Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

In recent years, many jurisdictions have developed sustainability taxonomies that aim to increase transparency of financial markets and redirect capital flows to sustainable investments. Such sustainable finance policies can be important levers because today’s investments shape economic production processes for decades. This case study on South Africa’s Green Finance Taxonomy (GFT) addresses the question of what factors influence the adoption of sustainability taxonomies by potential users. It finds that one year after its publication, the GFT has hardly been used in practice. Important factors hindering an effective implementation are a lack of regulatory embedding, the absence of a legal recognition of the GFT by the European Union (EU), a hesitancy among financial market participants to build capacities to collect the necessary data, and fossil-fuel path dependencies in South Africa’s economy. These findings have important policy implications (e.g. regarding accompanying governance measures) for implementation processes in many countries in the coming years.

In recent years, many jurisdictions have developed sustainability taxonomies that aim to increase transparency of financial markets and redirect capital flows to sustainable investments. Such sustainable finance policies can be important levers because today’s investments shape economic production processes for decades. This case study on South Africa’s Green Finance Taxonomy (GFT) addresses the question of what factors influence the adoption of sustainability taxonomies by potential users. It finds that one year after its publication, the GFT has hardly been used in practice. Important factors hindering an effective implementation are a lack of regulatory embedding, the absence of a legal recognition of the GFT by the European Union (EU), a hesitancy among financial market participants to build capacities to collect the necessary data, and fossil-fuel path dependencies in South Africa’s economy. These findings have important policy implications (e.g. regarding accompanying governance measures) for implementation processes in many countries in the coming years.

Das Bundesverfassungsgericht hat einen Nachtragshaushalt der Bundesregierung für das Jahr 2021 für verfassungswidrig erklärt. Damals wurden ursprünglich für die Bekämpfung der Corona-Pandemie vorgesehene Mittel in Milliardenhöhe in einen Klima- und Transformationsfonds umgeschichtet. Anlässlich des soeben bekannt gewordenen Urteils äußert sich Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zum Klima- und Transformationsfonds ist gut und sollte eine dringend benötigte Reform der Schuldenbremse anstoßen. Die Versuche der Bundesregierungen in den vergangenen zwölf Jahren, die Schuldenbremse zu umgehen, haben immer absurdere Züge angenommen. Die Schuldenbremse ist nicht mehr zeitgemäß, weil sie der Politik notwendigen Spielraum nimmt, um Krisen zu bekämpfen und Zukunftsinvestitionen zu tätigen. Es ist heute dringender denn je, dass die Bundesregierung eine Investitionsoffensive für Zukunftsinvestitionen startet – in Bildung, Klimaschutz, Innovation und Infrastruktur.

Es sind noch genügend Gelder im Klima- und Transformationsfonds, sodass das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts nicht unmittelbar zu Problemen führen wird. Die Bundesregierung wird jedoch als Konsequenz des Urteils die Schuldenbremse mindestens für ein weiteres Jahr aussetzen müssen, um die für bereits versprochene Maßnahmen notwendigen Kredite aufnehmen zu können.

Die Bundesregierung bleibt ihr Versprechen eines Klimageldes weiterhin schuldig. Dies liegt nicht an fehlenden Einnahmen, denn das Klimageld soll durch die CO2-Abgabe finanziert werden. Allerdings gibt die Bundesregierung das versprochene Klimageld in Form massiver Subventionen für billigeren Strom nun lieber den Unternehmen. Angesichts der riesigen Hilfen für die Industrie sollte die Bundesregierung ihre Hilfen sozial ausgewogener gestalten und Menschen mit mittleren und geringen Einkommen nicht vergessen.

This article investigates whether public works / cash for work (CfW) programmes contribute to economic growth locally, beyond benefits paid to participants, especially in contexts of flight and migration. Based on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan, it affirms that CfW substantially promotes economic growth through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most income locally. Some programmes in Jordan improve also the employability of their participants, which, however, does not transform into higher employment rates because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women by easing labour-market access and – though not irrevocably – changing gender roles.

This article investigates whether public works / cash for work (CfW) programmes contribute to economic growth locally, beyond benefits paid to participants, especially in contexts of flight and migration. Based on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan, it affirms that CfW substantially promotes economic growth through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most income locally. Some programmes in Jordan improve also the employability of their participants, which, however, does not transform into higher employment rates because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women by easing labour-market access and – though not irrevocably – changing gender roles.

This article investigates whether public works / cash for work (CfW) programmes contribute to economic growth locally, beyond benefits paid to participants, especially in contexts of flight and migration. Based on quantitative and qualitative research conducted in Jordan, it affirms that CfW substantially promotes economic growth through multiplier effects since CfW participants spend most income locally. Some programmes in Jordan improve also the employability of their participants, which, however, does not transform into higher employment rates because the Jordanian labour market is extremely tight. Finally, the programmes empower women by easing labour-market access and – though not irrevocably – changing gender roles.

With the first Global Stocktake to be presented at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, the question of inadequate levels of climate finance for developing countries will again take centre stage. Ongoing efforts to reform climate finance include the negotiation of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) by the end of 2024; the structural reform of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to provide more climate finance and to lower the cost of capital; and the setting-up and integration of the new funding stream for loss and damage. Yet, there are other longstanding issues in international climate finance that likewise need to be addressed as part of these ongoing efforts, which are mainly related to the disentanglement of the development and climate finance regimes. Official Development Assistance (ODA), per definition, aims to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and at the same time plays an increasing role in the global climate finance landscape. However, sourcing climate finance from ODA is already leading to a “crowding out” of limited ODA resources for its original purposes. Moreover, the current system of reporting on and accounting for climate finance provided through ODA has significant pitfalls and weaknesses. This paper discusses some of the key challenges caused by the blurring of the development assistance and climate finance regimes and argues that the NCQG process and the integration of loss and damage into the climate finance system must go hand in hand with a separation of climate and development finance accounting mechanisms whilst ensuring integrated policy responses. We address these issues in two parts: first we focus on the current system of reporting and accounting for international climate finance (as ODA); and second on the role of ODA to finance mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. We argue that there is a political necessity for distinguishing between ODA and climate finance (for transparency and credibility), which contrasts with the operational reality where co-benefits of projects and development finance must be achieved by integrating climate and non-climate objectives. In this regard, the paper analyses the implications of on-going negotiations under the UNFCCC around the NCQG and loss and damage for a necessary ODA reform. In particular, we make the following recommendations:
(1) Align the accounting and reporting system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) with the NCQG: one should separate climate and development finance; reduce over-reporting; and establish triangulation of climate finance data reported by donors.
(2) Introduce qualitative frameworks for monitoring and assessment of the impact of climate-related interventions; and define “fit-for-purpose” instru-ments and channels for the provision of climate finance.
Looking ahead, we expect discussions on a potential enlargement of the contributor base of climate finance to give new impetus to climate finance reform.

With the first Global Stocktake to be presented at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, the question of inadequate levels of climate finance for developing countries will again take centre stage. Ongoing efforts to reform climate finance include the negotiation of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) by the end of 2024; the structural reform of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to provide more climate finance and to lower the cost of capital; and the setting-up and integration of the new funding stream for loss and damage. Yet, there are other longstanding issues in international climate finance that likewise need to be addressed as part of these ongoing efforts, which are mainly related to the disentanglement of the development and climate finance regimes. Official Development Assistance (ODA), per definition, aims to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and at the same time plays an increasing role in the global climate finance landscape. However, sourcing climate finance from ODA is already leading to a “crowding out” of limited ODA resources for its original purposes. Moreover, the current system of reporting on and accounting for climate finance provided through ODA has significant pitfalls and weaknesses. This paper discusses some of the key challenges caused by the blurring of the development assistance and climate finance regimes and argues that the NCQG process and the integration of loss and damage into the climate finance system must go hand in hand with a separation of climate and development finance accounting mechanisms whilst ensuring integrated policy responses. We address these issues in two parts: first we focus on the current system of reporting and accounting for international climate finance (as ODA); and second on the role of ODA to finance mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. We argue that there is a political necessity for distinguishing between ODA and climate finance (for transparency and credibility), which contrasts with the operational reality where co-benefits of projects and development finance must be achieved by integrating climate and non-climate objectives. In this regard, the paper analyses the implications of on-going negotiations under the UNFCCC around the NCQG and loss and damage for a necessary ODA reform. In particular, we make the following recommendations:
(1) Align the accounting and reporting system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) with the NCQG: one should separate climate and development finance; reduce over-reporting; and establish triangulation of climate finance data reported by donors.
(2) Introduce qualitative frameworks for monitoring and assessment of the impact of climate-related interventions; and define “fit-for-purpose” instru-ments and channels for the provision of climate finance.
Looking ahead, we expect discussions on a potential enlargement of the contributor base of climate finance to give new impetus to climate finance reform.

With the first Global Stocktake to be presented at the 28th Conference of the Parties (COP28) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Dubai, the question of inadequate levels of climate finance for developing countries will again take centre stage. Ongoing efforts to reform climate finance include the negotiation of a New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG) by the end of 2024; the structural reform of Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) to provide more climate finance and to lower the cost of capital; and the setting-up and integration of the new funding stream for loss and damage. Yet, there are other longstanding issues in international climate finance that likewise need to be addressed as part of these ongoing efforts, which are mainly related to the disentanglement of the development and climate finance regimes. Official Development Assistance (ODA), per definition, aims to promote the economic development and welfare of developing countries, and at the same time plays an increasing role in the global climate finance landscape. However, sourcing climate finance from ODA is already leading to a “crowding out” of limited ODA resources for its original purposes. Moreover, the current system of reporting on and accounting for climate finance provided through ODA has significant pitfalls and weaknesses. This paper discusses some of the key challenges caused by the blurring of the development assistance and climate finance regimes and argues that the NCQG process and the integration of loss and damage into the climate finance system must go hand in hand with a separation of climate and development finance accounting mechanisms whilst ensuring integrated policy responses. We address these issues in two parts: first we focus on the current system of reporting and accounting for international climate finance (as ODA); and second on the role of ODA to finance mitigation, adaptation, and loss and damage. We argue that there is a political necessity for distinguishing between ODA and climate finance (for transparency and credibility), which contrasts with the operational reality where co-benefits of projects and development finance must be achieved by integrating climate and non-climate objectives. In this regard, the paper analyses the implications of on-going negotiations under the UNFCCC around the NCQG and loss and damage for a necessary ODA reform. In particular, we make the following recommendations:
(1) Align the accounting and reporting system of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) with the NCQG: one should separate climate and development finance; reduce over-reporting; and establish triangulation of climate finance data reported by donors.
(2) Introduce qualitative frameworks for monitoring and assessment of the impact of climate-related interventions; and define “fit-for-purpose” instru-ments and channels for the provision of climate finance.
Looking ahead, we expect discussions on a potential enlargement of the contributor base of climate finance to give new impetus to climate finance reform.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

The objective of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between trade policy and food security in the MENA region. It provides an overview of the theoretical nexus between international trade, trade policy, and food security. It also analyzes the status of food security in the MENA region and trends in trade policy between trade barriers and trade agreements. The repercussions of the current global shocks (COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian war on Ukraine) on food security, together with longstanding structural issues that undermine the region’s potential to achieve food security are also discussed. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations for enhanced food security in the region.

Bonn, 13. November 2023. Die jüngste Welle von Staatsstreichen in Afrika hat die internationalen Akteur*innen aufgeschreckt, die für demokratische Werte einstehen. Was in Mali nach regierungsfeindlichen Protesten im August 2020 begann, breitete sich bald wie ein unkontrollierbares ‚Harmattan-Feuer‘ auf fünf weitere Länder in der Sahelzone und in frankophonen Teilen von Zentral- und Westafrika aus und brachte die dortigen Regierungen zu Fall.

Während diese Putsche zwar einen besorgniserregenden Trend in Afrika markieren, scheinen sie unter der afrikanischen Bevölkerung jedoch auf breite Unterstützung zu stoßen. Es bleibt jedoch abzuwarten, ob diese Militärputsche die Erwartungen der Bürger*innen erfüllen werden. Denn so gut wie keiner der bisherigen Militärputsche – vor allem in der Region – hat der Bevölkerung Vorteile gebracht. Nun scheint sich der Staub gelegt zu haben und die internationalen Akteur*innen, denen an einer Demokratisierung gelegen ist, sollten aus dem Geschehenen Lehren ziehen, um weitere Putsche in Afrika zu vermeiden.

Internationale Akteur*innen sollten genau darauf achten, welche Arten von Demokratie sie in Afrika unterstützen. Gegenwärtig sind viele Länder Afrikas langjährige Wahlautokratien (Hybridregime), die sich schon lange hinter der Fassade von Wahlen als Demokratien ausgeben. Das Handeln bzw. Nichthandeln der internationalen Akteur*innen, die Demokratien in Afrika fördern wollen, lässt jedoch darauf schließen, dass sie diese Hybridregime kompromisslos unterstützen, statt sich für demokratischere Regimeformen einzusetzen. Fast 64 % der Netto-Entwicklungsleistungen aller Geber*innen fließen in Länder, die nach international anerkannten Demokratieindizes wie dem Varieties of Democracy Index als nicht vollständig demokratisiert gelten. Daraus folgt, dass Entwicklungsleistungen weiterhin dazu dienen können, unvollständige Demokratien zu stabilisieren.

Infolgedessen ist die Demokratie in Afrika nicht mehr als ein zyklisches Phänomen, das durch scheinbar erfolgreiche Wahlen herbeigeführt wird, die allerdings mit einer ganzen Reihe von systemischen Mängeln einhergehen. So waren zwischen 1990 und 2023 etwa 70 % der Regime in Afrika entweder geschlossene Autokratien (17,6 %) oder Wahlautokratien (51,7 %). Nur 25,1 % waren Wahldemokratien und 5,6 % liberale Demokratien. Die häufigste Regierungsform in afrikanischen Ländern scheint also die Wahlautokratie zu sein, die de facto ein Mehrparteiensystem ist, aber aufgrund erheblicher Unregelmäßigkeiten und Einschränkungen des Parteienwettbewerbs nicht demokratischen Standards entspricht.

Die Unterstützung dieser hybriden Regime als Standardform der Demokratie erweckt den Eindruck, dass funktionierende Demokratien vorhanden sind. Tatsächlich sind diese jedoch nicht nachhaltig, denn sie sehen weder eine vertikale noch eine horizontale demokratische Rechenschaftspflicht vor, während öffentliche Gelder und Ressourcen in großem Maßstab veruntreut werden. Die Bürger*innen geben ihre Stimme in der Erwartung ab, dass die von ihnen gewählten Politiker*innen ihre Wahlversprechen erfüllen. Aufgrund der institutionellen Schwächen und Inkohärenz von Wahlautokratien sind die Regierenden jedoch nicht verpflichtet, ihre Versprechen einzuhalten und können ungehindert ihre Macht missbrauchen. Und so kommt es, dass in vielen afrikanischen Ländern dringend benötigte öffentliche Güter fehlen, während sich korrupte Beamt*innen die Taschen füllen.

Besonders problematisch ist, dass sich diese Regime durch scheinbar demokratische Wahlen als Demokratien ausgeben. Die Bevölkerung, die unter der Unfähigkeit ihrer Regierung leidet, zweifelt zunehmend an der Idee der Demokratie, weshalb andere Regierungsformen wie die Militärherrschaft immer beliebter werden. Menschen in ganz Afrika unterstützen und feierten die Staatsstreiche – nicht etwa, weil sie demokratische Systeme an sich ablehnen, sondern weil sie unzufrieden damit sind, wie die ‚Demokratie‘ funktioniert bzw. nicht funktioniert.

Ein weiterer wichtiger Punkt sind ungerechte (post-)koloniale politische Vereinbarungen zwischen afrikanischen Regierungen und ehemaligen Kolonialmächten, denn sie schüren Feindseligkeiten und begünstigen Staatsstreiche. Dies zeigt etwa der antikoloniale Diskurs gegen Frankreich bei den jüngsten Putschen. Die Bürger*innen kritisieren ungerechte Steuerabkommen, die Monopolstellung von Air France in den frankophonen Ländern, die einseitige militärische Zusammenarbeit und die Dominanz französischer Unternehmen, z. B. in den Uranminen. Verstärkt wurden diese Ressentiments durch die Ambitionen konkurrierender Supermächte, sich in der Region Wettbewerbsvorteile und eine Vormachtstellung zu verschaffen. So soll Russland beispielsweise mit Desinformationskampagnen in afrikanischen Ländern die Stimmung zugunsten antidemokratischer Akteur*innen in der Region aufgeheizt haben. Die Militärjuntas in diesen Ländern beziehen sich oft strategisch auf Russland. Allerdings war Russlands Rolle in vielen dieser Länder bisher eher rhetorischer Natur.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass die Arbeit von demokratischen Akteur*innen, wie der ECOWAS, zur Stärkung der Demokratie über die Ermöglichung von Wahlen hinausgehen sollte. Außerdem ist es notwendig, die demokratischen Verfahren zu institutionalisieren und zu festigen. Der derzeitige Ansatz internationaler Akteur*innen, Hybridregime als gültige Form der Demokratie anzuerkennen, legt nahe, dass Wahlautokratien bereits liberalen Standards genügen würden. Allerdings gelten Wahlautokratien als eine fragile und defizitäre Form der Demokratie – weitere Schritte zur Demokratisierung sind notwendig. Zudem lässt sich die Zustimmung der afrikanischen Bevölkerung zur Demokratie nur dann gewinnen, wenn keine ungerechten (post-)kolonialen politischen Vereinbarungen mehr geschlossen werden.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

Updating the rules of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become imperative to address the dynamic challenges confronting modern trade. Plurilateral agreements can be a viable option for responding to trade issues where achieving multilateral consensus in the full WTO membership is difficult. However, plurilaterals should follow an inclusive and development-focused framework for participation. They should have a layered architecture of rights and obligations and encompass capacity-building measures. WTO Members should also initiate plurilaterals on topics which are of particular concern to developing countries and which can help achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The G20 (Group of 20) can play a decisive role in fostering discussion and mutual understanding on plurilaterals.

This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.

This chapter offers a comprehensive and up-to-date evaluation of Chinese foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, with a specific focus on the motives, profiles and strategies of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Drawing on fieldwork and extensive interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders and 50 Chinese companies in Zambia and Angola in 2019, the chapter sheds light on the considerable heterogeneity that exists amongst firms operating in Africa. The chapter goes beyond a surface-level examination by exploring the diverse motivations, including both push and pull factors that drive Chinese investment in these two Southern African countries. By challenging prevailing misconceptions and offering nuanced insights, this chapter contributes to our understanding of the heterogeneous and dynamic nature of Chinese investors in Zambia and Angola. Moreover, it argues that African agency should be also viewed through the lens of policy implementation and the ability to drive fundamental structural change.