, improving the quality of the education system, and making it more efficient.

The EU budget channels financial cooperation with Greenland, contrary to the case for all other OCTs, which receive support from the European Development Fund. As regards the aid modality, the European Commission grants budget support for the implementation of the Greenland education programme, which is led by Greenland’s Ministry of Education, Church, Culture and Gender Equality, in cooperation with other ministries and stakeholders.

The evaluation of the 2014 Greenland Decision, which lays down rules for the EU-Greenland Partnership, fed into the mid-term review of the EU’s 2014-2020 external financing instruments (2017). This deemed the choice of education as the focal sector to be relevant to beneficiaries’ needs in Greenland: there is a broad consensus in Greenland that education is ‘the most relevant growth parameter’. The evaluation stressed that the fact that the education sector had been chosen by the Greenland government ensured strong support and ownership.

According to the evaluation, attempts to expand the official policy dialogue to include areas of mutual interest other than education had not yet been achieved. The document added that, while it was still too early to see a significant impact in terms of diversifying Greenland’s economy, the instrument had triggered positive dynamics and contributed to sustainable development by improving educational attainment.

On the basis of the assessment of current external financing instruments, the European Commission has proposed to streamline funding for OCTs and channel it entirely through the EU budget for the post-2020 programming period, with special arrangements for Greenland. The proposed resources for the years 2021 to 2027 amount to €500 million for all OCTs, including Greenland.

Read this briefing on ‘EU cooperation with Greenland‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf,

© Svyatoslav Lypynskyy / Fotolia

In 2014, around 122 million people were ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) in the 28 EU Member States– a quarter of the population. This means they were in at least one of the following situations: at risk of monetary poverty (17.2 % of the total population); living in households with very low work intensity (11.1 %); or severely materially deprived (9.0 %).

Since the onset of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, fighting poverty and social exclusion is a key priority for the European Union. One of the aims of the Europe 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ by at least 20 million by the end of the decade. Consequently, on 24 October 2012, the European Commission announced a proposal to set up a new Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) for the 2014-2020 period, to replace the EU’s food distribution programme for the most deprived (MDP).

The fund’s general objective is to promote and enhance social inclusion and therefore ultimately contribute to the goal of eradicating poverty in the Union. It seeks to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing non-financial assistance for the most deprived in conjunction with other EU funds, such as the European Social Fund (ESF), and with Member States’ national poverty eradication and social inclusion policies.

The EU contribution to the FEAD is more than €3.8 billion (in current prices) for the 2014‑2020 period. In addition, Member States are to co-finance at least 15 % of the costs of their national operational programmes (around €674 million), bringing the total resources channelled through the fund to approximately €4.5 billion.

The principal measures undertaken under the FEAD are:

• food support (distribution of food packages and meals to people in deprived situations, school lunches for children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, collection and distribution of donated food, etc.);
• material assistance (basic hygiene items for adults and children, basic household items, clothing, sleeping bags for the homeless, school supplies, etc.);
• accompanying measures to alleviate adversity through advice and guidance (regarding basic rights, nutrition and health, available social services and access to education services, temporary shelter for the homeless, etc.);
• social inclusion activities (improving access to existing support and social services, psychological support, training in self-reliance, language courses, etc.).

FEAD assistance is delivered via partner organisations (public bodies or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), selected by Member States on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.

On 27 March 2019, the mid-term evaluation of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived was published. It presents the FEAD’s main achievements for the period up to the end of December 2017. According to the report, between 2014 and 2017, the FEAD supported more than 12 million people per year and, during this period, more than 1.3 million tonnes of food were distributed. Social inclusion measures, meanwhile reached about 66 000 people. Given the FEAD’s very limited resources compared with other EU funds, the main conclusion of the mid-term evaluation is that there are strong arguments in favour of continuing the programme.

The European Court of Auditors is, however, much more severe in its evaluation of the programme’s first results. In its Special Report No 5/2019: FEAD-Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, published on 3 April 2019, the Court assesses whether the initial set-up of the FEAD and the Member States’ operational programmes effectively target the most in need and do contribute to the Europe 2020 poverty-reduction target. The Court points out that the fund remains primarily a food aid scheme, with 80 % of its budget devoted to food support. As a result, although the FEAD offers Member States the possibility to focus on social inclusion, those measures are scarcely implemented. The Court concludes by stating that the ability of the fund to reduce poverty has yet to be demonstrated.

Read this briefing on ‘Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.