European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Pernilla Jourde and Agnieszka Widuto (1st edition),

© matthi / Shutterstock.com

The EU aims to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 % by 2030 and achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This will require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and carbon-intensive industries. As part of the European Green Deal, on 14 January 2020, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation to create the Just Transition Fund, aimed at supporting EU regions most affected by the transition to a low carbon economy.

Funding will be available to all Member States, while focusing on regions with the biggest transition challenges. The fund will support workers, companies, and regional authorities, encouraging investments that facilitate the transition. The proposed budget for the Just Transition Fund (JTF) is €7.5 billion, to be complemented with resources from cohesion policy funds and national co‑financing (up to a total of €30-50 billion). The Fund will be part of a Just Transition Mechanism, which also includes resources under InvestEU and loans from the European Investment Bank. Total funding mobilised under the mechanism is expected to reach €100 billion, according to the Commission.

In the European Parliament, the file has been entrusted to the Committee on Regional Development. The committee is due to hold a workshop on 19 February 2020 before starting discussion on the rapporteur’s draft report.

Versions

• February 2020:  ‘Just Transition Fund‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing
the Just Transition Fund Committee responsible: Regional Development (REGI) COM(2020) 22
14.1.2020 Rapporteurs: Manolis Kefalogiannis (EPP, Greece) 2020/0006(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Pedro Marques (S&D, Portugal)
Ondřej Knotek (Renew, Czechia)
Francesca Donato (ID, Italy)
Niklas Nienass (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Raffaele Fitto (ECR, Italy)
Martina Michels (GUE/NGL, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Initial debate and committee workshop
Publication of draft report

Just Transition Mechanism

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

© Shutterstock.com

EU Heads of State or Government will meet on 20 February 2020 for a special European Council meeting to discuss the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). Both the Sibiu Declaration of EU Heads of State or Government and the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda state that ‘the EU must give itself the means to match its ambitions, attain its objectives and carry through its policies’. Following an initial informal discussion in February 2018, the European Council has touched regularly upon the MFF negotiations at its meetings over the last two years. Until now, however, the EU Heads of State or Government have not really attempted to reach an agreement. Most recently, in December 2019, the incoming President of the European Council, Charles Michel, was given a mandate ‘to take the negotiations forward with the aim of reaching a final agreement’. This confirms the European Council’s central involvement in the MFF negotiations, as was the case for the agreement in 2013 on the 2014-2020 long-term budget (see The European Council and the Multiannual Financial Framework, EPRS). This briefing will examine the discussions in and conclusions of the European Council over the past two years, outline the main topics debated and present the diverging views of the various players involved.

Discussions in the European Council since February 2018 Informal European Council meeting, 23 February 2018

On 23 February 2018, the EU Heads of State or Government met informally for an initial discussion on the 2021-2027 MFF. The aim was, in the words of the then European Council President, Donald Tusk, for ‘the European Commission [to] receive political guidance from the European Council, before coming up with its proposals’. Unlike the negotiations for the 2014-2020 MFF, in which the European Council only became fully involved after publication of the Commission’s proposal (The European Council and the Multiannual Financial Framework, EPRS), this time round the European Council began discussing its priorities for the next MFF at an early stage. EU Heads of State or Government discussed (i) the political priorities that should be addressed during the upcoming financial period; (ii) the overall level of expenditure in the next MFF; and (iii) the timetable envisaged for the MFF negotiations. At this meeting, EU leaders did not manage to agree on the overall level of expenditure, but a consensus emerged on the need for the EU to ‘spend more on stemming illegal migration, on defence and security, as well as on the Erasmus+ programme’.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Council and the 2021-27 Multiannual Financial Framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Visit the European Parliament homepage on the EU’s long term budget 2021-2027.

Or The EU’s long term budget explained.

 

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

© Ruslan Shugushev / Shutterstock.com

Separation of family members can have devastating consequences on their well-being and ability to rebuild their lives. This is true for everybody, but especially so for persons who have fled persecution or serious harm and have lost family during forced displacement and flight. In the case of beneficiaries of international protection, family separation can affect their ability to engage in many aspects of the integration process, from education and employment to putting down roots, as well as harming their physical and emotional health. That is why family reunification is a fundamental aspect of bringing normality to the lives of such people. While EU law ensures refugees and holders of subsidiary protection – the two types of beneficiaries of international protection – equal treatment in most areas, differences remain, among others, as regards family reunification in accordance with the Family Reunification Directive. Unlike refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection do not enjoy the favourable conditions associated with the right to family reunification.

After 2015, most EU Member States witnessed a significant increase in the number of asylum-seekers arriving in their territory, paralleled by an increase in the number of beneficiaries of international protection seeking reunification with their families. To establish some form of control over this unprecedented flow of people, Member States shifted away from awarding refugee status towards granting subsidiary protection, thus restricting the possibility of beneficiaries to reunite with their families. According to many legal experts, the fact that beneficiaries of subsidiary protection face stricter requirements regarding family reunification than do refugees disregards the particular circumstances related to their forced displacement and the corresponding difficulties they are likely to face in meeting these stricter requirements.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Family reunification rights of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova,

© Ugis Riba / Shutterstock.com

In May 2018, the European Commission published its proposal for the EU’s long-term budget for 2021-2027, known as the multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposed next MFF is structured in 7 headings, encompassing 17 policy clusters. The Commission has proposed a total budget of €1 134 583 million in current prices. The vast majority of these funds – over 93 % – is dedicated to a variety of EU programmes, and is invested primarily in Member States, as well as partially in partner countries as external spending. The remaining funds cover the administrative expenses of the EU, an underlying cost of all EU activities.

In the current MFF for 2014-2020, Heading 5 covers administration, while in the proposed 2021-2027 MFF, administrative costs will be funded under Heading 7, entitled ‘European public administration’. While in other policy areas there is more significant restructuring, the heading that covers EU administrative costs is comparable to that of the current MFF in size and structure.

In its proposal for the future Heading 7, the Commission upholds its view that, to ensure the smooth functioning of the Union, the EU budget must finance its administration adequately, particularly in view of the fact that the EU civil service has undergone two successive and substantial reforms within a short time frame, in 2004 and 2014. The Commission proposal aims to ensure that the EU can rely on a highly qualified administrative service, which respects a geographical and gender balance. The proposal has been backed by the European Parliament. On the other hand, in its first draft ‘negotiating box’ including figures from December 2019, the Council proposed a 2.6 % cut to the allocations in the Commission proposal and Parliament’s position.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Financing the EU’s administration: Heading 7 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Velina Lilyanova,

© European Union, 2019

In May 2018, the European Commission published its proposals for the new multiannual financial framework (MFF), the EU’s seven-year budget for the 2021-2027 period, followed by proposals for the MFF’s individual sectoral programmes. In the proposals, financing external action is covered under Heading 6, ‘Neighbourhood and the World’, which replaces the current Heading 4, ‘Global Europe’. Taking into account the evolving context both internationally and within the EU, as well as the conclusions of the current MFF’s mid-term review, the Commission has proposed changes to the EU external action budget in order to make it simpler and more flexible, and to enable the EU to engage more strategically with its partner countries in the future.

The proposed Heading 6 comes with increased resources and important structural changes. It envisages merging the majority of the current stand-alone external financing instruments into a single one – the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI) – as well as integrating into it the biggest EU external financing fund – the European Development Fund – currently outside the budget. Another proposed novelty is to set up an off-budget instrument – the European Peace Facility – to fund security and defence-related actions. With these changes, the Commission strives to take into account, among other things, the need for the EU to align its actions with its new and renewed international commitments under the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, the Paris Climate Agreement, the new EU Global Strategy, the European Consensus on Development, the European Neighbourhood Policy, and to make EU added value, relevance and credibility more visible.

Negotiations on the 2021-2027 MFF are under way. The final decision is to be taken by the Council, acting by unanimity, with the European Parliament’s consent. However, in view of current political realities and the financial implications of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, the adoption of a modern budget for the future remains a challenge that is not limited to Heading 6. Further developments are expected by the end of 2019.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Financing EU external action in the new MFF, 2021-2027: Heading 6 ‘Neighbourhood and the World’‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Sidonia Mazur,

© M-SUR / Fotolia

For the new 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF), the European Commission proposes to dedicate a separate heading to security and defence – Heading 5. Although the European Union (EU) has already financed action linked to security and defence, this is the first time that this policy area has been so visibly underlined in the EU budget structure. With an allocation of €24 323 million (in 2018 prices), Heading 5 is the smallest of the seven MFF headings and represents 2.1 % of the total MFF.

Heading 5 ‘Security and Defence’ under the new MFF consists of three ‘policy clusters’: security, (policy cluster number 12), defence (13) and crisis response (14).

The programmes and funds proposed for Heading 5 consist of old and new initiatives. They include the continuation of the current Internal Security Fund – Police instrument, funding for nuclear decommissioning and the Union Civil Protection Mechanism (rescEU). The European Defence Fund and the military mobility programme, which is a part of the Connecting Europe Facility, are new.

The European Parliament position is supportive of the Commission proposal, with the exception of the allocation for nuclear decommissioning, which the Parliaments sees as insufficient.

Even though the Council has not yet expressed its position on the 2021-2027 MFF, the Finnish EU Presidency contributed to the debate with its ‘negotiation box’ that proposed severe cuts to Heading 5, down to €16 491 million. The European Parliament reaction to this reduction is negative.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Financing EU security and defence: Heading 5 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Fotolia

The digital revolution, global trade disputes and low growth in the European economy have, among other factors, revived the debate about the merits and drawbacks of the European Union’s strict EU competition rules, which cover cartels, market dominance, mergers and state aid. Some politicians and economists argue that competition is an increasingly global phenomenon and that the intra-Community trade context for which the EU competition rules were originally designed no longer applies and the rules themselves are, as a result, too prescriptive. This emerging view might encourage the Union to pursue a more active and coordinated EU industrial policy supported by more flexible rules on state aid and mergers in particular. The debate comes at a time when the U.S.-China trade conflict and problems in the World Trade Organisation are reshaping global economic competition, with new relationships and partnerships being formed.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the EU’s competition and industrial policy challenges and on a changing naturee of global competition. More studies on trade issues can be found in a previous item from these series, published in September 2019.

A surprising new alliance: Europe and Japan
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2020

How can European competition law address market distortions caused by state-owned enterprises?
Bruegel, December 2019

Industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises and market distortions: Problems, proposals and a path forward
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2020

The economics of European sovereignty: What role for EU competition policy in industrial policy?
Jacques Delors Centren Hertie School, December 2019

What is the scope of the EU external competence in the field of energy today?
Jacques Delors Institute, December 2019

Detecting, investigating and prosecuting export control violations: European perspectives on key challenges and good practices
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, December 2019

The future of EU’s Eastern Partnership beyond 2020: EU’s engagement in a contested Eastern neighbourhood amidst internal crisis and geopolitical competition
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, December 2019

European seaports and Chinese strategic influence: The relevance of the maritime silk road for the Netherlands
Clingendael, December 2019

The UK and the EU should prevent mutual assured damage
Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2019

An Industry Action Plan for a more competitive, sustainable and strategic European Union
European Policy Centre, November 2019

A primer on developing European public goods: A report to Ministers Bruno Le Maire and Olaf Scholz
Bruegel, November 2019

The drafting of a European Business Code
Fondation Robert Schuman, November 2019

EU–US relations on internet governance
Chatham House, November 2019

Establishing trust in an AI-powered future
Jacques Delors Institute, November 2019

How does China fare on the Russian market? Implications for the European Union
Bruegel, November 2019

Europe and China’s belt and road initiative: Growing concerns, more strategy
Egmont, November 2019

Beyond industrial policy: Why Europe needs a new growth strategy
Jacques Delors Institute, October 2019

A geographically fair EU industrial strategy
European Policy Centre, October 2019

With or without you: Are central European countries ready for the euro?
Bruegel, October 2019

The Netherlands and Germany, ensuring competitiveness in a net zero emissions world
E3G, October 2019

Emerging trade battlefield with China: Export competition and firm’s coping strategies
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, October 2019

Shaping a new international trade order: Competition and co-operation among the European Union, the United States, and China
Dahrendorf Institute, October 2019

La politique de sanctions de l’Union européenne: Ambition multilatérale contre ambition de puissance
Institut francais des relations internationales, October 2019

The power to engage: Giving punch to a new EU global strategy 2020
Egmont, September 2019

A human-centric digital manifesto for Europe
Open Societies Foundations, September 2019

What are the benefits of data sharing? Uniting supply chain and platform economy perspectives
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, September 2019

Economic polarisation in Europe: Causes and options for action
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, September 2019

Holding together what belongs together: A strategy to counteract economic polarisation in Europe
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, September 2019

Should the EU tax imported CO2?
Centre for European Reform, September 2019

New beginnings – Objective 2024: Better living and working conditions for all Europeans
Notre Europe, September 2019

Über-influential? How the gig economy’s lobbyists undermine social and workers rights
Corporate Europe Observatory, September 2019

The US-China 5G contest: Options for Europe
Instituto Affari Internzionali, September 2019

Delivering sustainable food and land use systems: The role of international trade
Chatham House, September 2019

Chinese method of currency internationalization
Instytut Sobieskiego, September 2019

Measuring the rise of economic nationalism
Peterson Institute for International Economics, August 2019

The threats to the European Union’s economic sovereignty
Bruegel, August 2019

The European Union energy transition: Key priorities for the next five years
Bruegel, July 2019

A strategic agenda for the new EU leadership
Bruegel, June 2019

The European Union versus the better regulation agenda: Why the outcome depends on a paradigm shift
European Trade Union Institute, June 2019

Sustaining multilateralism in a multipolar world
Notre Europe, June 2019

Cross border services in the internal market: An important contribution to economic and social cohesion
Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, June 2019

Tech giants in banking: The implications of a new market power
Instituto Affari Internzionali, June 2019

Divergence and diversity in the Euro area: The case of Germany, France and Italy
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2019

Net neutrality regulation: Much ado about nothing?
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, June 2019

China and the world trade organisation: Towards a better fit
Bruegel, May 2019

Who is big in Brussels?
Tænketanken Europa, May 2019

Digitalsteuer in der EU Wo stehen wir?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

Rule of law infringement procedures: A proposal to extend the EU’s rule of law toolbox
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2019

L’Europe et la 5G : Le cas Huawei
Institute Montaigne, May 2019

Business (not) for peace: A call for conflict-sensitive policy in fragile states
South African Institute of International Affairs, May 2019

China and Europe: Trade, technology and competition
Observer Research Foundation, May 2019

Addressing China’s rising influence in Africa
Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 2019

China’s race to global technology leadership
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, May 2019

EP 2014-19 key votes: Copyright
Jacques Delors Institute, April 2019

Infrastructure for growth: How to finance, develop, and protect it
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, April 2019

Posted workers regulations as a cohesion test in the enlarged EU
Friedrich Ebert Sftitung, April 2019

A roadmap for a fair data economy
Lisbon Council, April 2019

EU industrial policy after Siemens-Alstom: Finding a new balance between openness and protection
European Political Strategy Centre, March 2019

Standing up for competition: Market concentration, regulation, and Europe’s quest for a new industrial policy
European Centre for International Political Economy, March 2019

Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness
Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute, March 2019

Escaping the startup trap: Can policymakers help small companies grow to major employers?
Progressive Policy Institute, February 2019

The German undervaluation regime under Bretton Woods: How Germany became the nightmare of the world economy
Max Planck Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, February 2019

Innovate Europe: Competing for global innovation leadership
World Economic Forum, January 2019

Vertical restraints and e-commerce
Bruegel, January 2019

Big data analytics need standards to thrive: What standards are and why they matter
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Competion in the EU and globally‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© robsonphoto/ Fotolia

The Treaty of Lisbon makes explicit reference to pooling financial resources to support common policies on asylum, immigration and external borders. While expenditure for these policy areas still represents a minor share of the EU budget, it has recently increased in the wake of the 2015-2016 refugee crisis. Since the resources available under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) of the EU proved insufficient to address the crisis, EU institutions had to use the flexibility provisions of the MFF extensively.

Given the increasing salience of the policy areas, the European Commission has proposed the establishment of a specific heading devoted to migration and border management worth €30.8 billion (2018 prices) in the 2021-2027 MFF. As compared with the current period, these allocations would represent a significant increase in relative terms, especially as regards border management. The heading would finance two funding instruments, the Asylum and Migration Fund (AMF) and the Integrated Border Management Fund (IBMF), as well as the activities of relevant EU decentralised agencies, such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency and the European Asylum Support Office. By designing these new funds, the European Commission seeks to improve synergies with other EU funding instruments and increase capacity to react to evolving needs.

Negotiations for the MFF package are very complex, involving different legislative procedures for the adoption of the overall MFF and the sector-specific instruments. The European Parliament, the Council and the European Council are working on the proposals, which have also triggered reactions from other stakeholders, including academics, think-tanks and commentators.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Migration and border management: Heading 4 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP / Michel CHRISTEN

Highlights of the February session included debates on a review of economic governance; the revised enlargement methodology proposed by the Commission; a breach of Council Decision 2017/2074 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in Venezuela; the current situation in Syria; on fighting against antisemitism, racism and hatred across Europe; as well as on the ongoing threat to the rule of law in Poland. Members also adopted a resolution on the illegal trade in companion animals. They debated the state of play in the EU’s fight against money laundering (in light of the Luanda Leaks); the humanitarian situation of refugees at EU external borders; and the coronavirus outbreak. Members also voted on a resolution on EU priorities for the 64th session of the UN Commission on the Status of Women.

Preparation of the extraordinary European Council Meeting on the MFF

Members called for an ambitious compromise on the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, hoping for early European Council agreement. Negotiations on the proposals put forward by the previous Commission are proving rather complicated, not least due to the withdrawal of a major net contributor in the UK. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, has called an extraordinary European Council Meeting on the MFF, scheduled to start on 20 February 2020, to attempt to finalise an agreement on the proposed new structure for EU finances, which aims at shifting the priority for spending towards a climate-resilient economy.

Mandate for negotiations for a new partnership with the UK

Members discussed statements from the Council and Commission statements on the negotiating mandate for the negotiations for a new partnership with the UK. By a very large majority, Parliament adopted its position on the EU-27’s priorities for negotiations, due to open in March, between the EU and the UK on a post-Brexit cooperation agreement, including trade. Parliament reiterated the well-known EU-27 principles: that a non-Member State must not have the same rights and benefits as a Member State; the single market’s four fundamental freedoms of movement are indivisible; the EU legal order and the role of the Court of Justice must be preserved; a level playing field must be ensured through guaranteed equivalent standards in social, environmental, employment, competitive, and State aid matters; and the EU’s financial stability must be underpinned by a balance of rights and obligations with proportionate financial contributions where appropriate.

Ongoing threat to the rule of law in Poland

A large majority of Members reiterated their concerns about the controversial reform of the Polish judicial system and, more broadly, about the state of the rule of law in Poland, underlining the continuing threat to the rule of law in Poland and the urgency of action.

SMEs and better regulation

Parliament is a staunch supporter of a business-friendly EU where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovators benefit from a level playing field, and promotes the use of impact assessment to gauge the effects of new legislation on SMEs in particular. Members debated a Commission statement on the progress made with minimising the impact of EU legislation on SMEs through the better regulation initiative. The Commission gave an indication of what to expect in the new industrial strategy for Europe, expected in March 2020 and its communication on better regulation, expected sometime afterwards.

United States Middle East Plan: EU response in line with international law

Parliament also debated a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, on the EU response to the US Middle East plan proposed by US President Trump (‘the White House plan’). While there was no vote on the subject, the EU and Parliament are strongly committed to a two-state solution that respects international law.

Gender equality strategy

Progress towards gender equality has stalled, and the current Parliament has lost no time in demanding a robust EU gender equality strategy. The Commission made a statement on its proposals for a new gender equality strategy, the preparation of which involved informal input from the Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Following a related plenary debate on 18 December 2019, Members adopted a resolution on the EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world. Parliament has long been active in raising awareness of the need to act to end the practice, which it considers a form of persecution, as part of its combat against all forms of violence against women and girls.

Free Trade and Investment Protection Agreements with Vietnam

Parliament gave its consent to the EU’s conclusion of two trade agreements with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The agreements (a Free Trade Agreement covering exclusive EU competences, and an Investment Protection Agreement based on competences that are shared with EU Member States), could see exports to Vietnam rise by almost 30 %. Although there is some concern regarding the human rights situation in the country, Parliament’s committees scrutinising the proposed agreements have concluded that engaging with Vietnam is the best way to encourage improvement. The agreements must subsequently be ratified by Vietnam (as well as EU Member States in the case of the IPA), before entering into force.

European Central Bank – annual report 2018

Christine Lagarde attended the plenary session for the first time in her capacity as President of the European Central Bank (ECB), for the debate on an Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee report on the ECB’s annual report for 2018. Reflecting on the rather mixed economic results over that year, the committee pointed out the need for a review of ECB monetary policy, with full Parliament involvement, as well as public consultation. It also underlined the ECB’s responsibility for considering the impact of policy on the environment, and urged the ECB to continue to improve transparency and communication with citizens. The adopted report also calls for better gender balance on the ECB Executive Board and Governing Council.

False and authentic documents online (FADO)

For the strengthened European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG – formerly Frontex) to carry out its work in support of EU countries’ border and migration management, it, and border guards more generally, needs to be able to verify the documents presented by people wishing to cross the EU’s external borders. However, the proliferation of both authentic and fake documentation makes the agency’s work that much harder. Members debated and voted by a large majority to approve the upgrading of the False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO) system. Under the agreed text, the EBCG will take over management of the system, which stores details of travel, identity, residence and civil status documents, driving and vehicle licences issued by Member States or the EU. Personal data will be kept to the minimum necessary for operations and availability filtered according to status, such as authorities involved in document fraud, or the general public.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, FebruaryI 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Karoline Kowald,

© Martin Erdniss / Shutterstock.com

Dedicated to programmes and funds supporting agriculture and maritime policy, and environment and climate change, Heading 3 is the second biggest in terms of funding in the European Commission proposal on the future multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. The two agricultural funds – the European Agricultural Guarantee Fund (EAGF) and the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD) – are the main financial instruments for the common agricultural policy (CAP). They will continue to absorb the greater part of the financial resources under this heading. However, the European Commission proposes an amount of €324 284 million to cover both funds, which is a decrease of around €60 000 million (or 15 %) compared to the current MFF (2014-2020), after deducing current United Kingdom (UK) spending. The proposed European Maritime and Fisheries Fund (EMFF) would amount to €5 448 million, which is 13 % less than in the current MFF, after deducting current UK spending.

In its November 2018 resolution on the European Commission proposals for the new MFF, the European Parliament, raised the budget for agricultural and maritime policy back to the level of the current MFF (2014-2020), to €391 198 million. Where the European Commission proposes €4 828 million for the Programme for Environment & Climate Action (LIFE) for 2021-2027, Parliament’s resolution increased this amount considerably, requesting an allocation of €6 442 million. Parliament has also asked for a new Energy Transition Fund, with a budget of €4 800 million for 2021-2027, to address the negative socio-economic impact on workers and communities affected by the transition from a coal and carbon dependent economy to a low-carbon economy.

The Council has not yet adopted a position on the MFF proposal and national positions are divergent. However, according to the ‘negotiating box’ proposed by the Finnish Council Presidency, under Heading 3, the cuts in the budget for agriculture would represent a reduction of 13 % in spending, compared to the current MFF.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Natural resources and environment: Heading 3 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Magdalena Sapala,

© European Union, EPRS

Heading 2 – Cohesion and values – is the biggest in terms of budget in the multiannual financial framework (MFF) proposed by the European Commission for the 2021 to 2027 period. It is also the most diversified heading in terms of the types of programme and fund included. It encompasses expenditure on cohesion, one of the EU’s long-standing policies, on an entirely new budgetary instrument supporting economic and monetary union, and on other increasingly important goals, including youth employment, the creative sector, values, equality and the rule of law. Under this heading the Commission is proposing to almost halve the Cohesion Fund and double the Erasmus+ programme. Moreover, some of the programmes included fall under shared management between the Commission and EU Member States, while some are managed directly by the Commission.

This briefing presents Heading 2 in detail, on the basis of previous EPRS publications on the 2021-2027 MFF proposal. It aims to provide some clarity on its structure and allocation in comparison with the current MFF, based on the Commission’s proposal for the 2021-2027 MFF and the European Parliament’s negotiating position adopted on 14 November 2018. The analysis is structured around three issues: the introduction to the EU budget of a new budgetary instrument for economic and monetary union, a change in the allocation for cohesion policy, and the merging of programmes supporting people, social cohesion and values.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Cohesion funds, values and economic and monetary union in the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP/Michel CHRISTEN

The European Commission has a near monopoly on legislative initiative in the European Union (EU), with special initiative rights for other institutions applying only in certain specific cases. However, the European Parliament and the Council may invite the Commission to submit legislative proposals. Whilst this ‘indirect’ initiative right does not create an obligation on the Commission to propose the legislation requested, the Treaty of Lisbon codified the Commission’s obligation to provide reasons for any refusal to follow a parliamentary initiative. Against this backdrop, some argue that Parliament could take the Commission to the Court of Justice of the EU if it fails to justify a negative decision.

Others see Parliament’s increasing participation in overall political planning – particularly through negotiations on the Commission’s annual work programme (CWP) – as a further channel for Parliament to increase its influence on EU legislation. It is thus argued that the increased role of Parliament in the legislative procedure should have reduced the need for its Members to make use of legislative initiatives. Notwithstanding that, there is a trend towards greater use of formal parliamentary legislative initiatives to assert greater influence on the political process.

Most recently, in her inaugural address in July 2019 and in her Political Guidelines, the then newly elected President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, pledged to strengthen the partnership with the European Parliament, inter alia, by responding with a proposal for a legislative act whenever Parliament, acting by a majority of its members, adopts a resolution requesting that the Commission submit legislative proposals. She added that this commitment would have to be in full respect of the proportionality, subsidiarity and better law-making principles. President von der Leyen also declared herself supportive of moves towards recognition of a right for Parliament of legislative initiative.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Parliament’s right of legislative initiative‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘European Parliament’s legislative initiative‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marianna Pari,

© Oleksii Lishchyshyn / Shutterstock.com

The European Union’s long-term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), sets out the maximum annual amounts of spending for a seven-year period. It is structured around the EU’s spending priorities, reflected in broad categories of expenditure or ‘headings’.

Heading 1 – Single market, innovation and digital – is one of the seven headings in the MFF proposed by the European Commission for the new 2021-2027 financial period. The heading covers spending in four policy areas: research and innovation, European strategic investments, single market, and space. The Commission, with a view to matching the budget to the EU’s political ambitions, is proposing an overall amount of €166.3 billion (in 2018 prices) for this heading, representing 14.7 % of the MFF proposal. However, the new Commission’s six priorities for 2019-2024 could have a budgetary impact on this heading, in particular the support for investment in green technologies and a cleaner private and public transport, which are among the actions included in the European Green Deal, and efforts to enable Europe to make the most of the potential of the digital age.

This briefing presents the structure and budget allocation of Heading 1 and compares it with the current MFF. It describes each policy cluster and compares the Commission’s budgetary proposal with the European Parliament’s negotiating position and the negotiating box presented by the Finnish Presidency in December 2019. It then explores some considerations that could contribute to the forthcoming budgetary negotiations on the 2021-2027 MFF.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Single market, innovation and digital: Heading 1 of the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

A joint EPRS-EUI policy roundtable

Written by Marcin Cesluk-Grajewski and Joanna Apap,

The Middle East and North Africa Region (MENA): What future for stabilisation and reconstruction

Nearly a decade after the Arab Spring, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region remains ravaged by war and social conflict and mass migration of refugees, as well as suffering economic impoverishment. This unstable neighbourhood poses many threats and challenges for the European Union (EU), including terrorism and radicalisation of local minorities and mass migration. The EU should therefore increase its engagement in the MENA and, perhaps, exchange its traditional model of conflict resolution and reconstruction for a ‘bottom up’ one, focused on citizens and local communities, according to analysts speaking at a conference in the European Parliament. A lack of meaningful EU action is likely to increase China and Russia’s efforts to gain more influence in the oil-rich area and allow regional powers, for example Iran, to solidify and expand their spheres of influence.

The ‘Outlook for the MENA Region: What future for stabilisation and reconstruction’ event was organised by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) and the Florence-based European University Institute (EUI) in the European Parliament’s Library Reading Room on 21 January 2020. Gathering an audience of more than 100 policy-makers, diplomats and members of civil society, it evolved around a recent e-book – ‘Fractured stability: war economies and reconstruction in the MENA‘ – a collection of essays by eminent scholars, who explore alternative approaches to reconstruction.

The EUI hosts the  Middle East Directions Programme, promoting multidisciplinary research on the region. EUI Professor Luigi Narbone, one of the key contributors to the e-book, told the audience ‘We must think forward and see what Europe can do to create appropriate conditions for real-term, sustainable conflict resolution in the MENA countries’. He added that the traditional model of diplomatic negotiations, followed by power-sharing deals and reconstruction fuelled by foreign aid does not seem to work in the MENA region. More than nine years have passed since popular uprisings in the region, but war still rages in Syria, Yemen and Libya, while politics and economies remain highly fragile in many other counties.

‘We need a new approach. We need to think outside the box. It is important to continue diplomatic pressures. Nevertheless, we need to start reconstruction with a bottom-up approach, a people-centred approach. We need to work with local communities, to provide basic service to the population, some security, foster an inclusive bottom-up economy to create islands where very construction starts’, said Narbone.

Professor Steven Heydemann of Smith College, a co-author of the e-book, concurred, saying that the complex situation in the region requires fresh ideas. He challenged a long-standing view that wars and revolutions, in fact, provide a fresh opportunity to re-build economies. Conflicts usually do not destroy previous systems, which are ‘parasitic, illicit and predatory. ‘War-time economies in Syria, Libya and Yemen exhibit a lot of continuity with pre-war economies’, he stated. ‘The principal objective of post-conflict economic reconstruction should be to insulate citizens from the predatory, coercive, extractive norms and institutions that are the every-day practices of dominant political elites.’

Brando Benifei, Member of the European Parliament and Rapporteur on Parliament’s ‘Post-Arab Spring: Way forward for the MENA region‘ report, deplored that the EU’s inconsistent approach towards the region, with some countries driven by their economic interests or post-colonial ties. This diminishes the EU’s leverage in the MENA region. He also cautioned European diplomacy against ‘quick-fixes’ intended to address pressing issues in the short-term, such as migration and terrorism. Benifei felt that EU policy should be oriented towards democratisation and respect for human rights.

Acting in their role as discussants, Perla Srour-Gandon, Policy Adviser on the Middle East and Gulf Countries at the Secretariat of Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee and Branislav Stanicek Policy Analyst in the External Policies Unit of EPRS, shared their views from a country-based focus. Srour-Gandon focused on Iraq, Lebanon and Yemen and gave a comprehensive overview of how the European Parliament is engaged in the region, notably through formal and informal meetings with parliamentarians and ministers. She noted the growing role of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for individuals engaged in peace-making and democratisation.

Branislav Stanicek, who focused on Libya and Syria, portrayed a picture of the region, which emerged as complex and facing humanitarian crisis. Sadly, there are no easy answers to putting the region on the path towards stability. Should the EU negotiate with dictators to achieve a short-term alleviation of the situation, or fix its problems with, for example, migration? If the EU refuses to engage, what if China and Russia are willing to do so? Such questions call for deep reflection by the EU in its efforts to boost engagement in the MENA region.

An ex-ante impact assessment/ex-post evaluation perspective for parliamentary committees

Written by Milan Remáč and Stefano Vettorazzi,

© fotolia

This briefing is intended as a background overview for parliamentary committees planning their activities in relation to the European Commission’s 2020 work programme (CWP 2020). It offers a brief description of the work programme’s content and of related publications provided by the Ex-Ante Impact Assessment Unit (IMPA) and the Ex-Post Evaluation Unit (EVAL) of the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in particular initial appraisals of Commission impact assessments and implementation appraisals.

Following the same format as in previous years, the CWP 2020 announces multiple legislative proposals, whether entirely new or updating existing legislation. Also, as in previous years, the annexes to the CWP 2020 provide a fairly clear overview of new initiatives, regulatory fitness and performance (REFIT) initiatives, pending priority proposals, intended withdrawals and repeals of existing legal acts envisaged. Under the CWP 2020, the Commission plans to submit at least 97 new legislative and non-legislative initiatives to the European Parliament, and at least 44 REFIT initiatives (both legislative and non-legislative), by the end of 2020.

Commission work programme 2020 communication

On 29 January 2020, the new European Commission published and presented its work programme for 2020: ‘A Union that strives for more’, COM(2020) 37. This sets out a targeted agenda to implement the von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities for 2019-2024 and the key initiatives that support them. The six priorities are:

• A European Green Deal,
• An economy that works for people,
• A Europe fit for the digital age,
• Promoting our European way of life,
• A stronger Europe in the world and
• A new push for European democracy.

The European Commission presented the CWP 2020 in the form of a communication, with five annexes providing more in-depth information about the Commission’s legislative and non-legislative intentions for 2020.

The communication is structured along the six priorities set out in President von der Leyen’s political guidelines and focuses on the priorities for the European Parliament and those in the European Council’s Strategic Agenda for 2019-2024. The work programme focuses in particular on the opportunities that can be generated by ‘the twin ecological and digital transition’. According to the CWP 2020, the UN Sustainable Development Goals will be placed at the centre of EU policy-making.

The Commission underlines its strong commitment to strengthen its special relationship with the European Parliament, and in this regard supports a right of initiative for the Parliament. Better regulation will continue to be the main tool for designing and evaluating EU policies and laws. The CWP 2020 explicitly refers to the application of a ‘one in, one out’ approach (although it does not provide any further explanation),and draws on the benefits of strategic foresight for the design and implementation of policies for the years to come.

The unprecedented challenge of negotiating a new partnership with the United Kingdom distinguishes the CWP 2020 from previous work programmes.

Based on the CWP 2020, the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council will now start discussions with a view to establishing a list of joint legislative priorities on which co-legislators agree to take swift action.

Read the complete briefing on ‘European Commission Work Programme for 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Nera Kuljanic with Evangelia Thoukididou,

© shutterstock

Synthetic pesticides are often denounced as harmful to both human health and the environment. European Union (EU) policy has a tendency to encourage a reduction in their use. But what effective alternatives are there to protect plant health and boost crop yields?

Plant protection products (PPPs) are formulations containing active substances, key ingredients that repel, control or eliminate crop-disruptive living organisms such as weeds, pests and insects, thus preventing crop losses and enabling high agricultural yields. The ‘active substances’ can be produced by chemical synthesis or derived from a biological source such as plants, animals, microbes or minerals. ‘Pesticides’ is a broader category, also comprising biocides used to control organisms harmful to human and animal health.

The use of pesticides has remained relatively stable globally in recent years. This is also the case for PPP sales in the EU, but with considerable differences between Member States. At the same time, the biopesticides market is growing (see next section). On the other hand, the number of active substances approved for use in the EU has decreased, because they did not pass the strict safety assessment in place, were no longer profitable or because better alternatives were identified.

Together with intensive modern breeding techniques, the use of fertilisers, irrigation and mechanisation, the increase in PPP use contributed to boosting agricultural yields. However, yields have now reached their plateau, given the current cultivation techniques and varieties in developed countries, while agricultural losses due to harmful organisms and weeds are still significant. In parallel with their growing use, synthetic PPPs have been at the centre of controversy, as they have worrying consequences for human health and the environment, including soil. At the same time, the pests they fight are becoming increasingly resistant, making the need for alternatives even more crucial. Current EU legislation lists ‘candidates for substitution‘, i.e. active substances currently on the market, which could potentially be replaced by non-chemical control and prevention. Guidelines for the sustainable use of pesticides and the promotion of integrated pest management with alternative approaches in the EU were set out in a separate piece of legislation. With all this in mind, is it possible to reduce the use of synthetic pesticides while feeding 3 billion more people by 2050?

Potential impacts and developments

Biological control agents (BCAs) or ‘biopesticides’ is an umbrella term for a set of tools used to control pests such as insects, weeds and plant diseases, using other organisms. These long-used methods rely on natural mechanisms, but are not without risk, notably for biodiversity, as non-target species could be negatively affected by BCAs. For example, some organisms, such as insect pests and plants, communicate with the help of pheromones or other semiochemicals to modify a recipient’s behaviour. Applications of this in pest control include population suppression by affecting the survival and/or reproduction of insect pests. First used over one hundred years ago, semiochemicals are considered eco-friendly, but face application challenges due to their physical instability and high cost of deployment in the field.

Advances in genetics could help us understand mechanisms of plant self-defence, a kind of plant immune system, as a basis for new plant protection methods. For example, a spray-on biopesticide containing a molecule involved in the plant immune system can trick the plant into believing it is under attack, initiating a protective response. This in turn reduces the need for PPPs without altering the genetic sequence of the plant. The substance then degrades, reducing risk to the environment and human health. The effectiveness and safety of this method, however, are still to be proven in field tests. Another promising approach involves plant microbiomes. Microbes living on and around plants benefit plant health and are affected by cultivation practices. It is now possible, through DNA sequencing and computational bioinformatics, to assemble databases on microbes, which are based on samples collected from ‘survivor’ plants. Algorithms applied to such a database then find the best microbiome combinations, which can then be applied to seeds – a sort of ‘plant probiotics’. These complement natural processes in plants in much the same way as gut flora in humans, helping to improve overall plant and soil health, and increasing crop yields without the need for agro-chemicals, while they can even help prevent bacterial food poisoning.

Another approach to decreasing PPP use is the breeding of resistant cultivars. Many (often wild) crop varieties are resistant to specific pests and diseases. Although not prioritised in the past, these resistance genes are becoming as important today as a propensity for high yield. It is suggested that high-precision gene editing enabled by CRISPR-Cas9 could make the process very efficient. Alternatively, genetic material from other species, such as micro-organisms, could be introduced to crops. However, issues around genetic manipulation remain the subject of intense discussion and some controversy.

Lastly, the internet of things has also arrived, enabling smart farming practices, and helping to accurately predict, detect and manage diseases and pest outbreaks. This can facilitate approaches such as mapping the layout of wildflowers across fields to attract pest-eating predators to the right places, and, while it does not eliminate the need for PPPs, it significantly reduces it.

Anticipatory policy-making

Seemingly safer alternatives, e.g. nature-based methods and products, may appear harmless, but they are not without risks. When using selective, narrow-range PPPs instead of one broad-spectrum product, PPPs often need to be sprayed more often, or require a combination of approaches to achieve a desired result. Therefore, in light of the development of new plant protection approaches which could reshape the agricultural landscape, assessments and authorisation procedures may need to be updated to better understand the overall risks and impacts associated with their individual and combined use. Furthermore, the research seems inconclusive as to whether a reduction in PPP use is possible for all crops and across all circumstances without negative effects on productivity, crop quality and farmers’ income.

Development of new PPPs is an expensive and lengthy process: industry costs have almost doubled since 1995 and it now takes more than 11 years between the first laboratory synthesis and the first sale of a PPP. Such costs and administrative compliance can be particularly burdensome for SMEs. With the biopesticide market growing, the EU is funding research in sustainable plant protection options. Environmentally friendly methods for protecting plant health are also a focus of the UN’s International Year of Plant Health in 2020.

EU legislation on PPPs is designed to ensure a high level of protection for human health and the environment, and PPPs are among the best-studied categories of products. The legislation prioritises non-chemical alternatives for plant protection and allows for faster procedures for authorising low-risk active substances. The European Commission recently evaluated EU chemicals legislation and found significant benefits, but also identified areas for improvement. As part of the European Green Deal, the Commission has also promised to propose measures for reducing the use of and risks associated with synthetic pesticides, to increase the land area under organic farming and to develop innovative plant protection methods. The European Parliament assessed the pesticides authorisation procedure in 2018 and called for, among other things, all studies, data and information used in the authorisation procedure to be made publicly available, as well as stronger post-market evaluation, and called for studies on long-term toxicity. With regard to products and approaches involving genetic manipulation, according to a recent Court of Justice of the EU judgment, organisms obtained by new breeding techniques, even if they do not involve the insertion of foreign DNA, fall under EU GMO legislation. More clarity as to how novel genomic techniques are to be legally classified and regulated in the future is expected in 2021.

Finally, continued guidance and support from the EU and national authorities will be needed, as farmers may be resistant to transition away from products they have grown accustomed to using. Consumers’ desires for ‘perfect’-looking products and their attitudes to alternative plant protection approaches could also play a role in their uptake by the agricultural sector.

Read the complete ‘At a glance’ on ‘What if crop protection were environment-friendly?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if crop protection were eco-friendly?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Ahmad Hammoudeh,

©NOAA photo library /flickr

Internet satellite companies, such as Starlink, OneWeb and Blue Origin (Amazon), aim at providing global internet access via satellites. This will bring many benefits to citizens, isolated regions and the global economy, but what if internet satellites collide with other satellites? What if an internet satellite company becomes the next internet monopoly? What if satellite debris hits people on the ground?

Throughout history, humans have developed ways of communicating and transferring knowledge over long distances, from transmitting public information via smoke signals and sending private messages via homing pigeons to developing modern telecommunication technologies, with the internet at the top of the list.

The internet is a global network of interconnected computers that communicate with each other by sending and receiving signals. Although the military used the internet as early as the 1960s (ARPANET), it took until the 1990s to commercialise the network for the public. The internet is provided at local level by different organisations that serve limited geographical areas either via wire (fibre optic, digital subscriber line (DSL)) or wireless connections. The organisations that connect end-users to the internet are known as internet service providers (ISPs).

Starlink aims at providing worldwide high-speed internet access via thousands of satellites. The project is run by an American aerospace company, SpaceX, which plans to serve North America by 2020 and the rest of the globe by 2021. In October 2019, paperwork for an additional 30 000 satellites was filed, on top of 12 000 that have already been approved by the United States Federal Communications Commission (FCC). Once approved, the FCC will submit these filings to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), the United Nations agency that coordinates telecommunications at international level. Although launching a great number of satellites was hitherto considered an expensive option, SpaceX benefits from its relatively cheap launchers due to its success in developing reusable rockets. The revenue from Starlink will be invested in SpaceX and CEO Elon Musk‘s goal of colonising Mars. Europe has long been interested in Mars exploration, and the European Union supports missions to Mars via the European Space Agency (Aurora and ExoMars).

Potential impacts and developments

With the explosive spread of digital transformation, the internet has become a vital element of human life, from contacting people and shopping online to controlling internet-connected devices. Nevertheless, half of the world’s population still has no internet access, and many areas in the world, including oceans and remote islands, are not easily accessible. Global internet access would therefore not only connect isolated regions of the planet to the internet but also provide dense cities with high-speed internet of low latency (the delay between sending a signal and receiving a response). This would have a positive impact in various sectors, including the following examples.

• Every internet of things (IoT) device needs the internet to communicate. For example, medical devices could access the internet to contact an ambulance, and self-driving cars could access the internet to pick the best route.
• Rural areas, which historically suffer from a lack of services, could accelerate their development. Moreover, children in these areas would have access to online education.
• In the ocean, fishermen and sailors could access the internet easily, and the availability of the internet would help in ocean governance.
• Internet coverage in farming would allow for more information transfer, and increase capabilities for planting, harvesting and other activities in the food cycle.
• Global internet access would open new markets for internet technologies, as well as boost the creative industries. It is worth mentioning that internet satellites could be a cheaper solution for 5G deployment than replacing ground infrastructure. For example, it is estimated that shifting to 5G in the USA using fibre optics will cost US$130–150 billion, whereas the entire Starlink project will only cost around US$10 billion.

Some technical risks arise from the life cycle of satellites and the nature of satellite communications. Signals transferred in an open medium (air or space) are easier to interrupt and could be collected by unintended receivers, although decrypting the signal would have to take place before accessing useful information. At the end of its life, an internet satellite turns into uncontrolled space debris that contaminates space and can potentially cause collisions. While there are projects that aim at removing debris from space, such as RemoveDEBRIS and ESA ADR, Starlink satellites are designed to avoid contamination of space by burning up in Earth’s atmosphere, which results, however, in fragments that could reach the ground. In addition, astronomers are concerned that the growing number of satellites obscures their view of the Universe.

Since covering the globe with internet via satellites implies no escape from exposure to electromagnetic waves, there are concerns about the health impacts of the radiation. Although the relation between cancer and telecommunication waves is controversial, it is agreed that the risks depend on the type of wave and the intensity of radiation. International standards, set by the International Commission on Non-Ionizing Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), define radiation exposure limits. The EU rules on electromagnetic fields are laid down in Council Recommendation 1999/519/EC, based on the ICNIRP guidelines.

Data has grown exponentially in recent years, and globalising internet connectivity would boost the already tremendous growth of data. However, storing massive amounts of data comes at a cost: it consumes energy, much of which contributes to carbon emissions. Moreover, the machine-learning industry is hungry to develop what can be sold as artificial intelligence by mining these data using intensive computing power.

Having thousands of satellites in space would intersect with European space projects and would require coordination of satellites in order to avoid collisions between European and internet satellites. In September 2019, the European Space Agency performed an evasive manoeuvre to avoid a potential collision with SpaceX, demonstrating an urgent need for space traffic management with more intelligent control.

As internet infrastructure (cell towers or fibre optic cables) is expensive to build, it is not easy to break the monopoly of the current players in the market. If successful, internet satellites would break the present ISP monopoly, but might perhaps replace it with another monopoly. A global internet satellite service would also weaken the potential for internet censorship compared to the present situation, where local authorities control internet access by blocking websites or even shutting down the internet via national ISPs.

Anticipatory policy-making

As internet satellites are not deployed in air space, but in outer space, which according to international law, is free for use by all states and thus not subject to a claim of sovereignty. However, international space law enforces liability for any damage caused by space objects and obliges states to avoid harmful contamination.

It is advisable that future EU space policy consider the swift development of internet satellites. It is vital that EU legislation is reviewed with an eye on the potential risks such as the health impacts, the internet monopoly, signal disturbances by destructive interference, and the consequences of satellite debris. Some of these issues (i.e. signal disturbances and satellite debris) were addressed in the Commission’s proposal for the Space Programme in 2018. A critical issue is the balance between the risks and gains, especially the trade-off between the security of the European Union and catching up with competitive technological advances. The security aspects include ensuring the robustness of communications and the ISPs’ compliance with the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). Additionally, handling soft impacts is also needed, perhaps by pushing ICT industries towards cleaner energy.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if internet by satellite were to lead to congestion in orbit?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Miroslava Karaboytcheva,

© PopTika / Shutterstock.com

The fifth generation of telecommunications technologies, 5G, is fundamental to achieving a European gigabit society by 2025.

The aim to cover all urban areas, railways and major roads with uninterrupted fifth generation wireless communication can only be achieved by creating a very dense network of antennas and transmitters. In other words, the number of higher frequency base stations and other devices will increase significantly.

This raises the question as to whether there is a negative impact on human health and environment from higher frequencies and billions of additional connections, which, according to research, will mean constant exposure for the whole population, including children. Whereas researchers generally consider such radio waves not to constitute a threat to the population, research to date has not addressed the constant exposure that 5G would introduce. Accordingly, a section of the scientific community considers that more research on the potential negative biological effects of electromagnetic fields (EMF) and 5G is needed, notably on the incidence of some serious human diseases. A further consideration is the need to bring together researchers from different disciplines, in particular medicine and physics or engineering, to conduct further research into the effects of 5G.

The EU’s current provisions on exposure to wireless signals, the Council Recommendation on the limitation of exposure of the general public to electromagnetic fields (0 Hz to 300 GHz), is now 20 years old, and thus does not take the specific technical characteristics of 5G into account.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Effects of 5G wireless communication on human health‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘Is 5G wireless communication safe for human health?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

© wk1003mike / Shutterstock

Desertification is a land degradation process that occurs in drylands. It affects the land’s capacity to supply ecosystem services, such as producing food or hosting biodiversity, to mention the most well‑known ones. Its drivers are related to both human activity and the climate, and depend on the specific context. More than 1 billion people in some 100 countries face some level of risk related to the effects of desertification. Climate change can further increase the risk of desertification for those regions of the world that may change into drylands for climatic reasons.

Desertification is reversible, but that requires proper indicators to send out alerts about the potential risk of desertification while there is still time and scope for remedial action. However, issues related to the availability and comparability of data across various regions of the world pose big challenges when it comes to measuring and monitoring desertification processes. The United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification and the UN sustainable development goals provide a global framework for assessing desertification. The 2018 World Atlas of Desertification introduced the concept of ‘convergence of evidence’ to identify areas where multiple pressures cause land change processes relevant to land degradation, of which desertification is a striking example.

Desertification involves many environmental and socio-economic aspects. It has many causes and triggers many consequences. A major cause is unsustainable agriculture, a major consequence is the threat to food production. To fully comprehend this two-way relationship requires to understand how agriculture affects land quality, what risks land degradation poses for agricultural production and to what extent a change in agricultural practices can reverse the trend. Cropland expansion and intensification of agriculture are among the drivers of land degradation processes that can lead to desertification. Yet, agriculture itself can provide solutions to land degradation.

Almost half of the EU Member States have declared that part of their territory is affected by desertification, yet there is no EU-level strategy to tackle this problem.

EU agricultural policy can have an impact on the elements and drivers of desertification, for example, by promoting sustainable agriculture in the awareness that protecting farmland productivity is of interest to the public and farmers alike.

Read this briefing on ‘Desertification and agriculture‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rachele Rossi,

Every year, millions of live animals are transported within and outside European Union (EU) territory for trade purposes. EU legislation regulates the protection of animals during transport, but reports of breaches of the rules and accidents raise doubts on the transport of live animals and have rekindled the debate on the need to improve the current legislation.

Background

© Jiri Foltyn / Shutterstock

The EU has a large population of farm animals. In 2018, EU herds counted 87 million bovine animals, 147 million pigs, some 100 million sheep and goats, 290 million laying hens, not to forget countless chicks and other types of animals, from rabbits to horses. Most of these animals experience transport during their life. In most cases, it is essentially domestic transport, i.e. transport from the farm to the slaughterhouse, or from one farm to another for production reasons (such as calves transported to cattle-fattening farms). In some cases, transport of live animals from one place to another occurs in relation to trade, because animals are sold alive on the market for different purposes. This happens in both intra‑EU trade and with EU imports and exports to or from third countries. The distances travelled can vary a lot.

The EU legislative framework

Transport of live animals is regulated by Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2005 on the protection of animals during transport and related operations. It covers the transport of live animals (mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians, and fish) taking place in connection with an economic activity, both within the EU and when entering or leaving the Union. An EPRS European Implementation Assessment of October 2018 provides a comprehensive overview of the main issues at stake in transport of live animals and of the implementation of the legislation by national competent authorities, with which lies primary responsibility for carrying out checks on both animals and means of transport, and taking appropriate enforcement measures.

EU transport of live animals in numbers Number of animals transported for trade

Approximately 3.5 million sheep and goats, 4.3 million head of cattle, 33.4 million pigs, and 1 000 million poultry were traded alive between EU countries in 2018. Belgium, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, and Italy exchanged more than 1.8 million head of cattle. The reason behind over 70 % of animal transfers within the EU was the production cycle, in the case of cattle and pigs, and slaughtering, in the case of sheep and goats. The import and export of live animals with third countries represents less than 10 % of intra‑EU trade. Cattle is the most traded live animal category, mostly for export to third countries (below half a million animals in 2015). The number of live pigs traded with third countries is much lower than the number of pigs exchanged for intra‑EU trade, whereas the number of live sheep exported from the EU (2 million a year) is almost as high as the number of sheep traded within the EU.

EU countries of origin and destination of animals transported for trade

Trade of live animals involves all world regions. Some EU countries appear among the main importers and exporters at global level. Table 1 provides an overview of the main EU players for each animal category.

Economic value of EU trade in live animals The value of EU trade in live animals

The value of intra‑EU trade in live animals was €8.6 billion in 2018. Bovine animals, pigs and poultry made the highest values. The value of EU trade in live animals with countries outside the EU was much lower, and amounted to less than €3 billion in 2018, the greatest part represented by EU exports to third countries. Bovine animals, poultry, and sheep and goats made the highest values in EU exports of live animals for food production. EU exports of live horses are typically related to non‑food purposes, as well as the vast majority of EU imports of live animals, which involves mostly horses and other categories of animals (such as other mammals, birds, reptiles, bees, insects, etc.). EU exports of live animals to third countries have been rising in recent years.

Live animals vs animal products

Value of EU exports of live animals and of meat and edible meat offal in 2018

In 2018, EU countries traded meat and edible meat offal for about €37 billion in intra‑EU trade and for about €14 billion outside the EU (70 % of which was represented by EU exports and 30 % by EU imports).

Generally, for any type of trade and animal category, the value of EU trade in meat and edible meat offal is much higher than the value of EU trade in live animals. Only the value of EU exports of live sheep and goats and, to a lesser extent, of live bovine animals, is higher than the value of EU exports of the respective meat and meat offal, as shown in Figure 1.

European Parliament position

The conditions of transport of live animals are part of the wider sphere of animal protection and welfare. The EU policy on animal welfare, including its 2012-2015 strategy, has lifted EU standards in this domain. To continue delivering, Parliament has advocated on a number of occasions – such as in its January 2020 resolution on the European Green Deal – a proposal for a new strategy to pave the way for a general EU animal welfare law. However, what has prevailed so far is to prioritise the implementation and enforcement of existing legislation. Parliament has also brought up the issues of export and transport of live animals and the treatment of animals exported to third countries (such as slaughtering methods). In a 2019 resolution, it acknowledged progress made, but expressed concerns over reports of breaches of the rules and of inappropriate vehicles used for animal transport. In November 2019, the sinking in the Black Sea of a cargo ship with more than 14 000 sheep on board reignited criticism of the cruel conditions in which animals are transported over long distances and, more generally, against the export and transport of live animals, due to the harsh conditions in which animals are kept. Following this accident, on 17 December 2019, Parliament held a debate in plenary, during which the Council representative announced the adoption of Council conclusions on animal welfare that acknowledge the need to continue improving the welfare of animals in transport over long distances. The Commissioner for Health and Food Safety, Stella Kyriakides, reiterated the initiatives undertaken by the Commission and the need to address unresolved issues. A number of Members took the floor to demand better treatment of animals during transport, and some Members called for new rules to limit or prohibit transport of live animals. Moreover, the Parliament’s Animal Welfare Intergroup held a meeting focused on the transport of Romanian sheep to the Persian Gulf, and more generally on the conditions of the transport of unweaned animals, including within the EU.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘EU trade and transport of live animals‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.