European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp,

On 28 January 2020, United States President Donald Trump released his administration’s ‘vision for Israeli-Palestinian peace’. The White House Plan, coupled with earlier Trump administration moves, marks a distinct departure from past US policy on the Middle East Peace Process. Key elements are illegal under international law, as they advocate the annexation of occupied territory. Israeli leaders have welcomed the plan, seen as meeting Israel’s key demands. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Hamas have been united in rejecting the proposal, and the PA has since cut ties with Israel and the USA. The plan is meant to serve as the basis for future direct negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, to stretch over four years. However, the Israeli government has announced plans to implement parts of it unilaterally in the near future.

Key points of the White House plan

Palestinian statehood. The ‘Peace to Prosperity’ plan would see Israel agree to the creation of a future Palestinian state as set out in ‘a conceptual map‘. However, the establishment of a – demilitarised – Palestinian state within four years is subject to several conditions, which are difficult to meet under current circumstances. They include the Palestinian Authority (PA) taking control in Gaza, the disarming of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and other armed groups, a commitment to non-violence and recognition of Israel as ‘the nation state of the Jewish people’. The capital of the Palestinian state would comprise a Palestinian town outside the city of Jerusalem and several eastern Jerusalem neighbourhoods (see below).

Borders and Israeli settlements. Israel would acquire sovereignty over about 30 % of the West Bank, through the annexation of the vast majority of Israeli settlements in the West Bank, as well as most of the Jordan Valley. A future Palestinian state would incorporate the remainder of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as well as additional land located in the desert straddling the Israeli-Egyptian border. The total would be ‘reasonably comparable in size to the West Bank and Gaza’, with the non-contiguous areas connected by roads, bridges and tunnels. Many commentators have likened the result to a ‘Swiss Cheese’.

Security arrangements. A future Palestinian state would be demilitarised. Israel would ‘maintain overriding security responsibility for the State of Palestine’, including control of border crossings, airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum. Counter-terrorism efforts would remain under Israeli control until the Palestinian security apparatus meets predefined security criteria.

© Haaretz Newspaper

Palestinian refugees. The plan explicitly renounces Palestinian refugees’ ‘right to return’ to Israel (a key Palestinian demand in previous negotiations), instead offering them the option of ‘absorption into the State of Palestine’, or ‘local integration in current host countries’, or in third countries (subject to their agreement).

Jerusalem. The plan proposes that Jerusalem become the ‘undivided capital of Israel’, giving Israeli sovereignty over all parts of the city west of the Israeli separation barrier, including most of East Jerusalem, with nearly 300 000 Palestinian residents, and the Old City. It disregards Palestinians’ claim to all of East Jerusalem. Palestinians are offered a capital in Abu Dis, and several neighbourhoods in East Jerusalem, including Kafr Aqab and Shuafat (see map). It is ambiguous and potentially provocative regarding the city’s holy sites, advocating ‘maintaining the status quo at the Temple Mount/Haram a-Sharif’, but permitting ‘people of every faith to pray there’.

Economic framework. The second part of the plan, which the White House had already released in June 2019, comprises a US$50 billion economic plan, intended to spur the Palestinian economy.

US endorsement of key Israeli positions

In December 2017, the USA recognised Jerusalem as the capital of Israel, mirroring the official Israeli position on the status of the city, and subsequently moved the US Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. On 21 March 2019, President Trump announced that the USA would recognise Israel’s sovereignty over the Golan Heights, which Israel captured from Syria in 1967. On 18 November 2019, the Trump administration declared that Israel’s West Bank settlements did not violate international law. During the unveiling of the plan on 28 January 2020, President Trump said that the USA would ‘recognise Israeli sovereignty over the territory’ that the plan provides to be part of the state of Israel. Emboldened by the plan, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced that his government would move to annex Jewish West Bank settlements and the Jordan Valley, but only after the Israeli elections on 2 March 2020. Left-wing Israeli politicians have spoken out against the White House plan.

Reactions to the plan

The Palestinian leadership severed contact with the US administration after the latter recognised Jerusalem as Israel’s capital in December 2017. In June 2019, the Palestinian leadership rejected the economic part of the US plan, calling the 96-page document ‘meaningless’ and ‘impractical’. The PA has refused to be involved in the elaboration of the political part of the US administration’s peace plan, having lost faith in the role of the US as an ‘honest broker’. On 1 February 2020, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas announced that the Palestinian Authority would cut ties with Israel and the USA over the proposed plan, including over security cooperation. The Arab League has unanimously rejected the ‘US-Israeli deal of the century’, as has the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Arab states, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq and Lebanon, agreed ‘not to cooperate with the US administration to implement the plan’. Reactions from Egypt, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and Qatar had earlier shown qualified support, calling for the renewal of negotiations, while three Gulf Arab states (Oman, Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates) actually attended the unveiling of the plan at the White House on 28 January 2020. Russia has questioned the feasibility of the White House plan, noting that it contravenes several United Nations (UN) resolutions. The PA is calling for a UN Security Council resolution to condemn the US peace plan. The USA is expected to veto the resolution, in which case it is likely to be submitted for a vote to the UN General Assembly.

The conflict between Israelis and Palestinians

There have been many attempts to resolve the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians since the Middle East war of June 1967, in which Israel occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza, the Golan Heights and parts of the Sinai peninsula. UN Security Council Resolution 242, passed on 22 November 1967, embodies the principle that has guided most of the peace negotiations – the exchange of land for peace. Clause 1 of Resolution 242 called for Israel to withdraw from the ‘territories’ conquered in 1967, including the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Efforts to resolve the dispute between Palestinians and Israelis have centred on the principle of a ‘two-state solution’ to the conflict, with an independent Palestinian state created alongside the state of Israel. One of the most intractable issues in peace talks has been Jerusalem. The Israeli 1980 Basic Law on Jerusalem declared Jerusalem to be the ‘complete and united’ capital of Israel. Israel officially rejects any division of the city, the seat of the Israeli government. Palestinians, for their part, seek to establish the capital of their future Palestinian state in East Jerusalem. The international consensus has so far been that Jerusalem would have to be the capital of both states, in a manner to be agreed between the two sides in the conflict during ‘final status’ negotiations. Other critical issues have been the approximately 230 settlements Israel has built in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, home to approximately 660 000 Israelis; and the right of return to Israel of Palestinians who fled Israel in 1948, as well as their descendants. There are 5.5 million registered Palestine refugees across the Middle East.

The position of the European Union and the European Parliament

In reaction to the White House plan, EU High Representative Josep Borrell recalled the established EU position and commitment to a negotiated, viable two-state solution, respecting all relevant UN resolutions and internationally agreed parameters. He criticised the US initiative as departing from these parameters and noted that the EU does not recognise Israeli sovereignty over territories occupied in 1967, that annexation of such territories would be contrary to international law, and that such a move would ‘not pass unchallenged’. In 2017, the European Parliament reiterated its strong support for the two-state solution, with Jerusalem as the capital of both states. In 2014, Parliament recognised Palestine statehood.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘US ‘Peace Plan’ for the Middle East‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

The European Union is preparing its next long-term budget – the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). However, more than one and a half year after the European Commission made its MFF proposal, differences persist over the size of the budget and spending levels on particular policies. The European Parliament has called for an ambitious budget, capable of financing new initiatives, such as the European Green Deal. Despite tensions, a decision on the next MFF is still expected in 2020, before the planned start of the next financing period the following year. The later the decision comes, the more significant the negative consequences for beneficiaries of the EU budget, as some aid programmes could be delayed.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the EU’s long-term budget and related issues. The current item includes a recent package of publications on the MFF prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service.

How could net balances change in the next EU budget?
Bruegel, January 2020

EU budget negotiations: The ‘frugal five’ and development policy
European Think Tank Group, January 2020

A new look at net balances in the European Union’s next multiannual budget
Breugel, December 2019

The future of EU finances: New own resources
EUROPEUM, December 2019

How much will the UK contribute to the next seven-year EU budget?
Breugel, December 2019

Budget debate: the battle of the 1% threshold
Fondation Robert Schuman, December 2019

The MFF non-decision: More at stake than delays
European Policy Centre, December 2019

Who pays for the EU budget rebates and why?
Bruegel, December 2019

10 Years of redistribution between the EU Member States
Centrum für Europäische Politik, December 2019

Cross-border, but not national, EU interregional development projects are associated with higher growth
Bruegel, October 2019

New beginnings: An EU budget in support of the next Commission’s agenda
Notre Europe, September 2019

Reconciling foreign policy and development priorities in the EU budget (MFF 2021-2027)
Institute of International and European Affairs, September 2019

A new budget for the EU: Negotiations on the multiannual financial framework 2021–2027
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, August 2019

Paris-proofing the next Multiannual Financial Framework
European Policy Centre, June 2019

Mainstreaming innovation funding in the EU budget
Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

From ‘paymaster of Europe’ to ‘shaper of Europeʼs future’: A new self-perception of Germany in the EU
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, May 2019

Migration and the next EU long-term budget: Key choices for external action
European Centre for Development Policy Management, March 2019

A jumbo financial instrument for EU external action?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, February 2019

Reducing climate risk in the post-2020 EU budget
E3G, February 2019

Leveraging the next EU budget for sustainable development finance: The European fund for sustainable development plus
European Centre for Development Policy Management, February 2019

The MFF: Europe’s other ticking clock
European Policy Centre, January 2019

EU budget implications of a no-deal Brexit
Bruegel, January 2019

Reforming the MFF and cohesion policy 2021-27: Pragmatic drift or pragmatic shift?
European Policies Research Centre, January 2019

Financing EU external action: Understanding member state priorities
European Think Tanks Group, December 2018

Budget européen 2021-2027: Doter l’Europe des moyens de nos ambitions
Terra Nova, November 2018

Funding the just transition to a net zero economy in Europe: Opportunities in the next EU budget
E3G, November 2018

Can the V4’s priorities shape ‘Europe’s Priorities’? The multiannual financial framework 2021-2027
EUROPEUM, November 2018

Die Finanzierung der EU nach 2020: Zeit für Reformen
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, October 2018

Strengthening cohesion in the EU: How can structural reforms contribute?
European Policy Centre, October 2018

Negotiating the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework in an electoral year: Which consequences?
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, September 2018

Aiming high or falling short? A brief analysis of the proposed future EU budget for external action
European Centre for Development Policy Management, September 2018

More money, fewer problems? How the ‘Migration Crisis’ affected funding under the MFF
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin September 2018

Resources for a prosperous Europe: Redesigning the EU budget in a progressive way
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2018

The EU’s multiannual financial framework and some implications for CESEE countries
Bruegel, September 2018

The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework: Where should Italy stand?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

The EU Budget and Common Agricultural Policy beyond 2020: Seven more years of money for nothing?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2018

ESM reform: No need to reinvent the wheel
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin August 2018

Making better use of public funding: The role of national promotional banks and institutions in the next EU budget
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, August 2018

Winners or losers? The Baltic States in the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations
International Centre for Defence and Security, July 2018

EU reform: Does everything have to change for things to remain the same?
Carnegie Europe, July 2018

Le Fonds européen de défense ou l’enfant prodige de la défense européenne
Confrontations Europe, July 2018

Budget de l’Union européenne: Quel compromis possible entre la France et l’Allemagne?
Fondation Robert Schuman, June 2018

Financing sustainability: Triggering investments for the clean economy
European Political Strategy Centre, June 2018

A stabilization fund can make the euro area more crisis-proof
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, June 2018

The MFF proposal: What’s new, what’s old, what’s next?
Notre Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, May 2018

Should the EU budget have a stabilisation function?
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2018

New EMU stabilisation tool within the MFF will have minimal impact without deeper EU budget reform
Bruegel, May 2018

Common or own goals: Reforming the financing of the European Union
Research Institute of the Finnish Economy, April 2018

No escape from politics: Four tests for a successful fiscal instrument in the euro area

Notre Europe, Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2018

EPRS publications

Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2020
January 2020

The 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework in figures
January 2020

European Regional Development Fund and Cohesion Fund 2021-2027
January 2020

Single market, innovation and digital: Heading 1 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Natural resources and environment: Heading 3 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Migration and border management: Heading 4 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Financing EU security and defence: Heading 5 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Financing the EU’s administration: Heading 7 of the 2021-2027 MFF
January 2020

Neighbourhood and the world: Heading 6 of the 2021-2027 MFF

November 2019

Cohesion and Values: Heading 2 of the 2021-2027 MFF

January 2019

2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and new Own Resources: Analysis of the Commission’s proposal
June 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Financing the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

Now that both the new Parliament and the new European Commission are in place and making their positions clear on a number of fronts, Members return to a full agenda for the February plenary session in Strasbourg.

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

This year’s European Union (EU) budget is the last under the 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF). Time is therefore pressing to finalise negotiations on the MFF for 2021-2027. However, negotiations on the proposals put forward by the previous Commission are proving rather complicated, not least due to the withdrawal of a major net contributor, the United Kingdom, from the EU. Charles Michel, President of the European Council, has called an Extraordinary European Council Meeting on the MFF, scheduled for 20 February 2020, to attempt to finalise an agreement on the proposed new structure for EU finances, which aims to shift the priority for spending towards a climate-resilient economy. Members are due to hear statements from the European Council and Commission on Wednesday morning on the preparation of that meeting. Parliament will also hear Council and Commission statements on the previous morning, on the negotiating mandate for the negotiations for a new partnership with the UK. Members are expected to vote on a resolution on the subject on Wednesday.

Parliament will also hear a statement by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrell Fontelles, on the EU response to the United States Middle East plan proposed by US President Donald Trump and referred to as the White House plan. While Parliament will not vote a resolution on the subject, the EU position and its strong commitment to a two-state solution that respects international law is already well established.

An important aspect of relations with non-EU countries, Members will continue on the theme of international trade in a joint debate on Tuesday morning. Parliament is then set to vote (on Wednesday lunchtime) on whether to consent to two trade agreements with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. The agreements (a Free Trade Agreement covering exclusive EU competences, including customs and competition rules, and an Investment Protection Agreement based on competences, such as agriculture and environment, that are shared with EU Member States), could see exports to Vietnam rise by almost 30 %. Although there is some concern regarding the human rights situation in the country, Parliament’s committees scrutinising the proposed agreements have concluded that engaging with Vietnam is the best way to encourage improvement. The agreements must subsequently be ratified by Vietnam (as well as EU Member States in the case of the IPA), before entering into force.

With so much focus in the news on the effects of globalisation and giant multinationals, it may be easy to forget that companies with fewer than 250 employees account for 99.8 % of non-financial firms in the EU, and create 85 % of new jobs. The Commission has not forgotten, and uses its ‘SME Test’ to look at the impact of new legislation on such companies. Parliament is a staunch supporter of a business-friendly EU where small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and innovators benefit from a level playing field, and promotes the use of impact assessment to gauge the effects of new legislation on SMEs in particular. The Commission will make a statement to plenary on Monday evening on the progress made with minimising the impact of EU legislation on SMEs through the better regulation initiative. It may also give an indication of what to expect in the new industrial strategy for Europe, expected in March 2020 and its communication on better regulation, expected sometime afterwards.

Christine Lagarde will attend the plenary session on Tuesday afternoon for the first time in her capacity as President of the European Central Bank (ECB), for the presentation of an Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee report on the ECB’s annual report for 2018. Reflecting on the rather mixed economic results of the period, the committee points out the need for a review of ECB monetary policy, with full Parliament involvement, as well as public consultation. It also underlines the ECB’s responsibility to consider the impact of policy on the environment, and urges the ECB to continue to improve transparency and communications with citizens. The report also calls for better gender balance on the ECB Executive Board and Governing Council.

Progress towards gender equality more generally has stalled, and the current Parliament has lost no time in demanding a robust EU gender equality strategy. The Commission will make a statement on Wednesday afternoon on its proposals for a new gender equality strategy, the preparation of which involved informal input from the Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Following a related plenary debate on 18 December 2019, Members are also due to vote on a motion for resolution on Wednesday lunchtime on the EU strategy to put an end to female genital mutilation around the world. Parliament has long been active in raising awareness of the need to act to end the practice, which it considers a form of persecution, as part of its combat against all forms of violence against women and girls.

For the strengthened European Border and Coast Guard Agency (EBCG – formerly Frontex) to carry out its work in support of EU countries’ border and migration management, it needs to be able to verify the documents presented by people wishing to cross the EU’s external borders. However, the proliferation of both authentic and fake documentation makes the agency’s work that much harder. On Wednesday evening, Members will debate the details of a provisional agreement with the Council (and vote the following day) on the online system collecting False and Authentic Documents Online (FADO). Under the agreed text, the EBCG will take over management of the system, which stores details of travel, identity, residence and civil status documents, driving and vehicle licences issued by Member States or the EU. Personal data will be kept to the minimum necessary for operations and availability filtered according to status, such as authorities involved in document fraud, or the general public.

Finally, the Council and Commission will also make statements on the ongoing threat to the Rule of law in Poland on Tuesday evening.

An autonomous vehicle is a robot that can bring people or goods from one place to another without a human driver. But such a thing as a fully autonomous vehicle does not exist yet not even in the testing phase.

Listen to Tatjana Evas, an EPRS policy analyst, explaining the issues in 3 key questions on autonomous vehicles.

Or read more in our publications:

• A common EU approach to liability rules and insurance for connected and autonomous vehicles
• Artificial intelligence in transport: Current and future developments, opportunities and challenges
• Artificial Intelligence ante portas: Legal & ethical reflections

Our “3 Key Questions on …” series of video interviews with our policy analysts include visual aids to getting a swift grasp of the policy challenges at hand. Take a look at the full series on YouTube.

Written by Cemal Karakas, Carla Stamegna, Ioannis Zachariadis,

© frank_peters / Shutterstock.com

State aid can be defined as an advantage given by a government that may provide a company with an unfair competitive edge over its commercial rivals. State aid can take several forms, such as public subsidies, tax relief, or the purchasing of goods and services on preferential terms. While the European Union (EU) competition rules consider State aid to be incompatible with the internal market, they allow such aid when it promotes general economic development, for example, when tackling the challenges of global competition, the ongoing financial crisis, the digital revolution, and demographic change. To this end, all EU Member States provide some public economic support, for instance, to the coal mining sector, banks, or the digital economy. To contribute to regional development and to increase competitiveness, some Member States have created special economic zones (SEZs), which offer an attractive combination of tax-and-tariff incentives, streamlined customs procedures, less laws, provision of infrastructure, and creation of business clusters.

The European Commission is currently evaluating the State aid modernisation (SAM) package and some of its related laws, as these will expire by the end of 2020. The European Parliament takes a two‑fold stance towards public economic support in the EU. On the one hand, Parliament stresses that State aid should support ecological transformation and foster the development of services, knowledge, and infrastructure rather than providing support to specific companies. On the other hand, it calls on the Commission to ensure that State aid is reduced in the long term, given its distortive effects on the internal market. While the temporary State aid offered to the financial sector to stabilise the EU financial system might have been necessary, Parliament calls on the Commission to scrutinise and eventually remove this aid. Parliament, inter alia, also calls on the Member States to abandon unfair competition practices based on unjustified tax incentives and to adopt appropriate rules in the Council.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Public economic support in the EU: State aid and special economic zones‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘How State aid works in the EU‘ on YouTube.

Written by Branislav Stanicek,

How can enlargement of the European Union remain a realistic, merit-based and politically credible exercise, when some Member States are unwilling to move forward with concrete steps, such as opening negotiation talks? This was the key question at the heart of the European Parliamentary Research Service policy roundtable held on Tuesday, 28 January 2020, which gathered over 120  participants, including Members of the European Parliament, experts and think-tankers.

EPRS roundtable ‘ Western Balkans : A rocky road to enlargement ‘

Organised on the same day as the European Parliament’s Western Balkans Summit (convened by President David Sassoli and attended by the speakers of the Western Balkan parliaments), the timely roundtable provided a moment for reflection one week ahead of the European Commission’s presentation of a new methodology of enlargement. Eduard Kukan, former Slovak Minister of Foreign Affairs, and former Member, opened the discussion was opened with a keynote speech. Previously appointed United Nations (UN) Special Envoy on Kosovo by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, a role he held alongside Carl Bildt, Kukan warned against the deepening frustration of regional leaders, pointing out that ‘with new and new additional requests, the whole process will lose credibility’. Taking the positive experience and transformational power of past enlargements for central and eastern European countries into account, he remarked that it is in the interest of the both the EU and the Balkan countries to propose tangible benefits for the people when acceding countries are closing negotiation chapters. With regard to the speed of and calendar for EU enlargement, Kukan said that ‘not acting quickly enough would worsen the situation’.

Tanja Fajon (S&D, Slovenia) also warned against possible enlargement fatigue and strongly supported the accession process. As Chair of the European Parliament Delegation for Serbia, Fajon will visit Belgrade, together with the EP Rapporteur for the country, Vladimir Bilčik (EPP, Slovakia) and the new Commissioner for Neighbourhood and Enlargement, Olivér Várhelyi, on 6 and 7 February 2020. It is expected that the Serbian electoral crisis and the implementation of the obligations to improve electoral conditions will be the focus of the visit. Fajon and Bilčik were involved in mediating inter-party dialogue on this issue in November and December 2019, while this will be Várhelyi’s first visit to Serbia since his appointment as Commissioner.

The economic aspects of enlargement, as well as the changes proposed in the French ‘non-paper’, were presented by Milica Delevic, Director for Governance and Political Affairs at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and Member of the European Council on Foreign Relations. Delevic warned against the risk of slipping into theology on enlargement, with promises of a ‘future life’, and underlined the importance of the pace of enlargement and opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia for the credibility and success of the process. The alternatives could be increased third power influence and a slower pace of reforms.

Tim Judah, Balkans Correspondent for The Economist, then presented the demographic challenges facing the whole region. All Balkan countries are in strong demographic decline, facing ‘brain drain’, as well as undocumented migratory flows. There is a lack of serious analysis of the region’s demographic decline, depopulation and the hollowing-out of the labour force. In 2050, Serbia’s population will fall by 23.8 %, Croatia by 22.4 % and Kosovo by 11 %, compared to 1990. Bosnia and Herzegovina has a fertility rate of 1.26, one of the lowest in the world. With a median age of 29, Kosovo is the youngest country in the region, but does not escape demographic decline: as almost a fifth of its population lives abroad. Branislav Stanicek, Policy Analyst with EPRS noted that such declining demographics will have a direct impact, slowing GDP growth, the main component of which is household consumption. In addition to slower growth, declining demography will also accentuate deflationary pressures, as an ageing population tends to decrease spending, and deflation is much harder for monetary institutions to tackle than inflation. To provide tangible benefits to Balkan citizens, Stanicek supported the proposal of a gradual integration of European policies by the countries of the region. European broadband networks, digital, transport and energy infrastructures as well as investment within the Horizon Europe programme all provide the possibility of excellent initiatives for the region. As an example, in addition to the 2019 inter-regional agreement to curb roaming fees (the six Western Balkan countries agreed to cut roaming fees by 27 % in July 2019, and to abolish all roaming fees from July 2021), roaming fees could be cut for Western Balkans citizens travelling within the EU as well.

Concluding the roundtable, Lívia Járóka (EPP, Hungary), Vice-President of the European Parliament replacing the EP President for the Western Balkans, thanked the participants for their engagement and shared her personal experience as the first female Roma MEP, as well as her activities in favour of social inclusion, education and Roma communities. Járóka noted the excellent opportunity available to the EU to be the driver of positive change and reforms throughout the region, as has already been observed in central Europe. She also underlined the importance of keeping all communities engaged, and doing more for the social inclusion of minorities in the Western Balkans. It is important that EU and Croatian Presidency work together to prepare a pan-European Roma strategy and that Western Balkan countries play an integral part. Finally, Járóka noted the European Parliament’s support for the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia ‘as soon as possible’ and that the Parliament will work together with other EU institutions and Member States to accompany future enlargement policy. She also thanked the Croatian Presidency for their strong support and the emphasis they have placed on Western Balkan European integration.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Magdalena Sapała and Carla Stamegna,

Trade in goods with the world, euro area and US © European Union, 2020

Growth in the European Union and euro-area economies – albeit still positive – slowed significantly in 2019. Moreover, prospects for the next two years remain muted, against the backdrop of a generalised slowdown. Uncertainty is the overarching theme of this year’s outlook, whether at regional level, or more globally, and whether in terms of short-term policy or deeper, structural economic factors affecting the world’s important economies.

Gross domestic product (GDP) growth in Europe progressed at uneven speeds, from both geographic and sectoral perspectives. Moreover, while downward trends are expected for all the factors underpinning GDP (private and public consumption, investment and exports), their respective contributions to the final figure are also set to change (for example, private consumption will carry less weight). When it comes to employment, the positive trends observed last year are continuing. In this context, the forecasts for 2019 and 2020 have observed – and tried to explain – the reasons why, contrary to textbook theory, (i) an increase in wages did not come immediately after the improvement in employment conditions, and (ii) when the increase in wages came, it did not translate into an increase in prices (inflation).

For 2019, the general government deficit is expected to reverse its previous decline and pick up modestly, a trend that is likely to continue for the next two years. The debt-to-GDP ratio, meanwhile, decreased in 2019 both for the euro area and for the EU as a whole, and is expected to maintain its downward trend in 2020. Lastly, inflation for the euro area is expected to remain below the ECB target of 2 % in the near future, a trend that played a part in the European Central Bank’s decision to resume its asset purchase programmes in 2019, after a brief pause, and to take further accommodative measures. The 2020 EU budget amounts to €168.7 billion, representing only 2 % of total public spending in the European Union – approximately 1 % of gross national income (GNI). Despite its volume, the overall impact of the EU budget is amplified by a number of features, including: a higher share of resources devoted to investment than in national budgets; the capacity to leverage additional funding from other sources; and attention to policy areas where the pooling of resources can provide the EU as a whole with added value (such as research, innovation and development cooperation).

The most prominent aspect of the agreement between the European Parliament and the Council of the EU on the 2020 budget, highlighted by all the negotiating parties, was the increased focus on climate-related action. This additional ‘greening’ of the EU annual budget is designed to help the EU meet the 20 % goal for climate-related spending over the 2014-2020 MFF period. Other spending priorities include stimulating investment, growth and research, and new jobs, especially for young people, as well as addressing migration and security challenges. As in all previous years of the 2014-2020 MFF, the budgetary authority had to resort to the flexibility provisions in order to finance these persistent policy challenges.

The 2020 EU budget is the last under the EU’s current financing framework. This year, the EU institutions and Member States are expected to finalise the design of the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) to cover the 2021-2027 period. Negotiations, which are based on the proposals that the Juncker Commission tabled in mid-2018, are proving lengthy and complex. Taking into account the withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the proposal organises allocations for 27 Member States, around a new structure reinforcing priorities that emerged during the current MFF, such as research, innovation, digital transformation, climate action, borders, migration, security and defence. Against the backdrop of the new agenda for Europe set out by the von der Leyen Commission, financial support for the recently proposed European Green Deal and the transition to a climate-resilient economy will be a major topic in the debate on the next MFF.

Current global trends, the emergence of new economic powers and the development of new technologies are leading to a potential transition of the international monetary system from a still dollar-dominated environment to a more diversified and multipolar system involving several international currencies. After quickly establishing itself as the second most important global currency, the euro gradually lost international standing from the mid-2000s onwards, and has only recently shown signs of reversing the trend.

Recent unilateral third-country actions, such as the renewal of sanctions on Iran, and challenges to international rules-based governance and trade, have highlighted the need to reinforce the EU’s economic and monetary sovereignty. As a result, the idea that the single currency could be a tool of foreign economic policy is coming back into fashion, and the case for an increased international role for the euro being considered more prominently. The benefits arising from this role would seem to offset the possible challenges, nonetheless the consequences of a stronger international role for the euro should be carefully assessed, including those affecting the ECB’s monetary policy.

Against this backdrop, the Commission adopted a communication, ‘Towards a stronger international role of the euro’, and a recommendation on the international role of the euro in the field of energy in December 2018. In this context, the strengthening of the euro’s international role is seen ‘as part of Europe’s broader commitment to an open, multilateral and rules-based global economy’. In the same month, the Euro Summit discussed economic and monetary union reform and, in this context, noted the Commission’s communication, and called for ‘work to be taken forward to this end’.

Policies supporting the euro’s international role should address three broad weaknesses in the institutional design of the EU and EMU: the ability to provide stability both domestically and internationally; the limited depth and liquidity of euro-area financial markets; and Europe not speaking with a single voice on international matters, including security.

Read the complete study ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP

The highlights of the January II plenary session included discussion and the vote on the agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, the ceremony to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day, and a debate on the von der Leyen Commission’s first work programme, for 2020. Parliament also debated the coronavirus outbreak, the humanitarian situation on Greek islands, the strategy for sustainable mobility and transport, and the EU’s response to devastation following floods in Spain. It also debated statements on the rights of indigenous peoples and India’s Citizenship (Amendment) Act 2019. Finally, Members adopted Parliament’s calendar of part-sessions for 2021 and 2022.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day

Holocaust remembrance in the EU takes place around International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the date on which the Auschwitz Birkenau extermination camp in Poland was liberated. The European Parliament has long warned against the rise of neo-fascist violence, and particularly the increase in violence against Jews, calling for EU countries to take action to counter revisionist narratives that aim at denying or trivialising the mass murder of 6 million European Jews. Jewish communities in the EU have consequently been shrinking recently, in reaction to increasing anti-Semitic acts. The commemoration provides an ideal opportunity to promote public discourse on the facts of the Holocaust. It is also an occasion in many EU Member States, as in Parliament itself, to honour the victims of the less well known Roma and Sinti Holocaust.

Withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union

Members gave consent in a single vote to the conclusion, by the Council on behalf of the EU, of the treaty on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The Withdrawal Agreement was agreed between EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. It includes provisions covering citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, governance, protocols and annexes. It will enter into force at the end of January, whereupon the United Kingdom will become a third country, ending 47 years of EU membership. With the departure of 73 British Members, the Parliament itself will consequently change. Twenty-seven seats will be redistributed among 14 Member States, with the remaining 46 seats held in reserve for future EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency.

Commission 2020 work programme

Members heard and discussed a statement on the Commission’s work programme for 2020, adopted on 29 January 2020. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced considerable changes in the focus and scope of the Commission’s work for the next few years. President von der Leyen’s ambitions include forging a stronger partnership between the Commission and Parliament by, among other things, providing greater support for Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, prioritising dialogue between the institutions during international negotiations, and submitting legislative proposals in response to Parliament resolutions adopted by a majority (in line with Article 225 TFEU).

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced two committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, on the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund 2021-2027 (EMPL) and on a framework for the recovery and resolution of central counterparts (ECON). Parliament’s earlier first-reading positions provide the mandates.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, January II 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen,

How should democracies respond to disinformation, without compromising freedom of expression? This question preoccupied policy-makers in and beyond Europe in the previous policy cycle and will continue to dominate the debate in Brussels in the new legislature.

Against this backdrop, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) invited Peter Pomerantsev – a renowned, seasoned expert on information disruption; Director of the Arena Initiative; Senior Fellow at the London School of Economics; and Research Fellow at Johns Hopkins University – to speak about disinformation at the EPRS Reading Room on Thursday, 23 January 2020. Pomerantsev’s first book, ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible‘, was published in 2014, at the beginning of the Parliament’s 8th legislature. His most recent work, ‘This is not propaganda – adventures in the war against reality‘, was published in 2019, just ahead of the new legislature.

This first EPRS event on disinformation of the 9th legislature was an excellent opportunity to take stock of the EU’s response to online disinformation so far and at the same time to hear about Pomerantsev’s new book. Philipp Schulmeister, Head of the European Parliament’s Public Opinion Monitoring Unit, opened the event with a reminder that the war against reality, the undermining of trust in facts and in democracy itself – concerns the future of democracy and thus of the European Parliament itself.

Monika Nogaj, Head of the EPRS External Policies Unit who moderated the event, asked Pomerantsev to elaborate on the seemingly surrealist title of the new book ‘This is not propaganda’. Indeed, Pomerantsev explained that the title is a reference to Magritte’s painting ‘This is not a pipe’. The surrealist gap between word and meaning seems to have returned: in a world of ‘influence campaigns on steroids’, the words ‘democracy’ and ‘freedom of expression’ are increasingly used in a way that is detached from their meaning.

Pomerantsev explained that the attempt to manipulate reality and make truth unknowable (which he experienced himself when he was working in Russia as a reality TV producer in 2001-2010 and captivatingly analysed in ‘Nothing is true and everything is possible’), has now spread to the rest of the world. In ‘This is not propaganda’, Pomerantsev analyses the different manifestations of emotional influence, disinformation and coercion in the rest of the world: the Philippines, Mexico and the Balkans. These frontlines involve technological and ideological players, as well as a change in culture: when nostalgia is more important than the future, when emotions trump facts – partly because they bring more revenue for online platforms – real information becomes secondary.

Building a bridge between the hotspots in Pomerantsev’s book and the political reality in Brussels, Naja Bentzen of EPRS pointed out that the awareness of disinformation in Brussels has increased significantly since Pomerantsev’s first book was published, coinciding with Russia’s hybrid war and information attacks against Ukraine in the wake of the pro-democratic and pro-EU Maidan revolution. The US Presidential elections and the Brexit referendum in 2016 increased the sense of urgency in Brussels, further exacerbated by the 2018 revelations that Cambridge Analytica had harvested the personal data of millions of people’s Facebook profiles without their consent and used it for political advertising purposes. The EU’s response to disinformation has evolved accordingly. The first key milestone, the establishment of the East StratCom Task Force in 2015, consistently supported by the European Parliament, was followed by the launch of the EU’s European approach to online disinformation, which included a Code of Practice signed by the major online platforms in 2018. The European Commission’s final response to the behaviour of online platforms ahead of the European elections in May 2019 is expected this spring.

EPRS Book talk – ‘ This is not propaganda, adventures in the war against reality ‘

Against this backdrop, Pomerantsev elaborated on his expectations for the EU’s final response, on the likely ‘Brussels effect‘. Although Pomerantsev indicated that we cannot trust platforms to regulate themselves, banning microtargeting, as some suggest should be part of the response, is hardly feasible or practical, as we cannot sufficiently define the terms. Instead of focusing on content, Pomerantsev suggests focusing on behaviour and, more generally, increasing transparency. In addition, he proposes that a non-commercial public service internet, that rewards collaboration instead of attention-seeking behaviour, should be created.

The phrase ‘knowledge is power’ can mean very different things. In authoritarian systems, ‘knowledge is power’ means controlling access to information and suppressing public debate. For the tech industry, ‘knowledge is power’ can mean controlling access to our data and monetising the public debate. In an open democracy, we multiply power by sharing knowledge; this is the key mission of the European Parliamentary Research Service.

Pomerantsev’s first book was a source of inspiration in the debate in Brussels during the previous legislature. In sharing his knowledge and reports (with a spellbound audience), Pomerantsev has already enlightened the disinformation-related debate in the new policy cycle: empowering his audience of experts from EU institutions, as well as Members of the European Parliament such as Markéta Gregorová (Pirates, Czechia) and Ivars Ijabs (Renew, Latvia), to empower others to survive the war against reality.

Further reading:

• The sharp power of knowledge: Foreign authoritarian meddling in academia, EPRS, European Parliament, December 2019
• Ukraine: Religion and (geo-)politics: Orthodox split weakens Russia’s influence, EPRS, European Parliament, February 2019
• From post-truth to post-trust?, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2018
• Foreign influence operations in the EU, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2018
• Multimedia: 3 questions on disinformation and democracy, EPRS, European Parliament

Written by Agnieszka Widuto,

© Marcin Kadziolka / Shutterstock.com

The EU plans to cut greenhouse gas emissions by at least 50 % by 2030, and to achieve climate neutrality by 2050. This will require a socio-economic transformation in regions relying on fossil fuels and carbon-intensive industries. As part of the European Green Deal, the new Commission has announced a ‘Just Transition Mechanism’ of €100 billion to support the territories most affected by the transition towards climate neutrality.

Background

In December 2019, the European Commission published a communication presenting the European Green Deal. Further details on financing followed in January 2020 in the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan (European Green Deal Investment Plan), including the ‘Just Transition Mechanism’. On 14 January 2020, the Commission also published the legislative proposal on the ‘Just Transition Fund’ (JTF), which specified its scope of support. The establishment of the Fund entailed amendments to the proposal on the Common Provisions Regulation governing cohesion policy funds, which are expected to complement the resources of the JTF. These steps come in response to the need for finance for the transformation towards climate neutrality and investment in restructuring of regional economies, to mitigate the social impacts and expand activities supporting the green transition.

Just Transition Mechanism

The mechanism will consist of three pillars: the Just Transition Fund, a just transition scheme under InvestEU and a loan facility with the European Investment Bank (EIB). Taken together, it is expected to mobilise at least €100 billion for just transition in EU regions.

The Just Transition Fund will have its own budget of €7.5 billion, complemented by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and European Social Fund Plus (ESF+), as well as national co-financing. With these additional resources, it is expected to generate €30-50 billion in total. Support will be available to all Member States, while focusing on the regions most affected by climate transition. It will be allocated on the basis of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions of industrial facilities in NUTS2 regions with high carbon intensity, employment in industry in these regions, employment in coal and lignite mining, production of peat and production of oil shale. The allocation method will also take into account the country’s level of economic development (gross national income (GNI) per capita). Eligible territories will correspond to NUTS3 regions or parts thereof. The activities supported will include investments in SMEs, clean technologies, renewable energy, energy efficiency, and reskilling of workers. Territorial just transition plans will be prepared, and a set of indicators used to monitor progress.

Source: European Commission, 2020.

The dedicated just transition scheme under InvestEU is expected to mobilise up to €45 billion, mostly of private investments. The target of generating this amount corresponds to a provision of around €1.8 billion from the EU budget under the InvestEU programme. Its scope will be broader than the Just Transition Fund, financing projects not only in just transition territories, but also outside (if these projects are key to the transition within the just transition territories). It will fund renewable energy investments, energy efficiency schemes, and energy and transport infrastructure, including gas infrastructure and district heating, as well as decarbonisation projects, economic diversification of the regions and social infrastructure.

The public-sector loan facility with the European Investment Bank, backed by the EU budget, will provide subsidised financing to local authorities in the regions concerned. It is expected to leverage public funding and mobilise €25-30 billion in investments. The loan facility will rely on a contribution of €1.5 billion from the EU budget and EIB lending of €10 billion at its own risk. Support may take the form of an interest rate subsidy or an investment grant (financed from the EU budget), blended with loans provided by the EIB to municipal, regional or other public authorities. It will finance energy and transport infrastructure, district heating networks, energy efficiency measures including renovation of buildings, and social infrastructure. Similar to InvestEU funding, its scope will go beyond the transition territories to include other regions, if the projects are key to transition within the just transition territories. This may be the case for instance for transport or energy infrastructure projects that improve the connectivity of the just transition territories.

Advisory support and technical assistance

In addition to funding and technical assistance available under the Just Transition Mechanism, the communication on the Sustainable Europe Investment Plan also lists a number of supporting measures. The InvestEU Advisory Hub will offer tailored advisory services on sustainable projects, including just transition. The Structural Reform Support Programme (and its successor, the Reform Support Programme) will provide technical support to public authorities on reforms to achieve climate transition, including preparation of territorial just transition plans. Moreover, assistance will be available through a new Just Transition Platform, managed by the Commission and building on the existing Platform for Coal Regions in Transition.

Links with cohesion policy

The Just Transition Fund will be implemented under cohesion policy and complemented by its resources. Its delivery will be governed by the amended Common Provisions Regulation and included in partnership agreements and programmes. According to the proposal on the JTF, the Fund will be a key tool to prevent regional disparities from growing as a result of the transition towards climate neutrality. Thus, it will contribute to strengthening economic, social and territorial cohesion. In terms of funding, the Fund will have its own resources of €7.5 billion. The proposed amendments to the CPR also introduce a new article 21a stipulating that JTF resources will be complemented from ERDF, ESF+ or a combination of these two funds. The total of ERDF and ESF+ resources transferred to the JTF will be between 1.5 and 3 times the amount of JTF support. In order to ensure continued impact of cohesion policy, the resources transferred from either the ERDF or the ESF+ cannot exceed 20 % of the respective ERDF and ESF+ allocation to the Member State concerned. Member States are also expected to provide national resources, with levels of EU co-financing set according to the categories of regions in which the territories concerned are located.

European Parliament position

Parliament called for the establishment of a Just Energy Transition Fund of €4.8 billion in its November 2018 resolution on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework. The call for the establishment of the Fund was echoed by the European Committee of the Regions in its opinion on ‘The socio-economic structural change in Europe’s coal regions’ of October 2019. In its resolution of January 2020 on the European Green Deal, Parliament stressed that just transition is about more than just a fund, but a whole-policy approach underpinned by investment, which must ensure that no one is left behind. In a debate during the January 2020 plenary session with the Commission, some MEPs expressed scepticism about the complementary transfer of funds from cohesion policy to JTF. The work on the Just Transition Fund proposal is currently in preparatory phase. The European Parliament’s Committee on Regional Development (REGI) is expected to take the lead (publication of the rapporteur’s draft report will be the next step). While revisiting the proposal on InvestEU is not envisaged, a new legislative proposal to set up the EIB loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism is expected in March 2020.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Just transition in EU regions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Etienne Bassot,

EP Plenary session – Implementing and monitoring the provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement

In her statements to the European Parliament in July and November 2019, as candidate for European Commission President and President-elect respectively, Ursula von der Leyen outlined the six political priorities that would shape the working programme of the European Commission over the next five years. While the former Commission President, Jean-Claude Juncker, had claimed to lead a ‘political Commission‘, his successor, Ursula von der Leyen, has pledged to lead a ‘geopolitical Commission‘. Such a Commission will have a political agenda in which reinforcing the EU’s role as a relevant international actor, and trying to shape a better global order through reinforcing multilateralism, is to become a key priority (‘A stronger Europe in the world’). The other main political priorities of the Commission are brought together under five broad headings: ‘A European Green Deal’, ‘A Europe fit for the digital age’, ‘An economy that works for people’, ‘A new push for European democracy’, and ‘Promoting the European way of life’. Together they define the framework within which the Commission will act in the coming five years. The structure and working methods announced by von der Leyen show that her Commission will differ from its predecessors in a number of ways.

What is new in the ‘geopolitical Commission’ New structure

Concerned about the coordination and coherence of the College’s activities and decisions, von der Leyen has decided to structure the Commission around three executive vice‑presidents (Frans Timmermans, Margrethe Vestager, and Valdis Dombrovskis) and five vice‑presidents (Josep Borrell Fontelles, Maroš Šefčovič, Věra Jourová, Dubravka Šuica, and Margaritis Schinas). The executive vice-presidents are to assume a dual role as commissioners dealing both with a specific portfolio and as coordinators responsible for one of the core topics of the political agenda, while the five remaining vice-presidents will assume a single coordinating role for specific policy priorities.

The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (Borrell), who also has the role of Vice-President (HR/VP, Article 18(4) TEU), coordinates the external aspects of the work of all Commissioners, in addition to being responsible for the European External Action Service (EEAS). The importance attached to the EU’s external action under von der Leyen’s political priorities explains why external policy will be systematically discussed and decided upon by the College. A specific Group for external coordination (EXCO) has been created to prepare the external aspects of College meetings on a weekly basis and to enhance coordination between the Commission and the EEAS. It remains to be seen how this new approach and emphasis will fit with the dual character of the mandate of the HR/VP and the prevalence of the Council in every decision taken under the common foreign and security policy.

The Commission President had originally assembled a gender-balanced College, although this balance was lost with the new candidates replacing those who failed to pass the parliamentary hearings process. But von der Leyen has sought to favour gender equality with new rules for the composition Commissioners’ cabinets (private offices), requiring Commissioners to include 50 % of women among their administrator staff. She has also pledged to work towards gender equality among the Commission’s senior management.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s priorities for 2019-2024‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

The agenda for the European Parliament Plenary Session of 29 and 30 January 2020 is a sombre one, featuring a solemn ceremony in remembrance of the 75th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz, and a vote on the Withdrawal Agreement of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU).

The European Parliament has been warning against the rise of neo-fascist violence and particularly the increase in violence against Jews for some time, calling for EU countries to take action to counter revisionist narratives that aim at denying or trivialising the mass murder of 6 million European Jews. Jewish communities in the EU have consequently been shrinking recently, in reaction to the increase in acts of anti-Semitism. Holocaust education is vital to keeping the memory of victims alive and learning from past mistakes. Holocaust remembrance in the EU takes place around International Holocaust Remembrance Day on 27 January, the date on which the Auschwitz Birkenau extermination camp in Poland was liberated. The commemoration provides an ideal opportunity to promote public discourse on the facts of the Holocaust. It is also an occasion in many EU Member States, as in Parliament itself, to honour the victims of the less well known Roma and Sinti Holocaust.

Later on Wednesday evening, Members will approve or deny consent in a single vote (with no amendments possible), to the conclusion, by the Council on behalf of the EU, of the treaty on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU. The text of the treaty was agreed between EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. The product of a rather tortured process, the Withdrawal Agreement includes provisions covering citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, governance, protocols and annexes. A separate Political Declaration provides the basis for future EU-UK economic and security cooperation. Should Members concur with the Constitutional Affairs Committee recommendation to give their consent to the agreement, it should enter into force at the end of January, whereupon the United Kingdom will become a third country, ending 47 years of EU membership. With the departure of 73 British Members, the Parliament itself will consequently change. Twenty-seven seats will be redistributed among 14 Member States, with the remaining 46 seats held in reserve for future EU enlargements and/or the possible creation of a transnational constituency.

Looking to the future, Members will hear a statement on the Commission’s Work Programme for 2020 on Thursday morning. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has announced considerable changes in the focus and scope of the Commission’s work for the next few years. President von der Leyen’s ambitions include forging a stronger partnership between the Commission and Parliament by, among other things, providing greater support for Parliament’s right of legislative initiative, prioritising dialogue between the institutions during international negotiations, and submitting legislative proposals in response to Parliament resolutions adopted by a majority (in line with Article 225 TFEU).

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© designer491 / Shutterstock.com

On 29 January 2020, the European Parliament is set to vote on the recommendation to give consent to the treaty on the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the European Union (EU), endorsed in its current version by EU leaders and the UK Prime Minister in October 2019. Parliament’s consent, following the completion of the UK’s domestic procedures for ratifying the agreement, will allow its entry into force on 1 February 2020. The UK will then cease its 47-year membership of the EU, although EU law will remain applicable to the UK during an 11‑month transition period ending on 31 December 2020. If however Parliament were to deny consent, the UK would leave the EU without a deal on 1 February 2020, absent another extension of the Article 50 period.

The EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement

After 40 months of negotiations, three extensions to the Article 50 TEU negotiating period and two draft agreements endorsed by the EU-27 leaders and the UK Prime Minister, the approval of the treaty setting out the terms of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is now close to completion. Initiated in June 2017, the negotiations focused in a first phase on three key issues: protecting UK and EU citizens’ rights, agreeing a financial settlement, and ensuring the absence of a hard border on the island of Ireland. In the second phase of talks, from December 2017 on, the framework for the future EU-UK relationship and transitional arrangements were discussed. On 14 November 2018, negotiators agreed a draft withdrawal treaty and a political declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship, both promptly endorsed by then UK Prime Minister Theresa May and EU-27 leaders. However, the UK House of Commons voted repeatedly to reject the withdrawal deal; and after taking office in July 2019, the new UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson set out to renegotiate the ‘backstop’ solution for Northern Ireland. On 17 October 2019, the European Council endorsed a revised withdrawal agreement, in which the main changes related to Northern Ireland, and revised political declaration. Subsequently, the EU-27 granted a further Article 50 extension to the UK until 31 January 2020 to allow the ratification process to be completed.

The withdrawal agreement is an extensive legal document comprising: common and final provisions, citizens’ rights, the financial settlement, rules on the transition period, other separation issues (rules on concluding ongoing processes at the end of the transition period, e.g. ongoing judicial procedures) and governance of the agreement. It also includes three Protocols (on Ireland/Northern Ireland, Gibraltar, and the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus) and annexes. The Political Declaration is a non-binding text, providing the basis for future EU-UK economic and security cooperation. The few changes in October 2019 reflect the UK government’s ‘different level of ambition’ with respect to the future EU-UK relationship.

The transition (or implementation) period is to last until 31 December 2020, during which time the UK, although a third country, is treated as a Member State (with the exceptions set out in the withdrawal treaty), but without any EU decision-making or representation rights. This period is extendable once (before 1 July 2020) for up to one or two years. The transition period was meant to allow time for negotiations on the future partnership, however experts consider that 11 months is insufficient to reach a comprehensive agreement in all relevant areas (the trade relationship, security cooperation, immigration, data-sharing, fisheries, etc.), all the more so if the UK wishes to diverge significantly from EU standards after the transition.

As regards the border issue, the revised agreement reverts from the previous UK-wide backstop option to a Northern Ireland-only solution, whereby once the transition period ends, Northern Ireland will apply EU customs and tariffs legislation, as well as the relevant EU single market rules needed to avoid any regulatory or customs border on the island of Ireland. A consent mechanism for Northern Irish authorities is also included. However many of the detailed rules necessary for the operation of this Protocol have still to be established by the parties.

In terms of governance, a Joint Committee made up of EU and UK representatives will be responsible for the implementation and application of the agreement. The treaty also includes a mechanism for dispute settlement, based on arbitration (with the role of the Court of Justice of the EU preserved if the dispute relates to a question of interpretation of EU law), and compliance provisions.

Ratification procedure In the United Kingdom

The general election in the UK in December 2019 delivered a clear majority to the Conservative party of Prime Minister Boris Johnson, thus facilitating the adoption of the necessary legislation for ratifying and implementing the Withdrawal Agreement. On 19 December 2019, the government introduced the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill 2019-2020, which fulfils two roles: 1) it gives effect domestically to the withdrawal treaty (the UK being a dualist state); and 2) it fulfils provisions of the previous EU Withdrawal Act 2018 which requires an Act of Parliament before the UK can ratify the treaty.

A previous version of the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill was introduced by the UK government on 21 October 2019. While the House of Commons voted to allow the bill to proceed to the next stage, it rejected the timetable proposed by the government for its adoption.

The bill repeals previous domestic requirements related to the ratification of the withdrawal agreement; implements the transition period; delegates a range of powers to the government for the implementation of the citizens’ rights provisions, the Protocol on Northern Ireland and the separation issues; and, importantly, it confers direct effect to the relevant provisions of the Withdrawal Agreement, after the transition, and foresees that incompatible or inconsistent domestic legislation must be disapplied. In terms of changes from the October version, the bill does not include powers for the UK parliament relating to the future relationship negotiations and agreements, and blocks the possibility of the government asking for an extension to the transition period. The bill completed its passage through the UK Parliament on 22 January, with the House of Lords choosing not to insist on its earlier amendments, and received Royal Assent on 23 January 2020.

In the European Union

In December 2018, the European Commission adopted two proposals on the signing and conclusion of the withdrawal agreement. On 11 January 2019, the Council (Article 50) adopted a decision on signing the agreement and approved a draft decision to conclude the agreement. Both the decision to sign and to conclude the agreement were subsequently amended in light of the Article 50 extensions and the revised deal in October 2019. The draft Council decision to conclude the agreement was sent to Parliament for consent in October 2019. According to Rule 88 of its Rules of Procedure, Parliament gives its consent to a withdrawal agreement by a majority of votes cast (i.e. simple majority of Members present). Members elected in the UK have the right to vote. If Parliament gives consent, the Council can adopt the decision to conclude the agreement with a ‘super qualified majority’, following the treaty’s signature by both parties. Ratification by Member States is not required. For the agreement to enter into force, the parties must provide written notification that their internal ratification procedures are completed.

European Parliament position

Throughout the negotiations, Parliament has made its views heard through various resolutions and through its Brexit Steering Group has cooperated closely with the other EU institutions, in particular the Commission’s Task Force in charge of the EU-UK talks. On 15 January 2020, the EP adopted a new resolution on implementing and monitoring provisions on citizens’ rights in the Withdrawal Agreement.

The recommendation on consent was drawn up by the Committee on Constitutional Affairs (AFCO), rapporteur Guy Verhofstadt (Renew Europe, Belgium). Ten other Committees adopted opinions in the form of letters from their respective chairs to the AFCO Chair. On 23 January 2020, AFCO voted to recommend giving consent to the agreement by 23 votes, with 3 against, and no abstentions. In plenary, on 29 January 2020, there will be a single vote, to approve or deny consent, no amendments being possible.

Recommendation on consent to Council conclusion of the UK withdrawal agreement: 2018/0427(NLE);
Committee responsible: AFCO; Rapporteur: Guy Verhofstadt (Renew Europe, Belgium). Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Agreement on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Delphotostock / Fotolia

It is now clear that the United Kingdom will leave the European Union on 31 January 2020. It will do so on the basis of the revised Withdrawal Agreement negotiated between the EU-27 and the UK by Boris Johnson after he became Prime Minister last year. Both sides will then start negotiations on future relations, including on trade, which will run during the transitional period, currently due to end on 31 December 2020. The UK government has said it will set out its hopes for the future partnership after Brexit has happened.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on numerous challenges facing the UK, EU and their future ties after their divorce.

Brexit: Getting it done
European Policy Centre, January 2020

Flexibility does not come for free
Centre for European Reform, January 2020

Devolution restored in Northern Ireland as the British and Irish Governments prepare for the next phase of Brexit
Open Europe, January 2020

Scotland’s European choices as UK exits the EU
Scottish Institute for European Relations, January 2020

The Irish 2020 election and Brexit
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

The UK seeks its own ‘phase one’ deal on Brexit
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2020

Britain voted for independence, but it has achieved isolation
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020

Brexit’s finish line is only the ‘end of the beginning’ for Britain and the European Union
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2020

Getting Brexit done: What happens now?
Institute for Government, January 2020

Attention turns to the structure of next phase Brexit talks
Open Europe, January 2020

A bumpy level playing field awaits the next round of Brexit talks
Institute for Government, January 2020

The North-East of England after Brexit
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

Post-Brexit trade deals: What do the public think?
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2020

Brexit endgame: Brexit nears, Northern Ireland assembly reconvenes, and Megxit distracts
Brookings Institution, January 2020

The Border into Brexit: Perspectives from local communities in the central border region of Ireland/Northern Ireland
The UK in a Changing Europe, December 2019

A post-Brexit Europe in a new decade
Carnegie Europe, December 2019

Britain must balance a transatlantic heart with a European head
Chatham House, December 2019

A Brexit trade deal by December 2020 won’t be much of a deal at all
The UK in a Changing Europe, December 2019

What Boris Johnson’s big win means for Brexit and Scotland
Chatham House, December 2019

Getting the UK ready for the next phase of Brexit negotiations
Institute for Government, December 2019

Will Boris Johnson go full speed ahead or wobbly on Brexit?
Council on Foreign Relations, December 2019

The end of twentieth-century Labour
Carnegie Europe, December 2019

How much will the UK contribute to the next seven-year EU budget?
Bruegel, December 2019

A very different Brexit year lies ahead
Open Europe, December 2019

A second independence referendum: When and how could Scotland vote again?
Institute for Government, December 2019

Post-election: Where next for a divided, diminished UK?
Scottish Institute for European Relations, November 2019

Independence, Scotland and EU accession: Challenges ahead
Scottish Institute for European Relations, November 2019

How economically damaging will Brexit be?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

Brexit: Research and analyses
House of Commons Library, 2020

Latest thinking and research about Brexit from LSE
LSE Brexit blog, 2020

Written by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass and Philippe Perchoc,

© cge2010 / Fotolia

The term Holocaust refers to the mass murder of 6 million European Jews, Roma and other persecuted groups, whom the Nazi regime and its collaborators sought to annihilate.

The expropriation, state-sponsored discrimination and persecution of the Jews by the Nazi regime began in 1933, followed by pogroms and their mass incarceration in concentration camps. Ultimately, this policy was extended to all Nazi-controlled European territories and countries during World War II, culminating in mass summary executions (‘Holocaust by Bullets’) and extermination in death camps. The perpetrators were prosecuted at the Nuremberg trials in 1945-1946; however, the tribunal preferred to indict them on charges of crimes against humanity rather than genocide.

It was not until 2005, on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz that a United Nations resolution designated 27 January the day for international commemoration of the Holocaust, to be known as ‘International Holocaust Remembrance Day’.

In the European Union, numerous programmes seek to preserve the memory of these tragic events in the history of the continent. Since 1995, the European Parliament has adopted resolutions drawing attention to the obligation to remember not only through commemorations but also through education. In November 2018, the EU became a permanent international partner of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

Read the complete briefing on ‘The European Union and Holocaust remembrance‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Frederik Scholaert (1st edition),

© Hans Christiansson / Shutterstock

Eastern Baltic cod has long supported the livelihoods of many Baltic fishermen, but stocks of this valuable fish have been declining sharply in recent years. Every year since 2014, total allowable catches have been reduced accordingly. Recent scientific advice, published in May 2019, reinforced concerns regarding eastern Baltic cod, showing an even steeper decline and estimating the stock to be below safe biological limits for the past two years. Scientists point to high natural mortality resulting from various environmental pressures, including a lack of salinity, little oxygen, pollution, high water temperatures and parasite infestation. On 22 July 2019, as an emergency measure, the Commission imposed an immediate closure of the fishery for six months, with the exception of a limited amount arising from the unavoidable by-catch. Subsequently, fishing opportunities for 2020 were cut by 92 %. As recovery of the stock is not expected before 2024, on 31 October 2019 the Commission issued a proposal amending the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund Regulation in order to allow support for permanent cessation and introducing parallel changes to the Baltic multiannual plan by setting capacity limits for the fishing segments concerned and by including additional control and data collection measures.

Versions

• January 2020:  ‘European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT): Regulation and new strategic innovation agenda‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/1139 as regards the introduction of capacity limits for Eastern Baltic cod, data collection and control measures in the Baltic Sea, and Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 as regards permanent cessation for fleets fishing for Eastern Baltic cod Committee responsible: Fisheries (PECH) COM(2019) 564
31.10.2019 Rapporteur: Niclas Herbst (EPP, Germany) 2019/0246(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Ivo Hristov (S&D, Bulgaria)
Søren Gade (Renew, Denmark)
Ska Keller (Greens/EFA, Germany)
Ruža Tomašić (ECR, Croatia) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Consideration of draft report

 

 

Written by Gianluca Sgueo,

© Ico Maker / Shutterstock.com

What will European Union (EU) decision-making look like in the next decade and beyond? Is technological progress promoting more transparent, inclusive and participatory decision-making at EU level?

Technology has dramatically changed both the number and quality of connections between citizens and public administrations. With technological progress, citizens have gained improved access to public authorities through new digital communication channels. Innovative, tech-based, approaches to policy-making have become the subject of a growing debate between academics and politicians. Theoretical approaches such as ‘CrowdLaw’, ‘Policy-Making 3.0’, ‘liquid’, ‘do-it-yourself’ or ‘technical’ democracy and ‘democratic innovations’ share the positive outlook towards technology; and technology is seen as the medium through which policies can be ‘co-created’ by decision-makers and stakeholders. Co-creation is mutually beneficial. Decision-makers gain legitimacy by incorporating the skills, knowledge and expertise of citizens, who in turn have the opportunity to shape new policies according to their needs and expectations.

EU institutions are at the forefront of experimentation with technologically innovative approaches to make decision-making more transparent and accessible to stakeholders. Efforts in modernising EU participatory channels through technology have evolved over time: from redressing criticism on democratic deficits, through fostering digital interactions with stakeholders, up to current attempts at designing policy-making in a friendly and participative manner.

While technological innovation holds the promise of making EU policy-making even more participatory, it is not without challenges. To begin with, technology is resource consuming. There are legal challenges associated with both over- and under-regulation of the use of technology in policy-making. Furthermore, technological innovation raises ethical concerns. It may increase inequality, for instance, or infringe personal privacy.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Using technology to ‘co-create’ EU policies‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochaka,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP/Christian CREUTZ

January highlights included statements on ongoing hearings on the rule of law under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union (EU) regarding Hungary and Poland; bushfires in Australia and climate change consequences; cross-border organised crime and its impact on free movement; a common charger for mobile radio equipment; the gender pay gap; and the ‘Housing First’ approach to address homelessness. Parliament also debated statements on the situation in Iran and Iraq, in Libya, and in Venezuela following the illegal election of the new National Assembly Presidency and Bureau. Members voted on annual reports on implementation of the common foreign and security, and foreign and defence policies. Members debated citizens’ rights provisions in the UK Withdrawal Agreement. They also voted on a resolution on the European Green Deal, following their debate in December’s special session – on the day on which the Commission had itself adopted and presented its plans. In addition, His Majesty King Abdullah II of Jordan addressed a formal sitting of Parliament.

Presentation of the programme of activities of the Croatian Presidency

Members debated Council and European Commission statements presenting the programme of the new (and first) Croatian Council Presidency. The priorities for the six-month tenure include developing European economic and social cohesion and convergence; making stronger connections between European citizens, focusing on infrastructure for smooth mobility of people and goods; boosting internal security to protect citizens and tackling migration issues; and strengthening multilateralism and Europe’s influence in the world.

Conference on the Future of Europe

Members adopted, by a large majority, Parliament’s position on arrangements for the Conference on the Future of Europe, which closely follows the text agreed by Parliament’s Conference of Political Group Presidents. Parliament has high expectations for the conference, and is eager to contribute to a design that affords maximum opportunities for citizen contribution, while avoiding the pitfalls inherent in any selection. A Parliament working group is reflecting on ensuring that the conference structure, aims and scope are realistic and result in meaningful outcomes.

COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (Kunming 2020)

Parliament debated a Commission statement on the COP15 of the Convention on Biological Diversity, and adopted a resolution in view of the 15th meeting of the parties to the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity in Kunming, China in October 2020. The EU post-2020 biodiversity framework (to 2030) needs to be in place in time for this meeting. However, Parliament is asking how the Commission proposes to strengthen implementation of biodiversity-protection measures, given the failure to achieve 2020 targets.

2018 Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world

Members debated and adopted Parliament’s position on the 2018 Annual report on the human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter. The report takes stock of all EU action in human rights and democracy, and Parliament takes the opportunity to review EU action and make recommendations for the future, in an annual resolution adopted in response to the report.

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced five Legal Affairs (JURI) Committee decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 72. Parliament’s positions adopted earlier at first reading will provide the mandates for these negotiations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, January I 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luzitanija / Fotolia

The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) aims to ensure an appropriate role for the Union in peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of international security. It is an integral part of the EU’s comprehensive approach towards crisis management, drawing on civilian and military assets. Now its importance is rising because of the increasingly uncertain strategic environment. For years, the EU has been considered as an economic powerhouse but militarily weak, and it is currently debating whether and how to enhance its defence capabilities, notably because of the growing complexity of transatlantic security relations. The new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is determined to expand the EU’s international role, calling her Commission ‘geopolitical’.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the state of the future of the EU’s foreign, security and defence policy.

What EU geopolitical power will cost
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

The EU as a maritime security provider
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2019

Differentiated integration within PESCO: Clusters and convergence in EU defence
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

On European power
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2019

From global strategy to strategic compass: Where is the EU heading?
Egmont, December 2019

Strategic investment: Making geopolitical sense of the EU’s defence industrial policy
European Union Institute for Security Studies, December 2019

How can the EU learn the language of power?
Chatham House, December 2019

Europe’s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2019

Putting the core at the centre: The crisis response operation core (CROC) and the future of PESCO
Egmont, December 2019

Europe´s coherence gap in external crisis and conflict management: The EU’s integrated approach between political rhetoric and institutional practice
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2019

Towards a European Security Council?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

EU-NATO cooperation in an era of great power competition
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, November 2019

Towards a more capable European Union civilian CSDP
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2019
Towards a more gender-balanced European Union CSDP
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, November 2019

EU-U.S. consensus and NATO-EU cooperation
Egmont, November 2019

Gaming the new security nexus
Clingendael, November 2019

Transatlantic relations: Past, present and future
College of Europe, November 2019

EU defense cooperation: Progress amid transatlantic concerns
Carnegie Europe, November 2019

Trump, NATO leaders converge in London: What to watch
German Marshall Fund, November 2019

Can the European Commission develop Europe’s defence industry?
Centre for European Reform, November 2019

New perspectives on shared security: NATO’s next 70 years
Carnegie Europe, November 2019

The militarization of US foreign policy: Engagement with Europe increasingly about defense
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, November 2019

What does it mean to be a European defence company today?
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2019

Rethinking European security
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, October 2019

Mutual reinforcement: CSDP and NATO in the face of rising challenges
Institut français des relations internationales, October 2019

Der vernetzte Krieg. Warum moderne Streitkräfte von elektronischer Kampfführung abhängen
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2019

The first year of the compact: How the review process can make civilian CSDP more capable
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, October 2019

NATO’s futures through Russian and Chinese beholders’ eyes
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2019

EU watch list 2019: Third update
International Crisis Group, October 2019

Articulating the logic of nuclear-sharing
Institute for European Studies, October 2019

The European intervention initiative: Developing a shared strategic culture for European defence
Clingendael, September 2019

Democratization first: The community method in CFSP as a precondition for a European defence policy
Institut français des relations internationales, September 2019

New beginnings: Bolstering EU Foreign and Security Policy in times of contestation
Notre Europe, September 2019

European security 2030
LSE Ideas, Dahrendorf Forum, Mercator Stiftung, September 2019

Up in arms: Warring over Europe´s arms export regime
Centre for European Reform, September 2019

Give the people what they want: Popular demand for a strong European foreign policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2019

European security in crisis: What to expect if the US withdraws from NATO
International Institute for Strategic Studies, Körber Stiftung, September 2019

The EU and NATO
European Union Institute for Security Studies, August 2019

An attack against them all? Drivers of decisions to contribute to NATO collective defense
Rand Corporation, August 2019

From plaything to player: How Europe can stand up for itself in the next five years
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

Military mobility and the EU-NATO conundrum
Clingendael, July 2019

Strategic autonomy for European choices: The key to Europe’s shaping power
European Policy Centre, July 2019

The end of the INF-Treaty: Context and consequences
Egmont, July 2019

Strategic sovereignty: How Europe can regain the capacity to act
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Towards an EU security community? Public opinion and the EU’s role as a security actor
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, June 2019

The EU’s security Union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019
Moving PeSCo forward: What are the next steps?
Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques, May 2019

The future of EU civilian crisis management: Finding a niche
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 2019

Together forever? Alliances in times of foreign policy uncertainty
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, May 2919

NATO at seventy: Filling NATO’s critical defence-capability gaps
Atlantic Council, April 2019

NATO at 70: From triumph to tumult?
German Marshal Fund, April 2019

Open door: NATO and Euro-Atlantic security after the cold war
Center for trans-Atlantic Relations, April 2019

Europe in the midst of China-US strategic competition: What are the European Union’s options?
Bruegel, April 2019

Russian ground forces posture towards the West
Chatham House, April 2019

NATO anniversary: Will there be another 70 years?
Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, March 2019

The European Defense Fund: Key issues and controversies
Carnegie Europe, March 2019

A more strategic approach towards CSDP partnerships
Jacques Delors Institute, March 2019

EU it yourself: A blueprint for a European Security Council
Wilfried Martens Centre, March 2019

Digital infantry battlefield solution. Research and innovation
Latvian Institute for International Affairs, March 2019

Allein oder im Verbund? Allianzen in Zeiten außenpolitischer Unsicherheit
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, March 2019

Interregnum
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, March 2019

Joining forces: The way towards the European Defence Union
European Political Strategy Centre, February 2019

Security radar 2019: Wake-up call for Europe!
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2019

Are PESCO projects fit for purpose?
International Institute for Strategic Studies, European Leadership Network, February 2019

Strategische Autonomie Europas
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

The Aachen mutual defence clause: A closer look at the Franco-German treaty
Egmont, February 2019

What’s in the CARDs?
Egmont, February 2019

Hybrid conflicts: The new normal?
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, January 2019

Fighting for Europe: European strategic autonomy and the use of force
Egmont, January 2019

A European Security Council: Added value for EU foreign and security policy?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019

Opportunities for European collaboration in armoured vehicles
Rand Europe, January 2019

‘Fort Trump’ or bust? Poland and the future of European defence
Friends of Europe, January 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Future of European Security and Defence Policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp,

© andriano.cz / Shutterstock.com

On 3 January 2020, a United States (US) strike outside Baghdad killed Iranian General Qasem Soleimani, the leader of the al-Qods force within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IGRC), and arguably the second most important man in Iran after Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The assassination was a reaction to an escalation in the growing conflict between the USA and Iran. Iran retaliated on 8 January 2020, by attacking two US bases in Iraq with missiles; luckily – or intentionally – without casualties. Although both the USA and Iran have refrained from any further action, few expect this to mark the end of tensions between the USA and Iran in the region. The EU reaction to the assassination has been to try to de-escalate the situation to prevent all-out war, to focus on stabilising Iraq, and to limit damage to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).

What led to the assassination of Qasem Soleimani?

US-Iran relations have been strained since 1979, when the Islamic Revolution removed the US-backed government of the Shah. Since then, US administrations have largely treated Iranian policies in the Middle East as a threat to US interests. As part of international efforts to curtail Iran’s nuclear programme, former US President Barack Obama signed a nuclear agreement with Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), in 2015. However, current President Donald Trump, a strident opponent of the JCPOA, withdrew the USA from the agreement in May 2018, and re-imposed sanctions that had been lifted as part of the nuclear deal. Tensions between the USA and Iran have been rising ever since. Tehran responded to each new round of US sanctions with increasingly bold attacks, on ships in the Gulf of Hormuz and oil installations in Saudi Arabia. Over several months, the theatre of conflict moved to Iraq, leading to growing clashes between US forces and Iranian-backed paramilitary Popular Mobilisation Units (PMF) in Iraq, and culminating in attacks on the US Embassy in Baghdad, and the death and wounding of American and Iraqi personnel. The USA initially claimed that Soleimani, who the USA holds personally responsible for the deaths of hundreds of US service members in Iraq, posed an imminent threat to US interests in the region. According to later statements, his assassination was part of a ‘broader strategy of deterrence’, or, simply, Soleimani’s ‘horrible past‘.

Oil prices
Following an initial surge in oil prices immediately after the Soleimani assassination, prices have since receded to 2019 levels. However, even in 2019, oil prices were nearly 25 % higher, due partly to rising tensions in the Middle East region. The dangers for Iraq

On 5 January 2020, in protest against the killing of Soleimani and a close associate, Iraqi militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the Iraqi parliament voted to seek the removal of foreign military troops from the country. The parliament also called for the cancellation of an agreement under which US forces are stationed in Iraq to help fight the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIL/Da’esh). In the meantime, the international coalition against ISIL/Da’esh has suspended operations. Any weakening of the international coalition against ISIL/Da’esh could lead to the resurgence of ISIL/Da’esh in Iraq, where the terrorist organisation is still present, with potentially grave humanitarian consequences. Moreover, there is growing concern about increasing instability in Iraq, which has experienced decades of violence and armed conflict, and which has seen large-scale anti-government protests in recent months.

The EU is particularly concerned that any further military escalation could undo many years of international effort to stabilise the country and divert attention from necessary political reforms, the tackling of urgent social challenges, and the fight against corruption. Since 2014, the EU has made €1.2 billion available to support Iraq, in the form of humanitarian aid, support for internally displaced persons, and stabilisation of liberated areas. The EU has also supported civilian security sector reform, including through the common security and defence policy (CSDP) EU Advisory Mission Iraq, since October 2017, and has worked with the Iraqi authorities to improve Iraq’s counter-terrorism efforts. In response to the specific challenges Iraq faces following the territorial defeat of ISIL/Da’esh, the EU adopted an EU strategy for Iraq on 22 January 2018.

Developments in Iran

Soleimani’s death led to an outpouring of grief in Iran, with millions reported to have taken to the streets. However, the mood turned rapidly, when it was revealed that, shortly after the Iranian missile attack on US military bases in Iraq on 8 January 2020, the Iranian military accidentally shot down a Ukrainian civilian aeroplane leaving Tehran airport, killing all 176 people on board. Iranians took to the streets in large numbers to protest against the country’s rulers, who took three days to admit responsibility for the crash.

EU terrorist list
In 2011, the EU added Qasem Soleimani to the EU terrorist list. The list sets out persons, groups and entities subject to restrictive measures with a view to combating terrorism. Persons, groups and entities on the list are subject to the freezing of their funds and other financial assets in the EU. EU operators are also forbidden to make funds and economic resources available to them. EU reactions to the assassination

The Trump Administration’s approach to Iran has strained EU-US relations in recent years. The EU ‘deeply regretted‘ the US decision to withdraw from the JCPOA and reintroduce sanctions on Iran. While the EU and the E3 (France, Germany and the United Kingdom (UK)) have worked with the other signatories (China, Iran and Russia) to save the JCPOA, the USA has repeatedly called on Europeans to abandon the nuclear agreement and has threatened to undermine the EU’s main initiative to maintain trade with Iran – the INSTEX special purpose vehicle. At the same time, the EU shares US concerns over Iran’s missile programme, especially after the 8 January 2020 attack on US air bases in Iraq, and Iran’s activities in the region, especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. Senior US officials complained that European allies have not shown sufficient support for the US, following the Trump ordered assassination of Soleimani. However, neither the EU nor the E3 have condemned the killing of General Soleimani. Instead, EU leaders have called for urgent de-escalation on both sides, for stabilising Iraq and maintaining the coalition against ISIL/Da’esh, and for preserving the JCPOA.

In a joint statement issued on 6 January 2020, France, Germany and the UK condemned Iran for escalating the situation in Iraq prior to Soleimani’s assassination. The statement also highlighted the negative role Iran had played in the region, ‘including through the IRGC and the Al-Qods force under the command of General Soleimani’. The E3 ‘specifically called on Iran to refrain from further violent action or proliferation’.

At an extraordinary meeting on 10 January 2020, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Secretary-General, Jens Stoltenberg joined EU Foreign Affairs Ministers to discuss the implications of the latest developments in Iraq, including on the international coalition engaged in the fight against ISIL/Da’esh. The Council called for urgent de-escalation and maximum restraint, condemned the attacks on coalition forces and restated that the fight against ISIL/Da’esh remained an EU priority. The EU ministers reiterated their support for Iraq’s stability and reconstruction, and for the JCPOA.

Activating the dispute resolution mechanism

In a separate development on 14 January 2020, following Iran’s 5 January 2020 announcement that the country was taking a fifth step away from compliance, the E3 group announced they were triggering the dispute resolution mechanism under JCPOA, paragraph 36, and once again expressed their commitment to the JCPOA, stating that the overarching objective remained to preserve the JCPOA. EU High Representative Josep Borrell reinforced this message during a statement delivered to the European Parliament on 14 January 2020. The dispute resolution process will begin with a meeting of all parties to the JCPOA within 15 days.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Escalating US-Iran conflict: The EU’s priorities‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.