Foreign Policy Blogs

North Korean MiG-29s fly over a Parade in the nation’s capital.

The National Post recently published an article detailing in depth the size and complexity of the armed forces of North Korea. They showed in a graphic the number of planes, tanks, submarines, ships, and other weapons systems North Korea possesses. The goal of the article was to highlight how large the North Korean military really is, but it did not go into finer details of why a conflict might erupt, or how it might play out.

Missile tests into the sea of Japan, bouts of artillery fire, and the loss of an occasional ship are unfortunately expected by South Korea as the North postures and attacks aggressively towards their southern cousins. The conflict that never really ended since the mid-1950s has kept South Koreans in a stalemate that persists until today.

During the Korean War, US-led troops actually took over the North but were pushed back to the current borders by a surge in Chinese troops. Chinese interests and American strategic patience has kept the war at a stalemate.

For this reason, any resolution may only come from an agreement between the United States and China. Indeed, after 60 years the regional powers have become tired of threats to stability coming from the ruling family of North Korea.

China has been the North Korean lifeline, providing essential exports and weapons systems. One reason for this support are to maintain a physical buffer between Western powers and China’s border. China’s professed military support for the regime in case of a conflict also serves as a point of leverage against American and Japanese interests in Asia. An oppressive yet stable North Korea also limits the number of refugees that would flood into China if the regime were to fall.

While fighting the silhouetted army of North Korea might become an end game for American, South Korean and Japanese forces, it is likely the case that missile defense will take precedence and pressure on China will need to delicately balanced in order to meet everyone’s interests.

To avoid a chaotic result, China would likely have to decide and agree to remove the North Korean ruling family. Alternatively, taking away power from the Kims could occur without China’s assistance or consideration, but this would involve special forces incursions and the use of large and sophisticated weapons.

Political will to deal with a situation most political leaders would prefer to avoid is largely motivating the inaction in the Korean peninsula. But with nuclear weapons and threats to the US mainland it may be that Washington will decide on a policy of “now or never” if an aggression takes place, and China may see solutions beyond supporting a dictator that will produce beneficial leverage for its ever growing international presence.

The post North Korea after 60 Years of Status Quo appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The U.S. and China recently held a summit meeting at Mar-a-Lago, Florida. Many issues currently plague U.S.-China relations, such as trade, the South China Sea, and cyber-security. However, the issue of North Korea clearly dominates the issues now potentially derailing U.S.-China ties. Unfortunately, as important as North Korea is at the moment, it is but an ancillary topic compared to the issue of how China views overall U.S. intentions towards it in Asia. Until this underlying Chinese strategic concern is addressed, there will be no resolution of the North Korean issue.

Look At A Map: Syria Is Not North Korea

With the recent U.S. missile strikes against Syria for its alleged chemical weapons usage, there has been speculation that the true intended recipients of this message are China and North Korea. The thinking is that both China and North Korea will see that the U.S. is willing to inflict the same lesson on North Korea. If true, then it’s critical to point out several differences here.

Syria is not located near the epicenter of international trade and the world’s major nuclear states. Southeast Asia is certainly vital to world trade as it is essentially the gateway for natural resources departing the Middle East and Africa and making their way towards some of the world’s most resource-dependent economies, namely China, Japan, and South Korea. However, the destination of these resources highlights the true indispensability of Northeast Asia to the global economy as a whole.

This area is home to the world’s second, third, and fourth largest economies in the world, respectively. In many respects, such as international trade and purchasing power parity (PPP), China is already the world’s largest economy. As has been stated numerous times before, a military conflict in this area would have far-reaching regional and global repercussions.

Even China itself has admitted that a stable, peaceful regional environment is vital to its continued ascendancy. As globalization’s past leading proponent, the U.S. may ironically be a victim of its own post-Cold War success, as the relentless spread of globalization is precisely what has allowed China, Japan, and South Korea all to reach their current commanding heights positions leading the global economy.

In Asia, Memories Are Quite Long

In order to give even further context to the North Korean dilemma and how it impacts U.S.-China relations, it’s vital to remember that most states in Asia have both quite long histories and associated memories. This has played itself out in several instances within the past year alone.

First, we have the Filipino Ambassador to the U.S.’ reference to U.S. President William Howard Taft’s “little brown brothers” sentiment towards The Philippines over a hundred years ago. This was a prelude to The Philippines’ announced foreign policy re-balance between the U.S. and China currently.

Next, Finland was among the first European countries to diplomatically recognize China and actually the first to establish a bilateral trade agreement with China in 1953. As a result, Finland is now a beachhead of sorts for China in terms of furthering not only trade relations between the two states themselves, but diplomatic ties between China and the EU as a whole.

Lastly, we have the Syrian peace talks currently being held in Astana. Although the talks are at times difficult, they are nevertheless viewed as absolutely critical by the talks’ major proponents, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Kazakhstan was ostensibly chosen as the location for these talks because, at several points in its rich history, it was part of the Russian Empire (later Former Soviet Union), as well as the Persian and Ottoman Empires, respectively. This theoretically signifies that the interests of any one proponent of the talks do not necessarily outweigh those of the other two.

This last example is also an important lesson to learn regarding China and its interests on the Korean peninsula via the now-stalled Six-Party Talks. It’s also important to remember that it was U.S. miscalculation during the Korean War which initially led to China’s entry on the side of North Korea. More fundamentally, the two Koreas are still technically at war.

As their respective allies, this harms the long-term sustainability of positive U.S.-China relations, despite the salve of business ties. These ties do not override fundamental geopolitical considerations. The U.S. recognized China in order to leverage it against the Former Soviet Union. What exactly are U.S. motivations currently? Are they to similarly leverage India against China now, for example?

Where Do We Go From Here?

A new model of great power relations between the U.S. and China needs to be defined, and then actually implemented. It appears that this already may be happening with the U.S. apparently adopting China’s doctrine of “No Conflict, No Confrontation, Mutual Respect, and Win-Win Cooperation”.

The salient point here is that issues such as North Korea won’t be solved until China’s underlying security concerns are addressed, namely what exactly are U.S. intentions towards it in Asia? Will the U.S. pursue a policy towards China of containment, engagement, or “congagement”? More pertinently, does the U.S. consider China a “strategic partner”, “strategic competitor”, adversary, etc.?

Because no state in Asia wants to be forced to choose between China and the U.S., a possible solution is a power-sharing agreement, proposed by Australian National University Professor Hugh White. White proposes that a concert of regional powers, to include China, the U.S., Japan, and India, is the long-term solution for stability in Asia. This is reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, responsible for upholding stability on the European continent from Napoleon’s eventual defeat until the outbreak of World War I, a hundred years later.

While the details of such an arrangement may be debatable, it certainly has the potential, at least, to address the major security concerns of the regional Asian players. In addition to issues such as North Korea, a power-sharing arrangement in Asia would have ramifications with respect to the South China Sea as well.

The South China Sea example is critical as China’s double cancellation proposal (no further DPRK missile launches in exchange for no U.S.-South Korea military exercises) may have been designed to elicit a negative U.S. response and thereby expose the U.S.’ true motives in Asia (in China’s mind). These motives would include the U.S.’ conflation (deliberate or otherwise) of civilian freedom of navigation with military freedom of navigation. Additionally, a power-sharing agreement would send a strong signal to weaker, external states like France, which is also expanding its own regional military presence.

The post North Korea Is Only One Tree In The Forest Of U.S.-China Relations appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Protestors confront riot police in Caracas, Venezuela on April 8, 2017 in response to an opposition leader’s banishment from holding political office. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

Over the last week Venezuela has seen upheaval in the national legislature and banning of the leading opposition figure from running for office. Both developments resulted in massive protests throughout the country and violent clashes with police. While it is clear the ruling Socialist government of President Nicolas Maduro—heir apparent to long-serving dictator Hugo Chavez—has a tight grip on power, it is possible they might have gone too far now, and have many within and outside the country demanding change.

Venezuela Supreme Court moved to take over National Assembly

The trouble started two weeks ago, when Venezuela’s Supreme Court shocked many when it announced an intention to assume the functions (and power) of the country’s National Assembly. While the Supreme Court is loyal to Maduro, the National Assembly holds a variety of political views and was seen as the only opposition voice in the government, the only check on the regime’s power.

As reported by Foreign Policy, the reason for this bold move derives from financial troubles the Maduro regime got themselves into and then tried to use their political control to get out of. The Venezuelan government has to make a major bond payment by April 12; to get the needed funds (which the government doesn’t have on its own), it planned to sell assets based in Venezuela to a Russian oil company, Rosneft. Knowing the legislature would never approve such an arrangement, the government attempted to take it over. Or as stated by Eric Farnsworth of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, “They [the Maduro regime] tried to get the legislature out of the mix and just take unilateral action. When they find their laws inconvenient, they just change them.”

Massive opposition to this move results in protests and international criticism. While Maduro walked back the Supreme Court takeover a few days later (on April 1st), those supporting the opposition demanded the Supreme Court judges be dismissed. They also called for the next presidential election, currently expected in late 2018, to be moved earlier, though it is highly doubtful the regime will agree to this. Protests continued throughout the week, with thousands filling the streets of Caracas carrying signs saying “No to dictatorship!” In at least one instance in the capital police fired tear gas at crowds.

Opposition leader Henrique Capriles banned from holding political office

In my most recent report on Venezuela in January, I briefly mentioned that Henrique Capriles feared he would be blocked from holding political office by the Maduro regime. Capriles, a current state governor, had previously been a presidential candidate is viewed unilaterally as the best hope for unseating Maduro in the 2018 election. On April 7th it turned out his worries were well-founded: the government banned Capriles from holding office for 15 years. The national comptroller’s office issued the directive, claiming “administrative irregularities” including breaking contracting laws and improper management of donations.

Regional and international organizations and governments condemned the action almost immediately. The U.S. State Department released a statement on April 8th saying it was “deeply troubled” by repression against Venezuelan opposition, and that it “reject[s] the rationales the Maduro government proffers for its repressive actions, which, when closely examined are spurious and, politically-motivated, and without basis in domestic or international law.” On April 10th, the foreign minister of Brazil Aloysio Nunes and chair of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro jointly called for national elections to be held in Venezuela, stating that elections are the “only solution” to the deepening political crisis.

The action against Capriles sparked even more protests, some resulting in violent clashes with police. This is not necessarily new, as protests have popped up periodically in Venezuela over the last few years.

The last straw?

But this time the outcome may be different. Some are hopeful that the government’s recent aggressive moves will be the fuel needed to re-galvanize and unite the opposition in demanding, and maybe even successfully seeing, regime change.

Prying political power and control from a group as deeply entrenched as Maduro’s government will be extremely difficult. But there is reason to think it is possible, especially as Venezuela’s economic and political crises worsen. Even more troubling, Venezuelans’ quality of life—especially access to needed food and medicine—has not improved.

It is extremely important for the international community to remain vigilant in demanding that free and fair elections be held within a reasonable timeframe. Perhaps non-partisan election observers should be put in place to ensure the elections’ validity, and that Venezuelans can vote for their choices without intimidation or fear of reprisal.

Then, perhaps, the country can start on the road to recovery.

 

The post Venezuela Thrown into Turmoil Anew: Last Straw for Regime? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Demonstrators in Hanoi last May, demanding cleaner waters in the central regions after mass fish deaths along the coast of Vietnam. (REUTERS/Kham)

Vietnam took another small step toward inclusive political institutions this month, announcing the creation of a website where Vietnamese can air their grievances. At a regular press conference, Minister and Chairman of the Government Office, Mai Tien Dung, formally declared the website nguoidan.chinhphu.vn, which would allow authorities at all levels to receive, answer, and respond to citizens’ questions and complaints, and collect proposals on how to improve the country’s administrative system.

The initiative is timely, coming just days before the one-year anniversary of the start of the Formosa protests, sparked by mass fish deaths along a 200-kilometer coastline of central Vietnam, which some called Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster. The deaths of some 100 metric tons of fish in four central provinces were first recorded on April 6, 2016, and protesters soon gathered to accuse a steel mill in Ha Tinh. The steel mill, being developed by Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group, was widely suspected of discharging untreated waste into nearby waters.

The accusations led to organized protests breaking out in several major cities, and resulted in the arrests and detainment of dozens of Vietnamese protesters. Those actions drew the attention of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), who called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly. Formosa finally admitted responsibility in June, pledging $500 million in compensation to some 186,000 fishermen and fish farmers.

To date, there is some confusion over exactly how much compensation has been paid out. Minister Dung, at last week’s press conference, announced local authorities disbursed 76.8% of the total as of March 6. Afterwards, one newspaper reported just 32%, or VND3.7 trillion ($162 million) of VNĐ11.5 trillion ($500 million) had been paid to support local fishermen and help clean up the polluted marine environment as of April 1.

Minister Dung also sought to reassure the Vietnamese public, announcing an inspection team from the environment ministry would begin a three-day examination of the plant, checking whether a blast furnace could be put into use, “If they cannot ensure the safety for the facility’s operation, the mill will never be allowed to go into production.”

Here in Vietnam, findings from the 2016 Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) were also published last week, revealing a dramatic increase in concern by citizens for the environment. More than 12% of those surveyed expressed the environment as their most important concern, increasing 10% from last year. And the party secretary of Ha Tinh province, Vo Kim Cu, was reportedly fired last week for his role in the Formosa fish kill.

Through these timely actions, Hanoi appears to taking positive steps toward acknowledging their citizens’ newfound environmental activism, hoping to avoid any widespread social unrest given the extent of pollution. But they are also taking punitive measures to quell protests. This past week, Nguyễn Văn Hóa, a 22-year-old resident of Kỳ Anh District, was arrested by Hà Tĩnh police for “abusing his civil rights, freedom and democracy to infringe upon the interests of the State.” He stands accused of using a Flycam device to shoot videos of the protests at the Formosa steel plant that posted on social networks.

The anniversary of Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster has seemingly motivated government officials to pay heed to citizens’ concerns and take actions to address the pollution and potential unrest. Yet there are some fears the new website will be used against the agitated populace much like Mao Zedong used the “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign in China.

 Hopefully restraints on waste discharge will displace restraints on peaceful assembly – lest another environmental disaster crashes the new website after a flood of complaints, and the increasingly environmentally-paranoid Vietnamese return to the streets. On Sunday, the favorite day for Vietnamese to protest last year, the streets of Saigon were quiet, and locals were back to eating fish again.

The post Vietnam Seeks to Calm Waters One Year After Environmental Disaster appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Following the recent decision of the South Korea’s Constitutional Court to remove President Park Guen-hye in the wake of the massive scandal that has deeply shaken South Korean’s political and economic landscape, former President Park was arrested last Friday and is currently detained at the Seoul Detention Center while awaiting trail. If convicted, she will be facing more than 10 years in prison.

Indeed, hundred of thousands have railed in the street demanding President Park’s resignation since October 2016. The scandal has unveiled a large network of bribery, corruption and influence peddling that has led to the arrest of important political members such as Moon Hyung-pyo, Chairman of the National Pension Service (NPS), but also Samsung Vice President Lee Jae-young and several prominent members of the Chaebol financial clique face trial and severe charges.

While South Korea’s political history has been characterized by a deep turmoil during the turbulent years that have marked the democratic transition from the authoritarian rule period, President Park has become the first president to be forced from the office and later arrested after being involved in a large-scale corruption scandal since the military era.

South Korea will be electing a new president on May and the attention remains focused on Park’s successor and on his or her ability to define a new critical strategy to address the North Korean issue. President Park relied on strong measures to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, marking a significant shift from a trustpolitik strategy championed during the first years of her Administration.

Following the escalation of tense relations with Pyongyang, culminated with a series of missiles and nuclear tests, Park Administration was characterized by an increasingly open and harsh confrontation with Pyongyang. In less than a year, Park Administration closed the jointly operated Kaesong Industrial Facility, denounced the violation of human rights in North Korea while encouraging additional sanctions targeting North Korea, stressed Seoul’s level of preparedness in the event of an imminent collapse of the North Korea’s regime and also openly disclosed the existence of a plan to kill Kim Jong-un and his close entourage in order to decapitate the command-chain in the event of a war.

The sudden end of Park Administration is expected to affect the delicate balance in the region. In the attempt to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Park’s Administration reinforced the security ties with Washington and has also promoted a new entente with Tokyo, considered a valuable asset in containing North Korea’s nuclear threat despite decades of tensions caused by the historical legacy of Imperial Japan’s occupation of the Korea.

Last November, under the auspices of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement, allowing the two countries to share classified information including North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities. The agreement was strongly opposed by the Minjoo Party, concerned about the involvement of Seoul into a larger missile defense pact with Japan that could endanger the unsteady balance in the Korean peninsula while alimenting additional tensions with Beijing.

Besides the evident turmoil within South Korea’s political landscape, the new scenario characterized by the sudden end of the Park Administration will be a determining element in outlining a new direction in South Korea’s security priorities, while Pyongyang continues to cast a dreadful nuclear shadow across the region.

In the wake of President Park’s dismissal, the attention on the recalibration of the relations with Beijing and the growing tensions with Pyongyang aliment the debate. Relations with China have been strained by the acceleration of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system strongly supported by Washington, alarmed about the resurgence of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.

Under the rising leadership of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s notorious provocations and sinister nuclear ambitions have reached an unprecedented level of threats, jeopardizing not only the unsteady military balance in the region but accelerating the dangerous confrontation with Washington and its allies. Pyongyang has conducted an increasing number of ballistic tests, creating concern about its fast-paced ability to develop ballistic missile capabilities to reach the continental U.S. with a nuclear-tipped warhead.

The end of the strategic patience advocated by Obama Administration toward North Korea has led to a critical outcome, as stressed by Secretary of State Tillerson during his recent visit to South Korea. While the United States have reiterated their commitment in defending its critical ally from Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, the chance of a military option remains on the table. Trump Administration’s concerns about the volatility of the regional scenario, constantly exposed to a consistent number of strategic shifts jeopardizing Washington’s presence, have certainly contributed to the renovated close entente between South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s emerging security challenges and opportunities 

In the last few weeks, the future of the US-ROK Alliance, relations with China and the nature of the strategic approach in the Korean peninsula that will be determined by South Korea’s new president have further fueled the debate.

President Park’s dramatic downfall has already galvanized the opposition and opened the doors for a return to power of the Minjoo Party led by its front runner candidate Moon Jae-in. The impeachment has exposed the Saenuri Party to a large scandal, putting in disarray its core leadership and also creating a strong fracture within its party members and supporters. More important, it has almost certainly determined a marked change in the South Korea political leadership, opening the door for a return of the Minjoo Party as leading forces after many years of the unchallenged prominence of the Seanuri Party.

The expected return of Minjoo party to the power after almost ten years represents an additional shock in defining the new contours of South Korea’s tense relations with China and also in dealing with the emerging threat represented by North Korea. Minjoo Presidential candidate, Moon Jae-in, former Chief of Staff during Roh Administration and former Chairman of the Minjoo is considered as a front runner in the upcoming election after the sudden announcement of Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon to not run as a candidate for the South Korea’s presidency.

Moon Jae-in is a former human right lawyer and also a well-known political figure in the South Korea ran as a presidential candidate in 2012 and he was eventually defeated by President Park. Moon Jae-in has several times expressed his wish to foster a wide recalibration of South Korea’s foreign policy and security. During the years of Park Administration, Minjoo Party called several times for a reduction of military engagement with Washington and the promotion of a greater level of diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea, as the ultimate tool to promote peace and foster a path toward the stability of the inter-Korean relations.

Minjoo Party has also often criticized when not openly opposed the deployment of the THAAD, considered an ineffective measure, but also expressed concern about the deterioration of the relations with China. Last January, in the attempt to reduce the frictions with China, Minjoo lawmakers traveled to Beijing to promote a positive framework to enhance the level of dialogue between the two countries after the decision of Seoul to participate to Washington-led anti-missile system. Beijing’s relations with South Korea have reached a tense peak after China has banned Chinese tour groups from travelling to South Korea. Mending ties with China represents an important goal for Minjoo leaders since Beijing is not only an important trade partner but certainly remains a critical actor in bolstering any diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.

On the other hand, Minjoo Party leaders have expressed their desire to mend relations with Beijing while fostering a different approach to defuse an incoming crisis in the Korean peninsula. With the front runner presidential candidate Moon Jae-in likely to be elected as a president, a new direction in foreign policy is extremely plausible. It is also expected that the new priorities in Seoul’s agenda will be not to antagonize North Korea, trying to encourage dialogue and foster engagement rather than maintaining a hard line position.

For instance, this might coincide with Moon’s decision to reopen Kaesong and even remove some economic sanctions in the attempt to reduce the level of economic and diplomatic isolation that has alimented Pyongyang’s rampant bellicose posture and that could ultimately ignite a larger crisis. Yet, it is unlikely that this could induce North Korea’s leadership to suspend its nuclear and military activities, especially after the recent declaration of Pyongyang in the wake of Washington’s airstrike in Syria.

It remains difficult to predict whatever Seoul will remain strongly committed in upholding any strategic initiatives promoted by Washington in the region, while the new forthcoming South Korean Administration might choose to determine a different direction from the path originally marked by Obama’s Pivot to Asia. There is no doubt that the alliance will remain, yet the new Administration might be inclined to foster a deep recalibration of the level of cooperation between Seoul and Washington while fostering a renovated entente with Beijing in order to defuse an imminent crisis in the Korean peninsula.

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In a speech at the Foreign Policy Association Khanna argued that globalization is not at risk of reversing despite recent surges in popularity of nationalist ideas.

Author and political scientist Parag Khanna rebuked those who do not believe the world is becoming more interconnected, stating last Thursday that globalization can lessen conflicts and distribute power and trade more equally.

Khanna, promoting his book Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization in a speech at the Foreign Policy Association in New York, said globalization is not at risk of reversing course despite recent surges in the United States and Europe of trade policies that favor national protection.

“Fortunately, I have the numbers on my side,” Khanna said. “I’m not remotely concerned about it. I’m certainly concerned about the methodologies and the intellects, to be perfectly blunt, of those people who are anti-globalists.”

He argued that a massive increase in infrastructure investments, especially in Asian economies over the last 25 years, is driving a transition to a “supply chain world” governed by trade connectivity. New roads, railways, ports and internet cables have enabled people to become dependent on goods and services provided from far greater distances than ever before.

And because this is happening at the same time across the world, Khanna explained, there is no one cog in the wheel that can stop it.

“The supply chain is a force that’s even more powerful than states themselves, as states seek to be part of those supply chains,” he said. “I’ve found that whenever a country tries to stop the flow of something, it just flows around them.”

For example, the conclusion by most United States leaders to abort the Tran-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement with Asian countries brokered to contain China’s influence, will not halt regional trade. In fact, 12 countries that formed TPP met in Chile in March, and were joined by China, to discuss future trade cooperation.

“So a trade agreement that we had conjured up to help isolate China winds up going on without us, and with China,” Khanna said.

Anchor powers

Shifting to a supply chain world is part of what Khanna sees as a “systems change.”

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has operated under a US-led unipolar system based on a hierarchical power structure. That is now transitioning to one where power is distributed among “anchor” countries.

China is the fastest growing anchor power right now, Khanna said, driven first by opening its markets in the 1970s, and now with its focus on infrastructure development.

A McKinsey Global Institute study reported in 2016 that China is spending more of its gross domestic product on infrastructure, 8.6%, than the US and Western Europe combined.

Khanna said this is increasing China’s influence near and far.

Not only is it building roads, bridges and ports at home, it’s financing projects for its neighbors as part of its “One Belt, One Road” Asia development strategy. Even if some of China’s neighbors are concerned about its growing influence, they “need that Chinese investment,” Khanna said.

“Most of the countries are not able to find on the global market some willing substitute for their economic and infrastructural requirements,” he explained.

Even more, China’s dedication to an infrastructure build out is increasing its connectivity with Europe. Khanna described the unification of the Eurasian “mega-continent” the biggest trend to watch in geopolitics over the next 25 years.

China has created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a $100 billion development finance institution, to act as a driver for its regional strategy.

Acknowledging the economic opportunity, 14 European Union members have joined the AIIB. According to Khanna, EU trade with the US is about $1 trillion annually, similar to its trade with China, Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries combined. However, he said the trade value with the US will be “stuck where it is” by 2025 or 2030, but EU trade with Asia is expected to increase dramatically.

Khana concludes that the emergence of regional powers in which “connectivity is the governing force” can be a good situation for all parties involved.

“In the long run, I have a cautiously optimistic view because of the fact that even if we build these infrastructures and connectivity for selfish reasons,” he said. “They wind up creating a much more connected and distributed system where supply can meet demand and where there is less reason for conflict.”

The post Parag Khanna’s ‘Blunt’ Defense of Globalization appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By W.A. Schmidt

Through decades of personal encounters, U.S. diplomats and other State Department representatives have deeply impressed me with their decency, common sense, patriotism and profound understanding of the world. Along with members of the military and the intelligence community, these committed individuals are at the front lines of America’s engagement with the world. Often, they do so with insufficient resources at their disposal. They endure hardships and take considerable risks, and some even make the ultimate sacrifice.

They deserve all the support we can muster as a nation. They help keep us safe and make the world around us a safer place—a world from which we cannot take a holiday, let alone escape, not even into “Fortress America”.

Hence, the idea of cutting the international affairs budget is foolish. Slashing it by almost a third, as proposed by President Trump, is outright shocking. It reflects utter ignorance of its crucial importance for our security and well-being. Moreover, it also implies an appalling disdain for the dedication and sacrifice of some of America’s finest.

If a foreign power wanted to weaken America’s security and standing in the world and bring it down a few giant notches from its contested perch, this is where it would start. Diplomacy would be the first in its crosshairs, not the military which still enjoys a considerable safety margin compared to other armed forces overseas. (The intelligence gathering apparatus is, of course, always a prime target; deliberately undermining it by publicly disparaging it is thus not only reckless but exposing us all to potentially existential dangers.)

The country’s reputation has already suffered immeasurably as a result of the utterings and tweets of Mr. Trump, both as candidate and president. Allies and friends are in shock, while America’s adversaries cannot believe their luck. Adding drastic budget cuts would not only amplify their elation, it would add insult to the immense injury already inflicted upon the U.S. both internationally and domestically.

At home, if President Trump’s budget passes, the ongoing disparagement of the intelligence community will be accompanied by an even more tangible assault on our diplomats and development aid workers. The resulting loss of institutional knowledge and memory will have dire consequences, adding to an already alarming recent brain drain. What a thoughtless waste of some of the best human capital this country has to offer.

Abroad, fixing the damage already done will require Herculean efforts, such as strengthening existing programs and pursuing policies that show America at its best. Many of them (now at risk of being curtailed or cut) are essential if the country wants to credibly claim—or rather, reclaim—its moral high ground. However, without a commitment to fundamental values and the rule of law in international affairs that will be unattainable. Mr. Trump’s and Secretary of State Tillerson’s noticeable disinterest in and indifference towards human rights will most likely keep it that way, namely out of reach.

Claiming or reclaiming the moral high ground appears to be a moot point given President Trump’s implied ridicule of the very notion. Few of his statements demonstrate this better than his toxic assertion that the behavior of the U.S. government was no different than the criminal shenanigans of Mr. Putin. (In Mr. Putin’s case this is particularly galling given his ruthlessness at home and the war crimes being condoned and perpetrated under his watch [if not on his command] in Ukraine and Syria.)

Should Mr. Trump’s announcements become actual U.S. foreign policy, the resulting conflicts of conscience for those tasked with carrying it out will make any previous ones look almost quaint. The deep concern among diplomats about this issue is understandable and palpable.

Should the unthinkable occur, it would be historically unprecedented as U.S. diplomats would have to potentially justify the committing of crimes against humanity (e.g. see Mr. Trump’s apparent affinity for torture and collective punishment) as well as war crimes (e.g. see Mr. Trump’s irresponsible remarks about the use of nuclear weapons or about stealing Iraq’s oil [the next time the U.S. occupies the country]).

If the president comes to his senses and, in the process, sidelines those zealots in his inner circle who are feeding his basest instincts, our diplomats will be spared this moral quandary. If not, resistance to approaches this inimical to U.S. national interests will have to come from within the executive branch, from Congress, from the judiciary and, last but not least, from civil society, i.e., the rest of us.

It is encouraging to note that congressional and military leaders are indeed opposed to the flagrant violations of international law that Mr. Trump’s flights of cruel fancy would entail. There is a similar gulf between the president’s views of America’s international affairs budget and military representatives who understand the larger geopolitical context.

The chasm between the Trump White House and the military is deeply concerning. While the president proposes a far-reaching deconstruction of the State Department, Secretary of Defense Mattis had this to say about increasing military spending at the expense of cutting back on diplomacy and development: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately. So, I think it’s a cost benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of an apparent American withdrawal from the international scene.”

This is when, under normal circumstances, the Secretary of State would step up and exert his influence and authority. Yet Mr. Tillerson, incredibly, agrees with the proposed ravaging cuts to his department.

It is more than troubling that, from an outsider’s perspective, Secretary Tillerson has also allowed his department to go adrift: leaderless, rudderless, without a compass and soon deprived of the means to make it safely to any sensible destination. No wonder Foggy Bottom “felt like a ghost ship” during a recent visit by one of its eminent former diplomats.

Possible explanations for Tillerson’s behavior—namely that he has been sidelined, he may be out of his depth and/or may lack motivation to turn things around because he seems not to have wanted this job in the first place—are all equally worrisome.

Congress will have a historically unique opportunity to prove itself and show that it, at least, puts the nation’s interests first. One way to stymie the proposed budget from becoming enacted would be to adhere to the Budget Control Act. Sequestration is an odd way to govern a country. However, as this case shows, it can act as an important check to prevent an out-of-control administration from committing senseless acts.

How unusual and perilous a time we live in if our best hope for keeping the country from harming itself is the resistance within government itself, and the American people at large.

Many of my encounters with U.S. diplomats have been in the Midwest, specifically in the state of Wisconsin. Their profound knowledge of the world as well as their understanding of the concerns of their fellow citizens is remarkable. Likewise, there seems to be a genuine public appreciation for the sacrifices diplomats make and the personal risks they take.

Similar events dedicated to international affairs and open to the general public have impressed upon me, time and time again, the fundamental sincerity of the American people. They show a willingness to listen and to learn about America’s place in this world that so often seems chaotic and confusing. Their openness is one of this country’s most distinctive strengths. Hence it is not surprising that several surveys show that the vast majority do not subscribe to the noxious nationalism that is being stirred up and spread by President Trump and his innermost circle.

Foreign visitors are usually struck by America’s friendliness and hospitality. They are left with an image of a country that, while not perfect, is aware of many of its shortcomings and even willing to discuss them with strangers—an America that is self-confident enough to invite scores of people through government-sponsored programs to experience the country first- hand.

Countless volunteers across the nation graciously host these foreign guests. This sort of citizen diplomacy is an important part of educating the world about us and us about “them,” “one handshake at a time.” Unscripted and unchoreographed, visitors are allowed to freely explore the essence of America. At the end of their exploration they are free to make their own judgment: is it reflective of their experience, or of the president’s cheerleaders in the crude, jingoistic media?

The extraordinary benefits of these exchange programs must surely make America’s adversaries cringe. They would much rather see America’s image eternally tarnished by biased and fake news accounts about the daily “carnage” in this dystopian place that preposterously calls itself the United States of America. Incidentally, those caricature-like images of America are not that far removed from how its own president painted the country in his gloomy and foreboding inaugural address.

The proponents of “America First” delude themselves that previous administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, neglected U.S. national interests. This is a bogus argument. It merely serves as a smokescreen to hide the fact that bullying others and breaking America’s ties to the outside world is ill-considered and harmful. This includes the administration’s condescension toward multilateral institutions. Weakening them would be yet another gift to those determined to topple the liberal international order and, in its wake its core pillar, the United States. The navel-gazing advocates of this bizarre and self-defeating doctrine are oblivious to how much these institutions contribute to our peace and prosperity.

If this myopic vision becomes reality, America’s place in the world will become a lonely, isolated one, its security and well-being fundamentally jeopardized. And yet, this is what the “America First” nationalists in the Trump administration seem more than willing to risk. It is beyond naïve to think that such policies are not going to backfire and cause blowback that may haunt us for a long time to come.

In addition to the aforementioned exchange programs, even those related to refugees are in jeopardy. This is at once heartless and short-sighted. Heartless because closing the doors and cutting funds at a time when the need for refugee care and resettlement has never been greater is morally indefensible and betrays America’s core values. It is also short-sighted because the refugee crisis will not go away. Quite the opposite, it will be exacerbated if the world’s most powerful and richest nation, the one that could make the biggest difference, pulls back.

Instead of educating a receptive but ill-informed public about how little we actually spend in relative terms on international affairs and how important it is to our national interest to keep (or better yet: increase) the level of funding for diplomacy and development, the president engages in willfully bashing both.

Only 5% of respondents to a survey about the subject guessed the correct amount of the federal budget that goes into foreign aid, between 0% and 1%. Answers varied widely, the average guess was 26%.

The U.S. spends the smallest percentage of GDP of the rich industrialized countries on official development assistance, namely 0.17%. This is far from the internationally agreed upon commitment of spending 0.7% of GDP.

Visiting any of the countries on the receiving end of U.S. aid will prove its benefits first-hand. This is what I experienced on visits to Africa, where strangers expressed how appreciative they and their families were for the generosity of the American people, in several cases for PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), initiated by the George W. Bush administration.

While PEPFAR and similar health-related programs are expected to be spared, there are plenty of others whose proposed elimination will result in more misery, more loss of life, and less stability and security for all of us. As the broad political resistance to the planned cuts indicates, this is not a partisan matter.

Should Mr. Trump’s vision prevail, the notion of American magnanimity and enlightened self- interest will be overshadowed, if not replaced, by the image of a self-absorbed, egotistical, stingy, rich nation only out for itself. Our resulting international isolation would deepen the sense of insecurity that Mr. Trump has been so successful in fueling for his own narrow political purposes. This is the opposite of making America great. Resisting it is therefore a patriotic issue.

Resistance also entails opposing the dangerous worldview that has seeped into the highest echelons of power. The ugly nationalist ideology that hides behind the slogan of “America First” used to be confined to the lunatic political fringes. Contemporary history alone should help us recognize its uncanny resemblance to movements and regimes overseas that the U.S. all too often ended up fighting with American lives. It cannot possibly become the driving force of a nation that views itself as principled and great.

True patriotism calls for keeping such destructive dogmas from becoming policy. They would harm our national security and prosperity as well as our standing in the world—a world where our friends and remaining allies look at us with unparalleled trepidation, while our adversaries can hardly hide their schadenfreude and glee over the sheer extent of our self-inflicted wounds.

Follow this link for a footnoted PDF version of the article: Death by a Thousand Cuts (and Tweets) The Impending Train Wreck of U.S. Foreign Policy

W. A. Schmidt, a member of the board of the Foreign Policy Association, is a former Chair of the International Institute of Wisconsin (IIW). IIW is one of the state’s refugee resettlement agencies and a partner of the Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Prog He also served as longtime chair of the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a member council of the World Affairs Councils of America, Washington, DC. This blog does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the board of these organizations or their members.

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Flowers and candles outside the French Embassy in Moscow in memory of the victims of the terrorist act in Nice. (RIA Novosti)

St. Petersburg suffered an attack inside one of its subway stations on April 3rd. Russia is not unfamiliar with horrific terrorist incidences—in the past they have targeted military personnel, theatre goers, and even children. The response in the country regions—Chechnya and Dagestan—where Russian officials have fought against extremism has been to siege and destroy those communities and cities from where rebel leaders originate.

Some argue that, with the growth of extremist movements along Russia’s southern border, the Kremlin has been playing a key role in assisting the Assad regime in the extermination of extremists as an extension of its domestic policies. Many parts of Syria have been flattened by the regime with the help of Russia, making parts of Syria an example of how policymakers can adopt the Chechnya strategy.

The attacker was identified as Akbarzhon Jalilov, a 22-year old Russian of Kyrgyz origin. However, it is still unclear what his motivations were and it is unknown whether or not his cause is linked to movements in the Caucasus region or actions in Syria.

Like in Chechnya, the end of the larger conflict may not eliminate attacks like those in Russia, as the root issues plaguing the Caucasus and the Middle East will remain unresolved. In Mosul, Sunnis do not perceive Shi’a militias as liberators but rather as a continuation of religious and ethnic conflict post-ISIS.

Regional conflicts comprise several competing interests that go beyond religion, policies, and race. Without an educated and strategic understanding of these issues, it is likely that otherwise well-intentioned policies may lead to a power vacuum and genocide as a post-ISIS reality settles in.

As Manuel Valls learned in the wake of the Nice attack, an acceptance of terror attacks, especially those involving children, is unacceptable in any Western society. Accepting policies that have lead to current genocides of Yazidis, Christians and many Muslim communities in the Middle East should also be considered unacceptable with no reservations.

Future policies that deeply antagonize communities need to be prevented at all costs. Otherwise, it is unlikely that attacks in places like St. Petersburg, Nice, Paris, or Brussels will end. Security, refugee and local policies need to address that even a passive acceptance of removing humanity from those who have no power will always lead to desperate actions.

The post Catalysts for Never Ending Attacks appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Vietnam reacted strongly again in response to a recent visit by a Chinese cruise ship to the disputed Paracel archipelago (Hoàng Sa to Vietnamese and Xisha to Chinese). Hanoi pressed for an end to the cruise ship visits, which since 2013 have taken hundreds of Chinese tourists on a sun-soaked holiday intended to cement Beijing’s claim to the island chain.

Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Hai Binh strongly condemned China’s action, saying “Vietnam strongly opposes this and demands that China respect Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and international law and immediately stop and not repeat those activities,”adding, “Those actions have seriously violated Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and international law.”

China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea (or East Sea to Vietnamese) under its notorious “nine-dash line” and fought a war with Hanoi over control of the Paracels in 1974. Before the skirmish, Vietnam had control of some islands within the Paracel archipelago, China controlled others, and Taiwan also laid claim to some of the 30 islands and reefs.

According to Professor Toshi Yoshihara, of the Strategy and Policy faculty at the Naval War College, the Battle of the Paracels started as a clash between the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies. The fighting was short and intense, and “involved small, second hand combatants armed with outdated weaponry. The fighting lasted for several hours, producing modest casualties in ships and men.” The Chinese forces eventually prevailed, after three of the four Vietnamese warships had to retreat and the fourth sank with its captain on board. Dozens of southern Vietnamese sailors were killed, and China took control over the entire group of islands. Following Vietnam’s defeat, little mention of the battle has featured in Vietnamese media until 2014, some forty years later.

In 1979, Vietnam would fight another battle with China on their shared land border, with Chinese forces invading Vietnam to punish Hanoi for invading Cambodia to drive out the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge leadership in Phnom Penh. Chinese forces would again fight the Vietnamese in 1988, after China seized six reefs and atolls of the Spratly Islands after a skirmish at Johnson South Reef.

The latest heated rhetoric from Hanoi follows a series of warming relations between the two Communist brothers, who had in recent months seemingly set aside their differences, including an effort by the Vietnamese government to silence protestors in Hanoi marking the 43rd anniversary of the China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in January. But distrust of Chinese intentions is always present, and Hanoi has reportedly been actively fortifying its key holdings in the Spratlys, including the construction of a runway, tunnels and bunkers.

For now, there is little Hanoi can do (besides comments from diplomats) to counter Beijing’s efforts at furthering its claims through waging tourist-fare. Hanoi has established an office for the administration of the Paracels in the coastal city of Da Nang, loaded with maps, photos and historical documents to support Vietnam’s claim. And a new museum is in the works to bolster patriotism among its citizens. But beyond furthering its legal case, taking on China’s massive military strength is a daunting prospect for this much smaller nation of 90 million. Harassing civilian cruise ships will not win over the international community.

Perhaps the only safe response is tit-for-tat diplomacy, either offering Vietnamese tourists a cruise to the disputed Spratlys or turning back the hoards of Chinese tourists flocking to visit the areas in Vietnam where the Hollywood movie ‘Kong: Skull Island’ was filmed.

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“We must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism.” – Xi Jinping – (Flickr)

Initiating a defense against Beijing’s recent economic retaliations over the deployment of THAAD, Seoul raised the issue at a meeting of the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services, held on March 18th. Such a move marks South Korea’s first state-level gesture that—if supported by evidence—could possibly develop into a formal trade dispute.

“We have notified the WTO that China may be in violation of some trade agreements,” stated Joo Hyung-hwan, South Korea’s Trade Minister, revealing this activity to the National Assembly’s Trade, Industry and Energy Committee during his attendance of the committee’s session on March 20th.

In reaction to Seoul’s move, Beijing’s spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce, Sun Jiwen, denied the implications of retaliatory ‘policy measures’, declaring: “As responsible member of the WTO, China has consistently and will continue to respect WTO rules and relevant promises.” Beijing’s spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, also made remarks on the issue while answering reporters’ questions during a press conferences, stating: “We support normal business and trade exchanges between China and the ROK, but this needs a corresponding basis in public opinion. In the meantime, China’s position on opposing THAAD is consistent and clear.”

The comments appear to reckon with South Korea’s current post-impeachment politics in which liberal presidential candidate, Moon Jae-in, is emerging as a frontrunner in the current race (the election is scheduled to be held on May 9th). Moon’s ambiguous stance on the deployment of THAAD, in tandem with his incremental approach to Korean Reunification, has been perceived as a boon to Beijing’s interests.

Seoul’s appeal to the WTO is widely regarded as a symbolic lobbying gesture to exert pressure on Beijing, on one hand, and to raise his issue on the multilateral level, on the other. However, if Beijing’s myopic retaliations continue to worsen, Seoul would consider them as an opportunity to reduce excessive trade dependency on China (trade with China currently accounts for almost a quarter of all South Korean exports). Seoul would accelerate the reformulation of its trade strategies with an emphasis on trade diversification toward India and ASEAN member countries.

In 2016, both the number of subsidiaries set up by Korean corporations and the total value invested by these subsidiaries were 1.5 times greater in ASEAN member countries than they were in China. Such growing trade ties also characterize the current status of ROK-India trade relations; approximately 3% of India’s 2016 imports were South Korean shipments.

Beijing’s miscalculated retaliations generated other unintended consequences for Beijing. It propelled Seoul to strengthen its distant bilateral relations with other Asian countries such as India. Recently, Seoul has agreed with New Delhi to hold an annual ‘two plus two’ high-level meeting to bolster the two countries’ ‘strategic cooperation’ on security and political issues. Above all, Beijing’s counterproductive treatment of its eastern neighbor in the manner one would treat a ‘vassal state’ has served to provoke an anti-China sentiment in South Korea.

Beijing anticipates that such sentiment will be drained when Moon Jae-in wins the presidential election. However, Beijing underestimates Moon Jae-in’s nationalist tendencies, which overshadow his pro-China leanings; given his nationalist views, he is likely to prioritize public sentiment over Beijing’s interests once he wins the election. Unfortunately, KBS-Yonhap News’ March survey results frustrate Beijing, with more than half of the Korean people favoring the deployment of THAAD.

THAAD is a Matter of South Korea’s Sovereignty

THAAD was deployed immediately after Kim Jong-un’s four ballistic missiles landed on Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEC) in the East Sea on March 7th. The arrival in South Korea of two THAAD launchers, along with 16 missiles, has since caused considerable damage to the already aggravated ROK-China relations (which have been impaired since last July’s U.S.-ROK agreement on the deployment of THAAD), largely attributable to Beijing’s hasty and regressive economic retaliations.

Beijing authorities deny implementation of official retaliatory ‘policy measures’ over the deployment of THAAD; however, alleged retaliatory incidents have resulted in significant economic losses to a wide range of South Korea’s industries. Media reports on, inter alia, smashed Hyundai cars and destroyed Lotte products capture the violent façade of Beijing-maneuvered anti-South Korea propaganda, which has turned Chinese consumers into offensive nationalism-driven vandals. Behind the unpleasant pictorials, Lotte, South Korea’s fifth largest conglomerate and its largest confectionary manufacturer, is expected to suffer US$102.7 billion as a result of the Beijing-imposed temporary shutdown of 90% of its department stores in China. The bare effect of providing the THAAD site in South Korea’s rural city Seongju, as part of a land swap deal with the South Korean government, has been to drag the apolitical economic entity into the THAAD imbroglio. Lotte’s case, although indicative of a high-water mark in Beijing’s economic retaliation, is merely the tip of the iceberg.

The year 2017 might prove to be a nightmare for South Korea’s tourism industry, with the annual number of Chinese tourists expected to decrease by 20%. K-Drama and K-pop stars—including those already active in China’s entertainment market as well as those attempting to enter this market—might similarly face hardship, as Beijing continues to impose visa restrictions and event cancellations. Overall, Beijing’s economic retaliation, if intensified, could shrink South Korea’s GDP by up to 0.25%.

Beijing’s growing concerns over THAAD genuinely derive from the possibility that the defense system will weaken the credibility of China’s second-strike nuclear capability. In other words, THAAD is a dagger to China’ ambitions for regional dominance. Nevertheless, Seoul does not have the luxury of encouraging such ambitions on China’s part now, as Kim Jong-un’s relentless terrorist activities continue to South Korea’s survival. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s recent assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, by VX nerve agent, has substantiated, beyond any reasonable doubt, the possibility that the regime could process the chemical into a WMD with the aim of conducting chemical warfare. Kim Jong-un’s ruthless mentality, exemplified in the slaughtering of his own family and his continued fireworks, amply vindicates Seoul from Beijing’s ‘arms race’ accusations.

The deployment of THAAD is an intricate issue that will ultimately be guided by the South Korean people’s will. Still, most South Korean nationalists adamantly assert that the deployment of THAAD is the country’s sovereign right to defend itself from Kim Jong-Un’s existential threats. Some of them take the threats very seriously and go further to advocate for the re-deployment of U.S.-supplied tactical nuclear weapons in the country. Others even warn that, should the Kim dynasty escalate regional tensions in Northeast Asia to the next level, the terrorist regime should fasten its safety belt for an arms race with an economy (South Korea) that boasts a GDP 40 times larger than that of the regime.

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“World’s Emptiest Airport”: Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, Sri Lanka

With protests against China’s investments taking a volatile shape in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan, it is safe to say that the country’s ambitious expansion via economics in the Indian subcontinent is not going as well as Beijing had imagined.

On February 2nd, one person died and more than a dozen got injured when a protest against a $2.4-billion Chinese-backed power plant in Bangladesh turned violent.

The protesters believe that the construction of the coal-fired plant 265 km south-east of Dhaka will cause widespread displacements, disturb graveyards, thereby snapping a sentimental link with the land (too), and damage the environment.

When the agreement was signed for the project, which was expected to begin power generation by the end of 2019, it was touted as the symbol of Chinese-Bangladeshi relations.

In the most recent violence linked to Chinese investment in Myanmar in the third week of February, Hundreds of workers in Myanmar attacked a Chinese garment factory in Yangon, destroying equipment and briefly making seven Chinese workers captive. It took joint efforts of the Chinese embassy and the local police to secure the release of the Chinese workers.

Though this particular incident was related to the sacking of an employee, anti-China sentiment has been rising recently in Myanmar, leading, for instance, the shelving of plans to build a huge dam on the Irrawaddy River.

Similar resistance is also seen in the construction of an oil pipeline in Myanmar, a country that had a good trade and political relations with China at a time it was facing international sanctions due to the military rule.

Elsewhere, a month earlier, in January, scores of people were injured in southern Sri Lanka during a protest against allowing China to build a port and surrounding industrial zone.

The project involved probable displacement of many thousands of people living in villages near Hambantota port, about 250 km south-east of the capital Colombo.

The protesters believe that the area is being turned into “a Chinese colony”. Giving credence to their fears is the fact that the Sri Lankan government is finalizing a 99-year lease of the entire port area to a Chinese-owned company.

In Pakistan, a country with which China’s friendship has recently acquired a proverbial turn, and is said to be “deeper than the seas and higher than the mountains”, the problems are two-fold:

A section of the intelligentsia share the fears of the Hambantota port protesters – that about Pakistan, as a matter of speaking, becoming a Chinese enclave by not negotiating well the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an under-construction $54 billion economic corridor in Pakistan, that aims to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan province in the southwestern Pakistan with Xinjiang in far-western China.

Then there is a more violent opposition in place too – that by groups that have long been demanding independence for Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province. Only this week, the Baloch activists blew up a part of a bridge that belonged to CPEC. More than 15,000 troops are designated by the Pakistan government to safeguard the corridor, and the 7,000 Chinese personnel working on it.

Pakistan squarely blames its neighbour India for all the violence in its country, especially that which targets the CPEC.

India, on the other hand, and while denying any role in Pakistan’s internal violence, has raised concerns about the CPEC passing through some areas of the Kashmir region, which it calls Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and claims it to be a part of its sovereign territory.

The incidents across four countries in the Indian subcontinent—especially the problems of the ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka—reflect the probability of there eventually being a resistance to what experts like Brahma Chellany, a geostrategist and, among other, a fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, calls “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy”.

Addressed in other forms elsewhere by other experts, the term generally refers to China’s ploy to dominate geopolitics via economics, especially that part of economics that involves mega infrastructure investments in underdeveloped and often restive states where the need for investment outbids the need for geopolitical considerations.

For the purpose of brevity, let’s just focus on Chinese investments in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

When the world was apparently against Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s then president, in his bid to brutally crush the deadly terrorist organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), China had readily come forward with not just arms but also economic packages like Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of nearly $14 billion in the decade spanning 2005-2015. ODA was offered for infrastructure, energy, and services projects at an interest rate of 2-5%. Hambantota Port Development was one of the biggest recipients of the assistance.

Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, Hambantota port, built in 2008, today generates almost no noteworthy revenue—while the adjoining Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which became operational in 2013, was dubbed as the “world’s emptiest airport” by Wade Shephard, author of a forthcoming book on China’s “One Belt, One Road”.

Writing for Forbes, Wade mentions that the cost of paying off the airport alone was topping $17 million per year.

In another article for the same publication, Wade mentioned, “All in all, the Hambantota fiasco is sending a clear message to Beijing: showing up with bags of money alone is not enough to win a new Silk Road”.

The twin issue of the port and the airport was enough for the opposition to topple Rajapaksa, almost a cult hero in the country for making it free of 26-year-old LTTE terrorism, in the 2015 presidential elections.

Things have not been smooth for Chinese investments in the country ever since. For instance, a deal about Chinese-owned companies (government proxies in general) taking over 80% of Hambantota port for a 99-year lease for about $1 billion, was scheduled to be signed in January—but has now been postponed indefinitely due to mass protests.

Pakistan poses even greater challenges to Chinese investments. There, China has to deal not only with Baluchistan militant factions that are calling for independence but also international considerations like India claiming a part of the Kashmir region that is currently held by Pakistan—and from where the much-touted CPEC highways pass—to the possibility of Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia fuelling the fire in Baluchistan for their own geopolitical and sectarian interests.

On the business side too, the history of Gwadar port does not inspire much confidence. Despite Phase II of Gwadar getting completed as far back as in 2008, barely any ships anchor there and little freight handling is recorded.

Then there are stray voices in the Pakistan intelligentsia too expressing doubts about the terms and conditions of CPEC, which remain shrouded in mystery, and often also about the host nation become a (notional) Chinese enclave or colony.

Some of the statements and concerns might be exaggerated but the fact remains that uneven usage of Chinese investments, local and social-political bearings of the investments, and, most of all, suspect ability of the financed projects in particular and financed nations, in general, are raising formidable questions to the Chinese steps in the Indian subcontinent. Bulldozing its way multi-billion dollar speed vehicles might not be the answer that Beijing might be hoping for.

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U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson concluded his visit to China earlier this month, meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and pledging to his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, that relations between the two countries would be based on “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.”

The statement by Tillerson is a Chinese concept, first put forth by Beijing in 2010, perhaps in an effort to avoid the much-quoted “Thucydides trap”, after a theory developed by an Athenian historian after the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens. The “Thucydides trap” simply says that a rising power causes fear in an established superpower which escalates toward war.

Tillerson’s seemingly easy endorsement of a Chinese phrase is in sharp contrast to the previous Obama administration’s refusal to do so, largely because the term “mutual respect” was seen as implying that other nations should respect China’s “core interests,” including Beijing’s claims to the East and South China Seas.

Tillerson’s acquiescence to the phrase also contrasts with his testimony during the confirmation process, when the aspiring secretary of state sent this confrontational message to Beijing: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

During that testimony, he also reiterated Beijing’s building and placing military equipment on the contested South China Sea islands were “illegal actions” and “extremely worrisome,” arguing “They’re taking territory or control, or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China’s,” while adding the territorial grabs were “akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine.

Of course, with his latest comments, Chinese and foreign media were quick to jump on the apparent reversal of Tillerson’s earlier hawkish statements and serve their respective readerships. The Global Times, a state-owned nationalist tabloid, referred to “analysts believing that this means Tillerson has implicitly endorsed the new model of major power relations.”

The critics from the Western media also pounced, with the Washington Post running the headline: “In China Debut, Tillerson Appears to Hand Beijing a Diplomatic Victory.” Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued Tillerson’s acceptance of “mutual respect” translates into “the US is in effect saying that it accepts that China has no room to compromise on these issues.” 

With Xi Jinping praising the U.S. Secretary of State’s comments: “You said that China-US relations can only be friendly,” adding, “I express my appreciation for this,” Tillerson has chosen to save face for his Beijing hosts. His face-saving gesture may be an effort not to rock the boat in the days preceding the planned Trump-Xi summit in April. 

Yet if we are to take Tillerson’s and Trump’s previous statements at face value, the foreign policy they will adopt toward China will unlikely be one of ‘non-conflict”. One skeptic is Shi Yinhong, director of the Center for American Studies at the Renmin University of China. “Tillerson said these words because Trump wants to create a friendly atmosphere and environment for the upcoming summit,” according to Shi.

For despite the pleasantries offered by Tillerson to his hosts, the Trump administration has plans for a huge new arms sale to Taiwan, officials are preparing measures to punish Chinese trade practices in the automotive industry, and Tillerson has said that military force might be an option should North Korea persist with its development of nuclear weapons. Trump may want to create a friendly atmosphere for the upcoming summit, but if these issues are still on the table in April, the practice of saving face may be swept aside.

The post Tillerson Gives Beijing Face appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Trump Administration’s budget proposal cuts 28% from the State Department’s funding, reducing foreign aid and de-funding a range of programs. The plan’s well-known focus on the military, and the absence of discussion of detail, or entitlements, lead many to view the so-called “skinny budget” primarily as a statement of intent.

Still, presidential expressions carry clout. In any case life will not return to what it was before the inauguration, no matter how many terms President Trump serves, or who may follow him. Disruptive as the budget plan is, State should take the opportunity to contemplate its mission, and how to fulfill it in the long run with reduced resources.

Secretary Tillerson, in a letter to the Department speaks of programs, more efficient execution, and national and economic security. These are familiar formulas for hard-power advocates and aid staffers alike. But is State’s purpose defined by programs and by security?

State is the home of the diplomatic service. This blogger gained an insight during a Foreign Service posting in Brazil in 1991. The Brazilian government ran a publicity campaign on children’s welfare, asking for assistance from foreigners, including the U.S., who had cited them for human rights abuses. I was directed to mount a “juvenile justice” program with no funds.

When I protested the assignment’s impossibility to a colleague, his encouragement was that this was a chance to practice ”pure diplomacy.” Introducing a few U.S.-based experts and Embassy staff to Brazilian agencies and NGOs, it turned out, successfully showed sympathy with Brazil’s challenges while standing by our policy. My annual review credited me with starting a program, but really what I did was carry out a U.S. answer to Brazil’s diplomatic “put up or shut up” challenge.

Diplomacy is what puts a context around military action, aid, PR programs, or even inaction, regarding issues of economic and national security—and everything else. We need to set a narrative of our motives and concerns whether we are fighting a war or doing nothing at all. The nature of the function has been obscure to professionals and public alike for decades, hence my citation for starting a program rather than executing diplomacy. If State’s budget cuts any number of programs and aid efforts, the diplomatic mission still remains vital. Furthermore the function is not expensive; if State will now have to practice more pure diplomacy, the Department should re-focus on delivering it.

Diplomacy’s basic currency is credibility, which rests on consistency of words with actions, and coherence of national policy. For it, the U.S. diplomat today needs a durable picture of our core national interest. During the Cold War, U.S. diplomats knew that the Containment Doctrine explained almost any actions of our government. Since we lost that focus, U.S. policy has reacted to crises, such as terrorism, and veered between political priorities, from trade liberalization to climate policy to energy independence to women’s rights.

Given today’s volatile politics and a swirling internet-connected world, Containment’s consistency will not be replaced any time soon. We must be able to name a core interest that can fit shifting priorities, more fundamental than partisan politics, drawn in our own terms rather than in reaction to adversaries or crises.

The post-modern world does not only disrupt American foreign policy. Any nation’s priorities are perpetually overtaken by events, discoveries, and new voices. Many are turning for guidance to traditions of ethnicity, religion, or nationalism. The U.S. does not have this option. Individual Americans carry such old markers of personal identity, but our nation was conceived on principle, invoked by our founders as they divorced their ethnic homeland.

Our founding creed, voiced in the Declaration of Independence, is the source of America’s legitimacy, the national beacon and bedrock of a U.S. diplomat’s credibility. To re-hone its diplomatic mission, State must create a body of people expert in the creed’s meaning, who are able to transmit it in policy.

Knowing the creed rigorously takes a rare understanding. It is abstract, enumerating minimal, overarching concepts. It is paradoxical, as free individuals do abuse each other, and government charged to secure rights must restrain itself—and also some individuals. Its words alone cannot guide policy in the flesh, yet their meaning has grown ever more real in our society as we have developed, strained, and fought among ourselves. It is both eternal and fragile: the words shape our view for any circumstances in any times, but we must perpetually prove both our commitment to open-ended rights and our competence to meet people’s needs.

Capturing the creed in policy and diplomacy will require a specialized skill, as distinct as military expertise. The diplomat must be aware that an abstract creed admits of multiple interpretations. They must be ready to agonize over the proper mix of prudence and ideals, and able to translate choices into policy. An extensive and intensive course of professional formation will be needed. It will have to integrate studies of praxis, social sciences, and history; deep immersion in the philosophy and nuances of our creed; grounding experiences in the realities of American life; and personal preparation for the dilemmas and stresses of applying our paradoxical creed in a complex world.

A diplomatic service formed in this light will represent us, their sovereign, by our true national nature. It will also carry our values into policy-making, via the diplomats’ role in interagency processes. As the desk for America’s founding values in our government, and as America’s face to others, they can imbue our actions with our creed.

In the diplomatic function, explicitly oriented to this core national interest, State can revive its mission and guide policy, to keep America true to our founding. If there are programs and actions to be managed, diplomacy will set them in context and support them; if resources limit those, diplomacy will express our motives. As a response to the proposed budget, this re-focus can bring benefit out of shock. The focus is needed, whatever the budget.

The post Diplomacy As A Budget Friendly Program? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently concluded a trip to Asia which included visits to Japan, South Korea, and China. With respect to the Chinese leg of the tour, the North Korean crisis and trade were among the many issues discussed between the two sides. As the North Korean situation has proved particularly intractable over several decades, perhaps more novel solutions need to be investigated. One of these solutions may be a proposal for a permanent, non-aligned stance for a unified Korea in order to allay the security concerns of the great powers within the region.

Ghosts of Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)

To combat the increasing range of North Korean ballistic missiles following the most recent test, the U.S. has begun deployment of its THAAD system to not only better protect itself from possible attack, but also to protect its South Korean and Japanese allies as well. However, THAAD deployment has been highly controversial due to the capability of its X-band radar component to surveil deep into both Chinese and Russian territory. This ability not only has the potential to upset the existing regional balance of power within Northeast Asia itself, but global security as a whole as the THAAD radar would impact both Chinese and Russian missile strike capabilities against the U.S. proper.

Most likely, this will simply lead to an accelerated arms race by both China and Russia focused on newer missile technology in order compensate for the THAAD radar capabilities. This security dilemma reflects China’s stance that it simply is not possible to have “perfect” security for oneself, while simultaneously denying the legitimate security concerns of others. Additionally, this stance was a major impetus behind China’s endorsement of Kazakhstan’s Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) initiative.

China has also proposed its own “double cancellation” deal in order to resolve the North Korean dilemma. This proposal would involve the cessation of North Korean missile tests in exchange for the termination of joint U.S.-South Korean military drills in the region. Unfortunately, the proposal is considered infeasible by the U.S. as it wouldn’t allow it to fulfill its treaty obligations to South Korea. These regional drills affect Russia’s security interests in the area as well and are surely a factor in Russia’s recent deployment of troops to the Kuril Islands, further inflaming ties with both Japan and the U.S.

The Cold War Never Truly Ended

Pivoting back to Europe, yet another security dilemma affecting Russia may hold an answer to the North Korean situation, namely the Ukraine Crisis. While the Ukraine Crisis may not have lasted as long as the situation on the North Korean peninsula, it is sure as equally intractable. The two situations are also similar in other ways. Whereas the Six-Party Talks have failed to provide a permanent solution with respect to North Korea, the Minsk Agreements have had little to no effect in resolving the underlying security concerns of the parties involved. Additionally, both situations are legacies of the Cold War, further proving that a war’s end can have long-lasting effects on both “winners” and “losers” alike.

Several advocates of realism in international relations have proposed that only a Ukraine that professes permanent neutrality between The West and Russia can hope to solve the Ukraine Crisis. These advocates, including Dr. John Mearsheimer of The University of Chicago, maintain that only such a solution will permanently address the underlying strategic issues currently dividing The West and Russia. There is historical precedent here as well, as neutrality for a re-unified Germany was the original condition proposed by the Former Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War.

While such a corresponding solution to the North Korean situation may indeed be labelled as “radical”, with details sketchy, surely now is the time for radical thinking given that the U.S. has clearly stated that its policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea is now over and is also stating that “all options are on the table”. In theory, such a solution has the potential to allay the legitimate security concerns of China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. Both China and the South Korean people as a whole have repeatedly favored continued dialogue with North Korea as opposed to “other options”.

Lastly, and most importantly, a unified and permanently neutral Korea may not only be the key to Korea’s re-emergence as a great power within the region itself, but ultimately is a question that the Korean people (and no one else) have to decide for themselves.

The post Permanent Neutrality for a Unified Korea May Be The Only Solution for DPRK Crisis appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Ever since Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) rose to power in November 2015 on a conservative ticket, the country’s institutions have been mercilessly assaulted. From gagging state media to gridlocking the constitutional court, the PiS government has managed to turn one of the EU’s success stories into a backwater.

That reckless behavior was on full display last week when Donald Tusk was re-elected as President of the European Council in spite of raving opposition from Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo who tried to oust her political opponent.

While Poland is still nominally obliged to respect democratic principles regarding the rule of law as a member state, and the European Commission has been “forcefully” expressing its displeasure with the country’s course of action, PiS has so far been unstoppable.

Brussels’ muted response stems mostly from the toothlessness of Europe’s options for sanctioning misbehaving members. Article 7, for example, was added to the Treaty of the European Union in the late 1990s as a way of holding members accountable for rights violations, enabling the Council to issue a formal warning before revoking the voting rights of the violating country. Even after the Commission triggered the pre-Article 7 process last year, Warsaw’s response was little more than a shrug.

By failing to coerce Warsaw into changing its way, the move instead exposed the EU’s practical inability to enforce the rule of law in member states. As is the case with many of Europe’s rules and procedures, the systemic rule of law mechanism presupposes a willingness to cooperate from the affected national governments. Warsaw has considered the dispute closed since submitting a detailed response regarding its views to the European Commission, allowing Poland to stonewall the Commission from taking repercussive measures for almost a year now.

Making matters worse, actually going through with invoking Article 7—the “nuclear option”—is nearly impossible because this would require a unanimous vote from EU member states. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who is himself busy upending Hungarian democracy, has already expressed his opposition to employing Article 7 against Poland and has no interest in seeing Law and Justice reprimanded for following his lead. Between them, Budapest and Warsaw have exposed the ineffective enforcement of the EC’s mechanisms. Absent the “spirit of cooperation,” national governments can stall Europe’s legislative process to their own ends.

Faced with this dilemma, European Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourová has drawn inspiration from the US Congress and its “power of the purse” by proposing to make the distribution of EU funding dependent on whether states uphold fundamental EU principles like the rule of law.

In the U.S., the federal government uses funding it provides to the states as leverage when the two sides find themselves at odds. Washington has, for example, used federal highway funding to force states into adopting laws on speed limits and drinking age. Seeing how countless projects within the EU member states and the surrounding European neighborhood rely on money from Brussels, the funds Europe provides (and recipients take for granted) could very well be turned into an effective enforcement tool.

Countries like Poland and Hungary, where derogations from EU standards are the most egregious, also happen to be most susceptible to any kind of budget pressure. The Polish government heavily relies on EU funding, to the tune of €104.8 billion between 2014 and 2020. Losing that support would drastically impact the Polish economy and the functioning of the national government, offering a powerful incentive for Poland to comply with the EU’s rule of law principles.

This approach can also be easily applied to aspiring EU members, which enjoy billions of euros in funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which falls under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In the Western Balkans, the EU is the largest investor committed to improving governance and rule of law—areas that are notoriously lacking. Montenegro, for example, is one of the leading candidates for EU ascension and yet it faces rising concerns over corruption and insufficient judicial independence. Freedom House noted a declining trend in Montenegro’s governance, especially since the 2016 election.

That election’s troubling aftermath saw opposition figures arrested, with parties opposed to the continued rule of long-time leader Milo Dukanovic boycotting parliament in a political crisis that exposed the fragility of Montenegro’s rule of law. These developments make the EU’s €270.5 million in funding, €99.2 million of which are supposed to be used for improving the judiciary and fighting corruption and organized crime, appear like wasted money.

Dukanovic, who has placed an ally in the premiership but is still leader of the ruling party, is notorious for his links to mafia organizations and cigarette smuggling. Of course, that IPA funding can be seen in a very different light: combined with the carrot of eventual EU membership, it gives Brussels an important tool for pushing Montenegro towards real reform.

The stakes are even higher in Serbia. Despite being an EU candidate country, Serbia has begun to fuel tensions between neighboring Balkan states by taking an aggressive nationalist stance on a variety of issues. Relations have notably declined between Serbia and Bosnia over a genocide appeal, leading to significant delays in the reform efforts. Even so, the Serbs depend on €1.5 billion worth of ENP allocations for infrastructure improvements and economic transition. Thus far, the worst they have seen from the EU are verbal reprimands which are clearly not doing the job.

With the rise of the far-right and nationalist sentiments across the continent, it is more important than ever to enforce the fundamental principles of the European Union and make the EU a coherent, consistent voice for democratic values and good governance. The EC’s existing mechanisms to enforce compliance have been exposed as paper tigers, but Europe still needs to be able to bring unruly member and prospective states to heel. By leveraging the billions of Euros it sends to these countries, the Union can make sure its rules and principles are no longer trampled underfoot.

The post EU Funds Allocation: Is Brussels Flexing Its Muscles? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Robert Lighthizer said President Donald Trump had picked him for the job “in part because of my enforcement background.” (Associated Press)

The new pick for U.S. trade representative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer, recently signaled the new administration’s get-tough approach to China over trade issues. Lighthizer is currently a trade lawyer for the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and has represented U.S. industries, such as steel, who lobby for higher tariffs on Chinese imports. He previously served as deputy U.S. trade representative under president Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

At a Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, Lighthizer did not stray far from the views of his president, vowing to crack down on unfair trade practices by China and suggesting the U.S. needs “imaginative” solutions and a “multi-faceted approach” on trade litigation. The USTR, was mandated in 1962 to “negotiate directly with foreign governments to create trade agreements, to resolve disputes, and to participate in global trade policy organizations.”

Lighthizer has suggested the World Trade Organization (WTO) is poorly-equipped to deal with “troubling” Chinese overproduction of steel and other exports, arguing, “I don’t believe that the WTO was set up to deal effectively for a country like China and their industrial policy.” 

He also penned an op-ed in the Washington Times in 2011 defending Trump’s criticism of Chinese trade, “How does allowing China to constantly rig trade in its favor advance the core conservative goal of making markets more efficient? Markets do not run better when manufacturing shifts to China largely because of the actions of its government. Nor do they become more efficient when Chinese companies are given special privileges in global markets, while American companies must struggle to compete with unfairly traded goods.”

Lighthizer is also on record declaring the trade deficit with China as “widely recognized as a major threat to our economy.” He has also come out strong against Chinese attempts to keep its exchange rate competitive by keeping the yuan artificially weak, arguing “In the past, it is my judgment that China was a substantial currency manipulator,” Lighthizer said. “Whether China is manipulating the currency right now is another question. That’s up to the Treasury secretary.”

Lighthizer is the latest among several Trump appointees who have argued for a tougher approach to Chinese trade. Peter Navarro, an economist and author of “Death by China” was recently selected to head the newly-formed White House National Trade Council.

With such vocal critics of Chinese trade emerging in the new administration, senior government officials in China are no doubt worried over how trade policy will play out. But some U.S. economists argue that a trade war started by the U.S. may in fact lead to higher prices for consumer goods, such as Americans now enjoy at Walmart, as high tariffs are added to the price of goods. Analysts at the investment firm of Goldman Sachs, whose alumni feature prominently in the Trump administration, also predict a trade war will lead to falling GDP growth in both countries, as well as those countries such as South Korea and Taiwan which are in the supply chain. With so much heated rhetoric from both sides, finding a solution mutually acceptable to both Washington and Beijing is far from certain.

The post Robert Lighthizer on Trade with China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

From front to back, Cold War era Soviet designed SA-6 Kub (with SA-11 Buk type missiles mounted) and SA-4 Krug Surface to Air Missile Systems.

The idea of using weapons to achieve equilibrium between powers and maintain peace is not novel, but its effectiveness depends on the technological balance between competing powers.

One of the accepted theories of the Cold War era was that if both sides had ballistic nuclear missiles, than neither side would risk a first strike. The theory was called Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD, and it meant that both sides would lose the war due to the virtually guaranteed destruction of all parties in a hypothetical nuclear conflict.

This theory may work when both actors in the scenario are rational and accept that death is a final and negative outcome. But it may not add any level of security if one or more of those actors are not rational, have have an apocalyptic view of the world that honors death before life.

The other limitation is when one side is able to neutralize the ballistic missiles to an effective degree of the other side, unbalancing the relationship between the powers and giving incentives for instigating increasingly aggressive actions.

Theories like MAD may be challenged by new anti-aircraft technologies able to successfully target and hit smaller and faster weapons like cruise missiles and even incoming ballistic missiles. The Reagan administration announced a program to develop laser weapons that could destroy Soviet missiles while in space. The Soviet response was to create missiles with multiple warheads so that there was a greater chance of some of the warheads reaching their targets after encountering countermeasures.

While this “Star Wars” technology was not likely to succeed in the 1980s, current anti-aircraft systems may be a solution to advanced ballistic missile threats coming from actors who have challenges being rational in their behavior.

While the early Patriot Missile systems had claimed success against SCUD missiles coming from Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, the reality was that few were successful. But the idea that they could protect their bases and allies tamped down the likelihood that the entire conflict would escalate.

The use of the Iron Dome missile system follows this line of rationale. The new technology reduces the need for a harsh response where innocent civilians are in danger as the effects of ballistic missiles are muted by Iron Dome, eliminating a full scale response to aggressive gestures from both rational and non-rational actors.

The recent deployment of THAAD missiles to protect the region from North Korean missile threats is an another example. However, in this scenario China perceives this deployment as an aggressive gesture itself close to their own territory.

Generally, anti-aircraft missiles do not perform the function of a surface-to-surface missile without major reformatting, and even in that case, the warhead on a surface-to-air missile would not cause any major damage due to its smaller size and the design of how SAM missiles combusts.

The THAAD system therefore is not a direct threat to China as a means to launch an assault on Chinese territory, but it could target and shoot down Chinese aircraft and maybe even their ballistic capabilities.

Anti-aircraft missiles on opposing sides of a conflict act as two shields, whereas ballistic missiles are only used as an offensive weapon a conflict. Thus, it could be argued that they are most effective as a political tool to diffuse a conflict, without making aggressive gestures like placing missiles in Cuba during the Cold War.

Conflicts could occur if both sides have equivalent missile shields, but one side has a large ballistic missile advantage over the other that might still cause a great deal of damage. In either case, rational actors would hopefully see Mutually Assured Defense as a valuable step back from Mutually Assured Destruction, and take steps to reduce the ability for non-rational actions to have a sword when selling or giving them a very capable shield.

The post Missiles as Part of the Peace Making Equation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Adama Barrow, newly elected president of Gambia, arrives for an Independence Day celebration in city of Bakau on Feb. 18, 2017. (REUTERS/Thierry Gouegnon)

After emerging from a harsh dictatorship, now comes the gargantuan task of reconciling Gambia’s past horrors, and laying the groundwork for future prosperity.

I previously covered the encouraging though shocking developments over the last few months in the tiny West African nation of Gambia, population 1.7 million (63% of which is under age 34, which has been and will be a crucial factor in its development- more on this later). To recapitulate, after surviving through the tyrannical reign of Yahya Jammeh for 22 years, in December 2016 the country chose the opposition candidate Barrow in a peace, free and fair election. After vital intervention from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and regional leaders, Yammeh relented his power and left Gambia. In late January 2017 Barrow began his term as the country’s rightful leader.

Young people in Gambia voted in record numbers in the December election, and are thought to have been a significant factor in Barrow’s sweeping victory. Suleyman Ceesay, a Gambian journalist and youth activist, commented “This time we saw the importance of voting. Collectively we agreed we want to be free [of dictatorship] and that having a change of government is the only way to achieve this.”Protests under Jammeh often resulted in mass arrests or worse; one opposition leader died in government custody last April, and watchdog groups have long accused Jammeh of arresting, torturing, and killing political opponents.

But on January 31, 2017 Gambian youth took to the streets for a peaceful show of displeasure for the previous regime. About 1,500 demonstrators gathered at the parliament building demanding all members of the national assembly resign. The protesters hold the assembly accountable for stoking fear and confusion by declaring a state of emergency at the behest of Jammeh, causing many to flee. Youth involvement in elections and peaceful political organization will be important in holding the new government accountable.

On Febuary 20 Gambian national police arrested 51 people in Kafenda, a town that has been a known base of support for Jammeh. Those arrested were involved in a skirmish with Barrow supporters, indicating that tensions are still running high between followers of the old guard and new.

Around the same time, it also became more clear that Jammeh’s financial transgressions were far worse than originally thought. On February 23 officials in Barrow’s government announced that Jammeh looted a whopping $50 million from state funds (up from previous estimate of $11 million), including skimming money from pensions, port operations, and the state telecom company. His mismanagement also left the country with $1 billion in debt. Barrow’s ministers claimed no stone will be left unturned in getting the money back—even going after Jammeh in his current exile in Equatorial Guinea—if it is possible. On February 25 the World Bank pledged $60 million to the new government to help alleviate the financial crisis, and IMF and African Development Bank are expected to follow suit.

Barrow has taken action in support of his promise to sweep away remnants of Jammeh’s regime. On February 27 he dismissed the country’s chief military officer, other army leaders, and the director of the state prison system. The prison director and head of the national intelligence agency were also arrested on charges of murder and human rights abuses. Many citizens and human rights groups are demanding investigations, and justice for perpetrators, in more than 30 cases of political or military opponents who were arrested, killed, or went missing during Jammeh’s rule. Barrow has vowed to implement such investigations.

Finally, on March 10 the Gambian government said it would undertake even more inquiries into Jammeh’s finances. A Reuters investigation revealed that Jammeh stole more than $8 million from a national charity bank account over a 2 year period in 2012-2013.

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Adama Barrow, who came to power in a legitimate election, leading a free and democratic Gambia is certainly a good thing. Yet the developments presented above show that its road will not be smooth, and much work still needs to be done. Barrow needs to both undo the harm (financial, political, psychological) left by Jammeh, but move the country forward through healing and growth. The support of organizations like ECOWAS and the World Bank will be essential in ensuring stability and getting the economy on its feet. Involving youth and different political groups in the new government will help ensure all feel their needs and wishes are represented.

This is the critical time where strength and support, both internal and external, will determine whether or not Gambia will emerge from the shadows of its past.

The post Gambia Seeks to Clean Up the Past, Look to Future appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Defendants in the Court of Düsseldorf. (Speigel Online)

We do not need to be reminded of the lasting political debacles of 2016—but the news cannot help but highlight the fallouts from Brexit and a Trump presidency. What we do not hear enough about is what went right.

Next week is the one year anniversary of the attacks at the Brussels airport. Despite the pain and anger, the Belgians refused to elect their Trump at the end of last year. They refused the far right and opted in favor of a party with a more open mind towards immigration.

This year, as Britain plans its exit from the EU, three other nations face a similar dilemma. France is facing a “Frexit” vote if Marine Le Pen wins the presidency. It will also look at Trump style immigration bans. In the Netherlands, the far-right leader Geert Wilders—who has been on trial for hate speech and discrimination—has said if elected, he will “de-Islamize Europe” by imposing bans (thankfully the latest poll results of the Dutch election seem to deny him this opportunity). And then we have Germany.

Merkel is up for reelection in November. She has faced a blowback from her open immigration policy from within her party and without. Germany has seen security problems – arguably as a result of this open policy. Even so, Germany remains ardent in supporting refugees. In 2016, Germany took in 280,000 asylum seekers—a 70% decrease from the 2015 intake of 890,000.

Despite facing a lot of public dissent for her open policy, Merkel has schooled Trump on the requirements of the Geneva Convention on refugees and maintains the moral and legal obligation of the more developed nations to take in those in need from around the world. All German government functions outwardly support this policy.

In June of last year, a fire broke out in a refugee shelter over a dispute over lunch during Ramadan. Ramadan is the Muslim month of fasting, and some refugees insisted on getting a hot meal midday—before dusk when the fast breaks. This angered other refugees who saw it as a sign of disrespect towards those who were fasting. This was the reason behind the argument, which led to a fire in the asylum center, causing 10 million euros worth of damage. The building has since had to be gutted and repaired.

Two of the accused arsonists, an Algerian and a Moroccan man, both aged 26, were arrested and appointed a public defender in their case. After a long trial, the two asylum seekers were released without reprimand. The court admitted that there was not enough substantiated evidence to convict the accused.

So while this ruling gives hope that Germany will not follow in the Trump path, we do not know what will unfold in the coming months. What we do know is that by November, the shape of Europe will be very different.

The post What Germany Got Right appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With over a million migrants arriving on Greek and Italian shores last year looking to enter the EU, curbing the flow of third country asylum seekers from places like Eritrea is an urgent policy priority for European leaders.

New research from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) suggests that lack of access to employment for refugees in stable east African countries like Ethiopia—which host large refugee populations—makes the decision to take risky smuggling routes to Europe more appealing.

Based on interviews with 63 Eritrean migrants in Ethiopia, the ODI report suggests that there are specific policies Western governments and donors can pursue that could preempt irregular movement from east Africa’s refugee centers to the West.

Some 400,000 Eritreans—or roughly 10% of the population—have left their country in recent years. Most escape into neighboring Ethiopia. The small coastal country in the horn of Africa is known as one of the world’s most closed and oppressive. Poverty, political persecution and military conscription all contribute to people’s decision to leave.

While Ethiopia has an open asylum policy for refugees and provides some services to support them, Eritreans still overwhelmingly make the choice to attempt the perilous Mediterranean crossing. According to Amnesty International, around two-thirds of Eritreans in Ethiopia decided to pursue secondary migration in 2016.

“While there is no doubt this support is helping people meet basic survival needs, the policy has a limited effect on people moving,” says Richard Mallet, research fellow at ODI.

“If refugees are not allowed to work, then they are unlikely to want to stay where their opportunities are limited—and instead opt to take life-threatening routes, sometimes to Europe. Policymakers have to address these realities if their aim is to curb secondary migration.”

Eritreans account for most of the 3,000 people who drowned in the Mediterranean through 2015, according to humanitarian agencies. Trafficking operations net smugglers millions, while Europe’s political gridlock on how to respond to the waves of new arrivals leaves migrants stranded and stateless.

At present, all foreign refugees and economic migrants are barred from working legally in Ethiopia, making it nearly impossible to set down roots or provide for families independently of aid. The ODI research suggests that Ethiopia’s current livelihood support programs for refugees, while helpful and worthy of ongoing donor support, are not sufficient.

Enhancing refugee labour rights in Ethiopia is a key step, albeit a challenging one since most are housed in rural border camps far from any major towns or cities. Opening up the labour market to migrants can also be politically challenging when Ethiopia’s own population is also struggling with joblessness and poverty.

A proposed Jobs Compact in Ethiopia, which aims to create 30,000 jobs for refugees living there paid for by Western donors, shows promise. This would allow refugees to make a practical use of the skills and job training they are already being given through donor-funded livelihood support programs.

Still, much more must be done given the numbers of migrants arriving in Ethiopia every month.

The ODI research also suggests that if Western governments are serious about wanting to stem irregular migration, they need to step up formal resettlement programs. This should be coupled with better information to allow Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers to make informed decisions about their futures.

“By providing an opportunity for safe and legal migration, resettlement often produces an initial preventive effect, linked to people knowing how dangerous and expensive the irregular alternative is,” the report notes.

However, this effect dissipates over time if migrants are left in indefinite limbo. “Essentially, as faith in accessing formal channels declines, the risks of irregular transit become more tolerable,” the authors conclude.

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Financial Times’ This Is Africa service, and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Can Better Policy Curb Irregular Migration to Europe? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.