European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Tania Lațici and Elena Lazarou.

© fotomaster / Fotolia

The promotion of global peace and security is a fundamental goal and central pillar of European Union (EU) external action, following the model of its own peace project. Both within and beyond the EU, there is a widespread expectation among citizens that the Union will deliver results in this crucial area. Nevertheless, as the deteriorating security environment of the past decade has posed significant challenges, the EU has been intensifying its work in pursuit of peace and security in a number of key policy areas.

According to the Global Peace Index, the state of peace in the world deteriorated further in 2020, owing not least to the coronavirus pandemic. In addition, multilateralism, a core element in the EU’s foreign policy and identity, and a cornerstone of its approach to peace and security, is under increasing pressure from alternative value systems and ideologies; a situation that has been exacerbated by the effects of the pandemic.

The coronavirus crisis has accelerated pre-existing trends, which were already signalling the advent of a more competitive international geopolitical environment, characterised by great-power rivalries and the weakening of multilateral security guarantees. In response to these trends, the European Commission under President Ursula von de Leyen, with the support of the European Parliament, has committed to empowering the EU’s external action. The fundamental goals remain those stipulated by the founding Treaties, including the achievement of peace.

The over-arching values and objectives of the EU guide all facets of its external action, including common foreign and security policy (CFSP); democracy support; development cooperation; economic, financial and technical cooperation; humanitarian aid; trade; and neighbourhood policy. While the promotion of peace remains the objective of EU foreign policy, achieving it is also linked to understanding peace and its components. Thus, measuring peace and the threats that challenge it is becoming an increasingly relevant exercise. In that context, the Normandy Index attempts to measure threats to peace based on variables identified in the EU Global Strategy. The EU Member States, supported by the European External Action Service (EEAS), conducted a comprehensive threat analysis in 2020, as part of the plans to develop an EU Strategic Compass. This has been ongoing in 2021 and is set to be finalised by March 2022.

The EU’s contribution to countering threats to peace, security and democracy globally has been growing significantly through legislation, financing and the creation of new structures and initiatives. A significant share of EU aid goes to fragile states and to issues related to securing peace. The EU’s ‘new consensus on development’ emphasises the role of development cooperation in preventing violent conflicts, mitigating their consequences and aiding recovery from them. On the ground, the EU has been able to strengthen the nexus between security, development and humanitarian aid through the implementation of comprehensive strategies, for example in the Horn of Africa and in the Sahel. Through the CSDP, the EU runs 17 missions and operations, making it one of the United Nation’s main partners in peacekeeping.

In 2020, the EU advanced its work on countering new threats to peace, such as disinformation, cyber-attacks and climate change. New elements strengthening EU security and defence capabilities are being implemented with the aim of boosting EU strategic autonomy, including its capacity to work for peace and security. These elements of ‘hard power’, together with the EU’s long-standing experience in the practice of soft power, form the backbone of its action for peace and security.

The EU also continues to be a staunch promoter of multilateralism on the global and regional levels to counter global threats, such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism and global health crises, including the economic and humanitarian consequences of the coronavirus pandemic across the world. A consistent focus in the EU’s work is on its neighbourhood, with the aim of building resilience and upholding peace and democracy, both challenged by the implications of the health crisis.

Looking to the future, the global environment is expected to grow in complexity, not least because of the long-term effects of the coronavirus pandemic. Threats such as cyber-attacks, disinformation and foreign influence campaigns are here to stay, and demand new types of responses that take into account their nuances. While the EU has made significant progress in furthering its aim of strengthening its presence and efficiency in the area of peace and security, more remains to be done. The 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) is focused on streamlining the EU’s various programmes and instruments to allow for sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen threats, while also implementing innovative financial instruments. Underlying the quest for flexibility, efficiency and innovation is the strategic goal of empowering the EU in its global role as a promoter of peace and security, while adapting to the new realities of the international order and the rapid technological, environmental and societal changes of our times. What constitutes peace and security in 2021 has become more multidimensional, dual, and civil-military in nature. The EU is therefore one of the best placed actors to ensure a comprehensive response by employing all its instruments strategically and coherently. Advancing towards increased strategic autonomy will depend on a harmonious blend of instruments and on increasing political and institutional capacity to act. A strategically autonomous EU will be invaluable in achieving the objective of a more peaceful, secure and prosperous world.

Read this study on ‘Peace and Security in 2021: Overview of EU action and outlook for the future‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

See also our animated infographic on Peace and Security. 

• Normandy Index, 2021
• Threats to peace and security in the current global environment

Written by Giulio Sabbati.

Asylum is a form of international protection given by a state on its territory to someone who is threatened by persecution on grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular group or political opinion in their country of origin or residence. This infographic provides an overview of the number of third-country nationals seeking asylum in EU Member States, their success in asylum procedures, and requests for transfers between Member States, as a consequence of the Dublin Regulation.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Asylum in the EU: Facts and Figures‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Resettled persons
• First instance decisions on asylum in the EU-27
• Final decisions on appeal or review
• Dublin statistics on the country responsible for the asylum application
• Asylum applicants considered to be unaccompanied minors
• Asylum applicants in the EU-27
• Asylum applicants in the EU-27
• Asylum applicants in the EU-27
• Age and gender of asylum applicants

Written by Rafał Mańko (1st edition).

© everythingpossible / Adobe Stock

The e-CODEX system is the digital backbone of EU judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters. e-CODEX comprises a package of software products that allow the setting up of a network of access points for secure digital communication between courts and between citizens and the courts, while also enabling the secure exchange of judicial documents. The project, which was launched in 2010 with EU grant funding, is managed by a consortium of Member States and other organisations and is coordinated by the Ministry of Justice of the German Land of North Rhine-Westphalia. Even though it is currently used by 21 Member States, e-CODEX lacks a clear, uniform and EU-wide legal basis. To remedy this situation, on 2 December 2020 the Commission put forward a proposal for an e-CODEX legal instrument (a regulation) to formally establish the e-CODEX system at EU level. The management of the project would be entrusted to eu-LISA (the EU Agency for the Operational Management of Large-Scale IT Systems in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice). Within the European Parliament, the LIBE and JURI committees are jointly in charge of the file, and the draft report is expected shortly.

Versions

• Computerised system for communication in cross-border judicial proceedings (e-CODEX) (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a computerised system for communication in cross-border civil and criminal proceedings (e-CODEX system), and amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) and Legal Affairs (JURI) (jointly under Rule 58) COM(2020) 712 02.12.2020 Rapporteur:

Nuno Melo (EPP, Portugal); Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria)

2020/0345(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Franco Roberti, Isabel Santos (S&D); Ramona Strugariu, Adrián Vázquez Lázara (Renew); Gwendoline Delbos-Corfield, Sergey Lagodinsky (Greens/EFA); Angel Dzhambazki, Cristian Terheş (ECR); Clare Daly, Emmanuel Maurel (The Left) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Kristina Grosek.

Adobe Stock

The International Labour Organization (ILO) introduced the World Day Against Child Labour in 2002, as part of their efforts to eradicate this unacceptable phenomenon. The day is observed annually on 12 June, and this year the focus is on the 2021 International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour. It is also an opportunity to consider measures taken at international and EU level.

Child Labour

The UN defines child labour as work performed by children who are under the minimum age legally specified for that kind of work, or work that, because of its detrimental nature or conditions, is considered unacceptable for children and is prohibited. Not all work performed by children should be considered child labour. Forms of work that are beneficial to a child’s personal and social development, that do not interfere with schooling and childhood, but rather provide useful experience and skillsets should be encouraged.

Worst forms of child labour. The biggest concern within the scope of child labour, according to ILO Convention No 182, these forms of labour are prohibited for any person below the age of 18 and must be eliminated as a matter of urgency. They include all forms of slavery or practices similar to slavery; involvement of children in commercial sexual exploitation; involvement of children in illicit activities; and work which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety or morals of children (Article 3).

Global trends. There has been a significant decline in the number of children between the ages of 5 and 17 involved in child labour, from an estimated 246 million children worldwide in 2000, but the pace slowed considerably from 2012 to 2016 and in the past four years, the number increased by 8.4 million. According to latest global estimates, a total of 160 million children were engaged in child labour in early 2020, and nearly half of them (79 million) carry out hazardous work, endangering their health, safety and moral development. The Covid‑19 crisis is likely to cause a substantial rise in child labour, with 8.9 million more children predicted in child labour by the end of 2022. Over half of all child labour is in Sub-Saharan Africa, the region with the highest rate of child labour, with 24 % of children employed as child labourers, a total of nearly 87 million. Next is Asia and the Pacific, where although a steady decline has been seen since 2008, 48.7 million children remain in child labour. Globally, the largest number of child labourers (71 %) are in the agricultural sector. Although the phenomenon is more commonly associated with non-EU countries, and reliable data are lacking, there is evidence that child labour also persists in the EU and Europe.

Root causes. It is believed that child labour is commonly driven by family and community poverty, paired with lack of access to decent work for adults and youth (income insecurity, inadequate wages), weak social protection and lack of free, quality, public education and other public services.

Future goals. The ILO’s initial goal was to eliminate the worst forms of child labour by 2016. However, despite its efforts, supported by countries all over the world, and notable progress, the goal has still to be achieved. The United Nations Sustainable Development Goals, and Goal 8 in particular, set the target of eliminating all forms of child labour by 2025. To meet this, according to the latest projections, progress needs to be 18 times faster than in the past 20 years. Immediate action is required to reduce the negative impact of the Covid‑19 crisis on child labour. The risk of child labour in growing crises, conflicts, and disasters should be addressed. Social protection needs to be universal, and children’s education safeguarded and advanced. It is important to address the risk of child labour in both domestic and global supply chains.

Act now: End child labour! This year’s Day Against Child Labour is the first since universal ratification of ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of child labour. It is also the International Year for the Elimination of Child Labour, declared by the UN General Assembly in July 2019. The ILO is responsible for its implementation, and all member states and stakeholders are invited to raise awareness of the importance of eradicating child labour, working towards the goal of eliminating it by 2025. A week of action runs from 10 to 17 June 2021, starting with the publication of the new global estimates on child labour (2016‑2020).

International legal framework for combating child labour

The ILO has been committed to the abolition of child labour as one of its main goals since 1919, playing a crucial role in raising awareness of the importance of eliminating child labour, as well as in establishing recognised standards. Three international conventions establish the legal framework for national action against child labour. ILO Convention No 138 on the minimum age for admission to employment and work, adopted in 1973, has been ratified by 173 countries, including all European Union (EU) Member States. This crucial document lays down standards for the minimum age for employment, calling on the parties to set the minimum age at 15 years (Article 2(3)), or at least 18 for hazardous work (Article 3(1)). It also emphasises the importance of taking all necessary steps to ensure the effective abolition of child labour. ILO Convention No 182 on the worst forms of child labour, adopted in 1999, has been ratified by 187 countries, including all EU Member States, and is known for being the fastest ratification in the history of the ILO. It calls on members to ensure immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour as a matter of urgency (Article 1). The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) adopted in 1989, has been ratified by 196 countries, including all EU Member States. In the framework of prohibiting child labour, the CRC confers upon children the right to protection from economic exploitation, as well as from performing any work likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harmful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development (Article 32). Although it does not specify a minimum age for employment, it urges parties to stipulate one, as well as to regulate hours and conditions of employment, and provide penalties and sanctions.

EU action to combat child labour

The EU’s strong commitment to eliminating child labour is reflected in Article 32 of the 2012 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU (CFR), which prohibits the employment of children and stipulates that the minimum age of employment may not be lower than the minimum school-leaving age. The main legal instrument prohibiting child labour in the EU is Council Directive 94/33/EC. It allows Member States to set the minimum age for employment below the minimum school-leaving age only exceptionally, in Article 4(2). Transposition of the directive into national law was uneventful, as most Member States already had legislation providing for the prohibition of child labour. There is also an external dimension to the fight against child labour, and to the EU’s full commitment to its eradication. Building upon a document from 2010, the Commission staff working document, Trade and Worst Forms of Child Labour, SWD(2013) 173 provides the framework for understanding the complexity of the issue, emphasising the link between trade and child labour, and pointing out the positive impact of economic growth on the elimination of the worst forms of child labour. More recently, a Commission staff working document, SWD(2017) 147, addresses child labour in the context of promoting sustainable garment value chains through EU development action. In its recent communication on the EU Strategy on the Rights of the Child, the Commission confirms its strong commitment to elimination of child labour and the ‘zero tolerance’ approach already announced in the Commission’s political guidelines. The Council of the EU has also reaffirmed its strong commitment to eliminating child labour, particularly its worst forms, and stressed the importance of eradicating the recruitment and use of children in armed conflict, including child soldiers.

The European Parliament has condemned child labour and its various forms within and outside the EU in a number of resolutions, and called for measures that would facilitate its elimination. For example, in 2010, Parliament called for all future trade agreements to provide for a ban on the exploitation of child labour. Subsequent resolutions, on the EC-Uzbekistan Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (2011) and on child labour in the cocoa sector (2012) repeated that call, with specific reference to forced child labour, while the 2013 resolution on the global cotton value chain referred to a traceability mechanism for goods produced through child or forced labour. A Parliament resolution on the EU flagship initiative on the garment sector (2017) calls on the Commission to propose binding legislation on due diligence obligations for supply chains in the sector, including standards for the elimination of forced and child labour. More recently, in its resolution on children’s rights in view of the EU strategy on the rights of the child (March 2021), Parliament calls on the Commission and Member States to end, in law and in practice, all child labour and all other forms of work likely to harm children’s health and safety. It also calls on the Commission to embed children’s rights in the upcoming EU sustainable governance framework, and recommends adopting cross-sectoral mandatory due diligence and ensuring that all EU policies are child-friendly.

Read this at a glance note on ‘World Day Against Child Labour‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP/DAINA LE LARDIC

The June I 2021 plenary session took place in Strasbourg once more (although still in hybrid form), some 15 months after the previous session was held there, with coronavirus-containment measures restricting the Parliament’s activity throughout that period. A number of important debates took place, including on European Council and European Commission statements on the conclusions of the special meeting of the European Council on 24 and 25 May 2021, and on preparation for the G7 and EU-US Summits. Members also debated the state of play on implementation of the Own Resources roadmap and Parliament’s scrutiny of the Commission and Council assessments of the national recovery and resilience plans. Debates were also held on the rule of law situation in the European Union, including the application of the conditionality regulation. Members discussed the follow-up to the Porto Social Summit, as well as the situation of women in politics. Debate was held on systematic repression in Belarus and its consequences for European security in the light of Belarus’ interception of a civilian plane. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, Josep Borrell, made statements on the situation in Afghanistan and in Cuba. Parliament also voted on the proposed EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, and on amendments to information systems required for operation of the European Travel Information and Authorisation System. In a formal ceremony, Parliament awarded the annual Lux Audience Award to a Romanian documentary, Collective, directed by Alexander Nanau.

EU Digital Covid Certificates

Members approved by an overwhelming majority the proposed EU Digital Covid Certificate for EU nationals as well as the parallel proposal covering third-country nationals. Parliament agreed to an accelerated procedure to consider these proposals. The co-legislators agreed on a compromise on the certificate proposal, now named the ‘EU Digital Covid Certificate’, and the system should be in operation by 1 July 2021. Parliament has ensured that the testing required is more affordable and accessible, through the allocation of around €100 million for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests. If necessary, EU countries may still impose duly justified additional restrictions with 48 hours advance notice. The second proposal covers travel for third-country nationals within the EU.

European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) 2021-2027

The European Parliament approved the interinstitutional (trilogue) agreement on the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) 2021‑2027 (without a vote) at early second reading. The ESF+ budget for social inclusion is greatly needed to provide resources to improve youth employability and equal opportunities for children at risk of poverty in light of the coronavirus pandemic. The compromise reached between the co-legislators after some disagreement allocates an €88 billion EU budget for employment, education and social inclusion measures (almost 8 % less than under the previous multiannual financial framework, MFF).

Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 2021‑2027 – Global Europe

Members endorsed, at second reading, the final text agreed between the Parliament and Council on the regulation establishing the new single financing instrument Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 2021‑2027 (NDICI, also known as Global Europe) in the 2021‑2027 EU budget. As agreed, the proposal allocates €70.8 billion (in 2018 prices) under the 2021‑2027 MFF and brings together the 10 previous funds for external action along with the European Development Fund. The agreement enhances Parliament’s oversight of the strategic direction of the funding, including ending assistance to countries that do not respect democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

Establishing the instrument for financial support for customs control equipment

Parliament formally adopted (without a vote) an early second-reading agreement on establishing the instrument for financial support for customs control equipment. The instrument will be used to purchase, maintain and upgrade detection equipment for customs controls at external EU borders. Parliament has succeeded in amending the proposal to ensure the equipment has optimal cybersecurity and safety standards. The regulation now takes effect retroactively, as of 1 January 2021.

EU Ombudsman’s status

Following 2019 proposals to update the EU Ombudsman’s Statute, to align it with the Lisbon Treaty and strengthen the role of this guardian of institutional accountability and transparency, Members debated a new European Parliament regulation governing the Ombudsman’s duties, in the presence of Emily O’Reilly, the current European Ombudsman. Members adopted a resolution based on the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee’s report, to which is annexed an amended text for the European Ombudsman’s statute. This new text follows informal consultations with the Council, which had indicated it would be in a position to give consent to the regulation. Once formally received, the Parliament will vote on final adoption of the new statute.

State of the SMEs Union

Over 60 % of European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 100 million people, have reported a fall in turnover in 2020. In a joint debate on the State of the SMEs Union, Members called on the European Commission to take action to reduce barriers and red tape for SMEs. Parliament had requested that the European Commission set ambitious targets for the reduction of the administrative burden on SMEs by June of this year, and would also like to see better assessment of the costs and benefits for SMEs of proposed EU legislation in future.

Cyber-attacks in the EU

Members heard Council and Commission statements on recent cyber-attacks on EU and national public and private institutions, particularly in light of the EU digitalisation agenda, as part of a joint debate, including an oral question on the future EU cybersecurity strategy. The 230 000 daily new malware infections detected by the ENISA cybersecurity agency between January 2019 and April 2020, give an idea of the scale of the issue. Members also adopted a resolution on the EU’s cybersecurity strategy for the digital decade.

European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the cage age’

With nearly 1.4 million signatures, the European citizens’ initiative, ‘End the cage age‘ has gained sufficient support to oblige the European Commission to propose legislation to ban the use of the remaining cages, farrowing crates, stalls and pens still authorised in the EU for a range of livestock. Members debated and adopted a resolution, based on an Agriculture & Rural Development (AGRI) report, proposing to phase out cages in farming, possibly by 2027.

Parliament’s right of inquiry

In 2012, Parliament proposed to revise the regulation of its right of inquiry, whereby a majority in Parliament may set up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law. Although the Parliament has the right of initiative, adoption of the regulation is subject to a special legislative procedure requiring Council and Commission consent, which has not been forthcoming to date. Seeking to break the deadlock on strengthening Parliament’s right of inquiry, the Constitutional Affairs (AFCO) Committee sought assurance from both the Commission and the Council that they will engage in good-faith political dialogue with the Parliament to reach agreement. While both Council and Commission representatives claimed to be ready to cooperate with Parliament on this file, both underlined that they could not agree to the text unless Parliament changed several aspects.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed the mandate for negotiations by the Regional Development (REGI) Committee on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Brexit Adjustment Reserve.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – June I 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Clare Ferguson, Tania Latici, Matthew Parry and Ionel Zamfir.

President Biden

Expectations are at an all-time high in Europe for a re-set in transatlantic relations in advance of the EU-US Summit scheduled for 15 June. With President Biden personally attending the summit, as well as both the preceding G7 Summit and the NATO leaders’ meeting, EU leaders will be keen to make the most of the opportunity for face-to-face diplomacy, with a view to repairing relations that have negatively impacted cooperation on trade, the fight against climate change and even the defence of democracy itself.

US Foreign policy

Eager to shore up US democratic institutions, President Biden has promised to pursue a ‘foreign policy for the middle class’, and insisted that American citizens’ future prosperity can be maximised through intensified international cooperation. The Biden Administration’s emerging foreign policy priorities therefore focus on ‘building back better’ on a global scale, in pursuit of the same imperative at home, while working with allies to counter authoritarian threats to US interests. Early moves to re-enter the Paris Agreement and to re-affirm the importance of the transatlantic partnership confirm that this administration is taking a different transatlantic tack. However, some trade policy issues remain contentious. A joint approach towards China is expected to be on the summit agenda, but some divergence still exists in that area.

G7 Summit

President Biden’s first European appointment is at the 47th G7 Summit, which will take place on 11‑13 June, after a one year break due the coronavirus pandemic (the 46th Summit did not take place). There, he might be expected to follow-up on his agenda to reassert democratic values. With a reputation as an informal framework of cooperation on major global issues, the G7 Summit this year is likely to uncover the depth of the shared commitment to the fundamental values of liberal democracy in the face of authoritarianism, and the strength of cooperation in tackling Covid‑19. To ensure more equitable and rapid access to vaccines and other medical supplies for developing countries, the US has supported a proposal to waive patent rights for the production of vaccines. However, the EU insists on using existing flexibilities and on expanding production capacities, particularly in Africa. It remains to be seen whether G7 leaders will find common ground on how to improve access to vaccines for developing countries. Likewise, the global corporate tax proposed by the USA and agreed by the G7 finance ministers is likely to be a priority subject for discussion. While it could represent a historical change in the international taxation system in pursuit of greater fairness, the commitment is yet to be tested at the implementation level. Regulation of digital developments is also expected to figure in the discussions. Climate change commitments under the Paris Agreement are naturally another priority, following President Biden’s April 2021 virtual climate summit, which announced an updated US target, new initiatives to help developing countries decarbonise, and prompted several other countries to update their targets. While the US return to positive climate action is welcome, questions remain regarding their feasibility.

See also our Topical Digest with selected publications on EU Transatlantic Relations

NATO leaders’ meeting

Recent turbulence in the international order has also led to a strategic reflection on the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO). In parallel, the EU is carrying out its own deliberation on the scope of its security and defence policy, known as the ‘Strategic Compass’. Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has provided a forward-looking agenda for the leaders’ meeting on 14 June 2021, inspired by the ‘NATO 2030’ process, which is intended to reinforce the ‘unity between Europe and North America’, to broaden ‘NATO’s approach to security’, and to safeguard rules-based multilateralism. While presenting certain risks, the decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan, where NATO troops have been deployed since 2001, is certain to be on the leaders’ table. With the recent hijacking perpetrated by Belarus fresh in leaders’ minds, the seemingly perpetual tensions with Russia and reinforcing the Eastern flank, in advance of President Biden’s forthcoming meeting with President Putin, are also expected to be discussed. In the same vein, NATO Allies are likely to balance the opportunities to cooperate with China on economic and climate matters with its build-up of its defence capabilities and its stance on human rights. A debate on a renewed EU‑NATO cooperation is expected during European Parliament’s plenary on 5 July 2021.

Trade

Transatlantic relations have been rather difficult for some time, particularly in the context of the World Trade Organization Appellate Body crisis. Thus far, President Biden’s position on international trade shows some overlap with that of previous administrations. It is highly likely that both G7 and EU leaders will engage with President Biden on these issues during his time on European soil, not least because so many of his administration’s other priorities, on corporate tax, Big Tech and climate change, depend on good trading relations.

Nevertheless, the Biden Administration’s foreign policy moves to date augur well for a move to a more positive and dynamic transatlantic relationship in the years to come, and there are signs of transatlantic alignment on major trade files.

G7 members: Population and nominal GDP per country in 2021

Български (jpg | pdf) – Español (jpg | pdf) – Čeština (jpg | pdf) – Dansk (jpg | pdf) – Deutsch (jpg | pdf) – Eesti Keel (jpg | pdf) – Ελληνικά (jpg | pdf) – English (jpg | pdf) – Français (jpg | pdf) – Gaeilge (jpg | pdf) – Hrvatski (jpg | pdf) – Italiano (jpg | pdf) – Lietuvių Kalba (jpg | pdf) – Magyar (jpg | pdf) – Malti (jpg | pdf) – Nederlands (jpg | pdf) – Polski (jpg | pdf) – Português (jpg | pdf) – Română (jpg | pdf) – Slovenčina (jpg | pdf) – Slovenščina (jpg | pdf) – Svenska (jpg | pdf)

Graphic taken from the EPRS Briefing ‘G7 summit, June 2021: Asserting democratic values in the post-crisis context‘.

Written by Tania Latici (lead author).

© Premium Collection, Nicola, wetzkaz, Alx, W.Scott McGill, david hughes / Adobe Stock.

The transatlantic relationship has been witnessing a significant injection of renewed enthusiasm and policy activity since Joe Biden became President of the United States in January 2021. This paper focuses on three important issues on the rapidly evolving transatlantic policy agenda, exploring their potential for generating, in effect, new ‘common global goods’ during the Biden presidency. First, it looks at pathways towards developing some kind of ‘transatlantic green deal’, taking climate action, trade and climate diplomacy in the round. Second, it analyses the comparative fabrics of US and European societies through the triple lens of violent extremism, the rule of law and technological disruption. Third, the prospects for ‘crisis-proofing’ the transatlantic space for the future are examined by looking at defence, health security and multilateralism. The paper also explores some potential avenues for closer transatlantic parliamentary cooperation, building on the already strong relationship between the European Parliament and the US Congress.

Momentum for restoring transatlantic relations

Like-minded strategic partners, natural and historical allies or an Atlantic bridge are among the terms used to describe the complex relationship between the European Union (EU) and the United States of America (USA). The evolution of EU-US relations has been subject to innumerable analyses, not least since the election of former US President Donald Trump in 2016. The arrival of a new, pro-transatlantic US administration, with Joe Biden displacing Donald Trump in the 2020 presidential election, has injected significant new enthusiasm into the relationship – matched only by pressure to deliver lasting change amid the deep geopolitical uncertainty left in President Trump’s wake.

Polling data from late 2020 show that across 11 EU countries, 57 % of respondents consider that President Joe Biden’s administration is a positive development for the EU. The same poll however reveals a significant ‘trust deficit’ among European countries towards the USA while another one from June 2021 illustrates that almost half of Europeans (from the eight countries polled) no longer think that the USA is the most influential global leader. About two-thirds of Americans believe that alliances with Europe are beneficial to them, while some 70 % believe that the USA should cooperate more with allies to tackle global problems. Although the transatlantic relationship has travelled several bumpy roads over the years, it has endured. Recent economic and geopolitical shifts led to a focus on resilience ‘at home’ and to a reshuffle of strategic priorities – the Indo-Pacific on the US side, beginning during the Obama administrations, and boosting strategic autonomy on the European side – which will influence the terms of a renewed relationship.

The EU and USA ‘share more with each other politically, socially, legally and culturally’ than either share with almost any other power.[4] Nevertheless, as polling data indicate, this should not be taken for granted. Instead, shared transatlantic values should be channelled through concrete policy action to generate alignment where interests converge and functional diplomacy where they diverge. The expectation is not a return to a status quo ante, but rather of a fresh start through a recalibrated relationship that can respond to the challenges of this decade and the next. The coronavirus crisis has underlined our interdependence and potential as a global force for good. This is the aim of an agenda to revitalise the transatlantic alliance.

Read this complete in-depth analysis on ‘Harnessing the new momentum in transatlantic relations: Potential areas for common action during the Biden presidency‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Costs of extreme weather events
• EU, US and Chinese CO2 emissions: Production v consumption
• Historical and projected total GHG emissions according to NDCs
• Rule of law index in the USA and EU
• People who feel that using violence for political goals is justifiable, US 2017 2020
• Important links and actors in the digital world
• Common areas of transatlantic interest in security and defence
• Health infrastructure in the US and EU
• EU-US cooperation for renewed multilateral engagement

Written by Frederik Scholaert.

© shaunwilkinson / Adobe Stock

Marine resources are a vital and growing source of food for human consumption, while oceans also play an important role in climate regulation. Scientific evidence shows that the climate system has changed rapidly in recent decades, with the oceans greatly mitigating the effects of climate change by absorbing excess heat and human-made carbon emissions. The velocity of the effects of climate change leaves little room for adaptation, causing both declines in abundance and geographic shifts in fish populations. As a result, people who rely heavily on seafood and fisheries for their livelihoods run the risk of income loss and food insecurity.

The European Green Deal places climate action at the heart of a wide range of new legislative and non-legislative initiatives and includes ambitious goals such as achieving climate-neutrality by 2050 and preserving and protecting biodiversity. The new ‘farm to fork’ strategy addresses the challenges of sustainability in the food supply chain and, in the area of seafood, highlights the imminent update of the strategic guidelines on aquaculture, the goal to support the algae industry and the focus on climate change in the 2022 common fisheries policy review. In its biodiversity strategy, the Commission proposes a new binding target of 30 % marine protected areas in EU waters by 2030, a target supported by Parliament.

A reduction in fishing pressure could also offset the environmental impacts of climate change. The last reform of the common fisheries policy marked an important milestone by requiring fish stocks to be restored and maintained above levels capable of producing the maximum sustainable yield. An own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries focuses specifically on the impact of rising seawater temperatures on fish stocks and fisheries. The oceans can be harnessed to help to close the emissions gap however, by unlocking their renewable offshore energy potential. In its offshore renewable energy strategy, the Commission aims to reach a deployment of 300 GW in offshore wind capacity by 2050, a 20-fold increase compared to today. Another own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committee on Fisheries looks into the impact on the fishing sector of offshore wind and other renewable energy systems.

Cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind energy worldwide

Cumulative installed capacity of offshore wind energy worldwide

Български – Español – Čeština – Dansk – Deutsch – Eesti keel – Ελληνικά – English – Français – Hrvatski – Italiano – Latviešu valoda – Lietuvių kalba – Magyar – Malti – Nederlands – Polski – Português – Română – Slovenčina – Slovenščina – Suomi – Svenska

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU climate action in ocean governance and fisheries policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Branislav STANICEK.

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) held a round table on the new Roma strategy for equality, inclusion and participation on 1 June 2021.This event was part of the regular EPRS policy series, and was a follow-up to the seminar held last year with Vice-President Lívia Járóka (NI, Hungary) who is responsible for the Western Balkans and a member of the High-Level Group on Gender Equality and Diversity. The event marked the 15th anniversary of the adoption of Lívia Járóka’s report entitled Situation of Roma women in the European Union (adopted 1 June 2006).

In his welcome speech, Director of the EPRS Members’ Research Service Etienne Bassot recalled that the EU Roma Strategic Framework for Equality, Inclusion and Participation was adopted by the European Commission on 7 October 2020. The new Roma strategy was endorsed not only by the European Union but also by all Western Balkan countries at the ministerial meeting in Tirana, Albania on 27 October 2020. The ministerial meeting was a follow-up to the 2019 Poznan meeting and declaration on Roma integration in the EU enlargement process.  

The new Roma strategy proposes seven qualitative and quantitative targets for 2030. Three of these objectives are horizontal in the areas of equality, inclusion and participation. The other four are sectoral objectives in the areas of education, employment, housing and health. The European Commission requires the Fundamental Rights Agency to conduct surveys and assess the situation, both in the EU and Balkan countries. In 2021, the survey will be extended to Serbia and North Macedonia.

Vice-President Lívia Járóka, the first Roma ever elected to the European Parliament, stated in her keynote speech that human rights and inclusion for all citizens should remain a cross-cutting priority both for the European Union and Western Balkan countries. Roma participation in some countries remains fragile, and the situation was aggravated during the Covid‑19 pandemic. She also recalled the important role played by the Roma in European culture and emphasised the need for increased Roma political participation, in particular by Roma women. Alongside increased political participation, better and positive media coverage would be highly beneficial.

Sónia Pereira, Portugal’s High Commissioner for Migration responsible for the Roma communities integration strategy and President of the Management Board of the High Commission for Migration, presented the views of the Portuguese Presidency to the European Council. She reviewed the successful adoption of the strategic framework in March 2021, as well as the Portuguese Presidency conference ‘Working together for Roma rights’ held in April 2021. Roma rights are a cornerstone of social rights, and the combat against hate speech and anti-gypsiysm should be taken up by all citizens. Finally, she stressed that the new framework should be implemented in line with multilevel governance, together with regions and cities, respecting the subsidiarity principle.

Marta Garcia Fidalgo, advisor for the coordination of Roma policies and Equality Coordinator at the European Commission (DG NEAR), presented the Roma situation in the Western Balkans accession countries. She noted that, considering that the Roma’s status in the Western Balkans has hardly improved in the last 20 years, despite considerable financial investment by the EU, the new strategic framework is important to Roma equality and participation. The Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) includes the financing of Roma inclusion projects. It is important that references to Roma employment and social inclusion be retained in the new Investment Plan for the Western Balkans adopted last October.

Beata Bislim Olahova, advisor on Roma and Sinti issues at the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), and the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (OSCE), presented the social and economic situation of the Roma, as well as their political participation within the OSCE countries. The European Commission recognises that the high NEET rate (not in employment, education or training) among Roma in the EU is a problem. The Commission therefore set an objective to cut the gap in the NEET rate by at least half. Currently the NEET rate among Roma in the EU is 62 %, compared to 10 % among the general population.

Some Roma face double difficulties as they live in poor regions and disadvantaged communities. Marja Eronen, chief coordinator of the International Romani Union in Finland, described the social challenges that the Roma population is facing in Europe. Low schooling rates and frequent premature school leaving, crowded housing and insufficient health care are among the main challenges. Participation in the labour market and social inclusion are fundamental for improving the living conditions of Roma in Europe. She also described the role of the Roma ombudsman in Finland.

Finally, Branislav Stanicek, policy analyst for the External Policies Unit at the EPRS, spoke about the need for accurate data on the Roma population for better policy-making. He pointed to some successful projects, such as the Atlas of Roma Communities, initiated by Iveta Radičová, former Prime Minister of Slovakia, and currently being developed by Ábel Ravasz, former governmental envoy for Roma communities in Slovakia. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe might also better share their best practices with the accession countries of the Western Balkans. Finally, he noted the fact that Roma rights are placed within the first negotiations policy cluster of ‘fundamentals’, establishing the central role of this policy for EU accession of the Balkan countries.

The new EU Roma Strategic Framework: Towards equality, inclusion and participation

Written by Eszter Fay.

©Viperagp/Adobestock

Fake news? Disinformation? Misinformation?

Misinformation is always troubling, not least in science. Scientists feel distress when public understanding diverges from facts. Intentional disinformation (fake news) is not, however, the only source of misinformation. Citizens living in modern democratic societies frequently face the dilemma of whether to consider true or false – and accept or reject – information they receive concerning climate change, vaccinations, genetically modified agricultural products, nanotechnology, artificial intelligence, or Covid‑19.

Misinformation is not new – but the information ecosystem within which it is now spreading is. The public sphere has evolved into a completely new phase, where information filtering mechanisms are often ineffective. The producers of messages disseminated through social media can broadcast news unchecked by any scientific or editorial authority. We have entered a world of public communication where facts play a limited role in substantiating the content of the statements.

Political misinformation and disinformation have always existed. What is different today is that contemporary lies by populist actors often have no apparent purpose, but create a climate of shocks and chaos. Although misinformation is a topical issue, there is little consensus concerning the different types of misinformation, however. McCright and Dunlap[1] have recognised the need to differentiate between types of misinformation in order to know how to deal with them. Yet, their types – ‘truthiness, bullshit, systemic lies, and shock-and-chaos’ – are mostly connected with political misinformation and disinformation.

Disinformation is a hot topic today and is of course a global phenomenon, but may also have a correlation with how new and older democratic societies present and teach scientific achievements and innovation in their education systems. The topic of fake news has been extensively studied in political science, but surprisingly enough, no study has dealt with fake science news. As mentioned above, misinformation that contains intentionally false information is known as disinformation, and fake science news usually falls into this category.

Part of the mission of the European Science-Media Hub (ESMH), operating under the political responsibility of the EP’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), is to identify and disseminate trustworthy information sources in the field of science. During a health emergency, it is essential to explore how science information circulates and how people get their news and knowledge about science and new technology. In this context, the ESMH supported a project to conduct a survey examining the spread of disinformation among young people in some countries of Central Europe and in Italy, to explore the public understanding of scientific topics and address the damaging impact of disinformation and junk science.

The survey outcomes were presented to the European Parliament’s Committee on Culture and Education (CULT) at its meeting on 19 April 2021. The recording is available here.

Gullibility of false science news in central European countries

The ESMH/STOA study ‘Disinformation and Science – A survey of the gullibility of students with regard to false scientific news’ resulting from the above ESMH project discusses the disinformation phenomenon, its causes related to social trust and types of media consumption among university students in Austria, Croatia, Czechia, Hungary, northern Italy and Slovakia. The survey was coordinated by Professor György Csepeli from Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE) in Budapest.

How to tackle the infodemic?

In the midst of the research, Europe was hit by the coronavirus pandemic that highlighted the radically new features of our information ecosystem by magnifying the most controversial aspects of the public sphere. Falsehood has literally become a lethal problem on an unprecedented scale. Pandemics affecting our health will come and go, but the pandemic of misinformation (known as the ‘infodemic’) will stay. The lesson to be drawn from the survey’s results is that, to tackle the infodemic, there is a need to enhance the level of public trust in science. Consumers and producers of social media should be motivated and trained to use fact-checking mechanisms enabling them to distinguish between true and false information. Furthermore, misinformation consumed by credulous persons should be distinguished from disinformation that is manufactured intentionally to cause havoc.

Myths are no doubt inherent parts of the human mind-set. However, myths cannot serve as the only means of constructing reality. Real knowledge, in contrast, lies in recognising information and thoughts produced by trustworthy sources. Science communication alone, however, does not guarantee against inaccuracies and errors. Real wisdom is the art of doubting: this is a lesson Europeans can draw from this experience.

The EuroScience Open Forum 2020 Roundtable

The ESMH/STOA study findings were also presented at an earlier ESOF2020 roundtable discussion on 4 September 2020. The EuroScience Open Forum (ESOF) is a biennial, pan-European, general science conference dedicated to scientific research. The 2020 event brought together over 4 500 leading thinkers, innovators, policy-makers, journalists and educators from more than 90 countries, to discuss current and future breakthroughs in contemporary science.

The ESOF roundtable ‘Perspectives on science-related fake news among young people in Central-Eastern Europe and Italy’ was opened by Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), STOA Chair. The project team members presented the results of the survey. Keynote speaker Stephan Lewandowsky from the University of Bristol addressed the questions of science, misinformation and conspiracy theories in the age of Covid‑19. The ESMH and its activities during the corona crisis were presented at another ESOF2020 panel session devoted to science communication in times of crisis.

Your opinion matters! If you read our study or watched the presentation, let us know what you think at stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

What are the psychological determinants of gullibility? 'Escape from complexity' @ISIG_Gorizia @EPCulture

Study: https://t.co/YjIh40khwW #ESMH #STOA #disinformation #falsenews pic.twitter.com/qflc93WgWV

— STOA Panel (@EP_ScienceTech) April 19, 2021

[1] A. M. McCright and R. E. Dunlap, Combatting Misinformation Requires Recognizing Its Types and the Factors That Facilitate Its Spread and Resonance, Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2017, 6(4) 389-396.

Written by Magdalena Sapała with Nina Thomassen.

© European Union, 2021, EPRS

In December 2020, the adoption of the legislative package on the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) and the Next Generation EU (NGEU) recovery instrument marked the end of an important stage in the process of launching a unique financial stimulus package – the recovery plan for Europe. However, in order to make the plan fully operational, additional conditions need to be met and preparatory steps completed.

First, there is the financing of NGEU, based on borrowing operations carried out by the European Commission on behalf of the European Union. These operations could start only once the Member States had ratified the Own Resources Decision (ORD). This procedure was completed before the end of May 2021. In the meantime, the Commission started preparing for its role as a borrower on an unprecedented scale and published its diversified funding strategy for the financing of NGEU. The Commission has ensured that the preparations are advanced and that it would be ready to begin the borrowing operations as soon as ratification of the ORD was finalised and the act in force.

In parallel, preparations are ongoing for the spending of the biggest part of NGEU (90 %) under the Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF). This process includes the drawing up of national recovery and resilience plans by the Member States, their evaluation by the European Commission, and approval by the Council of the EU. Only then will the Commission conclude an agreement with each Member State on a legal commitment authorising the financial contribution to be made, and begin pre-financing. An indicative timeline of the whole process shows that the first payments for Member States could be made between July and September 2021.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Recovery plan for Europe: State of play‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Figure 1 – Overview of the recovery plan for Europe, € billion, current prices.
• NRRPs: state of play as of 31 May 2021 (€ billion, current prices)
• Recovery and Resilience Facility (RRF) grants by Member State and per capita (current prices)
• Structure of the recovery and resilience facility (current prices)
• Timeline and main steps in the procedure
• NGEU resources pre-allocated to Member States (RRF, REACT-EU, JTF and rural development) by Member State and per capita (€, current prices)

Written by Vivienne Halleux.

© JasperSuijten / Adobe Stock

Based on Member States’ reporting under the Birds and Habitats Directives, the backbone of European Union (EU) nature conservation policy, the latest assessment on the state of nature by the European Environment Agency shows that despite some encouraging developments, the overall picture remains bleak. Only 15 % of habitats and around 27 % of species protected under EU legislation have a good conservation status. An EU-wide assessment of terrestrial, freshwater and marine ecosystems found that, overall, the condition of ecosystems in the EU is unfavourable. Worldwide, most indicators of ecosystems and biodiversity show rapid decline. Targets set to tackle biodiversity loss by 2020, at both EU and global levels under the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), have not been met.

Under the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030, part of the European Green Deal, the EU has therefore set itself new targets for the next decade. These include enlarging the current network of legally protected areas to cover at least 30 % of the EU’s land area and 30 % of the EU’s seas; and setting legally binding EU nature restoration targets to restore degraded ecosystems. The recent zero-pollution action plan for air, water and soil proposes additional commitments relevant to biodiversity protection.

Parties to the CBD, including the EU, are due to meet on 11-24 October 2021 in China to agree on a post-2020 global biodiversity framework. The EU intends to push for global 2030 targets in line with the commitments set out in its biodiversity strategy and for a much stronger implementation, monitoring and review process. The issue of resource mobilisation will be an important one, especially in the context of the coronavirus crisis, affecting the funding available for biodiversity.

On 28 May 2021, Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety adopted an own-initiative report with recommendations to strengthen the EU biodiversity strategy for 2030. The vote in plenary is scheduled for the June I plenary session.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Biodiversity protection: Where do we stand?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© Adobe Stock

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages regarding a non-binding own-initiative report on the ‘situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the European Union, in the context of women’s health’. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in May 2021, expressing concerns about the draft report, which they saw as threatening the powers of EU countries to regulate access to abortions. The Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality amended the draft report and adopted its report by 27 votes to 6, with 1 abstention on 11 May 2021. In its report, the committee recognised that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in EU countries. In addition, it called on EU countries to safeguard the right of all persons to make their own informed choices with regard to sexual and reproductive health and rights, and to ensure that every person has equal access to these services and rights.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter (in English and in French).

Main points made in the reply in English

On 11 May 2021, the European Parliament’s Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) adopted its report on the situation of sexual and reproductive health and rights in the EU by 27 votes to 6, with 1 abstention. In doing so, the committee amended the draft report to which you are referring. The report, currently only published in English, will be available here in the other official EU languages in early June 2021. It is an own-initiative, non-binding report.

In the report, the FEMM committee points out that the EU has no direct powers to deal with sexual and reproductive health and rights (SRHR) in EU countries. In accordance with Article 168(7) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, it is the Member States’ responsibility to define national health policies and organise and deliver health services and medical care. The Union complements the actions of its Member States. It encourages them to cooperate and can lend them support.

The FEMM committee report calls on EU countries to safeguard the right of all persons to make their own informed choices with regard to SRHR, and to ensure that every person has equal access to these services and rights. The report also voices concerns about the impact of the Covid‑19 pandemic on access to health services and sexual and reproductive rights.

For more information on the FEMM committee’s standpoint, the European Parliament’s press release of 11 May 2021, entitled ‘EU countries should ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health’, is available to the public.

The committee’s report will be submitted to Parliament in plenary and put to the vote on 23 June 2021. More details on the procedure can be found here. The results will be published in the section Plenary sitting, Votes, Results of votes. To view them, select a date in the ‘Search by date’ calendar located on the right and the results will appear at the very bottom of the minutes page.

The President of the European Parliament is not permitted to give voting instructions to Members of the European Parliament who, under Article 2 of the Statute for Members of the European Parliament, exercise their mandate freely and independently.

Main points made in the reply in French

Le 11 mai 2021, la commission des droits des femmes et de l’égalité des genres (FEMM) du Parlement européen a adopté par 27 voix pour, 6 contre et 1 abstention son rapport sur la situation de la santé et des droits sexuels et génésiques dans l’Union européenne.  Ce faisant, la commission a modifié le projet de rapport auquel vous faites référence. Le rapport, publié pour l’instant uniquement en langue anglaise, sera disponible ici dans les autres langues officielles de l’UE début juin. Il s’agit d’un rapport d’initiative non-contraignant.

Dans le rapport, la commission des droits des femmes et de l’égalité des genres rappelle que l’Union européenne n’a pas de compétence directe en ce qui concerne la santé et des droits sexuels et génésiques (SDSG) dans les pays de l’Union européenne. En effet, conformément à l’article 168, paragraphe 7, du traité sur le fonctionnement de l’Union européenne, c’est aux pays de l’UE qu’il incombe de définir les politiques nationales de santé, y compris l’organisation et la fourniture de services de santé et de soins médicaux. L’Union complète l’action de ses pays membres. Elle encourage la coopération entre eux et peut soutenir leur action.

Le rapport de la commission FEMM invite les pays de l’UE à sauvegarder le droit des personnes à faire un choix informé en ce qui concerne la santé et les droits sexuels et génésiques et à assurer l’égalité d’accès de toute la population à ces services et droits. Par ailleurs, il exprime des préoccupations concernant les effets de la pandémie de coronavirus sur l’accès aux services de santé et droits sexuels et génésiques.

Pour plus d’informations concernant la position de la commission FEMM, vous pouvez consulter le communiqué de presse du Parlement européen du 11 mai 2021 intitulé « Les États membres doivent garantir l’accès universel à la santé sexuelle et génésique ».

Le rapport de la commission va désormais être soumis au Parlement en séance plénière, pour un vote prévu le 23 juin 2021. Vous trouverez  ici plus de détails sur la procédure. Les résultats des votes seront publiés dans la section Séance plénière, Votes, Résultats des votes. Vous pouvez choisir une date dans le calendrier « Recherche par date » à droite et vous trouverez les résultats des votes au fond de la page du procès-verbal.

Le Président du Parlement européen ne peut donner d’instructions de vote aux députés européens qui sont libres et indépendants, comme le prévoit l’article 2 du statut des députés au Parlement européen.

Main points made in the reply in Italian

L’11 maggio 2021 la commissione per i diritti della donna e l’uguaglianza di genere (FEMM) del Parlamento europeo ha approvato la sua relazione sul tema “La situazione della salute sessuale e riproduttiva e relativi diritti nell’Unione europea” con 27 voti favorevoli, 6 contrari e 1 astensione. In tal modo, la commissione ha modificato il progetto di relazione cui Lei fa riferimento. La relazione, per il momento pubblicata solo in lingua inglese, sarà disponibile qui nelle altre lingue ufficiali dell’UE all’inizio di giugno. Si tratta di una relazione d’iniziativa non vincolante.

Nella relazione, la commissione per i diritti della donna e l’uguaglianza di genere ricorda che l’Unione europea non ha alcuna competenza diretta in materia di salute sessuale e riproduttiva e relativi diritti nei paesi dell’Unione europea. Infatti, a norma dell’articolo 168, paragrafo 7, del trattato sul funzionamento dell’Unione europea, spetta ai paesi dell’UE definire le politiche sanitarie nazionali, comprese l’organizzazione e la fornitura di servizi sanitari e di assistenza medica. L’Unione integra l’azione degli Stati membri, incoraggiando la cooperazione tra questi e sostenendo le azioni intraprese.

La relazione della commissione FEMM invita i paesi dell’UE a tutelare il diritto delle persone a compiere una scelta informata in merito alla salute sessuale e riproduttiva e ai relativi diritti nonché a garantire a tutti parità di accesso a tali servizi e diritti. Esprime inoltre preoccupazione per gli effetti della pandemia di coronavirus sull’accesso ai servizi per la salute sessuale e riproduttiva e i relativi diritti.

Per maggiori informazioni sulla posizione della commissione FEMM, può consultare il comunicato stampa del Parlamento europeo dell’11 maggio 2021 dal titolo “Gli Stati membri devono garantire l’accesso universale alla salute sessuale e riproduttiva”.

La relazione della commissione FEMM sarà presentata in Aula durante la sessione plenaria del Parlamento, con una votazione prevista per il 23 giugno 2021. Maggiori dettagli sulla procedura sono disponibili qui. I risultati delle votazioni saranno pubblicati sulla pagina del Parlamento alla sezione Plenaria, Seduta plenaria, Votazioni, Risultati dei voti. È possibile scegliere una data nel calendario “Ricerca per data” a destra della pagina. I risultati dei voti si trovano in fondo alla pagina del processo verbale.

Il Presidente del Parlamento europeo non può dare istruzioni di voto ai deputati europei, che sono liberi e indipendenti, come previsto dall’articolo 2 dello statuto dei deputati del Parlamento europeo.

Main points made in the reply in Spanish

El 11 de mayo de 2021, la Comisión de Derechos de las Mujeres e Igualdad de Género (FEMM) del Parlamento Europeo aprobó su informe sobre la situación de la salud y los derechos sexuales y reproductivos en la Unión por 27 votos a favor, 6 en contra y 1 abstención.  Al hacerlo, la Comisión modificó el proyecto de informe al que usted hace referencia. El informe, que actualmente solo está disponible en inglés, se publicará aquí en las demás lenguas oficiales de la Unión a principios de junio. Se trata de un informe de propia iniciativa no vinculante.

En él, la Comisión de Derechos de las Mujeres e Igualdad de Género recuerda que la Unión no tiene competencias directas en materia de salud y derechos sexuales y reproductivos en los países de la Unión. De hecho, de conformidad con el artículo 168, apartado 7, del Tratado de Funcionamiento de la Unión Europea, es responsabilidad de los Estados miembros definir las políticas nacionales de salud, incluida la organización y prestación de servicios sanitarios y atención médica. La Unión complementa la acción de los Estados miembros, fomenta la cooperación entre ellos y puede prestarles apoyo.

El informe de la Comisión FEMM pide a los países de la Unión que salvaguarden el derecho de las personas a tomar decisiones con conocimiento de causa en lo que concierne a la salud y los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, y que garanticen la igualdad de acceso de todos a estos servicios y derechos. También expresa su preocupación por las consecuencias de la pandemia de coronavirus sobre el acceso a los servicios de salud y derechos sexuales y reproductivos.

Si desea más información sobre la posición de la Comisión FEMM, puede consultar el comunicado de prensa del Parlamento Europeo de 11 de mayo de 2021 titulado «EU countries should ensure universal access to sexual and reproductive health» (Los Estados miembros deben garantizar el acceso universal a la salud sexual y reproductiva).

El informe de la Comisión se presentará al Parlamento en la sesión plenaria para una votación prevista para el 23 de junio de 2021. Puede encontrar más información sobre el procedimiento aquí. Los resultados de las votaciones se publicarán en la sección «Sesión plenaria, Votaciones, Resultados de las votaciones». Puede elegir una fecha en el calendario de «Búsqueda por fecha» que se encuentra en el ángulo inferior derecho de la página. Los resultados de las votaciones se encuentran al final de la página del acta.

El presidente del Parlamento Europeo no puede dar instrucciones de voto a los diputados, que son libres e independientes, como prevé el artículo 2 del Estatuto de los diputados al Parlamento Europeo.

Written by Anita Orav.

© Fotofreundin / Adobe Stock

Migration to the European Union from third countries has been substantial over the past few decades, as Europe has historically been considered a continent of relative economic prosperity and political stability. While many foreign-born individuals arrive in the European Union (EU) to work, pursue studies or join family members, the EU also experienced a peak of irregular arrivals beginning in 2014 and only starting to subside in 2016. Those large migratory flows included a substantial number of asylum-seekers and refugees fleeing war and instability in their home countries. As host societies, EU Member States are required to facilitate their integration, i.e. their acceptance in society and ability to access different services and the labour market.

EU law envisages access to employment for refugees as soon as they are granted refugee status, or for asylum-seekers at the latest within nine months of lodging an asylum application. However, employment rates for migrants in general, and refugees and asylum-seekers in particular, are persistently lower than those of native-born populations. Moreover, they are more likely to be employed in low-skilled occupations that have high automation potential in the future. If this potential is exploited through the use of artificial intelligence and digitalisation, the European economy is expected to see a decline in low-skilled employment. To ensure that migrants’ skills will match the future EU labour market, focus should be turned to facilitating the proper recognition of their qualifications, as well as to upgrading their education and skills. The EU supports Member States’ integration efforts through its EU action plan on integration and inclusion.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Labour market integration of asylum seekers and refugees‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ionel Zamfir.

© Сake78 (3D & photo) / Adobe Stock

The 47th G7 summit is scheduled for 11-13 June 2021, and will be chaired and hosted by the United Kingdom. After a year-long break caused by the pandemic and the former US administration’s inability to organise the 2020 summit at a later date than initially scheduled, this year’s event is expected to mark a return to strong global cooperation among the world’s major democracies. The leaders of four guest states – Australia, India, South Africa and South Korea – will join the leaders of the G7 nations and the European Union, thus reinforcing the group’s global democratic representativeness. The G7 has built up a reputation for being an informal framework of cooperation on major global issues, which is driven by a shared commitment to the fundamental values of liberal democracy. This year’s summit is expected to reaffirm these values in the face of assertive authoritarian tendencies elsewhere in the world.

Ahead of the summit, ministerial meetings in areas selected by the presidency have already taken place, shaping future cooperation among the G7 nations. ‘Beat[ing] Covid-19 and building back better’ is an obvious priority this year. Achieving it includes ensuring more equitable and rapid access to vaccines and other medical supplies for developing countries. While the group has reaffirmed its general commitment to this priority, the US proposal to waive patent rights for the production of vaccines still needs to find common ground among the G7 members. Another US initiative – setting a minimum global corporate tax rate – could make history for the G7, marking a major change in the international taxation system. Reinforcing cooperation on the regulation of digital developments is another priority, as are ambitions linked to honouring the commitments under the Paris Agreement.

As every year, the EU, which is a G7 member in its own right, will be represented by the Presidents of the European Council and of the European Commission.

Read the complete briefing on ‘G7 summit, June 2021: Asserting democratic values in the post-crisis context‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher.

STOA’s Centre for Artificial Intelligence (C4AI) produces studies, organises public events and acts as a platform for dialogue and information exchange on AI-relevant topics within the Parliament and beyond. It aims to contribute to the quality and coherence of discussion and policy-making as the EU seeks to coordinate its efforts and influence global AI standard-setting.

Last year, STOA and the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) launched a partnership on artificial intelligence (AI) with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Global Parliamentary Network (GPN). The GPN is a hub for legislators and officials from parliaments around the world to share experience, identify good practices and foster international legislative cooperation. It includes a Parliamentary Group on Artificial Intelligence, and benefits from proximity with the OECD’s AI Policy Observatory and Global Partnership on AI.

In the context of this partnership, we are currently producing a series of podcasts examining various aspects of AI development and policy with key experts from the field.

Image by Gerd Altmann from Pixabay

The first podcast in the series explores the role of international cooperation in AI governance. It includes an extensive conversation between STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) and Anthony Gooch, Director of Public Affairs & Communications at OECD and Chair of the GPN, on the importance of international cooperation on AI and the role parliaments can play in this respect in the context of the Covid‑19 pandemic, as well as a way of promoting human autonomy and empowerment in relation to AI.

There are also contributions from Jeremias Prassl, Deputy Director of the Institute of European and Comparative Law, University of Oxford, who shares his perspectives on best practices and capacity building in AI governance, and Kate Crawford, AI scholar and author of the book ‘The Atlas of AI: Power, Politics, and the Planetary Costs of Artificial Intelligence’, who talks about multilateral initiatives and the distribution of costs and benefits of AI.

You can listen to the podcast here. Watch this space for further podcasts in the series.

Follow us on Twitter at @EP_ScienceTech to stay informed about our activities.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

© Arjan / Adobe Stock

Formally, the EU and China have been strategic partners since 2003 – a partnership that was broadened five years ago by the EU-China 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation. However, more recently, EU officials and politicians have been expressing increasing concerns over China’s economic expansionism and human rights violations. The current coronavirus pandemic and developments in Hong Kong have had a marked negative impacted on EU-China relations.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on China, its ties with the EU and related issues. The previous issue on the subject was published in October 2020.

Xi Jinping thought on the rule of law: New substance in the conflict of systems with China
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2021

New trade agreements in Asia: Liberalisation in times of geopolitical rivalry
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, April 2021

Home advantage: How China’s protected market threatens Europe’s economic power
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

Multilateralism after covid-19
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

Chinese sanctions: How to confront coercion and avoid a squeeze on Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

The new China shock
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

Decade of patience: How China became a power in the Western Balkans
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

Après le Brexit, appliquer la ‘méthode Barnier‘ avec la Chine
Institut Jacques Delors, February 2021

Reshaping trade ties with China in the aftermath of Covid-19
Wiener Institut für Internationale Wirtschaftsvergleiche, February 2021

The United States, China, and Taiwan: A Strategy to prevent war
Council on Foreign Relations, February 2021

China’s digital silk road: Integration into national IT infrastructure and wider implications for Western defence industries
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2021

China’s grand industrial strategy and what it means for Europe
European Policy Centre, April 2021

EU crash course in geopolitics: Lessons from the foreign policy ‘battlefield’
European Policy Centre, March 2021

Chips on our shoulder: Is Europe neglecting design in its semiconductor strategy?
European Policy Centre, March 2021

Vaccine diplomacy: Soft power lessons from China and Russia?
Bruegel, April 2021

China has a grand carbon neutrality target but where is the plan?
Bruegel, April 2021

Is the European Union’s investment agreement with China underrated?
Bruegel, April 2021

The EU-China investment deal may be anachronic in a bifurcating world
Bruegel, April 2021

Form a climate club: United States, European Union and China
Bruegel, March 2021

China’s state-owned enterprises and competitive neutrality
Bruegel, February 2021

China and the WTO: Why multilateralism still matters
Bruegel, January 2021

An EU-China investment deal: A second look
Bruegel, January 2021

Europe’s disappointing investment deal with China
Bruegel, January 2021

Northern expedition: China’s Arctic activities and ambitions
Brookings Institution, April 2021

Jack Ma Taunted China: Then came his fall
Brookings Institution, April 2021

An asymmetric defense of Taiwan
Brookings Institution, April 2021

How China’s savings could help save the planet
Brookings Institution, April 2021

What does Biden’s first 100 days tell us about his approach to China?
Brookings Institution, April 2021

US-China phase one tracker: China’s purchases of US goods
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2021

China in the WTO
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2021

China’s pursuit of leadership in digital currency
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2021

US economic sanctions against human atrocities in China and Myanmar
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 2021

US-China trade war tariffs: An up-to-date chart
Peterson Institute for International Economics, March 2021

China’s Belt and Road Initiative should be on the World Bank and IMF’s agenda
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

The climate challenge and China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021

China’s Huawei is winning the 5G race: Here’s what the United States should do to respond
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021

China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Italy: An analysis of financial cooperation
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2021

Technological competition: Can the EU compete with China?
Istituto Affari Internazionali, April 2021

Broadening the Transatlantic partnership to address the China challenge
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2020

The EU-China comprehensive agreement on investment
Centre for European Policy Studies, May 2021

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Latest developments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig (1st edition).

© Tobias Arhelger / Adobe Stock

On 9 December 2020, along with its counter-terrorism agenda, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation to reinforce the mandate of Europol, the EU law enforcement cooperation agency. The proposed regulation principally aims at rendering Europol’s cooperation with private parties more effective; at responding to the agency’s ‘big data challenge’, by providing a legal basis for processing large and complex datasets, including personal data of data subjects not related to a crime; and at providing a reinforced role for Europol in relation to research and innovation for law enforcement. The legislative proposal, which would amend the existing Europol Regulation (EU) 2016/794, is also linked to another legislative proposal to modify Regulation (EU) 2018/1862 on the Schengen Information System (SIS), to allow Europol to issue alerts in SIS under a new category.

Discussions in the Council started in January 2021. In the European Parliament, a draft report was discussed in the Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs at the end of May 2021.

Versions

• Strengthening Europol’s mandate (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2016/794, as regards Europol’s cooperation with private parties, the processing of personal data by Europol in support of criminal investigations, and Europol’s role on research and innovation Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2020) 796 9.12.2020 Rapporteur:

Javier Zarzalejos (EPP, Spain)

2020/0349(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Franco Roberti (S&D, Italy), Dragoş Tudorache (Renew, Romania), Tom Vandendriessche (ID, Belgium), Saskia Bricmont (Greens/EFA, Belgium), Patryck Jaki (ECR, Poland), Clare Daly (The Left, Ireland) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee on draft report

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

The European Parliament returns to Strasbourg this month (though still in a hybrid format), for the first time since February 2020. This welcome sign that life is returning to a form of normality in Europe means that many Members who travel to Strasbourg will have direct experience of the issues addressed by an important point on their agenda – the Digital Covid Certificate. As we enter the second summer under coronavirus restrictions, many people in the EU are hoping to be able to travel at last, to visit loved ones or for a holiday. Parliament agreed to an accelerated procedure to consider the proposals for a digital Covid certificate, with the aim of allowing EU countries to open their borders without worsening the coronavirus situation. The co-legislators have agreed to a compromise on this proposal, now named the ‘EU Digital Covid Certificate’, and the system should be in operation by 1 July 2021. Parliament has ensured that the testing required is more affordable and accessible, through the allocation of around €100 million for polymerase chain reaction (PCR) tests. If necessary, EU countries may still impose duly justified additional restrictions with 48 hours advance notice. A second proposal covers travel for third-country nationals within the EU. Members are expected to debate the final adoption of the texts on Tuesday morning.

Over 60 % of European small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), which employ 100 million people, have reported a fall in turnover in 2020. Members will take part in a joint debate on the State of the SMEs Union on Monday evening and have already called for the EU strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe to take the impact of Covid‑19 into account. A new SME strategy for a sustainable and digital Europe is proposed, aimed at supporting SMEs in becoming more sustainable and digital, and at improving access to markets and financing. Parliament has requested that the European Commission set ambitious targets for the reduction of the administrative burden on SMEs by June of this year, and would also like to see better assessment of the costs and benefits for SMEs of proposed EU legislation in future.

In light of these impacts of the coronavirus pandemic, the European Social Fund Plus (ESF+) 2021‑2027 budget for social inclusion will be greatly needed, to provide resources to improve youth employability and equal opportunities for children at risk of poverty. On Tuesday afternoon, Members are expected to debate the adoption at second reading of the text, a compromise reached with the co-legislators after some disagreement, on an €88 billion EU budget for employment, education and social inclusion measures (almost 8 % less than under the previous multiannual financial framework, MFF).

When it comes to tackling the diverse challenges outside the EU, a multi-instrument funding architecture with many and various priorities and management structures is not ideal for the kind of effective and flexible action needed to help other countries cope with the pandemic and other issues. Members will debate Parliament’s consent to an interinstitutional agreement on the proposed regulation establishing a Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 2021‑2027 on Tuesday afternoon. If agreed, the proposal would allocate €70.8 billion (in 2018 prices) under the 2021‑2027 MFF and bring together the 10 previous funds for external action along with the European Development Fund. The agreement enhances Parliament’s oversight of the strategic direction of the funding, including ending assistance to countries that do not respect democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

External affairs are also scheduled for Wednesday morning, where Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the preparation of the G7 summit of 11‑13 June and the forthcoming EU‑US Summit, which will provide an opportunity for a closer examination of the emerging contours of President Biden’s foreign policy.

A country’s resilience to hybrid threats such as cyber-attack is now considered to be an important indicator of stability, as public administrations become more reliant on digital technologies. Members are expected to hear Council and Commission statements on Wednesday afternoon on recent cyber-attacks on EU and national public and private institutions, particularly in light of the EU digitalisation agenda, as part of a joint debate, including an oral question on the future EU cybersecurity strategy. The 230 000 daily new malware infections detected by the ENISA cybersecurity agency between January 2019 and April 2020, give an idea of the scale of the issue. Parliament is also expected to decide on formal adoption at second reading of a provisional agreement on establishing the instrument for financial support for customs control equipment, on Monday evening. The instrument will be used to purchase, maintain and upgrade detection equipment for customs, border and security controls at external EU borders. Parliament has succeeded in amending the proposal to ensure the equipment has optimal cybersecurity and safety standards. Once adopted, the regulation should come into effect retroactively, as of 1 January 2021.

Meanwhile, a majority of Europeans think that more should be done to improve animal welfare. Many Members of the European Parliament agree, and have been supporting the European citizens’ initiative, ‘End the cage age‘. With nearly 1.4 million signatures, this popular initiative has gained sufficient support to oblige the European Commission to propose legislation to ban the use of the remaining cages, farrowing crates, stalls and pens still authorised in the EU for a range of livestock. Members are scheduled to debate the initiative on Thursday morning, along with an Agriculture & Rural Development Committee motion for a resolution proposing to phase out cages in farming, possibly by 2027. A debate on protecting biodiversity against habitat loss, where trade policy has a clear role to play, is also scheduled for Monday afternoon.

Following 2019 proposals to update the EU Ombudsman’s Statute, to align it with the Lisbon Treaty and strengthen the role of this guardian of institutional accountability and transparency, Members are expected to debate a new European Parliament regulation governing the Ombudsman’s duties on Wednesday afternoon, in the presence of Emily O’Reilly, the current European Ombudsman. Parliament’s proposals include possible extension of the deadline for institutions to reply to the Ombudsman’s findings, and allowing the Ombudsman to carry out own-initiative inquiries. However, other proposals were not retained following discussions with the other institutions. Mention of sexual harassment is less specific and the proposed two-year extension of the deadline for filing complaints was discarded. Although the Council has already informally indicated its agreement with the proposal, its formal consent as well as an opinion from the European Commission will be required before the new statute can be formally adopted in a future plenary session. For Parliament to exercise its own oversight role regarding the EU’s executive in full, a majority in Parliament may set up a temporary committee of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions or maladministration in the implementation of Union law. However, current legislation restricts Parliament’s investigative powers. Accordingly, such a committee would have no power to summon witnesses, and cannot formally require witnesses to testify under oath, or impose sanctions. As far back as 2012, Parliament proposed to revise the regulation of its right of inquiry, where it has the right of initiative. However, adoption of the regulation is subject to a special legislative procedure requiring Council and Commission consent, which has not been forthcoming to date. Seeking to break the deadlock on strengthening Parliament’s right of inquiry, the AFCO committee has put questions to both the Commission and the Council for oral answer on the plenary agenda for Tuesday evening, seeking assurances that they will engage in good-faith political dialogue with the Parliament to reach agreement.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp.

© Denis / Adobe Stock

A key objective of the EU’s external action is to preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. In the context of its common foreign and security policy (CFSP), the Union offers assistance to third states, international organisations and regional organisations engaged in peace support operations. Moreover, the EU’s common security and defence policy (CSDP) – part of the CFSP – provides the Union with its own operational capacity, allowing it to deploy civilian and military assets (provided by the EU Member States) in third countries. While many of the operations and missions the EU supports have military and defence implications, the EU cannot finance activities with military or defence implications from the EU budget. EU Member States therefore have mechanisms to fund expenditure with military and defence implications directly from national budgets.

The European Peace Facility (EPF) is a new off-budget fund with a financial ceiling of €5.692 billion financed by Member State contributions. The EPF, which will be operational by 1 July 2021, will make it easier for Member States to share the costs of EU military operations. It will also help the EU to support military peace-support operations conducted by third countries and regional organisations, anywhere in the world. Controversially, for the first time, the EU will be able to provide the armed forces of partner countries with infrastructure and equipment, including weapons. Several non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have warned that the new facility risks fuelling conflict and human rights abuses around the world. They warn that this could exacerbate violence and arms proliferation, and fuel the very dynamics the EPF seeks to address. By contrast, practitioners believe the facility will ensure that the EU is taken seriously as a security provider and is able to maintain its influence in conflict areas. The Council has called for swift operationalisation of the EPF and has invited Member States and the High Representative to present proposals for assistance measures.

Read this briefing on ‘European Peace Facility: Promoting peace or fuelling conflict?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Military CSDP operations
• African-led peace support operations with ongoing APF/future EPF funding