Foreign Policy Blogs

(Japan Times, 2016)

Much noise has been made about U.S. president-elect Donald J. Trump’s recent telephone conversation with Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen and about Trump’s challenge to the “one-China policy” that Beijing unilaterally considers “the cornerstone of Sino-U.S. relations.”

While state-run mainland Chinese media arrogantly declared that the “mainland must shape Taiwan’s future,” a cadre of professional China apologists in the United States attacked Trump for “provoking China,” and the current U.S. administration rushed to reassure Beijing that America still respected its precious “one-China policy.”

The one thing we mustn’t ever, ever do, according to much of the foreign policy establishment, is anything that might upset or offend mainland Chinese dictators. Above all, we must be sensitive to China’s easily-hurt feelings regarding its unilateral claim of sovereignty over Taiwan (aka the “one-China policy” to which all the world is expected to kowtow). However it may bully its neighbors and abuse the human rights of its own citizens, we must always keep China a happy panda.

More recently, China lodged “stern representations” against content in the U.S. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 including a plan to conduct high-level military exchanges with Taiwan. According to a December 26 editorial in People’s Daily, U.S. military cooperation with Taiwan “clearly violates the one-China principle, interferes in China’s internal affairs, infringes upon China’s sovereignty, endangers China’s national security, undermines peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, and treats the Taiwan issue as a card to play against China.”

(Cagle Cartoons, 2016)

Let’s get real: Taiwan has never been a part of the People’s Republic of China. Taiwan is officially the one remaining part of the Republic of China that did not fall to communist rule in 1949. Previously, Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. Of the more than 120 years since Japan occupied Taiwan in 1895, the island has spent only four years (1945-1949) as part of a unified China.

While mainland China self-destructed under Mao, slaughtered its own young on Tiananmen Square, imprisoned dissidents, and constructed the world’s most extensive system of internet censorship, Taiwan underwent a normal course of development into the modern democracy and free society that it is today. Taiwan therefore has a very different history and a very different national identity from mainland China.

Nor do most of Taiwan’s 23 million citizens have any interest in being part of the People’s Republic of China. In every recent public opinion poll on the question, the vast majority of the island’s citizens are opposed to “reunification” with mainland China and consider themselves to be of “Taiwanese” rather than “Chinese” nationality. Tsai Ing-wen’s landslide electoral victory in early 2016 was furthermore a “clear call to remain separate from China.” Increasingly even the official name, “Republic of China,” is being rejected by independence-minded Taiwanese in favor of “Republic of Taiwan” to signify a complete break from China.

None of this matters to authoritarian Beijing, which insists that “Taiwan society ought to understand and attach importance to the feelings of the 1.37 billion residents of the mainland.” Funny how the opinions of the mainland’s 1.37 billion residents seem to matter to Beijing only when they can be turned against a smaller population that it wishes to subjugate. Like self-entitled brats, state-run mainland Chinese media have declared that “it’s Beijing who has the final say between peace and war on cross-Straits relations, not Taiwan or the U.S.”

(Sakura Jade House, 2016)

Mainland China is a one-party dictatorship, a human rights disaster area, and a clear adversary of the United States. Taiwan is a modern democracy with a positive record of respect for human rights and, at least potentially, a valuable U.S. ally in a region where the United States is losing allies almost by the day. While autocratic mainland China is rewarded for its bad behavior with full diplomatic recognition and full membership in the international community, however, democratic Taiwan is punished with diplomatic isolation.

For a nation such as the United States that considers itself a beacon of democracy and human rights, it doesn’t get much more ass-backwards than that. Beijing’s “one-China policy” is not merely a polite “diplomatic fiction“: It is an authoritarian absurdity, and continued U.S. obeisance to it is an insult to American values.

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Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice, Washington, D.C., 2016.

President-Elect Donald J. Trump is following his iconoclastic campaign with an irregular and irreverent transition period. With a controversial nominee for Secretary of State (an oil executive decorated with an award by the Russian government), a renewed commitment to track Muslims, and tweets about “nukes,” the shaping of the future of U.S. foreign policy has been notable.

A distinction might be made, though, between the hard power of U.S. foreign policy and the soft power constructed daily from unofficial American foreign policy. Presidents make speeches, host summits, sign executive orders, and send troops into battle. But thousands of ordinary Americans serve as unofficial ambassadors of the United States—many counter, or oblivious to official policy.

Americans made over 73 million international trips in 2015. These included 12 million to Mexico, 12 million to Europe, 5 million to Asia, 2 million the Middle East, and more than 300,000 to Africa. Over 300,000 thousand American university students study abroad each year, including more than 10,000 in Africa, 30,000 in Asia, and nearly 50,000 in Latin America. More than 100,000 Americans serve overseas as Christian missionaries. Thousands more serve abroad in non-evangelical roles with organizations like the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. (And there are 7,000 active Peace Corps volunteers, a U.S. government agency but whose work in 60 countries far from the daily business of the State Department.)

Unofficial foreign policy is made with money, as well. U.S. companies held over $5 trillion in overseas direct foreign investment in 2015, including over $400 million in Ukraine, $90 billion in Mexico, and $2 billion in Libya. U.S. companies generated exports of $2.2 trillion in goods and services in 2015, and imports of $2.7 trillion. Migrant workers in the U.S. sent home over $60 billion in remittances in 2015. The U.S. Government’s foreign assistance budget is $34 billion, but American individuals and private organizations donated another $16 billion.

Together, American companies and individuals intentionally or unintentionally drive a tremendous amount of public diplomacy and the foreign policy agenda. Among the many competing interests, the message of one group of young people has stayed consistent for many years. Students and their Jesuit universities remain passionately committed to social justice, and the United States government’s unique obligations.

Their 18th annual conference met recently in Washington. Begun as a protest movement at the U.S. military’s School of the Americas (SOA), a Cold War-era training facility for Latin American anti-Communists, the 2016 Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice brought together over 1,800 high school and college students on a range of social justice topics, especially immigration.

The origins of this emphasis are rooted in the civil wars in Central America in the 1980s, especially El Salvador. U.S. foreign policy at the time was driven by a worsening of the Cold War, supporting anti-government Contras against the Soviet-supported Nicaragua, and the military government of El Salvador against Soviet-supported guerrilla groups.

Salvadoran Archbishop Oscar Romero was assassinated while celebrating Mass, after persistently advocating a “preference for the poor,” and just one day after he called for Salvadoran soldiers to stop killing their fellow countrymen. At Romero’s funeral, dozens more were killed by gunshots and the subsequent stampede.

In 1989, six Jesuits priests at the University of Central America in San Salvador were killed by the government death squads. As one observer noted, “It is frankly difficult to imagine anything more likely to spur American Jesuits to action than the complicity of their own government in the violent death of their fellow Jesuits.” The presidents of Georgetown University and Fordham University led the charge, and Jesuit universities across the country strengthened their commitment to peace in Central America generally and to the cause of Central American immigration specifically.

Immigration reform has new urgency as the Trump administration takes shape. The 2016 Ignatian Family Teach-in for Justice took place just days after Trump’s victory. Students and their social justice mentors shared a shock and dismay at what the results might mean, especially those young beneficiaries of President Obama’s Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, or those with parents and friends without legal status in the United States.

The focus of these conferences leaves some questions. They seem to give more attention to undocumented aliens in the U.S. than to those trying to follow the system’s legal paths, and a precedence for Mexican and Central American immigrants over refugees from Syria, Iraq, Africa, or elsewhere.

But their commitment is not in doubt. Jesuit schools have been working with generations of students on these and related issues, like fair trade, the environment, and criminal justice reform. And not just for discernment—for action. After celebration and education on Saturday and Sunday, on Monday more than 1,000 students had appointments with Congressional staffs to express their political passions—and to begin to develop their political advocacy skills.

The new President and Secretary of State will have a wide range of foreign policy issues to attend to, including immigration, trade, the environment, conflict, global poverty, and more. The professional diplomatic corps, lobbyists, and policy wonks will make their contributions. But millions of unofficial ambassadors—as students and scholars, business professionals, service volunteers, donors, and tourists—will help shape the image and expectations of America abroad, and the policies of the new administration.

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‘Reality Presidency’ and New Diplomacy

The recent public execution of ‘political correctness’ in the U.S. and other Western countries had an unintended consequence: it has removed the curtain of pretense and hypocrisy. This, needless to say, is one of the key factors that could help solve some of the most critical political, economic, and faith-based issues of our time.

However, this positive outcome might not be immediately experienced or appreciated since assertive ignorance and crude communication dominate the public space. President-elect’s supporters had this to offer for post-election consensus building: ‘Donald Trump is the President; deal with!’ And his Transitional Team and selected Cabinet had nothing substantive to add. So, we must deal with this world-changing reality.

And this makes the unpacking of these two concepts critical: ‘conspiracy theory’ and its less known archenemy ‘conspiracy realism’. Both are relevant to understand and to function with the new diplomacy.

The Theorists’ Dilemma

Everything in life is not organized by clandestine cabals, secret societies, or sinister groups driven to achieve political, economic or religious objectives. And everything does not always have a wicked, illegal, or immoral motive. And yes, there are people who always look at authorities with a relentless antipathy and distrust; people who are obsessed in finding the evil geniuses behind everything in ways that borderlines, if not indicates, mental disorder. The notorious killer cult leader, Charles Manson is an example.

Much of the issues in politics and economics are multidimensional and complex. As such, it is too difficult for the average people to wrap their minds around them. Especially during the seasons of heightened uncertainties due to wars, economic downfall and such, it is easy to seek meaning through professional conspiracy theorists. These influence-wielding individuals such as Alex Jones of InfoWars often have packaged explanations to everything.

They—seekers and providers—never change their minds or admit being wrong when new facts emerge and new evidences are unveiled. To them facts are nothing more than convenient covers- hence their offshoot or the creeping effect of fake news websites.

Undermined Reality

The perennial question that puzzled great minds throughout the ages (Is man innately good or innately evil?) has never been more relevant. Most of us may have strong opinions on this matter. As a Muslim, I believe that the human being is hard-wired with divine nobility—moral conscience—and is granted the free-will to disgrace him/herself to the lowest of the lows.

Is man not capable of connivingly conspire to immorally and illegally claim power beyond his rights and thus impose his will on others or commit sexual violence to please his lust? In that case, who is haplessly naïve- the one who believes that man never conspires to control and exploit or the one who thinks he does?

Before the WikiLeaks on government and corporate exploitation and misconduct, Snowden’s expose of intrusive ‘Big Brother’, any such claim would’ve been easily dismissed as a conspiracy theory. Throughout history man has lusted for exclusive advantage in order to control, manipulate or exploit. Yet, most people are still robotically inculcated to disassociate themselves with anything that suggests conspiracy; they are likely to resort to knee-jerk reaction in defense of status quo- whatever that may be. Those in power are often the main beneficiaries.

Politics of the Label

Not all conspiracy claims are driven by far-left or far-right nutty mobs that have an inventory of conspiratorial misgivings and fantasies.

Unless one is locked into state of absolute conformity to one’s own biases or denial, the Crusades, the Inquisition, the cleansing of Native Americans, slavery, colonialism, geopolitics, al-Qaida, ISIS, Shabaab and other such mortal enterprises would not have been possible without some form of conspiracy. And this should compel us to have a frank and sensible discourse on this ever-present human controversy.

Nowadays, any credible challenge to the official narrative of any serious issue, policy, or action is met with resistance from devout conformists or is shot-down by professionals who should be called the conspiracy police. This intellect-policing force needs not to present facts or establish any pattern of analytical discrepancies. All they need is to unleash cold-blooded ad hominem.

On the Receiving End

There are some who vehemently deny the notion that there is a synchronized effort to collectively demonize Muslims and other minority groups. The growing number of mainly far-right politicians who cunningly use “dog whistle politics” to give subtle marching orders. The political operatives, and well-funded media institutions with colorful personalities whose jobs are to incite religious intolerance and to whip people into crippling hysteria, therefore dependency.

In the U.S. and some parts of Europe, anti-Muslim partners foster uniformed propaganda led by hate-mongering “hipsters”. Their motto is: “All Muslims are not terrorists, but all terrorists are.” They insist that their motive is neither racist nor anti-Islamic. However, their thinly disguised racism falls apart as soon as one replaces “Muslims” with Jews, and “terrorists” with financial scammers. Was the latter not the malicious pretext that led to the holocaust?

In the current trend, Muslims are so demonized that individuals and mosques could be implicated arbitrarily and be condemned in the court of public opinion. And since neither media nor the law-enforcement is pressed to present evidence or establish clear trend before accusing any Muslim person or institution, whatever they present is often considered “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.”

Institutional Racism

In the spirit of conspiracy realism and trying out the new diplomacy, let me spread these cards on the table. There are mainly two phenomena that support the notion that Muslims are in political and economic crosshairs: First, geographical areas in which terrorists operate are almost always resource rich or are geopolitically important. Second, though terrorism presents real indiscriminate threat, all countries that succumb to political pressures to make counter-terrorism their principle domestic and foreign policies almost always grow more insecure. Are these random acts of nature or human intervention?

Against that backdrop, the President-elect and his selected Cabinet raise a red flag; especially with regard to their naïve world view and reliance on ‘security experts’ who are blinded by their hate of Islam and Muslims. To what extent are they going to abuse the authority vested in them is open for debate.

The known factor is that governments strategically keep society fearful, senseless, and disoriented in order to create sense of dependency or pass controversial policies or decrees? This is not something that only dictators such as el-Sisi of Egypt would do. Certain intelligence and law enforcement agencies within democratic states such the U.S. have historically fabricated and staged fearful dramas in order to achieve specific political objectives.

Like many Muslims across U.S. and Europe, when some Somali-American activists complained of being discriminatively targeted in the Twin Cities, they were swiftly dismissed as ‘conspiracy theorists’, until recently when a staff whistleblower exposed that TSA was indeed discriminating and “treating Somalis as a community of suspects.

Positive Change Is Coming

Much of humanity, especially those who are digitally connected, is in state of trauma due to wars, economic uncertainty and excessive negativity.

Watching the Aleppo holocaust in real time and the empty political rhetoric of those who could end that horrific misery but would not act has exposed humanity’s corroding collective conscience. Mindful or not, most of humanity—those who are connected to the rest of the world—are suffering from collective trauma of different levels. Still we should not allow that to push us into a state of hopelessness where all we can sense are bloody spooks moving in the blinding darkness. The last thing humanity needs is reckless leaders to make situations more volatile.

Collective Responsibility of Objective Scrutiny

Anyone who accepts the premise that all political initiatives are the works of one interest group or another can comfortably accept the suspicion that his counterpart is engaging in a self-serving conspiracy; even if the counterpart were to deny.

A healthy dose of skepticism is good so long as one maintains a balance and not goes off the rails with it. Runaway skepticism leads to a dangerous state of mind- uncompromising cynicism. It is in that psychological state of profound fatalism where conspiracy theories and theorists thrive.

There is a difference between skepticism and cynicism. The former is the obligation and moral duty of every professional journalist, law enforcement, and public official whereas the latter is an endless emotional wave of doubt, distrust, and pessimism.

In the course of the next four years, institutional attempts to derail or repress genuine discourse and debate on fault-line issues that could add fuel to a global burning fire is very likely. Here is where the non-conglomerate media could assume heroic roles. They should be loyal to the public and not the corporate interest or those in power.

Let us face it, it is not by sheer coincidence that man often performs his very best on stages and under spotlights, and his most vile in darkness or behind veils of secrecy. Keep the lights bright.

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After a series of skirmishes, frantic deal making now looks to have brought about the surprise return to force of Libya in the oil export market.

However Libyan oil coming back online could jeopardize a fragile production cut deal orchestrated by producers cartel OPEC to rebalance the global supply glut driving down prices and squeezing the revenues of oil-dependent economies.

A spokesman from the Libyan Government of National Accord (GNA) has confirmed that Libya will be sharply increasing its oil output in the near future, raising its total production to 900,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd).

Prior to the 2011 death of long-time dictator Colonel Muammar Gaddafi, the north African country exported some 1.6m barrels per day of sweet crude that required only slight refining. Output collapsed after Libya lapsed into revolution and then civil war.

While the new production level remains significantly lower than during Gaddafi-era heights it still represents a significant increase in Libyan output, which had already doubled to about 600,000 bpd since September.

The latest rise in production comes after two of Libya’s warring factions agreed to cooperate to raise output. A group within Libya’s Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) agreed to lift two blockades on oil pipelines which have been in place since 2014 and 2015 respectively as they realign themselves with the Libyan National Army (LNA), one of Libya’s strongest militia groups.

The LNA had held onto two crucial oil ports during factional fighting with the PFG in September, which may have convinced breakaway PFG members to strike the new deal.

Libya’s state-run National Oil Corporation (NOC) has recently prepared to restart oil exports from these ports. With the end of the blockade on pipelines to Libya’s Sharara and El Feel oil fields, national oil officials believe they can add 365,000 bpd to Libya’s production, though they caution this is dependent on the agreement holding.

However the prospect of a Libyan production surge comes shortly after OPEC members finally managed to negotiate a reduction deal.

Despite being members of the cartel, both Libya and Nigeria have been exempted from OPEC’s recent agreements because of their ongoing security and economic problems. However a rapid increase in crude exporting from Libyan fields might change this calculus.

The reopening of the two blockaded pipelines could even bring Libya above its official 0.9m bpd target, potentially straining OPEC deals and the cartel’s willingness to allow Libya to continue producing at pace to get back on its feet.

“OPEC’s agreement granted a Libyan exemption despite this stated production target… but this exemption is not likely open-ended,” warns Jonathan Lang, an analyst for Global Risk Insights.

Production increases will likely only be gradual as Libya’s technical issues and tenuous security situation put a damper on production potential. But if production reaches or even exceeds Libya’s target they could begin to hear sharp protests from other oil producing countries, whose economies are feeling the strain of sustained low prices.

“Saudi Energy Minister Khalid al-Fali, after the conference with non-OPEC producers, gave a very strong statement to the effect that he was willing to cut the Kingdom’s production even more than agreed in order to restore market balance. If Libyan output does increase more, he may need to do that,” says Bryan Plamondon, Middle East and Africa  director at IHS Market Economics.

“A return of Libyan production to world oil markets…on a sustained basis would hamper OPEC’s plan to restore oil markets to equilibrium and move prices upward. It is a serious issue for the organization.”

This article originally appeared in the Financial Times’ This Is Africa service and reappears here with kind permission.

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Russia’s President Vladimir Putin shakes with his Iran’s counterpart Hassan Rouhani. (Alexey Druzhinin/AFP/Getty Images)

As Iran’s economy is likely to become a bonanza for foreign companies in the upcoming years, Russia is preparing to secure its share. In early December, Tehran became the gathering spot for the executives of top Russian corporations seeking to extract commercial benefits, as Iran—a country of almost eighty million people and an economy worth more than $400 billion—is set to open up to the world.

The meetings were carried within the frameworks of two major events: the Intergovernmental commission for Trade and Economic Cooperation and the Russia-Iran Business Forum.

While the permanent Russo-Iranian Commission has taken place in the past, this year’s business forum by all accounts is an unprecedented event, highlighting the growing bilateral cooperation between Moscow and Tehran. By various estimates, the Russian delegation to Iran consisted of almost 200 business representatives, making it the largest group of Russian businessmen to ever visit the Iranian capital.

The diversity in businesses represented was one of the peculiarities of the delegation. In addition to the expected representatives from major Russian oil and defense corporations, there were also members of the top banks, agricultural companies, as well as governors and even the head of the Agency for Strategic Initiatives, an influential organization directly controlled by the Russian President. Overall, Russian and Iranian companies have signed nine deals that are potentially worth almost $10 billion, according to Bloomberg. Moscow and Tehran also signed agreements to construct a heat and power plant, and railway electrification worth more than €2.2 billion.

There are good reasons behind this. Year-on-year trade between the two nations has increased by almost 80%, according to the statement by Russian Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak. Novak has also stated that the amount of bilateral financial payments has tripled in 2016 alone. Hence, both sides are hoping to further commercial ties, increasing bilateral trade from $1.6 billion in 2014 to around $10 billion in the upcoming years.

Interestingly, the trade dynamics between Iran and Russia indicates one of the largest increase throughout all international Russian commercial ties, percentage-wise.

As the West maintains its sanctions regime against Moscow—even though the sanctions might be removed or softened in the upcoming years—many Russian businesses are desperate to find new “friends” abroad. Therefore, as Iran gradually opens up to the world, many in Russia perceive it as an opportunity and, in contrast to Western counterparts, are not afraid of repercussions of such “friendship” in the foreign policy arena.

Indeed, the growth in bilateral trade is easier to achieve due to Moscow’s and Tehran’s similar views on a number of key foreign policy issues, in particular regarding the Middle East. The Kremlin supports the Assad regime in Syria and maintains friendly ties with the current government in Iraq. Most people that I personally spoke to in Tehran were enthusiastically pointing out to the fact that Russia and Iran were each other’s “best friends” at the moment.

Walking in the streets of Tehran, the abundance of Chinese cars and Korean electronics is striking. For Russians, who are seeking to diversify their trade, the success of these Asian countries in Iran shows the path for their own trade expansion. While the West is more timidly entering the Iranian market, Moscow has the opportunity to take a lead in areas where it has sufficient competence and even a modest competitive advantage.

For instance, one of the proposals during the business forum was to promote a Russian alternative to Visa payments technology called “MIR”. Furthermore, many Russian banks look for opening exchanges with Iranian counterparts and even establishing headquarters in Tehran. Russia’s attempt might be particularly fruitful, taking advantage of the fact that Iran is still cut off from the SWIFT network.

Indeed, Moscow is specifically interested in banking, an industry that is potentially worth several trillions of dollars. As Russia is just beginning to expand its influence within the area, Iran’s experience might be helpful in boosting Islamic banking in the southern Russian territories in particular.

The future of the Iranian economic and its growth potential remain uncertain, even more so in the light of the statements of President-elect Trump and his hawkish rhetoric against the Iran Deal. Nevertheless, Russians do not seem to be bothered.

The post As Sanctions are Lifted, Russia Eyes Trade Opportunities with Iran appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

President-elect Donald J. Trump and National Security Adviser-designate Michael T. Flynn. Flynn at the Republican National Convention in July.

Since the election, commentators have repeatedly voiced concern over the uncertainty of a Donald J. Trump administration’s foreign policy direction. This is true despite the fact that Trump focused on foreign policy issues during the campaign more than most presidential candidates. Even his proposed solutions to domestic problems—such as spurring economic growth by opposing foreign trade treaties and limiting immigration—have strong foreign policy implications.

Why, then, is there so much confusion about his intentions? I can suggest a couple of reasons.

Trump’s Statements Are Not Reliable

The first problem is that Trump’s statements are not reliable. It is important to note that most politicians running for office try to be consistent in their statements and, once elected, try to fulfill their promises (although they may not always succeed in doing so or may be forced to make compromises). I know that is not the common wisdom, but it is generally true.

Also, most presidential candidates are closely tied to their party, share their party’s basic outlook and policy agendas, and will be encouraged and supported by their staffers and their party colleagues in Congress. This tends to bolster consistency.

Trump, however—as he and his supporters regularly boast—is not a politician, and he does not think like a politician. Part of not being a politician is that, instead of fretting about what the voters will say next election if he doesn’t pursue his stated agenda, he may very well believe the common wisdom that campaign promises are meaningless.

Indeed, in the days following the election he appeared to change his position suddenly on a number of seemingly essential campaign promises (although, to be sure, the new statements have often been vague and conditioned and may be just as easily dropped the next time he addresses a different audience).

He has little concern for consistency. NBC News has listed 141 positions that Trump took on 23 issues in the course of the campaign. His statements do not conform to any conventional ideological schema. As one political analyst put it:

“We probably know less about what the Trump administration will be like than any incoming administration in modern American history. Trump could end up being one of the most moderate presidents in a generation, or he could be one of the most extreme. He might be both.”

Moreover, members of his campaign staff have advised foreign dignitaries not to take everything he says about their countries, or about his intended policies toward their countries, literally. Overall, one cannot assume that he is strongly committed to anything he has said.

His supporters may not care—as The Atlantic’s Salena Zito quipped, “. . . the press takes him literally, but not seriously; his supporters take him seriously, but not literally.”

The people in Trump’s entourage have taken that perspective and run with it. Corey Lewandowski, Trump’s former campaign manager (who, somehow, continued to receive $20,000 a month from the campaign after allegedly being fired and becoming a paid commentator on CNN) castigated the press for believing what Trump had said during the campaign.

“You guys took everything Donald Trump said so literally. The American people didn’t. They understood it. They understood that sometimes—when you have a conversation with people, whether it’s around the dinner table or at a bar—you’re going to say things, and sometimes you don’t have all the facts to back it up.”

Leaving aside the question of whether comments made around the dinner table or at a bar constitute an accetable standard of truth for a presidential campaign, this leaves it up to all commentators, all citizens, all foreign observers to decide for themselves what Trump really meant. To suggest that they will all come to the same conclusion because that conclusion is so obvious is ridiculous.

Regarding his ties to his party, Trump regularly took stances opposed to standard Republican positions and occasionally denounced the party as dishonest and corrupt. Speaker Paul Ryan, R-Wisc., drew up his own legislative agenda as an alternative to Trump’s proposals, and despite his denunciations of the party, Trump has suggested that he may defer to Ryan on legislative matters. So, at least with regard to legislation, there may be a basis for predictability—based on Ryan’s positions rather than Trump’s.

Nevertheless, Trump, as president, will have the power to intervene on issues as the mood strikes him, and Ryan will have to deal with the relatively small but intimidating Freedom Caucus within his own party conference, which introduces whole new vectors of unpredictability. Beyond that, foreign policy is not like legislation; the president often has a freer hand to act without regard for the wishes of Congress.

Finally, we have to remember that Trump simply lies a lot. For some reason, many voters came to view him as more honest than Hillary Clinton, but in the hundreds of statements that it reviewed, Politifact found that Trump made more than three times as many “mostly false,” “false,” or “pants on fire” statements as Clinton. He regularly makes false statements of fact, such as the notion that “the murder rate in the United States is the highest it’s been in 45 years” (although there was an uptick in 2015, 2014 had the lowest rate in 54 years and 2015 was still among the lowest) or the notion that Trump won “one of the biggest Electoral College victories in history” (of the 54 presidential elections using the current Electoral College system, i.e., since 1804, his outcome ranked 44th, in the bottom fifth).

A reputation for lying will not benefit him in the conduct of foreign policy. Whether you hope to deter aggression through threats or solicit cooperation through promises, your efforts will be hindered if no one believes you mean what you say.

His Positions Never Made Much Sense

While Trump has exhibited considerable flexibility on policy details, however, he has shown greater consistency in a few underlying aspects of his worldview. For instance, his view of politics is highly personalized, highlighting the role of individuals. He sees dependence as weakness. His view of international relations is extremely transactional, suggesting that nothing should be done unless it generates a profit in real terms.

The abhorrence of dependence and the transactional view of politics promote a preference for isolationism. Based on this, he is skeptical of the value of alliance commitments. He is highly skeptical of the value of free trade.

Finally, he admires authoritarian leaders, not because we need them as allies in particular situations (a common justification for supporting authoritarian regimes in the past), but precisely because of their authoritarian characteristics. These perspectives have appeared consistently in Trump’s statements not only throughout the campaign but over the course of decades. While consistent, however, this worldview does not necessarily lead to a sensible foreign policy.

First, although it should not be necessary to point it out, I must say that the notion that it is vital to say the words “radical Islamic terrorism” is such utter nonsense that it barely deserves the minimal effort required to refute it. Even the people who repeat this assertion have not come up with a reason why it matters, nor have they even tried. It is simply something to say when you have nothing of substance to offer.

Moreover, it is practically designed to offend Muslim allies (the ones who do the actual fighting on the ground in the Middle East, including ones whom some might consider radical) and the millions of Muslims who may be sitting on the fence. In any event, “moderate” and “radical” are our terms, not theirs, and the notion that we can decide who is a moderate Muslim and that moderate Muslims will not be offended by all this is simply wrong. The suggestion that the terrorists represent Islam offends them. Constantly repeating this assertion amounts to doing the terrorists a favor.

Now, let’s examine just one of the positions rooted in Trump’s consistent worldview. In an interview with the New York Times in July 2016, Trump discussed his position on NATO. He stressed that he did not want to say whether he would come to the assistance of NATO members under attack, regardless of treaty obligations, because he saw it as better to keep the Russians guessing about his intentions.

He also complained: “Many NATO members are not making payments, are not making what they’re supposed to make. That’s a big thing. You can’t say forget that.” He then suggested that the United States should come to their assistance only if “they fulfill their obligations to us.”

There are problems with this on many levels. It is true that the issue of burden-sharing has been argued and debated within NATO for as long as NATO has existed. The current standard is that each NATO member should contribute 2 percent of its GDP to its own defense budget, and nearly all—not all, but nearly all—fall short of the mark.

The burden-sharing issue is rooted in the common problem of collective goods: The smaller countries in a deterrent, or collective-defense, alliance often invest suboptimal amounts in their own defense if they believe that a large ally is going to defend them anyhow. They will often argue that they have other fiscal obligations, cannot afford large military outlays, and could not contribute enough to have a meaningful impact on the collective defense in any event. This has given rise to years of debate, negotiation, and deal-making within NATO and other U.S. alliances.

Trump seems to be addressing this issue, and many analysts view his statements from this perspective. Yet, while it is often difficult to ascertain what Trump is thinking from what he says, that does not appear to be what he means here. In this and related statements, he seems to expect allies to make cash payments to the U.S. Treasury in return for our defending them. If they don’t make those payments, we will not be there for them.

This questioning of commitments undermines the very purpose of a deterrent alliance. (Without any evident recognition of the irony, in a speech in April, right after making this argument—“The countries we are defending must pay for the cost of this defense, and if not, the U.S. must be prepared to let these countries defend themselves. We have no choice.”—he then went on to complain that under Obama, “our friends are beginning to think they can’t depend on us.”)

Elsewhere he has spoken more specifically of how much the United States spends on bases overseas to defend allies and has suggested that we should bring those troops back home to save money.

Yet even as a narrow fiscal calculation, this argument does not make sense. He is not talking about demobilizing those troops; he intends to expand the military, so they would have to be stationed here in the United States. According to a 2013 RAND report, it does cost $10,000 to $40,000 extra per person per year to station troops abroad, but the host countries cover most of it.

Regardless of what Trump suggests, countries like Germany, Japan, and South Korea (the countries where most U.S. overseas bases are located) actually do spend considerable amounts to defray the costs of the U.S. military presence, albeit in the form of free land, tax and fee waivers, or in-kind payments of services, supplies, and facilities, not direct payments to the Treasury. Last April, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea told the Senate Armed Services Committee that, all things considered, it is actually cheaper to keep our troops in Korea than to bring them home.

Yet all of this still misses the main point. There is a reason for stationing troops overseas—even if it were to cost more. The purpose is to show a commitment to the common defense; the purpose is deterrence. A single U.S. battalion stationed in, say, Poland or a Baltic state, cannot defeat a Russian invasion directly, but it can convince the Russians that an attack on that state automatically means a larger war with the United States—something best avoided.

The United States benefits from the maintenance of peace and stability. It costs far less not to fight a war because it never happened then to let it happen and then get dragged into it. (See World Wars, I and II.) If Putin were to consider Trump’s frequent praises of him, put them together with Trump’s questioning of the U.S. commitment to NATO, and then conclude—mistakenly—that he could intervene with impunity in the Baltic states, you could very well end up with World War III.

As a businessman, Trump is accustomed to negotiating about dollars, maximizing revenues and minimizing expenditures, but national security, and politics more generally, is a different kind of beast. The goal is rarely in the form of dollars or anything else that can be quantified and calculated in the same way. Nor can success be measured easily or precisely when success means the absence of action (e.g., not being invaded).

Deterrence, stability, peace—these are valuable goals, but they are achieved through perceptions and other amorphous psychological processes as much as through hardware; and the key perceptions, being the perceptions of the other side, cannot be precisely manipulated. Trump may think he is being clever and improving his bargaining leverage by keeping his commitments vague and fostering an image of unpredictability, but such tactics can easily backfire.

Remember, in 1950 Kim Il Sung had been pestering Stalin for a year to let him invade South Korea, claiming both that he had prepared uprisings in the south and that his military could seize the entire peninsula before anyone had time to react. Stalin put him off repeatedly—until a partial withdrawal of U.S. troops and a speech by Secretary of State Dean Acheson put into doubt our commitment to the south’s defense.* The result was the Korean War. Would something similar happen in the Baltics today? We should make an effort to assure that we never find out, and Trump’s approach is not the best way to go about it.

So, in conclusion, it is worth repeating: It is difficult to know what Trump will actually do as president. On the one hand, it seems that he doesn’t really mean many of the things he says. On the other hand, the underlying beliefs of his worldview have such dangerous implications that they might never get through the foreign-policy bureaucracy. At least, that’s what I like to tell myself.

*Other factors were the failure of the United States to intervene in the civil war in China, which was generally considered more significant than Korea, and the Soviet testing of its first atomic bomb.

The post The Donald J. Trump Foreign Policy Enigma appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The UN Security Council adopted a resolution to impose sanctions on the DPRK in order to curb the country’s nuclear and missile programs. (Xinhua/Li Muzi)

Of all Donald Trump’s transitional appointments, perhaps the least controversial has been his choice of South Carolina governor Nikki Haley for UN ambassador.

Haley, who will need to be confirmed by the Senate, is a seasoned politician at the national level but has far less foreign policy expertise, an experience gap that could quickly make itself felt as the governor juggles dealing with the UN bureaucracy while handling major rivals like Russia and China.

First on Haley’s plate will be turning her boss’s mostly unarticulated views on the United Nations into a coherent approach to the global body. During the campaign, Trump indulged in strident criticism of the UN, denouncing it in a speech to AIPAC as “not a friend” of freedom, democracy, the US, or Israel.

In that same vein, the President-elect has threatened to dismantle some of the Obama era’s key multilateral accomplishments. He pledged to pull the US out of the Paris climate and tear up the nuclear deal with Iran, fatally undercutting two of the UN’s banner accomplishments. This would anger the other members of the Security Council, who backed the Iran agreement unanimously, as well as the UN leadership who helped bring both to fruition.

Trump has also denounced Obama’s rapprochement with Cuba, widely supported at the UN, and vowed to “veto any attempt by the U.N. to impose its will on the Jewish state.”

For diplomats used to Obama-style multilateralism, Trump’s victory has been a harsh shock. The UN has long had a fraught relationship with Republicans, but Obama had mostly shielded the organization from their reach.

Even Obama, though, has at times found himself at odds with the UN. He has consistently shielded Israel from UN criticism, and is the only president since 1967 to not allow a single Security Council resolution specifically condemning Israel. During Obama’s tenure, the US also defunded UNESCO after the agency admitted Palestine to its ranks.

Where Obama’s approach to the UN has been muted, the Congressional Republicans who will need to confirm Haley’s nomination have been far more outspoken. To that end, Florida representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen introduced a United Nations Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act in 2015 that would have pushed for voluntary US funding of the UN and required an itemized justification of the funds the US government was contributing to the UN budget. Those demands aren’t new: Marco Rubio introduced an identical bill in the Senate in 2011.

The opaqueness of American contributions to the UN, as described by Rubio and Ros-Lehtinen, is a major sticking point. The most recent example involves the International Agency for Research on Cancer (IARC), which operates as part of the World Health Organization and receives substantial funding from the National Institutes of Health (NIH). Jason Chaffetz, Chairman of the House Oversight Committee, is currently leading a Congressional inquiry into NIH’s funding of IARC,  which has been criticized by other scientific bodies over a series of controversial findings that break from those of regulators in both the US and Europe.

These include glyphosate, a common herbicide IARC determined “probably carcinogenic” in contradiction of recent findings issued by the EPA and international health authorities. Alongside glyphosate, however, IARC has also found itself on the defensive for its evaluations of processed meats and especially coffee, which it insinuated was carcinogenic for well over two decades before changing its mind this year. The agency’s critics, Chaffetz among them, say the agency lacks transparency and scientific rigor and is too quick and too liberal with the carcinogenic label.

With a fellow skeptic replacing Obama in the White House, initiatives like the Chaffetz investigation are likely to pick up steam. While a stricter approach to America’s share of the UN budget will ruffle diplomatic feathers, the new administration and its Congressional allies have a strong hand to play.

Namely, the US is the single largest contributor to the UN budget, with its mandatory and voluntary payments amounting to about $8 billion annually. With Washington on the hook for 22% of the UN’s regular budget and 28% of the peacekeeping budget, American lawmakers have considerable power of the purse: UNESCO, for example, had to forego over a fifth of its operating budget when it lost US funding.

As US ambassador, Haley will be the embodiment of America’s attitude to the UN apparatus. After all, one of the main sources of relief among diplomats in New York at the news of the Haley appointment was that Donald Trump would not be sending another “angry white man” in the mold of John Bolton.

That honeymoon might not survive an era of intensified Congressional scrutiny and lower contributions, but the measure of influence that the US maintains over the UN structures will depend in large part on Haley and her ability to channel her gubernatorial experience in dealing with an entrenched bureaucracy.

Unfortunately, the US in general and Haley in particular will be bringing far less firepower to the UN Security Council. The new ambassador will have to navigate pressure from both Russia and China; Moscow has repeatedly reminded the rest of the Security Council who calls the shots in the Syrian war, stonewalling resolutions from the other permanent members and agreeing to UN observers in Aleppo only after its allies took most of the city.

Of course, the new president-elect’s professed willingness to work with Russia on Syria could mean Haley spends less time arguing and more time acquiescing. In either event, Beijing will continue quietly gaining ground on Washington and Moscow within the UN bureaucracy, making moves like increasing its funding for UN peacekeeping operations to increase its influence while its main rivals focus on mutual recriminations in the Middle East.

While the particulars of Nikki Haley’s ambassadorship will remain a matter of conjecture until she takes her seat, one thing is for certain: come January, things are going to get interesting in New York.

The post Nikki Haley Steps into the Turtle Bay Meat Grinder appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Anastasia Lin (Wikimedia Commons)

Recent events surrounding Chinese Canadian beauty queen and human rights activist Anastasia Lin‘s participation in this year’s Miss World pageant illustrate the negative effects of China’s growing global influence. Nominated twice to represent Canada in the pageant, Lin was banned from participating in the 2015 contest held in China; and has now been barred from speaking on human rights at this year’s contest in the United States (See Boston Globe, Epoch Times, New York Magazine, New York Times, Toronto Star, Washington Post).

A native of mainland China who immigrated to Canada as a teenager, Ms. Lin has been outspoken in her criticism of China’s atrocious human rights record. As a practitioner of the Falun Gong spiritual practice banned in China, she has dedicated herself particularly to fighting religious persecution in China. China’s efforts to silence her have included threats by Chinese authorities against her father in China. In 2015, Lin was denied entry to China to participate in the contest held in Sanya on Hainan Island.

“The Chinese government has barred me from the competition for political reasons,” said Lin when she was banned from the 2015 contest, “They are trying to punish me for my beliefs and prevent me from speaking out about human rights issues…. The slogan of the Miss World competition is ‘Beauty with a purpose.’ My purpose is to advocate for those who cannot speak for themselves—those who suffer in prisons and labour camps, or whose voices have been stifled by repression and censorship.”

This year’s contest was held in Washington D.C., where free speech is guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution. Under Chinese corporate sponsorship, however, the pageant’s U.S. organizers and the London-based Miss World Organization have now become enforcers of Chinese censorship.

Lin has been barred from speaking with the media, and even a U.S. State Department official was refused access to Lin unless “accompanied by a pageant employee, who insisted on attending the meeting.” A friend of Ms. Lin’s reported: “They have specifically told her not to talk about human rights during the pageant, even though that is her official platform…. She is very frustrated.”

Boston Globe writer Jeff Jacoby describes the scene in a Washington DC hotel lobby, as pageant officials behaved exactly like Chinese government thugs when he tried to interview Lin: “A Miss World employee saw us talking, and demanded an explanation…. The employee instantly called in reinforcements. Soon there were three officials. Two of them hustled Lin from the lobby, angrily accusing her of breaching the rules and causing trouble. The third blocked me from talking to Lin, and assured me that my interview would be scheduled the next day. It wasn’t, of course.”

The increasingly “long shadow of Chinese censorship” has been noted for several years. China’s efforts at silencing its critics around the world have included harassment of exiled Chinese dissidents, pressure on international film and literary festivals to bar works by Chinese dissidents, economic pressure on international news media to produce more “positive” China coverage, and cyber-attacks on news and human rights websites. Now even the Hollywood movie industry appears ready to submit to Chinese censorship for access to the Chinese market.

“We all live under threat from the Chinese regime,” Lin wrote in 2015, “Too easily we accept this kind of coercion as the social norm, blaming those who speak out rather than those who wield the batons…. Leaving China doesn’t make one free, not when friends and family there become hostages. Freedom comes when we stop accepting tyranny and challenge those who would preserve it.”

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Police officers cordoned off the area from family members and other churchgoers after the bombing of a Coptic church. (Reuters)

In 2017, we may see more of the assault on the ancient minority communities in the Middle East. Another major attack on the Coptic community in Egypt this week set targeted its most important Church in Cairo, and there is little doubt that the mass causalities of women and children was done with intent.

Attacks on these ancient communities in the region often focus on women and children, as one of the main goals is not just murder members of these minorities, but to wipe out future generations through death, submission or conversion out of their faith and culture.

The attack on Christians in the Middle East, and other minority communities such as Yazidis, attempt to destroy the present and future of some of the oldest cultures in the region.

A renewed assault on Palmyra by the Islamic State may have some connections to this genocidal policy. Palmyra has been re-taken by an assault of 4,000 ISIS fighters on the ancient city. While Aleppo, Raqqa and Mosul would be the logical destination for re-enforcements, as they are in the midst of being recaptured by local government forces, Palmyra has been targeted for further destruction.

One of the reasons Palmyra is a target lies in its historical significance. Actions by ISIS aim at erasing the history of minority and historical communities in the region, leaving not a shred of evidence to their existence, despite them being some of the oldest surviving communities.

Although Western countries have an obligation to stop genocide, they have continuously failed. While bickering  about less urgent issues continues, minority communities are being wiped out and have received little to no support on the ground until recently.

The government of Canada—one that loves to receive praise by the international community on its humanitarian efforts—was revealed to only having brought in three or four Yazidis in their push to bring in over 30,000 refugees from the region.

After Nadia Murad came to Canada to plead for an increased push to bring in more Yazidis, Canadian authorities declared they would only bring in 50 people in total, despite committing to bringing in tens of thousands of more refugees from the region. This is significant less than what independent Canadian NGOs have brought into the country without government support.

A great analysis and approach to how Western governments should address genocide in the Middle East was produced this past weekend. It reflects the lack of effort from Western nations in their commitment to end genocide in the region. The conference can be seen on the One Free World International’s Facebook page under the December 10th 2016 Celebrating Freedom video link.

2017 will either be the year in which governments decide to stop genocide in the region or let it continue. This will impact how future generations, seeing us all as the ones who allowed such atrocities to become normalized.

The post The Normalization of Policies that Ignore Genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With the nomination of General James “Mad Dog” Mattis as the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, many are wondering how, if appointed, General Mattis will influence a Trump Administration concerning U.S. relations with China.

In August, General Mattis co-authored a report along with Kori Schake and Jim Ellis, all fellows at the Hoover Institution, entitled “A Blueprint for American Security.” In the report, the authors criticize the last three administrations for a perceived lack of national security vision, saying those leaders have largely ignored threats posed by Russia, China and terrorist groups worldwide. In the report, the coauthors refer to predatory states that prize their own sovereignty but destroy that of others—in particular, Russia, China and Iran:

“The priority challenges we would confront are: Russian belligerence, Chinese activities in the South China Sea, ISIS and Iranian aggressiveness, and drug-gang activity south of our border.”

“China chips away at others’ sovereignty in Asia.”

“China is doing the same, demanding veto authority over the rights of its neighbors in the South China Sea. This behavior follows a classical Chinese “tribute” model that demands deference from “lesser” nations in Beijing’s sphere of interest.”

“nuclear rearmament and proliferation, respectively, back in fashion for the saber-rattling Russians and expansive Chinese”

“America’s foreign policy objective should be to reassert an order conducive to our security and that of our allies.”

“Even long-term friends of our country are hedging their bets, questioning the reliability of our partnership.”

Finally, last year Mattis called for a “policy to build the counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea.”

When President-elect Trump announced his selection of Mattis as secretary of defense, Trump referred to him as “Mad Dog Mattis,” which could be read as foreshadowing a more aggressive defense policy, including toward China.

In recent days we have seen Trump taking a more combative position toward China, asserting his right to take a call from Taiwan’s president and calling into question the U.S. adherence to the long-standing “One China” policy. 

While Trump may have calmed some nerves by appointing Iowa Governor Terry Branstad as the new U.S. ambassador to China, who is a “long time friend” of Chinese President Xi Jinping, we really won’t know what actions the new U.S. president will take until after his inauguration January 20.

Until then, we can expect more soundbites and tweets which disturb the international order (and more counter punches from Beijing) making for more interesting dinner conversations. 

The post Mad Dog Mattis on China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On December 5, the Obama administration released a report outlining the legal and policy frameworks for the president’s use of military force. A Presidential Memorandum accompanying the report directs the National Security Council staff to update and release the report to the public on at least an annual basis.

The report was not designed specifically in response to the incoming Trump administration, but its tone is colored by Trump’s win. In a post-election New Yorker article, President Obama said “I think that if Hillary Clinton had won the election then I’d just turn over the keys. We’d make sure the briefing books were in order and out we go.” Trump’s upset win upended that plan.

The report received brief coverage in the midst of the—wholly justified—media scrutiny of Trump’s executive appointments. Beneath its wonkish veneer, however, the report addresses one of the key concerns surrounding a Trump presidency: the amount of military power that has been centralized in the presidency, which Trump will now inherit, and the opacity with which that power has been exercised by the preceding Republican and Democratic administrations.

The accumulation of presidential prerogative to authorize the use of force outside of Congressional constraints and with limited public disclosure—often through the use of drones—has become an issue of structural governance rather than partisanship. Further, concerns about President-elect Trump’s judgment, temperament, and his campaign pledge to “bomb the hell out of ISIS” bring greater urgency to the issue.

The Obama administration received more criticism on its drone policy from liberals than from conservatives. As drone technology developed and standards for their use in lethal operations remained ad hoc, organizations like the Stimson Center and the New America Foundation aimed to codify how, and by whom, drones were used.

President Obama embraced drones as an effective anti-terror tool that reduced U.S. military footprints in trouble spots. His ability grew to authorize strikes against individuals and groups deemed a threat to America. In Obama’s hands, that power was tempered by a prevailing skepticism about the use of military force. That power now passes to Trump, who has shown a greater openness to the use of force.

The report is an important marker in President Obama’s effort to impact Trump administration policy as he leaves office. Under any administration, the report is a paradox: it is an attempt at transparency that ultimately points to how little can be revealed about the use of military force.

Secrecy still governs national security strategy, both to protect those on the front lines and to ensure the strategy itself has the greatest chance to succeed. The report’s country-by-description of the administration’s use of force is brief and full of legal vagaries (“among other things”, “limited number”, “necessary operations”) that tack around specifics. It adds nothing to descriptions of military operations that mainstream media cannot improve on. It is an academic hat-tip to transparency that reveals little.

The second part of the report, particularly the portion addressing the rules used for targeting and engaging enemy combatants, is far more pertinent. It describes the decision-making procedure regarding the use of lethal force that involves five factors:

• Distinction: targeting combatants and not civilians;
• Proportionality: ensuring civilian losses are not ‘excessive’ in relation to military objectives achieved;
• Necessity: identifying a legitimate military purpose for the use of force;
• Humanity: avoiding injury unnecessary to accomplishing the military objective;
• A robust internal review process.

A review process, while shielded from outside scrutiny in a classified environment, ensures that the decision to use force passes through many hands, each one able to weigh it against the preceding standards. Describing the review, the report reads:

Throughout the military chain of command, commanders, advised by trained and experienced staffs—including intelligence officers, operations officers, and judge advocates—review operations for compliance with applicable U.S. domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict, and for consistency with the policies and orders of superiors in the military chain of command.

While not addressed to President-elect Trump specifically, this reads like an appeal to order in the face of a incoming leader known and feared for his impulsiveness and bombast. Should it calm fears about the concentrated power about to be handed to an inexperienced and potentially trigger-happy president-elect? Yes and no. Here are two reasons why it should not.

First, the Obama administration—while showing a commitment to both multilateralism and international law that its predecessor did not—acknowledges constraining standards while stopping just short of pledging to follow them. This sentence appears early in the report’s discussion of targeting: “The U.S. Government makes extensive efforts to ensure that its targeting efforts comply with all applicable international obligations, domestic laws, and policies.” The hole in the language is deliberate; “extensive efforts” are not a commitment. It is the presidency protecting itself.

Since 9/11, the presidency—regardless of party—has operated on permanent wartime footing and chafed at any constraint on its ability to project power quickly. There are strategic justifications for this. The result, however, is that concentrated power has accumulated, and is now to be handed to the least qualified incoming president in the nation’s history.

Second, the Obama administration promulgated its standards using Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governing the use of force. A PPG is just that—presidential. President-elect Trump will have the right and ability to supplant President Obama’s procedures. The report’s call for the National Security Council to update and release it at least annually is the Obama administration’s effort to be on the record attempting to influence how force is used and information about its use is disseminated. Ultimately, however, Obama cannot compel his successor to follow his recommendations.

That said, does the report have value? Yes. It is an on-the-record standard to which the Trump administration military policies may be held to account. It is an explicit acknowledgment that the nature of the fight against extremism and terrorism has changed the way presidents make decisions about force. It is an effort to codify precedents as presidential power changes hands to support consistency in decision-making.

Finally, it is an invitation to the public to demand more information about military decision-making from the incoming administration. Think tanks and NGOs took up the mantle of oversight on drones during Obama’s tenure. America benefits from a NGO sector, outfitted with expertise from former government officials, that keeps a watchful analytical eye on those in power. They do so as watchdogs, and in effort to influence government action. As the Trump administration takes office, these roles has never been more important.

The post Obama, Trump and Drones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On December 13, Donald Trump nominated ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for Secretary of State. Tillerson’s nomination raised questions on whether the top executive of one of the world’s largest corporations (5th largest by market cap, to be exact) can put the American national interest above business interests. Questions of incompatibility aside, what weighs even heavier are the accusations of Tillerson’s connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump’s pick is the most recent of many controversial choices for top jobs in his administration. The President-elect’s inner circle has long been accused of harboring pro-Putin and pro-Russian attitudes reflected in their cabinet picks and associates.

For example, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort has been investigated by the FBI over connections to a high-ranking pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, from whom he allegedly received a $12.7 million cash payment. Future Trump national security advisor General Michael Flynn attended a dinner in Moscow in 2015 and was seated at Putin’s table, while long-time Trump supporter Roger Stone admitted to having had “back channel” communication with Wikileaks head Julian Assange.

Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would have some “time in the barrel,” and Podesta’s emails were hacked by Russian groups and then posted on Wikileaks. Trump himself has on multiple occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the Russian President.

At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly rougher tone with China. As he has made abundantly clear while on the campaign trail, he considers China a serious—if not the most serious—threat to the United States.

First and foremost, he identified China as an economic threat, bent on undermining America’s global economic pre-eminence by inventing the concept of global warming in order to reduce the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. He also repeatedly blasted China for “taking our jobs” and accused the Middle Kingdom of “illegal dumping.” Add to that the fact that Trump reversed in early December decades of established U.S. policy towards China by accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen. After the call, he openly called into question America’s adherence to China’s “One China” policy.

If Trump advisors are indeed right, and the phone call with Taiwan was long planned, then the President-elect’s reasoning behind staffing the White House with pro-Russian hacks becomes quite clear: breaking apart the budding Moscow-Beijing alliance.

Seen in this light, aligning with Russia is not an expression of subservience to Vladimir Putin, but instead a strategic calculus of the Trump administration meant to contain China. Due to geographical proximity and historical animosity, Russia and China are acutely aware of the threat they pose to each other. In Trump’s view, faced with a revisionist Beijing, Moscow and Washington are natural allies.

China has always been suspicious of Russia’s intentions, because Moscow remains firmly anchored in the West. In the words of a Chinese academic, “If the next U.S. president shows more respect to Russia and is less tough toward Moscow, the Kremlin’s ‘turn to the East’ will very likely swing to the West.”

It seems that time has come. While Trump has indicated that he is hoping for more engagement against China from regional allies, especially Japan, some of America’s allies no longer seem to be inclined to follow Washington’s lead. When the Australian government declined to comment on Trump’s overtures to Taiwan, citing “national interest” as justification, eyebrows were raised in astonishment. But when looking at the economic data it makes sense: Australia is the “developed world’s most-China dependent economy”, owing much of its 25 years of uninterrupted economic growth to Beijing’s booming demand for commodities.

This helps to explain a string of pro-Chinese decisions taken by Malcolm Turnbull, from agreeing to a 99-year Chinese lease of parts of the Port of Darwin to rejecting a $40 billion Japanese bid to build Australia’s new submarine fleet. With China being the most important trading partner for Australia, it appears that Beijing has made its influence in Australia stick. For incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, China’s growing clout in Australia and across the Asia-Pacific will make strengthening U.S. alliances with trusted allies like Japan a priority.

For both the U.S. and Russia, strategic alignment is a way to keep the looming China threat in check. While Trump will likely disengage from Europe, he is likely to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific and China’s containment. Thus, the strategic encirclement that China suspected the U.S. would pursue under Obama’s pivot to Asia will continue, albeit in an altered form – not primarily via the control of Pacific island chains by the U.S. and its allies, but through Beijing’s immediate neighbor, Russia.

However, the degree to which this new partnership with the Kremlin will work out remains to be seen. America’s new alliance comes with many unknowns. Whether Putin can really be regarded a trustworthy ally is debatable, and whether Chinese President Xi Jinping will sit quietly through provocations amid a new serious strategic challenge may be called into doubt as well. Playing the “Russia card” against China the same way Nixon erstwhile played the “China card” against the Soviet Union remains a high-stakes gamble.

 

The post Trump’s Great Game: Courting Russia to Contain China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

DRC president Joseph Kabila speaking at the United Nations in New York. (MONUSCO Photos)

For the second time in 16 years, the United States is preparing to inaugurate a president-elect who has lost the popular vote. While his opponents are organizing a number of dubious recounts in Midwestern states, his own supporters retort by spreading untruths about massive amounts of voter fraud in California. The president-elect himself is under fire for unprecedented conflicts of interest. And then there are strong suggestions that a foreign power meddled in the election process, possibly tipping the scales in favor of its preferred candidate.

Meanwhile, in Ghana, a majority of voters cast their votes for the candidate who proceeded to win the election. The current office holder promptly conceded. This marks the seventh peaceful political transition in a row in the West African country. Of course, democracy has long since ceased to be the province of America alone. In Africa, Ghana is perhaps the best example.

Alas, for every Ghana, there is a Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC is a paradigm of the kind of state that people often associate with the African continent: weak governance, instability, violence, and a trend towards autocratic rule. However, current president Joseph Kabila had an opportunity to make history. Constitutionally barred from running for a third term, Kabila could have set a precedent by handing over power peacefully. He instead chose to do the opposite.

In the late 1990s, his father Laurent Kabila wrestled control over the DRC from long-time dictator and connoisseur of hats Mobutu. Upon Laurent’s death, Joseph was handed the reigns and then went on to win the presidential elections in 2006. These were widely regarded free and fair. However, inconsistencies and allegations of fraud marred his re-election bid in 2011, and his rule has become increasingly autocratic ever since.

Members of the Congolese community in Toronto protest the 2012 election results in the DRC, in which President Joseph Kabila was named the winner (Wikimedia)

According to the DRC’s constitutional rules, presidential elections were supposed to take place in November. Kabila and his supporters have argued that logistical and budgetary constraints have made this impossible. While there may be some merit to these concerns, these are clearly strawman arguments.

The constitution bars Kabila from running for a third term. He is wildly unpopular in the country, as fewer than 10% of Congolese want him to remain in power. He and his allies are trying to protect the economic and political gains they have amassed over the past 15 years in power. Kabila himself appears to have little to no interest in leaving the DRC for a position as an elder statesman in the mold of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. In his mid-40s, he is still young. There is also a sense that his camp has safety concerns. They fear that handing over power to the opposition will lead to prosecutions.

Kabila’s solution has been to drag his feet on organizing elections. He now wants to delay them until 2018. Protests have been met with violent repression. In September, security forces reportedly killed more than 50 people over two days. While the opposition is vocal, it is also weak and disorganized. Meanwhile, the international community has been slow to respond. All the ingredients for the outbreak of major conflict are there.

What happens in the DRC has never been limited to a domestic political issue. Over the past two decades, conflict and instability in the country have tended to pull in both neighboring countries and those further afield. For reasons ranging from security concerns to maintaining resource access, various states have involved themselves in counterproductive ways by funding rebel groups and sending military troops. In particular, Rwanda and Uganda have repeatedly meddled in Congolese affairs, helping to destabilize the DRC in the process. Renewed outbreak of tensions will therefore make it more likely that Congo’s neighbors will once again intervene, which could have implications for regional stability and development.

The situation in the DRC takes place in a context in which several African leaders have recently tried to circumvent constitutional rules on term limits. Examples include neighbors Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of Congo. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has held on to power for 30 years. These autocrats will be emboldened by Kabila’s desperate attempt to cling on to the presidency.

Lastly, as the site of the most expensive peacekeeping operation in UN history, the DRC could be among the first tests for incoming UN Secretary-General António Guterres. With no end in sight in the Syrian civil war, and a U.S. president-elect likely disinterested in supporting UN missions, there is potential for the international community to turn a blind eye to what is going on in the DRC. While the MONUSCO mission is supersized by UN standards, it is already struggling to maintain order as it is. Already, the eastern provinces of the country are among the largest sources of refugees and internally displaced people worldwide. As the long-time head of UNHCR, Guterres may find himself in familiar territory sooner rather than later.

UN peacekeepers shortly before the 2006 presidential elections (United Nations Photo)

The reasons for instability in the DRC are varied and complex. The worst kind of colonial rule under Belgium, Cold War meddling by the United States and the Soviet Union, and some thirty years of Mobutu have left the country in ruins. It is barely a state. It ranks 147th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 184th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, and 176th in the UN Human Development Index.

Now, Joseph Kabila is pouring oil into the fire. While the U.S. will probably survive Donald Trump’s autocratic tendencies, Kabila’s might be the final straw for the DRC.

The post Instability in the DRC: The Kabila Problem appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Africa is becoming a hotbed for technology, shifting again the conventional wisdom on the continent. Reinforcing regional trends in business, investment, and modernization is the emergence of an IT ecosystem—a growing patchwork of entrepreneurs, startups, and innovation centers coalescing from country to country. There are over 300 tech incubation hubs on the continent.

Young IT impresarios have launched several thousand African startups spanning e-commerce, to healthcare, to digital payments. Fueling these new companies is venture capital expected to top $1bn by 2018. And the world’s blue chip tech names, such as Facebook, IBM, and eBay, have all recently expanded in Africa.

Those in Africa business and foreign policy circles would be wise to tune into these IT developments. Tech is reshaping the continent’s orientation to the world and producing innovative models with application in advanced economies. Here are a few snapshots drawn from my research and writing.

The World’s First Drone Delivery Program

In October 2016 San Francisco based startup Zipline launched the world’s first national drone delivery program in Rwanda, as reported in TechCrunch. In partnership with UPS and the government of Rwanda, Zipline’s unmanned aerial vehicles make 50-150 daily deliveries of critical medical supplies (primarily blood and vaccines) to 21 locations across Rwanda. The small craft lift-off from a customized “drone-nest,” drop their loads by parachute, then return to base—guided digitally by Zipline’s California navigation system connected to Rwanda’s 3G network.

A core determinant of Zipline starting drone delivery in Rwanda before the U.S. is the government of Rwanda’s commitment to creating a modern ICT environment, including a fresh regulatory code for drone transport. Zipline’s Rwanda program has not only gained the attention of UPS and investors such as Google Ventures. In August the program was tapped by the White house and FAA as a model to follow for U.S. drone delivery.

Kenya’s Ride-Hail Rivalry Fosters Innovation

Global ride-hail company Uber expanded in Africa in 2012. As reported in the World Economic Forum’s Agenda, The San Francisco startup’s rivalry with a homegrown Kenyan app could impact innovation in digital taxi markets across the world. Uber entered the tech savvy East African nation (aka Silicon Savannah) in 2015 and has been relatively well received. Kenyans have taken over 1 million Uber trips, the app gets 100,000 hits a month in Nairobi, and Uber has created over 1,000 jobs in Kenya.

In Kenya and other African countries, Uber has tested unique service options not available to passengers in many of its global markets. These include cash payments, new safety measures, and photo direction apps that direct drivers to passengers through mobile phone images.

Of course, Uber’s Kenya presence has brought some of the digital disruption and blowback seen in many of its other global operating cities. Some Kenyan drivers and cab services have pushed back on “unfair competition” on local wages and jobs. Anti-Uber protests (and even violence) have erupted.

Enter local Kenyan telco Safaricom in July 2016. Widely recognized for the success of its M-Pesa mobile money product, the company launched the Little ride hail app and positioned the new service to aggressively take on Uber. Little immediately offered cheaper pricing and expanded services, such as free in-car Wi-Fi and a “female friendly” Lady Bug option, where women can request female drivers after dark.

Safaricom also zeroed in on driver wages, announcing it would take 10 percent less of earnings than Uber. The Uber-Little competition has spurred a tit for tat exchange in Kenya’s ride hail market on price, product offerings, and driver terms. The rivalry continues to reduce costs, expand services, and provide drivers more leverage. The Uber-Little rivalry could serve as model for how local competition can offset globalization’s downsides. It could also produce homegrown ride-hail innovation that ends up in digital taxis in London, Hong-Kong, or New York.

African E-commerce Draws Global Talent and Investment

A growing focal point in African tech is the race to wire the continent for e-commerce through Nigeria led by competing e-commerce startups Jumia and Konga. I’ve covered this extensively in The Next Africa, TechCrunch and The New Yorker.

Both ventures are collectively backed by over $400 million in VC funding. Each is also innovating new ways to bring online sales to the masses in a region still lacking many of the requisites for doing e-commerce. This is creating unique digital models around logistics, payments, and customer service that could impact online shopping globally. Jumia and Konga are also representative of how Africa’s tech sector is reshaping the continent’s global relations, in particular when it comes to people and investment.

Konga and Jumia’s roots weave paradigm shifting personal and financial ties through the U.S., Europe, and Africa. Ties that are much different than stereotypical patterns of brain drain, development work, and foreign aid. Jumia’s first CEOs Tunde Kehinde and Raphael Afaedor earned Harvard MBAs before co-founding the company and returning to Africa in 2012. Konga’s original CEO, Sim Shagaya, went to Harvard Business School and worked for Google before founding the startup.

In addition to bringing young talent home, local tech is attracting MBA types (compared to Peace Corps volunteers) to Africa. Jumia’s current CEO Sacha Poignonnec is a French alum of McKinsey and Company. Jumia’s Kenya MD, Parinaz Firozi, is an American and former banker from Texas. On the financial side, Jumia made global business headlines in 2016 when it became Africa’s first startup unicorn valued at $1 billion. The $326 million investment round that got them there included U.S. financial firm Goldman Sachs.

So again, to foreign policy and business folks keen on Africa, keep an eye on the continent’s tech scene. It will continue to redefine African business, politics, and foreign relations. 

The post Africa’s Tech Scene: Drones Deliver, Uber Innovates, Entrepreneurs Repatriate appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Ameer Hamza / The Express Tribune)

We all remember where we were when we heard about a specific tragedy. I was sitting in a language class when my news app flashed “Pakistan International Airlines crash…” Of course, that is the moment my hands froze and the sweat on my fingers did not allow the fanciest of technologies to function so I could read the rest of that headline. Knowing that both my parents were traveling that day, potentially on that airline, I ran out of class to call them. They were both safe, I was relieved, but shaking.

48 people died that day, virtually everyone onboard that flight from Chitral to Islamabad. Among the dead was Pakistan’s pop-star-turned-evangelic-preacher, Junaid Jamshed.

Flashback to 1990s Dubai with 6 year old me, my parents and my siblings. Car rides anywhere would have “Vital Signs” playing off of a cassette my older brother had brought back from our last trip to Pakistan. They were considered the revitalizing band of Pakistan, pulling it out of the dictatorial theocracy of General Zia-ul-Haq, into a nation swaying with nationalistic pride and romantic harmony.

Junaid Jamshed was their lead singer and every girls dream. Not your typical alpha male lead singer, Junaid or JJ was tall, fair skinned, light eyed and awfully shy. His band created the song that many believe to be our national anthem. Dil Dil Pakistan (literally “heart heart Pakistan”—something I cannot translate) is still played today at any national celebration.

Over the years, JJ, as he was endearingly known, became the epitome of Pakistan. When he puffed up his hair and wore a bright waistcoat, you best believe all Pakistani boys were doing it. Years later, with this following, he started a successful fashion brand. Soon after launching his solo singing career, JJ disappeared from the public eye.

He reappeared years later with a long, stark black beard which sat as though fake, on his radiant white face. With his charm still handy and post-9/11 confusion, JJ had a new message of faith, of the consciousness of the fleeting characteristic of life in this world. JJ had become an evangelical, who would soon be given multiple television appearances to talk about his new found peace in preaching Islam.

He eventually had his own television shows, and like before, JJ drew crowds and set trends. Over the next few years he would be caught making sexist remarks, some of which would force him into temporary self-exile. At this point, you either loved or hated JJ, but you could not look away from him long enough.

Junaid was one of the 47 that died the day the flight PK 661 crashed when it’s left engine caught fire. Pakistan was united in grief, yes, but in a particular mourning for the loss of JJ. Pakistani journalist, Fasi Zaka wrote:

“One section [of society] remembers how he provided the soundtrack to their lives, every song marking a memory, a milestone in life. Another section remembers him for the religious figure that he had become. Junaid himself didn’t bridge the gap between modernity and religion – he shifted from one to another. But in his death, the two differing tribes of Pakistanis – the ‘moderns’ and the [religious]– shared the same pew, united not in what they said but in their use of the language of grief.”

JJ was an avid member of both those factions of society—a modern 20-something, bringing music to the youth in Pakistan, and a preacher speaking to the religiously fervent. During his life, he did not wish to serve as a mediator between the two sections he knew so well—on the contrary when he “reverted” to religion he seemed to see his past life in slight disdain—but his death served as that bridge.

In the last sermon he offered in Chitral, he talked about death and how near it was and so our actions should all be measured. Hours later, Pakistani’s the world over came together to mourn this man that had served as a measure to the current state of mind of Pakistani society.

Pakistanis will always remember where they were when news of JJ’s passing came to them.

The post Junaid Jamshed: Pakistan’s Bridge appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Vladimir Putin at a meeting with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault.

The incoming U.S. administration and its new foreign policy approach will impact Russia on multiple fronts. Indirectly, both Russia’s relations with China towards its east and Europe towards its west will be affected by the U.S.’ own economic and foreign relations with these regions, respectively.

However, the lion’s share of world attention will be directed towards the Middle East and whether Russia and the U.S. can forge a productive relationship going forward. Contrary to any softening of hearts due to the alleged “bromance” between the two countries’ leaders, a more hard-hearted, transactional approach based on shared interests will be critical to productive U.S.-Russia relations in the Middle East and globally.

Major Powers Heighten Russian Insecurity (Again)

With the TPP on life support and apparently finding no favor with the next U.S. administration, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement is the only game in town as far as Asian mega trade agreements go. Although RCEP was formally started by ASEAN, all parties recognize China as the true economic power underwriting the scheme. As such, Russia will have to decide whether and under what terms it might like to join the concept if it’s indeed serious about pivoting east. However, doing so would almost certainly give China even more leverage within their “strategic partnership”, especially coming on the heels of the announced agreement to eventually merge Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s Silk Economic Road initiative.

With respect to Europe, the incoming U.S. administration has the potential to affect U.S.-Russia relations in two key hotspots: the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. With respect to newfound Russian assertiveness in Europe, Poland and the Baltic states have been the most vocal in requesting U.S. military reassurance. However, Russian militarization of its Kaliningrad enclave and the strengthened U.S. demand that NATO allies increase their own military spending only makes this situation more volatile. The only bright spot in this situation is that increased European defense spending overall may help to ameliorate Europe’s own sense of insecurity with respect to Russia. In fairness, this sense of insecurity has been attributed to Russia as well.

Ukraine comprises the second European front in the current U.S.-Russian standoff. Of course, it is different from the Baltics in that the Ukraine Crisis was the genesis of current U.S.-Russian hostilities. It’s important to remember, however, that the current hostilities are only a symptom of many unresolved issues since the end of the Cold War, namely Russia’s desire for inclusion in a new overall European security architecture. While Ukraine’s importance to Russia is currently mostly attributed to its geographic position as a barrier to the rest of Europe and home to many Russian gas pipelines, this is not the whole story.

Briefly, when Russia saw the West’s old Cold War paradigm, NATO, making overtures towards Ukraine, with Crimea both being considered the cradle of Russian civilization and Orthodoxy to some, and home to untold Russian sacrifices during the Crimean War, the stage was set for the current act of U.S.-Russian hostilities. Underlying Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia is Russia’s “bomber diplomacy”, where Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers have been used again for signalling purposes. The placement of these bombers in Crimea comes on the heels of their deployment, both in circumnavigating Japan, as well as in patrols near U.S. Pacific Ocean military bases.

The New Holy Alliance

Sergej Karaganov, an advisor to President Vladimir Putin, was recently asked what Russia hopes to accomplish through its Syrian intervention. Above even restoring Russia’s reputation as a great power both regionally and globally, Karaganov stated, “…to kill as many terrorists as far away from our borders as possible.” This statement was similar to that of a previous U.S. administration which stated that, “We’re fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them over here.” Immediately following this objective, Karaganov noted the importance of local regime stability.

In contrast to Western perceptions of either a Trump-Putin “bromance”, or even a dictatorial Putin-Assad “bromance”, Russia’s foreign policy is based on interests, not values. From the Russian standpoint, stable regimes in countries such as Syria, Iran, and Egypt are more effectively able to combat terrorism within their own borders, thereby contributing to Russia’s overriding anti-terrorism interests in the process. Simply put, Russia doesn’t “love” Syria or Assad, personally. Rather, Russia, again, appreciates the benefits that a stable Syrian government can bring to the table with respect to serving overall Russian interests.

Though a rough analogy, a comparison can be made to the formation of the Holy Alliance at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. At that time, Russia formed an alliance with both Austria and Prussia to uphold monarchical values in the face of possible expansion of republican ideas from France. Such was the power of these revolutionary ideas, that Russia still considered them a threat to its own existence even after Napoleon was defeated militarily and sent into his second and final exile. Countering this threat, Russia found useful allies in Austria and Prussia, both of whom shared its interests. Even though the three powers happened to share similar values, these were clearly superceded by their shared interests.

Fast forward to today, and we can clearly see that today’s Russia views terrorism as an existential threat due to its soft, Central Asian underbelly and the Caucasus region. Again, it has found useful, local partners whom share its interests to help combat this threat, namely Syria and Iran. ISIS forms a threat to these two powers as well, and as such forms a focal point for shared interests between Russia, Syria, and Iran. Yet again, Russia’s Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers have made their presence felt here, signifying the strategic importance Russia places on this front.

While striving for peace in the Middle East is admirable, doing so from a values-based approach, favoring certain regimes over others based on shared values will indefinitely put the U.S. in a quixotic position in the region. To more effectively combat ISIS regionally, as well as diffuse tensions in other hotspots globally, a more transactional, pragmatic U.S. approach towards Russia is most welcome and offers the opportunity for improved U.S.-Russian relations overall.

The post From Russia With (No) Love: A Hard Heart Works Best For Russia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. (Associated Press)

After U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s phone call on Friday with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, we may have more insight into how a President Trump will approach U.S.-China foreign relations. The call marked the first time and American president or president-elect has publicly spoken to Taiwan’s leader since the U.S. ended their formal diplomatic relationship in 1979. Outside of the formalities of a congratulatory call, little has been said of what else was discussed during their brief 10-minute call.

Immediately afterward, Beijing, which views Taiwan as a renegade province, sought to downplay the significance of the call. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissing it as a “little trick pulled off by Taiwan.” An editorial in the state-owned China Daily blamed the call on the “inexperience” and “lack of proper understanding” of the Trump transition team, saying there was no reason to “over-interpret” the congratulatory call. 

However, back in Washington, some argued the call was “an intentionally provocative move.” And in New York, the President-elect, being a huge user of media, could not help but respond, tweeting out the following comments Sunday night in response to Beijing’s criticism:

“Did China ask us if it was OK to devalue their currency (making it hard for our companies to compete), heavily tax our products going into…their country (the U.S. doesn’t tax them) or to build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so!”

His sharp response echoes some of his earlier commentary on U.S.-China relations, when he spoke out during an interview with the New York Times in April 2016, saying: “We have rebuilt China, and yet they will go in the South China Sea and build a military fortress the likes of which perhaps the world has not seen,” and “Amazing, actually. They do that, and they do that at will because they have no respect for our president and they have no respect for our country.”

Despite the diplomatic downsizing by Beijing of the unprecedented call, China’s leadership is surely fretting over the long-term consequences of a Trump presidency on Sino-U.S. ties and cross-Strait relations. And to the extent its population of nationalistic and sensitive citizens learns of the call, Beijing will have to temper their outrage.

After the election of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party Tsai as president earlier this year, Beijing formally cut communication with Taiwan and actively discouraged mainland Chinese from visiting the island. Tensions on the island have intensified following Beijing’s passage in 2005 of a law authorizing attack to prevent secession. We can expect Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will face some fallout from Beijing over the call, but will likely seek to downplay the call.

As for the U.S., these latest tweets seem to suggest the next President has his own strong views, and will quickly make those public. His selection for Secretary of Defense, General James “Mad Dog” Mattis will certainly voice his own views, as will his final choice for secretary of state, while his family members may also weigh in.

Yet for all the aggressive rhetoric, disbelief and rancor surrounding Trump’s call with Taipei, no one really knows how a Trump administration will deal with China. Actions during his presidency will speak louder than words—the building of a 350-ship navy or increased arms sales to Taiwan would reveal volumes more than a call and a few tweets.

The post Trump, Taiwan and Tweets: The Future of U.S.-China Relations appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Italy voted “No” to the national referendum on Sunday, December 4 resulting in important economic and political consequences for the nation and the European Union (EU). Italy has been in dire straits for a number of years, despite Prime Minister Mateo Renzi’s bold attempt to change its political system and revive the economy.

Renzi, who started with changes in Italy’s employment laws in hiring and firing workers, also cut payroll taxes by €35 billion ($37.1 billion) creating 580,000 new jobs. But the Prime Minister tried to make further changes in Italy’s government by putting forth a national referendum to change the Senate’s structure.  The referendum has economic and political consequences.

Political consequences

Italy not only has a huge governmental bureaucracy but a constitution that makes passing a law a long, tedious process. Compounding this problem is that the national government can change when there is a lack of confidence exhibited by the Senate and the House of Deputies. The referendum is designed to reduce the Senate’s size, streamline the process of passing a law, and bring more stability in the governmental process.

The Renzi-Boschi referendum, named after Renzi and the Reform Minister Maria Elena Boschi, was meant by the government as a radical approach in ensuring stable majorities for present and future governments in a tightly run parliamentary format. The Senate would have been broken apart and the House of Deputies becomes the actual law-making body in the Parliament.

This referendum also envisioned the simplification in the law-making process and planned to allow the House to pass laws and votes of “No Confidence” in the government. The legislative process was meant to be sped up since the House would be permitted to debate a bill sent from the cabinet of ministers within five days and vote on it in a maximum of 70 days. The reform also planned to reduce the number of senators from 315 to 100.

Those against the referendum saw it as taking away the constitutional right of government and abrogating democracy. Renzi and his supporters marketed it as streamlining government to make it faster and more responsive to new situations as they present themselves.

The “No” vote is a victory for the 5 Star Movement headed by the comedian turned political party leader Beppe Grillo. Grillo regards a “No” vote as a victory for the populist movement and an opportunity to have elections called next year. The 5 Start Movement’s anti-establishment agenda regards Renzi’s referendum as not radical enough. Renzi placed a huge bet on the referendum’s passage. Given his failure, he was forced to resign and the Italian President will be forced to call for elections for a new government in 2017.

This could allow Grillo and his party to assume enough popular votes to take control of the Italian government. Victory for the 5 Star Movement will rank with Brexit and the Trump presidency as another step forward for anti-establishment politicians. It also means that the 5 Star Movement may try to push to exit the euro and, in the long run, leave the EU.

Economic consequences

A larger concern for Italy regarding a “No” vote is the financial market’s reaction.  A “No” vote will result in a loss of confidence by the financial markets who will see Italy changing governments in 2017. Deutsche Bank estimates that if the 5 Star Movement came into power and Grillo becomes prime minister a referendum will be called on Italy’s involvement with the euro and the Stoxx Europe 600 index could drop by as much as 20%. This could also cause Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) to go higher than its average.

Markets and investors despise bad news and a “No” vote could cause a higher degree of anxiety than many are prepared for. A lethal combination of the unpredictability of Italian politics and serious economic problems for the EU’s third largest economy will cause the market deep consternation. Some analysts feel there will be a domino effect among the European financial markets that the European Central Bank cannot handle and therefore a serious downturn will cause investors to reach for antacid medications.

Compounding the ill reaction by the financial markets will be the effect on Italy’s government bond market, the fifth largest globally. It is bad enough that international bond markets are reeling since the recent American presidential elections, but Italy’s bond market will take a steeper decline in response to the referendum vote. Most recently, the yield on Italy’s 10-year government reached 10% for the first time in more than one year and analysts feel it could go higher. This increase in yields will cause bond and note prices to fall.

“No” could also make it very difficult for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS), Italy’s third largest bank by assets and one of the most troubled in Europe. MPS is looking to raise financial capital by shedding €28 billion ($29.7 billion) in bad loans while raising €5 billion to make up the void in its capital cushion that the write-downs from the sale of bad loans will cause. MPS is planning to sell common stock and swap certain bonds at full face value even if they are presently trading at 50% of nominal value.

With a “No” vote, potential investors will become jittery and avoid the offering. If this transaction cannot occur, then MPS will seek a bailout from Renzi’s government.  Renzi and MPS must move quickly to make this happen in order to avoid a bank run and calm financial markets.

Too many uncertainties

While a “No” vote does not mean that Italy will fall apart, it will cause deep anxiety for investors, financial markets, and those in the EU trying to keep it intact.  In the short term, analysts may compare the result to the quake caused by the Brexit vote. In the long term, “No” may cause more uncertainty and hurt Italy’s opportunity for political and economic stability.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Arthur Guarino, an assistant professor in the Finance and Economics Department at Rutgers University Business School

The post Italy and the Consequences of the “No” Vote appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Brigette Supernova/The Daily Beast)

After winning the election, Trump will soon have to navigate the labyrinthian US foreign affairs field as the President. As a diplomacy amateur, Trump’s strategy may cause uncertainty to US-Sino relations. Tracing back to Trump’s election campaign, he has never introduced a complete and systematic foreign policy strategy. Most of his commitments are based on the form of a slogan.

It is difficult to categorize his strategy as merely an election slogan or a truly tangible diplomatic policy. However, with reference to Trump’s media interview, his election platform and a speech provided by James Woolsey, the diplomacy advisor of Trump’s election campaign, in China-US Forum, a basic stance of Trump’s China strategy can be formulated.

This position can neither be simply classified as pro-Democrats nor pro-Republican. Rather, as Woolsey had stated, US’s external intervention will be exercised with more prudence. The national interest of US will also be redefined.

In the field of military, Trump has explicitly disagreed with the rebalancing strategy of the Obama’s administration in the Asia Pacific region. In terms of the South China Sea territorial dispute, not only does Trump having an ambiguous stance, but also criticize US’s allies of their lack of commitment.

He also propose to re-evaluate US-Japan allies. He has agreed with idea of South Korea and Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, stating that it may be beneficial to the containment of China and resolve North Korea nuclear issue. Moreover, Trump threatened to terminate economic relation with China if China fails to control North Korea effectively. In other words, to deal with the geopolitical issues in East Asia, Trump emphasizes on allies to bear more responsibility for security and to contain China. At the same time, he hopes China to act constructively in the region.

The implementation of the above strategies depends on the interaction of Trump, his cabinets and Republican-led House of Representatives and Senate. However, it inevitably causes uncertainty to the region. On the one hand, the roll-back of US’s external commitment can relieve the pressure on China created by the rebalancing strategy. China may be able to expand its sphere of influence in the Asia Pacific region. At the same time, the roll back of US’s responsibility may induce Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Philippine to bandwagon with China. On the other hand, US is predicted not to withdraw all its influence in the region as isolationism is not beneficial to US’s economic interests. Trump’s emphasis on “America First” requires significant external trade leverage.

Trump’s actual diplomatic strategy for China rests on the dimension of economic relations. In many of Trump’s speeches, Trump accused China of stealing America’s wealth and job position. Most of its “America First” strategies are targeting China, including those related to the protection of copyrights and anti-dumping measures. In the past, Trump has proposed to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese products, though it is unlikely for the parliament and Republican to acknowledge these proposals.

In Trump’s plan for his first 100 days in office, Trump stated that he would classify China as a currency manipulator and initiate negotiations with China regarding trade dispute. However, currency is not a major topic of the current US-Sino economic relations. Former president candidate Romney had also proposed a similar strategy in his platform, it is predicted that the classification of currency manipulation can be seen as merely a leverage for future negotiation.

Undoubtedly, if Trump pursues the above economic strategies, China reacted to these strategies strongly, guaranteeing an all-out currency war. However, given what we knew about Donald Trump’s personality and his love of “deal-making”, it is more likely that these will be used as leverages in future negotiations.

Another key issue related to the grand strategy of China is Trump’s reluctance on free trade agreement such as TPP and NAFTA. With no endorsement from the president, the prospect of TPP is undermined and the attempt of US to reconstruct the rules and norms of economic relations in the Asia Pacific region will be in vain. Therefore, it provides China with a decent chance to implement “Belt and Road” initiative to strengthen economic ties with countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe.

Woolsey has recognized the role of China in G20 in the fields of US-Sino relations and global governance. He stated that US should provide meaningful responses to China-led regional development institution such as AIIB and “Belt and Road” initiative. At the same instant, Woolsey urged China to uphold more responsibility to collective issues. He believed China had not been responsible for major global crises such as the Libya crisis and the rise of ISIS. It can be understood as an implicit criticism urging China to have their commitment commensurate with the international status it is pursuing.

Trump failed to provide diplomatic strategy other than those in the field of military, bilateral trade and global governance. In the field of normative diplomacy and soft power strategy, Trump has not provided any tangible plans. Commentators speculate it as an indicator of Trump’s lack of interests to promote democracy overseas.

Trump believes democracy may not be universally applicable. Current over-commitment on international issues can be attributed to the intense promotion of democracy in the current agenda. His viewpoints have been consistent with the general stance of Chinese nationalist. During his election campaign, Trump had repeatedly complimented the intelligence of Chinese leader and his frequent business interactions with Chinese. Therefore, he is quite popularly among regular Chinese inside the country.

In general, the effect of Trump’s diplomatic strategy on China is not specifically contained within certain aspects but how it introduced unpredictability to the Sino-US relationship. This is why, unlike the popularity Trump gained among ordinary Chinese citizens, Chinese officials have not been enthusiastic about the outcome of the election. For example, in the press conference of the closing ceremony of “The Two Meetings” (also known as “Lianghui” (The NPC and the CPPCC), Li Keqiang responded a US media stating that mutual benefits should be the essence of US-Sino relations, the progress of US-Sino relations will not be altered regardless of which president is elected. It demonstrated Li has not been concerned about the “tariff penalty” introduced by Trump.

Lou Jiwei, the former Minister of Finance of China, stated the behavior of Trump had brought uncertainty to the global economy in an interview with Wall Street Journal. For China, a predictable US will be more beneficial given the lack of combined capabilities to replace the US and the presence of internal and external threats. If Trump adopts isolationism, the existing rules of globalization will be undermined. It will cause disastrous effects to China’s development which is based on utilizing globalization to expand its economic relations and sphere of influence.

In his victory speech, Trump stated his desire to maintain a positive relationship with other countries. Structurally, the current outlook of US-Sino relations—characterized by both confrontation and cooperation—faces a number of constraints which cannot be solved by any individuals, including Trump. As a pragmatist, Trump understands the benefits offered by US-Sino relations. Therefore, prudence should be the essence of China’s strategy.

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The Millennium Challenge Corporation.

International media has been focusing on the near-term directions of US foreign policy with regard to the Iran nuclear accord, sanctions against North Korea, relations with China and Russia, mutual defense with Japan and South Korea, free trade agreements, immigration, terrorism, and the wider Middle East. But no closer look has been paid to the possible dynamics of foreign aid under a Trump presidency.

Having a look at the Middle East and North Africa, for example, shows that some form of foreign aid is given for strategic and geopolitical reasons. New policy challenges have also arisen in the face of violence and civil wars across the region which made the Obama administration use new sources of funding beyond traditional bilateral or State Department/USAID-controlled accounts.

However, questions will arise over the type (i.e. other than military aid) and amount of resources the US should devote to tackling the region’s challenges. The Congress and the Trump administration will most likely debate whether US aid would be vital for the promotion of stability and democracy across the region. Globally speaking, President-elect Trump’s agenda will likely be how to do less with foreign aid (especially where policy and institutional settings have not been conducive for effective aid), yet not ignoring low-income countries.

The orthodoxy in foreign aid viewed the lack of capital as a major cause of poverty; the most basic of which was the idea of a “vicious circle of poverty.” Foreign aid was used to fill that gap to provide a “big push” to poor nations and, in the view of Walt Rostow, lead to an “economic takeoff.”

Skepticism of such plans is widespread nowadays among academics and development practitioners. Peter Bauer (1915–2002) was actually the most articulate of the dissenters, who once explained that the notions of a vicious circle of poverty and of foreign aid as essential to development were absurd: rich countries that were once poor developed without outside aid, whereas those that have received substantial external aid have failed to escape poverty.

According to William Easterly, “foreign aid cannot achieve the grandiose goal of transforming other societies to escape poverty.” When foreign aid becomes a significant part of a nation’s income, the result is likely to be inflation, waste, corruption, rent-seeking, and indefinite postponement of needed economic and political reforms (the major theme of Easterly’s book The Elusive Quest for Growth).

Whatever the ideological divide, there might be a clear case which a Trump administration can give more attention to, and possibly, boost US aid’s relative success compared to other global aid agencies: the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was established in 2004 as a US foreign aid agency that works in partnership with competitively selected countries which demonstrate a commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investment in their citizens.

Since its inception, MCC’s mandate has included demonstrating results with rigorous criteria to evaluate countries’ aptitude to utilize grant funding. Perhaps of equal significance, raising indicator scores has become a prominent objective of some developing countries: the MCC effect. This means that countries seeking eligibility are said to be moving on their own to enact reforms and take measures to improve performance scores that would enable them to meet MCC criteria.

While there is little doubt that availability of MCC funding has influenced some decision makers in developing countries to undertake policy reforms, it is uncertain how large or widespread the MCC effect is. A limited number of quantitative analyses have attempted to test this incentive effect. The earliest of these was conducted by Harvard researchers in 2006 (Doug Johnson and Tristan Zajonc, “Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation,” April 2006). But because the analysis was conducted soon after MCC’s creation and with a limited amount of data, the researchers determined that the results were not conclusive.

The best evidence for an MCC effect thus remains qualitative and country-specific. Setting aside specific methodological aspects, we need to think of the MCC effect (and the effectiveness of foreign aid at large) as a process, rather than a policy outcome. This is not surprising as economic progress depends on the complex interaction of policies, institutions, and values, not all of which are easy to measure.

Coming from a private sector background where incentives matter, President-elect Trump can radically improve US foreign aid by looking at its effectiveness in the past, focusing on the intended beneficiaries of aid (the poor) rather than leaving it to politicians and corrupt governments. The MCC has a track record: it is one of the few aid agencies in the world that have been already held accountable for specific tasks and not the visions that follow from aid bureaucracies.

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