Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

How has the COVID-19 pandemic affected armed conflict and political violence within countries? Focusing on Africa, a continent with a particularly high number of ongoing conflicts, this policy brief analyses the immediate and long-term implications of the pandemic on conflict and reflects on its implications for international peacebuilding efforts.
In the short term, conflict patterns on the continent are marked more by a continuation of previous trends than by a strong direct impact of COVID-19. Regarding armed confrontations, there was a rise in conflict intensity in some countries and one new war erupted in the Tigray region of Ethiopia in November 2020. As to lower-scale political violence, especially in the beginning of the pandemic, many states used excessive state violence against civilians when enforcing Corona measures.
Perhaps more important than the immediate effect of the pandemic, the consequences of the pandemic are very likely to accelerate violent conflict in the medium to long term. This is firstly because the pandemic exacerbates structural weaknesses, including the sharpening of societal divisions, severe disruptions in the education sector and deteriorating socio-economic circumstances. Secondly, the pandemic has curtailed actors and institutions that might be able to reduce the risk of violent escalation. Trust in the state and security institutions has suffered in many countries due to dissatis-faction with the handling of the pandemic. Moreover, demo¬cratic processes are hampered by the postponement of elections and increasing levels of government repression. At the same time, international peace support is negatively affected by social distancing and further threatened by looming cuts of commitments in official development assistance.
Bringing together both the short-term and longer-term effects of the pandemic on conflict clearly shows the risk that the pandemic poses to peace in Africa. It is therefore vital for the international community to:
1. Stay engaged and stay alert. If the international community continues to focus on handling the domestic consequences of the pandemic rather than international challenges, conflict will further increase in intensity and spread geographically. COVID-19 has already led to a reduction in international peace support, including peacebuilding initiatives and mediation. However, these instruments are vital to foster peace and prevent emerging and renewed conflict.
2. Invest in conflict prevention. The adverse effects of COVID-19 on economic, social and political structures can, and very likely will, provide the breeding ground for larger-scale conflicts, both in least developed countries (LDCs) and middle-income countries. Thus, conflict prevention must be taken seriously, including the strengthening of open and participatory (democratic) processes that enable societies to deal with societal conflicts peacefully.
3. Pay special attention to post-conflict countries. Many African countries have experienced large-scale civil wars in their history and continue to be LDCs struggling with societal tensions. The risk of renewed conflict in these places is particularly high.

In June 2021, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) for the first time. This comes at a pivotal moment in Sudan’s transition, with the Sudanese transitional government facing high expectations from the Sudanese public amid a rapidly changing environment.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report organized a virtual workshop on April 26, 2021, to discuss UNITAMS’s mandate and political strategy. The workshop offered a forum for member-state representatives, UN officials, and outside experts to develop a shared understanding and common strategic assessment of the situation in Sudan. The session was intended to help the Security Council make informed decisions with respect to the strategic orientation, prioritization, and sequencing of UNITAMS’s mandate and actions on the ground.

While the current mandate broadly covers the substantive areas where the UN can play a constructive role, participants encouraged the Security Council and the mission to begin articulating a clearer focus for UNITAMS’s strategic objectives. They highlighted that UNITAMS’s credibility and capacity to promote more inclusive political processes and governance systems remain its greatest added value. They also emphasized that the Security Council should allow the mission the flexibility to scale up or reduce capacities as needed to address all major issues confronting Sudan—whether the peace processes, inclusive approaches to protecting civilians, or the building of frameworks and environments for sustainable peace and the protection of human rights.

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As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

As humanity, we face many common challenges in the 2020s: climate change and its effects are at the core, resulting in demands for economic transformation geared towards more sustainability. Underlying are demographic changes, with the need to feed more people while maintaining the natural basis for our survival. Increased digitalisation, global health issues (this is not the first nor the last pandemic), and strong refugee and migration movements call for a united action to address these shared global challenges. Additionally, geopolitical changes bring new important actors onto the world scene.

Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN.
Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision.
China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus.
• Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance.
• Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.

Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN.
Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision.
China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus.
• Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance.
• Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.

Protracted crises and frequent natural disasters have generated an unprecedented number of people in need of humanitarian assistance. The international community faces a great challenge in supporting these populations, as the gap between needs and available funding is growing. To close this resource gap, the European Union (EU) aims to step up its engagement with emerging donors, particularly China, to increase their level of funding. Although China has previously been reluctant to engage in the international humanitarian system, its response to the COVID-19 pandemic indicates a change in attitude. Over the past year, China has delivered hundreds of tonnes of personal protective equipment (PPE) to over 150 countries and dispatched medical teams abroad. It has also donated $100 million to the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations (UN) and pledged to establish a global humanitarian response depot and hub in China in cooperation with the UN.
Amidst increasing geopolitical tensions between China and the EU, China’s growing humanitarian engagement opens an opportunity for the EU to engage with China in the humanitarian sector. However, rather than framing China’s increased engagement in solely financial terms, the EU should develop a long-term strategy as to how to engage with China on humanitarian matters. A dialogue that takes both parties’ different approaches towards humanitarian aid into account and searches for common ground could open the door towards possible cooperation. This would not only help in narrowing the funding gap but carry the potential for greater coordination and consequently more effective assistance provision.
China conceptualises humanitarian aid as a subcategory of development aid and provides the majority of its assistance bilaterally. Beijing’s state-centric approach to humanitarian assistance means in practice that it engages mostly in the aftermath of natural disasters rather than conflict settings. The EU, on the other hand, has a separate humanitarian aid policy that guides the allocation of funds and provides its humanitarian assistance through non-governmental organisations (NGOs), UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
This Briefing Paper maps out the characteristics of Chinese humanitarian aid and outlines two areas on which the EU’s tentative steps towards a dialogue with China could focus.
• Food security sector: Food insecurity is a key component in existing humanitarian needs, only exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Food assistance and nutrition are already a key area of engagement for the EU and China. The EU should advocate for China to scale up its contributions to global food security through the World Food Programme (WFP), with whom China has a good working relationship. This could be combined with a political dialogue on how to foster cooperation on food security assistance.
• Anticipatory humanitarian aid: Disaster risk reduction, preparedness and response play an increasingly important role in global humanitarian aid. China has built up its most significant expertise in response to natural disasters. Enhancement of disaster risk reduction is one of the strategic priorities of the Directorate-General for European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (DG ECHO) for 2020–2024. In light of both parties’ interest in anticipatory humanitarian aid, knowledge exchange in this area has the potential to open the door for future cooperation.

Generating decent employment is key to the creation of a new social contract and social cohesion in Sub-Saharan Africa. The crucial question is, thus, how can more decent jobs be created? Much of the extant research has focused on the role of states and businesses in shaping employment relations. In this paper, we draw attention to a third type of actor that has been largely absent in the literature on the determinants of employment relations in developing countries: financial institutions. Based on data from 38 interviews of Kenyan manufacturing firms, financiers and labour representatives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, we examine the relationship between the patience of capital and labour relations. In particular, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that access to more patient sources of capital may help to enhance the quantity and quality of jobs in African countries. We discuss three mechanisms through which this occurs. Our paper contributes to the growing body of research on patient capital (which largely focuses on developed countries) by extending it to the context of lower income African countries; it also speaks to the broader debates about how to enhance the contribution of finance capital to social cohesion.

Generating decent employment is key to the creation of a new social contract and social cohesion in Sub-Saharan Africa. The crucial question is, thus, how can more decent jobs be created? Much of the extant research has focused on the role of states and businesses in shaping employment relations. In this paper, we draw attention to a third type of actor that has been largely absent in the literature on the determinants of employment relations in developing countries: financial institutions. Based on data from 38 interviews of Kenyan manufacturing firms, financiers and labour representatives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, we examine the relationship between the patience of capital and labour relations. In particular, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that access to more patient sources of capital may help to enhance the quantity and quality of jobs in African countries. We discuss three mechanisms through which this occurs. Our paper contributes to the growing body of research on patient capital (which largely focuses on developed countries) by extending it to the context of lower income African countries; it also speaks to the broader debates about how to enhance the contribution of finance capital to social cohesion.

Generating decent employment is key to the creation of a new social contract and social cohesion in Sub-Saharan Africa. The crucial question is, thus, how can more decent jobs be created? Much of the extant research has focused on the role of states and businesses in shaping employment relations. In this paper, we draw attention to a third type of actor that has been largely absent in the literature on the determinants of employment relations in developing countries: financial institutions. Based on data from 38 interviews of Kenyan manufacturing firms, financiers and labour representatives before and during the COVID-19 pandemic, we examine the relationship between the patience of capital and labour relations. In particular, the evidence presented in this paper suggests that access to more patient sources of capital may help to enhance the quantity and quality of jobs in African countries. We discuss three mechanisms through which this occurs. Our paper contributes to the growing body of research on patient capital (which largely focuses on developed countries) by extending it to the context of lower income African countries; it also speaks to the broader debates about how to enhance the contribution of finance capital to social cohesion.

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On May 17th, IPI together with the African Leadership Centre, King’s College London, cohosted the launch of the book Whose Peace are We Building? Leadership for Peace in Africa, authored by Dr. Youssef Mahmoud with Dr. Albert Mbiatem.

What is the relationship between leadership and peace? What kind of leadership styles, processes, and strategies are required to gain a deeper understanding of local context while at the same time maintaining the trust and cooperation of host authorities and other stakeholders on the ground? As concerns mount about the continued relevance and efficiency of UN peace operations, Dr. Youssef Mahmoud–who led several challenging peace missions in Africa–draws on many years of experience to offer insights into how leadership might be exercised to help restore and nurture peace.

Dr. Mahmoud makes the case for a paradigm shift in the type of leadership required to bring about strong, global diplomacy for peace. Making extensive use of the authors’ unique personal experiences in Burundi, Central African Republic, and Chad, the book offers an informed insight into the leadership challenges of complex conflict and post-conflict situations.

Speakers:
Dr. Youssef Mahmoud, IPI Senior Adviser
Dr. Albert Mbiatem, African Leadership Centre (ALC) alumnus and member of ALC’s Central Africa Hub

Discussants:
Amb. Fatima Kyari Mohammed, Permanent Observer of the African Union to the UN
Amb. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, Former UN Special Envoy to Burundi and President of the Centre for Strategies and Security for the Sahel Sahara (Centre 4s)
Prof. ‘Funmi Olonisakin, Member of the Advisory Group of Experts for the 2015 Review of the Peacebuilding Architecture, Vice-President & Vice-Principal (International) and Professor of Security, Leadership, and Development at King’s College London
Mr. Oscar Fernandez-Taranco, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Peacebuilding Support, DPPA-DPO

Moderator:
Dr. Adam Lupel, IPI Vice President and Chief Operating Officer

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Jedes Jahr am 22. Mai feiern die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der biologischen Vielfalt, um an den Tag im Jahr 1992 zu erinnern, an dem das Übereinkommen über die biologische Vielfalt (Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD) in Kraft trat. Das CBD ist der weltweit umfassendste Naturschutzvertrag, der zwar bisher den Erhalt von Arten in Schutzgebieten erfolgreich gefördert hat, allerdings weniger erfolgreich ist, die nachhaltige Nutzung der biologischen Vielfalt durch Wirtschaftssektoren zu sichern. Da der Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt immer schneller voranschreitet, sollten sich die Vertragsstaaten der CBD dringend mit den Folgen des Wirtschaftswachstums auseinandersetzen.

Studien aus den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zeigen eine starke Korrelation zwischen dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum und dem Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt. Konkret gesprochen geht das Wachstum des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) zum Beispiel mit Landnutzungsänderungen durch eine intensivierte Produktion und die Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen sowie mit einer Ausdehnung von Städten und Infrastrukturen einher. Die Folge: die Entstehung von Monokulturen und die Fragmentierung von Lebensräumen. Auch die Treibhausgasemissionen nehmen mit einem wachsenden BIP zu, und die daraus resultierende Erderwärmung hat zur Folge, dass viele Arten aussterben. Im Zuge der mit dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum einhergehenden Ausweitung der globalen Handelsrouten werden vermehrt gebietsfremde Arten in weit entfernte Lebensräume eingeschleppt, wo sie heimische Arten bedrohen. Die Hoffnungen, dass wirtschaftliche Effizienzgewinne das Wirtschaftswachstum deutlich vom Ressourcenverbrauch entkoppeln, haben sich bisher nicht erfüllt. In China, Indien und Südafrika war zwar eine beträchtliche relative Entkopplung zu beobachten, das heißt, das BIP ist schneller gestiegen als der Ressourcenverbrauch, global nimmt die Ressourcennutzung allerdings weiterhin zu, während die biologische Vielfalt abnimmt.

In Anbetracht der fortdauernden Herausforderungen, die mit dem materiellen Wachstum verbunden sind, haben zwei hochrangige Gremien jüngst wissenschaftliche Berichte veröffentlicht – den Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, veröffentlicht vom Weltbiodiversitätsrat (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services – IPBES) im Mai 2019, und den von der britischen Regierung in Auftrag gegebenen und im Februar 2021 veröffentlichten Dasgupta-Bericht zur Ökonomie der biologischen Vielfalt – in denen politische Entscheidungsträger*innen aufgefordert werden, ihre Wirtschaftspolitik von Grund auf neu auszurichten. Beide Berichte betonen die Notwendigkeit eines transformativen wirtschaftlichen Wandels, den der IPBES als „grundlegende, systemweite Umstrukturierung über technologische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Faktoren hinweg“ definiert. Zu den erforderlichen Maßnahmen gehören der Abbau biodiversitätsschädigender wirtschaftlicher Anreize (z. B. Agrarsubventionen), die Umsetzung umweltfreundlicher Anreize, die Anwendung von Vorsorgeansätzen im Ressourcenmanagement sowie strengere Umweltgesetze und -richtlinien. Allerdings berücksichtigt keines der beiden Dokumente systematisch mögliche Alternativen zum Wirtschaftswachstum, wie z. B. Postwachstum, als Lösung für das sechste Massenaussterben. Postwachstumsgesellschaften funktionieren auch ohne konstantes Wirtschaftswachstum. In ihnen haben das Allgemeinwohl und kooperative Ansätze Priorität, und es wird zwischen gutem (z. B. Bildung, Gesundheit) und schlechtem (z. B. Waffen, fossile Brennstoffe, Fast Fashion) Wachstum unterschieden. Es gibt zahlreiche Postwachstumsszenarien, und vielerorts werden Postwachstumsansätze bereits heute verfolgt. Eines der möglichen Zukunftsszenarien ist Degrowth. Insoweit Entwicklung nicht automatisch an das Wirtschaftswachstum gekoppelt ist und sich Degrowth an den vielen, im Globalen Süden praktizierten Umweltschutzansätzen orientiert, wäre das Konzept praktikabel, müsste aber unter Einbeziehung aller Akteur*innen diskutiert werden – so wie es auch im Globalen Norden erforderlich wäre.

Die Länder des Globalen Nordens stellen aktuell Überlegungen an, wie sie ihre Wirtschaft nach der COVID-19-Pandemie neu aufstellen können. Die Corona-Krise sollte als politische Chance begriffen werden, unser gesamtes Wirtschaftssystem zu transformieren. Auf internationaler Ebene werden die Vertragsstaaten der CBD im Oktober dieses Jahres voraussichtlich einen neuen strategischen Rahmen für das nächste Jahrzehnt und darüber hinaus verabschieden. Wenn dieses Rahmenwerk berücksichtigt, dass wirtschaftliches Wachstum eine Gefahr für die biologische Vielfalt darstellen kann, könnte dies zu einem wichtigen normativen Bezugspunkt für die Vertragsstaaten der CBD werden. In Deutschland sollten die Parteien angesichts der anstehenden Wahlen zeigen, wie „grün“ ihre Wirtschaftspolitik wirklich ist, indem sie den Fokus nicht länger einzig und allein auf das Wachstum des BIP legen.

Jedes Jahr am 22. Mai feiern die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der biologischen Vielfalt, um an den Tag im Jahr 1992 zu erinnern, an dem das Übereinkommen über die biologische Vielfalt (Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD) in Kraft trat. Das CBD ist der weltweit umfassendste Naturschutzvertrag, der zwar bisher den Erhalt von Arten in Schutzgebieten erfolgreich gefördert hat, allerdings weniger erfolgreich ist, die nachhaltige Nutzung der biologischen Vielfalt durch Wirtschaftssektoren zu sichern. Da der Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt immer schneller voranschreitet, sollten sich die Vertragsstaaten der CBD dringend mit den Folgen des Wirtschaftswachstums auseinandersetzen.

Studien aus den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zeigen eine starke Korrelation zwischen dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum und dem Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt. Konkret gesprochen geht das Wachstum des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) zum Beispiel mit Landnutzungsänderungen durch eine intensivierte Produktion und die Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen sowie mit einer Ausdehnung von Städten und Infrastrukturen einher. Die Folge: die Entstehung von Monokulturen und die Fragmentierung von Lebensräumen. Auch die Treibhausgasemissionen nehmen mit einem wachsenden BIP zu, und die daraus resultierende Erderwärmung hat zur Folge, dass viele Arten aussterben. Im Zuge der mit dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum einhergehenden Ausweitung der globalen Handelsrouten werden vermehrt gebietsfremde Arten in weit entfernte Lebensräume eingeschleppt, wo sie heimische Arten bedrohen. Die Hoffnungen, dass wirtschaftliche Effizienzgewinne das Wirtschaftswachstum deutlich vom Ressourcenverbrauch entkoppeln, haben sich bisher nicht erfüllt. In China, Indien und Südafrika war zwar eine beträchtliche relative Entkopplung zu beobachten, das heißt, das BIP ist schneller gestiegen als der Ressourcenverbrauch, global nimmt die Ressourcennutzung allerdings weiterhin zu, während die biologische Vielfalt abnimmt.

In Anbetracht der fortdauernden Herausforderungen, die mit dem materiellen Wachstum verbunden sind, haben zwei hochrangige Gremien jüngst wissenschaftliche Berichte veröffentlicht – den Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, veröffentlicht vom Weltbiodiversitätsrat (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services – IPBES) im Mai 2019, und den von der britischen Regierung in Auftrag gegebenen und im Februar 2021 veröffentlichten Dasgupta-Bericht zur Ökonomie der biologischen Vielfalt – in denen politische Entscheidungsträger*innen aufgefordert werden, ihre Wirtschaftspolitik von Grund auf neu auszurichten. Beide Berichte betonen die Notwendigkeit eines transformativen wirtschaftlichen Wandels, den der IPBES als „grundlegende, systemweite Umstrukturierung über technologische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Faktoren hinweg“ definiert. Zu den erforderlichen Maßnahmen gehören der Abbau biodiversitätsschädigender wirtschaftlicher Anreize (z. B. Agrarsubventionen), die Umsetzung umweltfreundlicher Anreize, die Anwendung von Vorsorgeansätzen im Ressourcenmanagement sowie strengere Umweltgesetze und -richtlinien. Allerdings berücksichtigt keines der beiden Dokumente systematisch mögliche Alternativen zum Wirtschaftswachstum, wie z. B. Postwachstum, als Lösung für das sechste Massenaussterben. Postwachstumsgesellschaften funktionieren auch ohne konstantes Wirtschaftswachstum. In ihnen haben das Allgemeinwohl und kooperative Ansätze Priorität, und es wird zwischen gutem (z. B. Bildung, Gesundheit) und schlechtem (z. B. Waffen, fossile Brennstoffe, Fast Fashion) Wachstum unterschieden. Es gibt zahlreiche Postwachstumsszenarien, und vielerorts werden Postwachstumsansätze bereits heute verfolgt. Eines der möglichen Zukunftsszenarien ist Degrowth. Insoweit Entwicklung nicht automatisch an das Wirtschaftswachstum gekoppelt ist und sich Degrowth an den vielen, im Globalen Süden praktizierten Umweltschutzansätzen orientiert, wäre das Konzept praktikabel, müsste aber unter Einbeziehung aller Akteur*innen diskutiert werden – so wie es auch im Globalen Norden erforderlich wäre.

Die Länder des Globalen Nordens stellen aktuell Überlegungen an, wie sie ihre Wirtschaft nach der COVID-19-Pandemie neu aufstellen können. Die Corona-Krise sollte als politische Chance begriffen werden, unser gesamtes Wirtschaftssystem zu transformieren. Auf internationaler Ebene werden die Vertragsstaaten der CBD im Oktober dieses Jahres voraussichtlich einen neuen strategischen Rahmen für das nächste Jahrzehnt und darüber hinaus verabschieden. Wenn dieses Rahmenwerk berücksichtigt, dass wirtschaftliches Wachstum eine Gefahr für die biologische Vielfalt darstellen kann, könnte dies zu einem wichtigen normativen Bezugspunkt für die Vertragsstaaten der CBD werden. In Deutschland sollten die Parteien angesichts der anstehenden Wahlen zeigen, wie „grün“ ihre Wirtschaftspolitik wirklich ist, indem sie den Fokus nicht länger einzig und allein auf das Wachstum des BIP legen.

Jedes Jahr am 22. Mai feiern die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der biologischen Vielfalt, um an den Tag im Jahr 1992 zu erinnern, an dem das Übereinkommen über die biologische Vielfalt (Convention on Biological Diversity – CBD) in Kraft trat. Das CBD ist der weltweit umfassendste Naturschutzvertrag, der zwar bisher den Erhalt von Arten in Schutzgebieten erfolgreich gefördert hat, allerdings weniger erfolgreich ist, die nachhaltige Nutzung der biologischen Vielfalt durch Wirtschaftssektoren zu sichern. Da der Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt immer schneller voranschreitet, sollten sich die Vertragsstaaten der CBD dringend mit den Folgen des Wirtschaftswachstums auseinandersetzen.

Studien aus den vergangenen Jahrzehnten zeigen eine starke Korrelation zwischen dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum und dem Verlust der biologischen Vielfalt. Konkret gesprochen geht das Wachstum des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (BIP) zum Beispiel mit Landnutzungsänderungen durch eine intensivierte Produktion und die Ausbeutung natürlicher Ressourcen sowie mit einer Ausdehnung von Städten und Infrastrukturen einher. Die Folge: die Entstehung von Monokulturen und die Fragmentierung von Lebensräumen. Auch die Treibhausgasemissionen nehmen mit einem wachsenden BIP zu, und die daraus resultierende Erderwärmung hat zur Folge, dass viele Arten aussterben. Im Zuge der mit dem weltweiten Wirtschaftswachstum einhergehenden Ausweitung der globalen Handelsrouten werden vermehrt gebietsfremde Arten in weit entfernte Lebensräume eingeschleppt, wo sie heimische Arten bedrohen. Die Hoffnungen, dass wirtschaftliche Effizienzgewinne das Wirtschaftswachstum deutlich vom Ressourcenverbrauch entkoppeln, haben sich bisher nicht erfüllt. In China, Indien und Südafrika war zwar eine beträchtliche relative Entkopplung zu beobachten, das heißt, das BIP ist schneller gestiegen als der Ressourcenverbrauch, global nimmt die Ressourcennutzung allerdings weiterhin zu, während die biologische Vielfalt abnimmt.

In Anbetracht der fortdauernden Herausforderungen, die mit dem materiellen Wachstum verbunden sind, haben zwei hochrangige Gremien jüngst wissenschaftliche Berichte veröffentlicht – den Global assessment report on biodiversity and ecosystem services, veröffentlicht vom Weltbiodiversitätsrat (Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services – IPBES) im Mai 2019, und den von der britischen Regierung in Auftrag gegebenen und im Februar 2021 veröffentlichten Dasgupta-Bericht zur Ökonomie der biologischen Vielfalt – in denen politische Entscheidungsträger*innen aufgefordert werden, ihre Wirtschaftspolitik von Grund auf neu auszurichten. Beide Berichte betonen die Notwendigkeit eines transformativen wirtschaftlichen Wandels, den der IPBES als „grundlegende, systemweite Umstrukturierung über technologische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Faktoren hinweg“ definiert. Zu den erforderlichen Maßnahmen gehören der Abbau biodiversitätsschädigender wirtschaftlicher Anreize (z. B. Agrarsubventionen), die Umsetzung umweltfreundlicher Anreize, die Anwendung von Vorsorgeansätzen im Ressourcenmanagement sowie strengere Umweltgesetze und -richtlinien. Allerdings berücksichtigt keines der beiden Dokumente systematisch mögliche Alternativen zum Wirtschaftswachstum, wie z. B. Postwachstum, als Lösung für das sechste Massenaussterben. Postwachstumsgesellschaften funktionieren auch ohne konstantes Wirtschaftswachstum. In ihnen haben das Allgemeinwohl und kooperative Ansätze Priorität, und es wird zwischen gutem (z. B. Bildung, Gesundheit) und schlechtem (z. B. Waffen, fossile Brennstoffe, Fast Fashion) Wachstum unterschieden. Es gibt zahlreiche Postwachstumsszenarien, und vielerorts werden Postwachstumsansätze bereits heute verfolgt. Eines der möglichen Zukunftsszenarien ist Degrowth. Insoweit Entwicklung nicht automatisch an das Wirtschaftswachstum gekoppelt ist und sich Degrowth an den vielen, im Globalen Süden praktizierten Umweltschutzansätzen orientiert, wäre das Konzept praktikabel, müsste aber unter Einbeziehung aller Akteur*innen diskutiert werden – so wie es auch im Globalen Norden erforderlich wäre.

Die Länder des Globalen Nordens stellen aktuell Überlegungen an, wie sie ihre Wirtschaft nach der COVID-19-Pandemie neu aufstellen können. Die Corona-Krise sollte als politische Chance begriffen werden, unser gesamtes Wirtschaftssystem zu transformieren. Auf internationaler Ebene werden die Vertragsstaaten der CBD im Oktober dieses Jahres voraussichtlich einen neuen strategischen Rahmen für das nächste Jahrzehnt und darüber hinaus verabschieden. Wenn dieses Rahmenwerk berücksichtigt, dass wirtschaftliches Wachstum eine Gefahr für die biologische Vielfalt darstellen kann, könnte dies zu einem wichtigen normativen Bezugspunkt für die Vertragsstaaten der CBD werden. In Deutschland sollten die Parteien angesichts der anstehenden Wahlen zeigen, wie „grün“ ihre Wirtschaftspolitik wirklich ist, indem sie den Fokus nicht länger einzig und allein auf das Wachstum des BIP legen.