Europäische Union

Betty Taube hatte eine traumatische Kindheit. Ihren täglichen Überlebenskampf mit einer alkoholkranken Mutter verarbeitete sie nun in einem Buch.

Bewegung mindert das Alzheimer-Risiko. Neue Daten zeigen nun: Sie nützt auch dann noch, wenn es bereits schädliche Ablagerungen im Gehirn gibt.

«Traumfabrik» heisst Vanessa Mais neues Album. Die Sängerin über erfüllte Kindheitsträume und skurrile Spitznamen. Zudem offenbart sie einen Tick – und auch, was sie gar nicht mag.

Die Symbolik ist offensichtlich: An seinem ersten Arbeitstag hat der neue Postchef gelbe Gummistiefel in petto. Pascal Grieder muss den Staatsbetrieb durch ein schwieriges Umfeld aus politischen Forderungen und wirtschaftlichen Zwängen manövrieren.

Main agenda items, approximate timing, public sessions and press opportunities.

On Wednesday, 5 November 2025, the Special Committee on the European Democracy Shield (EUDS) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET) will organise a joint public hearing on "China’s influence in the EU and globally".

This hearing will bring together experts to discuss the impact of China's global ambitions on European democratic resilience and offer guidance on building a coherent, principled response to these evolving challenges.

As China's strategic efforts to expand its political, economic and technological influence raise serious questions for democratic governance, strategic autonomy, and human rights, this discussion aims to pinpoint its impact and the next steps in the EU and beyond.
This hearing will explore how China exerts its influence ­̶ through infrastructure investments, academic and technology partnerships, media ownership, and pressure on diaspora communities ­̶ affecting European business sectors, security, and technological independence.

Poster
Programme
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Die Irritation der EU-Kommission erfolgt, obwohl sich europäische und chinesische Handelsvertreter erst vergangene Woche in Brüssel getroffen hatten.

Die CEO der Basler Kantonalbank sieht trotz Integration keine Staatsgarantie für die Tochter Bank Cler. Im Private Banking hegt Regula Berger mit ihrer BKB Expansionspläne.

Péter Magyar warf Russland zudem vor, die Angriffe gesteuert zu haben, um Orbán an der Macht zu halten.

The thematic report “Raw Materials for a Resilient Europe: The EU’s Strategic Partnership with the Western Balkans” is a result of ELIAMEP’s initiative think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration, supported by the Open Society Foundations – Western Balkans. 

The initiative contributes to reimagining the EU’s engagement with the Western Balkans, as well as the region’s attractiveness for the EU in order to ensure a resilient EU integration strategy and ever-closer integration with a full membership perspective in mind.

This thematic report authored by Dr. Ana Krstinovska (Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP & Senior Researcher, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration) and Dr. André Wolf (Non-Resident Reseach Associate, think nea – New Narratives of EU Integration & Head of Division, CEP Berlin) examines the strategic potential of the Western Balkans in the context of the EU’s efforts to secure critical and strategic raw materials essential for its competitiveness, green transition, and defence readiness. It argues that the region which is geographically proximate, economically interlinked with the EU, and engaged in the accession process, represents a crucial yet underutilized partner in strengthening Europe’s strategic autonomy and industrial resilience.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), adopted in 2024, highlights the strategic importance of securing reliable and diversified access to critical and strategic raw materials

(CRMs/SRMs) essential for Europe’s competitiveness, green transition, and defence capabilities. As global supply chains are increasingly subject to geopolitical pressures, the Western Balkans offer a unique opportunity for the EU. The region is geographically close, economically intertwined with the EU, formally engaged in the accession process, and endowed with significant reserves of copper, aluminium (bauxite), nickel, antimony, lithium, and rare earth elements.

Despite this potential, the Western Balkan’s contribution to European raw materials security remains underdeveloped. A recurring pattern emerges across countries: raw ores and concentrates flow mostly to China, while processed or semi-processed goods are exported to the EU. Serbia exports most of its copper ores to China, while processed copper is split between the EU and Chinese buyers. Montenegro ships bauxite largely to China, but aluminium articles to the EU. Albania exports raw copper to China but processed copper to the EU. In North Macedonia, domestic processing of bauxite has relied heavily on Chinese inputs. This structure secures greater value for China in the global supply chain, while constraining the EU’s strategic autonomy. 

At the same time, the Western Balkans capture limited economic value from their resources. Processing, recycling, and advanced technology investments remain underdeveloped. Outdated geological data, obsolete technologies, weak governance frameworks, and fragile investment climates further constrain efforts to move up the value chain. The lack of regional integration compounds these problems: national strategies often duplicate efforts rather than complement them, leading to inefficiency and missed economies of scale. 

Mining and extraction are politically sensitive and socially contested across the region. The legacy of polluting industries, opaque privatization, and unresolved environmental “hotspots” has fuelled public distrust and citizen mobilization. Serbia’s Jadar lithium project, suspended in 2022 following widespread protests but recently revived, is emblematic of the risks of pursuing extractive partnerships without transparent governance and robust safeguards. 

In Bosnia and Herzegovina, local opposition has slowed or blocked several projects in lithium and magnesium. In North Macedonia, civic mobilization successfully halted the Ilovica-Štuka gold-copper project. These cases underscore that raw material development is not only a technical or economic challenge; it also requires political legitimacy and social trust.

Weak rule of law and institutional capacity further aggravates these risks. Geological data often dates back to the 1970s–1980s, permitting processes are fragmented and slow, inspection services lack resources, and corruption remains pervasive. Governance deficiencies drive up costs for investors, fuel social opposition, and undermine the credibility of governments. Without visible guarantees that mining will meet the highest environmental, social, and governance (ESG) standards, even economically viable projects risk becoming politically toxic and socially unsustainable. 

The Western Balkans’ raw materials potential should not be treated as isolated national resources, but instead as part of Europe’s broader industrial ecosystem. The EU has already launched instruments such as the Single Market Highway and the Reform and Growth Facility, and Western Balkan partners have access to Horizon Europe. These can serve as platforms for joint projects, standards alignment, and technology transfer. Embedding raw materials cooperation into the enlargement framework, including through Chapter 20 (Industrial Policy), Chapter 27 (Environment), and the Fundamentals cluster, can reinforce EU credibility while incentivizing reforms. 

Regional cooperation is equally critical. Restoring value chains that once spanned the former Yugoslavia, covering exploration, smelting, refining, and processing, would generate economies of scale and reduce inefficiencies. EU-led processes such as the Berlin Process can serve as vehicles for fostering such cross-border integration. This report proposes five overarching policy priorities:

1. Value-chain upgrading: Invest in processing, recycling, and innovation capacities so the region exports higher-value goods to the EU instead of raw ores to China. Prioritize aluminium and copper as pilot sectors.

2. Embed partnerships in accession conditionality: Link EU financial support and market access to verifiable implementation of EU environmental, labour, and governance standards, ensuring public trust and the participation of affected communities.

3. Strengthen governance capacity: Modernize geological surveys, streamline permitting systems, consolidate fragmented concessions, and enhance inspection and enforcement to guarantee compliance with ESG safeguards.

4. Promote regional integration: Use the Single Market Highway and the Berlin Process to coordinate standards, infrastructure, and joint investments across the Western Balkans, restoring regional supply chains.

5. Mobilize the European private sector: Deploy EU financial instruments and risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage the greater involvement of European firms, fostering joint ventures that combine EU technology and capital with local resources.

By pursuing this agenda, the EU can simultaneously strengthen its strategic autonomy and support sustainable economic development in the Western Balkans. For the region, the path forward lies not in exporting raw ores but in developing modern, EU-aligned value chains that create jobs, generate revenues, and build public trust. For the EU, engaging early and systematically is the best way to prevent critical assets from reinforcing the influence of rival powers, while accelerating the accession process and securing the raw materials needed for

Europe’s future. By aligning raw materials cooperation with the EU’s enlargement policy, the Union and the Western Balkans can transform shared resources into shared prosperity—building a sustainable, competitive, and strategically autonomous Europe that includes the Western Balkans as equal partners.

You can read the full report here.

Der Vorstoß erfolgt, während die Sorge über mehrere Drohnenvorfälle im europäischen Luftraum in den vergangenen Monaten weiter zunimmt.

Linke EU-Abgeordnete verlangen eine Prüfung des Mercosur-Abkommens durch den Europäischen Gerichtshof.

Although lagging behind green finance, the market for social financial instruments, such as social bonds or social equity funds, has gained traction in recent years. This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of social finance. It also provides an overview of the heterogeneous definitions of social investments common in financial markets. It distinguishes between a focus on the impact of goods and services produced and one on process-related impacts in social investment criteria. The chapter describes a positive selection of sectors, exclusion of specific sectors, best-in-class procedures, and applying minimum standards as selection procedures commonly used for social financial instruments. The diversity of existing criteria and selection procedures in financial markets increases transaction costs, can facilitate deceptive practices, and might lead to adverse selection. Public governance frameworks are thus necessary to set common standards for social financial instruments.

Although lagging behind green finance, the market for social financial instruments, such as social bonds or social equity funds, has gained traction in recent years. This chapter focuses on the conceptual underpinnings of social finance. It also provides an overview of the heterogeneous definitions of social investments common in financial markets. It distinguishes between a focus on the impact of goods and services produced and one on process-related impacts in social investment criteria. The chapter describes a positive selection of sectors, exclusion of specific sectors, best-in-class procedures, and applying minimum standards as selection procedures commonly used for social financial instruments. The diversity of existing criteria and selection procedures in financial markets increases transaction costs, can facilitate deceptive practices, and might lead to adverse selection. Public governance frameworks are thus necessary to set common standards for social financial instruments.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP

Babiš’ neue Koalition sucht Nähe zu Ungarn und der Slowakei – mit Verankerung der nationalen Währung in der Verfassung, staatlicher Energiehoheit und harter Asylpolitik.

Our policy brief, authored by Ben Crumpton, Melis Baydag, Niels Keijzer, Camilla Rocca, and Benedikt Erforth, delves into the multifaceted landscape of Africa’s digital transformation. Titled “Digital Transformation in Africa: From Gaps to Goals,” the brief offers a comprehensive analysis of the digital divide across the continent. It provides both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. The analysis primarily draws from three recent reports: the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2024) Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures, the GSMA’s (2024) State of Mobile Internet Connectivity, and data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2024). In addition to a review of literature and quantitative data, the analysis incorporates insights from discussions held during a side event organized by IDOS, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the European Think Tanks Group at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend on June 3, 2025, in Marrakesh.

Our policy brief, authored by Ben Crumpton, Melis Baydag, Niels Keijzer, Camilla Rocca, and Benedikt Erforth, delves into the multifaceted landscape of Africa’s digital transformation. Titled “Digital Transformation in Africa: From Gaps to Goals,” the brief offers a comprehensive analysis of the digital divide across the continent. It provides both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. The analysis primarily draws from three recent reports: the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2024) Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures, the GSMA’s (2024) State of Mobile Internet Connectivity, and data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2024). In addition to a review of literature and quantitative data, the analysis incorporates insights from discussions held during a side event organized by IDOS, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the European Think Tanks Group at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend on June 3, 2025, in Marrakesh.

Our policy brief, authored by Ben Crumpton, Melis Baydag, Niels Keijzer, Camilla Rocca, and Benedikt Erforth, delves into the multifaceted landscape of Africa’s digital transformation. Titled “Digital Transformation in Africa: From Gaps to Goals,” the brief offers a comprehensive analysis of the digital divide across the continent. It provides both a global perspective and a comparative examination of its various dimensions across and within African states. The main objective is to give an overview of the overall situation and trends in terms of moving African digital access from gaps to goals. The analysis primarily draws from three recent reports: the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU, 2024) Measuring Digital Development: Facts and Figures, the GSMA’s (2024) State of Mobile Internet Connectivity, and data from the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2024). In addition to a review of literature and quantitative data, the analysis incorporates insights from discussions held during a side event organized by IDOS, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, and the European Think Tanks Group at the Ibrahim Governance Weekend on June 3, 2025, in Marrakesh.

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2025 - EP