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Récemment attaqué pour ses propos sur la colonisation, le mariage pour tous ou encore sur son programme jugé inconsistant (voire inexistant), Emmanuel Macron peut au moins se targuer d'avoir capté l'intérêt...

Aktiv dabei wie immer Steinmeier, die Deutsche und EU Botschaft und die als „Himmler“ bekannten Terroristen und Mord Financiers der Britten. Wednesday, 15 February 2017 Albania’s PM Edi Rama, Soros, US Ambassador part of Drug Trafficking Ring US Office of Inspector General joins Investigation on Jess Baily and US Embassy Monday, 20 February 2017 Multiple investigations have been launched to review the work of the US Embassy in Macedonia, and new ones seem to be added almost on weekly basis. Apart from the ongoing investigations, another two were added, one from the Office of the Inspector General, according to GOP Congressman Trent Franks. „This is the next step, we have […]

Az anyanyelv világnapján, vagyis ma hirdette ki a Kolozs Megyei Törvényszék, hogy ki kell helyezni a kincses városban a többnyelvű helységnévtáblákat. A polgármesteri hivatal szóvivője, Oana Buzatu az ítélet kapcsán sietett leszögezni: mindenképpen fellebbeznek, álláspontja szerint ugyanis városházá...

 

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On February 1, Rex Tillerson was sworn in as President Donald Trump’s secretary of state—a role which is shaping up to be one of the toughest jobs in the world. The former CEO of Exxon Mobil, who will help guide the new administration’s “America first” foreign policy, was confirmed by the Senate in a narrow 56 to 43 vote, in part due to concerns over his ties to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Mr. Tillerson will not only be dealing with “combined Russian-separatist forces” in the Ukraine, but also with a rebellion of dissenters at the U.S. State Department who oppose the temporary travel ban on seven majority Muslim nations. He will also need to reexamine Obama’s refugee deal with close ally Australia, economic ties with Mexico, and consider drawing a line in the sand with Iran. With all these issues on his plate, Tillerson and his State Department may soon be overwhelmed as more countries choose to test the new administration’s foreign policy, including China in the East and South China Seas.

Although much of his testimony during the confirmation process focused on Tillerson’s ties to Russia, the former oil executive also sent confrontational messages to leaders in Beijing, including the ominous: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

Tillerson also reiterated Beijing’s building and placing military equipment on the contested South China Sea islands were “illegal actions” and “extremely worrisome,” arguing “They’re taking territory or control, or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China’s,” while adding the territorial grabs were “akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine.

Tillerson has also shown a strong tendency to distance himself from the previous administration’s foreign policy toward China, blaming the continued Chinese aggression on a soft Washington: “The failure of a response has allowed them just to keep pushing the envelope on this,” Tillerson said, adding, “The way we’ve got to deal with this is we’ve got to show back up in the region with our traditional allies in Southeast Asia.” To be fair, the Obama Administration, under its “pivot to Asia,” did deploy greater military assets in the region, but their actions were limited to bomber flyovers, breaches by fighter jets of Beijing’s self-declared “air defense identification zones” and naval patrols to assert the right of free navigation.

Tillerson also commented on Beijing’s relationship with North Korea, arguing for the U.S. not to rely on empty promises from China to pressure Pyongyang over its nuclear and missile programs – saying “It has not been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea.” Tillerson also made the case for secondary sanctions to be imposed on Chinese entities found to be violating existing U.N. sanctions.

Some of Tillerson’s other prepared comments on China (59:10 on C-Span) include:

“We should also acknowledge the realities about China. China’s island-building in the South China Sea is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms.”

“China’s economic and trade practices have not always followed its commitments to global agreements. It steals our intellectual property, and is aggressive and expansionist in the digital realm.”

“China has proven a willingness to act with abandon in the pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with America’s interests. We have to deal with what we see, not what we hope. But we need to see the positive dimensions in our relationship with China as well. The economic well-being of our two nations is deeply intertwined. China has been a valuable ally in curtailing certain elements of radical Islam. We should not let disagreements over other issues exclude areas for productive partnership.”

While Mr. Tillerson has seemingly stayed on message with President-elect Trump’s hawkish views on China, exactly how the Pentagon would preclude China from accessing the islands it has built and now controls was not made clear. What is clear is Beijing’s reaction to the statement. In an editorial by the state-owned China Daily, Tillerson’s remarks were “not worth taking seriously because they are a mish-mash of naivety, shortsightedness, worn-out prejudices, and unrealistic political fantasies. Should he act on them in the real world, it would be disastrous.” An editorial in the Global Times, another state-run nationalistic newspaper, warned of a “large-scale war” should the U.S. attempt to block China from the islands, arguing:

“China has enough determination and strength to make sure that his rabble-rousing will not succeed.” 

In the election runup and with the nomination of cabinet posts we have certainly heard some heated rhetoric thrown at China, and Tillerson is no exception. Yet until the new administration develops and agrees upon any plan of action, we still have no idea whether or how these “unrealistic political fantasies” will become reality (or lost in contentious debate) – or merely intended to appease an aggrieved nationalistic audience at home.

In a recent and lengthy letter (PDF) to Senator Ben Cardin, Tillerson seemed to back off from his threat of force to prevent China from accessing islands it occupies, saying:

“To expand on the discussion of U.S. policy options in the South China Sea, the United States seeks peaceful resolution of disputes and does not take a position on overlapping sovereignty claims, but the United States also does not recognize China’s excessive claims to the waters and airspace of the South China Sea. China cannot be allowed to use its artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea. The United States will uphold freedom of navigation and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. If a contingency occurs, the United States and its allies and partners must be capable of limiting China’s access to and use of its artificial islands to pose a threat to the United States or its allies and partners.”

His latest statements largely reflect previous U.S. State Department and U.S. Navy policy under the Obama administration, but leave room for action following a “contingency.” How the new Trump administration defines and reacts to this future “contingency” we can only hope will be heavily debated among all the concerned parties.

The post Rex Tillerson On China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Voilà en avant première la couverture de mon nouveau bébé: «les salauds de l’Europe, guide à l’usage des euro sceptiques». C’est un bilan critique de la construction communautaire, sous forme d’essai, qui paraitra le 25 mars prochain, pour le soixantième anniversaire du traité de Rome. J’espère que vous l’aimerez.

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE 1 - 55 - Entwurf einer Stellungnahme Auf dem Weg zu einem neuen Handelsrahmen zwischen der EU und der Türkei und zur Modernisierung der Zollunion
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

A paksi beruházásról a versenypolitikai biztos távolléte miatt végül mégsem tárgyalt egynapos brüsszeli villámlátogatásán Lázár János, a Miniszterelnökséget vezető miniszter, aki viszont találkozott Günther Oettingerrel, az uniós költségvetés újdonsült őrével.

Les importantes manifestations de ces dernières semaines en Roumanie ont eu raison de la loi visant à alléger la loi pénale. Les parlementaires ont voté pour le retrait du texte mardi 21 février. Cela marque la fin d'un bras de fer de 21 jours entre le gouvernement et la rue.

Alors que Varsovie et Bruxelles sont engagées depuis plusieurs mois dans un bras de fer concernant l’État de droit en Pologne, le gouvernement a estimé lundi que le différend était « réglé ».

La Pologne avait jusqu’au 21 février pour se conformer aux recommandations de la Commission concernant le respect de l’État de droit. Varsovie avait obtenu en décembre une rallonge de deux mois, alors que la procédure avait été déclenchée par l’Union européenne en juillet 2016. À la veille de cette échéance, le gouvernement a transmis une réponse sans appel : « Les déclarations sur une menace systémique pesant sur l’État de droit en Pologne » sont « infondées » (AFP). Les lois controversées visant à réformer le Tribunal constitutionnel – et à le paralyser, d’après l’opposition – sont « conformes aux standards européens », estime le gouvernement conservateur, au pouvoir depuis la fin 2015.



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En refusant de tenir compte de ces recommandations, la Pologne s’expose à des sanctions, prévues par l’article 7 du Traité de l’Union européenne, notamment la suspension de son droit de vote au Conseil. Il s’agirait alors du premier État-membre à être confronté à cette situation.

« C’est un peu tôt pour prendre une décision », a réagi la Commission par la voix de son porte-parole, Margaritis Schinas (AFP). Il a toutefois précisé que la réponse de la Pologne serait évoquée par les commissaires européens lors de leur réunion hebdomadaire.
Jean-Claude Juncker, le président de la Commission Européenne, déclarait récemment dans les médias allemands que les États membres de l’UE étaient de plus en plus partagés et affichaient des opinions « pas nécessairement compatibles », en faisant référence à la Hongrie et la Pologne. Le soutien de la Hongrie pourrait permettre à la Pologne d’échapper aux sanctions, qui nécessitent un vote à l’unanimité pour être appliquées.

L’ONG Reporters sans frontières a choisi de tenir une conférence de presse à Varsovie le 21 février afin de dire à la Commission : « Voilà, vous avez la réponse des autorités polonaises (…), maintenant, on attend des mesures ! », a déclaré Pauline Adès-Mével, la responsable de la zone Union européenne et Balkans, rapporte le journal Ouest-France. RSF suit de près l’évolution de la situation politique depuis l’an dernier et s’inquiète particulièrement du sort des journalistes, qui « sont dans une situation intenable », et appelle l’UE à appliquer l’article 7.

Source : © European Union, 2017 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2017 - EP

LE BILLET POLITIQUE - François Fillon repasse devant Emmanuel Macron dans un sondage et offre à la gauche la même perspective qu'il y a un mois : celle d'assister en spectateur à un duel entre le candidat des Républicains et celle du Front National

Après une enquête, le Parlement européen réclame le remboursement de sommes versées au titre d'indémnités parlementaires au parti de Marine Le Pen.

The United Nations’ peace and security pillar has prevented the recurrence of conflict and protected civilians in many countries around the world. However, the peace and security architecture now faces deep challenges, with three reviews in 2015 pointing to the need for organizational reform. In one of his first decisions, the new Secretary-General António Gutteres tasked an Internal Review Team (IRT) to make recommendations on organizational change, following the recommendations of the high-level independent panel on peace operations, the advisory group of experts on peacebuilding and the 1325 review. As an interim measure, he gave initial instructions on the co-location of regional groupings of Department of Political Affairs (DPA) and Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) and the creation of an Executive Committee (EC) in his office.

Against this background, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) has produced a report entitled “Restructuring the UN Secretariat to Strengthen Preventative Diplomacy and Peace Operations” that analyzes managerial and structural challenges at UN headquarters that reduce performance on the ground, and assesses options for organizational change. On February 21st, the findings of this report were presented by Sarah Cliffe and Alexandra Novosseloff at a recent IPI closed-door roundtable event on “Restructuring the Peace and Security Pillar of the UN Secretariat” held under Chatham house rule.

The report identified that there are many operational challenges of large missions overwhelming a broader “culture of prevention”; the fragmentation of the system and of UN actors into silos, which undermines coherent action; the absence of clear political strategies to guide peace operations and enable sustainable solutions to crises; the lack of authority and resources for peacebuilding; competition between the departments of political affairs and peacekeeping operations; the multiplicity of UN actors and fragmented initiatives for political, security and justice institutional support; and the disconnect between operations and field support.

The paper presents four clusters of options for restructuring: (1) dedicated management options (e.g. second Deputy Secretary-General); (2) fusion models (e.g. merging DPKO/DPA and/or DPKO/DFS); (3) form-follows-function models (e.g. clearly delineating political, operational and “institution building” functions); and (4) peacebuilding options (e.g. integrating peacebuilding more closely with other EOSG cross pillar functions). The authors underlined that no one model is perfect, with competing pros/cons and various levels of political feasibility associated to each. The authors also described the paper’s analysis of budget issues and of practical policy considerations in selecting the most appropriate option.

Participants agreed with the paper’s conclusions that strong leadership and management are key factors to implement reform of the peace and security pillar. The authors noted that, in consultations on the paper, there had been general agreement on this, but that on the other hand when asked whether stronger leadership and management was enough to resolve the problems without organizational change, the clear conclusion was “No. The structures also need to be improved to deliver the functions needed.” Participants further stressed the need to overcome silos and to ensure coherence among departments to bring an end to the competition between the departments of peacekeeping operations, political affairs and field support, in particular; as well as to better link the capacities of agency, funds and programmes with those of the peace and security pillar, as has been done in the global focal point for police, justice and corrections.. The “static” UN work culture and its rigid rules and procedures were also mentioned; participants called for greater flexibility in order to adapt to the realities missions are confronted with on the ground. They stressed the need to rebalance the relationship between the Security Council and the Secretariat and to ensure timely and effective information-sharing.

The responsibility of Member States on the Security Council, particularly the P5, and their relation to the UN Secretariat was also discussed. The Council is often paralyzed and fails to take necessary action because of division amongst its members. This is particularly true in the case when preventative action is required, as was the case in Burundi. Among the participants, there was a broad consensus on the need to shift the UN’s work to more upstream conflict prevention.

Lastly, the need to change the way the budgets are negotiated was strongly acknowledged by all participants, as well as the need for a better strategic discussion between the Secretariat and the members of the Fifth Committee prior to the negotiations. The strategic budget analysis in the report was noted as useful, and participants felt that this type of more strategic-level analysis is urgently needed for the next budget discussions.

Participants welcomed strong leadership and direction from the office of the Secretary General and encouraged the work of the Internal Review Team (IRT) on the Secretariat’s Peace and Security Architecture due to report in June 2017. They however cautioned that reform will require the sustained support from a broad range of Member States at a time when there is pressure for budget reductions from major financial contributors.

The roundtable event was moderated by Arthur Boutellis, Director of the IPI Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.

L'ancien chef de l'Etat rejoint le conseil d'administration de l'hôtelier AccorHotels trois mois seulement après sa défaite à la primaire à droite.

Piriou Naval Servives (PNS), la branche réparation navale de PIRIOU, vient de mettre à l’eau ce mardi 21 février et après plusieurs mois de travaux, le chalutier « ARVORIG », propriété du jeune armateur du Guilvinec, Mikaël LE BRUN.

• Lire la suite de Lorient : Piriou achève la refonte du chalutier Arvorig