European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Fotolia

The European Union’s key institutions held a joint annual conference on 14-15 October entitled ‘Challenges and Choices for Europe.’ The annual event was organised under the auspices of the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), which is a framework for cooperation between the administrations of the European Parliament, European Commission, Council of the European Union, European External Action Service and other bodies, to work together on medium- and long-term trends facing or relating to the European Union.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on longer term trends – global and regional, with a focus on Europe. Some reports listed here were presented at the conference, some other can be found in the ESPAS’ repository of strategic studies called Orbis.

Politics and security

ESPAS Report 2019: Global Trends to 2030
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2019

The MENA region: A great power competition
Atlantic Council, ISPI. October 2019

Europe’s new politics: Transnationalism vs. the nation
Friends of Europe, October 2019

Liberal overreach and the misinterpretation of 1989
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Arab futures 2.0
European Union Institute for Security Studies, September 2019

Toward a new EU democracy strategy
Carnegie Europe, September 2019

Tomorrow’s EU democracy: Giving citizens a say
Bertelsmann Stiftung, September 2019

The future of work in Africa : Harnessing the potential of digital technologies for all
World Bank Group, August 2019

The geopolitical implications of future oil demand
Chatham House, August 2019

The future of meta-geopolitical competition in outer space
stituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, July 2019

Walking on Thin Ice: A balanced Arctic strategy for the EU
European Political Strategy Centre, July 2019

The Eastern Partnership a decade on: Looking back, thinking ahead
European Union Institute for Security Studies, July19

Approaches to regional stability and the outlook for NATO
Instituto Affairi Internazionali, July 2019

Can regular replace irregular migration across the Mediterranean?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Munich Security Report 2019: ‘The great puzzle: Who will pick up the pieces?’
Munich Security Conference, February 2019

Social imbalances: How are you doing, Europe?
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin, Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2019

Comparing global trends in multidimensional and income poverty and assessing horizontal inequalities
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, February 2019

What if….? Scanning the horizon: 12 scenarios for 2021
European Union Institute for Security Studies, January 2019

The global risks report 2019
World Economic Forum, January 2019

Global Trends to 2030: New ways out of poverty and exclusion
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, January 2019

The Sino-Russian and US-Russian relationships: Current developments and future trends
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, December 2018

The future of work: A guide for Transatlantic policymakers
Bertelsmann Stiftung, December 2018

Migration and remittances: Recent development and outlook
Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, December 2018

Global Trends to 2030: The Future of migration and integration
Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

The future of warfare
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

Economy and energy

10 trends shaping the future of work in Europe
European Political Strategy Centre, October 2019

The single market remains the decisive power of the EU
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2019

Energy ambitions for Europe 2024
Centre on Regulation in Europe, September 2019

Digital ambitions for Europe 2024
Centre on Regulation in Europe, September 2019

The future of gas in Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2019

Making the Single Market work: Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe
European Policy Centre, August 2019

World resources report: Creating a sustainable food future
World Resource Institute, July 2019

The opportunities of the Modernisation Fund for the energy transition in Central and Eastern Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Political warfare: Competition in the cyber era
Wilfried Martens Centre, April 2019

How civil society can adapt to the fourth industrial revolution
World Economic Forum, April 2019

Russia’s social awakening: A new challenge for the EU
Carnegie Europe, April 2019

The Future of government 2030+: A citizen centric perspective on new government models
Joint Research Centre, March 2019

China’s military modernisation: Recent trends
Observer Research Foundation, March 2019

Legislating for a low carbon and climate resilient transition: learning from international experiences
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2019

The future of shale
Atlantic Council, January 2019

Future of consumption in fast-growth consumer markets: India
World Economic Forum, January 2019

10 trends reshaping climate and energy
European Political Strategy Centre, December 2018

The future of work
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Labour Research Service, December 2018

A new future for European industry
European Policy Centre, December 2018

The future of international trade and investment
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

Technology

Electric vehicles roll-out in Europe: Towards an improved regulatory regime
Centre on Regulation in Europe, October 2019

Cyber security: How GDPR is already impacting the public-private relationship
Real Instituto Elcano, October 2019

A vision for a sustainable battery value chain in 2030
World Economic Forum, September 2019

Alternate cybersecurity futures
Atlantic Council, September 2019

What is DARPA? How to design successful technology disruption
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, July 2019

Top 10 emerging technologies 2019
World Economic Forum, July 2019

How young people are shaping the future of sustainable fashion
World Economic Forum, April 2019

Chinese FDI in Europe: 2018 trends and impact of new screening politics
Mercator Institute for China Studies, March 2019

Users, data, networks: Taxing the digital economy
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin, Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2019

Trends in artificial intelligence and big data
European Strategy and Political Analysis System, January 2019

The task ahead of us: Transforming the global economy with connectivity, automation and intelligence
Information Technology and Innovation Foundation, January 2019

Is the European automotive industry ready for the global electric vehicle revolution?
Bruegel, December 2018

Artificial intelligence and the future of humans
Pew Research Centre, December 2018

How 5G will shape innovation and security
Centre for Strategic and International Studies, December 2018

Our shared digital future: Building an inclusive, trustworthy and sustainable digital society
World Economic Forum, December 2018

Utilization of scenarios in European electricity policy: The ten-year network development plan
Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, December 2018

Is the Internet eroding Europe’s middle ground?
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

Global Trends to 2030: Identities and biases in the digital age
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

Trends in Artificial Intelligence and big data
European Strategy and Policy Analysis System, 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Global and regional trends‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Micaela del Monte and Silvia Kotanidis,

© EC – Audiovisual Service

The hearings of the Commissioners-designate before the European Parliament’s committees took place between 30 September and 8 October 2019. The plenary vote on the entire Commission was originally planned for 23 October in Strasbourg, after a presentation by the Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen of the full College and its programme. However, three Commissioners-designate did not successfully complete the hearings process, making it necessary for three Member States to nominate new candidates and for committees to carry out new hearings. The new Commission will not, therefore, now be able to enter into office on 1 November, as scheduled. The outgoing Commission will thus remain in office until the formal appointment of its replacement, although questions arise as to its powers in that period.

Background

Following the election by Parliament of Ursula von der Leyen as President-elect of the Commission, her next step was to announce, after a decision taken in common accord with the Council according to Article 17(7) TEU, the names and portfolios of the Commissioners-designate. They then had to undergo public hearings before the committees responsible for their portfolios, prior to the vote of consent of Parliament (a majority of the votes cast) on the President-elect and the Commissioners-designate (including the Vice-President appointed by the Council as High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy) as a body.

Ultimately, following that consent, the appointment of the Commission is done by the European Council, acting by qualified majority (Article 17(7) TEU). The hearings to which Commissioners-designate are subject are not required by the Treaties, but have long existed in a practice which has been codified in the Rules of Procedure of Parliament (Rule 125 and Annex VII). For the ninth term, the Conference of Presidents decided that the hearings would be held between 30 September and 8 October, with the plan being to vote subsequently on the Commission as a body at the Parliament’s plenary session of 23 October.

This process of scrutiny of the candidates and the ensuing hearings, which represent a fundamental democratic exercise, implies a possible need to adjust the steps and timetable. Indeed, after the scrutiny of the declaration of financial interests of Commissioners-designate László Trócsányi (Neighbourhood and Enlargement) and Rovana Plumb (Transport), the Committee on Legal Affairs concluded that both were unable to take up their duties in the Commission. Being a precondition for the holding of a hearing according to the Rules of Procedure (Article 2 of Annex VII), neither could proceed to that step.

In addition, after a first unsatisfactory hearing on 2 October, the Committees on Internal Market and Consumer Protection, and on Industry, Research and Energy requested the hearing of Commissioner-designate Sylvie Goulard (Internal Market) be resumed on 10 October, with, in the end, a negative outcome. With three Commissioners-designate not having successfully passed Parliament’s scrutiny, new appointments are required. As the date originally scheduled for a vote in Parliament on the Commission as a body has now passed, the new Commission cannot therefore take office on 1 November 2019 as required.

The notion of a ‘caretaker’ Commission

The question that arises is what are the consequences if the Commission is delayed in taking office, since the Juncker Commission’s term of office comes to an end on 31 October 2019. What limits are there, if any, on the exercise of the Commission President’s functions, and those of the College, and under what rules?

The Treaties do not explicitly take into account a possible delay in Commission taking office. Neither Article 17 TEU, setting out the term of office and the details of the procedure leading to the Commission’s election, nor any other provisions of the Treaties provide for this situation, although similar events have occurred more than once in the past (see below).

Article 246(6) TFEU, however, deals with a comparable situation, according to which, when all members of the Commission submit their resignation collectively, they are to remain in office and continue to deal with current business until they are replaced, for the remainder of their term of office. This provision embodies the principle, quite widespread in the life of both EU and national institutions, of institutional continuity. The Treaties do not define the powers of the ‘prolonged’ Commission, however some argue that the Commission must act as a ‘caretaker administration’ not only when it resigns collectively as a College but also when, as in this case, the new Commission does not take office immediately after the expiry of the term of office of the previous College.

In this context, ‘current business’ would include all daily, routine business as well as all acts that cannot be postponed to the next College. Against this background, the adoption of new legislative proposals would seem excluded except for emergency reasons. Some limited case law has helped in framing the scope of the Commission’s room for manoeuvre when the notion of ‘current business’ comes into play.

In 2003, the question arose in the case Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Commission of whether a State aid decision issued by a resigning Commission was lawful. On that occasion, the Court affirmed that the adoption of a State aid decision by the Commission after its collective resignation did fall within the scope of a caretaker administration, insofar as it did not constitute a new political initiative and the supervisory function of the Commission constituted part of the fulfilment of an ‘essential task of the Community’. In this sense, the Court considered that the Commission had not exceeded the powers entrusted to a ‘caretaker administrator’ but ‘confined itself to applying to that case a legal scheme of long-established rules and principles’.

In another case in 2012, European Parliament v Council, the Court argued that the same reasoning could be applicable ‘a fortiori in circumstances in which a pre-existing proposal remained pending’. In fact, in that specific case, the Barroso I Commission formally amended one of its own proposals – which was then adopted as Regulation 1286/2009 – in respect of its legal basis, to take account of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. This decision was taken at a time when the Barroso I Commission’s term of office had ended, but the new Commission had not yet formally entered into office. The Court also ruled in this case that such a ‘step was essential if the Union legislature was to continue with the pending procedure after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force’. However, the Court did not provide additional clarifications on what should be considered as ‘essential’.

The current circumstances, the precedents in jurisprudence and the principle of continuity of institutional work allow a reasonable belief that the current Commission will work in a ‘current business’ mode until the new Commission does take office. Although some commentators expect that the new Commission will come into office in December 2019, how long the ‘caretaker’ administration continues will depend on new Commissioners-designate being nominated by France, Hungary and Romania, the agreement thereon of the President-elect, and those candidates then completing the hearings process successfully. After that, the entire College would need to obtain the consent of Parliament in a plenary vote.

A look back

The current situation is not an extraordinary one. The Prodi Commission was appointed to a term running until 22 January 2005, although its end was brought forward to 31 October 2004 under Article 45 of the Act concerning the 2004 enlargement. The Barroso I Commission should, therefore, have started on 1 November 2004. Due to uncertainties as to whether Parliament would support three of the Commissioners-designate initially put forward by Barroso (Rocco Buttiglione, László Kovács and Ingrida Udre) the vote of Parliament was postponed from 27 October to 18 November 2004. After election by Parliament, the Barroso I Commission (with two of those three candidates replaced, and the third taking a different portfolio than originally proposed) took office on 22 November 2004, i.e. three weeks after the statutory date.

Likewise, the Barroso II Commission took office with a few months of delay, starting work on 10 February 2010, instead of 1 November 2009, due to the delayed process of ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, which was finalised only in November 2009 and which consequently delayed the process of election of the Barroso II Commission which fell under the Lisbon rules. On that occasion, the Commission spokesperson, Johannes Laitenberger, declared that the Commission’s mandate was extended ‘based on the principle of institutional continuity’ so that the Commission could work in a ‘caretaker capacity’.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Commission as ‘caretaker administration’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochaka,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

The October II plenary session highlights included statements and debates on the outcome of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019, and a review of the Juncker Commission’s term. Parliament also debated statements made on behalf of the Vice-President of the European Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) on the Turkish military operation in north-east Syria and its consequences, and on the violent suppression of young people’s and students’ protests in Iraq. Debates took place, inter alia, on Commission and Council statements on the effects of the Thomas Cook bankruptcy, on the dangers of violent right-wing extremism, on criminalisation of sexual education in Poland and on storms in Europe, followed by debates on accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Members declined to approve the 2017 accounts of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and European Council/Council, and adopted Parliament’s position on the general budget of the EU for 2020, which now goes to conciliation.

Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019

Members debated European Council and Commission statements on the outcome of the European Council meeting of 17-18 October 2019. After endorsing a revised United Kingdom withdrawal agreement, and approving a revised political declaration in the European Council (Article 50) format, EU Heads of State or Government tackled contentious issues including the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, enlargement, climate change and Turkey. Together with Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, EU leaders also discussed future EU political priorities and the follow-up to the 2019-2024 strategic agenda.

Review of the Juncker Commission

Although the renewal of the European Commission has been postponed beyond the scheduled date of 1 November, current President of the Commission Jean-Claude Juncker presented a statement, debated with Members, encompassing a review of the Juncker Commission. Whilst facing some challenging situations during 2014-2019, including terrorist attacks and increased refugee movements, analysis of the Juncker Commission’s 10 priorities shows that two thirds of the Commission’s proposals during the period resulted in changes to the law. However, progress has been slower on growth, jobs, investment and trade.

General budget of the European Union for 2020

Parliament adopted its position on all sections of the general budget of the European Union for 2020. Parliament’s Committee on Budgets proposed to reject the reductions made by the Council and to increase expenditure on social and climate target priorities instead. The budget will now be the subject of conciliation negotiations with the Council. If the institutions reach a compromise, Parliament would vote on that during the November II plenary session. In the absence of an agreement, the European Commission is required to submit a new draft budget.

Discharge 2017: European Asylum Support Office and European Council/Council

Members refused to approve the 2017 accounts of the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) and European Council and Council. The Budgetary Control Committee (CONT) report on EASO’s budget criticises its internal control system, but notes that the new EASO management has committed to reforms. As to discharge for the Council and European Council, the CONT Committee report underlines that the institution has again failed to provide information requested, to separate the budget of the European Council from the Council’s budget, and to align with the interinstitutional transparency register.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, October II 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christiaan van Lierop, 

Master Class at the European Week of Regions and Cities

While regular contact with researchers, academics and the broader policy-making community is part of our core business at the EPRS, it is always a particular pleasure to meet with PhD students and young researchers who are experts in regional policy. That is why we were very happy to be involved once again in the organisation of a specialist workshop as part of the European Week of Regions and Cities’ Master Class for early career researchers, which took place in Brussels from 7 to 10 October 2019.

Bringing together 29 specially selected early career researchers from across the EU, this year’s workshop examined the role of research in policy-making at the European Parliament by focusing on three main themes: forging closer ties between researchers and policy-makers, enhancing the communication of cohesion policy and, lastly, future trends and topics for research in the field of cohesion policy. As in previous years, discussions took place around three tables, one for each theme, with participants invited to get actively involved in the debate at each table, providing everybody with the chance to have their say. With each participant an expert in the field of regional policy, the stage was set for a frank, open and lively discussion. This led to a number of key findings, set out below.

Forging closer ties between researchers and policy-makers

Participants stressed the need for more continuous links between researchers and policy-makers at local government level in particular. Noting that the relationship between researchers and policy-makers is a multilevel process, coordinating and developing synergies between researcher/policy-maker relations at municipal, regional, national and European levels, they argued that interaction between researchers and policy-makers at the local government level called for different, more participatory styles of research that could elicit support and interest from local authorities. When it came to finding experts, speakers stressed the importance of using certain keywords for searches and considered that researchers should be proactive by highlighting their profiles through researchgate or h-index if they wanted to have greater visibility. Another idea was to draw up e-mail lists of experts in different topic areas using university databases, with one participant suggesting that universities could be required to keep their databases updated with information about their staff expertise.

Enhancing the communication of cohesion policy

The workshop found that if EU cohesion policy is to be brought closer to citizens and the knowledge gap between politicians and the general public closed, it is important to deliver a message that could have an impact across borders, to tell a story and to establish communication channels for active exchange. One way of doing this could be to strengthen EU identity by stressing the significance of Europe as an integration project and by helping people understand that Europe forms an integral part of their everyday lives. There was clearly a need to make local projects more visible: one idea was to make it compulsory for local municipalities that receive EU funding to allocate a fixed amount of the money received to communications activities about the funded project. Other ideas included organising more Open Day events at the EU institutions for citizens as well as sessions that bring together different groups of people, such as low-income workers or socially excluded groups, who may know little about the EU, to explain what the EU is doing for them. This would take the form of special meetings at the workplace or at community centres.

Future trends and topics for research in the field of cohesion policy

On a general note, participants felt that it was vital to make topics appealing by creating awareness and involving stakeholders. Equally, regional capacity-building was also important as this could help policy-makers learn to cope with various challenges through feedback loops of multilevel governance that could facilitate the process of better learning for policy-makers. More specifically, a number of topics were highlighted as possible areas of future research. These included issues such as how to implement cohesion policy more effectively or that of assessing absorption capacity of funds through multiple criteria such as GDP, migration, climate change or youth unemployment. The individual challenges facing certain types of regions were also the subject of discussion: participants drew attention to the question of planning in cross-border regions and cross-border cooperation in general and looked at how to help lagging regions by focusing, in particular, on why it is difficult for them to implement smart specialisation strategies.

This workshop for early career researchers certainly provided some valuable thoughts and ideas can help feed into the work of both researchers and policy-makers and we look forward to the next edition of this event in 2020.

Written by Monika Kiss,

© Nmedia / Fotolia

Economic and technical changes are redrawing the map of the world of work: new jobs are appearing while others are becoming obsolete, and atypical work patterns are replacing full-time work and open-ended contracts.

In addition, work is increasingly being carried out on online platforms connecting buyers and sellers, or by large project teams across borders and time zones.

Robotics and digitalisation raise new questions, as machines progressively replace the human workforce for routine tasks, and new types of professional and personal skills are required to respond to technological progress.

Active labour-market policies are gradually adapting to the changing reality in the world of work. This concerns social security systems, which increasingly face include new, and constantly changing requirements, as well as ethical and practical problems relating to robotics. The EU focuses on protecting workers’ rights while ensuring innovation, as the examples of the recently adopted Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions and the establishment of the new European Labour Authority illustrate. The need for the new digital skills that are essential to successfully master the challenges of the new working environment also continues to grow.

This is an update of an earlier Briefing on the Future of work in the EU, from April 2017, PE 599.426.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A fresh look at the future of work in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© Firn / Fotolia

Brexit talks between the EU and the UK had reached a standstill in spring 2019, with the House of Commons refusing to vote in favour of the negotiated withdrawal agreement, including a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland. The new UK government led by Boris Johnson, who came into office on 24 July, made a priority of finalising preparations for leaving the EU without a deal on 31 October 2019, unless the EU was willing to renounce the ‘backstop’ included in the Protocol. However, the EU continued to restate its opposition to removing what it considered a legally operational safety net that would prevent a future hard border on the island of Ireland, in the absence of concrete proposals from the UK. At the beginning of October 2019, the UK government sent its proposals on revising the above-mentioned protocol, which were received with a measure of concern by the EU and other stakeholders. Discussions aimed at bridging the gap between the UK and EU positions were stepped up and, after a series of concessions, the EU and UK announced they had reached a revised withdrawal agreement, which was then immediately endorsed by the European Council on 17 October 2019.

With only days to go until 31 October 2019, the date on which the UK is set to leave the EU, completing the ratification procedures to allow the withdrawal agreement’s entry into force on 1 November is going to be a challenge. Whereas on the EU side no major obstacles are foreseen, in the UK, the House of Commons decided on 19 October to withhold approval for the revised deal until Parliament passes the related implementing legislation. Required by law to send the EU a request for an extension of the Article 50 period until 31 January 2020, the UK Prime Minister is nonetheless still aiming to fulfil all the necessary steps for the ratification of the withdrawal agreement to allow its entry into force on 1 November. This is also the stated aim of the European Union, although if the European Council were to decide in favour of granting an Article 50 extension, following the UK request, that decision would have to be taken before the end of October.

Read this briefing on ‘The revised Brexit deal: What has changed and next steps?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Izabela Bacian with Fernando Hortal Foronda,

© Fotolia

Leaders of the 27 EU Member States (EU-27) endorsed the agreement on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU) with a revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland, as well as a revised political declaration on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship. They invited the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to take steps to ensure the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement by 1 November 2019. Following postponement of the House of Commons vote to approve the deal, the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, will consult the EU-27 Heads of State or Government as to whether to agree to the request he received on 19 October for an extension of the Article 50 negotiation period to 31 January 2020.

1. UK Withdrawal Agreement

On 17 October 2019, the European Commission and United Kingdom reached agreement at negotiators’ level on a revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland and a revised political declaration on the framework of the future EU-UK relationship. Both were endorsed by the European Council (Article 50) at its meeting later the same day. The revised Protocol provides a legally operative solution that avoids a hard border on the island of Ireland, protects the all-island economy and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement. Contrary to the previous solution (the ‘backstop’), the revised Protocol no longer presents an insurance policy that applies unless and until the EU and the UK conclude a subsequent agreement that replaces it in part or in full. Instead, the agreed solution will continue to apply unless it fails to receive the democratic support of the Northern Ireland Assembly.

Throughout the three-year long negotiations, several proposals have been made to address the unique situation on the island of Ireland and avoid the creation of a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. These have included proposals under which Northern Ireland would remain part of both the single market and the EU customs union, or more recently where the whole of the UK remained part of a single customs union with the EU.

The latest proposal, agreed on 17 October 2019, (detailed in Box 1) is based on four main elements: 1) Northern Ireland remains aligned to a limited set of EU rules, notably relating to goods, and will still apply the Union Customs Code for goods entering its territory. There will be no checks on goods at the border or on the island; 2) Regarding customs duties, Northern Ireland remains within the UK’s customs territory. Differentiated treatment would be applied between goods entering Northern Ireland headed for its market and goods bound for the EU market, with the latter paying EU tariffs; 3) To maintain the integrity of the single market and avoid distortions of competition, Northern Ireland will remain under EU rules for value added tax (VAT), while the UK will collect the VAT; and finally, 4) To ensure long-term democratic support for the application of relevant EU rules in Northern Ireland, the consent of the Northern Ireland representatives will be required after an initial four years following the entry into force of the Protocol (after the end of the transition period, in theory December 2020). Consent will be required periodically to extend the arrangements: where that consent has previously been given with a cross-community majority, eight years thereafter, but where only a simple majority has been found, four years thereafter. Should consent not be given, the arrangements would cease to apply to Northern Ireland two years later.

Issue Revised Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement The Protocol provides a legally operative solution that avoids a hard border on the island of Ireland, protects the all-island economy and the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement in all its dimensions. Regulatory compliance for goods Northern Ireland will remain aligned to a limited set of rules related to the EU’s single market in order to avoid creating a hard border on the island of Ireland. This will concern legislation on goods, food safety and animal and plant health measures (sanitary and phytosanitary), rules on agricultural production and marketing, VAT and excise in respect of goods and state aid rules. Northern Ireland will remain part of the UK’s VAT area. The UK will charge reduced rates of VAT in Northern Ireland on products for which the Irish VAT rate is lower. Consent of Northern Ireland The Protocol is a fully legally operative solution that will continue to apply unless it fails to receive the democratic support of the Northern Ireland Assembly. The Assembly will be asked to provide its consent for the Protocol four years after the end of the transition period and every eight or four years thereafter, depending on whether a cross-community majority or only a simple majority is obtained. This consent will concern issues of regulatory alignment on goods and customs, the single electricity market, VAT and state aid. Customs Northern Ireland is part of the customs territory of the United Kingdom. It will be able to benefit from participation in the UK’s independent trade policy. While Northern Ireland will leave the EU Customs Union, the Union Customs Code will continue to apply to all goods entering Northern Ireland. No checks or controls will be necessary on the island of Ireland. Customs duties EU customs duties will apply to goods entering Northern Ireland only if those goods pose a risk that they will subsequently enter the EU single market. The Joint Committee will establish, before the end of the transition period, the criteria necessary to make that determination. For goods from third countries that are not at risk of entering the EU, customs duties in Northern Ireland will be the same as in other parts of the UK. Revised political declaration Nature of future relationship The precise nature of commitments should be commensurate with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic connectedness of the parties.
Parties should uphold the common high standards applicable in the EU and UK at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters. Level playing field The precise nature of commitments should be commensurate with the scope and depth of the future relationship and the economic connectedness of the parties.
Parties should uphold the common high standards applicable in the EU and UK at the end of the transition period in the areas of state aid, competition, social and employment standards, environment, climate change, and relevant tax matters. 2. Future relations with the UK

In the Article 50 meeting’s conclusions, the European Council reiterated its gratitude to EU Chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, ‘for his tireless efforts and for his contribution to maintaining unity among EU-27 Member States throughout the negotiations’. The European Council restated its determination to pursue as close a political partnership as possible with the UK. Nevertheless, negotiations on ‘a balanced, ambitious and wide-ranging free trade agreement’ depend on ‘sufficient guarantees for a level playing field‘, as stressed in the European Council guidelines. The EU-27 leaders committed to maintaining the future relationship with the UK as an item for discussion at each formal European Council meeting.

Regarding the content of the political declaration, the UK has indicated that it would be pursuing the negotiation of a free trade agreement, eliminating the possibility of joining the EU customs union in the future, and aiming for a higher level of regulatory divergence from the EU.

3. Procedure in the UK Parliament

In the meantime, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson put forward a motion for the House of Commons to approve the withdrawal agreement and the political declaration on Saturday 19 October. This was to comply with two key pieces of legislation: 1) the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, which states that the ratification of the withdrawal agreement requires the agreement and the political declaration to be approved by a resolution in the House of Commons; and 2) the European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 (commonly known as the Benn Act). The latter states that the House of Commons must either agree to the withdrawal agreement or agree to leave the EU without a withdrawal agreement; and should the House fail to agree to either of these scenarios by 19 October, it requires the Prime Minister to request an extension, to 31 January 2020, of the negotiating period under Article 50(3).

At its sitting on 19 October, the House of Commons adopted an amendment, the ‘Letwin Amendment’ (proposed by Conservative MP, Sir Oliver Letwin). This amendment delays approval of the withdrawal agreement unless and until implementing legislation (referred to as the Withdrawal Agreement Bill) is passed. Given this delay, and to comply with the Benn Act, a letter was sent to European Council President Donald Tusk later the same day, requesting an extension of Article 50 to 31 January 2020. At the same time, Johnson sent a second letter deploring the ‘corrosive impact of the long delay on delivering on the mandate of the British people’ as expressed in the 2016 referendum. Johnson committed to put the necessary legislation forward without delay, so that a vote in the House of Commons could still take place in the week beginning 21 October. On Monday of that week, the Speaker of the House of Commons, John Bercow, rejected a motion by the Government aimed at holding another meaningful vote on the agreement, on the basis that the motion was of the same substance as two days earlier, and without any change in circumstances, and thus proceeding in this way ‘would be repetitive and disorderly’. Subsequently the government introduced the Withdrawal Agreement Bill on 21 October, and proposed an accelerated timetable to complete all stages of its passage in the House of Commons by the end of that week.

The current Conservative Party UK government has a minority of votes in the House of Commons. Despite the Conservative-Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) agreement under which the DUP has supported the government, the DUP has announced that its MPs will vote against the deal, expressing concerns about the negative impact of the deal on Northern Ireland’s economy and the Belfast Agreement political settlement, based on the consent principle. Close cooperation on Brexit between the DUP and the European Research Group (ERG) within the Conservative party, may lead some ERG Conservative MPs to vote against the deal. However, Johnson may be able to build a majority if a sufficient number of former Conservative MPs, other independents and some Labour MPs support the deal.

4. Procedure in the EU and consultation on a further extension

The EU-27 leaders invited the Commission, the European Parliament and the Council to take the necessary steps to ensure the entry into force of the withdrawal agreement by 1 November 2019. Following the UK request for a further extension, European Council President Donald Tusk responded that he would ‘now start consulting with EU leaders on how to react’. The previous request for an extension had generated differences in opinion among Member States, with a minority led by France calling for a short extension, and a larger number favouring a longer period.

While Johnson has offered to attend another European Council meeting to discuss the situation, EU‑27 leaders have not confirmed this. Should a consensus arise on the duration of the extension, the decision could be taken by written procedure, without convening another European Council (Article 50) meeting. Some Member States, notably Germany, have indicated openness to a short technical extension.

In the meantime, on 21 October, the Scottish and Welsh First Ministers, Nicola Sturgeon and Mark Drakeford, sent a letter to Donald Tusk calling for an extension long enough to ensure proper scrutiny of the Withdrawal Agreement by both parliaments, as well as sufficient time for a referendum, which both of the signatories favour, to be held.

The Council has given its authorisation for signature, and the agreement has been sent to the European Parliament for its consent. The European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group, the body coordinating the Parliament’s approach in the negotiations with the UK, met to examine the deal on 21 October 2019. The rapporteur, Guy Verhofstadt, appointed by Parliaments’ Constitutional Affairs Committee (responsible for the consent procedure) will in due course draw up a recommendation for Parliament on whether to approve the withdrawal agreement.

The European Parliament’s consent is given by a simple majority vote. Following Parliament’s consent, the Council may conclude the agreement by ‘super’ qualified majority (at least 72 % of the participating Member States, comprising at least 65 % of their population).

Statement by the President of the European Parliament

At the European Council meeting on 17 October, EP President David Maria Sassoli (S&D, Italy) welcomed the agreement reached with the UK and also expressed his gratitude to the EU’s Chief Negotiator, Michel Barnier, for the results achieved. He announced that the European Parliament would immediately begin detailed examination of the terms and content of the agreement, to ensure its coherence with the EU and its citizens’ interests.

Following a meeting of the Parliament’s Conference of Presidents on 21 October, Sassoli announced that the European Parliament would only vote on giving its consent once the UK Parliament had approved the agreement. In the meantime, the Constitutional Affairs Committee would start its examination of the deal. Parliament would be ready to ‘move forward rapidly when needed’, he emphasised.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 17 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© Rawf8 / Fotolia

The European Parliament did not always enjoy the powers and democratic legitimacy it does now. This is clear from a quick glance at how Parliament has evolved. Starting life as an Assembly – a name reminiscent of institutions linked to international diplomacy – with members simply appointed by national parliaments of Member States, it grew into an institution, the European Parliament, directly elected by citizens and now the only one representing EU citizens directly. This transformation has taken several decades.

Despite Parliament’s increased role, the current electoral rules remain only partly harmonised, to the extent that there is no uniform electoral process for all Member States. The current situation is that certain fundamental principles are enshrined in the 1976 Electoral Act, but many aspects are regulated by national law. This lack of a uniform electoral process also leads to differences in treatment between EU citizens depending on their country of origin and potentially deprives European elections of a truly European dimension.

Several reforms of the EU electoral system have been attempted over the years, but not all have resulted in legislation. The introduction of a transnational constituency in particular is a perennially controversial issue. Some consider it a step towards the genuine ‘Europeanisation’ of elections, others believe that it could increase the distance between the public and elected representatives.

While the co-existence of differing electoral rules under the aegis of common European principles is probably destined to last, the latest reform – adopted in 2018 – will bring in mechanisms designed to increase public participation in the EU political debate and make the appointment of one of the top EU leadership roles, president of the European Commission, more ‘political’, by means of the Spitzenkandidaten process.

Read this briefing on ‘European Union electoral law: Current situation and historical background‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Elena Lazarou and Nicholas Lokker,

Maximilian Schroeder, Head of Unit of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence Secretariat, and Anthony Teasdale, Director General of EPRS, welcomed a panel of six experts to a briefing seminar on ‘Understanding CSDP: EU Common Security and Defence Policy’ on 2 October 2019.

Sven Biscop of the Egmont – Royal Institute for International Relations focused his introductory remarks on leveraging the new common security and defence policy (CSDP) and defence industrial policy mechanisms into concrete capabilities. He stressed that instruments such as the European Defence Fund (EDF) and Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) are not ends in themselves. Real success will require an emphasis on using these frameworks to develop projects that the EU would not otherwise undertake, instead of, according to the expert, becoming stuck in procedures, as is currently the case. He added that a particularly important goal for PESCO should be the integration of, as opposed to simple cooperation between, European militaries. Without this, the EU cannot achieve a ‘comprehensive, full spectrum force package’.

The next speaker was Simona Soare of the EU Institute for Security Studies, who proposed three principal areas for the Parliament to consider. First, echoing Sven Biscop, she urged Parliament to take stock of the EU’s credible progress on the CSDP since 2016, focusing on concrete outcomes of the instruments it has designed. Second, Parliament should look ahead and prioritise emerging digital and climate issues. Specifically, how can the EU position itself to push for appropriate norms around technologies such as artificial intelligence, and how will climate change affect conflict prevention? Finally, according to the speaker, Parliament must consider how to respond to changes occurring in fundamental pillars of the transatlantic relationship such as trade, multilateralism, and security cooperation.

Defence has become a regular topic on European Council meeting agendas, the continued monitoring of which will be key to future implementation of CSDP initiatives. Suzanna Anghel Gavrilescu of the EPRS European Council Oversight Unit reminded the audience that the current discourse on defence is largely the result of consensus in the European Council since 2012-2013 that ‘defence matters’. However, she cautioned against expecting the Council to use vocabulary such as ‘European Defence Union’ or ‘strategic autonomy’ in its discourse regarding the CSDP.

Elena Lazarou of the EPRS External Policies Unit outlined a few of the largest challenges to future EU security. The increasing rate of technological change is a major concern, which will only heighten the problem of delayed EU responses to global issues. If it cannot resolve this discrepancy, the EU will fall further and further behind. Additionally, the EU lacks a clear ‘grand strategy’. To guide its actions on CSDP, the EU must formulate a coherent vision of the strategic link between its various developing capabilities, possibly in the form of a White Book, as the European Parliament has repeatedly requested.

Continuing this discussion of large-scale changes to global security, Leopold Schmertzing of the EPRS Global Trends Unit noted that we first must recognise the increasing power of information in warfare, as actors weaponise narratives to gain the upper hand in conflicts. Additionally, digitisation means that artificial intelligence will be increasingly used on the battlefield. Finally, a few entities will control a majority of the military capabilities in a multipolar world, which will add new complexity and volatility to nuclear strategy.

Wrapping up the discussion, Phillipe Perchoc of the EPRS External Policies Unit presented the new Normandy Index, developed by EPRS and the Institute for Economics and Peace, which measures threats to peace and democracy in the world. He emphasised that defence also includes peace protection, and that this index can therefore also be used as a tool for parliamentary work on the security and defence policy.

Overall, the members of the panel agreed that the new structure proposed for the European Commission suggests that there will be continuity of previous Commission efforts in this field, with an increased emphasis on industrial and technological aspects. During a Q&A session with the audience, the panel addressed cooperation efforts between the EU and NATO, approaches for investing in and retaining human capital, as well as the role of Parliament in shaping CSDP and the future of the EU defence industry.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

© European Union 2019 – Source : European Council

After endorsing the revised UK withdrawal agreement, and approving a revised political declaration, in the European Council (Article 50) format, EU Heads of State or Government had to tackle a range of divisive issues at their 17-18 October meeting, including the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework, enlargement, climate change and Turkey. EU leaders were not able to find common ground on key elements of the MFF, nor to reach consensus on the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. On climate, the European Council only reiterated its June 2019 conclusions considering persistent lack of agreement on raising climate targets. With respect to Turkey, EU leaders did not go beyond the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions, either in the area of sanctions or in the area of arms exports control. In the presence of the European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, EU leaders also discussed the political priorities of the EU for the coming years and the follow-up to the Strategic Agenda 2019-24.

1. European Council commitments: Implementation and new deadlines

The Prime Minister of Finland, Antti Rinne, President-in-Office of the Council, provided an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions. In accordance with Article 235(2) TFEU, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, addressed the European Council for the first time in his mandate.

Table 1: New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule MFF Present an updated negotiation box Council Presidency December 2019 Climate Finalise its guidance on the EUʼs long-term strategy on climate change European Council December 2019 Enlargement Revert to the issue of enlargement European Council Before May 2020 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework

On the basis of a paper prepared by the Finnish Presidency of the Council, EU Heads of State or Government exchanged views on key issues of the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). The paper outlined the ‘key issues’ for discussion: 1) the overall level of the MFF, 2) the division between the main policy areas (i.e. new challenges vs traditional policies), and 3) ‘policy coherence and conditionalities’ (i.e. the link between EU expenditure and the EU’s policies and values). Even prior to the European Council, some Member States, notably the Visegrad countries (i.e. Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) criticised the Finnish paper for being ‘vague’, and for crossing their ‘red lines’ on cohesion policy and the common agriculture policy (CAP). While no substantial conclusions indicting progress towards consensus were adopted, the Finnish Presidency was called upon to establish a ‘Negotiating Box with figures’ for the next European Council meeting on 12-13 December 2019.

Attending his final scheduled European Council meeting, the outgoing President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, reminded EU leaders of their obligation to conclude the debate quickly, because if the debate continues until next year ‘there will be two years wasted where researchers cannot research and young people cannot go on Erasmus’. Yet, he expressed doubts at the likelihood of reaching a decision even in December, stating that the European Council was thereby not living up to the objectives it had set itself in its June 2019 conclusions, namely ‘reaching an agreement in the European Council before the end of the year’.

Also attending a scheduled meeting for a final time, the European Council’s President, Donald Tusk, said that ‘this was an important discussion and will continue over the next months’.

Main messages of the EP President: The President of the Parliament, David Sassoli reiterated the EP’s view that the EU ‘need[s] an ambitious budget, equivalent to 1.3 % of gross national income’, and that ‘the decision on revenue and expenditure should be a “single package”’. The new long-term budget should be transparent, abolish the whole system of rebates and include various new own resources. Parliament is also favourable to introducing ‘a new budget protection mechanism that would penalise those who disregard the rule of law without affecting payments to final beneficiaries or recipients’. President Sassoli recalled that the EP has been ready to negotiate since November 2018, and expressed his hope that negotiations with the Council can be opened as soon as possible.

Strategic agenda and the next institutional cycle Strategic agenda

EU leaders discussed with the European Commission President-elect, Ursula von der Leyen, the Commission’s contribution to the implementation of the EU’s priorities for the next five years, and gave broad approval to her objective to form a geopolitical Commission, as well as her strategic priorities – climate change (i.e. green deal), digitalisation and competitiveness. The Finnish Council Presidency presented a report on the follow up to the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, which was adopted by the European Council on June 2019. A recent EPRS study identifies strong continuity between the new Strategic Agenda and its predecessor with regard to some policy issues (e.g. taxation, single market, employment and energy), while also noting that in other policy areas, new issues have been added (e.g. natural and man-made disasters, rule of law, functioning of Schengen).

Next institutional cycle

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, the European Council adopted a decision appointing Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank. She will take office on 1 November 2019.

Since the French, Hungarian and Romanian Commissioners-designate failed to get the European Parliament’s approval earlier in October, the calendar for the start of the new Commission’s mandate has had to be modified. Following hearings with the new candidates, the European Parliament is now expected to vote on the election of the European Commission at its November II plenary session; this would allow the Commission to start on 1 December.

Main messages of the EP President: Regarding the EU’s political priorities, David Sassoli stressed that EU citizens want a ‘new Europe, which is more attentive to their needs, is greener, is more resolute in safeguarding the rule of law, is more protective of social rights, and is more effective and transparent in its decision-making’. He underlined that the leaders’ choice ‘not to take into account the Spitzenkandidaten, although legitimate according to the Treaties, represented for the European Parliament, a wound that will have to be healed’. He pledged that the Parliament ‘intends to assert its role as one of the main actors in the European decision-making process … working side by side with the Council and Commission; but it will also stand up for itself and its prerogatives’.

Turkey

In the conclusions of the October European Council, ‘the EU condemns Turkey’s unilateral military action in North East Syria, which … threatens heavily European security’. EU leaders took note of the US-brokered five-day ceasefire, and urged Turkey to end its military operation and withdraw its forces. They endorsed the 14 October 2019 Foreign Affairs Council Conclusions on Turkey’s military action in north-east Syria, and recalled that Member States decided to stop arms-export licensing to Turkey. Analysts emphasised that in the absence of an ‘EU-wide arms embargo’ there is a broad palette of measures Member States may take, ranging from suspending both ongoing and forthcoming arms-export licences, to only stopping the approval of new ones.

EU Heads of State or Government also underlined the humanitarian dimension of the crisis and called on Turkey to obey international humanitarian law. They confirmed that the EU would continue its ‘efforts towards effectively addressing the serious humanitarian and refugee crisis in light of evolving needs’, reiterated solidarity with those Member States most affected by Eastern Mediterranean migratory flows, and confirmed their will to continue to monitor developments.

Illegal drilling activities

As expected, EU leaders expressed their solidarity with Cyprus, and endorsed the 14 October 2019 Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the exclusive economic zone of Cyprus. They thus confirmed the Foreign Affairs Council’s decision to put in place a ‘framework regime of restrictive measures targeting natural and legal persons responsible for or involved in the illegal drilling activity of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean’, and tasked the High Representative, Federica Mogherini, ‘to swiftly present proposals to this effect.’

Main messages of the EP President: President Sassoli emphasised that people in Europe looked with ‘dismay and anger’ at developments in north-east Syria, and praised the role of the Kurds in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh. He condemned Turkey’s military action, qualified it as ‘an act of war’, stressed its breach of international law, underlined its capacity to destabilise the region and called for its termination.

President Sassoli welcomed the initiative to coordinate ‘national embargos on future sales of arms to Turkey’ but spoke of the need to promote ‘a joint EU embargo not just on future arms shipments, but also on those already on their way’. He considered ‘positive’ the decision to impose sanctions on Turkey in connection to its illegal drilling activities, but deplored that ‘the military aggression in north-eastern Syria’ has not ‘prompted a similar response’, including economic sanctions which would target individuals and business but without affecting civil society and the population. As regards the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey, President Sassoli rejected the Turkish authorities’ attempts to use them and their distress ‘as a bargaining chip to justify violations of international law’. In this context and on behalf of the European Parliament, President Sassoli reiterated the Parliament’s call to suspend accession negotiations with Turkey.

Enlargement

The European Council discussed the opening of accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania without reaching a decision. EU leaders committed to revert to enlargement prior to the Western Balkans Summit in Zagreb in May 2020. The Prime Minister of Belgium and President-elect of the European Council, Charles Michel, spoke of a ‘dense, an intense debate’ and pointed to the lack of unanimity on enlargement; a topic emerging as a challenge for the beginning of his term as European Council President. Member States remained divided, with France, the Netherlands and Denmark continuing to oppose the opening of accession negotiations with the two countries, pointing to their lack of preparedness. Attempts to decouple the two countries remained unsuccessful. France has been calling for procedural reforms before giving the go-ahead for the opening of new accession negotiations. The stalemate in which the European Council ended led the Italian Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, to say that EU leaders had made a ‘historic mistake’. Commission President Juncker qualified the decision as a ‘huge historical error’ and underlined the EU’s lack of credibility with partners. Likewise, President Tusk stressed that ‘North Macedonia and Albania are not to blame for this’, acknowledging the ‘extraordinary achievement’ of the Prespa Agreement, and deploring the fact that ‘a few Member States are not ready yet’ for the opening of accession negotiations.

Main messages of the EP President: President Sassoli spoke of ‘unity and credibility’, which are critical when the EU calls ‘on neighbouring countries to make an extra effort to change’ and they comply with the request. He expressed support for opening accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania, and recalled the European Commission’s positive recommendations. He stressed that a negative decision would provoke disarray in public opinion in the Western Balkans and would have strategic implications for ‘Europe as a whole’.

Climate change

The heavy agenda overshadowed the debate on climate, which was seen more as a ‘stock-taking exercise’. EU leaders welcomed the result of the 2019 UN Climate Action Summit and, in line with their June 2019 conclusions and ahead of the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) to be held in Santiago de Chile in December 2019, reaffirmed their commitment ‘to lead the way in a socially fair and just green transition in the implementation of the Paris Agreement’. Climate will once again be on the agenda of the European Council in December 2019 when the Heads of State or Government are expected to adopt the guidelines for the EU’s long-term strategy, which are to be submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in early 2020. Earlier versions of the European Council conclusions made reference to a Just Transition Fund but have been dropped in the meantime due to Member State sensitivities. This was the case with the Visegrad 4, which have also opposed increases in climate targets.

Main messages of the EP President: David Sassoli confirmed the EU’s wish to take ‘a global leadership role in safeguarding the planet through sustainable policies’. He stressed Parliament’s call to set 2050 as a target to achieve climate neutrality and regretted that the EU ‘was not able to sign up to this’ target. Speaking of the ‘Green Climate Fund’, Sassoli invited those Member States who have not yet increased their contributions to do so, and to support the creation of a European Climate Bank. He spoke of a ‘strategic choice’, which needs to be made by agreeing on an investment plan able to ‘fund the green transition’ and which would lead to industrial development and job creation.

Flight MH17

Referring to their conclusions of 20 June 2019, EU leaders reiterated their ‘full support for all efforts to establish truth, justice and accountability for the victims of the downing of MH17’, calling on all states to cooperate fully with the ongoing investigation in accordance with UNSC Resolution 2166.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the European Council of 17-18 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vasileios Margaras,

To provide an opportunity for deeper reflection on the role of regions and cities in the EU in the years to come, the Committee of the Regions and the European Parliamentary Research Service organised a joint discussion on 16 October 2019, moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service, EPRS.

First Vice-President of the European Parliament, Mairead McGuinness (EPP, Ireland), welcomed the participants. She reminded them that, while many regions and cities were badly affected by the financial crisis and some regions have bounced back, others have still not returned to their pre-2008 level. Support for the regions lagging behind is important. In addition, many people feel a sense of disconnection between the ‘Brussels’ policy-making world and their daily life. It is therefore important to better engage people in EU politics, and a bottom-up dialogue with citizens should take place at local grassroots level. The quest for a more positive narrative for Europe is another important aspect.

President of the European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI), Younous Omarjee (GUE/NGL, France), began by mentioning the many challenges (such as demography, migration, climate change, globalisation, the transition to a carbon-free economy) that European regions face. He stated that it is important for cohesion policy to have the budget allocation it deserves, so that the EU can fulfil its ambitions. Regional policy has measurable results, which are evident in all parts of Europe. However, it is very important to improve communication about this policy.

OMARJEE, Younous (GUE/NGL, FR)

Turning to the uncertainties of Brexit, not to mention the proposed cuts in resources which will have a negative impact on the EU budget, President of the European Committee of the Regions Karl-Heinz Lambertz, underlined that delayed adoption of the next long-term EU budget, will undermine the ability of EU regions and cities to realise projects on the ground. Regarding the European elections, the President stated that on one hand, the high turnout showed that citizens are greatly interested in the EU. On the other hand, there is also a high level of frustration, resulting in large support for anti-European parties and abstention. Entering into dialogue with citizens during an election period is not enough. Citizens must be actively involved in European democracy by being able to share their views through permanent channels of consultation. As part of the foundation of EU democracy, cities and regions should be recognised as crucial partners in the further development of the Future of Europe.

In her turn, Ulrike Guérot, Professor at the Danube-University Krems, Austria, author, and founder of the European Democracy Lab in Berlin, suggested that the common good, res publica, can be the guiding principle of new proposals for a future European community. The continent can transform itself into a post-national, truly democratic, just, and fair place, a European Republic. Various important projects can help towards this idea. For instance, establishing a European identity card would, apart from its functional advantages, also serve to create a common sense of identity amongst the citizens of Europe. Ulrike Guérot also spoke in favour of a bottom-up citizens’ dialogue.

A lively dialogue followed the discussion, with members of the audience posing a number of questions on topics such as the integration of migrants, cross-border cooperation and transnational voting lists.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski with Eulalia Claros,

© mbolina / Fotolia

The financial crisis began with the collapse of Lehman Brothers, starting a worldwide chain reaction. The EU economy contracted for five consecutive quarters, with growth returning only in the second half of 2009. Stimulatory and fiscal actions by national governments and the EU, and the Eurosystem’s loose monetary policy, helped achieve recovery. It was short-lived, however, as in 2010 a sovereign debt crisis resulted from a loss of financial market confidence, with soaring public debt. Yields on government bonds, particularly in the periphery countries, rose dramatically. Ad hoc rescue devices, such as the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism, brought the situation under control, later supported by the pledge of European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to do ‘whatever it takes’ to save the euro. The acute phase of the crisis ended in 2014, followed by a period of extremely low inflation and weak growth. To boost inflation, facilitate bank lending and stimulate the economy, the Eurosystem relied increasingly on quantitative easing. While 2017 was the EU’s best year since the crises, with economic performance returning to pre-crisis levels, recent data suggest that the momentum is weakening, both in and outside the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepanski,

© doidam10 / Fotolia

It has been a decade since the financial crisis erupted and changed the world in 2008. Few at the time guessed what would be its magnitude and long-term consequences. The interconnectedness of the economy and the financial sector facilitated the spread of the crisis from the United States to Europe. First, the EU faced the Great Recession in the 2008-2009 period and then, after a short recovery, several Member States succumbed to the sovereign debt crisis. The combined crises had catastrophic consequences for economic growth, investment, employment and the fiscal position of many Member States. The EU engaged in short-term ‘fire-fighting’ measures such as bailouts to save banks and help stressed sovereigns, while at the same time reforming the inadequate framework. While signs of moderate recovery showed in 2014, the risk of falling into deflation or secular stagnation remained high, and it was only in 2017 that the EU economy returned to a state similar to that of before the crisis. The signs in 2019 are not so promising however.

Many efforts have been made to improve resilience in the EU and the euro area. These have included improving the stability of the financial sector, strengthening economic governance, creating a safety net for sovereigns in distress and carrying out structural reforms, particularly in the countries most affected. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken unconventional policy measures. Nonetheless many argue that the pace of the reforms has slowed down considerably since 2013 when the economic situation began to improve.

The legacy of the crisis is still present and many challenges persist. These include the absence of a clear and agreed vision for the future of economic and monetary union (EMU), perennial macroeconomic imbalances and high public deficits in a number of Member States, and the ongoing risk of a doom loop between sovereigns and the banking sector. Post crisis vulnerabilities also include rising inequalities, youth unemployment and high in-work poverty risk levels.

See also our infographic, A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A decade on from the start of the crisis: Main responses and remaining challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Ico Maker / Fotolia

Teaching – a profession that dates back through the generations – seems to have lost some of its attractiveness at present. An ageing teacher population, severe teacher shortages, difficulties with retaining younger teachers and a significant gender imbalance in staffing at different levels of education are just some of the serious challenges facing the profession. In the EU, only 7 % of all teachers are under 30 years old, while around 36 % are 50 or older. Also, 72 % of the nearly 6 million people working as school teachers are women, thus confirming the perception that teaching is a ‘woman’s world’. An extensive 2014 survey revealed that over a third of teachers in the EU work in schools with a shortage of qualified staff, and nearly half of school directors report a shortage of teachers for special needs pupils. Perhaps more worryingly, 81 % of teachers in the EU feel teaching is not valued in society. For most EU countries, raising the status and attractiveness of the teaching profession is therefore an urgent necessity. Despite the seriousness of the challenge, only 11 EU countries have taken some policy measures to make teaching more attractive.

EU education systems offer teachers various arrangements in terms of recruitment, career structure, professional development and support, and remuneration. The average starting salary in lower secondary education in the 2016-2017 period was €27 000, with top salaries peaking at €45 000. However, a strong geographical divide is noticeable, with salaries of school teachers in eastern Europe being substantially lower than those in western Europe.

Teachers have access to various mobility schemes through Erasmus, the EU’s flagship programme in the area of education. From 2014 to 2020, the programme has offered mobility opportunities to 800 000 education staff, thus confirming its growing impact and popularity. In March 2019, the European Parliament supported the tripling of the programme’s budget for 2021-2027, to make it more accessible and inclusive and enable more teachers and students to take part in it. Members of the European Parliament also proposed re-allocating the budget to different parts of the programme, as a way to offer pre-school and early education staff more possibilities to participate in mobility schemes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen,

© pogonici / Fotolia

New plant genetic modification techniques, referred to as ‘gene editing’ or ‘genome editing’, have evolved rapidly in recent years, allowing much faster and more precise results than conventional plant-breeding techniques. They are seen as a promising innovative field for the agri-food industry, offering great technical potential.

There is, however, considerable debate as to how these new techniques should be regulated, and whether some or all of them should fall within the scope of EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Those who take the view that the new techniques should be exempt from GMO legislation generally argue that the end product is very similar to products generated using conventional breeding techniques, or that similar changes could also occur naturally. Those who consider that the new techniques should fall within the scope of GMO legislation contend that the processes used mean that plants bred using the new techniques are in fact genetically modified.

In July 2018, the European Court of Justice gave a judgment ruling that genome-edited organisms fall under the scope of European GMO legislation. While welcomed by some, the judgment has also sparked criticism and calls for the new European Commission to amend EU GMO legislation.

This is an updated edition of a 2016 Briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© deepagopi2011 / Fotolia

The rapid development of digital technologies is posing a challenge to the European Union, spurring initiatives to catch up with the US and China in the area, notably in the context of the digital Single Market. Among the dilemmas are how to reconcile Europe’s sensitivity towards protecting private data with the need to use them in many algorithms, and ensure that automation and Artificial Intelligence strengthen rather than weaken labour market participation.

This note offers links to a series of some recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on digital challenges. Many earlier papers on the issue can be found in a previous item of the series, published in July 2018. Many reports on cybersecuirty are available in a publication from October 2018

The case for intelligent industrial policy
Bruegel, October 2019

5G: What we talk about when we talk about trust, the EU risk assessment process
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2019

Analytical report: Preparing the armed forces for disruptive technological changes
European Policy Centre, September 2019

On-location client-determined moderately skilled platform work
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Banking, FinTech, Big Tech: Emerging challenges for financial policymakers
Bruegel, September 2019

Blockchain is the real thing
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

In an era of digitalisation, the Single Market needs a software update
Bruegel, September 2019

Jobs and robots: Europe’s debate over the destiny of the welfare state
Bruegel, September 2019

China’s digital trade success: Two different perspectives
European Centre for International Political Economy, September 2019

The end of techno-utopianism
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Making the Single Market work: Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe
European Policy Centre, August 2019

Artificial Intelligence prediction and counterterrorism
Chatham House, August 2019

Machine politics: Europe and the AI revolution
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

How to strengthen Europe’s agenda on digital connectivity
Cligendael, July 2019

Creating a digital roadmap for a circular economy
European Policy Centre, July 2019

Europas nächste Schritte für die erfolgreiche Gestaltung der Digitalisierung
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, July 2019

Digitalisation and European welfare states
Bruegel, July 2019

Europe’s 5G wake-up call
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

The impact of digitalisation on labour market inclusion of people with disabilities
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Exploring media literacy education as a tool for mitigating truth decay
Rand Corporation, July 2019

Sustainability in the age of platforms
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

The EU’s security union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019

Harnessing artificial intelligence
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Zeit für ein Update: was die Menschen in Deutschland über Digitalisierung denken
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2019

Europe and the digital arms race: Is winter coming?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Digitalization and the future of work: Macroeconomic consequences
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, June 2019

Europe’s digital future: United and determined to win
Friends of Europe, June 2019

Why all the Facebook fire? Because it is the most cynical
German Marshall Fund, June 2019

Digitalsteuer in der EU – wo stehen wir?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

The future of work? Work of the future! On how artificial intelligence, robotics and automation are transforming jobs and the economy in Europe
European Political Strategy Centre, May 2019

Europe: The global centre for excellent research
Bruegel, May 2019

Norm contestation in the digital era: Campaigning for refugee rights
Chatham House, May 2019

Do data policy restrictions impact the productivity performance of firms and industries?
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, April 2019

A roadmap for a fair data economy
Lisbon Council, April 2019

Is this blog post legal (under new EU copyright law)?
Bruegel, April 2019

New digital threats to media pluralism in the information age
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, March 2019

Security first, technology second: Putin tightens his grip on Russia’s Internet, with China’s help
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Users, data, networks: Taxing the digital economy
Jacques Delors Institute , Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2019

Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, governance and policy challenges
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2019

Escaping the startup trap: Can policymakers help small companies grow to major employers
Progressive Policy Institute, February 2019

5G, Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

The European Digital Single Market: Delivering economic benefits for citizens and businesses
Bruegel, January 2019

Transformation numérique de l’industrie: L’enjeu franco-allemand
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2019

Four internets: The geopolitics of digital governance
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Digital Europe: Next steps, a European Agenda for the Digital-9+
Lisbon Council, November 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Digital challenges for Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher,

© shutterstock

Europeans are ageing. In 2016, there were 3.3 people of working-age for each citizen over 65 years. By 2070, this will fall to only two. As the population lives longer, our care needs grow, but fewer people will be available to deliver them. Could assistive technologies (ATs) help us to meet the challenges of elderly care?

It is important to recognise some key differences between age-related and sudden or lifelong impairments. First, age-related impairments of hearing, vision or mobility tend to be gradual. As such, the adjustment strategies are likely to differ from those that respond to sudden or lifelong impairments. Older individuals may be more likely to have multiple impairments – such as visual, hearing, mobility and cognitive impairments – which could affect the suitability of ATs that rely upon other sensory modalities or capabilities. Contextual differences are of crucial importance, and support for learning, employment and social inclusion may differ for sudden or lifelong and age-related impairments. There may also be differences in the experience of stigma and prejudice, and the relationship with new technologies.

It is also worth noting that all technologies are, to an extent, assistive, in the sense that they help people to achieve things more quickly, easily or effectively than would otherwise be possible. While ATs are designed specifically in response to impairments, people, impaired or not, regularly use all kinds of technologies to augment their personal abilities. As such, many insights that refer to ATs will also be relevant for mainstream technologies, and vice versa. Furthermore, technologies can be disabling in cases where new developments make services less accessible to some users, as can be the case where button-based interfaces are replaced by touchscreens that do not account for the needs of blind users.

Potential impacts and developments

In 2016, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) conducted a study of ATs for visual and hearing impairments, both of which are particularly prevalent amongst older citizens, and anticipated to increase along with the ageing European population. For visual impairments, ATs are sometimes designed to augment the affected sense, such as traditional reading glasses or screen magnifying applications, while others convey visual information via other senses, such as touch or sound. The latter include traditional low-tech devices such as white canes and Braille texts, as well as embossed or tactile maps and textured surfaces to support navigation. There are also high-tech equivalents, such as smart canes, haptic computer devices and text-to-speech converters. In the future, augmented reality spectacles may help users by magnifying images, filtering colours and providing object and facial recognition assistance by audio. One day, it may even be possible to repair or replace specific body parts, for example with ‘bionic eyes‘, which convert light to electrical impulses that are transmitted directly to the user’s nervous system. For hearing impairments, ATs can also make use of the affected sensory modality, as is the case for hearing aids, which amplify certain sound frequencies, and cochlear implants, which are surgically implanted sensors that convert sound inputs into electrical signals that are directed to the auditory nerve. Other ATs for hearing impairments make use of different senses, for example by alerting the user – via light, vibration or a combination of the two – about specific events that would usually be perceived audibly. Taking this further, text and video technologies can be used as a substitute for verbal communication. In future, advanced versions of many of these technologies, such as advanced auditory brainstem implants, could bypass the ear entirely, stimulating brainstem neurons directly. Augmented reality glasses (already mentioned in the context of visual impairments), could be used to communicate audio signals in the form of text.

Regarding mobility impairments, which are also often associated with old age, ATs such as mobility scooters and home stair lifts have been available for some time, as well as mainstream mobility technologies such as elevators. Future developments may include care robots that help users to move from their bed to their wheelchair and bathtub, and a proliferation of ATs to assist with the independent performance of daily tasks such as personal care, timekeeping, shopping, appliance use, and food preparation and consumption. While many of these ATs may be used by people with disabilities of all ages, other ATs are designed specifically for elderly users. For example the robot seal designed for dementia sufferers as well as other elderly people at risk of social, cognitive or emotional isolation.

Depending upon their implementation, such ATs might support and augment human care and companionship. Perhaps taking care of some of the more difficult tasks would enable elderly people to live with greater autonomy and independence for longer, and free up resources which could be used to enable other meaningful human interactions. However, there are also potential ethical risks. If ATs were to replace human contact, this would carry risks of isolation and alienation. In this sense, the aspiration for independence and autonomy in old age may conflict with the value of social inclusion and integration of elderly citizens. Some vulnerable people may experience illusory relationships with technical artefacts that could never reciprocate their feelings. In extreme cases, reliance on ATs for elderly care could leave vulnerable people with less regular human-to-human contact, which may also have health implications.

Anticipatory policy-making

While future ATs are promising, current ATs are not used to their full potential. A more effective promotion of the distribution and use of existing ATs could provide more immediate benefits than developing more advanced ATs. In this sense, social and regulatory action may be more important than technological development. While ATs offer significant support for some aspects of people’s lives, it is also important to consider social and regulatory action for social inclusion. For example, while ATs may ensure elderly citizens’ functional capability to remain in employment for longer, social change may also be required in order to counteract stigma, as well as organisational changes such as flexitime and working from home.

‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches for technology and policy are not well suited to this domain because everyone has different abilities and individual circumstances. Many people have multiple disabilities, while further differences appear in their social and economic resources, as well as in their personal needs, desires and preferences. Others are subjected to multiple forms of stigma or discrimination, as highlighted in a recent report on the problems facing women with disabilities in the workplace. Each individual’s circumstances can be as important as their impairments, or the AT’s capabilities, in shaping the extent to which the AT can respond to their impairment. Technology development and policy development need to be nuanced and flexible enough to respond to this range of individual circumstances.

Effective change should target all social groups, and it is important that action to achieve inclusivity does not target elderly people exclusively. For example, the problems of discrimination and stigma require attitudinal and organisational change that permeates society. Wider actions are also required in the specific area of ATs. For example, many people will increasingly encounter ATs in their professional and personal lives, perhaps in the form of tools for facilitating communication with citizens with multiple impairments. Understanding how to engage with others effectively through these means is important for health professionals and public services, as well as for designers of digital services and infrastructure.

The establishment of a defined profession of experts in the application of ATs could play an important role in addressing several issues. As well as providing support for individuals in the adoption of ATs that respond to their specific needs and individual circumstances – including old age – they could also help individuals without impairments to interact more effectively and inclusively with people using ATs. Their experience would also be valuable in informing the development of new ATs, as well as mainstream technologies that will be used by people with and without impairments.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

With momentous political changes occurring on the European scene, the agenda for the second plenary session of October features a number of high-profile issues, encompassing the outcome of the October European Council meeting and the Brexit negotiations, European Union (EU) enlargement, the end of the current Commission’s term, negotiations on the future EU budget and financing the fight against climate change.

A debate on Tuesday morning follows European Council and Commission statements on the outcome of the important European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019. If the United Kingdom House of Commons votes in favour of the deal announced on 17 October, it is likely that Members will then debate giving consent to the Withdrawal Agreement during this session.

Another item discussed at the European Council meeting features on the agenda on Wednesday morning, when Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the situation regarding EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Declared a priority by both outgoing and incoming Commission Presidents, Parliament supports the opening of negotiations with the western Balkan countries. However, Member States have expressed reservations regarding specific issues (regarding Albania in particular), and on the enlargement process in general. At stake is striking the right balance between the EU’s ability to honour its commitments towards third countries, whilst also protecting its own geostrategic and domestic interests.

Although the renewal of the European Commission has been postponed beyond the scheduled date of 1 November, current President of the Commission Jean‑Claude Juncker is expected to present a statement on Tuesday morning, encompassing a review of the Juncker Commission. Whilst facing some challenging situations during the 2014-2019 period, including terrorist attacks and increased refugee movements, analysis of the Juncker Commission’s 10 priorities shows that some two thirds of the Commission’s proposals during the period have resulted in changes to the law. However, progress has been slower on growth, jobs, investment and trade. The vote on the von der Leyen Commission has been postponed until late November, pending the organisation of hearings for new nominees from France, Hungary and Romania.

Members are expected to debate the Council position on all sections of the general budget of the European Union for 2020 on Tuesday afternoon. Once Parliament adopts its amendments, the budget will be the subject of conciliation negotiations between the institutions. However Parliament’s Committee on Budgets proposes to reject the reductions imposed by the Council and instead to increase expenditure on priorities such as the European Pillar of Social Rights, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and, in particular, meeting EU climate targets. The topical debate for this session, on Wednesday, will see Members discuss the current climate and ecological emergency in the presence of Council and Commission. While the EU is on track to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, with greater energy efficiency and increased use of renewables already achieved, more effort is needed. However, adapting to new climate measures, including providing mitigation, costs money, and may require a significant outlay of EU public resources.

Continuing on financial matters on Tuesday afternoon, the previous Parliament decided to postpone the decision on granting discharge for the 2017 accounts of the Council/European Council and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in March of this year. This now returns to the agenda, with Parliament expected to take a position in both cases. A Budgetary Control Committee report proposes that Parliament again refuse to grant discharge to the Council (which disputes the standing practice that Parliament grants discharge separately for each institution and body), as that institution has again failed to provide requested information, to separate the budget of the European Council from the Council’s budget, and to align with the interinstitutional transparency register. Corporate sponsorship of Council presidencies is also a sticking point. Regarding EASO, irregularities uncovered during the previous directorship led to refusal of that institution’s accounts for 2017. While the CONT committee notes that the new EASO management has committed to reforms, due to the previous problems in public procurement and recruitment procedures underlying payments, it proposes to refuse discharge for 2017.

Written by Jana Titievskaia,

© 9dreamstudio / Fotolia

The EU’s common commercial policy (CCP), or trade policy, has evolved gradually over the years to encompass a range of trade-related areas under the remit of European Union (EU) exclusive competence. The Treaty of Rome established the common market and the customs union with a focus on goods. Later treaties expanded the CCP to services and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. Trade policy falls under the EU’s exclusive competence, meaning that the EU manages trade policy and trade negotiations on behalf of the Member States. The determination of competence is critical for the procedures needed to conclude trade agreements, as in areas falling under shared competence these need to be ratified by both the EU and Member States. This has led to trade and investment agreements being split into two parts to speed up the ratification process for the trade parts, following European Court of Justice (ECJ) Opinion 2/15 (Singapore).

Whereas trade liberalisation is generally accepted to lead to economic growth, the impact on jobs varies both between and within countries. According to the European Commission, in 2018 trade supported 36 million export-related jobs. Trade can also lead to more inequality, however, in particular by widening the gap between skilled and unskilled workers or in causing the unequal relationship between developed and developing countries to become more entrenched.

Trade liberalisation in its most basic form involves the removal of tariffs, which are taxes or duties to be paid for an import. Tariff rate quotas charge lower rates within a certain quota, jumping to a higher tariff rate after the quota is exhausted. Tariffs are cut under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, with the most-favoured nation tariff representing the highest possible tariffs that WTO members can charge each other. In contrast, preferential tariffs are agreed to in trade agreements or customs union arrangements. Rules of origin have been developed in order to determine where goods originate from (or the ‘economic nationality’ of products). These rules are all the more important in the era of global value chains, where a significant proportion of European products’ value comes from foreign sub-components or services.

Trade liberalisation also seeks to remove non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade, these include protectionist measures to help domestic producers, subsidies, technical barriers to trade, or stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. Lower NTBs can facilitate cross-border trade in services, which play a huge role in overall EU trade. However, data collection and measurement issues complicate efforts to understand the services trade. Trade defence instruments, meanwhile, enable the EU to react, for instance, to dumping or WTO-incompatible subsidies in partner trading countries, and form the protective front of EU trade policy.

The CCP focuses on fostering fair and free trade, furthering market access and supporting the multilateral, rules-based trading system. To achieve these objectives, the EU employs a range of legislative tools and negotiates trade agreements with trade partners. More specifically, over recent decades the EU has aimed to spread open and free trade based on mandates from Member States. After the breakdown of the WTO Doha Round, the EU initiated a period of concentrated focus on free trade agreements, which tackle both tariff liberalisation and NTBs, with a wide range of partner countries from America to Asia.

The EU has concluded trade agreements on multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral bases. EU trade agreements are adopted through a lengthy procedure, which involves distinct stages, namely preparation, a mandate to open talks, negotiations, textual agreement, initialling, signature, provisional application and, finally, entry into force. The EU also offers different types of trade relationship, ranging from deep integration on both regulatory and trade fronts, to simple partnership and cooperation agreements that do not offer preferential treatment. Trade agreements are enforceable through a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism that allows parties to adopt economic remedies in the event of non-compliance. However, certain provisions in trade agreements, such as trade and sustainable development (TSD) clauses, have a different mechanism for settling disagreements that involves government consultations and recommendations issued by a panel of experts. Efforts to make trade policy ‘greener’ include TSD chapters, but also provisions to support sustainable use of natural resources, biodiversity, forestry and fisheries. Trade agreements also include human rights clauses that aim to incentivise trade partners to improve internal governance.

EU trade legislation is adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, and provides the framework for trade policy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has played an important role in the CCP. Parliament must give its consent to trade agreements or trade-related legislation, while it also monitors trade policy developments through resolutions, hearings and workshops. The European Commission proposes and negotiates, while the Council authorises the opening of negotiations and decides on the conclusion of trade agreements. Civil society and stakeholders are encouraged to feed into this process on a regular basis.

Where technocratic negotiations were once sufficient, trade policy has undergone intense politicisation in recent years. Where trade policy used to be characterised by material arguments based on numerical simplicity, now it features normative disagreements and regulatory politics. This makes knowledge and understanding of the complex concepts and themes of EU trade policy all the more important.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU trade policy: Frequently asked questions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

 

Written by Marie Lecerf,

Over recent decades, there has been marked progress in reducing poverty worldwide. The research conducted by this year’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences laureates, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, has considerably improved the ability to fight global poverty. Nevertheless, despite this progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty remains too high, even in Europe and, in particular, amongst children.

As 2019 also marks the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 20 November 1989), celebration of the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty on 17 October is a great opportunity to take stock of what the European Union is doing to fight against child poverty in its own Member States.

Child poverty in the European Union

In 2017, 112.8 million people in the EU-28 lived in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e. 22.4 % EU-28, Eurostat, latest data available). With an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.9 % in the EU-28, children were at greater risk in 2017 than the total population: almost one in four children in the European Union is at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This situation was mirrored in 19 EU Member States.

Source: Eurostat, 2019

EU contribution to the fight against child poverty

As child poverty in the European Union remains a reality, especially for certain groups (children in single parent, large or migrant families), child poverty has become a major policy concern for the European Union. Precarious living conditions during childhood have a detrimental effect, not only on attainment in school but also on health and on the ability to integrate socially during adolescence and early adulthood. The consequences of poverty experienced in childhood or adolescence can continue into later life and may be passed on from one generation to the next.

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Union and its Member States are bound to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24 of which is entirely dedicated to the rights of the child: ‘1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.’

EU policy responses to child poverty

Fighting child poverty in the EU is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. Nevertheless, at EU level, there is broad consensus that action is needed to lift children out of poverty and to promote children’s wellbeing.

One of the targets of the European 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people living in poverty by 20 million (compared with 2008). In 2013, the European Commission adopted, and the European Council endorsed, a Recommendation ‘Investing in children – breaking the cycle of disadvantage’. Considering child poverty from a comprehensive perspective, it sets a three pillar structure: employment and adequate income, access to quality services and children’s participation.

In November 2015, Parliament adopted a resolution on reducing inequalities with a specific focus on the most vulnerable children. In 2017, Parliament went a step further, requesting that the Commission implement a preparatory action on establishing a possible child guarantee scheme. This guarantee should ensure that every child in poverty receives free access to quality early childhood education and care, education, healthcare, and access to decent housing and adequate nutrition.

The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights in November 2017 demonstrates an increased willingness to tackle child poverty in the European Union. Article 11 explicitly reflects that the fight against child poverty is a priority under the social Europe approach, while referring to children’s right to be protected from poverty.

EU funds are key in tackling child poverty

Numerous financial instruments provide a framework for Member States to implement measures to address child poverty with the support of the European Union.

• The 2013 Recommendation calls for the opportunities provided by the European Social and Investment Funds during 2014-2020 to be used when possible to help children.
• The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) complements EU funding to fight child poverty. Its objectives are to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing food and/or basic material assistance as well as social inclusion activities for the most deprived. Children represent almost one-third (30 %) of the total number of people receiving food support.
• The EU’s proposal for the upcoming 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, including the European Social Fund +, highlights the need to strengthen the fight against poverty and social exclusion. On 4 April 2019, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the European Commission’s proposal on the ESF+, proposing that Member States should allocate at least 5 % of their ESF+ resources to targeted actions aimed at implementing the European Child Guarantee. It also recommended that Member States should allocate at least 27 % of their ESF+ resources to specific objectives in the field of social inclusion, and at least 3 % of their resources to the specific objective of the social inclusion of the most deprived and/or material deprivation. On 2 October 2019, the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs voted on the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, so that the dossier can progress.

Despite all the actions and policies undertaken, the task ahead to eradicate child poverty in the European Union will be a daunting challenge for the next decade. Hopefully, as Esther Duflo recently said, their research could also provide a source of inspiration for the European Union.