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What if AI could improve thermal imaging, to help fight coronavirus?

Fri, 12/25/2020 - 08:30

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Thermal imaging cameras have been widely installed in recent months in office buildings, hospitals, shopping malls, schools and airports as a means of detecting people with fever-like symptoms. Given their capacity to perform temperature checks from a distance, they have been seen as an effective means to limit the spread of the highly contagious Covid-19 virus. Looking beyond manual temperature checking, this note provides an overview of the use of thermal-imaging empowered with artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities, its suitability in the context of the current pandemic and the core technical advantages and limitations of this technology. The main legal responses and ethical concerns related to the use of AI in the context of thermal imaging at entry points, to identify and triage people who may have elevated temperatures, are also examined.

Infrared thermal-imaging cameras can measure radiated energy emitted from the human skin in a contactless, safe and fast manner. Adding machine-learning capabilities allows them to survey large groups of people at points of entry in an inexpensive, non-invasive way and to process their temperatures in seconds in the context of the current pandemic. Within this context, AI-enhanced thermal imaging cameras are currently being used in sensitive locations around the world to spot those who may have a symptom of the virus. Is general fever measurement through thermal cameras an effective means to tackle Covid‑19? Are these cameras designed or sufficiently operationally mature to operate as medical devices or diagnostic tests? Should we consider the possible legal and ethical implications related to the use of these cameras, especially when paired with facial recognition software and movement-predictive algorithms? Are employees and passengers aware of their data protection rights, including their right to rectification as well as their right to benefit from a second measurement?

Potential impacts and developments

AI-based thermal-imaging technology allows for fast and scalable screening of employees and travellers, from a distance, while they are moving, and without asking individuals to queue for individual checks. It can identify potential Covid‑19 carriers by automating and streamlining the monitoring of an individual’s temperature, simplifying and standardising record-keeping, and by reducing the need for invasive or potentially error-prone manual tracking procedures.

The integration of optimised algorithms for fever detection and facial-detection algorithms, as well as mask wearing detection functions, in thermal cameras allows them to  recognise human faces obscured by masks and glasses and distinguish faces from nearby objects in real time by excluding other heat sources. Through the use of machine-learning algorithms, automated recalibration procedures and AI-powered statistical analytics, thermal imaging can achieve high measurement speed and accurate temperature screening of up to 95 %. The incorporation of advanced AI image-processing and video-analytics algorithms not only allows the detection of elevated skin temperature in high-traffic public places through quick multiple target screening but also facilitates the emission of automatic alerts to security personnel. The integration of accurate mask-on face-recognition functionalities in thermal-imaging cameras is currently being tested in the United States of America, Israel, China and several Latin American countries.

Some authorities are now able to identify patients with an elevated temperature, revisit their location history through automated analyses of closed-circuit television (CCTV) footage, and provide audio and visual notification of temperature-screening passes and failures. London Heathrow Airport has used the technology to carry out large-scale passenger temperature checks, whereas Los Angeles International Airport has begun piloting thermal-imaging cameras that can detect fever in travellers. The installation of these cameras in entry points could reduce bottlenecks and delays, screen dozens or hundreds of people without the latter violating social distancing requirements, but also requiring less manpower for temperature checks.

At the same time however, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control and the World Health Organization (WHO) have concluded that thermal screening of passengers is a ‘high-cost, low-efficiency measure‘. There is little evidence of its effectiveness and accuracy in detecting and mitigating Covid‑19 cases, given that temperature is a bad proxy for having the disease. In addition, these measuring devices are sometimes not very accurate when used in high-traffic areas, where several individuals are moving in different directions at once, while being presented to the camera from different distances and at different angles.

Moreover, scanning may not detect people with early-stage illness, asymptomatic illness, those with symptoms that do not include fever, or those who take medicines to reduce their temperature. The UK Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory Agency has noted that thermal cameras are not a reliable way to detect if people have the virus whereas the US Food and Drug Administration has concluded that, despite their multiple advantages, are not effective at determining if someone definitively has Covid-19.

Anticipatory policy-making

In view of the absence of a common international standard for health-screening at airports and workplace locations, the use of thermal-screening cameras triggers questions about their compliance with ISO 13154, which sets the standard for deployment and implementation, and operational guidelines for identifying febrile humans using a screening thermograph, as well as with IEC 80601-2-59:2017 requirements for the basic safety and essential performance of screening thermographs for human febrile temperature screening.

Do temperature checks using AI-assisted thermal cameras constitute processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means within the meaning of Article 2(5) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)? Is the use of cameras to perform mass checks justified under the duty of care of the employer towards employees and proportionate under data protection and human rights laws? Is temperature-related data going to be analysed along with other biometric identifiers?

Many European Data Protection Authorities (DPAs), including in Belgium, France, Czechia, the Netherlands and Poland, have made a series of recommendations that range from absolute prohibition of their use for triaging people, to allowing thermal scanning under specific conditions. Such conditions include an analysis of the data life cycle and the verification that there is no recording of thermal images in accordance with the orientations on body temperature checks in the context of the Covid‑19 crisis that were recently issued by the European Data Protection Supervisor. An assessment of this kind should take account of the necessity, proportionality and effectiveness of this technological solution and provide for meaningful human involvement.

Beyond privacy concerns, the gradual installation of AI-enhanced thermal-imaging cameras enabled by facial recognition technology as a fever-detection tool in public spaces raises questions about their effects on the civil liberties of travellers and employees alike including questions of surveillance creep, namely the collection of biometric data beyond the current emergency context. The gradual introduction of this technology in airports and office buildings to proactively detect an elevated temperature also raises questions about what happens when people are detected as having fever, especially in cases of false positives:

Can they be banned from the airport or their workplace? Are robust safeguards in place to verify the technical accuracy of these public health measures, including meaningful human overview and control of the system? Are ethically and legally sound standardised technical protocols in place that could prescribe additional tests and temperature checks, data verification, and robust data protection safeguards?

In view of the novelty and possible limitations of the technological solutions being proposed, it would seem reasonable that any remote temperature-screening finding should be accompanied by secondary temperature screening, temperature checks by a healthcare professional and health questionnaires, and should be directed by public health guidance. They should be viewed as only one layer of protection in the context of the wider ecosystem of public-health emergency responses to the current pandemic.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI could improve thermal imaging, to help fight coronavirus?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

What if technology and culture combined to boost a green recovery?

Thu, 12/24/2020 - 08:30

Written by Vadim Kononenko,

© Adobe Stock

Technological innovation has always been an indispensable part of recovery from economic, social and environmental crises. Technology is often diametrically opposed to matters of aesthetics and culture. Yet historical experience and foresight suggest that in times of recovery technology and culture can combine to create a virtuous feedback loop. This could facilitate the EU’s post-pandemic recovery and also help tackle the potentially disruptive effects of the ‘green transition’.

With its current European Green Deal plan, the EU is striving to achieve climate neutrality in its economy by 2050 and, simultaneously, set itself on the path to recovery from the adverse effects of the global pandemic. Technology will inevitably play a significant part in this process. However, history also suggests that culture and aesthetics have a significant role to play in recovery from a crisis, be it war, economic recession or an epidemic.

Well-known artistic and architectural movements such as the Renaissance, Romanticism and Neo-Classicism came about in direct or indirect response to various shocks in Europe, for example, the plague of the 13th century, the Industrial Revolution of the 18th century, and political upheavals of the 19th century. Most recently, the 20th-century modernist movement was spearheaded by the recovery from the two world wars and skyrocketing post-war economic growth. None of these cultural movements developed autonomously from technology, however. Modernism, for example, was underpinned by the invention of steel and concrete construction techniques.

Potential impacts and developments

It is logical to assume that the EUs unprecedented green transition to a carbon-free economy will be accompanied by new technologies and also, perhaps, a new cultural movement. Some policies featuring cultural and technological aspects have emerged in recent years, in the form of the Davos Declaration and Baukultur and, most recently, the New European Bauhaus initiative of the European Commission. Yet the question remains: how can technology and culture align to further a green post-pandemic recovery in Europe, particularly given the extreme negative impacts of the pandemic on the cultural sector?

Among the many pertinent aspects of the interconnected dynamics of technology and culture, two in particular stand out:

  • There is a disruptive side to every recovery, as the many accompanying changes leave ‘stranded assets’ in their wake: investments that prematurely lose their value. Rapidly changing technology is often a factor that contributes to this phenomenon. For example, recovery from the Great Depression was closely related to the rise of the automobile industry, leading to the decline of American urban city centres. The green recovery, which is based on renewable energy technologies, is generating different kinds of stranded assets, for example, coal mines and pipelines or the beautiful but single-glazed windows of historical buildings. The rapid rise in teleworking is leaving a massive amount of unused office space as stranded assets. Culture could be the answer in cases such as these. To match the circular economy, a new aesthetic of car-free urbanism and ‘green and blue‘ cities is emerging. Likewise, re‑purposing old coal plants and empty office buildings into green neighbourhood and museum clusters is an increasingly popular and effective solution. In this regard, culture is helping to tackle the social impacts of technological disruption.
  • Conversely, culture itself can benefit from technological change. This has been seen during the pandemic, in which digital technologies have greatly aided the creative sector. Museums, concert halls and other cultural institutions have taken to live-streaming, online events, and open access to digital material. It is likely that these technologies will continue to serve the cultural sector in the recovery phase as well. However, the question is how sustainable this online content is, both for the economic survival of institutions and creators, and for the alignment of digital technologies with environmental targets.

Overall, however, both culture and technology have the potential to open up opportunities for sustainable and inclusive recovery. According to a recent analysis by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), cities and regions should consider the cultural and creative sectors and cultural participation as drivers of both economic and social advancement.

Anticipatory policy-making

When it comes to maximising the effectiveness of the contribution of technology and culture, anticipatory policy-making is key. In recent years, future-oriented strategic thinking has proliferated in new cultural domains, including architecture, design, and heritage. Foresight in these cultural domains can help policy-makers design policies to aid the green recovery. As far as the technology–culture nexus is concerned, anticipatory policy-making could explore the following three areas:

Citizen-centred approach: People’s collective memories, beliefs and attitudes to particular aesthetics constitute what anthropologists call ‘tacit culture’. It functions as a link between function and form, and appears to transcend political preference, age and ethnicity. For example, a recent poll suggests that 75 % of Americans prefer a classical style in public buildings, whereas only 25 % prefer a modernist style. Another study examining the views of hospital patients in Europe and Japan showed a consensus across countries on what people consider important in terms of the aesthetics of a hospital environment. This means that when working out policies on how buildings should be retrofitted to be rendered climate-neutral and how cities need to change according to circular economy principles, policy-makers would benefit from considering these tacit cultural trends and consulting widely on citizens’ aesthetic preferences. A useful step towards citizens’ dialogues would be the inclusion of cultural and heritage-oriented themes in the Conference on the Future of Europe process.

Strategic foresight and impact assessment: As EU policy-making is currently undergoing a profound embedding of foresight and impact assessment into its workings, culture remains somewhat overlooked. The current Better Regulation guidelines list environmental, social and economic impacts as the most important, with increased attention being directed towards the impact on the United Nations sustainable development goals (SDGs). As culture and heritage are at the heart of the SDGs, there is room for a more robust assessment of European added value in the fields of culture and heritage. Useful work has been done in this regard by Unesco, putting heritage impact assessment (HIA) on a par with the more widely used environmental impact assessment (EIA). The impact of new technologies in the cultural sector, such as digitalisation and AI, could be improved with the aid of such assessment.

Culture as innovation: As the OECD report notes, cultural institutions have difficulties gaining recognition as an innovative sector and accessing support measures that are typically reserved for more technological forms of innovation. While many innovations in the cultural sector do include technology – digitalisation, for example – there are other forms of innovation that are based on creative content. Examples include projects in which citizens ‘adopt’ a monument, social-media projects that popularise sustainable renovation and cultural heritage among young people, and grassroots non-profit cooperatives that promote and facilitate the salvage and reuse of construction materials.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if technology and culture combined to boost a green recovery?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

The public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism [EU Legislation in Progress]

Wed, 12/23/2020 - 18:00

Written by Sidonia Mazur and Christiaan Van Lierop (1st edition),

© small smiles / Adobe Stock

The public sector loan facility is the third pillar of the Just Transition Mechanism (JTM), along with the Just Transition Fund and just transition scheme under Invest EU. The facility will consist of a grant and a loan component. With the contribution of €1.525 billion for the grant component from the Union budget and EIB lending of €10 billion from its own resources, the aim is for the public sector loan facility to mobilise between €25 and 30 billion in public investment over the 2021-2027 period. Funding will be available to all Member States, while focusing on the regions with the biggest transition challenges. In the European Parliament, the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) have joint responsibility for this file. Their report was adopted at a joint sitting of the two committees on 16 October 2020. Parliament subsequently confirmed the committees’ mandate to open trilogue negotiations.

Complete version Proposal for a regulation on the public sector loan facility under the Just Transition Mechanism Committees responsible: Committee on Budgets (BUDG) and Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) jointly under Rule 58 COM(2020) 453
28.5.2020 Rapporteurs: Henrike Hahn (Greens/EFA, Germany) and Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium) 2020/0100(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: José Manuel Fernandes, Frances Fitzgerald (EPP)
Marek Belka, Eero Heinäluoma (S&D)
Clotilde Armand, Linea Søgaard-Lidell (Renew)
Gunnar Beck, Hélène Laporte (ID)
Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA)
Eugen Jurzyca (ECR)
Petros Kokkalis, José Gusmão (GUE/NGL) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Trilogue negotiations

Categories: European Union

UK trade agreements with third countries: Implications for the EU

Wed, 12/23/2020 - 14:00

Written by Issam Hallak,

© Rawf8 / Adobe Stock

The United Kingdom (UK) left the European Union (EU) on 1 February 2020 and will regain competence for its own international trade policy as soon as the transition period concludes at the end of 2020. Freedom to determine its own trade relationships was a major reason for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU: its new international trade policy is based on the goal of establishing ‘global Britain’, a country asserting that it is strongly committed to trade openness with international leadership.

To this end, the UK has concluded as many continuity agreements as possible, in order to roll over existing EU free trade agreements (FTAs), such as that with South Korea. It has also renegotiated, rather than simply roll over, the provisions of EU FTAs, with partners who so demanded, including Japan. Beyond those countries with EU FTAs to which the UK has been party, it has expanded the range of its FTA negotiations to Australia, New Zealand and the United States (US), three of its major trading partners. When it comes to geographic scope, the UK has set the Pacific as a high priority, its objective being to access the newly established Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In addition, the UK aims to use its advantage in digital trade and services to become a ‘world digital trade powerhouse’, and has stressed that FTA provisions should promote digital trade and foster regulatory cooperation in the field.

The EU represents 50 % of the UK’s total trade, and the UK economy is integrated with and reliant on the EU. Therefore, although the UK is facing obstacles in signing trade agreements, its new strategy has a number of implications for the EU. The UK is committed to remaining an open country with respect to international trade and its focus on digital trade and services, which depend less on geography, is seen as a way to diversify away from the EU.

Read the complete briefing on ‘UK trade agreements with third countries: Implications for the EU‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

What if artificial intelligence in medical imaging could accelerate Covid-19 treatment?

Wed, 12/23/2020 - 08:30

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Artificial intelligence (AI) solutions can help radiologists with the triage, quantification and trend analysis of patient data. AI-powered medical imaging is already used to detect critical diseases, and medical imaging has played a significant role in the fight against Covid-19, easing the pressure on healthcare systems. Although AI imaging as a diagnostic tool is still surrounded by various challenges and uncertainties, its use in the context of Covid-19 has assisted clinicians with its faster image-processing times – as little as 10 seconds compared with up to 15 minutes for a manual reading of a computerised tomography (CT) scan.

Medical imaging has always been one of the most advanced areas of AI application showing remarkable accuracy and sensitivity in the identification of imaging abnormalities. In the context of Covid-19, medical imaging has facilitated incidental diagnosis, offering supporting evidence in clinical situations where false negative RT-PCR tests are suspected and helping evaluate treatment outcomes, disease progression and anticipated prognosis.

AI-empowered image processing can automate searches through large databases and deliver more precise demarcation of infections in X-ray and CT images, facilitating fast evaluation of CT scans and identification of Covid-19 findings. Clinicians and radiologists can use machine learning (ML) algorithms to examine information contained in medical scans or images as these provide better tools for localisation and quantification of disease features. The result can be better early detection, diagnostic performance and prognostic value while also easing the burden on laboratory testing. Could these AI systems, with their several advantages, replace human (medical) judgement in the context of the Covid-19 pandemic?

Potential impacts and developments

AI-supported medical imaging can be vital in the fast detection and classification of Covid-19, as it can immediately flag chest CT scans showing suspected Covid-19 allowing the patients concerned to be tested promptly. Image recognition algorithms can bring together and analyse chest CT scan findings, clinical symptoms, exposure patterns and other forms of testing, thus providing clinicians and clinical decision-making systems in general with essential information.

Using well-curated medical imaging data, AI algorithms can be developed, trained and validated so as to anticipate possible clinical deterioration or improvement. These evidence-based predictions could in effect help hospitals plan workflow in an emergency context such as the current one. They would provide consistent, quantifiable information to evaluate precisely the gravity of a patient’s illness, enabling medical personnel to effectively triage patients and thus alleviate the ever-growing patient backlog.

Recently, a new algorithm has been developed combining CT images of patients’ lungs with non-imaging data to identify Covid-19-positive patients who require immediate intervention; another, meanwhile, offers an automated tool for rapid identification of patients with suspicious chest imaging for isolation and further testing.

AI can reduce the time taken in the medical imaging process by examining thousands of images from a chest CT scan. It can also increase patient safety by improving X-ray exposure parameters and producing low-dose CT scans. AI-empowered visual sensors can meanwhile accelerate scanning, automate risk stratification and, in effect, reduce unnecessary radiation exposure in the clinical setting.

AI medical imaging models have been deployed in a number of hospitals around the world. The US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has authorised the use of AI algorithms that detect Covid-19 in partially imaged lungs as an incidental finding, whereas the EU is funding the Imaging Covid-19 AI initiative, a multi-centre European project, to enhance the use of CT in the diagnosis of Covid-19 by using AI. Last but not least, a group of Belgian hospitals have recently developed the first CE-marked AI solution for CT that offers fast quantification of lung pathology on chest CT scans in Covid-19 patients. Are these initiatives sufficient to cope with the current needs for safe and accurate AI-powered diagnostic tools? Or are more multicentre and multidisciplinary clinical studies needed to address the current knowledge gaps?

Anticipatory policy-making

Along with great benefits, the introduction of AI to medical imaging also raises a significant number of legal questions and ethical considerations. The deployment of AI in the context of the current pandemic is also subject to numerous challenges that could undermine the accuracy and usefulness of its eventual clinical findings. These relate to the overall gap in knowledge of the long-term effects of Covid-19 and the lack of historical data to enable training on large-scale prognosis data. The result is the over-use of small incomprehensive public datasets and a combined lack of robustness and interpretability of AI models in clinical practice. One additional important diagnostic challenge lies with the non-specificity of Covid-19 patterns and their differentiation from non‑Covid‑19 viral pneumonia or asymptomatic patients with unaffected lungs.

The primary challenge in this context is that of accessing large volumes of data for AI development and the lack of representative data to train and validate algorithms. As the effectiveness of AI-supported devices relies on the accuracy of training data, grounding modelling and clinical decisions on sub-optimal data may compromise accuracy and reliability and result in deficient medical diagnoses. In fact, the accelerating development of AI‑based diagnostic tools in response to the current pandemic has brought to the fore the absence of standardised protocols for training and validating ML algorithms in this domain and the lack of large and diverse image datasets from a variety of certified sources, as required to train the algorithm.

The training, testing and eventual validation of AI-based algorithms for use in the current public health crisis requires access to large and curated datasets developed in accordance with existing privacy norms and data protection rules. The absence of such large datasets means AI-supported medical scans may be biased by technical factors owing to subtle differences in data from different scanning techniques or ill-curated data that train algorithms and deep networks on Covid-19. The integration of AI techniques in radiology in this particular context also raises questions about the ethics of the procedures and protocols followed for collecting and processing this medical data, including issues of informed consent, privacy and data ownership.

Under the General Data Protection Regulation, patients must give prior informed explicit consent for the use of their medical scans and imaging data in developing an AI algorithm, and this must be renewed before the design and training of each new version. Is that plausible given the time pressure to deliver fast clinical findings and solutions? The grounding of diagnostic decisions on AI-powered processing also raises liability questions: who should be held liable for an ineffective medical diagnosis? The doctor or the software developer?

Under the EU Medical Devices Regulation, a radiologist could be held liable if they depart from the AI-powered diagnostic medical imaging equipment’s diagnosis. However, the question is whether or not these AI algorithms have been subject to the same rigorous pre-market authorisation and auditing standards followed for the assessment and eventual deployment of other medical devices? Or have these regulatory procedures been fast-tracked owing to the urgent demand for Covid-19 related diagnostic solutions?

Beyond the issue of the availability, quality and representativeness of the datasets used to train algorithms, the majority of hospitals lack the technological infrastructure, manpower and knowhow to manage these complex AI systems effectively, since most of them use outdated computer-assisted diagnostics tools or only perform visual checks on medical scans.

Uptake of image recognition AI in medical diagnostics currently sits between 1 and 20 % depending on the disease area. Consequently, the use of AI-powered imaging in resource-limited settings remains a major technological and policy challenge that must be addressed as a matter of urgency, not least because of its potential benefits in boosting public health systems’ capacity to cope with the current extraordinary global health crisis.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if artificial intelligence in medical imaging could accelerate Covid-19 treatment?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Workplace monitoring in the era of artificial intelligence

Tue, 12/22/2020 - 18:00

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Workers’ interests should always be at the forefront of company approaches to privacy and data protection and worker representatives must always be consulted when a new technology is considered for workplace operations and analytics. This was one of the main conclusions of the study ‘Data subjects, digital surveillance, AI and the future of work’, which was carried out by Professor Phoebe Moore of the University of Leicester at the request of the STOA Panel, following a proposal from Lina Galvez Munoz (S&D, Spain), member of the Panel. This new STOA study provides a timely, in depth overview of the social, political and economic urgencies in identifying what we call the ‘new surveillance workplace’.

A wide range of technologies are gradually being introduced to monitor, track and, ultimately, surveil workers. Workplace surveillance is age-old, but it has become easier and more common, as new technologies enable more varied, pervasive and widespread monitoring practices and have increased employers’ ability to monitor apparently every aspect of workers’ lives. New technological innovations include surveillance cameras and keylogging software on work laptops to biometric sensors and GPS tracking, micro-chip implants, automated video pattern recognition and biometric access control.

Digital transformation, work design experimentation and new technologies are, indeed, overwhelming methods with intensified potential to process personal data in the workplace. New issues are emerging to do with ownership of data, power dynamics of work-related surveillance, usage of data, human resource practices and workplace pressures in ways that cut across all socio-economic classes.

The current pandemic has expanded the use of AI-empowered real-time work place monitoring systems and workforce analytics software that quantifies the previously un-measurable factors for team success, like collaboration and communication that are essential for productivity and performance. During the last few months, workplace monitoring appears to be stress-inducing, demotivating and dehumanising, leading to phenomena of presenteeism, a growing datafication of employment and the blurring of the boundaries between public and private spheres. Such technological practices threaten to alter workplaces in fundamental ways and to undermine trust between employers and employees.

How are institutions responding to the widespread uptake of new tracking technologies in workplaces, from the office, to the contact centre, to the factory? What are the parameters to protect the privacy and other rights of workers, given the unprecedented and ever-pervasive functions of monitoring technologies? The report evidences how and where new technologies are being implemented; looks at the impact that surveillance workplaces are having on the employment relationship and on workers themselves at the psychosocial level; and outlines the social, legal and institutional frameworks within which this is occurring, across the EU and beyond, ultimately arguing that more worker representation is necessary to protect the data rights of workers.

The study carries out a thorough analysis of automated decision-making, considering the extent to which it is admissible, the safeguard measures to be adopted, and whether data subjects have a right to individual explanations. It then considers the extent to which the General Date Protection Regulation (GDPR) provides for a preventive risk-based approach, focused on data protection by design and by default. In adopting an interdisciplinary perspective, the study identifies all major tensions between the traditional data protection principles — purpose limitation, data minimisation, special treatment of ‘sensitive data’, limitations on automated decisions — and the full deployment of the power of AI and big data. The vague and open-ended GDPR prescriptions are analysed in detail regarding the development of AI and big data applications. The analysis sheds light on the limited guidance offered by the GDPR on how to balance competing interests, which aggravates the uncertainties associated with the novel and complex character of new and emerging AI applications. As a result of this limited guidance, controllers are expected to manage risks amidst significant uncertainties about the requirements for compliance and under the threat of heavy sanctions.

It should be noted that the author makes several interesting findings, including the rapid increase of employees’ stress and anxiety as well as the augmented accuracy of tracking and monitoring technologies, but also the marginal role that the concept of consent and the workers’ representatives has so far exerted in the frame of the relevant technological and policy debates. The study’s added value lies not only in the detailed legal analysis but also in its methodological rigour: its findings are based on a wide range of country case studies and ‘worker cameos’ that are based on semi-structured interviews carried out with a series of workers to identify where electronic performance monitoring (EPM) and tracking are occurring. The study then proposes a wide range of concrete and applicable policy options about how to ensure union/worker involvement at all stages, how to introduce and enforce co-determination into labour law in all EU Member States, how to require businesses to compile certification and codes of conduct and how to prioritise collective governance. The study emphasises the need to guarantee worker representatives’ involvement at each increment of the life cycle of any technological tracking procedure and for EU states to establish co-determination rights in a firm manner. The author’s proposal concerning full inclusion – beyond trade unions – of employer associations in writing codes of conduct for data tracking and processing activities as partners is of practical importance. The arguments and findings of the study offer both theoretical insight and practical suggestions for action that policy-makers will hopefully find stimulating and worth pursuing.

Read the full report and accompanying STOA Options Brief to find out more. You can also watch the video of the presentation of interim findings to the STOA Panel.

Categories: European Union

What if AI-powered passenger locator forms could help stop the spread of Covid-19?

Tue, 12/22/2020 - 14:00

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

© Adobe Stock

Asking passengers to complete a passenger locator form (PLF) prior to their flights has been seen in recent months as an efficient way to help public health authorities trace travellers potentially exposed to Covid-19 in airports and ports and at other border check points. This digital identification form, which has increasingly been viewed as an essential travel document, could become a key health measure in the context of contact tracing and targeted testing, helping Member States perform risk assessments of arrivals. The accelerating use of this hybrid contact-tracing system in several European airports raises issues of transparency, accountability and privacy that need to be addressed in an efficient and responsible manner.

Several Member States have developed a screening procedure that allows them both to perform targeted testing and strengthen their contact-tracing efforts. According to this procedure, travellers are obliged to fill out a form online at least 24 hours before entering the country. This standardised form has been developed jointly by the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Air Transport Association (IATA). The form contains essential location information about the traveller’s visit including personal and travel details, such as their country of origin and the countries they have visited in the last 15 days, the accommodation they will stay in and their family status. Once the PLF is completed, the details of the tracking form are processed by special software for the creation of risk profiles and the categorisation of travellers. Data are evaluated by machine-learning algorithms that produce a unique quick response (QR) code. This code is sent to the passenger, who shows it either in print or on their smartphone upon their arrival in the country. The availability of machine learning as a special kind of artificial intelligence (AI) application is essential for the widespread and effective use of PLFs.

The availability of passenger locator data is crucial for the success and effectiveness of contact-tracing operations and the strengthening of countries’ capacity to combat Covid-19 at points of entry. The ICAO Guidelines for States concerning the management of communicable disease posing a serious public health risk state that the PLF ‘provides an appropriate method of rapidly collecting traveller contact information’. In comparison to other contact-tracing methods and static controls, the main advantage of this screening model lies in its capacity to facilitate targeted screening of travellers at borders and analyse real-time data to allocate resources. The selection of who should be tested is based on an algorithmic analysis of the data contained in the PLFs. This AI-based system should take into account, for instance, the passenger’s risk profile, the number of tests available and Covid-19 hospital beds available, the number of flights arriving and the epidemiological situation and transmission patterns in the country of departure.

What are the main advantages of this newly introduced system compared with other contact-tracing applications? Can countries rely on this particular system to control the spread of the disease despite the technical limitations? Does this sampling tool deter people from travelling abroad or even strike the right balance between the need to restore economic activities while protecting the health of passengers and local people alike? What kind of legal safeguards are needed for the responsible deployment of this screening tool, whose operation is based on the processing of travellers’ data by newly formed algorithmic models?

Potential impacts and developments

Several EU countries have recently introduced targeted Covid-19 testing of foreign travellers arriving at their borders. The form is currently required in most EU countries. Greece was the first country to use dynamic machine-learning algorithms to create a real-time dashboard to organise its diagnostic testing system at its borders. This is done through an AI system called EVA, which uses real-time data and optimisation techniques to perform risk predictions and allocate testing resources within the framework of Greece’s current Covid-19 screening capacity. Given the limited laboratory testing capacity of several airports, the lack of available large-scale testing kits and of health providers who could administer the tests and validate the results within a limited time-frame, this smart processing of PLFs may facilitate efficient resource management. The screening system can also supplement traditional contact-tracing procedures, as the data contained in the form can help authorities trace the contacts of all travellers, should a fellow passenger be confirmed as having tested positive for Covid-19.

At the same time, the processing of the data contained in PLFs raises several issues about their compliance with the relevant data protection standards and whether and how informed consent requirements can be met given that it is mandatory to complete this form when travelling to certain countries. In addition to the challenges associated with the management of huge quantities of travellers’ data, the efficiency of the PLF system may be undermined by incorrect phone numbers and other false or inaccurate information provided by travellers. How can travellers who provide inaccurate contact details be traced? Furthermore, the performance of targeted testing on the basis of data collected and processed using algorithmic models that are still under development carries the risk of errors. This could, for instance, pose the risk of public identification or stigmatisation of confirmed or suspected individuals. Finally, the usefulness of the system’s deployment from a public health perspective will depend not only on its actual technical effectiveness but also on whether its use can be combined with efficient diagnostic tests, other contact-tracing tools and comprehensive monitoring schemes.

Anticipatory policy-making

Public health authorities should collect and process the personal data from the PLFs for targeted testing in accordance with Regulation 2016/679, and the privacy framework and recommendation on health data governance of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control has issued Considerations relating to passenger locator data, entry and exit screening and health declarations and proposes collecting a minimum data set, the rest of the data to be obtained during the contact-tracing interview. As United Nations experts have stressed, ’emergency responses to the coronavirus must be proportionate, necessary and non-discriminatory’. The proportionate use of location data should consider the medical relevance of the data collected and safeguard its effective anonymisation and storage limitation, so as to prevent accidental disclosure of names of possibly infected persons.

Given the transnational nature of this public health emergency, as passengers travel across Europe, the data contained in PLFs and the results of testing and contact-tracing efforts could be collected in a common European database. Τhe Joint European roadmap towards lifting Covid-19 containment measures recognises that coordinated action between Member States should include actions to gather harmonised data, harmonise protocols, and share reference standards. The Commission’s recommendation on a common Union toolbox for the use of technology and data to combat the Covid-19 crisis strongly advocates the development of a common methodology on monitoring and sharing assessments of the effectiveness of contact-tracing applications. The European Commission recently announced that it is preparing, in collaboration with EASA and the EU Healthy Gateways joint action, to launch a common EU digital PLF as one of a number of measures to facilitate safe travel in the post-Covid-19 era, to be available by the end of 202010 January 2021. EU-wide initiatives may enhance the overall efficacy of the PLF system as an EU screening tool and minimise possible overlaps and inconsistencies.

However, the gradual deployment of this tool in European airports should be treated with caution given the limited scientific knowledge and technical experience in relation to the effectiveness, thoroughness and credibility of algorithmic decision-making systems of this kind. Τhere are questions about the type and quality of data used for the development and operation of the algorithms, and the rigour of the testing and operational protocols used for their design and deployment. Thus, there is an immediate need for algorithmic impact assessments to improve the quality, explainability and transparency of these screening procedures. As decisions about who should get tested in an airport are important from both public health and privacy perspectives, contact-tracing and targeted testing based on PLFs should be subject to thorough validation and accountability requirements so as to gain public trust and acceptance. Last but not least, the deployment of this screening system should remain part of a wider public health emergency response that needs to consider the essential nature of air travel in the context of Covid-19 and be constantly monitored by public health and data protection authorities alike given the novelty of the technology being used.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if AI-powered passenger locator forms could help stop the spread of Covid-19?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Citizens’ enquiries on the rule of law and EU funding

Tue, 12/22/2020 - 08:30

© Adobe Stock

Citizens often send messages to the President of the European Parliament (or to the institution’s public portal) expressing their views on current issues and/or requesting action from the Parliament. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (AskEP) within the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) looks into these issues and replies to the messages, which may sometimes be identical as part of wider public campaigns.

The President of the European Parliament has recently received a large number of messages urging the Parliament to take a strong stand in favour of the mechanism making the allocation of European Union (EU) funds conditional on the respect of the rule of law. In its conclusions of 11 December 2020, the European Council stated that the Commission should not launch procedures under the rule of law mechanism until the European Court of Justice has made a decision on whether to annul the instrument. Citizens first began to write to the President on this subject in December 2020. They expressed concerns about delays in the implementation of the rule of law mechanism and about the deterioration of human rights and the rule of law in Poland and Hungary. In its resolution on the rule of law, the European Parliament stressed that the European Council conclusions are ‘superfluous’. The agreement between the European Parliament and Council clearly states that it will apply from 1 January 2021.

Please find below the main points of the reply sent to citizens who took the time to write to the President of the European Parliament on this matter.

Main points made in the reply in English

On 16 December 2020, after the European Parliament gave its consent to the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the President of the European Parliament David Maria Sassoli stated: ‘For the first time in the history of our Union we have ensured that the resources of the European budget are conditional on respect for the rule of law and democracy throughout Europe.’

Furthermore, on 17 December 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on the MFF, Rule of Law Conditionality and Own Resources. Parliament stresses that the 11 December European Council Conclusions, which state that the Commission should not apply the Rule of Law mechanism until the European Court of Justice has made a decision on whether to annul the instrument, are ‘superfluous’. The agreement between European Parliament and Council clearly states that it will apply from 1 January 2021. More information is available in this press release.

In a speech to the European Parliament plenary on 16 December 2020, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen also underlined that: ‘In essence, as I understand it, there is a fear that the application of the regulation will be delayed and that justice delayed might be justice denied. This will not happen. The regulation will apply from 1 January 2021 onwards. And any breach that occurs from that day onwards will be covered.’

As to the legislation on the rule of law mechanism specifically, on 16 December 2020 also, the European Parliament approved the regulation on the protection of the Union’s budget in case of generalised deficiencies as regards the rule of law in Member States.

The European Parliament tightened the regulation in the negotiations held with EU countries. For instance, the new law does not only apply when EU funds are misused directly, such as cases of corruption or fraud. It will also apply to systemic breaches of fundamental values that all EU countries must respect, such as democracy or the independence of the judiciary, when those breaches affect – or risk affecting – the management of EU funds. The European Parliament also succeeded in securing a specific provision that clarifies the possible scope of the breaches by listing examples of cases, such as threats to the independence of the judiciary, failure to correct arbitrary/unlawful decisions, and limiting legal remedies.

The European Parliament debate of 16 December 2020 on the Conclusions of the European Council, MFF, Rule of Law Conditionality and Own Resources is publicly available. More information on the rule of law mechanism is available in the EP press release, and in the Legislative Observatory and the Legislative Train databases. Moreover, the full text of the Council’s common position as negotiated and agreed by the European Parliament is available online

Specifically on Poland, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on 17 September 2020, on determination of a clear risk of a serious breach by Poland of the rule of law. Parliament expressed concerns regarding the legislative and electoral system, the independence of the judiciary, and fundamental rights in Poland. It strongly deplored both the ‘Polish Stonewall’ mass arrest and subsequent treatment of 48 LGBTI activists on 7 August 2020, and the Polish Episcopate’s official position in favour of ‘conversion therapy’. More information is available in this press release.

On Hungary, on 16 January 2020, the European Parliament adopted a resolution on ongoing hearings under Article 7(1) of the Treaty on European Union regarding Poland and Hungary. Parliament stated that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by Hungary of the values on which the Union is founded. Parliament is concerned about breaches of the independence of the judiciary, freedom of expression, including media freedom, freedom of the arts and sciences, freedom of association and the right to equal treatment. Further information is available in this press release.

Finally, the rule of law is one of the fundamental values of the Union, enshrined in Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union. In this light, the European Commission published the 2020 Rule of Law Report on 30 September 2020. The report includes chapters on all EU countries including Poland and Hungary.

Categories: European Union

Plenary round-up – December 2020

Mon, 12/21/2020 - 18:00

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2020 – Source : EP/Alexis HAULOT

The December 2020 plenary session focused on the agreement on EU finances for the coming years, as well as the conclusions of the 10‑11 December European Council meeting. Members debated future relations between the European Union and the United Kingdom, and adopted first-reading positions on temporary contingency measures on air and road connectivity, fisheries and aviation safety, to come into force should no agreement be reached with the UK by the end of this year. Members also discussed the preparation of an EU strategy on Covid‑19 vaccination, including its external dimension, an EU Security Union strategy and a dedicated Council configuration on gender equality. Members discussed the European Citizens’ Initiative, Minority Safepack, seeking to protect minority languages and cultures. Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borell made statements on recent developments in the Eastern Partnership, on the situation in Mozambique and on the 25th anniversary of the Barcelona Process and the Southern Neighbourhood.

Sakharov Prize

In a formal ceremony, Parliament awarded the 2021 Sakharov Prize to the democratic opposition in Belarus, represented by the Coordination Council, for its peaceful role in opposing the falsification of the August 2020 elections.

Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027

Following agreement at the European Council meeting of 10‑11 December, Parliament approved, by large majority, the EU’s 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF). An Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary matters, setting out a timetable for the introduction of new own resources, was also approved. Adopted by the Council the following day, the MFF Regulation enters into force on 1 January 2021. The overall ceiling for the MFF is €1074.3 billion (2018 prices), which will be complemented by the €750 billion recovery plan (€390 billion in grants). Financing of the Next Generation EU recovery plan will be made possible by an unprecedented own resources decision authorising the Commission to borrow on markets.

EU general budget 2021

The fruit of the agreement found on 4 December during the budgetary conciliation between Parliament and the Council on the first draft budget for 2021, Members adopted the EU general budget for 2021, voting on the Council’s position (adopted without amendment) on the second draft EU general budget for 2021. Commitment appropriations for 2021 will amount to €164.2 billion and payments to €166.1 billion. The annual budgetary negotiations this year were both complex and delayed, due to the late agreement on the 2021‑2027 MFF, as well as the coronavirus crisis.

Parliament also voted on Draft Amending Budget No 10/2020, to increase EU payment appropriations in 2020, in line with updated forecasts of expenditure and other adjustments to expenditure and revenue. The limited expenditure adjustments proposed allow increased payment appropriations of €1 569.3 million for the European Agriculture Guarantee Fund and certain decentralised agencies.

Transitional rules for support from the common agricultural policy (CAP)

Based on a Parliament proposal and in view of the lengthy negotiations on the EU budget and agricultural policy post‑2020, the European Commission put forward rules aimed at ensuring continuity of EU support for farmers and rural areas. Parliament therefore debated and voted on transitional rules for support from the common agricultural policy (CAP), extending current EU farm policy until the new CAP framework is in place at the end of 2022 and allowing greater focus on environment and climate measures.

REACT-EU

Confirming the compromise agreement reached on the MFF and the considerable funding measures already agreed to combat the coronavirus crisis, Members adopted, by an overwhelming majority, the regulation establishing REACT‑EU. This is intended to mobilise €47.5 billion, offering Member States the flexibility to use EU funds to address the challenges faced by the sectors hardest hit by the pandemic, such as health care, tourism and culture. The funding should support social cohesion and climate objectives.

European Commission implementing powers

Following repeated difficulties and controversy over authorisation of pesticides and genetically modified organisms, the Commission proposed changes to the procedures involved, to encourage Member States to take greater responsibility for decisions in such cases. Members voted on a revised Regulation on the Commission’s implementing powers (Comitology Regulation), aimed at eliminating ‘no-opinion’ deadlock situations in the appeal committee and increasing the transparency of the procedure.

Water legislation

In a joint debate, Members discussed the legislation that ensures that Europeans have access to safe drinking water (particularly on tap, rather than in bottles). Following this debate, Parliament adopted the revised Drinking Water Directive and an associated resolution, changes that come as a direct result of the European citizens’ initiative ‘Right2Water’. The updated rules address concerns about endocrine disruptors, pharmaceuticals and microplastics by introducing a watch-list mechanism, to begin within one year. However, Parliament remains keen to see water quality further improved through other related policies.

European Public Prosecutor’s Office and European Anti-fraud Office

Members debated and voted on the early second-reading agreement reached in trilogue negotiations on the revised Regulation on the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF), to provide for cooperation with the new European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO). The EPPO will provide an independent and decentralised EU office to investigate, prosecute and bring crimes to judgment. However, this means that the relationship between the EPPO and OLAF needs to be carefully codified in the rules of both organisations, based on principles of close cooperation, information exchange, complementarity and non-duplication.

Nomination to the Court of Auditors

In a secret vote, Members issued a negative opinion on the nomination of Marek Opioła as the Polish member of the Court of Auditors, to replace Janusz Wojciechowski, now EU Commissioner for agriculture. While Parliament’s decision is not legally binding on the Council, the Budgetary Control Committee nevertheless examines each candidate on their ability to perform their duties in complete independence and in the general interest of the EU. The publicity surrounding these hearings and the questionnaire answered by the candidates therefore makes it difficult (but not impossible) for the Council to over-ride any negative opinion delivered by Parliament.

European Year of Rail

Members voted on a provisional agreement on a proposal to designate 2021 as the European Year of Rail, reflecting the EU’s climate ambition, as rail is a highly energy-efficient transport mode, and helping to boost passenger and goods traffic.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Members confirmed five mandates for negotiations from the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee: on the proposal for a regulation on European Production and Preservation Orders for electronic evidence in criminal matters; on the proposal for a regulation establishing the conditions for accessing the other EU information systems; on the proposal for a regulation establishing the conditions for accessing other EU information systems for ETIAS purposes; on a proposal for a regulation laying down harmonised rules on the appointment of legal representatives for purpose of gathering evidence in criminal proceedings; and on a proposal for a regulation on a temporary derogation from certain provisions on the use of technologies by number-independent interpersonal communications service providers for the processing of personal and other data for the purpose of combating child abuse online.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – December 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Climate action: The way ahead [What Think Tanks are thinking]

Fri, 12/18/2020 - 14:00

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© markoaliaksandr / Adobe Stock

In a passionate speech delivered recently at Columbia University in New York, the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, described the fight against climate change as the top priority for the 21st century. Furthermore, the election of Joe Biden as the next President of the United States raises hopes that climate action will now be more coordinated and ambitious. Meanwhile, the European Union is determined to push ahead with its Green Deal in a package of measures that aims to radically cut emissions of greenhouse gases while creating jobs in clean industries.

The main objectives of the European Green Deal are for the EU to become climate neutral by 2050, to radically reduce other types of pollution, help European companies become world leaders in green products, and offer aid to regions affected by this economic transition.

This note offers links to recent commentaries, studies and reports from international think tanks on the Green Deal and climate issues. More studies on the topics can be found in a previous item from these series, published in March 2020.

Climate superpowers: How the EU and China can compete and cooperate for a green future
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2020

How Europe can make climate neutrality a reality
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2020

Why Germany lost its way on climate policy
European Council on Foreign Relations, October 2020

How ‘frugality’ hurts the climate cause: And how to undo the damage
European Council on Foreign Relations, August 2020

Financing Europe’s Green Deal: Beware of the waterbed effect
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2020

Biomass and climate neutrality
Centre for European Policy Studies, August 2020

Germany’s inaugural green bond… not so green after all
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2020

A 2030 emissions target of net -55% means tough decisions on the bioeconomy can no longer wait
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

Offshore wind from the Black Sea can deliver the Green Deal for South East Europe
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2020

What role for forest-based industries in a climate-neutral future?
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2020

Hydrogen infrastructure: From pipedream to progress
E3G, November 2020

Green without the recovery
E3G, November 2020

What does the roadmap to COP26 look like now?
E3G, December 2020

Bridging the production gap: How fossil fuel producers can navigate collapsing demand
E3G, December 2020

Convention citoyenne pour le climat: Quelques enseignements pour l’avenir
Terra Nova, December 2020

Building EU green bonds that deserve their name
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Hertie School Jacques Delors Centre, October 2020

2021 can be a climate breakthrough, but Biden and Europe need to talk
Bruegel, November 2020

Understanding the European Union’s regional potential in low-carbon technologies
Bruegel, November 2020

Green certificates: A better version of green bonds
Bruegel, November 2020

Targeted horizontal industrial policy: Green, regional and European
Bruegel, November 2020

G20 endorses circular carbon economy: But do we need it?
Chatham House, November 2020

Inevitable clash when climate meets trade at the border
Chatham House, November 2020

New climate federalism: Defining federal, state, and local roles in a U.S. policy framework to achieve decarbonization
World Resources Institute, October 2020

Applying climate services to transformative adaptation in agriculture
World Resources Institute, October 2020

The role of long-duration energy storage in deep decarbonization: Policy considerations
World Resources Institute, September 2020

America’s new climate economy: A comprehensive guide to the economic benefits of climate policy in the United States
World Resources Institute, July 2020

Mining’s impacts on forests
Chatham House, October 2020

Carbon risk and resilience
Chatham House, July 2020

The cement sector: Seven reasons why it needs to change
Chatham House, June 2020

Understanding the world of tomorrow through the great challenges of energy and climate change
Bruegel, October 2020

The European climate law needs a strong just transition fund
Bruegel, October 2020

Unpacking President von der Leyen’s new climate plan
Bruegel, September 2020

Climate finance: An agenda for EU coordination with emerging markets
Bruegel, September 2020

Is the EU Council agreement aligned with the Green Deal ambitions?
Bruegel, July 2020

A green recovery
Bruegel, April 2020

The EU budget needs climate-proofing
Centre for European Reform, November 2020

Revisiting EU climate and energy diplomacy: A starting point for Green Deal diplomacy?
Egmont, November 2020

Towards road transport fit for a green and digital future
European Policy Centre, November 2020

Energy and climate: What is the new European Commission thinking?
European Policy Centre, September 2020

Reviving global cooperation in challenging times
London School of Economics, Grantham Institute on Climate Change, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, February 2020

The design of an independent expert advisory mechanism under the European Climate Law: What are the options?
London School of Economics, Grantham Institute on Climate Change, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, February 2020

Global trends in climate change litigation: 2020 snapshot
London School of Economics, Grantham Institute on Climate Change, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, February 2020

‘We have lost time but not momentum’ on climate goals, says EU’s Environment Commissioner
Jacques Delors Institute, October 2020

US election: How will a Trump or Biden presidency affect the fight against climate change?
Jacques Delors Institute, November 2020

Eight ways the European Investment Bank can help tackle climate change in Africa
European Centre for Development Policy Management, May 2020

The Climate Change Performance Index 2021
New Climate Institute, November 2020

Read this briefing on ‘Climate action: The way ahead ‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Adoption of the European Union’s 2021 Budget

Fri, 12/18/2020 - 10:30

Written by Sidonia Mazur,

© PhotoSG / Adobe Stock

During the December plenary session, the European Parliament is due to adopt the European Union’s general budget for the year 2021. In practice, Parliament will vote on the Council’s position on the second draft EU general budget for 2021. The Council adopted the second draft budget as presented by the European Commission on 10 December, without any amendment. This second draft budget is the fruit of the agreement found on 4 December during the budgetary conciliation between Parliament and the Council on the first draft budget for 2021. Commitment appropriations for 2021 will amount to €164.2 billion and payments to €166.1 billion. The annual budgetary negotiations this year were delayed and complex due to the lack of agreement on the multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, as well as the context of the coronavirus crisis.

European Union budget for 2021: Figures

2021 Budget by MFF heading

The Union budget for 2021 is the first of the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) for 2021-2027. The European Parliament can adopt it now, as the Council Regulation that establishes the new MFF – to which it consented on 16 December – has now been adopted. For the 2021 budget, commitment appropriations are agreed at €164 251.5 million (-5.5 % compared to the 2020 budget), leaving a margin of €778.8 million beneath the MFF ceilings. The overall level of payment appropriations is set at €166 060.5 million (+1.2 % compared to the 2020 budget), leaving a margin of €2 001.4 million in payment appropriations below the MFF ceilings for 2021. Figure 1 shows the allocations of commitments and payments under each of the headings established in the new MFF. On the top of the EU budget, the Commission estimates the contribution from the EU recovery instrument at €285 billion for 2021.

The EU Budget for 2021 includes an increase of €185 million, over the first draft budget, obtained in the conciliation negotiations reflecting Parliament’s main political priorities. Particularly noteworthy are the increases for: the Connecting Europe Facility – Transport (€60.3 million), LIFE (€42 million), the Digital Europe programme (€25.7 million), the Rights and Values programme (€6.6 million, of which €4.8 million for Daphne), the Justice programme (€2.7 million), Humanitarian Aid (€25 million), for UNRWA under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (€10.2 million) and €7.3 million for the European Public Prosecutor’s Office. The 2021 budget includes the package of pilot projects and preparatory actions as adopted by the Parliament, for a total of €71.8 million in commitments.

The budgetary procedure for 2021

The annual budgetary procedure establishing the Union budget for 2021 started late due to the delay in the agreement of the new MFF in the Council. The Commission published its draft general budget of the EU for 2021 on 27 July 2020, which is some three months later in the year than usual. The draft amounted to €166.7 billion in commitments and €163.5 billion in payments. The novel EU recovery instrument aimed at tackling the coronavirus crisis, Next Generation EU (NGEU), was set to reinforce several EU programmes with a proposed additional €211 billion in commitments as assigned revenue alongside the 2021 budget. Since there was no agreement on the new MFF yet, the Commission based the draft annual budget on its own MFF proposal, updated on 28 May 2020.

The five-day-long July 2020 European Council meeting reached political agreement on a €1 074.3 billion MFF, strengthened by the €750 billion borrowed on the capital markets for NGEU. Subsequently, the Council adopted its reading of the draft budget on 29 September 2020, proposing to reduce commitments, to €162.9 billion (-2.3 % on the draft budget) and to increase payments to €164.8 billion (+0.8 %), to cover the consequences of an increase in the pre-financing rate of programmes relating to the 2014-2020 period.

On 10 November, Parliament reached an agreement with the Council Presidency on the next MFF to, inter alia, increase funding by €16 billion on top of the package agreed by the European Council. €15 billion will reinforce flagship EU programmes, and €1 billion increases flexibility to address future needs and crises.

The Parliament’s reading of the draft 2021 EU budget, voted in plenary on 12 November, amended the September Council position. Parliament confirmed its priorities, as reflected in its resolution of 19 June 2020 on general guidelines for the preparation of the 2021 budget, in particular, mitigating the effects of the coronavirus pandemic and supporting a recovery built on the European Green Deal and digital transformation. The Parliament’s position opposed most of the Council’s cuts. Moreover, it proposed to increase the Commission’s original proposal by over €15 billion in commitments and in line with Parliament’s MFF negotiating position; bringing it to almost €182 billion. Parliament called to make available a further €1.6 billion in commitment appropriations for research, by reusing unspent commitments in line with Article 15(3) of the Financial Regulation. It referred to Parliament’s resolution of 16 September 2020, stating that, as of 2021, new own resources should be introduced, a key demand from the MFF negotiations. It also argued in favour of a more detailed budgetary nomenclature, to allow the budgetary authority to play a stronger role and for more transparent oversight over the use of the funds.

On 13 November 2020, the Commission adopted Amending Letter No 1 to the draft general budget of the European Union for the financial year 2021 (AL 1/2020). The Commission’s draft budget (DB) as amended by AL 1/2020 set commitment appropriations at €164.1 billion, and payment appropriations at €166.1 billion. AL 1/2020 included the adjustments resulting from the European Council’s July MFF position and the 10 November political agreement between Parliament and the Council on the 2021-2027 MFF. AL 1/2020 endorsed Parliament’s demands by proposing additional funding for several programmes, in particular for Horizon Europe, EU4Health and Erasmus.

The President of Parliament, in agreement with the President of the Council, convened the Conciliation Committee, which then had until 7 December to agree on a joint text. On 4 December, the Conciliation Committee reached a common understanding on the content of the 2021 Union budget. However, as the MFF had still to be adopted, the Parliament and Council could not sign the Joint Text and, at that stage, the conciliation had to fail technically. This obliged the Commission to adopt a second draft budget for 2021, which happened on 10 December. This second draft budget integrates fully the agreement found on 4 December during budgetary conciliation.

Finally, the European Council meeting of 10-11 December 2020 found the necessary unanimity on the MFF package. On 14 December, the Council adopted its position on the second draft budget for 2021, accepting the Commission’s proposal without any changes. On 15 December, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) voted (31 to 2, with 4 abstentions) to recommend that plenary approves the Council position on the second draft general budget as well as the joint statements annexed to the resolution, without any amendment. If the plenary follows the BUDG recommendation, the Union budget for 2021 will be adopted and can enter into force on 1 January 2021. The adoption in plenary of any amendment to the Council position would, on the other hand, trigger another budgetary conciliation.

Budgetary procedure: 2020/0371(BUD) and 2020/1998(BUD); Committee responsible: BUDG; Rapporteurs: Pierre Larrouturou (S&D, France) Section III – European Commission, and Olivier Chastel (Renew, Belgium) other sections.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Adoption of the European Union’s 2021 Budget‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Single European Sky 2+ package: Amended Commission proposal [EU Legislation in Progress]

Fri, 12/18/2020 - 08:30

Written by Maria Niestadt (1st edition),

© servickuz / Adobe Stock

The Single European Sky (SES) initiative aims to make EU airspace less fragmented and to improve air traffic management in terms of safety, capacity, cost-efficiency and the environment. Its current regulatory framework is based on two legislative packages: SES I (adopted in 2004), which set the principal legal framework, and SES II (adopted in 2009), which aimed to tackle substantial air traffic growth, increase safety, and reduce costs and delays and the impact of air traffic on the environment. Nonetheless, European airspace remains fragmented, costly and inefficient.

The European Commission presented a revision of the SES in 2013 (the SES 2+ package). While the Parliament adopted its first-reading position in March 2014, in December 2014 the Council agreed only a partial general approach, owing to disagreement between the UK and Spain over the application of the text to Gibraltar airport. With Brexit having removed this blockage, and also to take into account the changed context, the Commission has amended its initial proposal. The Council and the Parliament are now discussing the revised proposal.

Complete version Amended proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the implementation of the Single European Sky (recast) Committee responsible: Transport and Tourism (TRAN) COM(2020) 579
22.9.2020 Rapporteur: Marian-Jean Marinescu (EPP, Romania) 2013/0186(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Bogusław Liberadzki (S&D, Poland)
Jan-Christoph Oetjen (Renew, Germany)
Marco Campomenosi (ID, Italy)
Karima Delli (Greens/EFA, France)
Johan van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium)
João Ferreira (GUE/NGL, Portugal) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Publication of draft report

Categories: European Union

STOA and the OECD Global Parliamentary Network join forces to promote trustworthy and human-centred AI

Thu, 12/17/2020 - 18:00

Written by Andrés García Higuera,

As agreed during the Science and Technology Options (STOA) Panel meeting of 11 September 2020, STOA and the European Parliamentary Research Service are entering into a Partnership on Artificial Intelligence (AI) with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Global Parliamentary Network (GPN). The partnership was announced formally on 2 December 2020, during an online meeting of the GPN Group on Artificial Intelligence, co-organised with STOA.

The Centre for Artificial Intelligence (C4AI) was created to intensify the activities of STOA in the field of AI, in cooperation with prestigious organisations at European and global level. STOA Chair, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece) said at the time that C4AI ‘will be instrumental in promoting public trust, transparency and reflection on the future development of AI in its numerous manifestations and will aspire to assist EU policy-makers in their legislative work on the future development of this technology’.

Attended by 120 members of various parliaments from all around the world, in addition to over 100 parliamentary staff members, the meeting opened with a video presentation produced to mark the launch of the STOA-OECD partnership. Anthony Gooch, Director for Public Affairs & Communications and Chair of the GPN then welcomed the participants. He explained that the GPN brings together Members of Parliament (MPs) representing 42 countries from all continents, who identified digitalisation and AI as a top priority. This had led to the creation of the OECD Parliamentary Group on AI at the request from the MPs attending the GPN meeting in October 2019, and now to this new GPN partnership with STOA.

Eva Kaili followed these remarks by highlighting this occasion as an important milestone for the governance of AI, given that two of the most historic and prestigious institutions in the world were joining forces to generate an ethical framework to provide trustworthy and human-centred AI. For STOA, this partnership, which comprises setting up a ‘Legislative Observatory on AI’ and launching several joint communication projects, adds value to the ongoing global deliberations on AI with and within parliaments and also firmly underlines the European Parliament’s role as a leading actor in this field.

Ulrik Vestergaard Knudsen, Deputy Secretary-General of the OECD then introduced a session providing an update on AI trends. He noted that Covid‑19 has upset the world and that AI has played a significant role in confronting the pandemic, from predicting its evolution to tracking infected people in order to control the spread of the disease, and will also accompany the recovery process. He remarked that this is the first time AI has been called upon to help in such a globally critical situation. However, AI must be transparent and robust, and actors must be accountable at all times, as technology must always remain ‘human-centric’. This introduction was followed by an update on the work on AI being carried out at the OECD and other related institutions, and by a Q&A session. The need to connect with policy-makers was stressed, including through the creation of a policy observatory and a forum where they can develop strategies to guarantee safety, privacy, transparency and explainability in applications of the technology in areas as critical as employment and those in which equality is vital.

Another session reviewed topics of specific relevance to STOA: what has been learned from Covid‑19 about our relation with technology and what the virus has made urgent in AI. Nozha Boujemaa, representing the European Commission, reported on its 2019 ‘Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy AI‘. Members of several parliaments commented, including Cristian Silviu Bușoi (EPP, Romania), Chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), who complimented the STOA Chair for her championing of the promotion of trustworthy technology at the Parliament, and highlighted EU initiatives such as ‘Horizon Europe‘ and ‘Digital Europe‘. Rapporteur for the Parliament’s Special Committee on Artificial Intelligence in a Digital Age (AIDA), Axel Voss (EPP, Germany), commented on the EU civil liability regime in relation to AI. Alexandra Geese (Greens/EFA, Germany and STOA Panel member) highlighted the subject of bias, such as the lack of specific data about women for healthcare and regarding the allocation of funding for AI research and development.

Finally, the meeting featured a legislative learning space, in which members of parliament had the opportunity to exchange on concrete initiatives taken in parliaments. Maria-Manuel Leitao‑Marques (S&D, Portugal and STOA member) and Ibán García del Blanco (S&D, Spain and AIDA member as well as Parliament’s rapporteur on an EU framework of ethical aspects of AI, robotics and related technologies) commented on the EU framework adopted in September 2020. The need to increase inter-parliamentary collaboration was highlighted and, moderating the session, Eva Kaili stressed the need to ‘get things right’ at global level during this critical time and take full advantage of technology to mitigate its effect on society.

It is with this in mind that we look forward to a productive collaboration with the OECD Parliamentary Group on AI, continuing and building on the ongoing work of STOA while making it more relevant and useful for policy-making, not only at the European Parliament and within the European Union, but also for other parliaments around the world.

 

Categories: European Union

Amending securitisation requirements for the impact of coronavirus [EU Legislation in Progress]

Thu, 12/17/2020 - 14:00

Written by Angelos Delivorias (1st edition),

© lucadp / Adobe Stock

Preserving the ability of banks to continue lending to companies, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, is key when it comes to softening the economic impact of the pandemic and easing recovery. The Commission believes that securitisation can contribute to this. It also considers that in order to increase the potential of securitisation the EU regulatory framework (Regulations (EU) 2017/2402 and (EU) 575/2013) must be updated, to cater for (i) on-balance-sheet synthetic securitisation and (ii) the securitisation of non-performing exposures (NPEs).

The proposal, which is partly based on two recent documents by the European Banking Authority and on draft standards proposed in July by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, has been examined by the co-legislators, and both the European Central Bank and the European Economic and Social Committee have published opinions. Trilogue negotiations are now under way.

Complete version (A) General framework for securitisation and specific framework for simple, transparent and standardised securitisation to help the recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic and
(B) Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR): adjustments to the securitisation framework to support the economic recovery in response to the COVID-19 pandemic
Committee responsible: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) COM(2020) 282 (A)
COM(2020) 283 (B)
24.7.2020 Rapporteurs: Paul Tang (S&D, the Netherlands) (A)
Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria) (B) 2020/0151(COD) (A) 2020/0156(COD) (B) Shadow rapporteurs: Othmar Karas (EPP, Austria) (A)
Jonás Fernández (S&D, Spain) (B)
Luis Garicano (Renew, Spain) (A, B)
Marco Zanni (ID, Italy) (A, B)
Philippe Lamberts (Greens/EFA, Belgium) (A, B)
Johan Van Overtveldt (ECR, Belgium) (A, B)
Chris MacManus (GUE/NGL, Ireland) (A, B) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Conclusion of trilogue negotiations

Categories: European Union

‘How the EU political system is changing: New institutional dynamics since 2019’

Thu, 12/17/2020 - 08:30

Written by Joanna Apap

A very well attended policy roundtable on ‘How the EU political system is changing and the new institutional dynamics since 2019’, hosted by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) on 2 December 2020, focused on relations between the Commission, Parliament and Council, and the dynamics of the EU political system as a whole. A series of leading experts on EU politics and institutions took stock of these recent changes and explored how they may alter the way people think and write about the ‘Brussels system’ now and in the future.

Director-General of EPRS, Anthony Teasdale, welcomed the participants and opened the roundtable, noting how the last 18 months have been a period of unusually rapid change in the European Union’s political institutions. The May 2019 European elections saw a turnover of more than 60 % in the membership of the European Parliament. Autumn 2019 subsequently saw the entry into office of new Presidents of the European Commission and European Council, as well as a new High Representative/Vice President for Common Foreign and Security Policy, with the new College of Commissioners committed to a ‘geo-political’ agenda on climate change and digital issues in particular.

Heather Grabbe, Director at the Open Society European Policy Institute then highlighted how the end of January 2020 saw the first-ever departure of an EU Member State, in the form of the United Kingdom withdrawal. From March, the coronavirus crisis had huge consequences for all levels of government, including rapid moves to digitally based discussion and decision-making. In parallel, the EU’s prized achievements of free movement and the single market came under great strain. There has been an intense pressure for speedy EU action to ease the emerging economic crisis by fiscal intervention on an unprecedented scale and this has put the direction of the Commission’s role in question. Swift revision of EU policy on competition and State aid and to align other policies with the Green Deal objectives is needed. The Green Deal itself will pave the way for Europeans to get more involved through deliberative processes and co-creation of policy. This may have an impact on the EU institutions’ working methods. The way in which the Commission intends to ensure greater implication of citizens will be announced, together with the launch of the European Climate Pact, on 16 December 2020. In addition, Heather Grabbe noted that the rule of law crisis could put the whole EU system at risk.

Brigid Laffan, Director and Professor at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute (EUI), explained how the legacy of the Jean‑Claude Juncker Commission’s working methods has been very strong. Today, with a woman in the Commission’s top job, the approach and tone are different, and having a medical expert in a position to address of the impact of the Covid‑19 crisis is certainly an advantage. However, will the EU be capable of delivering on all the major policy areas prioritised by the Commission? The next five years will be crucial and the agenda is very demanding, not only due to the Covid‑19 crisis but also as action requires cross-sectoral cooperation. The EU institutions need to engage and negotiate, ensuring transparency, keeping the electorate on board and regularly informing Parliament. This therefore calls for intense inter-institutional collaboration, continuing the approach initiated in view of the Brexit negotiations.

Olivier Costa, Director and Professor with the European Political and Governance Studies at the College of Europe in Bruges, assessed how the European Parliament exerts its powers. He pointed out that, while the European Parliament’s two largest political groups, the European People’s Party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, have been used to sharing its presidency, they decided to end this coalition agreement in January 2017 during the mid-term election. Media and commentators predicted a new era of more political and conflictual decision-making. However, according to Olivier Costa, the grand coalition has remained in place, albeit informally, as can be observed in the adoption of legislation (although less for non-legislative amendments). Olivier Costa concluded that coalition formation in the European Parliament is affected by institutional, inter-institutional and conjectural constraints, regardless of any deal between the three centrist political groups. With the Covid-19 crisis, a more systematic use of a coalition approach can be observed and since September 2020, Parliament appears rather ‘consensual’ in formal voting.

Former Secretary-General of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) and Visiting Professor at the College of Europe and the London School of Economics, Martin Westlake, suggested looking at 2019 to see what we could expect in 2024. He noted that Parliament is the youngest of the three main decision-making EU institutions, but perhaps the most revolutionary. Agreeing that consensus between the EU institutions is key to moving the agenda forward, Martin Westlake underlined the ‘Presidentialisation of the Commission’, begun under Jean-Claude Juncker and continued strongly by Ursula von der Leyen. It might be expected that the Spitzenkandidaten procedure might be improved for 2024, and that possibly Ursula von der Leyen will take part.

Uwe Puetter, Professor for Empirical Research on Europe at the Europa-Universität Flensburg explained how consensus works in the Council and considered that the Council may need to consider moving towards enhanced cooperation to avoid stalemates such as that over the Multiannual Financial Framework and the recovery fund. He highlighted how Parliament has relatively little power in certain new policies such as the euro, but has exponentially increased in its powers in areas such as the single market regulatory framework. With respect to increasing citizen involvement, the Commission’s political guidelines include a Conference on the future of Europe, with the Vice-President of the Commission on Democracy and Demography specifically charged to lead this process. Uwe Puetter explained that, although the Commission needs to be a powerful communicator, it also needs to be an effective interlocutor with the European Parliament and the European Council and noted that the Commission needs to exercise its executive powers together with the Council rather than separately.

In his role as discussant, Andrew Moravscik, Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University, started by stating that the EU’s response to successive crises demonstrates it is optimistic and resilient. He described the EU as a democratic polity, reflecting what the people want and the pressures experienced. Over the last 25 years, the emergence of the European Council and Council of Minsters as dominant, thanks to greater consensus between Member States, is a big shift in constitutional terms. Andrew Moravscik concluded by stating that the issue of globalisation is driven by concrete drivers, such as national economic interests, which need to be understood in the context of international cooperation and the resultant institutionalisation of European integration. The EU has moved in a very positive direction, as it increasingly justifies its actions to show how it is protecting Europeans. Noting Ursula von der Leyen’s strong performance and agenda, he noted that for the first time, American politicians are saying ‘let’s speak with Europeans on issues of common concern, as Europeans know how to deal with these matters’, which is a very positive evolution.

Follow this link to the recording of the online Policy Roundtable

Categories: European Union

China’s economic recovery and dual circulation model

Wed, 12/16/2020 - 18:00

Written by Gisela Grieger,

© ink drop / Adobe Stock

After a delayed response to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus in late 2019, China has expanded its sophisticated digital surveillance systems to the health sector, linking security and health. It has apparently successfully contained the virus, while most other countries still face an uphill battle with Covid-19. China emerged first from lockdown, and its economy rapidly entered a V-shaped recovery. As in 2008, China is driving the global recovery and will derive strategic gains from this role.

However, China’s relations with advanced economies and some emerging markets have further deteriorated during the pandemic, as its aggressive foreign policy posture has triggered pushback. This has created a more hostile environment for China’s economic development and has had a negative impact on China’s hitherto almost unconstrained access to these economies.

The need to make the Chinese economy more resilient against external shocks and the intention to tap into the unexploited potential of China’s huge domestic market in order to realise the nation’s ambitions of becoming a global leader in cutting-edge technologies have prompted the Chinese leadership to launch a new economic development paradigm for China. The ‘dual circulation development model’ still lacks specifics but is expected to be a key theme in China’s 14th Five-Year Plan (2021-2025) to be officially approved in March 2021. The concept suggests that, in future, priority will be given to ‘domestic circulation’ over ‘international circulation’.

China’s more inward-looking development strategy geared towards greater self-reliance in strategic sectors requires major domestic structural reform and investment to unleash the purchasing power of China’s low-end consumers and the indigenous innovation efforts to achieve the technological breakthroughs needed. These innovation efforts are expected to be largely state-driven.

For the EU the envisaged shifts create challenges and opportunities. On the one hand, competition with China will become fiercer and, on the other, the EU can pursue openings for supply chain diversification with like-minded countries and thus boost its open strategic autonomy.

Read this briefing on ‘China’s economic recovery and dual circulation model‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Click to view slideshow.
Categories: European Union

What measures is the European Parliament taking to tackle vaccine hesitancy in Europe?

Wed, 12/16/2020 - 14:00

The European Parliament regularly receives enquiries from citizens about vaccine hesitancy.

© Adobe Stock

Vaccine hesitancy refers to delays in the acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite the availability of vaccination services. Vaccine hesitancy is complex and context-specific, varying across time, place and vaccines. It includes factors such as complacency (e.g. negative perceptions of the need for, or value of, vaccines), convenience (e.g. lack of easy access) and confidence (e.g. low level of trust in vaccine or provider). While national governmental authorities decide on vaccination policy, the European Union (EU) provides assistance in coordinating EU countries’ policies and programmes, for instance tackling vaccination hesitancy.

Position of the European Parliament

In April 2018, following a debate in plenary, the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting measures aimed at tackling vaccine hesitancy and the drop in vaccinations in Europe. It noted with concern the important gaps in the acceptance of vaccines, the insufficient vaccination coverage rates necessary to ensure adequate protection and the worrying proportions of growing and widespread vaccine hesitancy.

Moreover, the European Parliament called ‘for greater transparency in the production of vaccines and for measures to reassure European citizens’ and strongly supported the Joint Procurement Agreement, which gives EU countries and the Commission a framework to jointly procure vaccines, thereby pooling the purchasing power of individual countries. More information can be found in the press release.

In a September 2018 resolution, the European Parliament highlighted the high value of vaccination to combat antimicrobial resistance. In this regard, the European Parliament stressed the importance of ‘accessible information and awareness raising among the general public to boost the vaccination rate’.

Position of the European Commission

In February 2018, in response to concerns voiced by citizens in petitions objecting to a national law that has made vaccination mandatory for school attendance in Italy, the European Commission highlighted that vaccination is a competence of EU countries. However, the Commission supports EU countries in ‘maintaining or increasing vaccine coverage against a range of vaccine-preventable diseases, promoting in particular the attainment of high levels of childhood immunisation so as to protect children against vaccine-preventable diseases’.

Members of the European Parliament have asked numerous questions of the European Commission on this issue. In particular, in a written answer to a parliamentary question, the European Commission indicated that the priority in tackling vaccination hesitancy is the ‘communication on vaccination with the aim to explain the benefits and address the misconceptions around the issue’.

Concerted efforts among EU countries

In December 2018, the Council adopted a recommendation on strengthened cooperation against vaccine preventable diseases. The recommendation called on EU countries to develop and implement vaccination plans in order to increase vaccination coverage. It also welcomed initiatives by the European Commission to counter online vaccine misinformation, to develop evidence-based information tools and to present guidance that can support the EU countries in tackling vaccine hesitancy.

Coronavirus vaccine

In July 2020, the European Parliament adopted a regulation to fast track the development of vaccines, authorise more flexibility for researchers to speed up clinical trials while guarantying the safety of future Covid‑19 vaccines. The European Parliament held debates on the Covid‑19 vaccination in May and November 2020.

In its July 2020 resolution on the EU’s public health strategy post Covid‑19, while calling for stronger cooperation in the area of health, the European Parliament reaffirmed its concerns over the impact on public health of vaccine hesitancy and highlighted the need for clarity on the benefits and risks of immunisation in the EU countries.

Further information

Keep sending your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Categories: European Union

Coronavirus may cause high economic volatility: EPRS IMF conference

Wed, 12/16/2020 - 08:30

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

Towards European recovery: How big and how quick a rebound will we see in 2021

The Covid‑19 pandemic has hit the global economy hard and its future is difficult to predict. Although the development of vaccines and proposed policy responses offer hope for the world to return to a stronger performance, economic rules may have to be modified. These were the main conclusions of a joint conference organised online by the European Parliamentary Research Service and the International Monetary Fund on 8 December 2020. The European Union has so far managed to avoid any devastating economic outcome thanks to robust policy responses, but the outlook is extremely uncertain. It is certainly not the time for fiscal austerity, but rather fiscal stimuli are needed to lift the economy from the doldrums, especially now that the threat of inflation seems to have disappeared from the horizon. The event, entitled ‘Towards European recovery: How big and how quick a rebound will we see in 2021’ was organised as a result of increasingly solid ties between the EPRS and the IMF and was led by the IMFs new Director of the European Department, Alfred Kammer and European Parliament Vice-President Pedro Silva Pereira (S&D, Portugal).

Opening the event, Parliament’s Vice-President Pedro Silva Pereira said the relations between the IMF and the European Union are improving on the whole, leaving behind some disputes between them on how to resolve the financial crisis, and the Greek crisis in particular, following the credit crunch in 2008‑2009. ‘Differences between our institutions did not last very long. Progressive convergence pave the way for the improvement in our relationship, this discussion is part of this cooperation,’ he said. Vice-President Silva Pereira stressed that any government aid must be designed in such a way as to reach the real economy. There are reasons for optimism: ‘There is hope of vaccination, we have had a presidential elections in the US, there is prospect of ending absurd trade wars, which are damaging our economies’, referring to Democrat Joe Biden’s election victory over Donald Trump, whose trade policy was volatile.

In his presentation, Director of IMF’s European Department, Alfred Kammer stressed that the pandemic has dealt a severe blow to Europe’s lives and economic activity, but thanks to a strong policy response – both at national and EU level – more devastating outcomes have been avoided. Economic activity is forecast to rebound in 2021, but the outlook is very uncertain. While recent news on vaccine development is promising, the strength of the near-term recovery will crucially depend on the impact of containment strategies, on people’s behaviour, and the degree of policy support. It is therefore paramount that supportive policies remain in place for some time, including those to limit a cascade of job destruction, bankruptcies, and bank closures. Alfred Kammer also stressed that the crisis represents an opportunity to address challenges that pre-date the crisis, such as inequality and low productivity through investment in green and digital transformations.

Cinzia Alcidi, Director of Research and Head of the Economic Policy Unit at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels, and a research fellow at the LUISS School of European Political Economy, pointed to difficulties in combatting Covid‑19, because the pandemic affected countries and different economic sectors in a different manner and to a different degree. She added that, even with a vaccine in place, certain sectors will be in a bad shape for years to come. Before the situation stabilises, Europe will face repeated peaks and troughs in economic activity, possibly according to the intensity of the pandemic.

Iain Begg, Professorial Research Fellow at the European Institute of the London School of Economics and Political Science, concurred, saying ‘this disparity should alarm us enormously’. He pointed out how difficult it is make predictions, as we do not know with which assumptions to start. Iain Begg warned against dangerous political implications, namely the election of populists, if current government mishandle efforts to fight the disease. He stressed that differing abilities to absorb EU cohesion money among the EU countries aggravated the situation.

Finally, Jacob Funk Kirkegaard, senior fellow at the American think tank the German Marshall Fund and a senior fellow with another such institution, the Peterson Institute for International Economics, warned that the pandemic risks creating a lasting shift in consumer preferences, which will harm certain economic sectors. Even once the Covid‑19 virus is defeated, there may be less appetite in the future for use of civic aviation or going to the cinema or restaurants. He added that the Stability and Growth Pact, a set of rules underpinning the euro, remains, rightly, suspended. The crisis provides a good opportunity to reform the Pact. ‘The risk is doing too little rather than too much,’ he said. At some point, government should shift financial aid from providing immediate help to the business community to implementing structural reforms.

Alfred Kammer concluded the event, noting that the EU’s recovery fund, agreed in July 2020 and involving joint issuance of debt, provides a considerable opportunity to stimulate both the economy and the EU project as a whole.

Categories: European Union

Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 10 and 11 December 2020

Tue, 12/15/2020 - 18:00

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

© Adobe Stock

On Thursday 10 and Friday 11 December 2020, the European Council agreed on clarifications to the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism, which pave the way for the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework and the Next Generation EU recovery fund. The language used by EU leaders in their conclusions satisfied all actors involved, and avoided triggering renegotiation of the compromise reached between the co-legislators on the proposed regulation on rule-of-law conditionality. EU leaders also achieved a significant breakthrough in combating climate change, by committing to a binding EU reduction in greenhouse gas emissions of at least 55 % by 2030. Moreover, the European Council discussed the development, purchase and the EU-wide distribution of effective vaccines against Covid-19 and stressed the need to take forward proposals for a health union. EU leaders also agreed to step up the fight against radicalisation, terrorism and violent extremism. On external relations issues, they committed to develop a new agenda for the Mediterranean, agreed to expand restrictive measures in response to Turkey’s illegal drilling activities in the eastern Mediterranean and requested that the European Commission explore ways of preventing energy imports from nuclear facilities in breach of EU safety standards in third countries.

EU leaders paid tribute to the late President of France, Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, who initiated the 1974 decision to establish the ‘European Council‘. They also appointed Frank Elderson to the European Central Bank’s executive board, replacing Yves Mersch, whose term in office expired on 14 December 2020. The Euro Summit welcomed the Eurogroup’s agreement on the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), requested a work plan to complete the Banking Union, and called for rapid progress on the action plan on the Capital Markets Union.

1. European Council meeting

Table 1 – New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule Climate change Put forward a legislative proposal for an EU green bond standard Commission June 2021 Climate change Update EU’s nationally determined contribution and submit to the UNFCCC Member States End of 2020 Eastern Mediterranean Submit a report on the situation in the eastern Mediterranean and EU-Turkey political and economic relations for consideration High Representative and the Commission

European Council March 2021 at the latest Coronavirus pandemic

The European Council welcomed the coordination efforts at EU level, in particular on lifting restrictions on cross-border tourism. It invited the Commission to propose a common framework for rapid antigen tests and for the mutual recognition of test results. EU leaders supported a similar coordinated approach for vaccination certificates. Preparations for the timely deployment and distribution of vaccines were highlighted as essential. EU leaders also stressed the importance of increasing resilience in the area of health by taking forward the proposals on a Health Union, for which German Chancellor Angela Merkel expressed support. EU leaders underlined that vaccination should be treated as a global public good and that the EU would contribute to the international response, including through the COVAX facility, to guarantee affordable and fair access to vaccines for all. A possible international treaty on pandemics within the World Health Organization framework should aim to reinforce international cooperation. The next meeting of EU leaders will be a special European Council on Health and on European security and defence, in February 2021.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: President David Sassoli stressed that coordinated efforts were key to addressing the crisis, increasing health systems’ resilience and improving pandemic preparedness.

Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) / Next Generation EU (NGEU)

On 10 December, EU leaders agreed on an interpretative declaration, in the form of European Council conclusions, detailing their common view regarding the rule-of-law conditionality mechanism. This allowed Poland and Hungary to lift their veto, thereby clearing the way for the adoption of the overall package of measures making up the 2021‑27 MFF, including the NGEU. EU leaders had already agreed in principle on rule-of-law conditionality, as part of their July 2020 political agreement on the 2021‑27 MFF and NGEU, but the use of vague language at the time required them to return to this issue, and set out their views in greater detail to reach consensus.

The main innovation in the conclusions concerns a provision on the timing of the European Commission’s implementation of the new rule-of-law mechanism. The adoption of the Commission’s guidelines for the application of the regulation could be delayed, should an ‘action for annulment be introduced with regard to the Regulation’ before the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). However, it is unusual that, prior to such a court case even being brought, the Commission would explicitly acknowledge that it would wait for the result before finalising its guidelines, causing confusion among experts and practitioners alike. The European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, clarified that, provided the overall package of measures linked to the 2021‑27 MFF is adopted in the coming weeks, the rule-of-law mechanism would apply from 1 January 2021. While acknowledging that the finalisation of the guidelines would require some time, she stressed that the Commission will look, from day one, at potential cases of breaches of the rule of law and deal with them appropriately once the CJEU has delivered its ruling. The European Council therefore only introduced a possible delay in the application of the mechanism, rather than actually changing or deleting it.

While claiming ‘victory’ after this agreement, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán said that this debate was not only about the MFF, but also about defining where the centre of power in the EU lies, arguing that ‘the European Council conclusions are the strongest possible instrument in the European Union’, even stronger than regulations. He maintains this view, although the CJEU had already clarified – in ruling on a previous action brought before it by Hungary and Slovakia concerning measures addressing the migration crisis – that European Council conclusions are not legally binding.[i]

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli called on EU leaders ‘to be consistent with the spirit and letter of the compromise reached’ by the co-legislators. Initial reactions from Members stressed that the proposed regulation remained unchanged and that a political declaration from the European Council was not legally binding, whereas the proposed rule of law regulation would be. Critical voices also questioned the legal basis on which the Commission could decide not to apply a law once it had entered into force.

Climate

On the eve of the fifth anniversary of the Paris Agreement on climate change, the European Council agreed to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 55 % by 2030, as compared to 1990 levels. EU leaders invited the co-legislators – Council and European Parliament – to include this target in the forthcoming European Climate Law. The Parliament has already adopted a more ambitious reduction target of 60 %, which it will continue to support during the legislative process.

EU Member States should meet the 2030 target collectively and not individually, a confirmation of a change in policy initiated at the 15‑16 October 2020 European Council. Solidarity, fairness and inclusiveness are at the centre of the agreement, as requested by several Member States, including Poland and Hungary, who asked for reassurance that ‘key decisions will be taken by unanimity’. The agreement allows Member States to meet the goal of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050. The EU’s capacity to act as a credible global player on fighting climate change is also strengthened. President Charles Michel stressed the EU’s leadership position, whilst President von der Leyen welcomed a ‘great way to celebrate the first anniversary of our EU green deal’. She also underlined that the agreement gives ‘certainty to investors, to business, to public authorities and to citizens’.

The European Commission is expected to assess, across economic sectors, how the 2030 target can best be met and was encouraged to focus on the Emissions Trading System (ETS), thereby addressing ‘distributional concerns and energy poverty’. In response to Member States’ concerns, the European Council agreed that forthcoming legislation will address imbalances deriving from contributions made to the Modernisation Fund. EU leaders will consider this matter again, as well as the future Effort-sharing Regulation, at a later date. Member States are expected to update their nationally determined contributions in accordance with the 2030 target and submit them to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) secretariat by the end of 2020. EU efforts regarding the protection of biodiversity are also expected to be stepped up in view of the 2021 Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity.

Main message of Parliament’s President: Mr Sassoli stressed the EU’s ‘political and moral responsibility’ to deliver on the Paris Agreement. The ambitious 2030 target ‘to be set by the co-legislators’ and the Green Deal as a ‘new growth strategy’ will allow climate neutrality to be achieved.

Internal security

As flagged up in the EPRS outlook, EU leaders reiterated their condemnation of recent terrorist attacks, and pledged unity in the fight against radicalisation, terrorism and violent extremism. They welcomed the Commission’s new EU agenda on counter-terrorism and the adoption of the Council declaration on fighting anti-Semitism. EU Heads of State or Government called for the fight against the dissemination of terrorist content online to be enhanced, in relation to which a political agreement has been found between co-legislators on the corresponding proposal. To ensure the proper functioning of the Schengen area, agreed measures should be fully implemented, and police and judicial cooperation and coordination strengthened. EU leaders invited the co-legislators to swiftly move forward on the proposal on the strengthening of Europol’s mandate.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: For President Sassoli, a strengthened Schengen area, in which national police forces and judicial authorities cooperate in a frictionless manner, should be the cornerstone of the EU’s joint security action to fight crime and terrorism.

External relations EU-US relations

As expected, EU leaders considered relations with the United States of America and expressed readiness ‘to discuss shared priorities with the new President of the United States’. President Michel spoke of the US as a ‘friend and an ally’, and called for an ambitious transatlantic agenda.

EU-UK negotiations

While the issue was not discussed, President von der Leyen updated EU leaders on the negotiations on an EU-United Kingdom trade agreement, with positions remaining far apart, notably on level playing field provisions and on fisheries. The Commission has adopted contingency measures for a no-deal scenario, to ensure basic reciprocal fishing access in 2021, and air and road connectivity for six months. In a joint statement on 13 December 2020, the Commission’s President and the UK’s Prime Minister agreed to continue talks towards reaching an agreement.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: David Sassoli underlined that democratic scrutiny of an agreement remains essential, and that the necessary time should be made available for the Parliament to carry out its democratic mandate, before deciding on giving its consent to any agreement.

Southern Neighbourhood

A quarter of a century after launching the Barcelona Process, the European Council reaffirmed the EU’s commitment to stability and prosperity in its southern neighbourhood. It called for a new agenda for the Mediterranean, covering a wide range of issues.

Eastern Mediterranean

EU leaders noted that, ‘regrettably’, Turkey had continued its ‘unilateral actions and provocations’ in the eastern Mediterranean without demonstrating commitment to ‘sustained de-escalation’. The European Council invited the Council to adopt ‘additional listings’, based on the 11 November 2019 Council Decision on restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities, the extension of which is to be considered by March 2021; they also asked the High Representative to organise a multilateral conference on the eastern Mediterranean. Chancellor Merkel stressed that the EU hoped for ‘more constructive’ cooperation with Turkey but that, in light of developments, this was not possible for now. She stressed that there was a ‘certain strategic dependence’ between EU Member States which are also members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) on one hand, and Turkey on the other, underlining that a debate on armaments cooperation should be held within NATO.

Main message of the Parliament’s President: President Sassoli reminded EU leaders that Parliament condemned Turkey’s illegal actions in Varosha and that all tools available to the EU, including economic sanctions, must be used to send ‘a credible signal’ and to show solidarity with Cyprus.

2. Euro Summit

The Euro Summit on 11 December, with all 27 Member States participating, welcomed the Eurogroup’s agreement on the reform of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Most significant is the early introduction of a common backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF) in the form of a credit line from the ESM. EU leaders invited the Eurogroup to create a ‘stepwise and time-bound’ work plan to complete the banking union and called for rapid progress on the Commission’s renewed action plan for a Capital Markets Union. The next Euro Summit, in June 2021, will discuss the economic challenges ensuing from the Covid‑19 pandemic.

Read this briefing on ‘Outcome of the meetings of EU leaders on 10 and 11 December 2020‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

Parliament’s consent to the 2021-2027 MFF

Tue, 12/15/2020 - 10:00

Written by Alessandro D’alfonso,

© Thomas Reimer / Adobe Stock

During the December part-session, Parliament is due to vote on giving consent to the Council Regulation that establishes the EU’s next multiannual financial framework (MFF). Parliament consent requires a majority of its component Members (353 votes). On 14 December, its Committee on Budgets voted to recommend granting consent, following intense negotiations with the Council, which have secured additional resources for a number of flagship EU programmes together with a number of other improvements strongly advocated by Parliament.

European Commission proposal

The current MFF is in the form of a Council Regulation, which sets the distribution of EU budgetary resources between policy priorities for seven years until 31 December 2020. In May 2018, the European Commission put forward proposals for the future of EU finances, including the 2021-2027 MFF and the own resources system to finance it. Negotiations in the Council, where unanimity is required on the MFF Regulation, have proved lengthy. In May 2020, the Commission tabled revised proposals for a lower MFF worth €1 100 billion (2018 prices) and its financing, together with a proposal for a €750 billion recovery instrument, Next Generation EU (NGEU), in response to the severe impact of the coronavirus pandemic. NGEU aims to reinforce EU budgetary instruments in the first years of the next MFF, through funds borrowed on the capital markets.

European Council

Figure 1 – 2021-2027 MFF by heading

The July 2020 European Council meeting reached political agreement on a €1 074.3 billion MFF combined with the €750 billion NGEU. Many analysts deemed the total package momentous, notably for the launch of the unprecedented recovery instrument. However, the size of the 2021-2027 MFF agreed by the European Council represents a decrease in resources when compared to the current MFF (excluding the United Kingdom but including the currently off-budget European Development Fund). The new MFF is structured in seven policy areas or ‘headings’ (see Figure 1). As compared to the Commission proposal of May 2020, resources for funds with geographically pre-allocated expenditure such as cohesion policy and agriculture have been increased (by 2.2 % and 0.9 %). ‘Migration and Border Management’ and ‘Security and Defence’, the two headings affected by the largest relative cuts, have higher allocations than in 2014-2020, but significantly lower than in the Commission proposals and in Parliament’s position of November 2018. The same applies to instruments considered to be investments in EU common goods, such as Horizon Europe and Erasmus+. As for special instruments outside the MFF ceilings to address unexpected events, their amounts for 2021-2027 were set at €20.1 billion, including a reserve to tackle the impact of Brexit.

European Parliament position

Strong advocate of a robust MFF, the Parliament has been ready to negotiate with the Council on the 2021-2027 MFF since November 2018. It confirmed and updated its negotiating mandate in October 2019. Following the July 2020 European Council meeting, Parliament welcomed the creation of a recovery instrument to kick-start the economy, as proposed by Parliament in May 2020. However, it criticised various aspects of the political agreement on the MFF, expressing its readiness to enter negotiations immediately. On that basis, Parliament fast-tracked its legislative opinion on the own resources decision, adopted in September 2020, to enable the Council to ensure the timely launch of NGEU, while engaging in ten weeks of intense negotiations with the Council, with a view to improving the European Council’s settlement on the MFF. On 10 November 2020, Parliament’s negotiating team and the Council Presidency reached a compromise on the next MFF that now needs final confirmation by both institutions. The compromise includes various changes strongly advocated by Parliament that are to be incorporated into the MFF Regulation and in other texts of the broader package on EU finances, such as the interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on budgetary matters.

Reinforcements to flagship programmes and increased flexibility

Figure 2 – Agreed reinforcements by instrument

During the years 2022-2027, the overall level of MFF resources will gradually increase to €1 085.3 billion for commitments and €1 072.06 billion for payments (2018 prices), thanks to a new article negotiated by Parliament that introduces annual upward adjustments of the relevant ceilings. The financing of this €11 billion reinforcement will be linked to revenue stemming from competition fines, in line with Parliament’s long-standing call for such revenue to finance the EU budget. The top-ups will go to seven flagship programmes providing EU common goods, such as research, health, Erasmus+ and border management, based on an allocation key set in the new Annex II. Some of these programmes as well as two other instruments and Frontex (the Border and Coast Guard Agency) will receive a further €4 billion from the re-use of de-committed funds for research (another recurrent demand from Parliament), reflows from predecessor instruments and unused margins (see Figure 2). In addition, Parliament ensured a €1 billion increase for the Flexibility Instrument, and had limitations to its use removed from the Regulation.

Interinstitutional agreement (IIA) on budgetary matters

For NGEU, the IIA ensures greater involvement of the budgetary authority in its governance, while an annex establishes a roadmap for the introduction of new EU own resources to repay it. Cooperation arrangements are set for the adoption of future MFFs. The tracking methodology for climate mainstreaming will be enhanced, and the institutions will introduce corrective measures in case of insufficient progress towards the 30 % climate spending objective. Methodologies for a biodiversity spending target (7.5 % in 2024 and 10 % from 2026) and to measure the gender impact of expenditure are to be developed.

Delayed referral from the Council

Parliament was ready to tackle the consent procedure as a matter of urgency at its November II part-session, with a view to ensuring the timely launch of the new MFF. However, the Council delayed the referral of the Regulation because Hungary and Poland decided to withhold their support to the new MFF, being unhappy with the result of the parallel negotiations on a mechanism protecting the EU budget in case of ‘rule of law’ deficiencies in Member States. The European Council of 10-11 December 2020 solved the deadlock in the Council and the unmodified MFF Regulation was referred to Parliament. On 14 December, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets voted 30 to 2, with 4 abstentions, to recommend that plenary grant consent.

Consent: 2018/0166(APP); Committee responsible: BUDG; Rapporteurs: Jan Olbrycht (EPP, Poland) and Margarida Marques (S&D, Portugal).

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Parliament’s consent to the 2021-2027 MFF‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Categories: European Union

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