Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public.
BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.

For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public.
BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.

For years, German development cooperation (GDC) has been striving to become more results-oriented. In 2022, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (BMZ) took an important step in this direction by introducing 43 standard indicators. The aim was to aggregate development results across themes and countries in order to present them to the public. The BMZ hopes for more effective communication with Parliament (Bundestag) and the general public, as well as more coherent reporting by Germany’s two main implementing organisations, the GIZ (Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit – the German agency for international cooperation) and the development bank of the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW). From an international vantage point, Germany needs to catch up in respect to results orientation. Other major actors, especially the United Kingdom, the United States and multilateral development banks, introduced compre-hensive reporting systems back in the 2010s. These organisations report on 20 to 50 standard indicators to demonstrate how their activities contribute to measurable results. On this basis, they communicate more coherently with the public.
BMZ aims to create a similar basis for improved communication. In a participatory process – and jointly with the GIZ and the KfW development bank – the BMZ has formulated indicators that are equally suited to implementing organisations’ political priorities and their needs. The administrative burden of collecting the standard indicators is limited by leveraging existing data. In addition, the BMZ has set methodological standards whose obligatory use is intended to increase the quality of the data collected. However, the introduction of standard indicators also entails risks: They can set perverse incentives that encourage reporting on short-term results. Such reporting can lead to a neglect of long-term effects, which are more difficult to measure. Research also shows that indicators no longer fulfil their original purpose of providing neutral representations of change if they are used to exert political control. In addition, there are methodological challenges, such as double counting across different benchmarks, as well as concerns about unrealisable expectations. Overall, we assess the development and introduction of standard indicators in GDC positively. Yet, some important decisions are still pending. The level of detail at which the data will be shared among stakeholders and the public has yet to be determined. The quality of the data collected and the transparency of reporting will in turn determine what larger effects towards an improved results orientation of GDC can be achieved. In view of the decentralised and fragmented structure of GDC, especially regarding monitoring and evaluation systems, we hope that the new indicators can foster the harmonising of the reporting systems of the GIZ and the KfW development bank. The standard indicators can also help make GDC more transparent. We therefore recommend that all data collected be made publicly available. Finally, the integrative potential of standard indicators should be harnessed to improve the division of labour between the ministry and the two main implementing organisations towards becoming learning-oriented – both in the data collection process and during evaluation.

Dem kürzlich veröffentlichen besonderen Bericht des Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) zufolge stellen Herausforderungen im Gesundheitsbereich eine der zentralen Gefährdungen für die menschliche Sicherheit dar. Die Ausbreitung der Affenpocken in Europa zeigt, dass sich global ausbreitende (Infektions-)Krankheiten mit der Covid-19-Pandemie nicht enden, sondern ein bleibendes und voraussichtlich immer häufiger auftretendes Phänomen darstellen. In Folge des Klimawandels und der Ausbreitung des menschlichen Lebensraumes werden Zoonosen, also die Übertragung von Krankheiten von Tier zu Mensch und von Mensch zu Tier, zunehmen und sich schnell flächendeckend verbreiten. Doch nicht nur Zoonosen, sondern vor allem nichtübertragbare Krankheiten wie Diabetes, Krebs oder Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen werden dem UNDP-Bericht zufolge immer häufiger auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund, und aus den Erfahrungen der Covid-19-Pandemie lernend, setzt sich die neue Bundesregierung im  Koalitionsvertrag das Ziel, ein »vorsorgendes, krisenfestes und modernes Gesundheitssystem «aufzubauen. So soll unter anderem ein Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz» regelmäßige Ernstfallübungen für das Personal für Gesundheitskrisen«  garantieren. Während es zweifelsohne einer Stärkung des deutschen und des globalen Gesundheitssystems bedarf, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, inwiefern tatsächlich neue Gesundheitskrisen zu erwarten sind und wie die erwähnten Entwicklungen überhaupt zu solchen werden.

Dem kürzlich veröffentlichen besonderen Bericht des Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) zufolge stellen Herausforderungen im Gesundheitsbereich eine der zentralen Gefährdungen für die menschliche Sicherheit dar. Die Ausbreitung der Affenpocken in Europa zeigt, dass sich global ausbreitende (Infektions-)Krankheiten mit der Covid-19-Pandemie nicht enden, sondern ein bleibendes und voraussichtlich immer häufiger auftretendes Phänomen darstellen. In Folge des Klimawandels und der Ausbreitung des menschlichen Lebensraumes werden Zoonosen, also die Übertragung von Krankheiten von Tier zu Mensch und von Mensch zu Tier, zunehmen und sich schnell flächendeckend verbreiten. Doch nicht nur Zoonosen, sondern vor allem nichtübertragbare Krankheiten wie Diabetes, Krebs oder Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen werden dem UNDP-Bericht zufolge immer häufiger auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund, und aus den Erfahrungen der Covid-19-Pandemie lernend, setzt sich die neue Bundesregierung im  Koalitionsvertrag das Ziel, ein »vorsorgendes, krisenfestes und modernes Gesundheitssystem «aufzubauen. So soll unter anderem ein Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz» regelmäßige Ernstfallübungen für das Personal für Gesundheitskrisen«  garantieren. Während es zweifelsohne einer Stärkung des deutschen und des globalen Gesundheitssystems bedarf, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, inwiefern tatsächlich neue Gesundheitskrisen zu erwarten sind und wie die erwähnten Entwicklungen überhaupt zu solchen werden.

Dem kürzlich veröffentlichen besonderen Bericht des Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen (UNDP) zufolge stellen Herausforderungen im Gesundheitsbereich eine der zentralen Gefährdungen für die menschliche Sicherheit dar. Die Ausbreitung der Affenpocken in Europa zeigt, dass sich global ausbreitende (Infektions-)Krankheiten mit der Covid-19-Pandemie nicht enden, sondern ein bleibendes und voraussichtlich immer häufiger auftretendes Phänomen darstellen. In Folge des Klimawandels und der Ausbreitung des menschlichen Lebensraumes werden Zoonosen, also die Übertragung von Krankheiten von Tier zu Mensch und von Mensch zu Tier, zunehmen und sich schnell flächendeckend verbreiten. Doch nicht nur Zoonosen, sondern vor allem nichtübertragbare Krankheiten wie Diabetes, Krebs oder Herz-Kreislauf-Erkrankungen werden dem UNDP-Bericht zufolge immer häufiger auftreten. Vor diesem Hintergrund, und aus den Erfahrungen der Covid-19-Pandemie lernend, setzt sich die neue Bundesregierung im  Koalitionsvertrag das Ziel, ein »vorsorgendes, krisenfestes und modernes Gesundheitssystem «aufzubauen. So soll unter anderem ein Gesundheitssicherstellungsgesetz» regelmäßige Ernstfallübungen für das Personal für Gesundheitskrisen«  garantieren. Während es zweifelsohne einer Stärkung des deutschen und des globalen Gesundheitssystems bedarf, stellt sich jedoch die Frage, inwiefern tatsächlich neue Gesundheitskrisen zu erwarten sind und wie die erwähnten Entwicklungen überhaupt zu solchen werden.

Deutschland muss Abhängigkeiten vom chinesischen Markt abbauen und wirtschaftlich diversifizieren. Dafür sollte der Staat die richtigen Anreize und regulatorischen Vorgaben setzen. Das Risiko für Investitionen muss bei den Unternehmen liegen.

Deutschland muss Abhängigkeiten vom chinesischen Markt abbauen und wirtschaftlich diversifizieren. Dafür sollte der Staat die richtigen Anreize und regulatorischen Vorgaben setzen. Das Risiko für Investitionen muss bei den Unternehmen liegen.

Deutschland muss Abhängigkeiten vom chinesischen Markt abbauen und wirtschaftlich diversifizieren. Dafür sollte der Staat die richtigen Anreize und regulatorischen Vorgaben setzen. Das Risiko für Investitionen muss bei den Unternehmen liegen.

Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has disastrous consequences for the country. Although an end to the war is currently not in sight, it is already clear that a huge international effort will be required to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in July, the Ukrainian government presented a National Recovery Plan that envisions a deep modernisation of the country.
The Ukrainian government’s reconstruction priorities are well in sync with the European Union’s (EU) ambition to promote Ukraine’s transformation towards an EU member state and to foster the country’s green and digital trans¬ition. The National Recovery Plan fully embraces the “build back better” principle and closely aligns the reconstruction plans with the EU’s norms and standards.
The EU, on its part, is willing to bear a major share of the international effort required for Ukraine’s recovery. However, the same degree of unity and resolve that the EU showed when forging its initial response to the war will be needed to realise a strong EU leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s long-term reconstruction.
To provide a sustainable basis for Ukraine’s recovery, the EU and member states need to combine ad hoc humanitarian assistance with predictable, long-term support for reconstruction. In doing so, they should consider the follow¬ing key recommendations:
• Adopt a two-phase approach to reconstruction. The modernisation and transformation of Ukraine towards an EU member state will take several years. At the same time, the vast infrastructure losses that Ukraine is currently facing need to be addressed urgently, ideally before the winter sets in. Hence, international donors should prioritise the reconstruction of infrastructure related to basic needs, including
schools, hospitals, housing, electricity grids and roads. In a second phase, deeper modernisation efforts and institutional reforms that are of relevance for eventual accession to the EU should follow.
• Set up adequate governance mechanisms for the joint management and oversight of reconstruction efforts. The Ukrainian government and the EU should set up a coordination platform that also involves other international partners and Ukrainian civil society actors. This platform should then develop institutional governance mechanisms for the management and oversight of projects, and ensure close coordination between the Ukrainian government and international partners.
• Negotiate a comprehensive agreement on the EU’s contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine. A timely agreement on the governance and funding of the EU’s long-term assistance to Ukraine is needed. A mixed strategy that includes borrowing capital on behalf of the EU on the markets and funnelling additional contributions by member states to the EU’s budget might be a potential way forward. In addition, the EU should swiftly examine legal possibilities to channel sanctioned Russian assets towards Ukraine’s recovery.
• Continue and expand military assistance to Ukraine. Substantive investments in Ukraine’s reconstruction should not come at the expense of necessary military aid. One priority should be to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to protect its skies against Russian missile attacks. Moreover, the EU should realise its plans for an EU military training mission, provided that it creates real added value to existing efforts and matches Ukrainian needs.

Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has disastrous consequences for the country. Although an end to the war is currently not in sight, it is already clear that a huge international effort will be required to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in July, the Ukrainian government presented a National Recovery Plan that envisions a deep modernisation of the country.
The Ukrainian government’s reconstruction priorities are well in sync with the European Union’s (EU) ambition to promote Ukraine’s transformation towards an EU member state and to foster the country’s green and digital trans¬ition. The National Recovery Plan fully embraces the “build back better” principle and closely aligns the reconstruction plans with the EU’s norms and standards.
The EU, on its part, is willing to bear a major share of the international effort required for Ukraine’s recovery. However, the same degree of unity and resolve that the EU showed when forging its initial response to the war will be needed to realise a strong EU leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s long-term reconstruction.
To provide a sustainable basis for Ukraine’s recovery, the EU and member states need to combine ad hoc humanitarian assistance with predictable, long-term support for reconstruction. In doing so, they should consider the follow¬ing key recommendations:
• Adopt a two-phase approach to reconstruction. The modernisation and transformation of Ukraine towards an EU member state will take several years. At the same time, the vast infrastructure losses that Ukraine is currently facing need to be addressed urgently, ideally before the winter sets in. Hence, international donors should prioritise the reconstruction of infrastructure related to basic needs, including
schools, hospitals, housing, electricity grids and roads. In a second phase, deeper modernisation efforts and institutional reforms that are of relevance for eventual accession to the EU should follow.
• Set up adequate governance mechanisms for the joint management and oversight of reconstruction efforts. The Ukrainian government and the EU should set up a coordination platform that also involves other international partners and Ukrainian civil society actors. This platform should then develop institutional governance mechanisms for the management and oversight of projects, and ensure close coordination between the Ukrainian government and international partners.
• Negotiate a comprehensive agreement on the EU’s contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine. A timely agreement on the governance and funding of the EU’s long-term assistance to Ukraine is needed. A mixed strategy that includes borrowing capital on behalf of the EU on the markets and funnelling additional contributions by member states to the EU’s budget might be a potential way forward. In addition, the EU should swiftly examine legal possibilities to channel sanctioned Russian assets towards Ukraine’s recovery.
• Continue and expand military assistance to Ukraine. Substantive investments in Ukraine’s reconstruction should not come at the expense of necessary military aid. One priority should be to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to protect its skies against Russian missile attacks. Moreover, the EU should realise its plans for an EU military training mission, provided that it creates real added value to existing efforts and matches Ukrainian needs.

Russia’s brutal war against Ukraine has disastrous consequences for the country. Although an end to the war is currently not in sight, it is already clear that a huge international effort will be required to support Ukraine’s reconstruction. At the Ukraine Recovery Conference in July, the Ukrainian government presented a National Recovery Plan that envisions a deep modernisation of the country.
The Ukrainian government’s reconstruction priorities are well in sync with the European Union’s (EU) ambition to promote Ukraine’s transformation towards an EU member state and to foster the country’s green and digital trans¬ition. The National Recovery Plan fully embraces the “build back better” principle and closely aligns the reconstruction plans with the EU’s norms and standards.
The EU, on its part, is willing to bear a major share of the international effort required for Ukraine’s recovery. However, the same degree of unity and resolve that the EU showed when forging its initial response to the war will be needed to realise a strong EU leadership role in supporting Ukraine’s long-term reconstruction.
To provide a sustainable basis for Ukraine’s recovery, the EU and member states need to combine ad hoc humanitarian assistance with predictable, long-term support for reconstruction. In doing so, they should consider the follow¬ing key recommendations:
• Adopt a two-phase approach to reconstruction. The modernisation and transformation of Ukraine towards an EU member state will take several years. At the same time, the vast infrastructure losses that Ukraine is currently facing need to be addressed urgently, ideally before the winter sets in. Hence, international donors should prioritise the reconstruction of infrastructure related to basic needs, including
schools, hospitals, housing, electricity grids and roads. In a second phase, deeper modernisation efforts and institutional reforms that are of relevance for eventual accession to the EU should follow.
• Set up adequate governance mechanisms for the joint management and oversight of reconstruction efforts. The Ukrainian government and the EU should set up a coordination platform that also involves other international partners and Ukrainian civil society actors. This platform should then develop institutional governance mechanisms for the management and oversight of projects, and ensure close coordination between the Ukrainian government and international partners.
• Negotiate a comprehensive agreement on the EU’s contribution to the reconstruction of Ukraine. A timely agreement on the governance and funding of the EU’s long-term assistance to Ukraine is needed. A mixed strategy that includes borrowing capital on behalf of the EU on the markets and funnelling additional contributions by member states to the EU’s budget might be a potential way forward. In addition, the EU should swiftly examine legal possibilities to channel sanctioned Russian assets towards Ukraine’s recovery.
• Continue and expand military assistance to Ukraine. Substantive investments in Ukraine’s reconstruction should not come at the expense of necessary military aid. One priority should be to strengthen Ukraine’s ability to protect its skies against Russian missile attacks. Moreover, the EU should realise its plans for an EU military training mission, provided that it creates real added value to existing efforts and matches Ukrainian needs.

The challenge to develop more comprehensive health and social protection systems is not just technical in nature. Agreeing and implementing the necessary reforms to make this widely shared goal a reality requires acknowledging and potentially reshaping citizens’ vertical relations with the state and also the horizontal relationships between citizens. As a result, any strategy to expand the health and social protection systems requires thinking carefully about how the relationship between the informally employed and state institutions is perceived and defined. In addition, the fiscal dimension of the reform is undoubtedly crucial. Finding the scope for a reform that is politically, socially and fiscally sound requires changes in the predominant fiscal contracts, understood as an implicit agreement in a society defining how much members can expect to benefit from state action and how much they are expected to contribute in exchange. In this chapter. the results of surveys among the informally employed in six African countries are presented. The responses offers crucial indications to approach the challenges sketched above. Health is defined as the top priority that informally employed people would like governments to focus on. Generally speaking, informally employed are open to contribute more via taxes and fees if they themselves or even poorer people obtain better services in exchange. The vast majority also expresses support for a vision of the state that targets services at the poor, regardless of whether they are able to contribute to the fiscal effort. One major obstacle to coordinating and implementing more ambitious reforms seems to be lack of trust among informally employed in various social and political institutions, especially so-called intermediary institutions, such as political parties and trade unions. Overall, there seems to be scope for reform but much work is needed to create the socio-political conditions required for the vision to be feasible.

The challenge to develop more comprehensive health and social protection systems is not just technical in nature. Agreeing and implementing the necessary reforms to make this widely shared goal a reality requires acknowledging and potentially reshaping citizens’ vertical relations with the state and also the horizontal relationships between citizens. As a result, any strategy to expand the health and social protection systems requires thinking carefully about how the relationship between the informally employed and state institutions is perceived and defined. In addition, the fiscal dimension of the reform is undoubtedly crucial. Finding the scope for a reform that is politically, socially and fiscally sound requires changes in the predominant fiscal contracts, understood as an implicit agreement in a society defining how much members can expect to benefit from state action and how much they are expected to contribute in exchange. In this chapter. the results of surveys among the informally employed in six African countries are presented. The responses offers crucial indications to approach the challenges sketched above. Health is defined as the top priority that informally employed people would like governments to focus on. Generally speaking, informally employed are open to contribute more via taxes and fees if they themselves or even poorer people obtain better services in exchange. The vast majority also expresses support for a vision of the state that targets services at the poor, regardless of whether they are able to contribute to the fiscal effort. One major obstacle to coordinating and implementing more ambitious reforms seems to be lack of trust among informally employed in various social and political institutions, especially so-called intermediary institutions, such as political parties and trade unions. Overall, there seems to be scope for reform but much work is needed to create the socio-political conditions required for the vision to be feasible.

The challenge to develop more comprehensive health and social protection systems is not just technical in nature. Agreeing and implementing the necessary reforms to make this widely shared goal a reality requires acknowledging and potentially reshaping citizens’ vertical relations with the state and also the horizontal relationships between citizens. As a result, any strategy to expand the health and social protection systems requires thinking carefully about how the relationship between the informally employed and state institutions is perceived and defined. In addition, the fiscal dimension of the reform is undoubtedly crucial. Finding the scope for a reform that is politically, socially and fiscally sound requires changes in the predominant fiscal contracts, understood as an implicit agreement in a society defining how much members can expect to benefit from state action and how much they are expected to contribute in exchange. In this chapter. the results of surveys among the informally employed in six African countries are presented. The responses offers crucial indications to approach the challenges sketched above. Health is defined as the top priority that informally employed people would like governments to focus on. Generally speaking, informally employed are open to contribute more via taxes and fees if they themselves or even poorer people obtain better services in exchange. The vast majority also expresses support for a vision of the state that targets services at the poor, regardless of whether they are able to contribute to the fiscal effort. One major obstacle to coordinating and implementing more ambitious reforms seems to be lack of trust among informally employed in various social and political institutions, especially so-called intermediary institutions, such as political parties and trade unions. Overall, there seems to be scope for reform but much work is needed to create the socio-political conditions required for the vision to be feasible.

Im Frühjahr 2022 kündigte Bundesentwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze einen Paradigmenwechsel in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik an: Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) werde zukünftig eine feministische Entwicklungspolitik verfolgen. Was verstehen wir darunter?

Im Frühjahr 2022 kündigte Bundesentwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze einen Paradigmenwechsel in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik an: Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) werde zukünftig eine feministische Entwicklungspolitik verfolgen. Was verstehen wir darunter?

Im Frühjahr 2022 kündigte Bundesentwicklungsministerin Svenja Schulze einen Paradigmenwechsel in der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik an: Das Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) werde zukünftig eine feministische Entwicklungspolitik verfolgen. Was verstehen wir darunter?