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Die Ampel darf im künftigen Etat nicht an der falschen Stelle sparen. Ein Gastbeitrag von Stephan Klingebiel, Leiter des Forschungsprogramms „Inter- und transnationale Kooperation“.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

This paper focuses on analysing how Chinese firms operate in Latin America, Asia and Africa in regard to ESG (environmental, social and governance) standards and sustainability issues. How do they respond to the increasing global value chain requirement to incorporate and maintain ESG standards? Is their space for an alignment between Western development cooperation ESG policies, frameworks, strategies and practices and Chinese political and economic stakeholders in the developing world? The paper uses a variety of case studies covering Chinese firms (disaggregated into SOEs (state-owned enterprises) and large, medium and small private sector firms) operating in various sectors in countries across the developing world. It uses a three dimensional framework to analyse different types of Chinese firms in terms of value chain operations covering many of the ESG standards they are required to meet:
1. Supply chain relations (i.e. approach to supporting upgrading of local suppliers);
2. Internal firm processes (i.e. approach to local labour, training and upskilling);
3. Social licence to operate (i.e. approach to meaningfully engaging with local communities taking account of their social and economic needs).
There are examples of Chinese firms behaving according to the negative type casting that has dominated much of the literature. However, Chinese firms in developing countries are fairly flexible and more willing to adapt to ESG standards than conventionally assumed. There are sufficient instances of Chinese firms in host developing countries showing significant movement to alignment on ESG dimensions. Unlike the industrialised world, these firms are not driven by civil society socio-political pressure within China. China’s relationship to ESG has instead been driven by a) geo-political considerations involving the Chinese government’s global presence, and b) primarily economic risk considerations of Chinese lead firms operating internationally – risk relating to raising finance and ensuring that business operations in developing countries can avoid major disruption. For many Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world, ESG is increasingly being perceived as a fundamental risk mitigation tool assisting them to ensure that they are able to maintain continuous, consistent, and predictable economic operations. These tendencies can only be expected to grow much stronger as the Chinese government adopts more ESG standards within guidelines and regulatory frameworks and enforces compliance on Chinese firms operating abroad. As Chinese firms become more open to ESG compliance, this creates a foundation for potential development cooperation alignment with the Chinese government and Chinese lead firms operating in the developing world.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

We use new data on political connections from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys to examine the impact of connections on firms’ participation in global value chains (GVCs) for six MENA countries (Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt, the West Bank and Gaza, Jordan, and Lebanon). In addition to political connections, we construct several measures of “political influence” based on available data on lobbying and grand corruption. We also explore whether political connections help firms overcome barriers to trade and investment and increase their participation in GVCs at the extensive and intensive margins. Our findings suggest that political connections do matter for firms’ GVC participation. The impact is more pronounced for firms that combine political connections with informal payments to influence policymaking. Our findings on the significance of trade and investment barriers for GVC participation for different categories of firms’ political influence are – however – inconclusive.

Die Monopolkommission hat heute ihre Sektorgutachten zu den Bereichen Telekommunikation und Post gemeinsam mit der Bundesnetzagentur (BNetzA) vorgestellt. Tomaso Duso, Leiter der Abteilung Unternehmen und Märkte im DIW Berlin und Mitglied der Monopolkommission, kommentiert:

Die Bundesregierung hat sich zu Recht ehrgeizige Gigabit-Ziele gesetzt. Die digitale Infrastruktur ist die Grundvoraussetzung dafür, dass Deutschland bei der digitalen Transformation endlich vorankommt. Allerdings muss im Interesse der Endnutzer*innen in dieser kritischen Phase darauf geachtet werden, dass diese Märkte langfristig für den Wettbewerb offenbleiben und nicht durch kurzfristige Entscheidungen monopolisiert werden. Infrastrukturwettbewerb sollte weiterhin möglich bleiben, und die Glasfasernetze sollten durch einen frei verhandelten und wettbewerbsfreundlichen Netzzugang („Open Access“) weitgehend geöffnet werden. Neben dem Ausbauwettbewerb ist auch der Preiswettbewerb wichtig; ein Verbot des Überbaus von Glasfasernetzen ist nicht zielführend. Im Mobilfunkbereich sollten die demnächst auslaufenden Mobilfunkfrequenzen um maximal drei Jahre verlängert werden. Die dadurch entstehenden Wettbewerbsverzerrungen sollten allerdings durch wettbewerbsfördernde Auflagen ausgeglichen werden.

Zu begrüßen ist auch, dass nach über 25 Jahren endlich eine Novellierung des Postgesetzes gelingen könnte. Der Gesetzesentwurf, den das Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Klimaschutz am 28. November veröffentlicht hat, greift bereits viele Empfehlungen der Monopolkommission auf. Insbesondere im schrumpfenden Briefbereich empfiehlt die Monopolkommission, die Vorgaben zu entschlacken und an die Lebenswirklichkeit der Menschen anzupassen. In dicht besiedelten Regionen sollten die Vorteile von Wettbewerb auch weiterhin genutzt werden. In Regionen, in denen nicht mehrere Netze parallel profitabel sind, können Sendungsströme verschiedener Postdienstleister gebündelt werden. Bei der Frage der arbeits- und sozialrechtlichen Bestimmungen, insbesondere im wachsenden Paketbereich, empfiehlt die Monopolkommission, die Beschäftigten in die Lage zu versetzen, Missstände zu erkennen und anonym zu melden.

Die Weltgemeinschaft hat sich auf der UN-Klimakonferenz COP 28 in Dubai auf eine Abschlusserklärung geeinigt. Energieexpertin Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt im DIW Berlin, kommentiert dieses Einigung wie folgt:

Die COP28-Klimakonferenz war reines Greenwashing. Dies bestätigt allein schon die Abschlusserklärung. Es ist kein "historisches Paket", wie der Konferenzpräsident behauptet – weder im positiven noch im negativen Sinne. „Abkehr“ statt „Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien“ – das ist der anscheinend maximal zu erreichende Minimalkonsens der Weltstaatengemeinschaft. Ein Umstieg ist kein Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien. Die hier gewählten Wortgirlanden lassen zu viele Schlupflöcher, zu viele Hintertüren offen, damit weiterhin fossile Energien genutzt werden können. Zwar ist die Einigung weniger schlimm als der ursprünglich vorgelegte Beschlussentwurf erwarten ließ, aber dennoch unzureichend, um dringend notwendige Klimaziele zu erreichen. Die jetzige Einigung spiegelt nicht die Dringlichkeit wider, die benötigt wird, um aus fossilen Energien auszusteigen und die Emissionen so schnell wie möglich zu senken. Nur eine Verpflichtung zum sofortigen Ausstieg aus fossilen Energien hätte dazu führen können, dass die Klimaziele erreicht werden. Mit dieser Einigung wird das 1,5-Grad-Ziel kaum mehr erreichbar sein.

Die Bundesregierung hat sich auf einen Haushalt für das kommende Jahr geeinigt. DIW-Präsident Marcel Fratzscher kommentiert die Entscheidung wie folgt:

Die Einigung der Bundesregierung zum Haushalt 2024 ist ein fauler Kompromiss, mit dem die Bundesregierung die Probleme lediglich in die Zukunft verschiebt. Der Kompromiss ist unzureichend, um Deutschland zukunftsfähig zu machen. Die Einigung bedeutet, dass dem Staat dauerhaft 60 Milliarden Euro für Klimaschutz und Transformation fehlen werden. Die Bundesregierung versucht mit Tricks behaupten zu können, dass alle Ziele und Versprechen eingehalten werden. Dies stimmt aber nur bedingt. Die FDP ist der große Gewinner dieser Einigung, denn sie konnte ihre beiden roten Linien – Einhaltung der Schuldenbremse und keine stärkere Belastung, sondern Entlastung vor allem für Spitzenverdienende – durchsetzen, wohingegen SPD und Grüne bei Investitionen, Klimaschutz und Sozialleistungen Abstriche machen müssen.

Für die Wirtschaft reduziert die Einigung die Unsicherheit nur kurzzeitig, weil bereits getätigte Versprechen nun größtenteils eingehalten und umgesetzt werden. Langfristig erhöht die Einigung jedoch die Unsicherheit für die Unternehmen, da mit dem Sparkurs der Bundesregierung weniger Geld für Investitionen in Klimaschutz, Infrastruktur und die grüne Transformation zu Verfügung stehen wird. Das Paket der Bundesregierung wird die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der deutschen Wirtschaft langfristig weiter schwächen. Bürgerinnen und Bürger gehören zu den Verlierern dieser Einigung. Die Bundesregierung will 1,5 Milliarden Euro beim Bürgergeld und anderen Sozialleistungen einsparen, was vor allem die wirtschaftlich schwächsten Menschen treffen wird. Dagegen hat der Bundesfinanzminister verkündet, dass die steuerliche Entlastung durch das Inflationsausgleichsgesetz vor allem für Spitzenverdienende mit 16 Milliarden Euro im Jahr für 2024 auch weiterhin Bestand haben wird.

Auch die schnellere Erhöhung des CO2-Preises wird zulasten der Bürgerinnen und Bürger gehen. Im Gegenzug bleibt die Bundesregierung das Klimageld weiterhin schuldig, mit dem die CO2-Bepreisung an die Menschen zurückgegeben werden soll. Die Einigung ist eine Enttäuschung und eine große verpasste Chance eines Neuanfangs für die Bundesregierung. Die Bundesregierung hat es versäumt, klare Prioritäten auf Zukunftsinvestitionen zu legen und Deutschland langfristig wieder wettbewerbsfähiger zu machen. Die Einigung ist zudem realitätsfern, da sich durch den Ukraine-Krieg und viele andere Risiken schnell herausstellen könnte, dass man mit dem Geld wieder nicht auskommen wird. Es ist wahrscheinlich, dass die Bundesregierung sich weiter von Konflikt zu Konflikt hangelt und die großen Herausforderungen nicht lösen können wird.

Humanitarian organizations have repeatedly called attention to the challenges that counterterrorism resolutions and UN sanctions regimes can pose to humanitarian action. In response, the council has progressively incorporated language that better takes into consideration international humanitarian law (IHL), international human rights law (IHRL), humanitarian principles, and the need to protect principled humanitarian action from the potential negative consequences of sanctions and counterterrorism measures. Most notably, in December 2022, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2664, which provides a cross-cutting humanitarian exemption to asset freezes under all its sanctions regimes, including the 1267 counterterrorism regime against ISIL/al-Qaida, to safeguard the timely and effective conduct of humanitarian activities.

In this context, IPI and the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in New York hosted a closed-door, hybrid roundtable on November 14, 2023, to assess the implementation and impact of Resolution 2664, including its potential application to counterterrorism measures. This roundtable provided a platform for exchanges between humanitarian organizations, member states, the UN Secretariat, civil society organizations, and independent experts, including those based in Geneva and New York.

There was broad agreement among participants that Resolution 2664 is a milestone achievement representing a fundamental policy shift within the Security Council. However, the resolution does not resolve all obstacles facing humanitarian actors seeking to provide aid in contexts where sanctions from the UN and autonomous regimes, as well as counterterrorism measures, apply. Participants thus provided the following recommendations on how to continue to safeguard principled humanitarian action:

• Member states should incorporate the obligations of Resolution 2664 into national and regional frameworks;
• Member states should take steps to apply the humanitarian exemption to autonomous sanctions regimes and counterterrorism measures;
• Donors should streamline reporting requirements for humanitarian actors;
• UN entities, humanitarian actors, and member states should invest in greater guidance and capacity building on the implementation of Resolution 2664; and
• UN entities, international and local humanitarian actors, member states, and the private sector should continue to engage in inclusive, multi-stakeholder dialogue at the national and global levels on the implementation of Resolution 2664 and risk-mitigation measures.

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