Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Der Ozean ist ein existenzieller Teil der kulturellen Identitäten und des kulturellen Erbes Südostasiens. Gleichzeitig ist die Region den Folgen des globalen Meeresspiegelanstiegs und weiteren komplexen Risiken in höchstem Maße ausgesetzt. Dortige Küstengemeinden sind in ihrer Historie von Katastrophenereignissen geprägt, wodurch sie umfassendes Wissen sammeln und Überlebensstrategien entwickeln konnten. Diese reichen jedoch angesichts rasanten Bevölkerungswachstums, zunehmender Mobilität, Infrastruktur und technologischer Entwicklungen nicht länger aus. Kürzlich betonte Peter Schoof, deutscher Botschafter in Indonesien, dem Verband Südostasiatischer Nationen (ASEAN) und Timor-Leste, wie wichtig ein Wandel der internationalen Perspektive in Bezug auf Südostasien und den Indopazifik sei, nicht nur im Hinblick auf dessen großen Einfluss auf das Wirtschaftswachstum, sondern auch auf seine Resilienz gegenüber Naturkatastrophen. Die UN-Dekade der Ozeanforschung für nachhaltige Entwicklung hat gerade erst begonnen – und Südostasien wird 2022 im Fokus mehrerer dort stattfindender politischer Prozesse stehen.

Das Wissen südostasiatischer Länder in Bezug auf den Ozean gründet auf ihrer kulturellen Vielfalt sowie ihrer Verbundenheit. Letztere steht im Zentrum der Vision der ASEAN-Gemeinschaft und stärkt die Resilienz im täglichen Umgang mit meeresbedingten Gefahren. Doch welche Erkenntnisse und aktuellen Herausforderungen sind mit dem Risikomanagement und der Förderung von Ocean Literacy in der Region verbunden?
Die ASEAN-Staaten zeichnen sich sowohl als einzelne Akteure als auch in ihrer Gemeinschaft durch vorbildliche Leistungen bei der überregionalen Koordination aus. In den letzten Jahren haben sie erheblich in Infrastruktur für den Hochwasser- und Küstenschutz investiert, etwa in Dämme und Polder sowie in gemeinsame Programme zur Katastrophenvorsorge und Risikominimierung wie Tsunami-Frühwarnsysteme oder das Koordinierungszentrum der ASEAN für humanitäre Hilfe im Bereich Katastrophenmanagement (AHA). Durch den Aufbau von Institutionen mit erweiterten Kapazitäten zum Notfallmanagement soll die „letzte Meile“ erreicht werden: die verbesserte Resilienz von Küstengemeinden. Dennoch lassen sich technologische Fortschritte bei Frühwarn- und Risikomanagement-Systemen nur mit einem größeren Verständnis der Bedeutung einer verantwortungsbewussten Ocean Governance erzielen. Die südostasiatischen Länder sollten noch stärker zusammenarbeiten um die Nachhaltigkeit der erreichten Fortschritte zu gewährleisten und für den Umgang mit meeresbedingten Gefährdungen nicht nur auf rein landbezogene Maßnahmen zurückgreifen. Zudem muss Ocean Governance integraler Bestandteil nationaler Leitstrategien werden. Hingegen ist es etwa während Präsident Joko Widodos zweiter Amtszeit um ein solches Konzept, Indonesien zu einem globalen maritimen Knotenpunkt zu machen, sehr still geworden.

Wollen wir das Bewusstsein für Küstenrisiken stärken, muss dies auf dem Verständnis gründen, „dass der Ozean und die Menschen untrennbar miteinander verbunden sind“ – eines der Grundprinzipien der Ocean Literacy, welche die internationale Forschungsgemeinschaft gemeinsam entwickelt hat. Dies bedeutet auch, dass wir bei der Vermittlung von Meereswissen innovative Wege einschlagen müssen. Überregionale Veranstaltungen wie das Ozeanforum auf dem ASEAN-Südkorea-Sondergipfel 2019 vertiefen den Austausch an der Schnittstelle von Wissenschaft und Politik. Kreative Formen der Wissenschaftskommunikation umfassen interaktive Plattformen oder Ausstellungen, Kunstprojekte, Filme, Graphic Novels und Schulprojekte. Diese modernen Ansätze verbinden aktuelle Forschungserkenntnisse und -narrative mit überliefertem Wissen. Gleichzeitig ermöglichen sie in einer digitalisierten Gesellschaft eine breitere Zugänglichkeit, denn die Nutzung sozialer Medien und mobiler Apps in Südostasien gehört zu den höchsten weltweit. Jene Art von Wissensbildung um Risiken, ergänzt durch Technologien, kräftigt und stellt die bedrohten Gemeinden sowie die Menschen selbst in den Mittelpunkt. Sicherlich können auch hier gezielte Fehlinformationen Ängste schüren, zu Misstrauen in Risikowarnsysteme führen oder, ganz im Gegenteil ein falsches Gefühl der Sicherheit hervorrufen. Der Tsunami im Indischen Ozean im Jahr 2004 ist jedoch eines der besten Beispiele dafür, wie fundiertes Meereswissen die Resilienz stärkt: Die Zerstörung und die inspirierenden Geschichten von Überlebenden markierten einen Wendepunkt im Bereich Ocean Literacy und Katastrophenmanagement.

Im nächsten Jahr richtet sich die Aufmerksamkeit erneut auf Südostasien: Indonesien wird den Vorsitz der G20 übernehmen und die Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction in Bali ausrichten. Zudem wird das World Climate Research Program (WCRP) die internationale Konferenz „Regional Sea Level Change and Coastal Impacts“ in Singapur abhalten. Anlässlich dieser Veranstaltungen sollten die südostasiatischen Inselstaaten ihre Führungsqualitäten im Bereich internationaler Zusammenarbeit sowie Ocean Governance und Förderung von Ocean Literacy unter Beweis stellen. 2022 ist ein gutes Jahr, um das Bild der Region in der Welt zu verändern und deren Erfahrungen zu Beginn der Ozeandekade dafür zu nutzen, eine bessere und sicherere Zukunft zu schaffen.

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On June 24th, IPI and the Permanent Mission of Germany, with the co-sponsorship of the Missions of Belgium, Canada, Ireland, Spain and Switzerland to the UN, cohosted a virtual event entitled “Safeguarding Humanitarian Action in Counterterrorism Contexts: Addressing the Challenges of the Next Decade.”

This virtual policy forum was convened as an official side-event on the margins of the 2021 High-Level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States. Following the adoption of the seventh review of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) by the UN General Assembly, the event provided an opportunity to discuss the role of UN member states and of the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact in promoting respect for principled humanitarian activities in counterterrorism contexts.

Concerns about the impact of counterterrorism measures on humanitarian action have grown in recent years. Support for addressing this issue has especially increased since the inclusion of supportive language on international humanitarian law (IHL) in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (GCTS) in 2016 and 2018, as well as the adoption of Security Council Resolutions 2462 (2019) and 2482 (2019). In his last report on the implementation of the GCTS, the secretary-general recalled Resolution 2462 and noted that “upholding the impartiality of humanitarian actors and refraining from any politicization of humanitarian assistance is critical, given that humanitarian actors are increasingly operating in settings with an active terrorist threat and being targeted by terrorists.” Despite growing momentum, the unintended challenges that counterterrorism policies pose for the delivery of humanitarian aid have not been alleviated, and actions to mitigate the impact of these measures remain limited.

As the characteristics of armed conflict and other situations of violence evolve—including a multiplicity of armed groups designated as “terrorists” by the UN Security Council and member states—there is a need to examine counterterrorism policies and humanitarian needs in a holistic manner. As member states, including the heads of their counterterrorism agencies, gather to discuss the evolution of counterterrorism in an age of transformative technology, greater attention should be given to the need to safeguard humanitarian action, as foreseen by Pillar IV of the GCTS and by relevant Security Council resolutions.

Panelists analyzed how UN member states and the UN system can concurrently address two considerable challenges they face over the next decade: an evolving terrorist threat and unprecedented humanitarian needs. Taking into account Pillar IV of the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and relevant UN Security Council resolutions, they discussed ways to ensure that counterterrorism efforts do not reduce the space for humanitarian actors to operate when and where needed. In particular, panelists highlighted how member states and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact can best promote and facilitate humanitarian activities.

Welcoming Remarks:
Mr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President

Opening Remarks:
Ambassador Christoph Heusgen, Permanent Representative of Germany to the UN

Speakers:
Ms. Laetitia Courtois, Permanent Observer to the UN & Head of Delegation for the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)
Professor Naz K. Modirzadeh, Founding Director of the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Conflict
Dr. Jehangir Khan, Director of the UN Counter-Terrorism Centre (UNCCT) and the Office of Counter-Terrorism

Closing Remarks:
H.E. Mr. Agustín Santos Maraver, Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN

Moderator:
Mr. Jake Sherman, IPI Senior Director of Programs

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Zusammenfassung:

24. Juni 2021 - In von Unsicherheit geprägten Zeiten wie der COVID-19-Pandemie ist Vertrauen in die Mitmenschen eine wichtige gesellschaftliche Ressource: Denn die Pandemie kann nicht durch einzelne Institutionen oder Personen, sondern nur durch breite gesellschaftliche Kooperation überwunden werden. Wie aktuelle Ergebnisse der SOEP-CoV-Studie zeigen, ist das Vertrauen in andere auch in Zeiten der Pandemie in Deutschland sehr hoch und zwischen 2020 und 2021 sogar noch angestiegen. Gleichzeitig wird deutlich, wie wichtig dieses Vertrauen ist: Die Bereitschaft, sich impfen zu lassen, ist deutlich größer bei Menschen, die ihren Mitmenschen starkes Vertrauen entgegenbringen. Und wer ein ausgeprägtes Vertrauen in seine Mitmenschen hat, hält eher die AHA-Regeln ein, um COVID-19 zu verhindern.

Rural communities are particularly vulnerable to weather shocks and ecosystem decline. Traditionally, farmers have adapted to climate variability and extremes through various risk management strategies, either individually or cooperatively. However, climate change amplifies the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and exacerbates environmental degradation processes.
Market-based risk transfer instruments are now being developed as complements to these conventional risk management strategies to shield rural households from increasing climate risks. At present, risk transfer solutions play a central role in the global climate and development agenda. International- and regional-level initiatives such as the InsuResilience Global Partnership support vulnerable developing countries to increase their financial protection coverage through climate risk finance and insurance, including through innovative micro-level schemes such as weather index insurance.
Over the last decade, index-based weather insurance has been gaining attention in the climate resilience discourse. These schemes compensate insured individuals based on a pre-defined weather index instead of individual losses, as with traditional types of insurance. Therefore, this instrument has several advantages, including greater time- and cost-effectiveness and reduced moral hazard risk.
Although weather-index insurance holds great promise, there are several challenges in designing and promoting it in developing countries. First, on the demand side, there is a lack of accessibility to affordable insurance, especially for the poorest rural populations exposed to climate hazards. Second, on the supply side, insurance providers are facing an elevated risk of paying larger claims due to the increasing frequency and severity of weather extremes, while reinsurance services are often missing. Third, the ecological effects of implementing weather index microinsurance initiatives receive little attention in research and policy. Yet, protecting the environment and building ecological resilience are critical policy dimensions of climate risk management in rural regions, where the poor disproportionately depend on ecosystem goods and services for a living, as they often lack alternative livelihood strategies.
Looking into the key challenges to microinsurance initiatives and drawing upon findings of a review of literature on weather index insurance and field research, this Briefing Paper derives recommendations for development cooperation, governments and insurers for an enhanced action agenda on climate risk insurance. The discussion is focused on the specific case of weather index insurance for the rural poor at the micro level. We emphasise the importance of enhancing knowledge on the potential positive and negative ecological effects of weather insurance schemes, and the need to develop a diverse set of climate risk management strategies for the poor, including social protection mechanisms.

Rural communities are particularly vulnerable to weather shocks and ecosystem decline. Traditionally, farmers have adapted to climate variability and extremes through various risk management strategies, either individually or cooperatively. However, climate change amplifies the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and exacerbates environmental degradation processes.
Market-based risk transfer instruments are now being developed as complements to these conventional risk management strategies to shield rural households from increasing climate risks. At present, risk transfer solutions play a central role in the global climate and development agenda. International- and regional-level initiatives such as the InsuResilience Global Partnership support vulnerable developing countries to increase their financial protection coverage through climate risk finance and insurance, including through innovative micro-level schemes such as weather index insurance.
Over the last decade, index-based weather insurance has been gaining attention in the climate resilience discourse. These schemes compensate insured individuals based on a pre-defined weather index instead of individual losses, as with traditional types of insurance. Therefore, this instrument has several advantages, including greater time- and cost-effectiveness and reduced moral hazard risk.
Although weather-index insurance holds great promise, there are several challenges in designing and promoting it in developing countries. First, on the demand side, there is a lack of accessibility to affordable insurance, especially for the poorest rural populations exposed to climate hazards. Second, on the supply side, insurance providers are facing an elevated risk of paying larger claims due to the increasing frequency and severity of weather extremes, while reinsurance services are often missing. Third, the ecological effects of implementing weather index microinsurance initiatives receive little attention in research and policy. Yet, protecting the environment and building ecological resilience are critical policy dimensions of climate risk management in rural regions, where the poor disproportionately depend on ecosystem goods and services for a living, as they often lack alternative livelihood strategies.
Looking into the key challenges to microinsurance initiatives and drawing upon findings of a review of literature on weather index insurance and field research, this Briefing Paper derives recommendations for development cooperation, governments and insurers for an enhanced action agenda on climate risk insurance. The discussion is focused on the specific case of weather index insurance for the rural poor at the micro level. We emphasise the importance of enhancing knowledge on the potential positive and negative ecological effects of weather insurance schemes, and the need to develop a diverse set of climate risk management strategies for the poor, including social protection mechanisms.

Rural communities are particularly vulnerable to weather shocks and ecosystem decline. Traditionally, farmers have adapted to climate variability and extremes through various risk management strategies, either individually or cooperatively. However, climate change amplifies the frequency and intensity of extreme weather events and exacerbates environmental degradation processes.
Market-based risk transfer instruments are now being developed as complements to these conventional risk management strategies to shield rural households from increasing climate risks. At present, risk transfer solutions play a central role in the global climate and development agenda. International- and regional-level initiatives such as the InsuResilience Global Partnership support vulnerable developing countries to increase their financial protection coverage through climate risk finance and insurance, including through innovative micro-level schemes such as weather index insurance.
Over the last decade, index-based weather insurance has been gaining attention in the climate resilience discourse. These schemes compensate insured individuals based on a pre-defined weather index instead of individual losses, as with traditional types of insurance. Therefore, this instrument has several advantages, including greater time- and cost-effectiveness and reduced moral hazard risk.
Although weather-index insurance holds great promise, there are several challenges in designing and promoting it in developing countries. First, on the demand side, there is a lack of accessibility to affordable insurance, especially for the poorest rural populations exposed to climate hazards. Second, on the supply side, insurance providers are facing an elevated risk of paying larger claims due to the increasing frequency and severity of weather extremes, while reinsurance services are often missing. Third, the ecological effects of implementing weather index microinsurance initiatives receive little attention in research and policy. Yet, protecting the environment and building ecological resilience are critical policy dimensions of climate risk management in rural regions, where the poor disproportionately depend on ecosystem goods and services for a living, as they often lack alternative livelihood strategies.
Looking into the key challenges to microinsurance initiatives and drawing upon findings of a review of literature on weather index insurance and field research, this Briefing Paper derives recommendations for development cooperation, governments and insurers for an enhanced action agenda on climate risk insurance. The discussion is focused on the specific case of weather index insurance for the rural poor at the micro level. We emphasise the importance of enhancing knowledge on the potential positive and negative ecological effects of weather insurance schemes, and the need to develop a diverse set of climate risk management strategies for the poor, including social protection mechanisms.

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On Tuesday, June 22nd, IPI together with Women’s Resource and Development Agency (WRDA) cohosted a virtual policy forum entitled “At the Nexus of Participation and Protection: Risks and Barriers to Women’s Participation in Northern Ireland.”

This public discussion launched new research on women’s experiences of risks, harms, and barriers as a result of participation in public life. Focused on Northern Ireland, the research and public discussion highlight the security challenges and threats that women leaders in the community sector, justice and security sectors, and elected politics have encountered as a result of their participation in peacebuilding before, during, and after the Good Friday Agreement.

The ways that women’s full, equal, and meaningful participation is impacted by threats and violence directly and indirectly related to conflict have not yet been fully considered, yet they are a vital part of the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. With an overarching goal of advancing gender equality in peace and security, the discussion will highlight the need for the WPS agenda to address “protection” in the context of women’s participation in conflict-affected contexts. Of its four pillars, participation and protection have arguably received the most attention, yet the need to address the inter-relationship between the two pillars remains a gap.

This brought together stakeholders from governments, representatives from Northern Ireland’s women’s sector, the UN, and civil society organizations.

Opening Remarks:
Dr. Phoebe Donnelly, IPI Research Fellow and Head of Women, Peace and Security Program
Ms. Rachel Powell, Women’s Sector Lobbyist, Women’s Resources and Development Agency

Speakers:
Dr. Catherine Turner, Associate Professor and Deputy Director of the Durham Global Security Institute, Durham University
Ms. Sarah Douglas, Deputy Chief of Peace and Security, UN Women
Dr. Aisling Swaine, Professor of Gender Studies, University College Dublin
Dr. Sarah Taylor, Policy Specialist, Women, Peace and Security and Humanitarian Action, UN Women
Ms. Elaine Crory, Good Relations Coordinator, Women’s Resource and Development Agency

Moderator:
Ms. Gretchen Baldwin, IPI Senior Policy Analyst

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The European Green Deal conveys the EU’s ambition to adjust and “green” its economic growth trajectory and become climate-neutral by 2050, as part of its contribution to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. While being ambitiously pursued within the Union’s own borders, the Green Deal also has strong external ramifications, as the EU leaves a tremendous ecological footprint in other parts of the world. The EU has referred to this “external dimension” of the Green Deal without further defining it, and appears to primarily understand it as a reflection of the internal strategies and as a call for the EU’s partner countries to follow a sustainable recovery trajectory similar to its own.
A number of proposed EU domestic strategies (e.g. biodiversity, blue economy or farm-to-fork) contain chapters on global aspects, yet the EU seems to follow a predominantly sectoral logic to implementing the external dimension of the Green Deal. This approach has certain shortcomings. For one, it creates uncertainty for partner countries on how to adapt to the EU’s new rules, regulations and standards, and the extent of EU support for adjusting to this. It also creates a vacuum for member state engagement by means of their economy, finance, climate and foreign policies. Last but not least, it lacks clear governance mechanisms to address potentially conflicting policy objectives and to strive for greater coherence of domestic and external EU policies.
Ultimately, the EU needs to define the different external dimensions of the Green Deal and promote an integrated approach. Whereas this applies universally to all partner countries of the EU, we focus in particular on developing countries in this paper. We consider these dimensions to be (1) promoting the Green Deal in bilateral and regional cooperation, (2) ensuring coherence and addressing negative spillovers, both in trade and domestic policies and (3) the EU’s global leadership in multilateral fora. Combining those three dimensions and governing them across EU institutions and member states allows for the external response to become an integral part of the EU Green Deal.
Such an integrated approach allows the EU to claim leadership vis-à-vis other global powers, make credible commitments in multilateral fora for successful “green diplomacy”, and use its market and regulatory power to transform itself and others. In its bilateral relationships, the EU needs to strike a “deal” in the true sense of the word: together formulating and “owning” cooperation agendas that are clear in terms of what is in it for the EU’s partners and how the EU will cushion the potential negative adjustment costs of partners. Overall, the EU needs to avoid a “projectisation” of the external dimension of the Green Deal and clarify how the different Commission services and member states aim to work together to deliver the Green Deal, including through its various external policy areas, of which development is just one.

The European Green Deal conveys the EU’s ambition to adjust and “green” its economic growth trajectory and become climate-neutral by 2050, as part of its contribution to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. While being ambitiously pursued within the Union’s own borders, the Green Deal also has strong external ramifications, as the EU leaves a tremendous ecological footprint in other parts of the world. The EU has referred to this “external dimension” of the Green Deal without further defining it, and appears to primarily understand it as a reflection of the internal strategies and as a call for the EU’s partner countries to follow a sustainable recovery trajectory similar to its own.
A number of proposed EU domestic strategies (e.g. biodiversity, blue economy or farm-to-fork) contain chapters on global aspects, yet the EU seems to follow a predominantly sectoral logic to implementing the external dimension of the Green Deal. This approach has certain shortcomings. For one, it creates uncertainty for partner countries on how to adapt to the EU’s new rules, regulations and standards, and the extent of EU support for adjusting to this. It also creates a vacuum for member state engagement by means of their economy, finance, climate and foreign policies. Last but not least, it lacks clear governance mechanisms to address potentially conflicting policy objectives and to strive for greater coherence of domestic and external EU policies.
Ultimately, the EU needs to define the different external dimensions of the Green Deal and promote an integrated approach. Whereas this applies universally to all partner countries of the EU, we focus in particular on developing countries in this paper. We consider these dimensions to be (1) promoting the Green Deal in bilateral and regional cooperation, (2) ensuring coherence and addressing negative spillovers, both in trade and domestic policies and (3) the EU’s global leadership in multilateral fora. Combining those three dimensions and governing them across EU institutions and member states allows for the external response to become an integral part of the EU Green Deal.
Such an integrated approach allows the EU to claim leadership vis-à-vis other global powers, make credible commitments in multilateral fora for successful “green diplomacy”, and use its market and regulatory power to transform itself and others. In its bilateral relationships, the EU needs to strike a “deal” in the true sense of the word: together formulating and “owning” cooperation agendas that are clear in terms of what is in it for the EU’s partners and how the EU will cushion the potential negative adjustment costs of partners. Overall, the EU needs to avoid a “projectisation” of the external dimension of the Green Deal and clarify how the different Commission services and member states aim to work together to deliver the Green Deal, including through its various external policy areas, of which development is just one.

The European Green Deal conveys the EU’s ambition to adjust and “green” its economic growth trajectory and become climate-neutral by 2050, as part of its contribution to the Paris Agreement and the Sustainable Development Goals. While being ambitiously pursued within the Union’s own borders, the Green Deal also has strong external ramifications, as the EU leaves a tremendous ecological footprint in other parts of the world. The EU has referred to this “external dimension” of the Green Deal without further defining it, and appears to primarily understand it as a reflection of the internal strategies and as a call for the EU’s partner countries to follow a sustainable recovery trajectory similar to its own.
A number of proposed EU domestic strategies (e.g. biodiversity, blue economy or farm-to-fork) contain chapters on global aspects, yet the EU seems to follow a predominantly sectoral logic to implementing the external dimension of the Green Deal. This approach has certain shortcomings. For one, it creates uncertainty for partner countries on how to adapt to the EU’s new rules, regulations and standards, and the extent of EU support for adjusting to this. It also creates a vacuum for member state engagement by means of their economy, finance, climate and foreign policies. Last but not least, it lacks clear governance mechanisms to address potentially conflicting policy objectives and to strive for greater coherence of domestic and external EU policies.
Ultimately, the EU needs to define the different external dimensions of the Green Deal and promote an integrated approach. Whereas this applies universally to all partner countries of the EU, we focus in particular on developing countries in this paper. We consider these dimensions to be (1) promoting the Green Deal in bilateral and regional cooperation, (2) ensuring coherence and addressing negative spillovers, both in trade and domestic policies and (3) the EU’s global leadership in multilateral fora. Combining those three dimensions and governing them across EU institutions and member states allows for the external response to become an integral part of the EU Green Deal.
Such an integrated approach allows the EU to claim leadership vis-à-vis other global powers, make credible commitments in multilateral fora for successful “green diplomacy”, and use its market and regulatory power to transform itself and others. In its bilateral relationships, the EU needs to strike a “deal” in the true sense of the word: together formulating and “owning” cooperation agendas that are clear in terms of what is in it for the EU’s partners and how the EU will cushion the potential negative adjustment costs of partners. Overall, the EU needs to avoid a “projectisation” of the external dimension of the Green Deal and clarify how the different Commission services and member states aim to work together to deliver the Green Deal, including through its various external policy areas, of which development is just one.

Achieving the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda requires strong and accountable institutions. However, the focus on sustainability outcomes set forth in the Agenda’s 17 SDGs has side-lined the debate on accountability mechanisms to ensure effective policy implementation. Six years into the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, it is time to assess progress made in this regard. Drawing on theories of public interest and rational choice, this paper argues that horizontal accountability between different state organs will be key to the emergence of national SDG accountability regimes. We provide evidence on monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for SDG progress based on an original database (AccountSDG) built through a document analysis of 136 Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) submitted between 2016 and 2019. Our analysis provides the first systematic cross-national empirical analysis of the role assigned to parliaments, Supreme Auditing Agencies (SAI), and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) in national processes of SDG implementation. We conclude that horizontal accountability, especially the role of SAI and NHRI, remains under-institutionalized in most countries. We conclude by discussing best practices and addressing the most important lacunae, as well as by pointing out limitations of our study and avenues for future research.

Achieving the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda requires strong and accountable institutions. However, the focus on sustainability outcomes set forth in the Agenda’s 17 SDGs has side-lined the debate on accountability mechanisms to ensure effective policy implementation. Six years into the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, it is time to assess progress made in this regard. Drawing on theories of public interest and rational choice, this paper argues that horizontal accountability between different state organs will be key to the emergence of national SDG accountability regimes. We provide evidence on monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for SDG progress based on an original database (AccountSDG) built through a document analysis of 136 Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) submitted between 2016 and 2019. Our analysis provides the first systematic cross-national empirical analysis of the role assigned to parliaments, Supreme Auditing Agencies (SAI), and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) in national processes of SDG implementation. We conclude that horizontal accountability, especially the role of SAI and NHRI, remains under-institutionalized in most countries. We conclude by discussing best practices and addressing the most important lacunae, as well as by pointing out limitations of our study and avenues for future research.

Achieving the ambitious Sustainable Development Goals of the 2030 Agenda requires strong and accountable institutions. However, the focus on sustainability outcomes set forth in the Agenda’s 17 SDGs has side-lined the debate on accountability mechanisms to ensure effective policy implementation. Six years into the adoption of the 2030 Agenda, it is time to assess progress made in this regard. Drawing on theories of public interest and rational choice, this paper argues that horizontal accountability between different state organs will be key to the emergence of national SDG accountability regimes. We provide evidence on monitoring and evaluation mechanisms for SDG progress based on an original database (AccountSDG) built through a document analysis of 136 Voluntary National Reviews (VNR) submitted between 2016 and 2019. Our analysis provides the first systematic cross-national empirical analysis of the role assigned to parliaments, Supreme Auditing Agencies (SAI), and National Human Rights Institutions (NHRI) in national processes of SDG implementation. We conclude that horizontal accountability, especially the role of SAI and NHRI, remains under-institutionalized in most countries. We conclude by discussing best practices and addressing the most important lacunae, as well as by pointing out limitations of our study and avenues for future research.

Wichtige Forschungserkenntnisse lassen Bedrohungsszenarien eher unrealistisch erscheinen, die davon ausgehen, dass die Erderwärmung schon bald viele Millionen von »Klimaflüchtlingen« nach Europa treibt. Nach Ansicht des Autors muss die Wissenschaft noch stärker dazu beitragen, alarmistische Szenarien zu überwinden und politische Lösungen für Betroffene des Klimawandels voranzubringen.

Wichtige Forschungserkenntnisse lassen Bedrohungsszenarien eher unrealistisch erscheinen, die davon ausgehen, dass die Erderwärmung schon bald viele Millionen von »Klimaflüchtlingen« nach Europa treibt. Nach Ansicht des Autors muss die Wissenschaft noch stärker dazu beitragen, alarmistische Szenarien zu überwinden und politische Lösungen für Betroffene des Klimawandels voranzubringen.

Wichtige Forschungserkenntnisse lassen Bedrohungsszenarien eher unrealistisch erscheinen, die davon ausgehen, dass die Erderwärmung schon bald viele Millionen von »Klimaflüchtlingen« nach Europa treibt. Nach Ansicht des Autors muss die Wissenschaft noch stärker dazu beitragen, alarmistische Szenarien zu überwinden und politische Lösungen für Betroffene des Klimawandels voranzubringen.

Union und SPD haben zentrale Streitpunkte in der Klimapolitik ausgeräumt. Die überarbeiteten Klimapläne sollen noch in dieser Woche im Bundestag zur Abstimmung gestellt werden. Dazu ein Statement von Claudia Kemfert, Leiterin der Abteilung Energie, Verkehr, Umwelt am Deutschen Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Zwar hat die Bundesregierung sich in Punkto Klimaschutz etwas bewegt und einige wichtige und richtige Schritte in die richtige Richtung unternommen. So ist es begrüßenswert, dass bei Photovoltaik (PV) Freiflächenanlagen finanzielle Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten für Kommunen geschaffen werden und auch Hemmnisse bei der Erneuerung von Windanlagen etwas abgebaut wurden. Mögliche Entlastungen für Unternehmen durch höhere CO2-Preise, die im internationalen Wettbewerb stehen, sollten jedoch auf Ausnahmen beschränkt sein. Höhere CO2-Preise sind notwendig, um auch bei Unternehmen den notwenigen Lenkungseffekt für mehr Klimaschutz hervorzubringen. Zudem werden einseitig die ohnehin schon üppigen Ausnahmen für die Industrie ausgeweitet und die der privaten Verbraucher unzureichend adressiert. Da ist sozial unfair.

Besonders zu kritisieren sind die noch immer viel zu niedrigen Zubauraten für erneuerbare Energien insgesamt. Sie reichen nicht aus, um die Pariser Klimabeschlüsse zu erreichen. Der Strombedarf wird deutlich höher ansteigen als von der Bundesregierung angenommen, da der Mobilitäts- und Gebäudesektor elektrifiziert wird und stromintensiv Wasserstoff hergestellt werden soll. Da die bisherigen Zubauraten seit einigen Jahren verfehlt werden, ist zu erwarten, dass auch das 2030iger Ziel von 65 Prozent nicht erreicht werden wird, sondern eher bei 55-Prozent-Anteil erneuerbarer Energien liegen wird. Dabei ist der 65-Prozent-Anteil sogar noch zu niedrig und müsste mindestens bei 75 Prozent liegen, um eine Ökostromlücke zu vermeiden. Der Paris-konforme Ausbaupfad entspräche ein jährlicher Zubau von durchschnittlich etwa 30 GW PV und etwa 9 GW Windkraft. Das ist circa sechs- (PV) beziehungsweise dreimal (Wind) so hoch wie bisher vorgesehen.

Zudem wurden klare Fehlstellungen nicht behoben wie die endogene Mengensteuerung bei der Ausschreibung von Windenergieanlagen (Rationierung der Ausschreibungsmenge bei Unterzeichnung), diese hätte sofort abgeschafft werden sollen. Diese Regelung wirkt kontraproduktiv und birgt die Gefahr einer „Abwärtsspirale“ mit von Gebotstermin zu Gebotstermin weiter sinkenden Angebotsmengen. Zudem sind die noch immer vorhandenen diversen Ausbauhemmnisse bei der Planungs- und Genehmigungsphase nicht behoben worden. Gerade die Flächenverfügbarkeit bei Windkraft stellt sich weiterhin problematisch dar (z. B. durch die 10H-Regel in Bayern).

Außerdem ist die einseitige EEG-Umlagebefreiung für die grüne Wasserstoffherstellung zu kritisieren, da dadurch effizientere Klimaschutztechnologien – zum Beispiel die Wärmepumpe oder das Elektroauto – relativ schlechter gestellt werden. Diese Benachteiligungen sollten behoben werden.