European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Jana Titievskaia.

© Mar / Adobe Stock

International trade influences biodiversity through scale, composition and technique effects. Land and sea use change alter natural habitats, while emissions from production and transportation contribute to climate change. Among exports, animal-based agri-food products are particularly land-intensive. Trade policy can play a role in tackling these problems through stronger enforcement of biodiversity-related provisions in trade agreements. The EU Biodiversity Strategy 2030 commits to better assessing trade agreements’ potential impact on biodiversity and to better enforce biodiversity-related provisions. The Trade Committee of the European Parliament has adopted an opinion on the trade aspects of the new strategy.

Impacts of trade on biodiversity

Human economic activity has surpassed for years the rate of biosphere regeneration and total biodiversity stock of the planet. A 2012 study by Lenzen et al. linking species threat records with 15 000 commodities and 5 billion supply chains found that 30 % of threats to species were due to international trade, excluding invasive species. Moreover, the existence of tipping points in planetary boundaries means that gradual degradation in one region can lead to unintended destabilisation at the global level e.g. of water cycles. The option value of nature reflects the additional worth of conservation over use for e.g. business purposes. Different species may be instrumental for wellbeing, while extinction is irreversible. Therefore, protection of ecosystems and biodiversity can be viewed as an investment that will yield future returns.

A 2020 study on trade and biodiversity, commissioned by the European Parliament’s Committee on International Trade (INTA), distinguishes between direct and indirect impacts of trade on biodiversity. Direct impacts stem from transportation (e.g. air cargo, road transport and shipping), arrival of alien pests or wildlife trafficking. Indirect impacts can be divided into scale, composition and technique effects. Trade expansion can deplete natural capital as human demands on the biosphere increase (scale effect). Extractive or pollution-intensive activity can concentrate regionally, reflecting comparative advantages (composition effect). Trade liberalisation can contribute to the adoption of environmental technologies and goods, patents or production methods (technique effects).

In practice, land use change is a considerable driver of terrestrial species loss. Between 1986 and 2009, the majority of new cropland was used for exports. The agri-food industry is the world’s largest land user. Animal-based exports (e.g. lamb, beef, and cheese) are more land-intensive per kilogram of food produced than plant-based goods (e.g. rice, bananas and citrus fruit). Trade in raw materials (e.g. mining, quarrying) also influences the levels of biodiversity through emissions and pollution in air, land and waterways. However, the environmental impacts are highly variable and skewed across and within regions, suggesting that environmental mitigation measures and institution-building can considerably reduce adverse impacts.   

European Commission proposal

In 2011, the Commission adopted the EU biodiversity strategy to 2020, which sought to enhance the contribution of trade policy to conserving biodiversity and addressing potential negative impacts of trade. The Commission committed to analyse the impacts on biodiversity in trade sustainability impact assessments and ex-post evaluations, and include biodiversity goals in the trade and sustainable development (TSD) provisions of agreements with partners. In 2020, the Commission adopted a communication on ‘EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030: Bringing nature back into our lives‘, which calls for at least 30 % of land and 30 % of sea protection in the EU (up by 4 % and 19 %, respectively compared to today) building on the EU Green Deal. On trade, the strategy focuses on implementation and enforcement of these provisions, including through the EU Chief Trade Enforcement Officer. The strategy also commits to an assessment of trade agreements’ impacts on biodiversity (see box). The Commission seeks to further address illegal wildlife trade (following the EU Action Plan addressing wildlife trafficking which will be reviewed in 2021) and to ban EU trade in ivory. The possible revision of the Environmental Crime Directive could broaden its scope and include provisions for types and levels of criminal sanctions. In 2021, the Commission plans to adopt a legislative proposal seeking to avoid or limit EU market entry for imports that contribute to deforestation. Biodiversity has been included among the headline actions in the 2021 trade policy review (new EU trade strategy).

European Parliament position

In April 2021, the INTA committee adopted an opinion on the trade aspects of the EU Biodiversity Strategy for 2030 (rapporteur Saskia Bricmont, Greens/EFA, Belgium). The opinion recommends to the Commission to focus on a ‘process and production method’ (PPM) approach when drawing up measures to fight biodiversity loss, rather than focusing on the product itself, in line with rules of the World Trade Organization. The opinion takes a stand on phasing out fossil fuels subsidies urgently. It also calls on the EU to explore a white list of endangered species to combat illegal trade. The INTA opinion provided concrete suggestions to the Committee on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) report on the biodiversity strategy (rapporteur César Luena, S&D, Spain), which is due to be voted in plenary in June 2021. The Parliament also adopted, in October 2020, a resolution to halt and reverse EU-driven deforestation advocating for mandatory due diligence requirements for products entailing forest and ecosystem risks.

Views

While EU trade agreements foster international trade through tariff liberalisation and abolition of non-tariff barriers, import-based consumption increases ecological footprints. The footprint data foundation displays the ecological footprints of different countries (in productivity weighted biologically productive hectares). Most of the developed world, including EU countries, the United States and China, is in ecological overshoot, while most of South America and important parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have positive biocapacity reserves per capita. The EU tries to limit these adverse effects by including TSD provisions in trade agreements and making developing countries’ access to tariff preferences conditional on the ratification and implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. However, these provisions are not enforceable in the same way as, for example, trade in goods commitments, which has led researchers to criticise their effectiveness. TSD provisions fall under a separate dispute settlement process, with consultations, panel deliberation and issuance of recommendations, but not economic countermeasures. A notable exception is the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which includes rebalancing measures (e.g. tariffs) in case of ‘significant divergences’ between parties.

While sustainable development is a key objective in the preamble to the WTO Agreement, biodiversity-focused measures may prove difficult to justify under the general exceptions of Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) where causation between the measure and the objective must be demonstrated. For example, the revised EU Renewable Energy Directive (RED II) limits the inclusion of crop-based biofuels with significant indirect land-use change (ILUC) risk in the calculation of Member States’ required minimum share of renewable energy. However, Indonesia and Malaysia have challenged this as discriminatory against palm oil used in biofuel production, notably citing the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement and the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement, in addition to the national treatment principle under the GATT. Researchers have posited that the EU may invoke the GATT general exceptions defence during the dispute, for instance arguing that the objective of RED II is protecting animal / plant life or health (XX b), or conservation of exhaustible natural resources (XX g).

On 19 May 2021, the Commission published a methodology for assessing the impacts of trade agreements on biodiversity and ecosystems, developed by the Institute for European Environmental Policy (IEEP) and partners. The methodology outlines a staged process for impact assessment, recommending a comprehensive approach, using data, research, existing case studies, expert knowledge and stakeholder interviews. For the most significant biodiversity impacts, it recommends quantified analysis whenever possible. The methodology starts with identifying the trade-related driver(s) for change, i.e. sector(s) where an FTA leads to an increase in economic activity. It then ‘translates’ this change into possible pressure on biodiversity – through land or resource use – and assesses the resulting impact on ecosystems and/or species. The methodology also identifies safeguard measures that can be drawn up to mitigate negative impacts. The methodology has already been used in practice in the context of ex-post assessments for the EU–Andean and EU–Central America trade agreements.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Trade policy for the Biodiversity Strategy 2030‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Silvia Kotanidis and Giulio Sabbati.

© European Union, 2021 Further information Multilingual Platform

The Conference’s multilingual platform is a hub giving European citizens and European civil society organisations the opportunity to share ideas on the future of Europe, and to host and attend events. It will act as a repository of contributions and documents, and as an interactive tool to share and debate ideas of citizens. The platform is open to citizens, civil society, social partners, other stakeholders, public authorities at EU and national, regional, local level.

European Citizens’ Panels

These are vital bodies of the Conference, tasked with debating issues that matter to citizens. The composition of European citizens’ panels (± 200 citizens chosen at random) will be transnational and representative of the EU population, not only with respect to gender but also age, socio-economic background, geographic origin and level of education, with 1/3 of participants between 16 and 25 years of age. The European citizens’ panels will hold debates, including on the basis of contributions from the digital platform, and feed into the discussion of the Conference plenary with recommendations for the EU institutions to follow up. Four thematic citizens’ panels are planned: i) European democracy/values, rights, rule of law, security; ii) climate change, environment/health; iii) stronger economy, social justice, jobs/education, youth, culture, sport/digital transformation; and iv) EU in the world/migration.

European citizens’ panels will meet in deliberative sessions, in different locations and will be dedicated to specific themes. Member States (at national, regional or local level) and other stakeholders (civil society, social partners or citizens) may organise additional citizens’ panels under the umbrella of the Conference, provided they respect the Conference Charter in full.

Joint Presidency

The Conference is under the tripartite authority of the Presidents of the European Parliament, Council of the EU and Commission, respectively David Sassoli, António Costa, representing the Portuguese Presidency of the Council until 30 June 2021, and Ursula von der Leyen. Based on the rotation established by Council Decision, the Presidency of the Council will then be held by Slovenia (1 July–31 December 2021) and France (1 January–30 June 2022). The tripartite Presidency of the Conference is the ultimate body to which the final outcome of the Conference will be reported, so that each institution may provide the appropriate follow-up in accordance with their own competences.

Conference Plenary

The plenary comprises a total of 433 representatives, from the three institutions (Commission, Council of the EU and Parliament), national parliaments, citizens’ panels, the European Committee of the Regions (CoR), European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), national events or panels, social partners and civil society. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy will be invited when the international role of the EU is discussed. Other stakeholders and experts may also be invited. The plenary will discuss issues and recommendations coming from national and European citizens’ panels as well as input from the digital platform, grouped by themes. Debates will be open, without a predetermined outcome and without limiting topics to pre-defined policy areas. The plenary decides on a consensual basis (at least between the Parliament, Council, Commission and the national parliaments) on the proposals to be put forward to the Executive Board. The latter is responsible for drafting the final report of the Conference, in full collaboration and in full transparency with the Plenary, which will be published on the digital platform and sent to the Joint Presidency for concrete follow-up.

Executive Board

The Executive Board manages the work of the conference (plenaries, citizens’ panels, and digital platform), oversees all activities, and prepares meetings of the plenary, including input from citizens, and their follow-up. All three institutions (Parliament, Commission and Council) are equally represented in the Executive Board, with three members each and up to four observers. The Executive Board is co-chaired by a representative of each of the three institutions; in the Council’s case by the rotating presidency. The presidential troika of COSAC (the Conference of Parliamentary Committees for Union Affairs of EU national parliaments) have permanent observer status. The EESC and CoR also have observer status. The co-chairs can propose to the plenary the creation of thematic working groups, and invite experts to participate in events of the Conference.

Secretariat

A common secretariat composed of equal numbers of staff of the European Parliament, General Secretariat of the Council and the Commission, assists the Executive Board in the organisation of the Conference plenary and the European citizens’ panels.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘The Conference on the Future of Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera.

The internet of things is already making us reimagine daily life, but could artificial intelligence be the key to reaching the full potential of this technology?

© Elenabsl / AdobeStock

Smart objects have evolved beyond the original idea of the internet of things (IoT): to offer a better way to track products, replace obsolete barcodes and improve logistics. The inherent extended capabilities of simultaneous contactless identification of objects using a unique electronic product code (EPC), which can be referenced using the internet, has been apparent for some time. While leading to multiple new applications, it has also raised many concerns.

With information from tagged products directly available to computers, some levels of computer-based intelligence can also be associated with the original object over the internet. In practice, the object becomes ‘intelligent‘ in an abstract way, with no need to incorporate any electronics besides an RFID tag. The result is an intelligent physical object, whose brain is hosted by a computer elsewhere.

This kind of artificial intelligence (AI) can go a step further and associate the object, in the location where it has been identified by a reader, with additional information from sensors located in that area. It is also possible to draw conclusions by correlating the object with other tagged objects in the vicinity. What is more, this virtual network is not restricted to simple objects, but can be extended to more complex devices incorporating their own sensors. Either way, all the objects around us are now becoming intelligent as the technology of connected objects evolves to produce smart objects.

Potential impacts and developments

Smart objects are transforming the way we interact with our environments at home, at work and in our cities. The IoT network gathers vast quantities of data about our daily activities and is combined with AI to become AIoT (artificial intelligence of things) – a smart, connected network that communicates over powerful 5G links, efficient enough to take full advantage of big data and cloud computing.

We can be linked to the RFID tags in our clothes while wearable devices continuously gather medical data, as well as information about our preferences and habits. Applications include fitness and health tracking devices monitoring heart rate, blood pressure and blood sugar levels. Furthermore, a variety of widgets are also available, ranging from wireless headphones to highly sophisticated augmented-reality/virtual-reality (AR/VR) equipment with many applications, including gaming. Smart home devices such as thermostats, coffee-makers, lights and all sorts of smart appliances learn users’ habits to develop automated home support for everyday tasks. This can improve energy efficiency and safety; but can also be used for entertainment, access control and personal comfort among other applications. Smart cities integrate all levels of services to become safer, more convenient places to live. Applications include open data for better urban planning, optimised energy consumption, smart public transportation and increased public safety through smart traffic surveillance and control. Smart industry devices – the industrial internet of things (IIoT) – use real-time data analytics and machine learning to optimise operations, logistics and the supply chain. Data generated by these devices help industries foresee challenges – preventing costly errors and workplace injuries. The data being gathered may be sensitive, and therefore their protection must be ensured at all times in any communications that could be subject to tampering. Research is ongoing on ways to improve wireless communication standards and provide for encryption at different levels.

Anticipatory policy-making

Smart objects and the AIoT constitute a new paradigm that incorporates all the possibilities attributed so far to both AI and IoT technologies and benefits from others such as 5G, but it also takes in all the related ethical and legal concerns. The compulsion towards guaranteed outcomes may lead certain companies to collect excessively detailed behavioural data incompatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The EU has been actively regulating these two technologies (AI and IoT) for many years now. Policy discussions on IoT began at least 15 years ago – STOA released a study in 2007. Policy discussions on AI have been ongoing for some time and there is a broad spectrum of dedicated services within institutions such as the European Parliament, the European Commission, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the Joint Research Centre, Council and others. These services have already performed a variety of studies that have contributed to the development of a new set of EU rules for AI.

Over the years, the EU has become a reference for human rights and democracy. The precautionary principle enables decision-makers to adopt precautionary measures when scientific evidence about risks to the environment or human health is uncertain and the stakes are high. Its application presents many challenges, however, especially when it comes to the treatment of complexity, hazard and exposure assessment, research and economic activities. Nevertheless, it also presents opportunities, mainly regarding the possibility to reduce the overall costs of environmental and health research for society. Yet there are also concerns about the EU getting stuck in these discussions, losing technological sovereignty in the process, and not taking advantage of the fact that a good part of this path has been explored already. As already feared by the European Commission in 2009, the development of technologies such as IoT has been hindered in the EU by concerns about privacy that may have led to over-regulation, possibly over-rating the limited capabilities these technologies had so many years ago. The result was that the EU was left lagging behind, and the same may be happening now with AI. As all these discussions make more sense today because of increased connectivity, by looking to science for inspiration and information, evidence-informed policy-making can help strike the right balance.

On 21 April 2021, the European Commission presented a proposal for new rules and measures, aiming to turn the EU into a global hub for trustworthy AI; this took the form of a new regulatory framework on AI and a revised coordinated plan on AI. The proposal establishes a risk-based approach to regulation, where AI applications are classified according to levels on a pyramid. The broader lower levels of the pyramid refer to applications with minimal or no risk and the classification goes up to a restricted group involving unacceptable risks. Smart objects fit easily into the lower-risk levels in most cases, provided that no tracking is involved and the GDPR is duly respected. New rules on machinery products will complement this proposal by adapting safety rules to increase users’ trust in this new, versatile generation of products.

Through a series of related resolutions, the European Parliament has also been contributing to a comprehensive regulatory framework of ethical principles and legal obligations relating to the development, deployment and use of AI. This includes smart objects, although Parliament has focused mainly on high-risk applications and not so much on the broader low-risk levels of the pyramid.

Some studies suggest that a common EU framework on ethical aspects of AI, robotics and related technologies has the potential to bring the EU €294.9 billion in additional grow domestic product and 4.6 million additional jobs by 2030. The EU cannot afford to miss the opportunities offered by new technologies such as smart objects. By taking advantage of what has already been done at the institutional level, it can still lead responsible development while maintaining ethical values and standards. By setting these standards, the EU can pave the way to ethical technology worldwide, while also ensuring that the EU remains competitive.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if objects around us flocked together and became intelligent?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to Science and Technology podcast ‘What if objects around us flocked together and became intelligent?’ on YouTube.

Written by Lena Hirschenberger.

How do you think Europe should develop? Youthideas.eu is inviting young Europeans to outline your own ideas on the issues that Europe is facing today and your visions for the Europe of tomorrow. This online platform is available for young people to share ideas on specific topics and questions, not least related to Parliament’s initiatives for youth.

Your ideas will enrich the biennial European Youth Event (EYE) programme, and also provide inspiration and input for other European Parliament youth initiatives. Moreover, Youthideas.eu will forward a selection of the ideas to the Members of the European Parliament and other policy-makers, inviting them to join the debate.

But before you launch your ideas, perhaps you would like to know more about the field of EU action that interests you. The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has compiled a selection of publications to provide you with background information and insights, linked to the central topics of the EYE.

Climate Change and Environment

• EU Climate Action Policy, Study, March 2021
• Climate change and climate action (europa.eu), Ideas paper, July 2020
• Reparability: longer-lasting electronics, Video, May 2021

• Building up resilience to cross-border health threats (europa.eu), Briefing, April 2021
• What if we could engineer the planet to help fight climate change?, Science and Technology podcast, March 2021

• Green and sustainable finance, Policy Podcast, March 2021

Health

• Rethinking the future of EU public health, Ideas paper, July 2020
• Building up resilience to cross-border health threats (europa.eu), Briefing, April 2021
• Most important factors when buying food, Video, May 2020

• The rise of digital health technologies during the pandemic (europa.eu), Briefing, April 2021
• European Union food system (europa.eu), Briefing, September 2020
• Alcohol labelling, Policy Podcast, December 2021

• The rise of digital health technologies during the pandemic, Policy Podcast, April 2021

A stronger economy, social justice and jobs

• Social and employment policies in Europe, Ideas paper, September 2020
• Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2021, Video, February 2021

• Living in the EU: Work before the coronavirus crisis, Video, July 2020

• The future of work (europa.eu), Ideas paper, February 2021

Migration

• Migrant seasonal workers in the European agricultural sector – Think Tank (europa.eu), Briefing, February 2021
• Vulnerability of unaccompanied and separated child migrants (europa.eu), Briefing, April 2021
• EU policies to fight racial discrimination, Briefing, March 2021
• The external dimension of the new pact on migration and asylum: A focus on prevention and readmission, Policy Podcast, May 2021

• Search and rescue in the Mediterranean, Policy Podcast, February 2021

Values and Rights, Rule of Law, Security

• EU civil protection capabilities, Ideas paper, July 2020
• Protecting EU common values within the Member States, Video, February 2021

• The road to LGBTI equality, Video, May 2021

• The rights of LGBTI people in the European Union (europa.eu), Briefing, November 2020
• EU legislation and policies to fight racial and ethnic discrimination, Policy Podcast, April 2021

Digital Transformation

• What is a smart village?, Video, April 2021

• Workplace Monitoring In The Era Of Artificial Intelligence, Video, February 2021

• Potentially negative effects of internet use, Video, November 2020

• Regulating digital gatekeepers: Background on the future digital markets act, Policy Podcast, January 2021

Education, Culture, Youth and Sport

• Digital Cultural diversity, Briefing, April 2021
• Lifelong Learning, Video, March 2021

• The future of tertiary education in Europe, Video, November 2020

• Lifelong Learning, Animated infographic, January 2021

EU in the World

• Addressing violations of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (europa.eu), Ideas paper, September 2020
• Protecting, promoting and projecting Europe’s values and interests in the world, Ideas paper, September 2020
• Slowing down or changing track? Understanding the dynamics of ‘Slowbalisation’, Video, December 2020

• What is Strategic Autonomy?, Video, November 2020

• Peace and Security, Animated infographic, May 2021

European Democracy

• Addressing violations of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights (europa.eu), Ideas paper, September 2020
• What could be the future of democracy?, Video, September 2020

• Strengthening media freedom in the EU (europa.eu), Briefing, November 2020
• A practice of democracy – A selection of civic engagement initiatives, Study, June 2020

Written by Marie Lecerf with Stephanie Brenda-Smialowski.

© Zoran / Adobe Stock

The Roma are Europe’s largest ethnic minority. Out of an estimated total of 10 to12 million Roma in Europe, some 6 million live in the European Union (EU), most of whom are citizens of an EU Member State. A significant number of Roma people live in very poor socio-economic conditions. The social exclusion, discrimination and segregation they face are mutually reinforcing. Their restricted access to education, and difficulties in entering the labour market, result in low income and poor health compared with non-Roma people.

Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has stressed the need for better Roma inclusion. In 2011, a key EU initiative emerged with the adoption of an EU framework for national Roma integration strategies up to 2020, aimed at tackling the socio-economic exclusion of, and discrimination against, Roma by promoting equal access in four key areas: education, employment, health, and housing. As the framework had come to an end, the Commission adopted ‘A union of equality: EU Roma strategic framework for equality, inclusion and participation’ (2021‑2030) in early October 2020. Through this new strategy, Member States are invited to tackle the disproportionate impact of the pandemic. In March 2021, the Council adopted a recommendation on Roma equality, inclusion and participation, replacing an earlier one from 2013. This recommendation encourages Member States to adopt strategic frameworks for the inclusion of Roma communities and to communicate them to the Commission by September 2021. The EU also supports Member States in their duty to improve the lives of all vulnerable people, including Roma people, through the European structural and investment funds and other funding instruments.

Issues related to the promotion of democratic values and practices towards Roma, as well as their economic, social and cultural rights, have received particular attention from civil society organisations, while Parliament has advocated for Roma since the 1990s.

Read this briefing on ‘Understanding EU action on Roma inclusion‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski.

© PX Media / Adobe Stock

A year and a quarter after the Covid-19 pandemic first broke out, the disease continues to wreak havoc in many countries around the world. The process of vaccination continues at varying speeds across the globe, but with a clear discrepancy between rich and poor countries. Significant pressure is being applied by NGOs, international institutions and a number of national governments to help poor countries with vaccinations, notably because of actual or potential dangerous mutations of the coronavirus. Meanwhile, the EU institutions are close to finalising a ‘digital green certificate’ to facilitate safe and free movement between Member States, by providing proof that a person has either been vaccinated against Covid-19, received a negative test result, or recovered from the disease and carries antibodies.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the coronavirus and related issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous edition in this series, published in February 2021.

A new multilateralism for the post-Covid world: What role for the EU-Africa partnership?
European Think Tank Group, April 2021

Built to order: How Europe can rebuild multilateralism after Covid-19
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

Under cover of Covid, Poland is stifling free media – and all Europe should be worried
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2021

Belt and Road in Kenya: Covid-19 sparks a reckoning with debt and dissatisfaction
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021

A year on, the ‘Color of Covid’ still matters
Council on Foreign Relations, March 2021

The military in the time of Covid-19: Versatile, vulnerable, and vindicating
Egmont, March 2021

Towards cutting-edge European humanitarian leadership
Egmont, March 2021

African intra and inter-continental migration during Covid-19
Egmont, February 2021

The unequal inequality impact of the Covid-19 pandemic
Bruegel, March 2021

An update: Vaccination in the EU
Bruegel, March 2021

Persistent Covid-19: Exploring potential economic implications
Bruegel, March 2021

When and how to unwind Covid support measures to the banking system?
Bruegel, March 2021

Self-employment, Covid-19, and the future of work for knowledge workers
Bruegel, March 2021

The EU’s fiscal stance, its recovery fund, and how they relate to the fiscal rules
Bruegel, March 2021

The impact of Covid-19 on the Internal Market
Bruegel, March 2021

New EU insolvency rules could underpin business rescue in the Covid-19 aftermath
Bruegel, March 2021

Covid-19 credit-support programmes in Europe’s five largest economies
Bruegel, February 2021

Aiming for zero Covid-19: Europe needs to take action
Bruegel, February 2021

Will Covid accelerate productivity growth?
Bruegel, February 2021

Everything will be different: How the pandemic is changing EU economic governance
Jacques Delors Institute, February 2021

Spending EU subsidies well: A challenge for member states
Jacques Delors Institute, February 2021

A European vaccine passport? A healthy debate
Jacques Delors Institute, February 2021

Why Europe should spend big like Biden
Centre for European Reform, March 2021

How Greece can recover from Covid
Centre for European Reform, February 2021

The EU’s troubled leadership: You get what you pay for
Centre for European Reform, February 2021

An unequal recovery would be politically explosive
Centre for European Reform, January 2021

Trade policy and medical supplies during Covid-19
Chatham House, February 2021

Managing global liquidity through Covid-19 and beyond
Chatham House, February 2021

Prioritizing equity after Covid-19
Chatham House, February 2021

Fiscal policy and the post-Covid-19 recovery
Chatham House, February 2021

The Covid-19 pandemic and trends in technology
Chatham House, February 2021

The geo-economics and geopolitics of Covid-19: Implications for European security
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 2021

The European Union in the Covid-19 storm: Economic, political and stability challenges
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2021

Covid-19 vaccine race: The black market opportunity
International Institute for Strategic Studies, February 2021

Non-standard workers and the self-employed in the EU: Social protection during the Covid-19 pandemic
European Trade Union Institute, February 2021

Covid-19 and conservation: Crisis response strategies that benefit people and nature
German Development Institute, February 2021

Health and public communication in the era of conspiracy theories
EUROPEUM, February 2021

Covid 19 and Europewide income disparities
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, February 2021

Economic Assessment of the Euro Area
EURORAME, 2021

2020: Das schwierige Covid-19-Jahr auf dem Westbalkan
Österreichische Institut für Internationale Politik, January 2021

Impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on EU industries
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2021

What can the ECB achieve in a lockdown recession?
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2021

Vaccines: How to use market-based incentives to ramp up production
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2021

A transatlantic cure to the pandemic and structural global health
Clingendael, March 2021

One year in, Covid-19’s uneven spread across the US continues
Brookings Institution, March 2021

Getting the Covid-19 vaccine: Progress, and equity questions for the next phase
Brookings Institution, March 2021

Putting girls at the center of the Covid-19 pandemic response in Africa
Brookings Institution, March 2021

Read this briefing on ‘Coronavirus: Latest developments‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Vera Vikolainen.

© j-mel / Adobe Stock

This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission’s impact assessment (IA) accompanying the above-mentioned communication on the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change (new adaptation strategy), which aims to realise the 2050 vision of a climate-resilient EU. The IA was published on 24 February 2021 and was subsequently referred to the European Parliament’s Committee on Environment, Pubic Health and Food Safety (ENVI).

The Commission’s communication builds on Article 4 of the proposal for a European climate law regulation, which requires the Member States and the EU to enhance their adaptive capacity, strengthen their resilience and reduce their vulnerability to climate change. The new EU adaptation strategy was first announced in the European Green Deal communication in December 2019. The European Parliament welcomed the new strategy as a key component of the EU’s climate policy in its resolution of 17 December 2020 and called for a renewed and improved focus on climate adaptation. The Council, meanwhile, repeatedly stressed the need for further action on adaptation, most recently in January 2020. The new strategy on adaptation to climate change is part of the 2021 Commission work programme.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Establishing the new EU strategy on adaptation to climate change‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© beeboys / Adobe Stock

Following the forced landing of a Ryanair flight by Belarusian authorities on 23 May, Belarus became the central topic on the first day of the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021. EU leaders strongly condemned the ‘unprecedented and unacceptable incident’, and were united in imposing further sanctions on Belarus. As regards Russia, the European Council reconfirmed the five principles guiding the EU’s policy since 2016 and asked the High Representative and the European Commission to present a ‘report with policy options’ by June 2021. On EU-UK relations, EU leaders called on the European Commission to continue to monitor closely the implementation of the two agreements concluded with the UK. On foreign affairs, they also discussed the situations in the Middle East and in Mali, as well as the forthcoming EU-US summit. The leaders’ primary focus on the second day was the fight against the coronavirus pandemic, with the European Council calling for rapid implementation of the EU Digital Covid Certificate, the revision of the Council Recommendation on travel within the EU by mid-June 2021 and accelerated global access to coronavirus vaccines. Finally, regarding climate policy, despite renewed support for the 2030 and 2050 climate targets, diverging views on national efforts to achieve the objectives set remained apparent.

1.     General aspects and new commitments

In accordance with Article 235(2) TFEU, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, addressed the European Council at the start of its proceedings. As President-in-Office of the Council, the Portuguese Prime Minister, António Costa, provided an overview of progress made on implementing previous European Council conclusions. As of 12 May 2021, Bulgaria has an interim government and, following established practice, the President, Rumen Radev, represented the country rather than the interim Prime Minister.

Table 1 – New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule Policy area Action Actor Schedule Covid-19 Revision of the Council Recommendation on travel within the EU Council Mid-June 2021 Russia Presentation of a report with policy options on EU-Russia relations High Representative and the Commission June 2021 2.     European Council meeting EU coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic Production, delivery and deployment of vaccines

EU leaders took note of the improved general epidemiological situation (i.e. fewer confirmed coronavirus cases and hospitalisations) and accelerated vaccine delivery across the EU. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, updated EU leaders on the production, delivery and deployment of vaccines. As of 21 May 2021, 241.3 million doses of vaccine had been delivered to the EU Member States, 211.4 million administered, and 40.7 % of the adult EU population had received at least one dose. By the end of July, there should be enough doses for 70 % of the EU’s adult population to be vaccinated. In order to ensure the gradual reopening of European society, EU leaders stressed the need to remain vigilant regarding the emergence and spread of variants, for which vaccine production and adequate supply will be key. EU leaders also considered the vaccination of minors, and President von der Leyen announced that the approval of the first vaccination for 12 to 15 year-old children by the European Medicines Agency (EMA) was expected as early as the end of May.

EU Digital Covid Certificate

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, EU leaders welcomed the deal reached on 21 May 2021 between the European Parliament and the Council on the EU Digital Covid Certificate, calling for its rapid implementation. President von der Leyen confirmed that the IT infrastructure would be ready at EU level as of 1 June, and that Member States would be able to connect from mid-June. With the same aim of facilitating travel throughout the Union, EU leaders welcomed the agreement on the revision of the Council Recommendation on non-essential travel into the EU, and called for the revision of the Council Recommendation on travel within the EU by mid-June 2021.

International solidarity on vaccines

EU Heads of State or Government recalled that the EU was the largest exporter of Covid-19 vaccines to the rest of the world and pledged to continue efforts to increase global vaccine production capacities. The European Council called for work to be stepped up to ensure equitable global access to Covid-19 vaccines, reiterating the EU’s commitment to step up vaccine sharing to support third countries through COVAX, a global vaccine procurement facility. President von der Leyen announced that the pharmaceutical companies Biontech/Pfizer, Moderna, and Johnson and Johnson had committed to deliver 1.3 billion doses of vaccine, on a non-profit basis for low income countries, and at low cost for middle-income countries.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli welcomed the initial agreement on the Digital Covid Certificate, as this will avoid a patchwork of national solutions. Regarding vaccine exports, he invited the G20 Global Health Forum to follow the example of the EU by exporting vaccines to low- and middle-income countries. He expressed the view that production should be enhanced in these countries in the medium term, including by allowing for mandatory sharing of licences for this purpose – using the flexibility already allowed within the World Trade Organization’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement.

Climate change

The European Council reaffirmed its conclusions from December 2020, welcomed the co-legislators’ agreement on the EU climate law and invited the European Commission ‘to put forward its legislative package’ (Fit for 55). EU leaders welcomed the US’s return to the Paris Agreement and called on international partners ‘to increase their ambition ahead of the COP26 meeting in Glasgow’.

In recent years, the European Council has managed to steadily and progressively reach agreement on the EU climate goals for 2030 (a 55 % greenhouse gas emissions reduction compared with 1990 levels) and for 2050 (EU climate neutrality). This progress was welcomed by Ursula von der Leyen, who stressed that agreement was nevertheless still needed on how best to achieve the goals set. The Prime Minister of Italy, Mario Draghi, along with other members, questioned whether the European Council should continue with granular technical debates or allow the Environment Council to address climate-related technical matters. Perennial Member State sensitivities were reflected in the final conclusions, which were less ambitious than initially expected, providing no additional guidance to the Commission before its submission of the legislative package.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli stressed that Parliament was ‘working on legislative proposals’, negotiating the EU climate law and had reached an agreement with the Council on the 2030 climate target. He reminded the European Council that it should refrain from using its conclusions, which are not legally binding, to interfere with the legislative process.

Migration

Following events in the Mediterranean and the Spanish territory of Ceuta, EU leaders briefly addressed migration, with Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sanchez providing an update on the situation in Ceuta. After the meeting, European Council President Charles Michel reported that EU leaders had reaffirmed full support for the Spanish Government and stressed that ‘Spanish borders are European borders’. The leaders agreed to return to migration at their 24-25 June 2021 meeting.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: To be able to ‘save human lives’, David Sassoli called for a European search and rescue mechanism at sea, a European resettlement system and a genuine European migration reception policy.

External relations Belarus

Belarus was a last-minute addition to the agenda at the request of Poland. EU leaders strongly condemned the Belarusian authorities’ action in diverting and forcing the landing in Minsk on 23 May of an Athens-Vilnius flight, operated by the Irish airline Ryanair using a Polish registered aircraft, as well as the detention of Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega, demanding their immediate release. Ursula von der Leyen stated that ‘in the European Council, the judgement was unanimous: This is an attack on democracy. This is an attack on freedom of expression. And this is an attack on European sovereignty’. In a communiqué prior to the meeting, Charles Michel had already spoken of an ‘unacceptable, shocking and scandalous’ event and a ‘threat against the safety of international civil aviation’, and condemned the detention of Raman Pratasevich. The President of Lithuania, Gitanas Nausėda, and the Prime Minister of Poland, Mateusz Morawiecki, qualified Belarus’s behaviour as ‘state terrorism’. The Prime Minister of Greece, Kyriakos Mitsotakis, called for ‘clear and severe consequences for Belarus’, this call was echoed by the Taoiseach of Ireland, Micheál Martin.

In its conclusions, the European Council called on the International Civil Aviation Organization to investigate the forced landing of the Ryanair flight, on the Council to ban Belarusian airlines from operating at EU airports and from using EU airspace, and on EU-based carriers ‘to avoid overflight of Belarus’. They expressed their intention to ‘remain seized of the matter’, expressed solidarity with Latvia for the ‘unjustified expulsion of Latvian diplomats’, and agreed that the Council should proceed ‘to adopt additional listings of persons and entities’ as well as targeted economic sanctions, for which the High Representative and the European Commission have yet to submit a proposal. President von der Leyen emphasised that the €3 billion investment and economic package planned for the country had been ‘frozen until Belarus turns democratic’.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli stated that the events in Minsk were of ‘unprecedented gravity’, demanding the ‘immediate and unconditional release’ of Raman Pratasevich and Sofia Sapega. He called for EU unity, and stressed that an international investigation was necessary to determine ‘if there has been a violation of the Chicago Convention‘.

Russia

As flagged up in the EPRS Outlook, EU leaders held a strategic debate on relations with Russia during which they reaffirmed ‘the EU’s unity and solidarity’ and reiterated their ‘commitment to the five principles‘ guiding the EU’s Russia policy since 2016. They tasked the High Representative, Josep Borrell, and the European Commission with preparing and presenting a ‘report with policy options’ for the European Council’s consideration at its meeting in June 2021. President Michel stressed that EU leaders condemned Russia’s ‘illegal, provocative and destructive activities’, and expressed solidarity and support for Czechia and Eastern partners. President von der Leyen pointed to Russia’s assertive behaviour, which ‘is consistently challenging both our interests and our values’.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli spoke of a ‘changeable moment’ in international relations, calling for a ‘common European voice’. He underlined that ‘an attack on a Member State is an attack on us all’ and that ‘the safety of one is the safety of all’. He demanded the immediate release of Alexei Navalny, pointed to the rise in disinformation activities and underlined that ‘Parliament has always stressed that our strategic interests go hand in hand with our values’.

United Kingdom

The European Council reaffirmed the EU’s intention to have ‘as close as possible a partnership with the UK’, and committed to maintaining EU-UK relations on its agenda at future meetings. EU leaders reaffirmed that the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement and the Withdrawal Agreement offered the basis for cooperation with the UK. They invited the European Commission to ensure the full implementation of the two agreements, in particular with respect to ‘EU citizens’ rights, fisheries and level playing field’. Ursula von der Leyen pointed to tensions ‘felt around the access for example of EU fishing boats’, while Charles Michel expressed the EU’s support for ‘fair implementation in the letter and the spirit of the [trade and cooperation] agreement’.

Middle East

EU leaders briefly discussed the situation in the Middle East, welcomed the brokered ceasefire, committed to supporting a political solution, along with international partners, and reiterated, for the first time since their December 2017 meeting, the EU’s commitment to the ‘two-state solution’.

Mali

EU leaders supported the joint ECOWAS-AU-MINUSMA statement on Mali, condemned the kidnapping of Mali’s interim President, Bah N’Daw, and acting Prime Minister, Moctar Ouane, and stressed that targeted measures could be taken regarding those stalling the transition.

United States

EU leaders prepared for the forthcoming meeting with the US to be held in June 2021. Ursula von der Leyen indicated the topics that could be discussed with the US President, Joe Biden, which might include external relations, security and defence, climate and trade.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

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Citizens frequently turn to the European Parliament to ask what the European Union is doing to fight cancer.

Cancer is the second cause of death in the European Union, after cardiovascular diseases. As far back as 1985, the European Union has been fighting the causes and consequences of cancer, even though the main responsibility for health policies lies primarily at national level. Thanks to the dedication of its Members, the European Parliament has passed legislation and made funding available that have helped improve national action plans on the prevention, early detection, diagnosis and treatment of cancer. The EU has also invested in cancer research.

Members of the European Parliament against cancer

Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) have shown a genuine interest in the fight against cancer. They hold informal discussions in cross-party groupings such as the Cancer Intergroup (see the list of Members) and ‘MEPs Against Cancer (MAC) Interest Group’.

In June 2020, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Beating Cancer (see related press release). The main objective of the Special Committee is to enable the EU to take concrete actions on tackling cancer and its effects on people’s lives. Its work includes identifying legislation and other measures that can help prevent and combat cancer, and looking into the best ways to support research. The final report including findings and suggestions is expected to be adopted by the end of 2021.

EU legislation

The European Union has put in place many measures to improve the prevention, diagnosis and treatment outcomes of cancer, such as:

Patient’s safety and treatment

• Improving healthcare systems, through standards on patient safety and quality of care and rules on patients’ rights in cross-border healthcare.
• Promoting cancer screening in the EU.
• Maintaining safety and quality standards of pharmaceuticals: rules on clinical trials of medicinal products and law on safety standards in EU clinical trials; rules on the authorisation, import and production of medicines; law on medicinal products for paediatric use; rules on safe production of medicines and experimental treatment.
• Ensuring health security for blood, tissues and organs.

Prevention

• Introducing tighter rules on tobacco, including rules on tobacco advertising and sponsorship, and smoke-free environments.
• Guaranteeing a safe workplace: rules limiting the exposure of workers to asbestos, to carcinogens and mutagens, to chemical agents, to artificial optical radiation, to biological agents, and to risks from electromagnetic fields.

Diet and lifestyle

• Regulating nutrition and health claims made on foods.
• Making food supplements available in the EU safe.
• Reducing obesity (including childhood obesity) by promoting a healthy diet and activity, and healthy lifestyles.
• Reducing the use of endocrine disruptors: law on safe and effective fertilisers, pesticide safety, pesticide residues in human food, safe biocides, and rules on fighting water pollution from agricultural nitrates.
• Regulating foods for infants, young children and special medical purposes, as well as total diet replacement for weight control.
• Ensuring high quality foods: law on food safety from farm to fork; law on the labelling of foodstuffs; law on traceability and labelling of GMOs; law on food additives; laws on chemicals and contaminants (e.g. acrylamid, mercury, hormones, residues).

Environment

• Implementing rules on cleaner air for Europe and limiting pollutants in the air, including sulphur dioxide, nitrogen oxides and dust particles from medium combustion plants, volatile organic compounds (more details here).
• Preserving forests with an EU Forest Strategy: timber law combatting illegal logging and a plan preventing deforestation.
• Promoting cleaner road transports: law on cleaner fuels; law on reducing pollution from cars and vans; emission performance standards and fuel consumption standards for heavy-duty vehicles (e.g. tractors, trailers); rules on clean and energy-efficient road transport vehicles.
• Promoting cleaner water-based transports’ rules on safer and less polluting equipment on EU ships; strategy on inland waterway
• Setting up public-private partnerships to develop cleaner aircraft and to boost research and innovation in rail.

Cancer: EU budget for 2021-2027

In February 2021, the European Commission published its vision for the fight against cancer in ‘Europe’s Beating Cancer plan’. It aims to reduce inequalities between and within EU countries regarding screening, access to treatment, and social/financial support for patients after recovery. It has its own budget of €4 billion and will finance, amongst others: establishing an EU network of youth cancer survivors, addressing fair access for cancer survivors to financial services (including insurance), updating the 2003 Council recommendation on cancer screening and updating the European code against cancer.

In March 2021, the European Parliament also approved the EU4Health programme, which covers the 2021-2027 period with a budget of €5.1 billion (see press release); €1.25 billion of which will be allocated to the Beating Cancer plan.

In the field of cancer research, another €2 billion have been earmarked in the European research and innovation programme Horizon Europe (replacing the ‘Horizon 2020’ programme).

Further information

• Cancer: What Europe does for me – #EUandME, European Parliament
• World Cancer Day: how the EU is fighting cancer, European Parliament
• Europe’s Beating Cancer plan: Quick overview and initial reactions, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Briefing, March 2021
• Europe’s Beating Cancer plan – Pre-legislative synthesis of national, regional and local positions on the European Commission proposal, European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Briefing, November 2020
• Alcohol labelling – European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), Briefing, April 2021
• Cancer, European Commission

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us

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Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochaka.

© European Union 2021 – Source : EP/Jan VAN DE VEL

A number of important debates were held during the May 2021 plenary session, in particular on Parliament’s rights to information regarding the ongoing assessment of the national recovery and resilience plans, on a revised industrial strategy for Europe and on recent migrant deaths in the Mediterranean. Members also held a debate on possible waiving of the WTO TRIPS agreement on Covid‑19 vaccines to help developing countries fight the pandemic; on business taxation; and on Roma equality in the EU. Two joint debates took place, on hydrogen and energy strategies, and on data protection adequacy. Members debated a statement by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission, on the EU position on the Israel-Palestine conflict. A number of programmes under the multiannual financial framework were approved, and debates and votes were also held, inter alia, on the impacts of climate change on vulnerable populations in developing countries, on the digital single market, consumer use of artificial intelligence and on company liability for environmental damage.

EU strategies on hydrogen and energy system integration

Following a joint debate, Members voted on Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) own-initiative reports on developing EU strategies on hydrogen and on energy system integration. The transport, buildings and industry sectors still rely heavily on the use of fossil fuels, a situation that should change if the EU is to reach its climate-neutrality ambition. The ITRE committee report states that an EU hydrogen strategy should be based on clean hydrogen and requires measures to speed up hydrogen market and value chain development. The committee also underlined the need to balance energy systems and to ensure energy accessibility. Crucial energy efficiencies could be achieved through investing in upgraded EU energy infrastructure, storage and interconnections, as well as encouraging consumers to play their part too, for instance by contributing to energy production.

International transfers of personal data

Members debated and adopted two resolutions concerning international transfers of personal data. A first resolution, tabled by Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), concerned the Schrems II ruling, which forbids the transfer of personal data to a non-EU country (the United States in this case), without an equivalent level of data protection. The resolution maintains Parliament’s position that, without reform, surveillance laws in the USA prevent the European Commission adopting a new adequacy decision. The interim solution found since the United Kingdom became a third country runs out next month. In light of the Commission’s much-criticised draft adequacy decision, a second resolution calls for improvements to the draft decision before it can be adopted, in view of the UK’s level of data protection.

Draft amending Budget No 2/2021: Covid‑19 response, multiannual financial framework adjustment, and mobilisation of the EU Solidarity Fund

Parliament adopted draft amending Budget No 2/2021, along with a decision mobilising the EU Solidarity Fund to provide assistance to those hit by natural disasters in France and Greece, and to help 17 Member States and 3 accession countries face the impact of the coronavirus pandemic. Among other issues, the amending budget sets aside financing for the EU Covid‑19 response, including the provisional deal on an EU digital Covid certificate to facilitate free movement in Europe during the pandemic. However, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets also regretted that the Commission had combined so many urgent issues and technical adjustments in a single amending budget.

Access to justice in environmental matters

Members debated and voted on the amendments adopted by the Environment Committee (ENVI) to the report on access to justice on environmental issues under the Aarhus Convention, as well as on plenary amendments, but postponed the vote on the legislative resolution. The file is therefore referred back to the ENVI committee for interinstitutional negotiations. Changes proposed by the Parliament would inter alia open up the review mechanism to allow qualified members of the public other than NGOs to challenge acts that breach environmental law.

Just Transition Fund

Members debated and approved the interinstitutional agreement on the Just Transition Fund, the compromise reached with the Council. Parliament has had considerable input in the final agreement, securing voluntary top-ups from cohesion policy, conditionality on climate neutrality, higher co-financing rates and a new Green Rewarding Mechanism. While Parliament’s ambitions for a larger budget did not prevail, the final agreement nevertheless allocates €17.5 billion to helping workers who lose their jobs in fossil fuel production, as well as the transformation to clean energy technologies.

Creative Europe programme 2021-2027

Parliament debated and approved the Creative Europe programme for 2021‑2027 at second-reading stage. Parliament is keen to continue support for the European Union Youth Orchestra and seeks a special focus on the music industry and cinema, with a €1 842 million budget (36 % more than the previous programme) to support cultural projects, in an area hard-hit by the Covid‑19 pandemic.

Erasmus+ 2021-2027

Members debated and approved one of the EU’s most known and best-loved programmes, the regulation on Erasmus+, at second reading. Parliament secured an extra €1.7 billion for the flagship policy and insisted on ensuring the inclusion of young people with fewer opportunities in the target of 12 million participants.

European Solidarity Corps 2021-2027

Parliament also debated and approved the proposed revision of the European Solidarity Corps Regulation at second reading. Parliament’s negotiators have secured a number of modifications to focus the programme on volunteering opportunities for young people in solidarity and humanitarian projects, particularly outside their home country, including a 15 % increase on the previous budget.

Fiscalis programme 2021-2027

Parliament debated and approved Council’s first-reading position, without amendments, as an early second-reading agreement on the Fiscalis programme for 2021‑2027. The programme’s goal is to improve the operation of tax policy (including administrative cooperation with regard to taxes) and support tax authorities. The €269 million budget will enhance administrative and information technology capacity, as well as operational cooperation.

Turkey: 2019 and 2020 country reports

Members debated and adopted a resolution on the European Commission’s latest country reports on Turkey. The 2019 and 2020 reports on Turkey reflect the strained nature of EU relations with the country in the light of backsliding on democratic values and tensions in the eastern Mediterranean. While Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) has many concerns regarding Turkey’s commitment to the rule of law, democratic values and women’s rights, it has also pointed out that Turkey is hosting some 4 million refugees. Until relations improve however, accession talks are effectively at a standstill, and prospects for modernisation of the Customs Union remain suspended.

Montenegro: 2019 and 2020 country reports

Members debated and adopted a resolution on the European Commission’s latest country reports on Montenegro. A candidate for accession since 2008, the Commission’s reports on Montenegro show progress in accession negotiations and demonstrable respect for democratic standards in recent elections. Nevertheless, the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) is critical of the lack of progress on freedom of expression and media freedom in the country.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg.

© rarrarorro / Adobe Stock

The special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021 will concentrate on climate policy, hold a strategic debate on relations with Russia, continue its coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic and review the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Regarding climate, EU leaders are expected to take stock of progress made in adopting the EU climate law and give further guidelines on and impetus to EU climate action and policy. The strategic debate on relations with Russia comes at a moment when bilateral relations have reached a new low, and the EU is reviewing its threat perception as part of the ongoing Strategic Compass exercise. The leaders’ discussions on the EU’s response to the coronavirus pandemic will include vaccines, international solidarity and the EU Digital Covid Certificate, which has recently been provisionally agreed on by the co-legislators.

Background and agenda of the special European Council meeting of 24‑25 May 2021

On 23 April 2021, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, called a special European Council to be held on 25 May 2021; it was subsequently announced on 9 May, that the meeting would commence on the evening of 24 May. The European Council’s rules of procedure permit the European Council President to convene a ‘special’ meeting of the European Council ‘when the situation so requires’. Special European Councils are ‘formal’ meetings, as are ‘ordinary’ European Council meetings, and generally deliver a set of conclusions. Two key differences however are that special meetings are usually not planned long in advance, and the President is not obliged to submit an annotated draft agenda four weeks in advance of a special meeting.

The 24‑25 May special meeting needs to be seen in the context of the forthcoming ordinary European Council meeting of 24‑25 June 2021. Some of the agenda points of the May European Council, notably Russia and the implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, were scheduled to be discussed in June, but have been brought forward. This is probably both an attempt to lighten the June agenda and to give EU leaders the possibility to return to one of these issues for further discussion if needed.

In light of recent developments in the Spanish territory of Ceuta, where 6 000 migrants from Morocco illegally entered Spain, EU Heads of State or Government might also address migration in this specific context. The European Council President, Charles Michel, has already expressed the European Union’s support to Spain.

One outstanding task for the European Council is to define the strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning within the area of freedom, security and justice, as required by Article 68 TFEU. The European Council had been expected to adopt the new ‘strategic guidelines for legislative and operational planning‘ within the area of freedom, security and justice in spring 2020, but more than a year later and despite the 15 European Council meetings held in the meantime, EU leaders have still not complied with this Treaty obligation.

Main issues EU coordination efforts in response to the coronavirus pandemic

This will be the 17th time the European Council addresses the coronavirus crisis in a period of just over 12 months, underlining its role as Covid‑19 crisis manager. EU leaders will most likely refer to the improved general epidemiological situation and the accelerated pace of vaccinations, but also call for vigilance regarding the emergence and spread of virus variants.

Production, delivery and deployment of vaccines

The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, is expected to update the EU Heads of State or Government on the production and delivery of vaccines in the EU. On 18 May 2021, 237.5 million doses of vaccine had been delivered to the EU Member States, 199.6 million administered, and 38.7 % of the adult EU population had received at least one dose. EU leaders will most likely be informed about the Commission’s second legal action of 11 May (the first was introduced on 26 April 2021) against the vaccine manufacturer AstraZeneca over delayed deliveries.

To complement the EU strategy for Covid‑19 vaccines, on 6 May 2021, the European Commission published a new EU strategy on Covid‑19 therapeutics, a reinforced and strategic approach to developing, manufacturing and procuring safe and effective Covid‑19 therapeutics at EU level.

EU digital green certificate

As flagged up in the EPRS briefing on the 7-8 May Porto Summit, EU leaders will revert to the topic of the proposed regulation on the digital green certificate, now to be called the EU Digital Covid Certificate. Following the breakthrough in interinstitutional negotiations (trilogue meetings) between the co-legislators on 20 May 2021, after three inconclusive trilogue meetings, EU leaders are expected to welcome the deal reached between the European Parliament and the Council and call for its rapid implementation.

The co-legislators had each adopted very different negotiating positions (Council on 14 April and Parliament on 29 April 2021), and in bridging these views the compromise reached covers:

• Charges for the polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test: While ‘free of charge testing’, a key demand of the Parliament, was not agreed on, at least €100 million from the Emergency Support Instrument will be made available to purchase tests. The average cost for a travel-related PCR test currently differs significantly across the EU, costing between €100 and €160 in the Netherlands or Ireland, but less than €50 in Belgium.
• Additional requirements: The co-legislators agreed that Member States should refrain from imposing additional restrictions unless necessary in order to protect public health, however EU governments can decide if certificate-holders arriving on their territory have to quarantine or get tested.
• Data protection safeguards:The deal provides for strong data protection safeguards, as the personal data obtained from the certificates cannot be stored in destination Member States and there will be no central database established at EU level.

International solidarity on vaccines

EU leaders will continue their debate on intellectual property rights for Covid‑19 vaccines, largely triggered by the United States’ 5 May 2021 announcement that it would support a temporary waiver of patent rights. Member States are divided on this proposal. Several of the European Parliament’s political groups have called on the Commission to ask for a waiver of intellectual property rights (IPR) for Covid‑19 vaccines to support global vaccination efforts. Parliament discussed the issue of a waiver on Covid‑19 vaccine patents on 19 May, and a vote on a resolution on this matter is planned for the Parliament’s June plenary session.

The European Council will most likely also reiterate its support for COVAX’s leading role in ensuring equitable global access to Covid‑19 vaccines, and stress the EU’s commitment to stepping up vaccine sharing to support third countries. To date, the EU and the Member States have pledged over €2.2 billion to COVAX.

Climate change

Back in December 2020, EU leaders took a landmark decision for the EU’s efforts to fight climate change and committed to reducing greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, as compared to 1990. They invited the co-legislators to include this target in the forthcoming European climate law and to adopt it ‘swiftly’. In the interim, the European Parliament and the Council have reached a provisional agreement, which confirms the 2030 target and tasks the European Commission with proposing ‘an intermediate climate target for 2040’, which should enable the EU to meet its long-term collective objective of climate-neutrality by 2050. However, Member States seem to be pursuing different strategies when it comes to collectively achieving climate targets. Spain, for instance, has committed ‘to end fossil fuel production by 2042’. At the same time, Poland has extended the lifespan of the Turów open-pit coal mine until 2044, despite an ongoing lawsuit filed with the European Court of Justice by Czechia for breach of EU law.  

At the same meeting in December 2020, EU leaders also committed ‘to adopt additional guidance’ and consider the future of the Effort-sharing Regulation. They are thus likely, during the special meeting of 24‑25 May 2021, to discuss national targets and efforts undertaken by the Member States to comply with the criteria of the Effort-sharing Regulation. EU leaders might also consider the European Commission’s communication on the blue economy, which aims to bring all partners together, including industry, to contribute to coastal and ocean development and fight climate change.

As part of the EU’s commitment to climate diplomacy and multilateralism, EU leaders are also likely to welcome the return of the United States to the Paris Agreement. Earlier this year, President Michel stressed that the EU was ‘the first bloc to commit to climate neutrality by 2050’, and welcomed the decision of the US President, Joe Biden, to ‘bring America back to the Paris Agreement’. Furthermore, EU leaders may use the meeting to prepare their position for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP26), which will take place in Glasgow in autumn 2021, and call for more ambitious international action on fighting climate change. European Commission Executive Vice-President, Frans Timmermans recently stressed that ‘climate change has a geopolitical dimension, climate policy is also security policy’. He warned that, unless effectively addressed, climate change may lead to future conflicts over ‘water and food’ in a generation or two.

Russia

EU leaders are expected to hold a strategic debate on relations with Russia. This debate was first scheduled to take place during the March 2021 ‘ordinary’ meeting of the European Council. Following the change of format from an in-person to a video-conference meeting owing to the challenging epidemiological situation across the EU, the Heads of State or Government agreed to postpone their discussion to ‘a forthcoming European Council meeting’ and were thus then only informed of the state of play of EU-Russia relations. The last time the European Council held a strategic debate on relations with Russia was in October 2016, when the tense situations in Syria and Ukraine overshadowed the debate. No conclusions were adopted at that time, a pattern which EU leaders might follow once again unless, as recently decided in the case of Turkey, they agree to task the Presidents of the European Council and the European Commission and the High Representative with producing a paper outlining policy options for the European Council’s further consideration.

The ‘five guiding principles’ defined in 2016, pursued since and reconfirmed earlier this year by the Foreign Affairs Council, frame the EU’s relations with Russia. Those principles are: i) the full implementation of the Minsk Agreements prior to the lifting of economic sanctions against Russia, ii) countering hybrid threats and disinformation originating in Russia, iii) support to civil society, iv) closer cooperation with Eastern Neighbourhood and central Asian countries, as well as v) cooperation with Russia on issues of mutual interest such as climate change.

In past years, EU leaders have monitored the implementation of the Minsk Agreements, deplored the lack of progress, expressed support for Ukraine’s territorial integrity and denounced Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea, whilst setting and maintaining sanctions. They have repeatedly called for a transparent, open and fair inquiry into the downing of flight MH17. They have also condemned disinformation activities; hybrid warfare tactics; human rights abuses, including the treatment of Alexei Navalny; as well as international law violations, notably the Salisbury attack. More recently, the Prime Minister of Czechia, Andrej Babiš, asked the European Council to condemn Russia for its involvement in explosions at an arms depot in his country in 2014. The leaders of the Bucharest Nine (B9) condemned Russia’s actions, whilst the Foreign Affairs Council expressed ‘solidarity’ with Czechia, a state Russia has recently declared as ‘unfriendly’. President Michel expressed ‘full solidarity with [the] Czech Republic’ and considered Russia’s decision regarding ‘states committing unfriendly acts’ as yet ‘another escalatory step’ undermining bilateral relations. EU Heads of State or Government could possibly condemn recent, as well as recently revealed, illegal and provocative Russian activities in Member States and beyond.

Implementation of the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement

Finally, the European Council will discuss the state of EU-UK relations and review the implementation of the trade and cooperation agreement with the United Kingdom (UK). The Trade and Cooperation Agreement was signed on 30 December 2020 by the European Union and the UK and was provisionally applied from 1 January 2021. It came fully into force on 1 May 2021, after the Parliament had formally approved, on 28 April 2021, the Council’s conclusion of the agreement. The debate in the European Council was initially scheduled for June 2021, but the item has been brought forward at the request of the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, following recent disputes between the UK and France over vaccine distribution and fisheries.

The European Council is expected to reiterate its desire to maintain as close as possible a partnership with the UK, and that it sees the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, together with the earlier Withdrawal Agreement and its Protocols, and their full implementation, as the foundation for this relationship.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outlook for the special European Council meeting of 24-25 May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mathilde BETANT-RASMUSSEN and Branislav STANICEK.

Twenty-five years after the establishment of the Barcelona Declaration, the Mediterranean region remains characterised by major security, political, economic and humanitarian challenges, both long-standing and of recent concern. The new EU agenda for the Mediterranean, presented by the European Commission in February 2021 and approved by the Council in April 2021, addressed both internal and external determinants, such as the pandemic, with the aim of relaunching the Barcelona process. The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) roundtable on ‘The new agenda for the Mediterranean: Building peace and resilience through dialogue and cooperation’, held on 12 May 2021, discussed strategies and challenges to overcoming the multifaceted challenges of the Mediterranean and achieving lasting regional stability. Etienne Bassot, Director of the Members’ Research Service introduced the event, which was moderated by Elena Lazarou, Acting Head of the External Policies Unit.

In her keynote speech, Roberta Metsola (EPP, Malta), First Vice-President of the European Parliament, emphasised the strategic importance of the Mediterranean region at the convergence between three continents and several global powers. Vice‑President Metsola outlined key priorities for the EU in the region, namely addressing climate change, migration, the division of Cyprus, Turkey’s increasingly aggressive unilateral actions and the Israel-Palestine conflict. Furthermore, she highlighted the EU’s potential to become a catalyst for peace processes in the Mediterranean, recalling that such involvement could only be successful if the EU managed to speak with one voice as an actor fostering a common foreign policy.

Olivier Roy, Professor and Chair of Mediterranean Studies at the European University Institute in Florence, opened the discussion, declaring that migration is the most pressing challenge in the Mediterranean. Professor Roy highlighted the importance of addressing the needs of second-and third-generation immigrants in the EU through integrating Islam as a European religion. He also touched upon the increasing ‘gatekeeper’ role EU migration policy played by transit countries and the urgent need for tailored migration policies that address different types of migration, including labour force migration, political refugees and irregular migration.

Pierre Mirel, an Associate Professor at Sciences Po Paris and Honorary Director-General of the European Commission, followed with a pertinent critical analysis of the EU’s new agenda for the Mediterranean. He outlined the ‘genealogy’ of the new communication and its relations with previously adopted EU strategies for the region. He echoed Professor Roy in highlighting migration as a central point of the new agenda and welcomed the inclusion of new priority elements, such as climate change, post‑coronavirus recovery and digital policy. However, Professor Mirel regretted the omission of some crucial aspects, including trade, regional economic cooperation, demographic challenges and the discrimination of minority groups from the new agenda, as well as a relatively low budget of €7 billion for the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbours covering all Southern Neighbourhood countries for 2021‑2027.

Daniel Fiott, Security and Defence Editor at the EU Institute for Security Studies in Paris, delved into the security and defence situation in the Mediterranean. He pointed out that eastern and southern security challenges are often interrelated and involve major regional and external players. He listed examples, including the Russian presence in Libya, Turkish troops in Libya and Syria, and Chinese investment in strategic Mediterranean ports. Any EU action must take account of the threat of external powers and the spillover effects of conflicts in providing a comprehensive and effective approach to regional security challenges.

Branislav Stanicek, Policy Analyst with the EPRS External Policies Unit, continued with an analysis of the geopolitical dimension of the new agenda, highlighting contested claims on eastern Mediterranean exclusive maritime zones. In facing the presence of global and regional powers, such as Russia, China and Turkey, the EU needs to secure its maritime presence in the Mediterranean. In the words of Paul Valéry, if the EU were lose its influence in the Mediterranean, its ‘Atlantic facade’ would be its only remaining maritime sphere and Europe would risk being reduced to ‘a small cape of the Asian continent’. On a cautionary yet optimistic note, he concluded by pointing to several upcoming elections in the region that could open up opportunities for political change, and potentially, peace. However, for successful EU action in the Mediterranean, increased cooperation and dialogue with civil society actors, including mayors and representatives of regions and cities is suggested. Furthermore, he recommended deeper engagement with religious actors and churches, which remain important anchors of peace and resilience.

Written by Costica Dumbrava and David de Groot,

© Sandra in the Sun / Adobe Stock

The Covid-19 crisis has had a severe impact on free movement in the EU. To address this issue, on 17 March 2021 the Commission issued a proposal to establish a ‘digital green certificate’ – a common framework for issuing, verifying and accepting interoperable health certificates. The certificate would include proof of vaccination, Covid-19 test results, and/or information that the holder has recovered from being ill with Covid-19. The proposal has been given priority by the co-legislators with a view to seeking to reach agreement and launch the certificate before summer 2021.

A temporary digital health certificate is seen as a less restrictive measure than others currently in place, such as entry bans, quarantine and business closures, and may allow for a gradual reopening of the economy. Whereas the initiative has been welcomed by some (such as the tourism and transport sectors), the certificate raises a number of concerns, in relation to its design, fundamental rights implications and overall usefulness.

This briefing discusses the Commission’s proposals and the initial positions of the EU co-legislators in the broader context. It analyses a number of key issues raised by the certificate, namely: its legal scope, the different types of certificates included in the overall digital green certificate, the risk of discrimination, data protection concerns, technical aspects, the timeframe and the overall added value of the certificates.

Read the complete briefing on ‘EU Covid-19 certificate: A tool to help restore the free movement of people across the European Union‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mar Negreiro (1st edition),

© Kaikoro / Adobe Stock

The Roaming Regulation established the ‘roam like at home’ (RLAH) rule that mandated the end of retail mobile roaming charges as of 15 June 2017 in all EU Member States and EEA countries. The regulation is currently in force until 30 June 2022. The application of the RLAH rule has been a success, boosting the use of mobile devices while travelling to other EU/EEA countries. For instance, the use of data roaming increased 17 times in the summer of 2019 compared with the summer preceding the abolition of roaming surcharges. However, in 2020, owing to the pandemic, the number of travellers across the EU decreased along with the need for roaming.

Nevertheless, five years after its implementation, the Commission needs to review the Roaming Regulation, with a view to extending the roaming market rules by 10 years. The Commission is also seeking to continue lowering wholesale roaming charges, improve the quality of roaming services offered to travellers, and provide access to all available network generations and technologies and improved transparency, including free access to emergency services and information on any cost incurred accessing value added services, among other things.

Within the European Parliament the file has been allocated to the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE).

Versions

• Roaming Regulation review (1st edition)

Roaming on public mobile communications networks within the Union (Recast) Committee responsible: Industry, Telecommunications, Research and Energy (ITRE) COM(2021) 085 24.1.2021 Rapporteur:

Angelika Winzig (EPP, Austria)

2021/0045 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Robert Hajšel (S&D, Slovakia) Izaskun Bilbao Barandica (Renew, Spain) Paolo Borchia (ID, Italy) Jordi Solé (Greens/EFA, Spain) Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, Czechia) Marisa Matias (The Left, Portugal) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Written by Matthew Parry,

© Wirestock / Adobe Stock

On 22 March 2021, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) announced sanctions on 10 individuals and 4 entities in the EU, including Members of the European Parliament and of the Council’s Political and Security Committee, that it said ‘severely harm China’s sovereignty and interests and maliciously spread lies and disinformation’. It described the sanctions as a response to EU sanctions imposed the same day on a Chinese entity and individuals accused of human rights abuses in Xinjiang (PRC). The dispute comes at a sensitive time in EU-China relations, raising questions about approval of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI), a proposed EU-China bilateral investment treaty.

Sanctions and counter-sanctions

The EU sanctions against which China retaliated with counter-sanctions were among the first uses of the EU Global Human Rights Sanctions Regime (GHRSR) established in December 2020. The GHRSR allows the Council of the EU to target foreign individuals and entities – both state and non-state actors – that it holds responsible for human rights violations. Targets of the 22 March sanctions included four Chinese individuals and one entity connected to the reported mass detention and persecution of the Uyghur ethnic minority in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, and were coordinated with equivalent sanctions by the United Kingdom, the United States and Canada. Third-country individuals listed under the GHRSR are subject to EU asset freezes and a travel ban to the EU, and EU entities are prohibited from making funds available to those listed. China’s counter-sanctions targeted, inter alia, Parliament’s Subcommittee on Human Rights; MEPs Reinhard Bütikofer (Greens/EFA, Germany), Michael Gahler (EPP, Germany), Raphaël Glucksmann (S&D, France), Ilhan Kyuchyuk (Renew, Bulgaria) and Miriam Lexmann (EPP, Slovakia); the Council’s Political and Security Committee, and a number of EU Member State Members of Parliament, think-tanks and academics. The counter-sanctions prohibit targets from entering PRC territory and from doing business with China. In a statement on Twitter later the same day, European Parliament President David Sassoli said the PRC’s sanctions were ‘unacceptable’ and would have ‘consequences’. On 23 March, Bütikofer, Chair of Parliament’s Delegation for Relations with the PRC, published a statement in which he declared it ‘obvious that the Delegation cannot go back to normal in its work’ until the counter-sanctions were lifted. He also co-signed a statement with other targeted MEPs reiterating ‘serious concerns’ about the human rights situation in Xinjiang, and urging the EU to keep human rights ‘at the core’ of its foreign policy.

Talks on approving the CAI unofficially on hold

The statements by Sassoli, Bütikofer and other MEPs were widely understood to have implications for the proposed EU-China CAI, agreed to ‘in principle’ in December 2020. Although neither the Council nor the European Commission has formally suspended the CAI approval process, Commission Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis said in early May that the political context was ‘not conducive‘ to ratification, suggesting CAI approval could be put on hold. This interpretation was however later denied by a Commission spokesperson. Parliament has tabled a motion for a resolution on the sanctions, due to be voted in plenary on 20 May.

What is the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI)?
Launched in January 2014 and conducted in 35 rounds over the course of seven years, EU-China negotiations on the CAI reached a conclusion ‘in principle’ in December 2020. The agreement is designed to improve reciprocity in market access and level the playing field for EU investors in China. It would replace a number of older bilateral investment treaties agreed between the PRC and EU Member States. The conclusion of negotiations on the CAI was already the subject of debate before the imposition of EU and PRC sanctions. Critics questioned the ambition of the PRC’s market access commitments, and the strength and enforceability of its climate and human rights commitments. For more, see the relevant EPRS ‘International Agreements in Progress’ briefing.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Chinese counter-sanctions on EU targets‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© luzitanija / Adobe Stock

Over the past two decades, the European Union (EU) has been entrusted with a growing number of objectives and responsibilities. However, ensuring financing of related activities through the EU budget has often proven problematic, as this has long been capped at around 1 % of the Union’s gross national income (GNI). During the preparation of the post-2020 EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), climate action, migration and border management were identified among the emerging priorities that required increased joint action and funding. The agreement on EU finances for 2021 to 2027 provides for a significant relative increase in the financial resources devoted to these policy areas. In absolute figures, the reinforcements are stronger for climate action than for migration and borders.

Underpinned by the European Green Deal strategy, climate action will receive the bulk of its resources through the incorporation of climate considerations and objectives across all relevant EU funding instruments (climate mainstreaming). Next Generation EU (NGEU), the temporary instrument to aid recovery from the coronavirus pandemic, will play a major role in the boost to climate-relevant resources. In total, these could amount to some €550 billion (in 2018 prices, corresponding to 30 % of total MFF and NGEU resources). For the first time, migration and border management have a dedicated heading, accounting for 2.1 % of MFF resources. Among other activities, additional allocations will contribute to the agreed reinforcement of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency.

Opinion surveys show that respondents see climate change and migration among the main global challenges for the EU, but there are gaps between perceptions and expectations of the role of the EU budget in these two domains. The European Parliament, which is a strong advocate of a robust EU budget commensurate with the Union’s responsibilities, managed to secure additional resources for instruments relevant to both groups of policies, as well as the enhancement of the climate mainstreaming methodology. The Parliament plays a key role in shaping and scrutinising how the funding allocated to the policy areas is implemented. Other measures to reinforce the EU budget’s capacity to deliver in the areas of climate action, migration and borders seek to improve synergies between budgetary instruments.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Matching priorities and resources in the EU budget: Climate action, migration and borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Components of Heading 4: Final agreement, including top-ups, and 2014 2020 allocations (€ billion, rounded, 2018 prices, EU 27)
• Perceived and desired EU budget expenditure on climate/environment and immigration (% of respondents)
• Climate mainstreaming: Estimated contributions from 2021 2027 MFF and NGEU, contribution from 2014 2020 MFF (€ billion, rounded, 2018 prices)

Written by Christiaan van Lierop (1st edition),

© ktsdesign / Adobe Stock

As part of the preparations for the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, the European Council agreed in July 2020 to create a Brexit adjustment reserve within the special instruments outside the budget ceilings of the European Union’s multiannual financial framework, with a budget of €5 billion to counter unforeseen and adverse consequences in Member States and sectors that are most affected.

The European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation on the Brexit adjustment reserve on 25 December 2020. Under the proposal, the reserve will support public expenditure incurred by Member States from 1 July 2020 to 31 December 2022 for eligible measures, which include support for affected sectors, training, or new border facilities. Funding will be available for all Member States, distributed in two allocation tranches, with 80 % of the resources due to be allocated to Member States in the form of pre-financing, to be disbursed in 2021. Each country’s pre-financing allocation is calculated based on the importance of its trade with the United Kingdom (UK) and, where applicable, its dependence on fisheries in UK waters. All Member States will have to submit an application for funding by 30 September 2023, and those whose eligible expenditure exceeds both the pre-financing amount and 0.06 % of their national gross domestic product will be eligible for an additional contribution, to be paid in 2024.

Versions

• Brexit adjustment reserve (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing the Brexit adjustment reserve Committee responsible: Regional Development (REGI) COM(2020) 854 final 25.12.2020 Rapporteur:

Pascal Arimont (EPP, Belgium)

2020/0380 (COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Tsvetelina Penkova (S&D, Bulgaria) Irène Tolleret (Renew, France) François Alfonsi (Greens/EFA, France) Raffaele Fitto (ECR, italy) Martina Michels (The Left, Germany) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of Committee report

Written by Martin Russell and Ionel Zamfir,

Andrey Sakharov was a Soviet physicist who played a leading role in his country’s nuclear weapons programme. However, in the 1960s he fell out of favour with the regime due to his activism for disarmament and human rights. On the 100th anniversary of his birth, Sakharov’s legacy is more relevant than ever. Since 1988, the European Parliament has awarded an annual prize for freedom of thought named after him.

Andrey Sakharov: Scientist, disarmament campaigner, human rights defender © aquatarkus / Adobe Stock

Born on 21 May 1921 in Moscow, Andrey Sakharov was a physicist who in 1948 joined the Soviet atomic programme, where he played a leading role in work that led to the country’s first successful test of an atomic bomb in 1949. In the 1950s, Sakharov helped to develop the first Soviet hydrogen bomb and the Tsar Bomba, the largest atomic bomb ever exploded.

However, by the late 1950s Sakharov was becoming increasingly concerned about the dangers of these new weapons; together with other nuclear scientists, he persuaded the Soviet authorities to sign a partial test ban treaty with the US and UK in 1963, prohibiting atmospheric and underwater nuclear tests. Sakharov’s opposition to antiballistic missile defences, which he felt would increase the risk of nuclear war, eventually put him at loggerheads with the Soviet regime.

In 1968, Sakharov wrote his ‘Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Co-Existence, and Intellectual Freedom’, warning of the dangers of nuclear weapons and criticising the repression of dissidents. The essay was never published in the Soviet Union, but typewritten copies circulated widely and reached Western media. As a result, he was excluded from weapons research, and instead turned to theoretical fields such as particle physics and cosmology.

Previously celebrated as a ‘hero of Socialist labour’, Sakharov was increasingly regarded as a dissident from then on. In 1970, he co-founded the Moscow Human Rights Committee. His tireless defence of those unjustly persecuted and imprisoned brought him international fame, culminating in the 1975 award of the Nobel Peace Prize, but at home he was denounced by KGB head, Yury Andropov, as ‘domestic enemy No 1’. After Sakharov criticised the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, authorities stripped him of his honours and exiled him to Gorky (now Nizhny Novgorod), a city that was closed to foreigners.

With perestroika in full swing, in 1986 Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, invited Sakharov to resume his ‘patriotic work’. Back in Moscow, Sakharov played a leading role in organising the Soviet Union’s emerging independent civil society. In 1989, he was elected as an opposition member of the Parliament, where he demanded an end to the Communist Party’s monopoly on power. A few months later, he died of a heart attack.

Sakharov’s legacy in Russia

Sakharov’s achievements, as both a scientist and a human rights defender, are still honoured in Russia. Buildings and streets are named after him, such as Sakharov Avenue in Moscow, which has become a popular protest venue. There are Sakharov museums in Nizhny Novgorod and Moscow. In 2019, Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a presidential decree envisaging a series of events, such as exhibitions and debates, to commemorate the centenary of his birth, and in 2020 expressed support for the idea of a statue in Moscow, in addition to the one that already exists in Nizhny Novgorod.

As in 2014 (the 25th anniversary of Sakharov’s death), official centenary celebrations are likely to be fairly low-key. Praise for Sakharov’s human rights work mostly comes from civil society and fringe opposition politicians, rather than the political establishment. Official endorsement of Sakharov sits uneasily with Russia’s increasingly repressive environment for human rights defenders who continue his work.

Among the latter is Memorial, an NGO co-founded by Sakharov, which documents Soviet-era human rights abuses and was awarded the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize in 2009. In 2015, Russia’s Justice Ministry declared Memorial a ‘foreign agent’, a stigmatising label that exposes it to legal harassment and undercuts public support. In 2018, Oyub Titiev, the organisation’s representative in Chechnya, was arrested and charged with possession of drugs, which Titiev claims were planted by police in his car. A few days later, unknown perpetrators torched Memorial’s Ingushetia office, also in the Caucasus. Vandals attacked the Sakharov Centre in Moscow, another alleged ‘foreign agent’, which houses a museum on Sakharov and his archives.

Although mass protests following Alexey Navalny’s arrest in January 2021 show that many Russians are still ready to stand up for their rights, mainstream public opinion is often sceptical of the values promoted by Sakharov during his lifetime. There is increasing nostalgia for the Soviet era, remembered in February 2020 as ‘the greatest in the history of our country, with a high level of well-being and opportunities for ordinary citizens’ by 75 % of respondents to a survey by independent pollster Levada Centre. Nearly half of them believe it would have been better if the liberalising reforms of perestroika, which restored Sakharov’s freedom, had never happened. In 2017, asked to name the most outstanding historical figures of all time, Russians put Stalin in top place; Gorbachev came last, while Sakharov is mentioned nowhere on the list.

The significance of the Sakharov Prize

Several Sakharov Prizes are awarded around the world, including in Russia (for journalism) and the US (for scientists upholding human rights). At its July 1984 plenary session, the European Parliament debated the idea of leaving a seat vacant for Andrei Sakharov and thus symbolically for other human rights defenders; however, in the end it was French MEP Jean-François Deniau’s proposal for an annual human rights award named after Sakharov that prevailed, in a resolution adopted in December 1985. The idea was discussed with Sakharov himself, who agreed to the use of his name. The first prize was awarded in 1988 jointly to Nelson Mandela and, on Sakharov’s proposal, posthumously to Soviet dissident Anatoly Marchenko; international outrage at Marchenko’s death in 1986 after a three-month hunger strike in jail had prompted Mikhail Gorbachev to release many of the country’s remaining political prisoners.

The prize is awarded each year by the European Parliament to individuals or organisations for their outstanding achievements in one of the following areas: human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly the freedom of expression; safeguarding the rights of minorities; respect for international law; development of democracy; and implementation of the rule of law.

Although much has changed since 1988, the work of human rights defenders in repressive regimes remains as difficult and dangerous as ever. In a globalised world, human rights causes can reach a global audience more easily, and the Sakharov Prize helps to raise international awareness. Each year, its award makes the headlines of newspapers in Europe and beyond.

The ordeal of many Sakharov laureates continues
Although the Sakharov Prize helps to rally international support for human rights defenders, laureates continue to suffer harsh reprisals in countries such as Belarus, Cuba, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. In China, Uyghur human rights defender and economics professor, Ilham Tohti, awarded the Sakharov Prize in 2019, has been in jail since 2014; Hu Jia, a prominent Chinese human rights activist and 2008 laureate is under constant police surveillance and repeated house arrest; after 18 years of imprisonment, long-time democracy activist and 1996 laureate, Wei Jingsheng, was forced into exile. Raif Badawi, a liberal Saudi blogger and 2015 laureate, has served a 10-year jail sentence since 2012, facing torture and threats to his life in prison. Despite serious health concerns, Iranian human rights lawyer and 2012 laureate, Nasrin Sotoudeh, has spent years in jail due to her human rights activism. Many members of the Venezuelan and Belarussian opposition (collective winners of the prize, in 2017 and 2020 respectively) have been imprisoned or forced into exile.
Apart from the award of the Sakharov Prize itself, EU support for laureates includes resolutions, statements and diplomatic démarches. Foreign governments do not always respond favourably; for example, Beijing accused the European Parliament of ‘celebrating a terrorist’, after Ilham Tohti won the 2019 prize. Nevertheless, the Sakharov Prize may have helped to secure the release of laureates, such as Nasrin Soutoudeh in 2013 (although she has since been sent back to jail) and Oleg Sentsov in 2019, by focussing international attention on their cases. For others, Sakharov laureate status may at least have afforded some protection from torture and harsher treatment while in prison.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Sakharov’s legacy on the centenary of his birth‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Further reading:

• 2020 Sakharov Prize laureate: The democratic opposition in Belarus, ‘At a glance’ note by Jakub Przetacznik, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2020
• Sakharov Prize laureates in difficulty: Facing repression for defending human rights, Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, European Parliamentary Research Service, June 2020
• Sakharov Prize: Voices of humanity, ‘At a glance’ note by Ionel Zamfir, European Parliamentary Research Service, May 2018
• 30 Years of the Sakharov Prize: The European Parliament upholding freedom of thought, Study by Päivi Vaniomäki and Étienne Deschamps, Historical Archives Unit, EPRS, May 2018
• EU support for human rights defenders around the world, Briefing by Ionel Zamfir, European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2018

Written by Suzana Anghel with Dawid Fusiek,

© koya979 / Adobe Stock

On 8 May 2021, EU Heads of State or Government met in Porto for an informal European Council, preceded on 7 May by a social summit, organised by the Portuguese Presidency. The informal European Council was followed by an EU–India leaders’ meeting, attended remotely by the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi. At their informal meeting, EU leaders discussed social policy and, without formally endorsing the Commission action plan, adopted the Porto Declaration, welcoming ‘the new EU headline targets on jobs, skills and poverty reduction’ for 2030. They also assessed the EU Covid-19 situation, focusing on vaccine production and delivery, the future EU digital green certificate, and international solidarity in the fight against the pandemic. They also prepared for the EU–India leaders’ meeting, agreeing to resume talks on a free trade agreement (FTA) and start negotiations on a stand-alone investment protection agreement, and on an agreement on geographical indications that, depending on the pace of negotiations, could either stand alone or be built into the FTA.

1. Background

The 2020-2021 Leaders’ Agenda announced a meeting of the Heads of State or Government on 7‑8 May 2021, dedicated to the ‘social impact of the digital and green transformation’, and taking place ‘back-to-back’ with the EU–India leaders’ meeting. The social summit was added by the Portuguese Presidency, as a highlight of its six-month presidency. After Gothenburg in November 2017, Porto was the second social summit to be scheduled with an informal EU leaders’ meeting, allowing leaders to focus on social policy, a topic that comes onto their agenda only occasionally.

2. The Gothenburg and Porto summits: Similarities and differences

Whereas the Gothenburg Social Summit proclaimed the European Pillar of Social Rights, the Porto Social Summit focused on the related action plan; analysts summed up the process as ‘turning principles into action’. In Gothenburg, the European Parliament, Council and the European Commission made the Interinstitutional Proclamation on the European Pillar of Social Rights in the presence of the social partners. Proclamations, as legal instruments, are not mentioned in the EU Treaties, and are considered an expression of ‘soft law’. The social pillar’s 20 principles and rights are thus not binding on the institutions; conversely, they are binding on the EU and/or the Member States when enshrined in legally binding documents such as the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.

The social partners were fully involved in the process and, in Porto, alongside the European Parliament, the European Commission and the Portuguese Presidency, signed the Porto Social Commitment, which welcomes the Commission’s action plan and stresses that the European Pillar of Social Rights represents ‘a compass to guide us towards a strong, sustainable, inclusive recovery and towards upward economic and social convergence’. The Porto Social Commitment was handed over by the Prime Minister of Portugal, António Costa, to the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, to inform and inspire the European Council’s social policy debate. In turn, the EU leaders adopted the Porto Declaration, expressing their determination ‘to continue deepening the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights at EU and national level’.

The role played by the six-monthly rotating Council presidency in the organisation of the social summit was substantively different in Gothenburg and Porto. The Gothenburg Social Summit was called at the initiative of Sweden and Estonia. Estonia, which held the presidency of the Council at the time of the summit, actively supported the event, while also organising its own presidency event in the form of the Tallinn Digital Summit. Conversely, the Porto Social Summit was designed as the centre-piece of the Portuguese Presidency right from the start.

There were noteworthy differences between the Gothenburg and Porto informal summits. Ahead of Gothenburg, there was a clear intention by the European Council President at the time, Donald Tusk, to act as agenda-shaper. As he stated in his invitation: ‘I will also like to share with you my ideas on how to take the social agenda forward in the European Council in December’. Tusk circulated a Leaders’ note – the first under the 2017-2019 Leaders’ Agenda – to structure the debate, and used the invitation letter to stress the limited EU competences in the area of education and social issues. By contrast, Charles Michel used his invitation letter to announce the topics the EU leaders would consider, namely: social policy, the Covid-19 situation and external relations. Much of Michel’s letter focused on preparatory work for the EU–India leaders’ meeting, confirming his focus on foreign policy since his mandate began.

3. The informal European Council: Format and participation

The EU leaders met in person for the first time since December 2020, although a few leaders, the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel and the Prime Minister of the Netherlands, Mark Rutte, attended remotely owing to the domestic coronavirus situations in their countries. The hybrid – in-person and remote participation – nature of the Porto meeting was a first since the beginning of the pandemic, as all the meetings held over the past year have been either entirely in person or, on the contrary, conducted in a fully virtual setting. This model offers flexibility and could be used in the future for informal summits, but not for regular ones, for which personal interaction between leaders is key to successful negotiations.

4. Main results of the informal European Council meeting Covid-19

Since the European Council’s last discussion on Covid-19 in March 2021, the virus has continued to circulate at a high rate in all Member States. Nevertheless, there are now encouraging signs of a reduction in the number of infections.

Production and delivery of vaccines

The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, reported on vaccine production and delivery, confirming that 200 million doses had been delivered to the EU Member States so far, and that enough doses would be delivered by July 2021 to meet the 70 % population vaccination target. Furthermore, a new contract for the delivery of 1.8 billion doses up to 2023 has been signed with BioNTech-Pfizer to cover third dose needs and possible annual vaccination programmes. To avoid a loss of speed in the Member States’ vaccination campaigns owing to citizens’ hesitancy in being vaccinated, strengthened national and EU communication efforts are required.

EU digital green certificate

EU leaders took stock of progress made in setting up an EU digital green certificate aimed at fostering EU citizens’ freedom of movement, while preserving their health. The certificate, which will only certify that a person has been vaccinated, tested negative in a PCR test or developed antibodies following an infection with SARS/Covid-19, is expected to come into force in early June 2021. The Commission President welcomed the speedy work undertaken by the co-legislators, stressing that the legislative procedure was expected to be completed by the end of May 2021. EU leaders will return to the topic at a special European Council meeting on 25 May 2021.

International solidarity on vaccines

Charles Michel stressed that ‘Covid-19 is the greatest challenge of global solidarity in generations’, and that ‘the only way out is to immunise the global population’. Ursula von der Leyen called the EU ‘the pharmacy of the world’, stressing that the EU was currently exporting about 50 % of its production of Covid-19 vaccines and calling on countries around the world to follow suit. The EU is committed to the COVAX facility, to which France chose to donate some of its doses in support of African countries. Donations may also occur bilaterally, as was the case with Romania, which has donated vaccines to Moldova and to Ukraine.

EU leaders had an initial debate on intellectual property (IP) rights for Covid-19 vaccines, largely triggered by the US announcement that it would support a temporary waiver of patent rights. Several countries, including India and South Africa, have introduced a request to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for the IP rights for Covid-19 vaccines to be waived. The request goes beyond patents and includes technology, know-how and manufacturing processes. EU leaders agreed that there was a need to increase vaccine production rapidly worldwide in order to be able to fight the spread of the virus and its variants. How best to proceed had still to be clarified. However, a patent waiver alone would not be sufficient, since scaling up vaccine production would require technology and knowledge-sharing. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, considered that the model used in the international fight against HIV could be replicated, offering pharmaceutical companies the necessary guarantees as well as the opportunity to be part of the process in an inclusive way. Ursula von der Leyen stressed that measures such as vaccine exports, reselling and donations had immediate effects and that long-term solutions could include capacity-building in third countries, licence transfers and pricing.

The Porto Declaration and the future of EU social policy

EU leaders adopted the Porto Declaration without endorsing the Porto Social Commitment, but nonetheless taking note of the outcome of the Porto Social Summit. They confirmed their commitment to building a ‘fair and social Europe’ and to implementing the European Pillar of Social Rights as envisaged by the 2019-2024 EU Strategic Agenda. The Porto Declaration covers the principles and rights included in the European Pillar of Social Rights, with very few exceptions – data protection and long-term care. On minimum wages, a sensitive subject for both social partners and some of the Member States, as is apparent from the language used in both the Porto Declaration (‘defending fair wages’) and the Porto Social Commitment (support for ‘decent wages’), the European Commission presented a proposal for a directive in October 2020.

Given perennial sensitivities on specific aspects of social policy, the EU leaders did not endorse the action plan, despite an express request from the European Commission. They did however recognise that the action plan ‘provides useful guidance for the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights’ and ‘welcomed the new EU headline targets on jobs, skills and poverty reduction’ thus offering political support for the three pillars of the EU’s social policy up until 2030.

On employment, the target of at least 78 % of the population between 20 and 64 years being employed by 2030 is an ambitious but realistic one, as the EU employment rate was 73.1 % in 2019, thus 4.9 % higher than in 2009. With respect to skills and education, at least 60 % of adults should take part in training courses on an annual basis. This target is challenging, as in 2016 only 37 % of adults took part in training. The last target aims to reduce the number of people in the EU at risk of poverty and social exclusion by at least 15 million, from 91 million at present (17.9 million children).

Gender equality is one of the principles of the European Pillar of Social Rights. For the Porto Declaration to mention that the EU was committed to ‘work actively to close gender gaps in employment, pay and pensions’, unity needed to be achieved in the European Council on the word ‘gender’, as just days prior to the summit some Member States were still expressing reservations. Figure 1 below shows the degree of progress in reducing the gender pay and pensions gaps, as well as in increasing the employment rates of both men and women over the past five years.

Evolution of gender employment, pay and pensions gap in the EU

EU leaders recognised ‘the importance of closely following the progress achieved towards the implementation of the European Pillar of Social Rights’. In this way, they responded in part to the call ‘for a regular assessment at the highest political level of progress towards the 2030 headline targets’ made by the signatories of the Porto Social Commitment.

Message of the President of the European Parliament: European Parliament President David Sassoli warned that the pandemic threatened ‘to leave a legacy of poverty and social and economic instability’, and called on the EU institutions to ‘immediately define a strong political agenda with clear, ambitious and achievable objectives and with clear indicators of social sustainability’.

5. The EU–India leaders’ meeting

At the EU–India leaders’ meeting, Charles Michel expressed the EU’s ‘sympathy to Prime Minister Modi and the people of India as they battle the current Covid-19 surge’, and expressed ‘full solidarity’ during these challenging times. He stressed that, as the world’s largest democracies, the EU and India share the same values and are therefore natural partners. With a view to developing bilateral cooperation, they adopted a joint statement, which acknowledged the resumption of the human rights’ dialogue and a new EU-India connectivity partnership that identifies digital, energy, transport and people-to-people contact as priority areas. Substantive progress was made in the areas of trade and health, with agreement to resume talks on an FTA and open negotiations on investment and geographical indications agreements. With respect to health, the EU Member States offered India assistance and equipment worth over €100 million, in the form of medicines, oxygen and ventilators; the European Investment Bank is meanwhile increasing its financial support for India.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders in Porto on 7-8 May 2021‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Andrés García Higuera and Mihalis Kritikos (STOA) with Nuala Polo and Corinna Pannofino (Trilateral Research)

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) partnered with three EU-funded Horizon 2020 projects – SHERPA, SIENNA and PANELFIT – representing a €10 million investment in research by the European Union, to host the online workshop, ‘Policy options for the ethical governance of disruptive technologies‘. This event took place on 23 March 2021.

In view of the (now published) legislative proposal on artificial intelligence (AI), the workshop focused on identifying the main ethical challenges associated with the development of disruptive technologies and the best practices for mitigating the related risks. It also aimed at building on these findings to ensure that ethical principles and societal values are prioritised in the design and development of future technologies.

In her opening remarks, Susana Solís Pérez MEP (Renew, Spain) and Lead STOA Panel Member for this event, emphasised the need for Europe to take the lead in the creation of a legal framework enabling the development of a responsible innovation ecosystem in the field of AI. Despina Spanou, Head of Office of the European Commission Vice-President for Promoting our European Way of Life Margaritis Schinas, then delivered an insightful policy keynote speech. She emphasised the importance of AI in several areas and the need for high standards of protection of fundamental rights, to ensure the responsible development, deployment and use of these technologies to protect privacy and promote security. She further presented the Commission’s upcoming legislative and policy plans in the domain of AI, which put forward a risk-based, technology-neutral, holistic approach consistent with the European way of life.

The first panel discussion was based on the results of the SHERPA project, ‘Ethical, social and legal challenges of AI – Open questions and outstanding challenges’. This panel featured Members of the European Parliament, academics, technology developers and policy-makers, who engaged in a lively discussion and debate on best practices for harnessing the benefits of AI in order to improve citizens’ lives, while mitigating potential ethical, social and legal risks. It was agreed that ethical aspects of AI should not be seen as an obstacle but as a matter of ongoing critical reflection that is particularly important for protecting vulnerable people and children when using AI systems. The panellists emphasised that AI could help us fight climate change and achieve the Sustainable Development Goals, and stressed the need to construct AI ecosystems with governance structures that provide incentives for ethical uses of AI.

The second panel was based on the results of the PANELFIT project, ‘Mitigation options – What can be done to identify and address current and future challenges of emerging technologies?’. This panel also featured Members, privacy engineers, academics and developers, in discussion on how to better understand and address the ethical implications of new and emerging technologies in the early stages of design and development, to minimise potential negative impacts on society. Discussion centred on the importance of EU-wide policy and standards to achieve a dynamic and enforceable approach to address systemic risks and incorporate ethics in the design of data-driven technologies. It was agreed that certification schemes and self-regulation are not sufficient to address algorithmic bias and restore transparency and accountability.

These interactive discussions were followed by a keynote speech delivered by Yoshua Bengio of the University of Montreal and one of the world’s leading experts in AI. He considered ways for governments to better incentivise technology development and AI innovation in a way that promotes long-term benefits for society, for example, open science, data sharing and use of rewards based on delayed (technological) outcomes, rather than simply grants. His speech focused on the need to promote and facilitate the sharing of knowledge and data for the public good, which in effect could strengthen the social dimension of AI. His presentation is available here.

Yoshua Bengio’s keynote was followed by the event’s final panel, based on the results of the SIENNA project, ‘Beyond AI – Ethics and human rights implications of emerging technologies’. In addition to Members, this panel featured AI ethicists, and academics, who considered best practices for building ethical and legal regulatory frameworks, to ensure the ethical governance of new and emerging technologies. The discussion focused on the importance of protecting democratic values and fundamental rights, to ensure that technology works for the collective good and the whole of society. All panellists agreed on the need to strengthen multidisciplinary input in the design and deployment of AI, including the shaping of definitions in the domain of AI.

The final panel was followed by a roundtable discussion on policy options from an international perspective. The discussion focused on the various AI ethics initiatives adopted by international organisations and considered ways to enhance global efforts in standards development in strategic emerging technology fields, and strengthen the normative value of ethics and the role of the EU as an ethics trailblazer.

Mariya Gabriel, European Commissioner for Culture, Education and Youth, and Eva Kailli (S&D, Greece) and STOA Chair brought the event to a close, with Eva Kaili reiterating the importance of strengthening a harmonised EU-wide approach to the design and development of future and emerging technologies prioritising ethical and social values to enrich and improve society. In her view, the discussions had highlighted the importance of interdisciplinary collaboration and working with end-users to develop solutions that protect EU values, democracy and fundamental rights.

The event, moderated by BBC journalist Vivienne Parry, featured Q&A sessions with members of the audience, and opened up a critical discussion on how we can make use of AI and big data for public good. A recording of the event is available here.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu