European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marie Lecerf.

As things stand, the gender pay gap persists globally and in the European Union, and progress in reducing it is slow. The coronavirus pandemic is a further brake on gender equality. To accelerate the realisation of the principle of ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’, the United Nations marked the first International Day for Equal Pay on 18 September 2020. This year, for its second edition, the debate will focus on ensuring that equal pay remains at the centre of the response to the pandemic and recognition of women’s major contribution to economic recovery.

A persisting gender pay gap The gender pay gap by Member State. Source: Eurostat, Gender pay gap statistics.

The ‘gender pay gap’ is a measurable indicator of inequality between women and men. It generally refers to the average difference between the remuneration of employed women and male workers.

Although the gender pay gap is measured by different methods and indicators, data clearly show that women around the world still earn less when compared to men. According to the Global Wage Report 2018/2019 – What lies behind gender pay gaps, produced by the International Labour Organization (ILO), on average, women earn around 20 % less than men. Despite the increase in women’s educational attainment and participation in the labour market over the years, the gender pay gap remains a persistent and multi-dimensional issue in all countries and across all economic sectors. For women with children, women of colour, migrant women, and women with disabilities, the discrepancy is even larger. In 2019, women’s gross hourly earnings were on average 14.1 % below those of men in the European Union (Eurostat, EU-27). Across Member States, the gender pay gap varied widely, ranging from 1.3 % in Luxembourg to 21.7 % in Estonia.

The coronavirus pandemic has disproportionately affected women in the economic sphere. It is likely to have long-term adverse effects on gender equality. Research already suggests that the gender pay gap will widen because of the pandemic. 

International Equal Pay Day The United Nations’ commitment

Mainstreaming the gender perspective is key to the implementation of the United Nations (UN) 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Since 2015, the ‘Equal pay for work of equal value’ principle has been recognised as one of the priority areas of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals (UNSDGs), as mentioned in target 8.5: ‘By 2030, achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all women and men, including for young people and persons with disabilities, and equal pay for work of equal value’.

In 2017, under the leadership of the ILO, the UN entity for gender equality and the empowerment of women (UN Women) and the Gender Initiative of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and together with governments, labour organisations (e.g. ITUC), employers’ organisations (e.g. IOE) and other dedicated agencies, the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) was launched for the effective and swift achievement of the principle.

On 15 November 2019, the UN General Assembly adopted a resolution proclaiming 18 September as International Equal Pay Day. The resolution was introduced by the Equal Pay International Coalition (EPIC) with the support of Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Panama, South Africa and Switzerland. The day is intended to promote further action towards the achievement of equal pay for work of equal value.

The first International Equal Pay Day – 18 September 2020

On 18 September 2020, the first International Equal Pay Day, international leaders committed to taking affirmative action to narrow the gender pay gap. EPIC called on participants to put pay equity at the heart of Covid-19 recovery efforts by introducing integrated policy responses aimed at mitigating job and income losses resulting from the pandemic and ensuring that women do not end up disproportionately shouldering these job losses and reductions in incomes.

The 2021 Equal Pay Day

This year’s celebration will focus on the efforts of key labour market actors to ensure that equal pay remains central to pandemic responses worldwide and to fully recognise the contributions of women to coronavirus pandemic economic recovery. The event aims to strengthen commitments to closing the gender pay gap across regions and sectors.

European Union initiatives

Equal pay for equal work is one of the EU’s founding principles, enshrined in Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. However, the implementation and enforcement of this principle remain a challenge. Since then, there have been initiatives to address the gender pay gap both at EU and Member State levels. Although some reduction of the gender pay gap has been recorded in most EU Member States, the challenge persists.

In her political guidelines, the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that she would introduce a proposal on binding pay transparency measures in order to address the gender pay gap and ensure application of the principle of equal pay for equal work. The Commission’s legislative proposal was adopted on 4 March 2021. It is one of the key priorities in the EU Gender Equality Strategy 2020-2025. The proposed directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms would focus on two aspects of equal pay: measures to ensure pay transparency and better access to justice for victims of pay discrimination.

European Parliament position

Parliament has been calling for stronger measures on pay transparency and equal pay for a number of years. In its resolution of 8 October 2015 on ‘Equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation’, Parliament asked the Commission to draw up a legislative proposal on equal pay, incorporating measures on strengthening pay transparency, together with effective means of enforcement, such as mandatory pay audits for large companies. Parliament’s resolution of 30 January 2020 on the ‘Gender pay gap‘ urged the Commission to ensure that the forthcoming pay transparency legislation applies to both the public and private sectors, promotes the role of the social partners and collective bargaining, and includes strong enforcement policies for those failing to comply. Parliament also asked for the proposal to incorporate a number of concrete measures.

Parliament’s resolution of 21 January 2021 on the new ‘EU Gender Equality Strategy’ stresses that binding measures are necessary to close the gender pay gap.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘International Equal Pay Day‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tambiama Madiega and Hendrik Mildebrath.

Artificial intelligence (AI) powers the use of biometric technologies, including facial recognition applications, which are used for verification, identification and categorisation purposes by private or public actors. While facial recognition markets are poised to grow substantially in the coming years, the increasing use of facial recognition technologies (FRTs) has emerged as a salient issue in the worldwide public debate on biometric surveillance.

While there are real benefits to using facial recognition systems for public safety and security, their pervasiveness and intrusiveness, as well as their susceptibility to error, give rise to a number of fundamental rights concerns with regard, for instance, to discrimination against certain segments of the population and violations of the right to data protection and privacy. To address such effects, the EU has already put strict rules in place under the Charter of Fundamental Rights, the General Data Protection Regulation, the Law Enforcement Directive and the EU framework on non-discrimination, which also apply to FRT-related processes and activities. However, various actors question the effectiveness of the current EU framework in adequately addressing the FRT-induced fundamental rights concerns. Even if courts attempted to close gaps in protection through an extensive interpretation of the pre-existing legal framework, legal uncertainties and complexities would remain.

Against this backdrop, the draft EU artificial intelligence (AI) act, unveiled in April 2021, aims to limit the use of biometric identification systems including facial recognition that could lead to ubiquitous surveillance. In addition to the existing applicable legislation (e.g. data protection and non-discrimination), the draft AI act proposes to introduce new rules governing the use of FRTs in the EU and to differentiate them according to their ‘high-risk’ or ‘low-risk’ usage characteristics. A large number of FRTs would be considered ‘high risk’ systems which would be prohibited or need to comply with strict requirements. The use of real-time facial recognition systems in publicly accessible spaces for the purpose of law enforcement would be prohibited, unless Member States choose to authorise them for important public security reasons, and the appropriate judicial or administrative authorisations are granted. A wide range of facial recognition technologies used for purposes other than law enforcement (e.g. border control, market places, public transport and even schools) could be permitted subject to a conformity assessment and compliance with some safety requirements before entering the EU market. Conversely, facial recognition systems used for categorisation purposes would be considered ‘low risk’ systems and only subject to limited transparency and information requirements. While stakeholders, researchers and regulators seem to agree on a need for regulation, some critics question the proposed distinction between low-risk and high-risk biometric systems, and warn that the proposed legislation would enable a system of standardisation and self-regulation without proper public oversight. They call for amendments to the draft text, including with regard to the Member States’ leeway in implementing the new rules. Some strongly support stricter rules – including an outright ban on such technologies.

Looking beyond the EU, there is a global surge in use of facial recognition technologies, whilst concerns about state surveillance are mounting and amplified by the fact that there are, so far, very limited legally binding rules applicable to FRTs even in major jurisdictions such as the United States of America (USA) and China. Policy- and law-makers around the globe have the opportunity to discuss – in a multilateral and possibly in a bilateral context – how to put in place adequate controls on the use of facial recognition systems.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Regulating facial recognition in the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

The departure of United States (US) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban’s ability to provide sanctuary for international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military aeroplane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or were in hiding, and the Taliban had taken back control of most of Afghanistan. On 7 September 2021, the Taliban announced an all-male caretaker government drawn entirely from the Taliban movement, contrary to earlier promises that the new government would be ‘inclusive’. So far, no country has recognised the interim government. There have been reports of reprisals against security personnel, individuals with links to the previous administration and foreign forces, journalists and minorities, in particular. The rights to education and employment that women have enjoyed for the past 20 years are meanwhile being curtailed.

In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen. Many Afghans have fled to neighbouring countries, joining the estimated 3-4 million Afghan refugees already living there, mainly in Iran and Pakistan. The EU has expressed concerns over the composition of the interim government, noting that an inclusive and representative government – which the interim government is not – is an essential benchmark for EU engagement. The EU has made available large amounts of humanitarian and development aid and is hoping to establish a diplomatic presence on the ground in Kabul. The EU is also planning to set up a regional platform for cooperation with Afghanistan’s neighbours on issues including population flows from Afghanistan, terrorism, organised crime and drugs.

This Briefing expands and updates an ‘At a glance’ note published on 2 September 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The situation in Afghanistan: Essential benchmarks for EU engagement‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Further reading:

• Peace and Security, Animated infographic
• Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule, At a glance, 02 September 2021
• US and NATO leave Afghanistan: What next?, At a glance, 14 July 2021

Written by Magdalena Sapała with Nina Thomassen.

Since the beginning of 2021, Member States and EU institutions have been preparing intensively to launch the recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU). In order to make this unique financial stimulus package fully operational, many conditions have needed to be met and preparatory steps completed.

First, preparations have been ongoing for the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This process includes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation by the European Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Up to 15 September 2021, most of the national plans submitted have been positively assessed by the Commission and approved by the Council (18). Based on this, the Commission concluded agreements with those Member States on a legal commitment authorising the financial contribution to be made, and the first transfers of EU aid (pre-financing) were made on 3 August. In the case of some countries, however, the assessment procedure has been delayed.   

In parallel, the system for financing NGEU had to be created almost from scratch. It is based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union. These operations could start only once all Member States had ratified the Own Resources Decision (ORD), which was done by the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission was preparing for its role of borrower on an unprecedented scale. At the beginning of the summer, it started implementing its diversified funding strategy for the financing of NGEU. In three issuances successfully conducted so far, the Commission has raised €45 billion in total out of the €80 billion planned for 2021.

This is an update of a Briefing of 7 June 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recovery plan for Europe: State of play, September 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Structure of the recovery and resilience facility (current prices)
• Timeline and main steps in the procedure
• NGEU resources pre-allocated to Member States (RRF, REACT-EU, JTF and rural development) by Member State and per capita (€, current prices)
• Overview of the recovery plan for Europe, € billion, current prices

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

Why do figures matter in today’s world? How do we build and maintain trust in data and statistics? In an era which has seen such an explosion of data, should we not talk about data communication rather than dissemination? What does good data mean? How can data influence policy-makers? Are data literacy and ethics related to each other?

These and other topics were raised during the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) roundtable on ‘Statistics, Data and Trust: Why figures matter in today’s world’, held on 8 September 2021.

Vice-President of the European Parliament, Othmar Karas Introduced the event, which was moderated by Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service. The speakers were Mariana Kotzeva, Director General of EUROSTAT, Stefan Schweinfest, Director of the United Nations Statistics Division UNSTATS; Gaby Umbach, Director of GlobalStat and part-time Professor at the European University Institute (EUI); and Giulio Sabbati, Head of the Statistical and Data Visualisation Support Office, EPRS.

The composition of the roundtable could be compared to a statistical family. On one side were the data producers, represented by the UN and Eurostat, and on the other side data users in the shape of Globalstat and the EPRS Data Viz Office. And as a family, the participants all spoke the same language; that of statistics. In his introductory remarks, Mr Karas highlighted the importance of the UN fundamental principles of statistics and the European statistics code of practice. These are the global standards that statisticians need: to understand and to talk each other, and to learn from each other.

All the participants responded to the question in the roundtable’s title: why figures matter in today’s world? Being aware that figures are part of everyday life, as we often need to measure something to take actions, statistics are fundamental for making better informed decisions; official statistics are the foundation of any international information system;  data are essential for collective political action; the use of statistics has become a political power resource, and access to and understanding of data is becoming more and more important.

Historically, statistics started with surveys, then that expanded to public administrative sources and now in today’s world we face an explosion of data. The data ecosystem is much broader now – not only with official and non-official statistics, but also for instance with big data, digital data and geospatial data.

It is true that more data means more information; but it also means attempts at disinformation, raises questions such as over respecting privacy, and also means there is much data which are not good. But what is good data? It could refer to objectivity, accuracy, relevance, transparency or timeliness. Good data are based on scientific solid production processes. Ultimately a good data item is one that is responsibly and effectively used.

Mr Karas insisted in his message on how data and statistics are nothing if we cannot trust them. But how do we gain trust? First of all, using data that come from institutes with the highest international and European principles and standards. Official statistics in the EU and in the world are based on principles. And in the EU they are also based on a legal framework.

As a good product needs a good marketing campaign, so do official statistics. They need communication to build trust. Presenting statistics and data in an understandable and exciting way. Trust comes also with small actions when communicating: data properly ordered; clear labels; consistency in colours; texts to help understand a graph and to explain the data. It is also important to tell the story of where the data come from.

And what about data literacy, the ability to read data, to get data, to understand the meaning, what to do with them? Certainly, ethics plays an important role. It put limits on data use: what cannot be said with data and which questions need to be raised to understand.

What if we started teaching data literacy at school? How could we encourage this type of career path? Perhaps by quoting the article of the New York Times which said that ‘statistician is among the top ten sexy professions’.

The message from the roundtable could perhaps best be summarised with a quote form Hans Rosling, a Swedish doctor and statistician, who used the power of statistics to promote sustainable global development and to fight misinformation and misconceptions.

“The world cannot be understood without numbers. And it cannot be understood with numbers alone.”

Video recording of the event Further reading:

• Eurostat: European Statistics Code of practice
• Eurostat: European Statistical System (ESS) handbook for quality and metadata reports
• UN: Fundamental Principles of National Official Statistics
• Umbach, Gaby  (2020): Of Numbers, Narratives and Challenges: Data as Evidence in 21st Century Policy-Making, Statistical Journal of the IAOS (SJIAOS), Special Feature on Governing by the Numbers – Statistical Governance, Walter Radermacher (lead) December 2020, Vol. 36, No. 4, pp. 1043-1055
• Latest EPRS publication: ‘Ten composite indices for policymaking

Written by Gyorgyi Macsai (Members’ Research Service) with Igor Tkalec (GlobalStat, EUI).

Graphics: Giulio Sabbati.

The Covid-19 pandemic contributed to the continuous slowdown of China’s economy, from two-digit growth rates witnessed in the past to a ‘new normal’ growth rate of ‘only’ 5.7% on average under the current five-year plan (2016-2020). To what extent does this slowdown affect China’s public finances and other macroeconomic indicators? How has EU trade with China developed during the last decade? How important is the EU for China in terms of trade? And what about China’s trade relevance for the EU? Has the huge trade imbalance in goods trade between China and the EU narrowed in recent years? How intensive is trade in services between the EU and China? What are the EU’s main export items to China? How does China’s export basket look like? You can find the answers to these and other questions in our EPRS publication on China produced in collaboration with the European University Institute’s GlobalStat on the world’s main economies. This is an updated edition of an ‘At a Glance’ note published in December 2019.

Read this infographic on ‘China: Economic indicators and trade with EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Main trade partners (2020)
• EU trade with China
• Public finances, monetary and financial data
• Total unemployment rate (% of total labour force) – Female labour force participation rate
• GDP per capita – Annual GDP growth
• EU exports of services to China – EU imports of services from China (2020)
• EU imports of goods from China (2020)
• Top EU partners (2020)

Written by Clare Ferguson.

An important moment in Parliament’s oversight of the EU executive takes place during the September plenary session, as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen attends Parliament on Wednesday morning to make her second State of the Union address. With a difficult year behind it, issues such as the coronavirus pandemic, the effects of climate change and increasing digitalisation continue to present the Commission with both challenges and opportunities. While the new multiannual financial framework allows financing for the recovery plan for Europe and Next Generation EU, Members will expect to hear how the Commission intends to address the challenges that remain to achieve its stated six priorities, including on the continuing issue of adherence to EU values.

The coronavirus pandemic and its effects nevertheless remain a priority issue, and the session commences on Thursday afternoon with a joint debate on health and disease prevention. As life has returned to something approaching normal during the summer, wider health issues remain a legislative priority, and efforts continue to strengthen the EU’s response to health threats. These include proposals to boost EU defences against cross-border health threats, and to strengthen the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC). Although responsibility for health policy remains with the Member States, the pandemic has highlighted areas where stronger preparedness measures could better protect EU citizens and address cross-border health threats in future. Parliament will debate a Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report that supports increased consideration of all environmental, animal or human factors with an impact on health, as well as promoting cooperation and transparency – which could lead to smoother joint procurement for items such as personal protection equipment, should that be necessary in future. A further ENVI committee report on strengthening the ECDC is also due for debate. The committee proposes enlarging the ECDC’s mandate beyond communicable diseases to cover those that have a wide impact, including cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes, and mental illness. Once Parliament’s position is agreed on these two legislative proposals, interinstitutional negotiations can begin.

With an ageing population and an increasing need for skilled workers to sustain economic growth, the EU has to compete with other regions to attract highly qualified immigrants. On Tuesday evening, Parliament will debate a final text resulting from interinstitutional negotiations on the proposed revision of the EU Blue Card Directive. Parliament has long called for the revision of this legislation, which provides a legal route for migration to the bloc, not least in the face of considerable recent refugee movements. Should Parliament agree the new rules, skilled applicants will be admitted to remain on EU territory for at least two years if they are able to present a minimum six-month work contract or binding job offer. Admission to the EU Blue Card scheme should also become more inclusive, with reduced salary thresholds.

Later on Tuesday evening, Members are expected to take part in a joint debate on formal adoption, following interinstitutional negotiations, of the text setting out Parliament’s position at first reading on the Brexit Adjustment Reserve. Parliament has succeeded in modifying the proposals to ensure support for EU businesses – particularly fisheries and those in close proximity to the United Kingdom – against the additional costs ensuing from the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. A €5 billion budget will be made available over the period to December 2023, with funds distributed using an allocation method taking account of each country’s trade with the UK, its fisheries in UK waters, and the population size in maritime border regions neighbouring the UK. Members are also expected to debate measures to adapt the current EU budget to cover €4 billion in pre-financing for the ‘Brexit Adjustment Reserve’, under amending budget No 1/2021.

While the 1994 EU‑Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement remains in force today, relations have deteriorated since 2000. An already strained situation has worsened in the face of aggressive Russian foreign policy in Ukraine and Syria, as well as its repression of domestic dissent. Parliament is scheduled to debate political relations between the EU and Russia on Tuesday afternoon, following which Parliament is also expected to vote on a draft recommendation to Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. The Foreign Affairs (AFET) Committee’s draft recommendations call for a revision of the current stance, which combines pushing back with constraint and engagement, and proposes to base future relations on six principles. These include activating deterrence against security and hybrid threats alongside dialogue and engagement that offers incentives, such as trade and visas, in support of Russian democratic transformation. Members also expect to hear a statement by the High Representative on the situation in Afghanistan.

When the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, takes the floor in Strasbourg before the European Parliament to deliver her 2021 State of the Union address, she will report to Members of the European Parliament and, beyond them, to European citizens, after what has been the second summer of the Covid-19 pandemic. The coronavirus is still far from being tamed, and life – from everyday routine at individual level to global trends affecting the whole world – has entered a phase of profound change. Yet, as summer 2021 comes to a close, one of the leading impressions for many Europeans is of slowly recovering one of the freedoms at the heart of European Union, the freedom of movement they had been deprived of for public health reasons.

Mass travel in Europe became possible again during summer 2021, with 70 % of the adult population in Europe fully vaccinated and able to prove it thanks to the ‘Covid passport’ adopted by the European Union (EU) just before the summer. This legislative success reached in record time is illustrated by the cover photograph, where the presidents of the three institutions involved in its adoption (from left to right: António Costa, for the EU Council, Ursula von der Leyen, for the European Commission, and David Maria Sassoli, for the European Parliament) hold copies of the Regulation on the EU Digital Covid Certificate signed on 14 June. The certificate with a QR code is free of charge, available on paper or on a smartphone, and valid throughout the EU. For European citizens who could at last visit their loved ones, spend their summer break in another EU Member State, after many months of often highly restrictive measures, or simply get access to bars and restaurants in their home region, this initiative has shown the positive benefit of the EU, and is all the more noteworthy as it comes in a field – public health – that is not one of the core EU competences.

However, summer 2021 has left other lasting impressions that are more negative. Many are still shaken by the photographs – never mind those that experienced them directly – of mega-fires, unprecedented heatwaves, and deadly floods in various parts of the EU. Just one extreme rain episode caused a heavy toll of more than 200 deaths in Belgium and Germany, underlining once again the need to address climate change urgently. Combined with longer-term data confirming global warming and loss of biodiversity, this experience supports the priority given by the Commission to the European Green Deal. Even more, it confirms that Parliament has been right to be ambitious on climate, for example when it pushed for a higher target for the reduction of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 (60 % for the Parliament instead of 55 % in the Commission’s proposal, with the latter target later endorsed by the Council). On climate and environmental issues, including the principle of climate mainstreaming in the EU budget, the Parliament has repeatedly called for higher ambition – and often secured it, as with the 30 % of the overall resources from the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) and the Next Generation EU recovery instrument which will go to measures contributing to the fight against climate change.

As part of the European Green Deal, the European Commission tabled a ‘Fit for 55’ package in mid-July, including legislative proposals on climate, energy, land use, transport and taxation. The number of proposals foreshadowed (90) indeed makes the European Green Deal the Commission’s first priority in terms of announcements, although not in terms of proposals tabled (two-thirds (58) are yet to be submitted), let alone legislation adopted (only one sixth (15) so far).

Another dreadful event of summer 2021 has been the situation unfolding in Afghanistan. It calls for immediate humanitarian aid measures and visa solutions, but also brings asylum and migration issues to the forefront. This comes one year after the Commission’s proposal of the long-awaited new pact on migration and asylum, initially announced for the beginning of 2020 but postponed due to the pandemic (see fifth section below). This pact was supposed to bring new momentum to negotiations stalled for years. The number of legislative proposals under this priority should not disguise the difficulties in finding compromise and adopting legislation in this area, however urgent and dramatic the situation in Afghanistan, the Mediterranean and even on the shores facing the United Kingdom, may be.

Alongside these headline issues, the von der Leyen Commission is expecting progress on long-term files too: helping the EU recover from the coronavirus-crisis (see third section below), turning the EU into a digital continent (see second section below), becoming the ‘geopolitical Commission’ President von der Leyen claimed she would run when she took office (see fourth section below), and paving the way for the future of Europe, notably with the eponymous conference (see sixth section below).

This paper monitors all six priorities. It combines a two-page presentation for each priority and an infographic illustrating, in condensed form, on just one page (page 3), the degree of progress so far made – both overall and under each of the six priorities.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: State of play in Autumn 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

The von der Leyen Commission’s six priorities: Legislative delivery to 31 August 2021
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Written by Eric Pichon, Agnieszka Widuto, Alina Dobreva and Liselotte Jensen.

Policy-making is a difficult art. In a globalised world, decisions that do not take account of the bigger picture can have far-reaching unintended consequences. The current global debate on measures to tackle Covid-19 and vaccinate entire populations offers ample examples of just how intertwined are the social, economic, technological and other impacts of any policy. Policy-makers need to be able to trust data to help them make the best decisions.

Rough data are sometimes difficult to get hold of. Various non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics and think-tanks meanwhile produce tools aimed at interpreting data. These include composite indices that gather data from different sources in order to visualise the multiple dimensions of a specific concept more clearly. A composite index often proposes a ranking of countries. Such indices help to capture a comprehensive overview of a given situation and grasp its constitutive elements more easily. They provide for comparisons between countries or regions on a standard basis, and, when they are updated on a regular basis, give a good overview of the evolution of a situation over time. This can help with designing policies to prevent or mitigate risks and to encourage positive development. Indices can also – up to a certain point – help monitor the impact of policies and support forecasting exercises.

Fulfilling its core mission of ’empowering through knowledge’, in this analysis EPRS proposes a non-exclusive selection – which is in no way to be perceived as a ranking – of 10 composite indices in a range of policy areas. The indices selected are from reliable sources, already used as references by policy-makers. The majority have a good geographical coverage. With one exception – retained on account of its quality and uniqueness – they cover all EU Member States and/or most UN member states. The selection is also designed to cover some key EU policies, and most of the UN 2030 Agenda sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Each index is presented in a dedicated chapter that presents its producers and describes their objectives in publishing the index, the data compiled, and their actual and potential use by policy-makers. The chapters also highlight the potential limitations in using the indices. All composite indices of course are inevitably biased, as they select some indicators and reject others. They also standardise data that originated in heterogeneous units; therefore, the more indicators a composite index encompasses, the more bias it may carry. According to experts, this does not challenge the value of indicators, provided the authors’ vision and biases are acknowledged.

The information provided in this publication is geared towards supporting policy-makers by providing sources of data and by identifying possible biases in using them. Evidence and data are key to policy-making, particularly when it comes to making foresight reports, setting priorities, mitigating negative impacts and finding optimum trade-offs. In this context, when used properly, indicators can underpin better regulation.

Read the complete in-depth analysis on ‘Ten composite indices for policy-making‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Media Pluralism Monitor 2021: Risk assessment
• EU-SPI scores 2020
• EU-27 RCI scores 2019
• Commitment to development: Ranking of EU Member States monitored

Written by Silvia Kotanidis and Giulio Sabbati.

The Conference on the Future of Europe is a bottom-up exercise allowing European citizens to express their opinion on the Union’s future policies and functioning. It uses tools such as the Digital Platform and Citizens’ Panels to enable them to discuss topics that matter to them. This EPRS infographic sets out the structures of the conference, how they will work and the topics to be discussed.

Multilingual Platform

The Conference’s multilingual platform is a hub giving European citizens and European civil society organisations the opportunity to share ideas on the future of Europe, and to host and attend events. It will act as a repository of contributions and documents, and as an interactive tool to share and debate ideas of citizens. The platform is open to citizens, civil society, social partners, other stakeholders, public authorities at EU and national, regional, local level.

European Citizens’ Panels

These are vital bodies of the Conference, tasked with debating issues that matter to citizens. The composition of European citizens’ panels (± 200 citizens chosen at random) will be transnational and representative of the EU population, not only with respect to gender but also age, socio-economic background, geographic origin and level of education, with 1/3 of participants between 16 and 25 years of age. The European citizens’ panels will hold debates, including on the basis of contributions from the digital platform, and feed into the discussion of the Conference plenary with recommendations for the EU institutions to follow up. Four thematic citizens’ panels are planned: i) European democracy/values, rights, rule of law, security; ii) climate change, environment/health; iii) stronger economy, social justice, jobs/education, youth, culture, sport/digital transformation; and iv) EU in the world/migration.

European citizens’ panels will meet in deliberative sessions, in different locations and will be dedicated to specific themes. Member States (at national, regional or local level) and other stakeholders (civil society, social partners or citizens) may organise additional citizens’ panels under the umbrella of the Conference, provided they respect the Conference Charter in full.

Joint Presidency

The Conference is under the tripartite authority of the Presidents of the European Parliament, Council of the EU and Commission, respectively David Sassoli, Janez Janša, representing the Slovenian Presidency of the Council until 31 December 2021, and Ursula von der Leyen. Based on the rotation established by Council Decision, the Presidency of the Council was previously held by Portugal (1 January–30 June 2021) and will next be held by France (1 January–30 June 2022). The tripartite Presidency of the Conference is the ultimate body to which the final outcome of the Conference will be reported, so that each institution may provide the appropriate follow-up in accordance with their own competences.

Conference Plenary

The plenary comprises a total of 449 representatives, from the three institutions (Commission, Council of the EU and Parliament), national parliaments, citizens’ panels, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), national events or panels, social partners and civil society, and as of July, elected local and regional representatives. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be invited when the international role of the EU is discussed. Other stakeholders and experts may also be invited.

The plenary will discuss issues and recommendations coming from national and European citizens’ panels as well as input from the digital platform, grouped by themes. Debates will be open, without a predetermined outcome and without limiting topics to pre-defined policy areas. The plenary decides on a consensual basis (at least between the Parliament, Council, Commission and the national parliaments) on the proposals to be put forward to the Executive Board. The latter is responsible for drafting the final report of the Conference, in full collaboration and in full transparency with the Plenary, which will be published on the digital platform and sent to the Joint Presidency for concrete follow-up.

Executive Board

The Executive Board manages the work of the conference (plenaries, European citizens’ panels, and digital platform), oversees all activities, and prepares meetings of the plenary, including input from citizens, and their follow-up. All three institutions (Parliament, Commission and Council) are equally represented in the Executive Board, each with three members and up to four observers. The Executive Board is co-chaired by a representative of each of the three institutions; in the Council’s case by the rotating presidency. The presidential troika of COSAC (the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of EU national parliaments) have permanent observer status. The EESC and CoR also have observer status. Following the co-chairs’ proposal, the Plenary endorsed the creation of nine thematic working groups, one for each of the nine topics. The Executive Board may invite experts to participate in events of the Conference.

Secretariat

A common secretariat composed of equal numbers of staff of the European Parliament, General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, assists the Executive Board in the organisation of the Conference plenary and the European citizens’ panels.

The Conference on the Future

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie-Laure Augère-Granier and James McEldowney.

On 30 June 2021, the European Commission adopted a communication on its long-term vision for the EU’s rural areas. The communication identifies areas of action with a view to creating new momentum for the EU’s rural areas, while recognising their diversity. In recent decades, in many Member States rural areas have experienced depopulation. Such regions face a range of environmental and socio-economic challenges. These include, for example, lower income per capita, a higher percentage of the population at risk of poverty and social exclusion, a lack of access to basic infrastructure and services, and lower levels of access to fast broadband internet. The EU’s rural development policy has sought to help address these challenges.

Evaluation evidence is emerging on the impact of the common agricultural policy (CAP) on the territorial development of the EU’s rural areas. Measures relating to village renewal and LEADER (Liaison entre Actions de Développement de l’Économie rurale) measures are considered to be well-targeted and relevant to local needs, although they represent a small proportion of CAP financing. Administrative burdens have been raised as an issue that can impact on the developmental process. Recommendations from this evaluation evidence point to the need for better integration of funding streams, the need to maintain a dialogue across the European structural funds, and all the implications this may have for the new CAP strategic plans. The Commission’s recommendations to Member States on their CAP strategic plans highlight a number of recurring themes relating to the employment, education and training needs of rural areas, including the need to address rural depopulation, promote generational renewal, improve connectivity, and address the role played by action taken at local level. The Commission’s communication on a long-term vision for rural areas includes provision for a ‘rural pact’ to engage actors at EU, national, rural and local levels and an EU rural action plan, setting out a range of initiatives and actionable projects. The vision and its supporting analyses will provide a framework for addressing the future of the EU’s rural areas.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘EU rural development policy: Impact, challenges and outlook’ on YouTube.

Written by Rafał Mańko.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s second State of the Union address, scheduled for 15 September 2021, will be delivered at a time when the coronavirus pandemic continues to pose challenges for the European Union and its Member States. At the same time, thanks to the adoption of the multiannual financial framework for the 2021-2027 period, new opportunities lie ahead – the recovery plan for Europe and Next Generation EU. Furthermore, the Conference on the Future of Europe was finally launched on 9 May 2021. Nevertheless, a number of unresolved issues and new challenges remain. These include ensuring that EU values (Article 2 TEU) are upheld in the Member States, including through the application of the recently adopted Conditionality Regulation, addressing the threat of climate change, and equipping Europe for the digital age.

The tradition of EU State of the Union addresses, delivered to the European Parliament by the President of the European Commission, dates back to 2010. The address takes stock of the achievements of the past year and presents priorities for the year ahead. It constitutes an important instrument for the European Commission’s ex-ante accountability vis-à-vis Parliament and is also aimed at rendering the definition of priorities at EU level more transparent, and at communicating those priorities to citizens. The event chimes with a similar tradition in national democracies. The United States, for instance, has a long-standing tradition of presidential State of the Union addresses, in which the President speaks in the Capitol to a joint session of Congress, thus fulfilling a constitutional obligation. In contrast to the US Constitution, the EU Treaties do not prescribe a State of the Union address; the EU version was established by the 2010 Framework Agreement between Parliament and the Commission.

This briefing further updates an earlier one from September 2016, originally written by Eva-Maria Poptcheva.

Read the complete briefing on ‘State of the Union address, European Parliament, 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Deepfakes are hyper-realistic media products created through artificial intelligence (AI) techniques that manipulate how people look and the things that they appear to say or do. They hit the headlines in 2018 with a deepfake video of Barack Obama, which was designed to raise awareness of their challenges. The accessibility and outputs of deepfake generation tools are improving rapidly, and their use is increasing exponentially. A wide range of malicious uses have been identified, including fraud, extortion and political disinformation. The impacts of such misuse can be financial, psychological and reputational. However, the most widespread use so far has been the production of non-consensual pornographic videos, with negative impacts that overwhelmingly affect women. Deepfakes may also contribute to worrying trends in our media, as well as in our social and democratic systems. While the technology itself is legal, some malicious uses are not, and a combination of legal and technical measures may be mobilised to limit their production and dissemination.

The name ‘deepfake’ combines ‘deep’ as in deep learning, and ‘fake’, as in manipulated or entirely fabricated. The best-known examples of deepfakes are videos that manipulate how people look, and the things that they appear to say or do. However, they can also include still images, audio or even written texts that are designed to present a distorted representation of events.

In contrast to more traditional media manipulation techniques, deepfake production relies on an innovative deep learning technique called ‘generative adversarial networks‘ (GANs), which can increase both the degree of automation and the quality of the output compared to conventional techniques. GANs generate deepfakes by pitting two AI agents – also described as artificial neural networks – against each other. While the producer agent learns to create fakes that look just like standard recordings, a detector agent learns to identify whether a media product is fake or authentic. A feedback loop is generated between the two so that, as the producer agent learns, it gets better at fooling the detector by creating more realistic fakes and, as the detector agent learns, it finds more sophisticated ways of identifying the fakes. In the end, the producer agent can create extremely realistic fakes and sometimes only its adversary – the detector agent – can tell that they are not authentic. An interesting side effect of this learning process is that the two agents improve together. So, by creating a great deepfake producer, you also create a great deepfake detector, and vice-versa.

Rudimentary use of deepfake production tools with limited resources may allow some generally low-quality results. However, producing high-quality deepfakes that really pass for authentic recordings requires substantial data and programming skills. Nonetheless, the increasing availability of data and accessible tools is making it easier for more people to make their own deepfakes.

Potential impacts and developments

The number of deepfake videos online is growing exponentially. The best-known examples have used the faces of famous people, such as Barack Obama and Tom Cruise, partly because there is so much data available. However, these examples were clearly labelled as deepfakes, and were designed to show the world what was possible, while highlighting opportunities and challenges. Legitimate applications include art, satire and entertainment, with notable examples including special effects and personal avatars.

Yet, the malicious use of deepfakes can also cause serious harm to individuals, as well as to our social and democratic systems. Deepfakes may be misused to commit fraud, extortion, bullying and intimidation, as well as to falsify evidence, manipulate public debates and destabilise political processes. Political disinformation is often cited as the biggest risk of deepfakes and, indeed, a well-timed deepfake during an election campaign could do enormous damage on several levels. Until now, however, the overwhelming majority of deepfakes have been pornographic videos produced without the consent of the women that are falsely depicted in them. This reveals a substantial gender discrimination aspect of the technology, because the negative impacts disproportionately affect women.

Those that are most directly affected by malicious deepfakes are the individual victims of fraud, blackmail, disinformation and non-consensual pornography. Targets have included citizens, businesses, and public figures. However, perhaps the biggest victim of deepfakes is the notion of truth. Just as manipulated videos can be presented as authentic, genuine recordings may also, as a result, be falsely dismissed as high-quality deepfakes. As such, simply knowing that deepfakes exist can be enough to undermine our confidence in all media representations, and make us doubt the authenticity of everything we see and hear online.

While manipulated media is nothing new, deepfakes may be more difficult to detect than previous techniques. Furthermore, various features of the current technical, social and legal context may enhance the risks associated with the technology. For example, the widespread use of social media and private messaging applications allows for the rapid dissemination and amplification of content with limited oversight. Our social context may also play a role, as deepfakes are well aligned with a growing climate of mistrust and polarisation. The legal status of deepfakes may vary across jurisdictions and could be further complicated by the possibility for malicious users to evade detection and enforcement efforts. Deepfakes are not the sole or even primary source of these social, technological and legal concerns, but they develop synergies with other malevolent elements of this context, benefitting from the environment to prosper while contributing to its maintenance and development.

Anticipatory policy-making

Deepfakes are, in themselves, perfectly legal, although some malicious applications are not. Some risks of malicious deepfakes may be mitigated through technical and legal measures, such as ensuring that they are properly labelled as non-authentic. The European Parliament has called for mandatory labelling of deepfakes, and this does indeed feature in the draft text of the proposed artificial intelligence act. The draft digital services act sets out rules for flagging and removing illegal content, which could help to interrupt their circulation and amplification. Both are currently under negotiation. In terms of technology, the EU’s Horizon 2020 programme also supported the development of innovative responses to the challenges of deepfakes. Such technical and legal measures cannot respond to all risks of malicious deepfakes, and their effectiveness will likely depend upon the technical and legal measures that are introduced to enforce them. Of course, any limitations need to be balanced against freedom of expression and freedom of the arts and sciences. However, while we are free to create media products such as deepfakes, we are not automatically entitled to have them widely circulated and seen. It is important to consider how malicious deepfakes are circulated and amplified online, as well as their role within wider social and political trends, because these are key factors in determining their resonance and impact. In this context, the European Parliament has stressed the importance of media pluralism, quality journalism and awareness-raising.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if deepfakes made us doubt everything we see and hear?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to policy podcast ‘What if deepfakes made us doubt everything we see and hear?’ on YouTube.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

The departure of United States (US) and NATO troops from Afghanistan marks the end of a 20-year military campaign that was launched in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban’s ability to provide sanctuary to international terrorists, especially al-Qaeda, and stabilise the country with the help of a democratically elected government. However, as the last US soldier boarded a US military plane on 31 August 2021, terrorists were firing rockets at Kabul airport, members of the democratically elected government, including the president, had either fled abroad or where in hiding, and the Taliban were back in control over most of Afghanistan. The Taliban have yet to announce the nature and the full composition of their new government. In the meantime, the humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly desperate. The country relies extensively on foreign aid, most of which is currently suspended, while foreign assets have been frozen.

The Taliban
The predominantly ethnic Pashtun Taliban emerged as a political force in 1996, when they took control of the capital Kabul and changed the name of the country from the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. Their rule was characterised by the near-total exclusion of women from public life and strict application of Islamic law. In December 2001, the Taliban were ousted from government by a coalition of Afghan parties supported by the US. However, the Taliban insurgency against US and NATO forces continued. By some estimates, the Taliban command between 55 000 and 85 000 full-time fighters. The central government sought reconciliation with the Taliban, which the movement refused on the grounds that the US-backed government was ‘illegitimate’. Instead, the Taliban held talks with the US in 2018, culminating in a peace agreement in February 2020.

The US-Taliban Peace Agreement

In February 2020, the US signed a peace agreement with the Taliban. The essence of the agreement was the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan within 14 months of the agreement. In return, the Taliban committed to put in place guarantees and enforcement mechanisms to prevent the use of Afghan soil by any group or individual – including al-Qaeda – against the security of the US and its allies. Both sides also agreed to release combat and political prisoners. The US also committed to start diplomatic engagement with other members of the UN Security Council and Afghanistan to remove members of the Taliban from the UN sanctions list. The bilateral agreement, concluded without the Afghan government, also envisaged the launch of inter-Afghan talks, with the view to reaching a permanent and comprehensive ceasefire. For its part, the Afghan government committed to these talks by way of a joint declaration with the US. Intra-Afghan peace talks started in Doha in September 2020, but early hopes that these historic talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government would stabilise the country proved elusive. Instead, following the April 2021 announcement that the US would withdraw its forces from the country by September, the Taliban launched an offensive against the Afghan government. Minimal levels of resistance from government security forces allowed the Taliban to re-establish control over most of the country in the record time of four months. On 15 August 2021, as the Taliban entered Kabul ‘virtually unopposed‘, the Afghan president Ashraf Ghani fled abroad.

US and NATO troops – Presence and withdrawal

In 2011, US troops in Afghanistan peaked at around 100 000. At the end of 2018, then US President Donald Trump announced that the remaining US troops in Afghanistan, then numbering 14 000, would start to leave the country. On 13 April 2021, President Biden confirmed that all troops would leave by 11 September 2021. On 31 August 2021, the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan was completed. This brings to a close a 20-year military presence that is estimated to have cost the US more than US$2 trillion. For its part, NATO began withdrawing its Resolute Support Mission (RSM) on 1 May 2021. As recently as August 2020, the mission had around 10 000 personnel deployed in Afghanistan, from 36 NATO member states and partner countries. The RSM had been established at the invitation of the Afghan government, to help the Afghan security forces and institutions develop the capacity to defend the country. It superseded the earlier NATO led UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was deployed in August 2003. At its height, ISAF had more than 130 000 troops from 50 NATO and partner countries. NATO committed at its 2021 summit to continue ‘to stand with Afghanistan, its people, and its institutions’, and to continue to provide financial support to the Afghan security forces until 2024. However, following the Taliban takeover of the country, NATO has suspended all support to the Afghan authorities.

The security situation in Afghanistan

Afghanistan has been plagued by decades of violence; since 2010, the Global Peace Index has ranked Afghanistan consistently amongst the three least peaceful nations in the world. The 2020 US-Taliban peace agreement initially led to a decrease in violence affecting civilians, with civilian casualties in the first nine months of 2020 reaching the lowest number since 2012. However, the start of intra-Afghan peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban in September 2020 significantly raised levels of violence, as each side tried to gain leverage through the use of force. In the last quarter of 2020, civilian casualties increased by 45 % compared to the same period in 2019. Some of the worst attacks in Afghanistan (and Pakistan) in recent years, killing people at mosques, public squares and even hospitals, were attributed to adversaries of the Taliban, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), a regional affiliate of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/Da’esh). The group has claimed responsibility for the attacks outside Kabul airport on 26 August 2021 that killed an estimated 200 persons, including 13 US soldiers, and for a rocket attack targeting Kabul airport four days later. There are fears that the security situation could deteriorate further and that Afghanistan could once more become a safe haven for terrorists plotting attacks against the West. The Taliban released 5 000 ‘highest value‘ Taliban, al-Qaeda and Islamic State fighters that US and NATO forces had captured and interred at the former American base at Bagram. Resistance against the Taliban is concentrated in the Panjshir valley north of Kabul. Ahmad Masoud, the son of a famous Tajik tribal leader who fought the Taliban in the 1990s and was killed by al-Qaeda in 2001, has refused to surrender to the Taliban and is threatening to mount a rebellion. He has been joined by the ethnic Tajik former vice-president Amrullah Saleh.

The economic and humanitarian situation in Afghanistan

In 2020, violence in Afghanistan is estimated to have cost the country around 40 % of its gross domestic product (GDP), measured in terms of expenditure and economic effect related to ‘containing, preventing and dealing with the consequences of violence’. The economy mainly depends on aid; 90 % of the population lives below a poverty line of US$2 a day. With foreign countries and institutions largely withholding aid and monetary reserves following the Taliban victory, the country is facing economic collapse. The Covid-19 crisis has already impacted the economy heavily and real GDP is estimated to have contracted by around 1.9 % in 2020. Food prices soared with the onset of the pandemic and have only recently levelled off. Of a population of around 38 million, an estimated 4 million Afghans are internally displaced, including 1 million due to natural disasters, including climate-change related disasters such as extreme drought and flash floods. Escalating conflict over the past year has resulted in a further significant rise in the numbers being displaced. An additional 2.5 million Afghan refugees are registered in Iran and Pakistan. According to the World Food Programme, a combination of conflict, drought and the coronavirus pandemic means that up to 14 million Afghans may face starvation. Beyond the immediate humanitarian crisis, the Afghan economy’s reliance on the illegal drug trade is of great concern to the West, as well as other countries including Russia and China. The Taliban have called for foreign aid to help end impoverished communities’ reliance on opium cultivation.

Since 2002, the EU has provided more than €4 billion in development aid to Afghanistan, making the country the biggest recipient of EU aid in the world. At the 2020 Afghanistan Conference held in Geneva, the EU promised another €1.2 billion in financial aid to Afghanistan for the 2021-2025 period. However, at the time, EU support was made conditional upon an inclusive, Afghan-owned, Afghan-led peace process. Development cooperation has now been suspended. In light of the unfolding humanitarian crisis in the country, the European Commission announced that it would allocate more than €200 million in humanitarian aid to Afghanistan for 2021, more than tripling original aid amounts for this year. The EU has made it clear that cooperation with any future Afghan government will be conditioned on a peaceful and inclusive settlement and respect for the fundamental rights of all Afghans, including women, youth and persons belonging to minorities, as well as respect for Afghanistan’s international obligations, commitment to the fight against corruption and preventing the use of Afghanistan’s territory by terrorist organisation. On 10 June 2021, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation in Afghanistan, expressing concern about the consequences of the troop withdrawal. It also called for the adoption of a comprehensive strategy for future EU cooperation with Afghanistan.

Read the complete ‘at a glance’ on ‘Afghanistan once more under Taliban rule‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion in this category will cover the protection of human rights, rights of victims and children, combatting racism and religious discrimination as well as promoting justice and gender equality and the rights of the LGBTIQ+ communities and those with disabilities. At the same time, we will discuss how we can protects Europeans from acts of terrorism and crime and strengthen the rule of law in the European Union.

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Human Rights

Understanding EU action against human trafficking
Briefing by Piotr Bakowski and Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion
Briefing by Marie Lecerf, May 2021, 12 pages.

Women leading the fight against COVID-19
Thematic Digest, March 2021, 7 pages.

The impact of the coronavirus crisis on Roma and Travellers
‘At a glance’ note by Marie Lecerf, March 2021, 2 pages.

The principles of equality and non-discrimination, a comparative law perspective – United States of America
Study by EPRS Comparative Law Library, March 2021, 100 pages.

The coronavirus crisis: an emerging gender divide?
‘At a glance’ note by Marie Lecerf and Giulio Sabbati, March 2021, 2 pages.

EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination
Briefing by David de Groot, March 2021, 12 pages.

Combating Gender based Violence: Cyber Violence
Study by Meenakshi Fernandes, Niombo Lomba and Cecilia Navarra, March 2021, 242 pages.

Women in foreign affairs and international security: Still far from gender equality
Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, March 2021, 11 pages.

Covid-19: The need for a gendered response
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 12 pages.

Implementing the Anti-trafficking Directive
‘At a glance’ note by Sofija Voronova, February 2021, 1 page.

Women’s rights: 25-year review of the Beijing Platform for Action
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 2 pages.

Women in politics in the EU: State of play
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2021, 12 pages.

Achieving gender equality in the face of the pandemic and existing challenges
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, January 2021, 2 pages.

Violence against women in the EU: State of play
Briefing by Martina Prpic and Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 12 pages.

European gender equality strategy and binding pay transparency measures – Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission’s initiatives
Briefing by Claudio Collova and Laura Zandersone, November 2020, 12 pages.

The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union
Briefing by Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 12 pages.

The Istanbul Convention: A tool to tackle violence against women and girls
‘At a glance’ note by Ulla Jurviste and Rosamund Shreeves, November 2020, 2 pages.

Gender balance on company boards
‘At a glance’ note by Martina Prpic, September 2020, 1 page.

Women in local and regional government: Still a long way from achieving parity
Briefing by Vasileios Margaras, March 2020, 4 pages.

Women in films: Still fighting the celluloid ceiling
‘At a glance’ note by Ivana Katsarova, February 2020, 2 pages.

Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation
‘At a glance’ note by Rosamund Shreeves, February 2020, 2 pages.

Jewish communities in the European Union
‘At a glance’ note by Magdalena Pasikowska-Schnass, January 2020, 2 pages.

Children’s rights in the EU: Marking 30 years of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
Briefing by Ingeborg Odink, November 2019, 11 pages.

EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Human Rights
Briefing by Martina Prpic, Rosamund Shreeves and Ionel Zamfir, June 2019, 12 pages.

Gender Equality
Topical Digest, March 2019, 2 pages.

Rule of Law

Rule of Law
Thematic Digest by various EP contributors, November 2020, 6 pages.

Protecting EU common values within the Member States: An overview of monitoring, prevention and enforcement mechanisms at EU level
Study by Maria Diaz Crego, Rafal Manko and Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 163 pages.

Addressing violations of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
Briefing by Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 140 pages.

An EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights
Study by Cecilia Navarra and Wouter van Ballegooij, September 2020, 180 pages.

European added value of an EU mechanism on democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights – Preliminary assessment
Briefing by Wouter van Ballegooij, April 2020, 12 pages.

Security

Understanding EU counter-terrorism policy
Briefing by Piotr Bakowskiand Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action against human trafficking
Briefing by Piotr Bakowski and Sofija Voronova, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding EU action against migrant smuggling
Briefing by Katrien Luyten, January 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding the EU response to organised crime
Briefing by Katrien Luyten and Sofija Voronova, August 2020, 12 pages.

Victims of terrorism
‘At a glance’ note by Francois Theron, March 2019, 2 pages.

Written by Mar Negreiro.

As part of its digital decade strategy, the European Commission’s March 2021 communication puts forward its vision for new strategic digital objectives for 2030. These should prepare Europe for the roll-out of the next generation of broadband infrastructure with gigabit speeds, including 5G, as well as for the digital transformation of public and private sectors, to enable an array of new innovative services that should transform the manufacturing, energy, vehicle manufacturing, digital government services and health sectors.

Given its importance for European Union (EU) competitiveness, the European Commission is speeding up the digital transformation by co-financing research, development and deployment of innovative technologies in 2021‑2027, under the €7.5 billion digital Europe programme, the first EU programme fully dedicated to the EU’s digital transformation. Other EU programmes will also play a major role in funding digital infrastructure, including the Connecting Europe Facility and cohesion policy. Furthermore, at least 20 % of the EU Recovery and Resilience Facility funds received by each EU country should be dedicated to the digital transition.

There is some concern that not all consumers and businesses in Europe will benefit from the digital transformation, given the current and future digital divide between urban and rural areas and across EU countries. Given the current climate, the high level of investment needed to achieve the transformation might prove difficult to raise.

To measure progress towards the digital decade, the Commission is working on a digital compass method with indicators, which should be put forward for this task later in 2021. This would enable measurement of four dimensions (or ‘cardinal points’): improved digital skills, secure and sustainable digital infrastructures, digital transformation of businesses and of the public sector.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU digital decade: A new set of digital targets for 2030‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion on ‘Health’ will revolve around how we can secure vaccines and ensure availability of affordable medicines, treatments and medical equipment to fight coronavirus, but also around how countries can coordinate health services better in general: How can we protect ourselves in the event of a crisis? How can we improve European preventive care, treatment and aftercare for major diseases? How can we promote healthy lifestyles in general?

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

EU Covid-19 certificate: A tool to help restore the free movement of people across the European Union
Briefing by David Armand, Jacques Gera de Groot and Costica Dumbrava, May 2021, 12 pages.

What is the European Union doing to fight cancer?
Blogpost by EPRS AskEP unit, May 2021.

The rise of digital health technologies during the pandemic
Briefing by Maria Negreiro Achiaga, April 2021, 10 pages.

Alcohol labelling
Briefing by Tarja Laaninen, April 2021, 12 pages.

Building up resilience to cross-border health threats: Moving towards a European health union
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2021, 10 pages.

EU4Health programme
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2021, 10 pages.

Europe’s Beating Cancer plan: Quick overview and initial reactions
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, March 2021, 12 pages.

Covid-19 vaccination campaigns: The public dimension
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, January 2021, 12 pages.

Coronavirus testing: Contributing to efforts to stem the second wave
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, December 2020, 8 pages.

Next generation or lost generation? Children, young people and the pandemic
Briefing by Nora Milotay, December 2020, 12 pages.

Lifting coronavirus restrictions: The role of therapeutics, testing, and contact-tracing apps ‘In-Depth’ Analysis by Costica Dumbrava, July 2020, 36 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Nutrition labelling schemes used in Member States
Briefing by Tarja Laaninen, July 2020, 12 pages.

Cross-border regional healthcare cooperation to combat the coronavirus pandemic
‘At a glance’ note by Vasileios Margaras, June 2020, 2 pages.

Addressing shortages of medicines
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2020, 12 pages.

Organ donation and transplantation: Facts, figures and European Union action
Briefing by Nicole Scholz, April 2020, 12 pages.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

The Conference on the Future of Europe’s aim is to debate how the EU should develop in the future and to give European citizens a voice in the process, announced Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her inaugural address.

People’s ideas will be collected on the Digital Platform, in European Citizens’ Panels and de-centralised conference events all over Europe. The Conference Plenary – comprised of representatives of the Citizens’ Panels, the Parliament, the Council, the Commission, national parliaments, the Committee of the Regions, the European Economic and Social Committee, social partners and the European Youth Forum – will then discuss the ideas put forward. Launched in April 2021, the conference is expected to reach conclusions and provide guidance for the European institutions to follow up, by spring 2022.

The conference topics are divided into nine areas, with one additional ‘open’ area, reserved for out-of-the-box ideas. The topics are: ‘Climate change and the environment‘, ‘Health‘, ‘A stronger economy, social justice and jobs‘, ‘European Union in the world‘, ‘Values and rights, rule of law, security‘, ‘Digital transformation‘, ‘European democracy‘, ‘Migration‘, ‘Education, culture, youth and sport‘, and ‘Other ideas‘.

Discussion on ‘European Democracy’ will include topics such as ‘How can we strengthen the voices of European citizens in policy-making?’, ‘How can we fight extremism, disinformation and the perceived distance between people and their elected representatives?’, ‘What should the role of media be in this?’, and ‘How can we strengthen our European democracy in general?’

To support the proceedings of the conference, our EPRS policy analysts have prepared research material, available here in reverse chronological order. The following list will continually be updated as the conference unfolds:

Conference on the Future of Europe – EPRS Ideas Papers
Topical Digest by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 5 pages.

Conference on the Future of Europe
Topical Digest by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 4 pages.

Conference on the Future of Europe
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, May 2021, 12 pages.

Transnational electoral lists
Study by Maria Diaz Crego, February 2021, 62 pages.

The practice of democracy
Study by Gianluca Sgueo, June 2020, 64 pages.

Parliamentary hearings of the Commissioners-designate: An analysis of the portfolios of the von der Leyen Commission
Briefing by several EPRS authors, November 2019, 140 pages.

Parliament’s committees of inquiry and special committees
In-Depth Analysis by Eva-Maria Alexandrova Poptcheva, June 2016, 22 pages.
Available in German, English and French

The six policy priorities of the von der Leyen Commission: State of play in spring 2021
In-Depth Analysis by Etienne Bassot, May 2021, 22 pages.

The European Parliament’s appointing powers
Briefing by Micaela Del Monte, May 2021, 14 pages.

Understanding trilogue: Informal tripartite meetings to reach provisional agreement on legislative files
Briefing by Micaela Del Monte, May 2021, 12 pages.

Understanding the European Commission’s right to withdraw legislative proposals
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, March 2021, 12 pages.

Reform of the Comitology Regulation
Briefing by Rafal Manko, March 2021, 12 pages.

Passerelle clauses in the EU Treaties: Opportunities for more flexible supranational decision-making
Study by Silvia Kontanidis, December 2020, 80 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Unlocking the potential of the EU Treaties: An article-by-article analysis of the scope for action
Study by Etienne Bassot, May 2020, 140 pages.
Available in German, English and French

Parliament’s right of legislative initiative
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, February 2020, 12 pages.

Policy Podcast on Parliament’s right of legislative initiative

Rules on political groups in the EP
Briefing by Laura Tilindyte-Humburg, June 2019, 7 pages.
Available in Spanish, German, English, French, Italian, Polish

2019 European elections: National rules
Infographic ‘At a Glance’ note by Alina Dobreva, Giulio Sabbati and Gianluca Sgueo, April 2019, 2 pages
Available in German, English and French

Understanding the d’Hondt method: Allocation of parliamentary seats and leadership positions
Briefing by Silvia Kontanidis, June 2019, 8 pages

Understanding the d’Hondt method – EPRS policy podcast

Implementation of the Treaty provisions concerning enhanced cooperation
Study by Ivana Diendl Kristo, December 2018, 84 pages.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki.

The global innovation and technology landscape will evolve significantly in the next 20 years, and new and emerging technologies will drive changes in the character of warfare and the capabilities used on the battlefield. Understanding how the technological landscape evolves and what impact this will have on the future battlefield is key to formulating future-proof policies and investment decisions.

In this context, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA)commissioned RAND Europe to examine the challenges and opportunities related to new and emerging technologies expected to shape the 2040 battlefield, following a request from the Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE). The study presents implications stemming from consideration of individual technologies, as well as crosscutting analysis of their interactions with broader political, social, economic and environmental trends. In doing so, the study highlights a need for EU institutions and Member States to pursue a broad range of capability development initiatives in a coherent and coordinated manner, ensure the development of an agile regulatory and organisational environment, and guide investments in technologies most relevant to the European context.

This study investigates the implications of possible advances in six key technology clusters: (1) artificial intelligence, machine learning and big data; (2) advanced robotics and autonomous systems; (3) biotechnology; (4) technologies for the delivery of novel effect; (5) satellites and space-based technologies and assets; and (6) human-machine interfaces. It also identifies several crosscutting implications of new and emerging technologies for future battlefield dynamics and European defence.

One key conclusion of the study is that technological change alone is unlikely to result in fundamental shifts in future battlefield dynamics. Rather, it is the adaptation of military establishments and armed forces (including shifts in strategic mindsets and organisational culture), as well as wider socioeconomic and cultural factors that are likely to shape future trends in the uptake and adoption of new and emerging technologies on the future battlefield. The authors write that technological change, while pervasive, will not diminish the importance of human factors or significantly reduce the uncertainty and unpredictability of the nature of war. Emerging technologies, however, will continue to shape both conventional and unconventional warfare. This will require an equal focus on the impact of technologies on above- and sub-threshold activities, and will potentially blur the boundaries between the two.

To fully understand the future impacts of technological change, interactions among technological trends need to be considered. The extent and manner in which new and emerging technologies are used by European Union (EU) countries’ armed forces will also depend on how these and other technologies will be adopted by adversaries. Access to and control of data represents a key crosscutting enabler on the future battlefield, with new and emerging technologies also providing further opportunities for collecting, managing and analysing data to achieve superiority on the battlefield.

The ability of the EU and its Member States to effectively navigate an increasingly complex technology and innovation landscape represents a key enabler to achieve superiority on the battlefield. Divergences among EU countries, however, may exist with regard to access to new and emerging technologies, financial, cost-related barriers, and differing strategic mindsets. As such, national enablers and barriers may also shape individual adoption pathways for new and emerging technologies among the EU Member States.

This study presents three sets of policy options for EU institutions and Member States to consider in their ongoing effort to prepare for and shape this rapidly evolving landscape, focusing on capability development initiatives, regulatory and organisational environment, and on investment in research, development, technology and innovation (RDT&I).

policy options

• Pursue a broad range of capability development initiatives: Future technological developments may render existing capabilities obsolete and generate requirements for fostering and sustaining new skills, systems and approaches. Future technological developments may also result in a broader spectrum of sub-threshold activities. These will require initiatives to ensure cohesion within the EU and its societies and institutions, as well as its broader alliances and partnerships. Within this context, EU and Member State institutions should continue to pursue a broad range of capability development investments;
• Foster regulatory and organisational agility and absorption capacity: The evolving technology landscape suggests a need for EU institutions and Member State defence establishments to create an environment that is conducive to the effective and efficient harnessing of positive impacts of technological advances and to the mitigation of any vulnerabilities. As such, EU countries’ armed forces and their broader institutional and organisational frameworks should work to foster the capacity and agility required to respond to technological advances;
• Facilitate EU investments and RDT&I activities in relevant technologies by strengthening collaboration with industry: RDT&I in many new and emerging technologies are driven by private sector actors, often originating from outside the traditional defence industrial base. This presents increasing challenges to the EU, its Member States, and their institutions, to harness and adapt to technological advances – especially as these advances occur at a fast pace, are globally accessible, and fall outside their direct or exclusive control.

The STOA Options Brief linked to the study contains an overview of various policy options. Read the full report to find out more, and let us know what you think via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Philip Boucher.

Cutting-edge artificial intelligence (AI) techniques have enabled the production of highly realistic videos that manipulate how people look, and the things that they appear to say or do. These fabrications are commonly referred to as ‘deepfakes’. The Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) commissioned a study to examine deepfakes and to develop and assess a range of policy options focusing in particular upon the proposed AI (AIA) and digital services acts (DSA), as well as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).

The full study report sets out the key features of deepfake technologies, their technical, societal and regulatory context, and their impacts at individual, group and societal levels, before setting out a range of policy options targeting legislative files that are currently under debate at the European Parliament. These options are also presented in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Deepfakes can be used for a wide variety of purposes, with wide-ranging impacts. They can be put to good use in media production, human-machine interactions, video conferencing, satire, creativity and some novel medical applications such as voice creation. However, they also have substantial potential for misuse. The broad range of possible risks can be differentiated into three categories of harm: psychological, financial and societal. The impacts of a single deepfake are not limited to a single type or category of risk, but rather to a combination of cascading impacts at different levels. Since deepfakes tend to have a particular personal target, the impact often starts at this individual level. Yet they can cause harm to specific groups or organisations which can accumulate into widespread harms on the broad societal level. The infographic depicts three scenarios that illustrate the potential impacts of three types of deepfakes on the individual, group and societal levels: a falsified pornographic video; a manipulated sound clip given as evidence in court; and a false statement to influence a political process.

In the final stage of the study, the authors identified several policy options targeting different dimensions of deepfake technologies.

Technology: The technology dimension concerns the underlying technologies and tools that are used for generating deepfakes, and the actors that develop deepfake production systems. Policy options in the technology dimension are particularly relevant in the context of the proposed AIA, and include clarifying the obligations and prohibitions on deepfake technology providers, limiting their spread, developing systems to restrict their impact, and investing in education and awareness raising amongst IT professionals.

© Rathenau Instituut

Creation: While the technology dimension concerns the production of deepfake generation systems, the creation dimension concerns those that use such systems to produce deepfakes. Policy options here include clarifying how deepfakes should be labelled while limiting exceptions and banning certain applications. It also explores whether online anonymity could be limited for some practices, and highlights measures that harness diplomacy, international agreements and technology transfer.

Circulation: Policy options in the circulation dimension are particularly relevant in the context of the proposed DSA, which provides opportunities to limit the dissemination and circulation of deepfakes. They include measures concerning the detection of deepfakes, establishing labelling and take-down procedures, ensuing oversight of content moderation decisions, and slowing the circulation of deepfakes while increasing transparency.

Target: Malicious deepfakes can have severe impacts on targeted individuals, which may be more profound and long-lasting than for many traditional patterns of crime. Policy options in the target dimension include institutionalised support for victims of deepfakes, and addressing authentication and verification procedures for court evidence. Several options are connected with the GDPR, including guidelines on its GDPR application to deepfakes, strengthening the capacity of Data Protection Authorities, extending the scope of personal data protection to include voice and facial data, developing a unified approach for the proper use of personality rights and protecting the personal data of deceased persons.

Audience: Audience response is a key factor to the extent that deepfakes can transcend the individual level and have wider group or societal impacts. Policy options addressing these elements include establishing authentication systems, investing in media literacy, a pluralistic media landscape and high-quality journalism.

Finally, these options are complemented by some overarching institutional and organisational measures to support actions across all five of the dimensions discussed above. These include options to systematise and institutionalise the collection of information with regard to deepfakes to protect organisations against deepfake fraud and to help them identify weaknesses and share best practices.

The full set of policy options are set out in greater detail in the accompanying STOA Options Brief.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more. The study will be presented by its authors at a STOA Panel meeting this autumn.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.