Foreign Policy Blogs

Salman ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz Al Sa’ud, King of Saudi Arabia since 2015.

Intelligence Squared U.S., or IQ2US, organizes a regular series of debates on issues of public concern and broadcasts them via livestreaming, NPR, YouTube, and podcasts. The organization’s purpose, proudly proclaimed, is “to restore civility, reasoned analysis, and constructive public discourse to today’s often biased media landscape.” (Since it sounds a lot like me, I tend to like it.) The most recent debate, which I had the honor to attend, posed the provocative proposition “The Special U.S.-Saudi Relationship Has Outlived Its Usefulness.”

The debaters arguing for the proposition were Madawi Al Rasheed,* a Visiting Professor at the Middle East Center at the London School of Economics and a research fellow at the Open Society Foundation, and Mark P. Lagon, Centennial Fellow and Distinguished Senior Scholar at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and former Ambassador-at-Large in charge of the State Department’s Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons.

Arguing against the proposition were F. Gregory Gause III, the John H. Lindsey ’44 Professor of International Affairs and head of the International Affairs Department at Texas A&M University, and James Jeffrey, a Visiting Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy and formerly Deputy National Security Advisor and Ambassador to Albania, Turkey, and Iraq.

Life, of course, is not really as binary as a debate proposition, and in reality neither was the debate. No one said that the United States should abandon its relationship with Saudi Arabia altogether, and no one claimed that there were no problems. While that might strike debate professionals as a bit sloppy on the edges, it does mesh well with the world as we know it.

Those arguing for the proposition focused primarily on negative aspects of the Saudi regime and domestic Saudi policies. They argued that support for the regime undermines U.S. policy there and elsewhere in the Middle East. They believed that the support had been “unconditional” and that the U.S.-Saudi relationship was strong enough that the United States could insist on certain domestic reforms in exchange for that support. Thus they did not call for ending the U.S.-Saudi relationship but for modifying it in a way that would be beneficial to the Saudi population and to U.S. foreign policy interests.

Those arguing against the proposition basically agreed about the negative aspects of the Saudi regime and that, while the situation has improved somewhat over the years, the regimes efforts at reform tend to be rather superficial. They disagreed, however, on the question of whether it was appropriate for the United States to insist that another country modify its domestic political and social system to our liking and whether the United States had the capacity to achieve such changes in any event. The proper and presumably more successful approach, in their view, was to focus on the strategic situation, bolstering Saudi Arabia as a bastion of stability in a region steeped in turmoil.

Personally, I am of a realist bent and my natural tendency is against the proposition. When I hear the argument that our support should be conditioned on their reforming their political and social structures to suit our cultural norms, I find myself being grateful that the Saudis don’t say, “Sure, we’ll sell you oil, the day you stop making your women walk around in public like hussies with their hair showing.”

Yet I do not dismiss the other side out of hand. Their strongest case, I thought, concerns what happens to U.S. policy and U.S. strategic interests if Saudi Arabia’s domestic structures prove so intolerable that its own people overthrow it and then reject the United States for having supported the old regime. This argument was made by Professor Al Rasheed. While she described Saudi Arabia as a “pressure cooker,” the other three, including her debate partner, were more willing to accept the fundamental stability of the regime. One pointed out that Saudi Arabia has been described as a pressure cooker for decades and has yet to stumble. They may well be correct, yet, as Professor Al Rasheed pointed out, people said exactly the same thing about Iran right up to the moment that the Shah was chased out of the country. The complications are that you cannot work with the country at all if you do not cooperate with the regime in power, and the possibility that your own efforts to force reform might trigger the very revolution you seek to avoid.

Although leaning toward the realist perspective, I did not necessarily agree with every point made by that side. In particular, Ambassador Jeffrey made a statement that struck me as very curious. When asked by someone in the audience why the United States should care whether Saudi Arabia or Iran becomes predominant in the Middle East, the ambassador described Iran as a revisionist or revolutionary power not unlike the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, he saw as a force for stability.

I am sure this is the common understanding in this country and probably the basis for policy, but think about it for a moment. Iran, while a revolutionary regime, is operating in Iraq and Syria because it was invited there by their respective governments. In Iraq at the moment, it is a de facto ally of the United States in the fight against ISIS. In Syria the situation is harder to describe: Iran backs the government against various insurgent groups. The United States—officially—is not fighting the government but is supporting one group of insurgents (who would rather be fighting the government) against another group of insurgents, who are the same enemy that the United States and Iran are fighting in Iraq. (Unofficially, of course, the United States is also backing insurgents against the government, but that’s a secret.)

Saudi Arabia, is the one that has established madrassas throughout the region that have inspired Salafi-jihadi insurgents, and Saudi Arabia has encouraged freelance Islamists to join the jihad against the Syrian regime. Individual Saudi donors have contributed to insurgents in both countries and elsewhere in the region as well. It is easy to say the Saudi Arabia and the United States are forces for stability, while Iran is the disruptor, but is it really true?**

Finally, one question that struck me was not raised, a question to those arguing against the proposition. If we are relying on Saudi Arabia for strategic reasons, is it important that Saudi Arabia may not view the world the same way we do? All four panelists agreed, for instance, that world politics is not a zero-sum game and that we can maintain relations with Saudi Arabia and try to improve relations with Iran at the same time if we want to.

I believe that as well, yet I ask myself: Does Saudi Arabia believe it?

The United States and five other countries negotiated an agreement with Iran designed to prevent that country from acquiring nuclear weapons (nuclear weapons that could have been used, for instance, against Saudi Arabia), and Saudi Arabia seemed to treat it as if it were an act of treason. If the United States and Saudi Arabia come to diverge in their understanding of what constitutes strategic interests, then that could be a problem even if we do not try to interfere in their domestic arrangements.

*The “Al” in the name Al Rasheed is not the Arabic article “al-” (which is, indeed, a common element in Arab names), but rather an Arabic word meaning family, clan, or dynasty. The House of Rasheed (Al Rasheed, or Al Rashid) was a rival to the House of Saud (Al Sa’ud) in the late 19th and early 20th century, and the two fought many battles for control of the Arabian Peninsula’s Najd region. Allied with the Ottomans, the Al Rasheed forces were defeated after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. When this past rivalry was pointed out at the beginning of the debate, Professor Al Rasheed quipped that she had not taken part in any of those battles.

**Note that we are talking about stability here, a separate question from whether Assad deserves to be overthrown. Remember, too, that outside intervention, regardless of whether it is Russia or the United States that is intervening, tends to lengthen civil wars and ultimately to increase the overall number of deaths.

The post Has the U.S.-Saudi Relationship Outlived Its Usefulness? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

NAFTA has been made out to be one of the villains of the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. While some aspects of NAFTA surely have contributed to changing employment trends, other policy issues may cause as much tension as a renegotiation of NAFTA itself.

Relations between the U.S. and Mexico seem to be openly sour, but both NAFTA partners may suffer some severe consequences with a change in other non-NAFTA related policy developments.

Mexico seems to be in a more dire situation than Canada with regard to possible new trends in U.S. foreign policy. While American jobs are perceived by some to be lost to Mexico, the restrictions the new U.S. administration might place on Chinese manufacturing may raise the cost of Chinese goods coming into the United States and make Mexican goods more competitive.

The boom in Chinese exports to global markets came at a time when Mexico was reaching its peak in manufacturing processes and technology which made the country a good location to produce higher value goods. The rise in wages in Mexico since the beginning of NAFTA made low-wage labor in places like China more attractive to international companies. The growth in Chinese manufacturing affected Mexico greatly, and an attempt by the United States to hinder Chinese imports may have a residual positive effect on Mexican exports.

U.S. policy seems to concentrate on the trade deficit between nations, and with other factors contributing to funds leaving the U.S. and going to Mexico, the U.S. may take a long-term policy approach on the factors that create the greatest job losses over punishing Mexico over a small trade deficit.

Mexico’s greatest exports over the last 20 to 30 years have been their oil and gas industry, run mostly through state-run PEMEX, and Mexicans themselves. What is often not accounted for is that people sending funds back to their relatives from abroad is a massive economic engine for Mexico. While this trend has varied over time, the size of remittances of  Mexicans working abroad as a share of the national economy of Mexico is often so large that at times it brings in more money into the country than oil and gas exports.

With millions of individuals residing abroad, the Mexican state often does not have to provide local services for those individuals. In addition, many Mexicans send money back to their relatives to add another source of funding for locals who would otherwise rely on state social safety nets. Families and communities often grow with funds earned and sent from abroad, and while individual Mexicans and their funds are not linked directly to NAFTA, the effect on hindering these funds coming from abroad may create a larger loss for Mexico than any renegotiation of NAFTA itself.

A clear goal for the current Mexican administration will be to not let the U.S. hinder the remittances from abroad, but also to maintain a balanced approach to immigration so as not to push the U.S. add excessive taxes on funds coming into Mexico from citizens or dual citizens in other countries.

Canada has always been in a good position since the late 1960s when the Auto Pact was signed, giving Southern Ontario linked access to U.S. car manufacturing in Michigan, Pennsylvania and New York State. Now that most of the manufacturing plants have disappeared across the border, the Canadian automobile sector has no logistical partner in the United States.

While the Canadian government has been nervously seeking assurances from the new U.S. administration on NAFTA and trade, the reality is that many American companies are in Canada because of the favorable exchange rate, better healthcare coverage and lower corporate tax rates.

A NAFTA renegotiation has been assured to not affect Canada, but with a competitive U.S. tax rate coming into effect, no auto partners over the border and the Canadian and Ontario government pushing debt financing and high taxes, zero tariffs will not make a difference if there is nothing being produced in Canada to sell.

Added to that, a carbon tax will add costs to producing in Canada at the precise time costs will shrink in the United States. While NAFTA may not change, severe debt and ever increasing taxes and energy costs will surely push the main source of jobs in Southern Ontario out of Canada completely.

To survive a nationalistic U.S. policy approach, Mexico needs to choose its fights wisely and Canada needs to make policy decisions for the benefit of its citizens, their future employment and for the sake of economic reality. Beyond the issue of NAFTA, Mexico and Canada could benefit greatly from a boom in the U.S. economy if it is accompanied by wise domestic policy decisions placing jobs and economic growth above political credit.

The post Beyond NAFTA: Issues in North American Free Trade appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Luwowo Coltan mine near Rubaya, North Kivu. (MONUSCO/Sylvain Liechti)

The mining industry has recently descended on Cape Town for the Investing in African Mining Indaba conference, Africa’s biggest mining conference, which wrapped up last week. At the top of the agenda for many of the delegates was still the issue of cobalt, which companies such as Apple have moved to the category of conflict mineral in regards to sourcing it.

Despite moves by the Trump administration to relax laws on conflict minerals, a recent report by RCS Global’s Dr Nicholas Garrett, director at one of the world’s leading raw materials supply chain auditors, revealed the extent of the challenge to the market in finding ‘ethical’ supplies of the mineral, which is being mooted for inclusion in the controversial conflict minerals category.

Over 60% of the global cobalt supply comes from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), where a legacy of civil war, the persistence of de-industrialized, basic forms of mining, and a weak state all come together to make ethical and transparent sourcing hugely challenging.

“[DRC] mining operations tend to be split between what is called artisanal and small scale mining […] where you have small, independent miners extracting cobalt but hand or with rudimentary tools. In the upstream you also have larger industrial miners extracting cobalt through modern mechanized mining techniques. In the DRC, some industrial mines purchase artisanal production to supplement their own industrial production. For the artisanal production cobalt ore is then sold through local traders who sell the mineral in bulk to international traders and buyers, including refiners,” Dr Garrett says.

In response to complaints of unsafe conditions or labour violations at these artisanal mines, some companies, including Apple, who rely on the mineral to help power their products, have already prescribed cobalt as a conflict mineral, overnight increasing the pressure on the wider electronics markets to do the same. But at the same time demand is set to rise in 2017 as the nascent electric vehicle market goes mainstream. The mineral’s provenance is rapidly becoming a bellwether issue for observers interested in how the wider minerals mining sector is evolving in terms of ethics and transparency.

“Increasingly regulators, NGOs and consumers are requiring brand companies to take a degree of responsibility for their activities in the supply chains […]. The worldwide response to conflict minerals has demonstrated that they do have the power to influence the entire supply chain.” Dr Garrett tells African Business.

The goal for downstream businesses from Tesla to Huwai is how to secure their cobalt supply in an increasingly squeezed market while also proving to their customers and regulators that their supply chain is transparent and ethical. In the last year, regulators in the U.S. and China have intimated that scrutiny will be further tightened while the EU formally announced it would implement a new framework and new regulation to force greater mineral supply chain transparency.

But the market is responding. According to Dr Garrett, RCS Global itself has researchers, advisors and auditors physically on the ground in mine sites in Africa and other producing regions plus staff in China, the U.S. and Europe who engage with the firms responsible for moving the mineral from mine to market Fine. His firm checks these actors’ facilities and activities as well as working with the industry bodies to develop the systems, processes and tools to support responsible sourcing of the mineral. Other auditors are also now offering similar services as demand for due diligence increases.

But downstream businesses are also directly addressing the issue of supply chain standards for themselves, setting up the Responsible Cobalt Initiative. The driving force behind the initiative is the Chinese Chamber of Commerce for Metals, Minerals and Chemicals Importers and Exporters, but companies ranging from HP to Sony are also involved.

Dr Garrett, this move is hardly surprising: “It is now both legally and ethically the responsibility of downstream companies—those that ultimately use the raw material in their products—to ensure actors in their supply chain are adhering to the highest standards.”

Meanwhile with the DRC set to remain the dominant player in the cobalt production, ensuring supply can be verified as ethical and transparent will be key for cobalt producers and downstream customers, he says. Over the last two years cobalt production there has remained stable at 63,000 metric tonnes with an increase in production possible in coming years, dwarfing its competitors.

He explains: “Sourcing can continue as long as [cobalt] shipments are tracked down to mine sites and the integrity of the chain of custody can be assured. There are systems out there, like the Better Sourcing Program, which operationalize hands on due diligence approach in the upstream and are designed to operate in conflict-affected and high-risk areas.”

If firms can secure ethical cobalt supplies he thinks, it will also go a long way to proving real progress in the wider African mineral sector. Only time will tell if this can be achieved but with the Trump administration now considering using an executive order to repeal U.S. legislation (part of the Frank-Dodd act) covering transparent supply chain sourcing in the name of reducing bureaucratic burdens on business, the issue is suddenly looking very topical.

The post Ethical Cobalt Extraction & Trump’s Possible Rules Repeal appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With the Trump administration having introduced “alternative facts” into the U.S. political lexicon, rational and objective analyses of the threats facing America are more important than ever. At the same time, the administration’s intolerance of alternative points of view decreases the likelihood that they will influence policy.

The National Intelligence Council’s (NIC) latest quadrennial report—Global Trends: Paradox of Progress—invites needed debate over where the world is headed over the next two decades. The report arrived in the wake of President Trump’s unexpected victory and is a chance to assess whether some of the most pressing foreign policy topics are being considered from all angles. On one such topic the report points to some fresh thinking: just how big a threat is Russia?

With discussions on Russia focused with the Trump-Putin relationship, the report offers useful comparative data points. Projecting to 2035, it expects Russia’s population to be slightly more than 1/3 the size of the U.S.’ (135.6 million and 365.2 million respectively). Additionally, after a period where Russian life expectancy plummeted immediately after the collapse of the communist regime, the country will experience only small gains in life expectancy by 2035 (67.1 years for men, 77.8 years for women) and will remain far behind America (80.4 years for men, 83.9 years for women). Russia’s population will also be slightly older than America’s in 2035 (Russia’s median age is projected to be 43.6 years, compared with 40.8 years for America).

By the numbers then, former President Barack Obama was on solid statistical ground when, during his final press conference last December, he described Russia as a “smaller” and “weaker” country. How, then, could it significantly weaken America?

The report cites further economic pressures that could inhibit Russia’s ability to project power. If global growth were to weaken over a lengthy period of time, energy prices would likely decrease, undercutting Russia’s chief source of economic strength and one of its main levers to exert political pressure on its near abroad. Meanwhile, the more nations seek to move away from fossil fuels to combat climate change, the more demand for Russia’s hydrocarbons reserves could weaken, further impacting its economy.

Despite the risks to its economic prospects, the NIC considers projections based on Russia’s recent actions that would see it continue to build its regional influence. In a section considering the near-term prospects for Eurasia, the report concludes that “Russia’s aggressive foreign policy will be a source of considerable volatility in the next five years.”

One of the report’s scenarios sees an international system devolving to individual nations seeking to be “islands in a sea of volatility.” This scenario predicts Russian actions that harken back to George Kennan’s Cold War-era description of Russia’s view of itself, defending its sphere of influence against what it sees as an ever-encroaching world. In this projection, Russia will continue to be active in the former USSR territories both to re-assert its great power status and, in its view, to protect itself. At stake is the independence of the former Soviet satellites and the degree to which America and its NATO allies will defend their security guarantee.

Importantly, the NIC explores the degree to which China’s rise in Asia will impact Russia. Two American antagonists, united in their opposition to U.S. influence in Asia, are likely to devote increasing attention to their own rivalry. “To counter Western attempts to weaken and isolate Russia,” the report reads in a section on spheres of influence, “Moscow will accommodate Beijing’s rise in the near term but ultimately will balk before becoming a junior partner to China—which would run counter to Russia’s great power self-image.”

One weakness of predictive reports is a tendency to assert predictions that are in fact retellings of the past and affirmations of the present. “Moscow will test NATO and European resolve,” the report predicts, “seeking to undermine Western credibility.” This is a timeless statement of Russian policy since the end of World War II, and therefore a safe one to make.

Overall, however, the NIC report delivers on a needed premise: to challenge the discussion on global threats to expand beyond clichés and into fresh thinking. Across its different scenarios, the NIC presents a picture of the world to come as more complex, divided, and volatile. It stops short of flatly predicting the world will be a more dangerous place in 2035, but that perspective permeates its findings. That is enough to give today’s foreign policy planners pause.

The post What does the National Intelligence Council think of Russia? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President Donald Trump (R) and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hold a joint press conference in the East Room of the White House in Washington, DC, February 15, 2017. (AFP / Saul Loeb)

Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Trump met yesterday. There are many things to unpack from the first meeting of these two world leaders. Here are some takeaways from a few of the issues that were covered, following their short press conference.

Members of Netanyahu’s own coalition warned him not to mention a two-state solution in his talks with President Trump. They warned him the “earth would shake” if he supported a Palestinian state, a concept he has supported—though tenuously—since 2009.

Netanyahu’s biggest threat these days does not come from the Palestinians, the Iranians or the UN Security Council, but rather from the Israeli right. He needs them to keep his coalition in place, and he no longer enjoys the bogeyman that was President Obama. With an overtly friendly American president—the first Republican in the White House concurrently with Netanyahu’s long reign—placing international blame elsewhere will be much harder to accomplish.

Bibi seems to understand that Trump, due to his unpredictability, is not a man to be trifled with. Trump speaks (shallowly) of his love of the Jewish state, but he is unlikely to remain silent if he feels that Netanyahu is embarrassing or undermining him. It’s not hard to imagine an early morning tweet storm from @RealDonaldTrump or @POTUS literally leading to new elections in Israel.

President Trump undermined decades of American foreign policy on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, when he declared “I’m looking at two-state and at one-state, and I like the one that both parties like.” This is a fine concept for a neutral party, but Trump is now representing generations of diplomatic efforts aimed specifically at creating a two-state solution to the conflict. President Trump, new to government and diplomacy, still doesn’t seem to understand the weight of his words as they relate to American foreign policy.

The joint press conference opened with each leader delivering brief statements; Trump kicked things off by reading some prepared remarks: “The United States will encourage a peace, and really a great peace, deal. But it is the parties themselves who must directly negotiate such an agreement. Both sides will have to make compromises.” Trump—the king of adding spontaneous asides to his prepared statements—then looked at Bibi and added this little doozy: “you know that, right?”

Bibi strongly stated that settlements are not an obstacle to peace. Despite Trump’s appointment of an ambassador to Israel who has helped raise millions of dollars to fund settlement expansion and the fact that his trusted and powerful son-in-law has also helped fund West Bank settlements, he clearly isn’t quite as convinced, stating that he would “like to see [Israel] hold back on settlements for a little bit.”

Why would Israel hold back on settlements if they weren’t an obstacle to peace? A good answer did not emerge from the remarks or the Q & A that followed.

When Trump was asked by an Israeli reporter what he would say to those in the Jewish community who “believe and feel that your administration is playing with xenophobia and maybe racist tones,” he responded by bragging about his electoral college victory.

“Well, I just want to say that we are, you know, very honored by the victory that we had: 306 Electoral College votes. We were not supposed to crack 220. You know that, right? There was no way to 221, but then they said there’s no way to 270.”

Candidate Trump promised to move the American embassy to Jerusalem. It is an easy promise to make, a far harder one to fulfill.

Such a move might give Bibi some positive talking points with his rightward flank back home, but in the long run it would cost him more political capital with America than he is probably prepared to accept. And it is hard to imagine such a move not leading directly to bloodshed.

Trump purportedly had plans to make the U.S. Embassy move his first act as President. Literally. He allegedly planned to declare a directive to move the embassy at 12:01 on Inauguration Day. But he was seemingly convinced of the broader political ramifications of this choice and opted instead to push off the decision, like many of his predecessors before him.

When asked about the move, Trump said, “I’d love to see that happen, we’re looking at that very, very strongly. We’re looking at that with great care, and we’ll see what happens.”

For a straight shooter who has proven himself to mix things up quickly and sometimes without foresight, it is interesting to see him moderate this particular campaign promise. It is also promising that he understands—for now anyway—that if he wants to be remembered for brokering “the ultimate deal,” he can’t simply do anything he pleases in the build-up.

Prime Minister Netanyahu has a long history of demanding the Palestinians drop all pre-conditions to direct negations while simultaneously setting forth several of his own.

A quick Twitter search of @Netanyahu and @IsraeliPM finds over a dozen tweets stating that preconditions are impediments to peace and that he is prepared to come to the negotiating table, so long as there are no Palestinian preconditions in place.

I have written before about Bibi’s blind spot regarding his own pre-conditions. Today, he again undermined his longstanding argument by clarifying his own pre-conditions that must be met before he will come to the table:

The first will always be a deal breaker for the Palestinians. While they have long recognized Israel’s legitimacy as a state, 20% of the population of Israel is Palestinian. President Abbas isn’t going to recognize Israel as a Jewish state any sooner than the U.S. is going to recognize Taiwan as the legitimate seat of the Chinese state.

The second “prerequisite” is likely to be attained, but only within the confines of a grander peace deal. Why would the Palestinians acquiesce on the right to retain security control over their new state without receiving something in return from Israel? The very concept of preconditions declare that the issue is not up for negotiation—neutralizing it down the road as a bargaining chip.

The Palestinians won’t cede this chip in advance, just like Bibi will not accept preconditions on Jerusalem, the Palestinian Right of Return or settlement expansion. And Bibi knows it. But his language allows him to talk about peace on the world stage while also ensuring that no progress is actually possible.

Netanyahu is well on his way to becoming the longest-serving Prime Minister in Israel’s history. He has shown again and again that he will do anything in order to retain that seat. But really, Netanyahu is not so much Israel’s bold leader as he is a somewhat powerful member of the ruling coalition, working desperately to keep it from falling apart.

Trump threw a few barbs and Netanyahu weathered them. But he also got to stand on the stage as Trump—purposefully or inadvertently—changed America’s longstanding policy regarding the two-state solution.

All in all, this was a good trip for Netanyahu: he can go home with some breathing room from his own conservative wing. At least for a little while.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post Takeaways from the Trump-Netanyahu Meeting appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The amount of attention lone wolf terrorism has received over the last few years begs the question of whether or not specific types of lone wolves (and there are several) can be compared to a terrorism profile system based on statistical analysis of some characteristics.

The conclusion that no one type of lone wolf personality exists misses the mark because it asks the wrong question. Instead, sort out lone wolves into categories based on ideology, target type, age, business setting of attack, and socio-economic status. Next, perform statistical tests to find statistically significant and substantive relationships between those variables that are both theoretically valid and useful. Such efforts to craft a terrorist lone wolf profile portfolio is found in the empirical part of my new book Corporate Security Crossroads: Responding to Terrorism, Cyberthreats and other Hazards in the Global Business Environment.

To introduce this terrorism profile portfolio system, let’s compare two prominent lone-wolf terrorists: Omar Mir Seddique Mateen, who assaulted a gay discotheque in Orlando Florida in 2016, and Sirhan Sirhan, who assassinated Senator Robert F. Kennedy (D-NY) in Los Angeles in 1968 during California’s presidential primary.

The empirical testing identifies several statistically significant and substantive relationships between the variables (i.e. attributes) tested. I will discuss three sets of relationships in this article. In tests, Ideology, Target-Type, and Business-Type were dependent variables for the bivariate analysis performed and independent variables that represented other lone wolf terrorist attributes were regressed on those variables. The political ideology spectrum includes: (1) uber-leftist/anarchist, (2) Jewish extremist, (3) Islamist extremist, (4) solitary issue, (5) nationalist, and (6) uber-rightist lone wolves.

The first relationship or profile trait illuminated is Ideology-Age. The results suggest that a lone wolf’s political ideology has a weak to moderate but significant association with terrorist age. In other words, when the spectrum of lone-wolf terrorist political ideology is examined, the results suggest that lone wolf terrorists broken down by political ideology can be distinguished by age. At the same time, it should be noted for some perpetrators like Jared Lee Loughner who shot U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords (D-AR) and other “high profile” persons, ideology cannot be discerned because of a perpetrator’s psychopathy. In those cases, the political ideology category was left blank.

Omar Mateen was an Islamist extremist who carried out his Sig Sauer MCX rifle and pistol attack at the club when he was 30 years of age or below. That fits the profile of “Islamist extremist” lone wolves, primarily found in the United States, Western Europe, and Canada, who were mostly found to be thirty years old or younger. By contrast, Sirhan Sirhan was a “nationalist” lone wolf who murdered Senator Kennedy in the Ambassador Hotel with a “Saturday Night Special” Iver-Johnson .22 revolver in Los Angeles in 1968 when he was 24 years old. Even though the percentage of lone wolf “nationalists” who were 30 years old or younger is much lower than the percentage found for “Islamist extremist” lone wolves, Sirhan’s age is consistent with a significant number of lone wolf “nationalists” of that age.

The second relationship or profile trait found is Ideology-Business Setting, where a weak but statistically significant relationship is found. That data category is broken down into direct attacks against business, indirect business attacks where the primary target is not a business establishment, and attacks with no business involvement. Mateen’s assault against the Pulse discotheque was a direct attack on a business. While the majority of lone-wolf attacks did not focus on business targets, “Islamist” lone-wolves had a higher rate of such attacks than did other lone-wolf types considered. Still, what made this attack unusual is that “Islamist” lone wolves usually had comparatively little focus on commercial interests. At the same time, RFK’s murder by Sirhan at the Ambassador Hotel is also somewhat unusual with the “nationalist” lone wolf profile for venue because the Ambassador Hotel was an indirect target of attack. The results suggest “nationalist” lone wolves did not carry out a high percentage of such indirect business attacks.

The third relationship profile trait is Ideology-Target Type. It is found that a statistically significant relationship that is weak in strength exists between those two variables. Omar Mateen’s attack against a civilian target is consistent with the substantial percentage of “Islamist” extremist lone wolf attacks against civilian targets—a rate larger than the percentage of those types of attacks against government targets. In contrast, Sirhan Sirhan assaulted a government target in Senator Robert Kennedy, which is consistent with two important findings about “nationalist” lone wolves. First, lone wolf “nationalists” had the highest percentage of government target attacks compared to other lone-wolf types. Second, lone wolf “nationalists” had the second highest percentage of attacks that involved “high profile” government targets after “uber-leftist/anarchist” lone wolves. For both of these lone wolves, one a nationalist and the other an uber-leftist/anarchist, it seems plausible the ideology types they represent would focus rage and similar sentiments against the reification of the cause or movement most hated.

There are several metrics that comprise this lone-wolf terrorist profile system—this article describes only three of those metrics. The first is its “Age-Ideology” metric that reflects the relationship between lone wolf age and political ideology. Omar Mateen and Sirhan Sirhan’s age profiles are consistent with its basic contours. The ages of both terrorists fit within the two categories of 30 years old or less or and over 30 years old; both categories capture the observations of age chronicled for the data set.

The “Ideology-Business Setting” metric is the second metric under consideration. Sirhan Sirhan’s attack on Senator Robert Kennedy in the Ambassador Hotel fits fairly well with the “Ideology-Business Setting” metric, reflecting the relationship between target-type and setting of attack. That is because while “nationalist” lone wolves have a notable rate of indirect attacks against commercial interests as their primary targets are singled out for attack, that rate is still low.

The Mateen case is also unusual because of his preference for a direct attack on a business target, which is rare for lone wolves in general, and only slightly more common for Islamist and uber-leftist anarchist lone-wolves. Still, the Matten case is consistent with the occasional interest Islamist lone wolves have in targeting businesses. It is possible this provides some evidence of what some scholars call the broad all-encompassing nature of the eschatological struggle between the West and Islamic extremists. However, this particular attack with narrow focus against the Pulse discotheque most likely reflected Mateen’s personal rage against homosexuals, a rage inextricably bound up with his own personal struggles.

Both Omar Mateen and Sirhan Sirhan’s personal profile are a good fit with the empirical findings that serve as the basis for the third metric, “Ideology-Target.” For Mateen, an attack against a civilian target like the Pulse discotheque is consistent with broader findings about lone-wolf Islamist preference for civilian targets, even though most civilian targets those types of lone wolves choose for direct attackdo not involve commercial interests.

In closing, it appears these two lone-wolves have personal characteristics that dovetail well with some of the basic characteristic parameters associated with political ideology this terrorist profile portfolio system establishes and describes. It is my hope that in the future, with richer data sets and additional testing, new relationships between variables will appear to give this basic framework additional depth, flexibility, and utility for counterterrorism policymakers.

The post Lone Wolf Terrorism: Beyond the Quest for Personality Type Congruence appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the past two decades, both the West and the Islamic world have been living through destabilizing traumatic experiences. The former’s trauma resulted from random acts of terrorism often carried by violent extremists or deranged Muslims.

These atrocious acts routinely trigger excessive and jingoistic media coverages that paint them as an existential threat; hence the continuous flow of funding for the booming global fear industry that only creates more problems than solutions. This state of psychological tyranny creates helpless dependency and compels the public and policy-makers to submissively outsource their political and intellectual will to scrutinize results and respond accordingly—a phenomenon known as “overblown”.

The latter is a synchrony of manipulation, death, and destruction. It is executed by domestic and foreign actors ranching from corrupt tyrants who are determined to never let go their seats of power, to extremely violent militants whose rhetoric and actions are at odds with the faith they claim to promote, and more sophisticated foreign predators who mastered the art of camouflage.

Against this backdrop, we are compelled to ask one of the most urgent questions facing humanity today: are Islamic values compatible with Western values?

Though the two value systems seem dichotomous, I believe they are more compatible than many believe. And since the Western values are universally known, I will focus mainly on arguments used by Islamophobes to alienate Muslims and highlight Islamic values that support my answer.

In the ultra-conservative and extreme evangelical propaganda apparatus, anti-Muslim rant sessions are not just daily occurrences, they are program and gathering rituals. Listening to their hate-seething hosts and so-called terrorism experts leaves credulous minds with a paranoiac impression that Muslims have infiltrated all U.S. institutions, and that sword-wielding Muslim armies are about to take over the U.S. and replace the constitution with “Sharia law.”

In that paranoid tradition, recently, Sen. Ted Cruz introduced a bill to declare the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization. Apparently the Senator is in agreement with el-Sisi, Egypt’s dictator, who overthrew a democratically-elected President and handed him a life-sentence, and massacred thousands of unarmed protesters in a broad daylight, Cruz alleges that the organization espouses “a violent Islamist ideology with a mission of destroying the West.” With a name like that, the brotherhood perfectly fits the stereotype, though evidence and historical facts indicate the opposite.

Among the most vociferous advocates pushing this de-Islamization campaign are David Horowitz of Front Page Magazine, Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy, and Robert Spencer of Jihad Watch. These fear merchants who receive tons of monies are part of myth-making groups who use the ill-famed unindicted co-conspirator list concocted to smear almost all Islamic organizations and active leaders on one big political paintbrush. This same group insists that Huma Abedin, one of Hillary Clinton’s senior staff, was a Muslim Brotherhood Trojan Horse positioned to infiltrate the White House. A decade ago, this author was one of their targets. Today, ironically, these hate-mongers have access to the White House and the National Security Agency in Steve Bannon and Gen. Michael Flynn. In that context it is hardly shocking to learn that Donald Trump is overhauling the current counter-terrorism program to exclude militant white supremacists and zoom solely on Muslims.

“(The) West perpetrates two kinds of sins about the Muslim world and Muslim history- sins of omission and sins of commission,” wrote the late intellectual giant, Ali Mazrui. After the demise of the Ottoman empire, some historians—mainly Western—have deliberately left out historical facts underscoring Muslim contributions in various disciplines….while misrepresenting Islamic teachings and adding commentaries that distort the historical application of the Islamic teaching.

When the Ottoman era came to an end, almost the entire Muslim population around the world was living under the subjugation of Western colonial powers. During that period, Muslims have experienced a profound spiritual and intellectual stagnation.

It wasn’t until the 50s and 60s when liberated Muslim nations started to emerge. Alas, with mostly kleptocratic dictators eager to imitate their exclusively privileged colonial masters.

The Qur’an and the Sunnah (Prophet Muhammad’s deeds, attitudes and illustrations) teach that the ideal society is one that gravitates toward the Divine Will and establishes social, political and economic justice for all. Both underscore the importance of order, systematic process, and negotiating consensus based on mutual interest, even with people of other faiths or no faith. And both Islam identifies the best qualities expected of the leader. It emphasizes the importance of trustworthiness, sense of justice, and the wisdom to serve. These three leadership qualities are considered the most crucial in establishing human relationships beyond trivialities and political facades.

Islam emphasizes the importance of cultivating ethical and spiritually centered citizenry that could become the solid foundation necessary for establishing a good and sustainable society. However, neither the Qur’an nor the Sunnah provides specific details on building a modern state with its internal institutions and membership to multilateral institutions with global mandates. This matter falls in the realm of ‘mu’amalat’ or human relations. Unlike matters pertaining on how best to worship God, matters related to human or state to state relationships are left widely open for negotiation, collaboration, and adaptation. In the heyday of the Islamic civilization, Muslims advanced by trial and error, by adopting from other cultures, and by rewarding research, development, and ingenuity.

The average contemporary Muslim thinker inclines to the conviction that Islam is compatible with building a modern state. Muslims do not have to sacrifice the core values of their faith in order to participate or be part of that process. Many thinkers and activists believe this very fact is one of the reasons that Islamophobes and white supremacists rely on stereotypes and on the ‘we’re under siege’ fear campaign to sideline Muslims.

Let us forget for a moment all those Muslims who were elected to the U.S. Congress and various state, county and city positions, or as UK Members of Parliament and the Mayor of London, or as Canada MPs or appointed as a Minister. Let’s see what young Muslim scholars and community organizers are doing to make America a better place for all.

Here are two examples: Linda Sarsour who was one of the organizers of the Million Women March. As a tireless advocate for inclusive justice, she is now leading a class action lawsuit challenging Donald Trump’s anti-Islamic policies. Sheikh Omar Suleiman who has been an inspirational model of Prophet Muhammad’s message and an active participant in building bridges of understanding between faith communities. Ironically, both of these Muslim leaders are routinely accused of being the torch-bearers of the Muslim Brotherhood by the same Islamophobes.

Contrary to the common misconception, the Islamic faith is anchored on the principle of inclusiveness and collectiveness. Muslims are not commanded to worship God of the Muslims, but God of the Worlds or the physical and spiritual creations—something that practicing Muslims repeat in their prayers at least 17 times a day. Now you may wonder why is it that these facts about Islam are not part of the public discourse. Well, on the one hand, Muslims by and large, have been poor representatives of their own faith. On the other hand, there is a clearly coordinated effort in the West, especially the current White House, to keep Muslims outside the political apparatus by any means necessary.

Throughout the Middle East and beyond, wherever Muslims organized under an Islamic banner and participated in a democratic process, they have won. Though this has routinely outraged many of the losers and their Western backers, democracy does not need political desperadoes, or violent demagogues, or paranoid religious interest groups to reverse outcomes through unlawful and unethical means, it must be done peacefully and through the ballot box.

Stakes are too higher for these kinds of suicidal politicking.

The post Smearing Lenses and Distorting Islam appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

People take part in an anti-China protest to mark the 43th anniversary of the China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in Hanoi, Jan. 19, 2017.

Last month’s visit by Vietnamese Party chief Nguyen Phu Trong to Beijing appeared to smooth over differences between the two countries who have competing claims to the Paracel and Spratly island chains in the South China Sea. Both sides pledged to settle disputes peacefully and to work toward a code of conduct for maritime operations. The pledge for peace followed “war-like rhetoric” on trade relations with Beijing and confrontational comments on Taiwan expressed by U.S. President Donald Trump and some of his nominated cabinet members. 

The first test of this renewed friendship between Hanoi and Beijing came quickly after their meeting, as several Vietnamese assembled for protest in Hanoi on January 19. This time around, Vietnamese authorities were well-prepared for this annual protest, scheduled to commemorate the lives of Vietnamese soldiers who lost their life trying to protect the Vietnamese-controlled Paracel islands, which were seized by China on January 19, 1974.

According to Reuters, some 20 protesters were dragged onto a bus after they ignored a warning to disperse. Reports said the protesters had been marching with banners and chanting “Demolish China’s Invasion” along with other nationalistic slogans.

The swift crackdown on protesters signals an improvement in Vietnam’s relations with Beijing, which sank to a low after China moved an offshore oil rig into disputed waters in May 2014. At that time, protests around Vietnam broke out, resulting in the deaths of some Chinese workers and the evacuation of thousands of Chinese out of the country. 

Despite improved relations, the Vietnamese have long distrusted their biggest neighbor, and have been quietly building up their military defenses with the assistance of India, Israel, Japan and the U.S. During a visit to Vietnam last month, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offered Hanoi a concessional loan to help pay for six new coastguard patrol boats, worth some $338 million.

Just days before Abe’s visit, former U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry spoke with Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc in Hanoi, where both expressed satisfaction over the development of Vietnam-U.S. ties after the 2013 establishment of comprehensive partnership. How the new U.S. Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, will approach the South China Sea disputes has drawn some criticism, although in Tillerson’s recent letter (PDF) to Senator Ben Cardin, Tillerson seemed to back off this week from his threat of force to prevent China from accessing islands it occupies, stressing: “the United States seeks peaceful resolution of disputes.”

However Chinese President Xi Jinping or the new Trump administration decide to handle disputes in the South China Sea, Hanoi appears to be hedging its bets by making friends – a diversifying foreign policy which has served it well in the past. Yet Hanoi will need to maintain a careful balance between mollifying a nationalist Chinese leadership up north and Vietnam’s own nationalistic population.

The post Hanoi Halts Protest Over Disputed Islands appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The so-called post-truth era was a fundamental element in shaping international relations in 2016. There is no doubt that Russia actively helped spread a malicious post-truth worm to put the world out of kilter. Through its actions, Moscow targeted multiple institutions, organizations, and countries.

Russia also made an extraordinary effort to undermine the coherence, unity, and indivisibility of NATO. Moscow accused the alliance of being unable to adapt to an emerging new world order. In fact, Russian actions were aimed at holding NATO-Russia relations hostage in a post-truth world. Unexpectedly, at the beginning of 2017, the Russian Foreign Ministry spoke out in favor of a reset with NATO. Yet the Kremlin’s maneuvers in previous months suggest this may be just another post-truth ruse.

In July 2016, despite Russia’s ongoing aggression against Ukraine and bombing of Syria, NATO decided at its summit in Warsaw to put a genuine offer of dialogue with Russia on the table. NATO’s approach would be geared toward “periodic, focused and meaningful dialogue . . . on the basis of reciprocity.” The alliance’s goals were clear: to discuss the Russia-Ukraine conflict; to avoid misunderstanding, miscalculation, and unintended escalation; and to increase transparency and predictability. Most importantly, as stated in the summit communiqué, this dialogue was aimed at “a Russia willing to engage.”

A NATO-Russia Council meeting was convened on July 13, 2016, just four days after the summit. The alliance presented a briefing on the outcomes of the summit, a move that—based on the principles outlined by NATO—Russia should have reciprocated. To increase transparency in mutual relations, NATO would welcome a briefing on developments such as Russia’s decision to create three new military divisions in its Western Military District. At the same time, allies continued to suggest concrete options to enhance predictability and transparency in the Euro-Atlantic area.

After six months, it is clear that Russia, by contrast, has chosen a path of confrontation. The NATO-Russia Council meeting on December 19, 2016, proved that the West is still waiting for a Russia willing to engage. The Russian Foreign Policy Concept approved on November 30, 2016, shows how Moscow’s priorities pivoted from the economy to security and defense. And Russia’s actions in the last half year demonstrate that Moscow continues to treat the West like a rival in a zero-sum game.

Russia has interfered in the domestic affairs of Western states by combining cyberattacks with information and intelligence operations. In an unprecedented way, Russia intentionally subverted the 2016 U.S. presidential election, as was ultimately confirmed by the FBI, the CIA, and the director of national intelligence.

Moscow has further destabilized eastern Ukraine, including through ongoing direct involvement in the conflict by providing military, organizational, and financial support to militants. Russia neither complied with the Minsk agreements aimed at ending the conflict nor showed willingness to de-escalate the tense situation on the ground. On the contrary, in November 2016 alone, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine recorded the highest number of explosions caused by mortars, tanks, artillery, and rocket systems since the beginning of the conflict.

Elsewhere in Europe, Russia has heightened its military activities near NATO borders, including large-scale drills involving up to 120,000 military personnel and civilians and snap exercises. Russia continued to provoke dangerous military incidents and violated allied airspace. It deployed offensive missile systems—including the nuclear-capable Iskander system—and warships to the Baltic Sea and Black Sea regions. These deployments enhanced Moscow’s existing anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

Russia has also strengthened its aggressive nuclear-related signals, including through statements and bomber flights. Moscow has used this nuclear muscle flexing and saber rattling as a tool of psychological influence.

In October 2016, Russia allegedly participated in a plot to kill the prime minister and install a new government in Montenegro, soon to be a member of NATO.

Meanwhile in Syria, Russia’s approach to the conflict has included both massive bombing campaigns and the impediment of a political process. Also in October 2016, Moscow for the fifth time vetoed a UN resolution aimed at stopping the bombing of Aleppo.

The year 2017 might be a watershed moment for the liberal global order. NATO, a crucial transatlantic anchor, has a vital role to play in restoring a truth-based world. NATO-Russia relations will be instrumental to reaching that goal. In 2017, NATO and its allies need an action plan based on three pillars.

First, the alliance must fully implement the decisions made at the Warsaw summit on deterrence and defense. NATO needs a strategic six pack of measures to strengthen its long-term adaptation to a new military reality at its borders. This toolbox should embrace defense expenditure; capabilities to counter A2/AD systems; an ambitious policy of exercises; robust intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities; a revised NATO command structure; and a fully integrated approach to strategic communications.

Second, NATO should deepen dialogue with Russia on issues that require immediate attention. Among them are the snap exercises that Moscow uses as a tool of intimidation but that might also serve as camouflage for military action. Russian snap exercises are a dangerous escalatory instrument that could further destabilize the Euro-Atlantic region. A meaningful discussion on that issue might bring back the necessary elements that could help dismantle the post-truth world: predictability and transparency.

Finally, allies need to continue to constructively engage with Russia in the OSCE framework. At the OSCE Ministerial Council meeting in Hamburg in December 2016, all members, including Russia, agreed to launch a structured dialogue on the challenges and risks to security in the OSCE area. This initial positive signal from Moscow requires special attention, as the declaration might boost the organization’s role as a platform for a dialogue on security issues. Such a structured dialogue should be reinforced by the modernization of existing instruments.

Together, these three steps would show NATO’s ability to enhance deterrence and conduct dialogue as it waits for a Russia willing to engage. Strategic patience has always been NATO’s strong suit.

Dominik P. Jankowski is head of the OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The views and opinions expressed here are the author’s and do not necessarily reflect the official positions of the institution he represents.

This article was originally published by Carnegie Europe.

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U.S. President Donald Trump’s executive orders with regards visa restrictions for people from seven Muslim-majority states has generated heat across the globe. At the same time, Bangladesh—a Muslim majority state in the Indian subcontinent—is planning to send refugee Rohingya Muslims from neighboring Myanmar to a low-lying island in the Bay of Bengal that critics say is ‘unlivable’.

According to available records, nearly 70,000 Rohingyas from Myanmar’s Muslim-majority areas in the north have fled to Bangladesh ever since the Myanmar military launched a fierce crackdown last October that led to the killings of over 100 Rohingyas and widespread damage to their protests.

The government action was aimed at nabbing unidentified Rohingya insurgents who were alleged to have killed nine Myanmar police personnel on October 9th at three border posts in the district of Maungdaw.

About 2,500 Rohingya families have since taken refuge at a makeshift camp in eastern Bangladesh’s Cox’s Bazar near the border with Myanmar—taking the number of Rohingya in Bangladesh, both the old refugees and the current ones, to an estimated 500,000 as per some estimates.

But in January, Bangladesh brought out an old and much-maligned 2015 plan from the cold storage and proposed to move all Myanmar refugees, old and new, to the island of Thengar Char, which is totally isolated and gets easily flooded on high tide days.

Defending the move, Shahriar Alam, Bangladesh’s junior foreign affairs minister, said that the “move is temporary, as Myanmar would eventually take back its citizens”.

News agency Reuters quoted him saying, “After considering all aspects, we have taken a firm decision to shift them to the island.”

The move, however, does not have a clear timeframe currently—and might begin after proper shelters are in place on the island. But one thing that Alam was adamant upon was this: “Myanmar will have to take them back.” Read ‘soon’ between the lines.

More than the current place of residence, it is the question of their identity itself that has placed the Rohingyas between the rock and a hard place. The Myanmar authorities often call them ‘Bengali Muslims’, thereby inferring that they are actually (illegal) immigrants from Bangladesh. Bangladesh, in turn, refers to them as ‘Muslim nationals of Myanmar’.

Compare it with the global umbrage directed at non-Muslim nations for identifying refugees by their religion.

Giving a sense of déjà vu with regards the turmoil in the developed world about the issue of refugees, Bangladesh is resisting the prospects of the Rohingya refugees ‘mixing with Bangladeshi citizens’.

In a January 26th release on a Bangladesh government website, it was informed that several panels were being set up by the government to examine the influx of Rohingya Muslims, which the country fears could lead to law and order issues as they mix with residents.

“There’s a fear that the influx of Rohingya Muslims from time to time will lead to a degradation of law and order situation, spread communicable diseases … and create various social and financial problems,” the notice elaborated.

Going a step further, Alam said to Reuters in an almost Donald Trump style, “They are getting involved in drugs and other unlawful activities. If we could have confined them in the camp, it would not have happened.”

Apart from Trump, many of the nationalist leaders of Europe have said something similar. The outrage directed at them has been soul-numbingly deafening. Maybe it would have helped if they were all spokespersons of Muslim nations too.

Meanwhile, Myanmar says it is “ready to talk” about the repatriation of Rohingyas—but only of those who left the country after October 9th, 2016. It says it cannot take Bangladesh’s word about all the refugees being Myanmar nationals.

In other words, a certain group is being allegedly persecuted by its native administration. But when that group tries to seek refuge in another country, it finds itself unwelcome there. But then, there is no way back home either.

Sounds familiar?

And therein lies the point. This writing is neither about the actions of Bangladesh and Myanmar, nor the current and historical state of affairs of the Rohingya Muslims. It is about requesting all of us to stop being both savage and (savagely) holier-than-thou on the issue of refugees. It is a matter of a monumental human challenge, and taking sides blindly and fanatically would not be, well, human.

Listen to the opposing voices of the host nations too. It is not always merely about xenophobia/’religio’phobia.

The post Muslim Refugees and a Muslim (Host) Nation in South Asia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer speaks during the daily briefing. (AP Photo/Susan Walsh, File)

Recent comments at a press briefing from White House spokesman Sean Spicer on the South China Sea seem to have riled the Chinese and confused others who follow developments in the region.

When asked to remark on Rex Tillerson, Trump’s nominee for secretary of state, and Tillerson’s earlier threats to deny China access to man-made, militarized and disputed islands it occupies in the Spratly island chain, Spicer assured, “The U.S. is going to make sure that we protect our interests there.” He added, “It’s a question of if those islands are in fact in international waters and not part of China proper, then yeah, we’re going to make sure that we defend international territories from being taken over by one country.”

Beijing quickly responded to Spicer’s comments, with Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying telling a regular press briefing the following day, “the United States is not a party to the South China Sea dispute” and reiterating China had “irrefutable” sovereignty over disputed islands. She added, “We urge the United States to respect the facts” and defended Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea as “reasonable and fair”.

Bonnie Glaser, an expert on the South China Sea at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, called Spicer’s remarks “worrisome,” adding the Trump administration was “sending confusing and conflicting messages.”

Other littoral countries of the South China Sea, including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam have often argued China’s actions are anything but reasonable and fair, and Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying’s pleas for the U.S. to “respect the facts,” is confusing in this era of “alternate facts”, a term put forth by Kellyanne Conway, as Counselor to the President. And Spicer, in defending his claims of the size of Trump’s inauguration during Monday’s press briefing, said “I think sometimes we can disagree with the facts.”

But a fact is actual occurrence, not an opinion on a fact, and actions under the new administration will speak louder than heated rhetoric. The fact remains on both sides that China has occupied and militarized these disputed islands, and blocking China’s access to those islands could spark a serious confrontation.

In his vague comments, Spicer may have realized he was sailing into dangerous waters. When pressed over how the United States could enforce such a move against China, he responded: “I think, as we develop further, we’ll have more information on it.” Hopefully, we can take some comfort in this last sentence, and that more information will lead to true facts prevailing over alternative facts, when a new and untested Trump administration determines what actions, if any, to take over the disputed South China Sea.

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Thousands gathered at JFK airport in New York City in protest of people detained under Trump’s executive order. (Stephanie Keith/Getty)

Despite the frenzy over the recent controversial immigration policies, delegitimizing America and its institutions—the presidency, the media, and the political process—has been going on for decades, and is worsening.

In recent days, both the left and right have accused their opponents’ supporters in the media as being increasingly illegitimate.

Conservative radio talk shows attacked television and newspapers in the “mainstream media” as being deceitful and partisan. The left responded with identical counterclaims against conservative radio. A cable vs cable debate followed, where Fox News took on the role of defender of conservative values against CNN and MSNBC. The left responded that their critics were the irrational ones. As blogs and other forms of social media developed, people increasingly drew their news from sources that reflected their own political opinions, and their Twitter and Facebook feeds became siloed echo chambers.

During the 2016 presidential campaign, “fake news” became the allegation du jour. Some fake news was clickbait allegedly generated from the Balkans merely for profit-making. But other partisan sites, and sometimes mainstream sites, were assailed as fake news also. Candidate Trump was frequently seen to be careless, hyperbolic, or deliberately deceitful, with a professed disdain for the media. In the first days of the new Trump administration, White House spokesperson Sean Spicer and key counselor Kellyanne Conway seemed to elevate the use of “alternative facts” in their official roles.

Attacks on the legitimacy of other American institutions continue as well. Debating the legitimacy of education goes back at least to 1955’s Why Johnny Can’t Read, through de-segregation and bussing, Lean On Me‘s urban decay, charter schools, blind hostility to or embrace of teachers unions, and universities as lounges for left-wing radicals and their young acolytes.

Despite the “thank you for your service” gestures today, the military has been criticized (sometimes rightly) for its military-industrial complex and overpriced contracting, abuses in Vietnam and Abu Ghraib, as well as the drones strategy. The intelligence community has been delegitimized for missing 9/11 but seeing Iraqi WMD, massive domestic surveillance programs, and recent criticisms by candidate Trump. American industries—agriculture, pharmaceutical, finance, energy, to name a few—have also come under a long train of attacks.

This weekend’s immigration fiasco, based on the President’s executive order, “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” was the next stage of delegitimizing the American political process itself.

Previous presidents have made significant achievements with an opposition Congress. President Reagan signed laws on tax cuts and immigration reform (including amnesty for three million) with a Democratic House. President George H.W. Bush signed the Americans with 1990 Disabilities Act with a Democratic House and Senate. President Clinton managed tax cuts, immigration reform, and the creation of the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) as part of the Balanced Budget Act, all with a Republican House and Senate. President George W. Bush signed a major education reform bill with a Democratic Senate.

For a variety of reasons—depending on one’s perspectives, an absolutely obstinate Republican Congress or a lack of skill or will to build bipartisan consensus—some of President Obama’s largest achievements came without Republican support. Not a single Republican Senator voted in favor of the Affordable Care Act, for example.

Obama came to rely on the executive prerogative to implement major policies. Obama created the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) when he could not get the DREAM Act and comprehensive immigration reform through Congress. He signed the Paris climate accord and the Iran nuclear deal without submitting them to the Senate for treaty ratification.

In rapid succession, Trump has followed Obama’s example, even though his Republican party is in the majority in the House and Senate. On the Affordable Care Act, international trade, federal hiring, and other issues, he has not waited for the deliberative process of working with the Congress, executive branch departments, or outside experts.

The weekend’s so-called “Muslim ban,” the executive order on “Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the United States,” was controversial, misunderstood (and occasionally mischaracterized) in the mainstream and partisan media. But the policy was made worse by the seeming haste and carelessness with which it was promulgated: without the deliberation of the Congress, without careful input from terrorism or immigration experts, without consultation with allies, and without detailed instructions for the front-line personnel who were supposed to implement it in airports in the United States and abroad.

Opposition to the policy “went viral.” Protests and immigrant assistance efforts were broadcast globally by activists using social media, including the relatively new Facebook Live. Kathleen M. Vannucci, a prominent immigration attorney from Chicago, broadcast via Facebook Live to draw attention, activists, and media to O’Hare International Airport. Behind the scenes, people like Erin Kilroy Simpson, inspired by an expat friend, used social media to spread the call for Arabic, Kurdish, and Farsi translators to hustle to local airports to assist detained passengers.

This immigration restriction seemed to bring together the delegitimizing of American institutions—the presidency, the political process, and the media response. It built on decades of U.S. failure in the Middle East, withdrawal of global leadership, allegations of Russian influence in the election campaign, and a loss of faith in what news to believe. For America and President Trump to regain balance, progress, and legitimacy, they will have to undo not just what has happened since January 20th, but what the two parties have done to society and each other for more than 20 years. People like Vannucci and Simpson may provide some hope for the rest of us.

The post Delegitimizing America? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President Donald Trump, accompanied by  Chief of Staff Reince Priebus, Vice President Mike Pence, White House press secretary Sean Spicer and National Security Adviser Michael Flynn, speaks on the phone with with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Saturday, Jan. 28, 2017. (AP Photo/Andrew Harnik)

Similar to the two prior U.S. Presidential administrations, the current administration is making overtures towards Russia in the hope of improving U.S.-Russian relations. However, any penchant for deal-making must be buttressed by the clear understanding of other great powers’ legitimate security interests. Additionally, the realization by the U.S. national security establishment that other great powers’ national security architectures consider their own interests no less important to them than the U.S. does its own is critical.

President Trump has recently signaled his new policy orientation towards both China and Russia in two unorthodox moves. With respect to China, the administration has indicated that unless U.S.-China trade relations are better balanced in favor of the U.S., then the “One China” policy might be under review by the U.S.. Similarly, the administration has hinted at possible removal of U.S. sanctions against Russia in return for a new agreement on nuclear weapons.

While there are indeed some calls for the U.S. to review its “One China” policy, most of these have been voiced without consideration of the Chinese standpoint. Fundamentally, China has spent a generation gradually improving the economic benefits for its citizenry, resulting in more people being lifted out of poverty than ever before in human history. With the end of the Cold War, this economic development has been the basis for the continued legitimacy of China’s leadership in the eyes of its people.

Why, then, would it proceed to jeopardize this legitimacy for the the sake of a trade deal more favorable to the U.S.? As China has itself voiced multiple times, domestic considerations will override global perceptions of itself if given a choice between the two. Lastly, governmental legitimacy is surely a (if not the) prime example of this stark choice.

This pattern of attempting to leverage resolution over immediate issues into questions concerning other states’ overriding national security objectives continues with Russia. As stated above, the U.S. has indicated that it may be amenable to removal of Russian sanctions if a deal can be reached on nuclear armaments between the two sides. However, this deal will be next to impossible to reach, much less actually implement because of two key factors.

First, Russia’s nuclear superiority to the U.S. is a key plank in its bid to re-establish itself as a great power. What sane great power would make any deal towards nuclear weapons reductions when faced with conventional forces massing on its borders in the form of NATO? Additionally, any true progress towards any kinds of mutual arms reduction on both sides would require mutual trust. As is quite evident, there is absolutely zero strategic trust between the U.S. and Russia currently. Again, there is a tendency here by the U.S. to overestimate the importance of issues such as trade (increased or decreased) to a particular country when that country’s own core security interests are at stake.

Secondly, and more importantly, U.S. sanctions were initially imposed on Russia because of the Ukraine Crisis, not any nuclear issues. Again, the Ukraine Crisis is but a symptom of much larger issues between the U.S. and Russia going back to the end of the Cold War. There will be zero progress on issues such as Ukraine and Syria unless these underlying issues are addressed holistically.

Lastly, at the recent CSIS event, “Russia in Global Affairs”, the panel chair actually thanked the U.S. for the role of its sanctions in bringing Russia and China closer together. At the same event, yet another panelist made it quite clear that even if U.S.-Russian relations were improved, this would have absolutely no bearing on Sino-Russian relations. Again, this is evidence of the strategic mistrust between the U.S. and Russia.

In the end, perhaps the most immediate obstacle to the new U.S. administration’s outreach towards both China and Russia is the U.S.’ own national security architecture. Labeled “The Blob” by the previous administration, it is apparently composed of elements of the defense establishment and the intelligence community, as well as various think tanks and media outlets. The fear is that any intrinsic deal-making expertise brought to bear by the new administration will be ultimately countermanded by The Blob, which apparently is impervious to the desires of The White House, irrespective of any actual party affiliation.

Similar to the national interests of both China and Russia, The Blob is responsible for upholding the national security interests of the U.S.. These interests are many, but surely the paramount interest must be to retain hegemony in a liberal, rules-based order, while simultaneously preventing the rise of peer competitors in East Asia (China) and Eurasia (Russia). Unfortunately for the U.S., even some its staunchest allies have recently voiced a reluctance for further “nation-building”, where Western values are imposed on sovereign regional states. It’s far too early to tell how this game will play out, but what is clear is that unless the new administration understands and respects the national security interests of all three states, there will be no progress at all.

The post For China and Russia, U.S. Unorthodoxy Is No Substitute For Trust appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Bones, suspected to belong to members of Iraq’s Yazidi community, are seen in a mass grave on the outskirts of the town of Sinjar. 30 November, 2015. (Reuters)

The Western countries refugee policy of the last three years has given rise to a great deal of debate and political maneuvering in individual countries and altered the political fortunes of certain politicians. Refugee policy, however, should produce a consensus, as most fair minded individuals agree that helping those in serious need is an obvious response. While hyperbole abounds, no one on either side of the debate wishes to contribute to additional crimes against those fleeing conflict, war and genocide.

A realistic approach to refugee policy should take into consideration that a nation state will not be able to bring in every refugee that it would wish to take in, as the number of conflicts and victims continues to grow. Also, governments should not give assistance to one region of the world while not doing so in other regions that are burdened with more difficult situations. Assistance needs to be concentrated on those who are worst off, as there is a limit to the number of funds and places that a country can provide to individuals under their refugee protection regimes.

Taking in as many as possible without planned consideration will likely have the effect of leaving the worse off in a continued state of threat. For that reason, economic migrants and refugees who have already been settled in safe second countries need to be given opportunities to come to a new state only after the most vulnerable have been assisted. Unfortunately, that is not the case under the current refugee policies.

Three considerations on whether or not to prioritize individuals under a refugee program should be made an inherent part of the process. Before any of those considerations are applied, it must be established that the refugee is not an economic migrant, as a lack of employment is not a consideration for refugee status.

Firstly, refugees that are not be able to return to their region due to threats against them and their community must be given priority. In addition, refugees who will never be able to return to a region due to threats of genocide or continued violent discrimination should be taken in and settled in a different manner as their entire culture and community no longer has a homeland. Transplanting an entire society from one region to another involves a greater degree of trauma and endured issues as an entire society could be eliminated without proper assistance. Recent cases highlight problems that are still not understood by many refugee programs in Western countries, and errors in resettlement that can lead to further abuse.

The second consideration that must be applied is that refugees who are victims of genocide must be given first priority. There are differing degrees of safety for refugees and those that have been settled in safe second countries are not under direct threat. Those safe from the initial cause of conflict that make it to refugee camps should be given priority over those already settled in safe second countries, as taking in those who are already removed from conflict still keeps the less fortunate in danger.

The most vulnerable individuals—at risk of torture, genocide and ethnic cleansing—must always be given priority as they are labelled and targeted by those in their region for death or enslavement. It is often the case that assistance in the same region cannot be properly administered as long as they are a discriminated group in that same region. This even takes place in refugee camps themselves, as assistance to unfavored groups in the region is given last in a discriminatory process that continues the oppression of that group post violence.

This leads to a third consideration. Treating individuals or groups from cultures that are a target of being exterminated should take priority, and actions to assist them should be administered as soon as evidence of even an attempt at ethnic cleansing is found. So serious is that type of situation for refugees, that blocking, blurring or stalling assistance to those vulnerable groups should be taken as a legal violation within Western countries themselves as it would likely contribute to further genocide.

Working even passively against assisting refugees that are in a situation that is tantamount to events that led to the Nuremberg Nuremberg goes against the very fibers of modern democracies and the essential elements of human rights. When considering your own policy position on refugees, their region, language and color should not make a difference, the situation and the above criteria should be critical in deciding who receives assisting and is accepted into the limited spaces available for refugee protection in individual nation states.

The post Refugee Policy Should Always Prioritize the Most Vulnerable appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The main conference room inside South Korea’s National Assembly Building. (Wikimedia Commons)

The four-party system resurrected under the post-impeachment climate complicates the parties’ political calculus of carrying the ‘torch’ of participatory democracy. The political maelstrom is expected to turn more volatile with a possibility of an expedited presidential election cycle. Yet, the journey to permanently end ‘imperial presidency’ continues.

Out of the blame game over President Park Geun-Hye’s bizarre plummet to political perdition, the party in power, Saenuri, gave reluctant birth to the Barun party, pioneered by the anti-Park clique. The newly formed centrist-right party’s quest to establish their party label as the reformist representation of the conservative camp adds a third-way zest to the South Korean party system.

The People’s party entered the National Assembly during the 2016 parliamentary election by riding the increasing tide of conservative ‘dislodgers’ who were at the time dissatisfied with Park’s queenish management of party politics. Since then, the third major party has so far successfully walked a tight-rope, with considerable bargaining power independent of its mother party, the most long-established in the liberal camp, the Minjoo party. Barun’s abrupt parting with the dead-duck leader Park Guen Hye is expected to further boost 2016’s People’s party-led swing voter movement. This time, however, it is fueled by the explosive and anger-based Candlelight Revolution.

After seven weekly vigil-like mass protests, in one of which as many as two million people participated in one day, the National Assembly obeyed the ‘rhyme’ of the people’ participatory democracy. President Park was impeached for her part in a corruption case on December 6, 2016 by a 234–56 margin. The exposure of Park’s synchronization of national governance with her own household management infuriated especially young people with little money, but also their parents, drawing them onto the streets to exercise their civil and constitutional right to protest.

On the one hand, the success of the so-called Candlelight Revolution displayed the strength of participatory democracy in South Korea. Peaceful street demonstrations employing nonviolent, orderly and even artistic ways of communication intrinsically demanded democracy (pluralistic equality) at face value and civil and constitutional justice in eradicating corruption.

On the other hand, it created an impending lapse in high-level policy management and destabilized politics by setting the clock forward for this year’s presidential election cycle. The constitutional court now has up to six months (from December 6, 2016) to come up with the final decision (allegedly, the court will reach its decision by March 13, 2017). Once the ruling is reached, the presidential election must be held with the following two months.

The glory of participatory democracy shines only when pluralistic equality is maintained. Still, the parties are vigilant not to miss the post-impeachment opportunities to herd angry swing voters. The liberal camp, especially the Minjoo party, is eager to carry the torch of the Candlelight Revolution to win the presidential election based on a strategic claim of ‘regime change’. In coping with the legitimacy crisis, the disintegrated conservative camp in contrast seeks ‘constitutional-reforms’ to ‘imperial presidency’, seen as a post-1987 political malfunction, as a catalyst to form a grand coalition, a ‘big tent’, across centrist parties and what is now the façade of the ancien regime, Saenuri.

Former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon’s recent return has lifted the curtain on this dramatic framing war between the liberals and conservatives. Although having never officially expressed his interest in running for the presidency, during his return speech at Incheon airport on January 12, 2017, Ban called for ‘political change’ based on an ‘inclusive integration’ of Korean society.

Ban, a 50-year veteran diplomat yet a novice in South Korea’s domestic politics, lacks a firm support base that can mobilize resources and collective action on his behalf. Still, his experience as a networked global leader, preparedness in security issues, and relative socio-economic progressiveness compared to other presidential candidates are centrist strengths. These strengths have so far made him one of the top two presidential candidates.

In differentiating his candidacy from that of Ban, the Minjoo party’s Moon Jae-In, the leading presidential candidate in the liberal camp and the former chief of staff to the Ro Moo-hyun administration, emphasizes that, unlike Ban, his competency as a candidate has already been verified. Indeed, Ban’s candidacy will come under great scrutiny both from the public and the parties. Despite this hurdle, once Ban officially declares that he will roll the dice, it is highly probable that he will be the pivot for the conservatives’ grand coalition (Ban dropped out of the race on February 1, 2017, and it seems like there is no one to challenge Moon’s monopoly at this point in time).

In the aftermath of the Candlelight Revolution, the Korean people’s demands for constitutionally restructuring the post-1987 five-year-term presidency framework have heightened. Although parties’ and presidential candidates’ stance on this political hot potato differ with respect to how and when, no one disagrees over the urgency of implementing relevant remedies.

South Korea’s ‘winners-take-all’ majoritarian party system, leveraged by an ‘imperial’ president’s power, has been long criticized by many minority party leaders and even by faction leaders within the party in power. Pundits have blamed the predominant political culture in the country, under which the hegemony of the predominant regionalist party has a firm grip on the control of both the executive and the legislature. This prevents opposition parties from functioning effectively, and causes extreme legislative gridlock and filibuster.

Reforming such defects of the majoritarian party system was one of the core campaign agendas of the left-centrist DJP coalition in 1998, which helped liberal presidential candidate Kim Dae-Jung to win the election. Nevertheless, the Kim Dae-Jung administration’s DJP coalition was short-lived, leaving the impression that the coalition peddled the promise just to win the election.

Recently, optimism has been growing among Korean political scientists that South Korea’s party politics is ready to embrace Lijphart’s consociational democracy model. Indeed, analyzing through the lens of Sartori’s theoretical framework, South Korea’s relatively narrow spectrum of political cleavages, thus, more centripetal tendencies could render politics a multi-party-system-based ‘moderate pluralism’.

In theory, the new system might allow the grand coalition government and opposition parties to play the two-party system accountability game (since voters would easily figure out which of the two blocs is responsible for failures/successes), with more political voices represented (since cross-party deliberation is inevitable in forming a pre-election coalition, unlike in the two-party system where the two ‘catch-all’ parties simply do marketing to peddle their programmatic agendas to median voters). Such an experimental institutional design, however, needs to resolve the innate agency dilemma between elites and the people, and also come up with proper institutional devices to decentralize the current presidential power.

With regard to the latter challenge, the National Assembly’s Special Committee on Constitutional Reform is already examining whether the German-style semi-presidential system, the U.S.-style four-year-term presidency, or the U.K.-style cabinet system is best suited to reflect the country’s political reality. Nevertheless, ways to institutionalize the political solutions that narrow down the deliberation gap between elites and the people, as well as across the people, must also be taken into consideration.

The significance of the Candlelight Revolution’s success lies in the fact that the ‘rhythm (Hannah Arendt’s term)’ of participatory democracy, although unofficially, made the National Assembly accountable to the people. It is therefore important now to transform this unnatural rhythm into recurring, refined, and self-disciplined participatory institutional mechanisms in order to both ethically and functionally enhance elites’ accountability to the people. Direct-democracy tools like public referenda and popular initiatives such as are already widely practiced in advanced democracies are no doubt great examples of such mechanisms. Still more innovative political thoughts and experiments are pressing to preclude the agency dilemma, especially concerning the case in which the face value of democracy is lost in translation between undisciplined participatory democracy and polarized party politics.

The post Post-impeachment Consensus Calls for a New Political System in South Korea appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Katie Park / NPR)

Last week, Trump’s Secretary of State nominee, Rex Tillerson, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that first, the island-building stops, and second, your access to those islands is also not going to be allowed.” The following day, I attended meetings at universities and government-affiliated think tanks in Beijing as part of a delegation of American graduate students studying the South China Sea conflict.

During these meetings, there was a spirited discussion of the Chinese and American perspectives among our delegation of American scholars and the Chinese scholars and government officials who generously hosted us. We sparred on issues like the meaning of the Nine Dash Line, the implications of American freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs), and the validity of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea arbitration ruling, which had declared that China held no legitimate “historical rights” to the sea and its land features.

But in our meetings following Tillerson’s hearing, we abruptly found ourselves in agreement with our Chinese colleagues: Tillerson’s threat to attack Chinese forces in the South China Sea was ludicrously outside the mainstream of the foreign policy establishments on all sides. It is great if America’s chief diplomat can bring feuding parties into agreement, but ideally it shouldn’t be about how wrong he is.

And make no mistake: an armed attack is what Tillerson threatened. China has transformed rocks and reefs into massive military bases with airports, harbors, and housing for troops. Unless the Pentagon has a major announcement pending about force-field technology, denying China’s “access to those islands” means firing upon the ships and aircraft that supply them. It is a disproportionate escalation of force that few if any strategists or defense planners would advocate, because China would certainly respond to any such attack with force, as any nation would.

China views the South China Sea as its sovereign territory. This belief permeates not only the highest echelons of government but the entire population. The Chinese mindset, from peasant to party secretary, is shaped by a collective memory of the “Century of Humiliation,” during which foreign powers are perceived to have preyed on the dying Qing Empire, carving out semi-colonial concessions all over China.

The Communist Party derives its legitimacy from its restoration of China’s global status and, most of all, from its uncompromising defense of Chinese territorial integrity. The Chinese leadership views potential loss of territory in Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan, and the South China Sea all as existential threats. Would the Chinese people rise up and overthrow their government over its failure to defend previously uninhabitable rocks in the South China Sea? From a strategic perspective, it does not matter because Beijing has no intention of finding out.

In short, there is no bluff to call here: the Chinese are willing to kill and die for these rocks; Americans are not.

Nevertheless, Tillerson’s bellicosity on the South China Seas dispute is in-line with an emerging alt-right foreign policy consensus of extreme dovishness towards Russia and extreme hawkishness towards China. It is based not on reality but rather on a worldview that has been crafted to uphold the preconceived preferences of its standard-bearer, Donald Trump.

But here in reality, the truth is far more complicated. Though China has violated international laws and norms with its occupation of land-features (the Philippines v. China arbitration case concluded that they cannot rightly be called islands), so have American partners, like the Philippines and Vietnam. Despite this fact, while sovereignty is the central issue for China and America puts the highest premium on the maintenance of global norms like freedom of navigation and innocent passage, most other claimants are chiefly concerned with less lofty issues like fishing and hydrocarbon exploration rights.

What makes Tillerson’s proposed call of their non-bluff even more absurd is that the U.S. position in the South China Sea has never been weaker. Our chief ally, the Philippines, has elected an openly pro-Beijing, anti-Washington demagogue, and Duterte regularly repudiates the United States in public statements. His policy in the South China Sea has been to tacitly cede ground on sovereignty in exchange for fishing rights. Vietnam, another important American partner, is enjoying very close relations with the present administration in Beijing and thus unprecedentedly unwilling to push back against China on the issue.

By far our biggest prospect for curbing Chinese expansionism in the South China Sea was through greater cooperation between all of the non-China claimaints, namely the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, Taiwan, and Indonesia. The now-dead Trans-Pacific Partnership was the centerpiece of that approach. Its failure is utterly baffling to our partners in the region, and they view it as an indication that we are prepared to surrender the region to China. Truly, our position has never been weaker, nor our allies less confident in our support.

Still, there are policies we can pursue that will reinforce our commitment to both a peaceful resolution of the sovereignty disputes based in international law and the internationally-recognized right of freedom of navigation for both commercial and naval vessels. We should continue to conduct FONOPs to demonstrate concretely our rejection of China’s expansive and unsupported territorial claims. We should reiterate in unequivocal terms our commitment to the security of our allies. And we should ratify the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, so that we do not appear to be hypocrites when we demand its enforcement.

We will soon find out whether Secretary Tillerson plans to pursue this radical reinvention of American Pacific strategy, or was merely completely ignorant of the state-of-play of the dispute due to a poor briefing before his hearing. Either suggests that surprises and upheavals maybe ahead for American diplomacy.

Ultimately, America’s top diplomat should know intuitively that when he makes outrageous threats on which America is obviously unwilling to follow through, he weakens his own credibility not only on this issue but also on every other. If Rex Tillerson is unable to comprehend that most obvious law of diplomacy, the quality of his briefings will be the least of our worries.

Nathan Kohlenberg is a Security Fellow at the Truman National Security Project, and a student of Strategic Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. He is a contributor to a book on the South China Sea dispute to be published by the SAIS Conflict Management Department in April. Views expressed are his own. 

The post On the South China Sea, Tillerson Suggests Going All In on a Losing Hand appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Donald Trump’s election as President signals, in Walter Russell Mead’s term, a “Jacksonian protest”, of nativist sentiment and mistrust of elites. Meanwhile, similar sentiments are rising in other nations, so that Greg Ip discerns an ideological conflict of globalism against nationalism. A world of nationalists rejecting globalism seems also to reject the liberal order that has kept peace and prosperity. Many worry that it could slide into economic decline, international suspicion, and war. Many fear for the global condition of rights and the rule of law.

The United States can forestall such consequences, and more, and not in spite of American nationalism. We remain the most powerful nation in the world. We can promote the global spread of individual rights by deploying that power, pointedly and coherently, to embody America’s national essence.

For this to occur, American politics would have to reach some degree of consensus. which looks highly improbable today. However, that very national essence offers the best logical base on which to build a moral center.

The American nation was founded on an abstract article of faith, that all persons have inherent rights. The signers of the Declaration of Independence divorced their ethnic ties, and ignored other markers of identity in favor of this principle; the bulk of the document argues that Britain had violated it. The principle, and the corollary that governments exist to secure the unalienable rights and so must have the consent of the governed, make up America’s founding creed.

The United States’ legitimacy rests on our validation of that creed. To embody it successfully, then, is the core of our national interest. That interest corresponds to our unusual, not to say exceptional, nationalism.

This unusual nationalism lays down a simple dual mandate for our leaders: to protect the freedom we enjoy and its essential conditions, on the one hand; and to express our creed in our conduct, on the other. Any political outcome that meets those demands fulfills the mandate. No particular ‘isms’ need be served, no current commitments or interests require our compliance unless this mandate does, and it is particularly open to new and even radical ideas, if they fit our purpose.

Henry Nau argues that America’s is an “International Nationalism”, citing a plethora of actions throughout our history. And we are accustomed to the idea that America did act in its nature in promulgating the post-World War II liberal world order.

But our founding on principle does not automatically tie us to the current liberal world order, or any particular mechanism or policy, or role in world affairs. Future embodiment of our creed probably will not come through familiar channels.

As Michael Mazarr says, ‘doubling down” on current mechanisms may only exacerbate their failings. Ip calls for globalists to recognize their neglect of peoples’ nationalistic needs. Mead notes how Wilsonians and Hamiltonians assume their views of American interest demand intervention abroad. Some of those fuel the Jacksonian protest, and may be unnecessary. Walter McDougall sees a century-old “civic religion” of intervention that weakens our grasp of our basic values.

Any President, including President Trump, could set policy to express America’s creed. In this case, a transactional President and a Secretary of State with a deal-making history will benefit if day to day diplomacy sets America’s creed as the backdrop to their initiatives. It could start—though certainly would not end—with a Presidential pronouncement that that creed indeed defines his deepest purpose. Working level policy guidance to this effect, and a formative regimen steeping U.S. diplomats in our creed, could cement the statement into a norm.

Administration opponents can help American conduct voice our principles, with or without Presidential action, by declaring the creed as their own ultimate purpose. Followed up sincerely, this casts disagreements with the administration as differences over interpretation or policy execution, while implying the common fundamental ends.

Either step seems unlikely. Only nuanced public discourse on the creed will keep the inevitable political posturing from reducing our creed to one more claim of partisan rhetoric. And the best ways to express our nationality may point toward novel and risky channels. But only by understanding the creed as America’s basic source of values will we build a base for our national moral narrative.

As of this writing the administration’s rapid measures to fulfill campaign promises unsettles many; it also reinforces the partisan divisions of political discourse. Once the immediate actions and reactions have played out, the question is whether anyone will focus on America’s fundamental nature.

The post A Take on American Nationalism appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The new president of Gambia, Adama Barrow (center, waiving), after being sworn in from exile in Senegal on Jan. 19, 2017. Barrow returned to Gambia a week later, and hopes to launch a new democracy. (Sergey Ponomarev/New York Times)

Gambia may be the smallest country in mainland Africa, but it has received a big spotlight recently after a historic presidential election and transfer of power. After suffering under the harsh, authoritarian rule of Yahya Jammeh for 23 years, Gambians ousted him in an open election in December 2016. Winning opposition leader Adama Barrow took office as president last week. Many are hoping what happened in Gambia is a signal that the days of other long-ruling African dictators could be numbered.

The story is remarkable. Yahya Jammeh took power in a 1994 coup in the tiny West African nation of Gambia, a small sliver of land bordering the Gambia River that is completely surrounded by Senegal (with a small outlet to the Atlantic ocean).

Throughout his tyrannical reign, he jailed journalists and political opponents and led a series of witch hunts—he thought that some critical of his regime were actual witches. Jammeh inspired such fear that thousands fled to neighboring countries, and some even thought he was monitoring their communications from abroad. Concerned for their safety, many citizens would not even speak of Jammeh in public, and a Gambian newspaper even reported he hid poisonous gas pellets in the country’s state house before leaving. (However after a comprehensive search, none were found.)

Leading up to the December 2016 election, Gambia’s multiple opposition parties decided enough was enough. They pooled resources and unified behind one candidate, Adama Barrow. As he was called during the campaign, “no drama Adama” promised democratic reforms and an end to Jammeh’s tyranny. In a shocking result, Barrow actually won. Jammeh agreed to peacefully step down, and Gambians celebrated the dawn of a new era.

Except a few days later, Jammeh changed his mind. He claimed the election results fraudulent and threatened to use the army to maintain his hold on power. Fearing a violent reprisal, many Gambians fled the country. Barrow left for Senegal, and was sworn in as president in exile.

The situation seemed bleak. Then, in another unexpected turn of events, the regional trading bloc Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) intervened, sending in negotiators and a military force to ensure the transition of power took place.

In a surprise equal to that of the election result, it worked: without any violence, Jammeh accepted defeat and fled to Equatorial Guinea (along with a cargo plane filled with luxury cars and other results of his fleecing of Gambia’s economy). The ECOWAS troops did not face any notable resistance, but are expected to remain for a few months to ensure the transition remains peaceful. On January 26, Barrow returned to Gambia—as did many of his countrymen who had fled post-election—to a hero’s welcome.

ECOWAS has been hailed for its role in convincing Jammeh to relent, and peacefully step down. The group took action from the get-go, establishing a negotiating team immediately after the election in December. This team featured several presidents of countries in the region, including two who had directly experienced violent political change and military intervention: Ellen Johnson Sirleaf (ECOWAS Chairwoman) of Liberia, and Ernest Bai Koroma of Sierra Leone. Their influence proved critical. Paulin Maurice Toupane, a researcher with the Institute for Security Studies in Senegal, points out:

“It helped very much that those regional actors presented a united front and a common understanding of the situation—that Barrow was the victor and Jammeh must go. It meant they could speak as one voice and also helped them to earn the support of international bodies like the UN and [African Union] as well.“

Outside of Gambia, many others took notice in the hopes that what happened there could be repeated in other nearby dictatorships (7 of 10 longest-serving rulers are in Africa). The hashtag #LessonsFromGambia took hold across the continent, with Twitter posts like “Time is up for dictators in Africa #LessonsfromGambia” and “If regional blocks in #Africa take the same lead as #ECOWAS did in #Gambia, dictatorships will become a thing of the past.”

But, of course, it’s not that simple. Just because a peaceful transition took place in Gambia doesn’t mean the same principles would work elsewhere. For one, Jammeh was considered a delusional outsider with few political allies. Also the ECOWAS military force outnumbered Gambia’s army 7 to 1, a situation unlikely to occur in other areas. And Barrow faces many challenges in rebuilding the economy and fulfilling the people’s trust.

Nevertheless the success in Gambia should not be understated. After decades of tyranny, a democracy seems to be taking root. Whether this is the start of a movement that will topple other dictators remains to be seen. But if it happened once, there is good reason for hope.

The post Gambia Offers Hope for African Democracy appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(alkhaleejonline.net)

In 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah II used the term “crescent” to warn against the expansion of Iranian influence in the Middle East. This was later picked up by then Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak who said, in an interview with Al-Arabiya, that Shias in Iraq and across the Middle East “are more loyal to Iran… not to the countries they are living in.”

However, what King Abdullah II had meant was the possible disruption of the balance of power in the region. He never used the word “Shia” in a sectarian sense; he was rather referring to the political alignments and violent bloodshed that might result from such divides.

Lately, the same kind of “alarm” has being sounded by the Chief of Staff of the Jordanian Army, General Mamoud Freihat, who highlighted the dangers of an “Iranian Belt” which could create a territorial link between Iran and Lebanon via Iraq and Syria. In a recent interview with BBC Arabic, Freihat expressed Jordan’s concerns about the possible establishment of a “land belt,” or contiguous territory, between Iran and Lebanon.

Martin van Creveld, a distinguished military historian, once noted: “In the future, war will not be waged by armies but by groups whom today we call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits and robbers, but who will undoubtedly hit upon more formal titles to describe themselves.” Since that statement was written, the Middle East has indeed seen a huge proliferation of proxy wars, stemming from various non-state actors.

Sunnis in the Middle East look at what is happening (especially in Mosul in Iraq, and Aleppo and Raqqa in Syria) as a strategic war designed by Iran to secure a “Shia corridor” or an “imperial bridge” in the region. They also point to the “demographic change” being “engineered” to transfer the Sunnis out of their areas, whether in Syria or Iraq. To Shias, it is nothing but a battle against terrorism.

The “Shia crescent” brings the violence of the Sunni-Shia battles into our daily lives in new, unsettling ways, as if such terms (the crescent, corridors, the bridge, and so forth) are becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy. But measuring the phenomenon hardly tells us whether there is truth about its reality.

Those of us who take regional peace seriously face some important questions, among which is whether the policy findings emerging from statistical research still apply: that as national incomes increase, the risk of war declines. However, the Sunni-Shia divide predates the rise of nation-states or when conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran started to surface. Thus, if fundamental policy differences among capable nations arise, then warfare over ideology or religion can also be resurrected.

Maybe this is what King Abdullah II meant around a decade ago: that even if traditional geopolitical competition still plays a role, one has to take into account a significant and fluctuating number of non-state actors, motivated by various ideological or religious causes, mutating into new hybrid threats, and frequently shifting alliances among them.

But is war not a quintessential undertaking of the nation-state? Indeed, the relationship between the two was expressed in Professor Charles Tilly’s famous line, “War made the state, and the state made war.”

The two primary regional powers (Saudi Arabia and Iran) continue to project their geopolitical influence using their interpretations of Islam as instruments of foreign policy. The danger thus lies in the politicization of sectarian identities: such as picturing groups, like the Alawites in Syria and Zaydis in Yemen, to be orienting into the Iranian orbit and/or the Shia establishment, although these “new” Shia were previously considered heretics by Sunnis and most Shias themselves.

The Arab world has already decided to characterize Iraq, for instance, as an Iranian client-state; the Shia constituents as Iranian proxies; and the Alawites and Houthis as subsets of Shia. Whether Iran has influence over the region, such classifications and simplistic narration are ironically becoming instruments serving the continuation of wars. In fact, the “crescent” is helped by the way the Arab world has historically treated the Shia communities as threats to the regimes, not as citizens with national identity, natural rights and responsibilities.

The post The ‘Shia Crescent’ and Middle East Geopolitics appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korea claims to be close to test an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) as recently reported by the official KCNA news agency. During his annual New Year’s address Kim Jong-un expressed the country’s renewed ambition to foster its nuclear defense capabilities through the forthcoming acquisition of ICBM capabilities.

A North Korean ICBM would represent an additional fracture in the delicate regional security balance, not to mention a direct threat to the continental U.S.—potentially exposed to a direct nuclear strike.

Washington remains extremely vigilant about the threat represented by Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic defense program. As stressed by former Defense Secretary Ash Carter, the U.S. is ready to intercept and neutralize any missile “if it were coming towards our territory or the territory of our friends and allies.” South Korea and Japan have expressed their concern over their neighbor’s continuously provocative behavior, calling for stronger sanctions in response to a plausible ICBM test.

Pyongyang could decide to conduct a new ballistic test in the early weeks of the new administration to gauge President Trump’s response. According to U.S. intelligence, the intensification of the activities near North Korea’s Chamjin missile factory could be linked to an incoming ballistic test. Furthermore, Pyongyang has previously conducted ballistic tests during the early months of President Obama’s first and second terms.

While Pyongyang’s harsh confrontation with Washington and its allies has often been characterized by inflamed tones and warmongering propaganda, a successful ICBM test could have dramatic consequences, triggering a major crisis in the peninsula.

Although Trump has expressed his suspicions about Pyongyang’s real ability to reach such a relevant milestone, last year North Korea conducted 25 ballistic missile tests and five nuclear tests, threatening the peace of the region. North Korea’s ballistic arsenal is fully equipped with several Musudan (Hwasong-10) intermediate-range ballistic missiles, increasing its ability to strike Japan and the U.S. territory of Guam.

North Korea’s nuclear and military provocations have been condemned by the international community unanimously. Nevertheless, the imposition of new UN sanctions have not produced the expected result to bring back Pyongyang to the negotiating table.

Although the regime may be close to test a new ballistic test, the acquisition of a fully operative ICBM able to strike the continental U.S. would require several years to be completed. Many experts believe that North Korea will be able to produce an ICBM by 2020 and also has acquired enough plutonium to build ten warheads.

In recent years, North Korea’s leadership has resorted to the celebration of the country’s nuclear power status to prevent any shift in the Korean peninsula while maintaining the centrality of the divine right of the Kim family unchallenged. As it appeared evident during Obama administration, North Korea leadership has shown no intention of giving up its nuclear program—its best bargaining chip—in exchange for energy, food aid and other economic benefits.

Pyongyang has relied on the nuclear program to engage Washington and even explore the possibilities of a full normalization of relations as in the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. The sudden rise of Kim Jong-un to the highest ranks of the KWP and as “Great Successor of the revolutionary cause of the Juche” and his later ascension to power marked a critical acceleration of nuclear and ballistic activities.

Since then, Pyongyang has maintained a strong priority on the acquisition of nuclear and missile capabilities, as a fundamental consecration of North Korea’s nuclear power status, already enshrined in its 2012-revised Constitution. Moreover, the North Korea elites strongly emphasize its manifest destiny as a nuclear power nation and consider the expansion of its nuclear capabilities the most efficient way to demand the universal recognition of its new status.

During his campaign, President Trump has several times questioned Washington’s security commitment overseas, stressing his willingness to withdraw American troops from South Korea while encouraging Japan to acquire nuclear weapons to enhance its deterrence. Trump’s election has indeed raised questions about the future of American pivot to Asia inaugurated by his eminent predecessor.

Nevertheless, the Trump administration will be extensively engaged to address North Korea’s nuclear assertiveness, reassuring critical allies such as Japan and South Korea about Washington’s commitment to upholding regional security and the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

Like the previous administration, Trump will be facing a difficult decision in defining the contours not only of the Korean Peninsula’s strategic balance, but also in renovating Washington’s commitment in the Asia-Pacific region, constantly exposed to fundamental changes in the security dynamics.

The Trump administration has already expressed its willingness to support critical strategic initiatives such as the THAAD while upholding the existing security alliance between Washington and Seoul, as stressed by US national security advisor Michael Flynn during a recent meeting with his South Korean counterpart Kim Kwang-jin.

This approach follows the footsteps of the Obama administration, whose “strategic patience” strategy has been strongly contested by Republicans who see it as the wrong approach to induce Pyongyang to abandon its dreadful intents as a precondition to return to the negotiating table.

Under the previous administration, Washington has maintained a solid commitment in opposing North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, calling for a wider support from the international community, and particularly from China as a critical player, in demanding Pyongyang to comply with UN security resolutions.

A nuclear-armed North Korea remains a direct threat to Beijing’s core strategic interest and Chinese elites have already experienced frustration given their inability to persuade the former ally to restrain its nuclear ambitions.

The Obama administration has sought a closer cooperation with Beijing in imposing additional costs on Pyongyang for its belligerent activities, encouraging China to play a more effective role in implementing UN Security Council decisions against the North Korea.

Contrastingly, the Trump administration has already caused created frictions with Beijing, questioning the longstanding “One China Policy”, while considering more confronting strategies to challenge China’s presence in the South China Sea as stressed by the incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.

Mr.Trump’s harsh remarks over China’s economic policies have indeed raised questions about the future of Sino-U.S. relations and how this is going to affect the recalibration of Washington’s foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region.

Despite the initial criticisms, China remains a critical partner in ensuring the fulfillment of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula. Yet, Trump’s remarks over China and his threats to launch a trade war against Beijing could alienate Beijing’s desire to cooperate in dealing with the North Korea.

The Trump administration could have to confront as a serious crisis on the Korean Peninsula even before defying the new engagement strategy and the characteristic of its commitment in the region.

Strengthening the level of engagement with its close allies and defying a common and joint strategy to address the North Korean issue would be a valuable tool to mitigate the risk of a dangerous crisis in the Korean Peninsula.

Moreover, without a joint effort with Beijing in deterring Pyongyang through a marked increase of the economic and diplomatic pressure, little or virtually no results can be achieved on this issue.

The Trump administration might consider the implementation of partnerships and practices, inaugurated by the previous Administration rather than complying with his initial proclaims.

Despite the rising tensions, a renewed entente with Beijing is critical to deal with the North Korea’s nuclear program, whose spillover effects caused by Pyongyang’s nuclear and ballistic activities remains the most immediate threat to Washington’s security regional architecture and strategic interest.

Yet, it remains difficult to predict how the new administration will be able to define a new strategy without the contribution of Beijing in defusing such a dreadful scenario.

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