Foreign Policy Blogs

Across the Middle East, refugees, IDPs, and indigenous religious minorities remain at considerable risk.  The U.S. presidential election has not addressed any of these concerns, from humanitarian or geostrategic perspectives. But the new U.S. president will have to.

Military operations in northern Iraq against ISIS’s control of Mosul bring to fore the question of Iraqi Christians and other religious minorities in Syria and Iraq. The importance of these questions remained invisible in the U.S. presidential and vice-presidential debates.

The 2016 U.S. elections process has been dominated by personalities, not by issues. Donald Trump emerged as the Republican nominee by exaggeration and personal attack on his rivals—”low-energy” Jeb Bush, “Little Marco” Rubio, and so on. Trump continued this line of attack on the Democratic nominee, “Crooked Hillary” Clinton, directing attention to her at-home email server, hiding of alleged health issues, and non-progressive governments who donated to the Clinton Foundation.

Former Secretary of State Clinton has directed her attacks on his failure to release his tax returns, his apparent exemption from paying federal taxes, and his disrespect for immigrants, minorities, and women—recently illustrated by release of a crude audio recording and allegations of unwanted sexual touching by more than 10 women.

Mr. Trump has made elements of foreign policy central to his campaign. Build a wall to keep out Mexican immigrants, and deport illegal immigrants. Tighten immigration restrictions from countries with large Muslim populations, to reduce the risk of terrorism. Renegotiate trade deals—including NAFTA, with two of the U.S.’s largest trade partners. Expect more burden-sharing from U.S. allies. Respect Putin. Reject the Iran deal that intends to trade sanctions relief for promises to defer a nuclear weapons program. Defeat ISIS.  Secretary Clinton, naturally, opposes most of these goals, or has an opposite strategy to achieve them.

In the three presidential debates and one vice presidential debate, though, which included discussions of ISIS, Islam, oil, terrorism, and immigration, candidates never got to the subject of protecting religious minorities in the Middle East (or elsewhere, for that matter). When they were asked specifically in the second debate about the humanitarian crisis in Aleppo, neither discussed it all.

These issues are being debated outside the presidential race, though.  Earlier this year, the Vatican sponsored and three-day meeting on religious persecution at the United Nations in New York. This spring, the White House and both houses of Congress proclaimed ISIS activities as genocide against religious minority groups.  Secretary of State John Kerry stated that “Daesh is genocidal by self-proclamation, by ideology, and by its actions.” In May, the House passed amendments to the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act in support of local defense by Christians and others against ISIS. In September, more than 50 members of Congress spoke at the third annual In Defense of Christians (IDC) conference.

The IDC conference focused on issues like support for Lebanon and the 1.5 million refugees it hosts, Congressional resolutions in support of Iraqi and Syrian religious minorities, and the fate of Coptic Christians in Egypt. But it also raised a question that will be difficult for the next president: what Iraq should look like.

Rep. Jeff Fortenberry (R.-Neb.) introduced House Concurrent Resolution 152, supporting an autonomous Nineveh Plain Province for Christians and other minorities. This is the region from which the Iraqi Army and the Kurdistan Region’s peshmerga, with U.S. and allied support, are currently attempting to drive out ISIS. American diaspora groups like the American Mesopotamian Organization have been promoting this for some time, building not only political support in Congress but also creating the Nineveh Plain Protection Units (NPU), to fight ISIS in northern Iraq.

The difficulty for the next president will be how to approach the Iraqi Government, Kurdistan Region, and American diaspora after the liberation of Mosul and defeat of ISIS, at least in Iraq. The Kurdistan Region (KR) hosts about 1.8 million refugees from Syria and IDPs from the rest of Iraq, including many Christians, Yezidis, Turcoman, Kakai, and other religious minorities. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has protected many Christian interests in northern Iraq, but also has been criticized by Assyrian Christian/Nineveh Plain diaspora. The next president will have to answer:

Should the U.S. support independence initiatives from the KRG? The KRG has governed territory outside of its three constitutional provinces, including in the Nineveh Plain, since even before ISIS’s attack in 2014—what territories, if any, might the U.S. acknowledge as part of a Kurdish independence declaration? If necessary, should the U.S. be prepared to militarily support the peshmerga from the Iraqi Army? Turkey and Iran each have Kurdish populations of their own; how Ankara and Tehran react will matter intensely.  Syria’s Kurds get rolled into this chess game as well.

In Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq, refugees, IDPs, and indigenous religious minorities remain at considerable risk.  The U.S. presidential election has not addressed any of these concerns, from humanitarian, human rights, or geostrategic perspectives. But the new U.S. president will have to.

See also the author’s earlier post on indigenous Christian militias in he Nineveh Province, Jan 2015.

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Off the coast of Vietnam, an ocean farmer monitors Barramundi fish in an offshore net pen, where the fish are allowed to swim freely at low densities. With financing from OPIC, Australis Aquaculture LLC expanded operations to Van Phong Bay, Vietnam where it operates the world’s largest Barramundi farm, specializing in sustainable and eco-friendly aquaculture and employs one hundred local workers. (OPIC)

Many developed and developing country governments offer development assistance and loans to lesser developed countries for a variety of reasons, including efforts to win business opportunities for their national companies, to advance foreign policy goals, and for altruistic reasons. In recent years, Chinese offers of developmental assistance have drawn the most attention, not only due to their size and potential for environmental hazard, but also for their potential to influence foreign policy.  

One recent example of this influence concerns the Philippines, where Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has decided to put aside his country’s favorable ruling on July 12 from The Hague over competing maritime claims in the South China Sea, or West Philippine Sea. Duterte’s decision to set aside the ruling, and criticize the Americans, has obviously been welcomed by Beijing. He recently returned from Beijing with an entourage of Filipino businessmen, coming away with some $24 billion of promised developmental aid and loans from China.  

Some analysts argue Vietnam may be the next Southeast Asian nation with competing claims in the South China Sea to move closer to Beijing. While not a formal treaty ally of the U.S., Vietnam has welcomed Washington’s intervention in the South China Sea, or East Sea as it is referred to here in Vietnam.

Ties between the two countries have grown under the Obama Administration, and have led to joint military exercises, cooperation on dioxin removal, the full lifting of the lethal arms embargo during Obama’s visit in May, and a port of call by two U.S. warships to the historic and strategic Cam Ranh Bay earlier this month—following a 21-year absence. All of this growing interaction is a result of Washington’s “pivot to Asia”, announced by Obama and implemented by his former secretary of state, Hillary Clinton from 2009-2013.

Of course, this pivot is part business, foreign policy and philanthropy, and one of the best tools the Obama Administration has to advance the pivot is the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). As the U.S. Government’s development finance institution, the independent agency “mobilizes private capital to help address critical development challenges and in doing so, advances U.S. foreign policy and national security priorities”. Established in 1971, OPIC provides investors with financing, political risk insurance, and support for private equity investment funds, and operates on a self-sustaining basis at no net cost to American taxpayers.

Given the uncertainty created by Duterte over the strength of Washington’s pivot to the Philippines, a visit on October 25 to Ho Chi Minh City by OPIC officials was a timely reminder of the two countries growing bonds. Leading the delegation was Elizabeth L. Littlefield, president and CEO of OPIC, who announced the agency will seek to work with Vietnam’s private sector to provide a potential $500 million worth of financial assistance to Vietnamese projects over the next three years. While Littlefield acknowledged little investment by OPIC to date in Vietnam, she said U.S. investors were particularly interested in commercially-viable renewable energy, agriculture, and information technology projects which contribute to Vietnam’s development.

Finding these commercially viable projects, especially in renewable energy space where the feed-in-tariffs (a set price guaranteed by the utility) are not yet commercially attractive, will be the challenge for U.S. investors, OPIC and the Vietnamese private sector. And most of the $12.3 billion of foreign direct investment in Vietnam is currently earmarked for the processing and manufacturing sectors.

However, the mere offer of substantial assistance will go a long way in helping cement the bilateral relations between the U.S. and Vietnam, and will help reassure Hanoi that Washington will not be pivoting away from the region—despite worries in the region over the passage of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and how the next American president will choose to engage (or disengage) with the region.

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Smoke rises during an air strike on a mountain overlooking Yemen’s capital Sanaa(REUTERS/Khaled Abdullah)

Saudi Arabia has long been accused of needlessly hitting civilian targets during its air campaign in neighboring Yemen. Most commentators have put this down to a mixture of indifference and military incompetence on the part of the Saudi armed forces.

Their capabilities against hardened fighters like the rebel Houthis were long questioned by outside observers before the Kingdom intervened in its neighbor early last year.

While the southern theatre of a large war games exercise held in 2014 featured fighting against Yemeni Shi’a rebels suggests that the Kingdom had established practical contingency plans ahead of its attack on the Houthi movement in March 2015, the Saudi coalition and their Yemeni allies have indeed proved unable to overcome the rebels.

The futile conflict has already resulted in 10,000 dead, including an estimated 4,000 civilians, while the United Nations estimates that 80% of the Yemeni population is now in need of humanitarian assistance.

But now academics from the London School of Economics, who have been working in Beirut on data from the Yemen Data Project and statistics from the Yemeni agriculture ministry, have pointed to a grim possibility about the Saudi-led airstrikes which have been battering their southern neighbor. According to a report in the Independent newspaper the air campaign has deliberately sought to undermine Yemen’s undeveloped agricultural sector in a country where more than half the population relies, in part or in whole, on agriculture and rural husbandry to survive.

The $250 million a month cost of the war effort and an oil slump have caused a hole in Saudi Arabia’s finances and created pressure on the Saudi monarchy to declare a quick victory and return home. But with the war at a stalemate the Kingdom’s military planners may be looking beyond withdrawal to creating a situation in post-war Yemen that gives them the strongest hand in the peace negotiations to come.

Riyadh has always considered Yemen to be in its backyard, and insisted that foreign countries, including the United States, follow the Saudi lead when making deals with its troublesome neighbor. Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh was a key ally for years until his overthrow in the Arab Spring, though for now he is now fighting alongside the Houthis. But before Yemen’s fragile political order began to breakdown earlier this decade Saudi money did much to keep the country’s distorted economy afloat with subsidies.

The suspicion now is that Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies are deliberately destroying the foundations of rural life in Yemen so that whoever takes over at the end of the war finds their country faces a total reliance on food imports, the bulk of which presently come through the Gulf states. This seems part of an emerging Saudi strategy of economic warfare against the Houthis to increase the Kingdom’s leverage over its Houthi enemies, but which directly threatens a humanitarian catastrophe in the Arab world’s poorest country.

The influence welded by the Kingdom behind the scenes initially allowed it to escape much open international condemnation over the issue of its human rights violations in the Yemeni civil war. But a recent massacre of mourners at the funeral of a top Houthi leader by coalition airplanes was probably what prompted a sudden wave of missile attacks by Houthi forces against ships in the Bab al-Mandeb strait, a major shipping lane between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The Gulf of Aden leads into the Indian Ocean and traffic along this trade route ultimately connects the Gulf region and Asia to Europe and North America through the Suez Canal. Any disruption to the passage of international shipping along it carries massive financial implications for logistics and insurance companies involved in the maritime sector, not to mention the fragile global economy.

The attack on the funeral and the Houthi response, which also included failed strikes on US naval vessels, therefore pushed the war and the Saudi handling of it abruptly back into global headlines. The unwelcome gaze of the international media may cause the Saudis to moderate their behavior while the attention lasts but it is unlikely to sway them from their aim of subordinating their southern neighbor back under Saudi hegemony.

Calls are now being made for the U.S. to increase its involvement in the conflict with the objective of bringing about a political solution that favors Saudi Arabia’s interests. While they are unlikely to be heeded by the outgoing Obama administration, the Saudis know that the president’s successor may be keener to listen. Even Obama has studiously avoided pressing the Saudis too hard on their actions in Yemen, whilst speeding up arms sales to the Kingdom and its Gulf allies.

But the U.S. and the UK should instead reconsider their unwise involvement on the Saudi side of this unnecessary conflict. As long as they back Saudi actions in Yemen, and supply the Kingdom’s forces there, these two Western countries are undermining their own credibility whenever they condemn war crimes in conflicts elsewhere. The Russian and Iranian backers of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad now have an example of hypocrisy they can point to whenever Western critics of the Syrian regime call out its nasty habit of starving besieged rebel areas of food aid for example.

The upcoming change in American administrations provides a key chance for a policy reset however. Whoever becomes the next U.S. president should review America’s current joint military operations with Saudi Arabia and cut off those related to its war in Yemen. They should also encourage the UK government to reconsider its support for the Saudi adventure and stop enabling the Saudis by supplying them with intelligence, arms and ammunition. This will likely enrage Riyadh but by putting an additional burden on the Saudi economy America will probably speed up the day the Saudi government realizes it can no longer afford to try and bomb its smaller neighbor into submission.

This article was originally published on Professor Juan Cole’s blog Informed Comment and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Why is Saudi Arabia Targeting Yemen’s Future? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Global Gender Gap Index examines differences between men and women in four fundamental categories: Economic Participation and Opportunity; Educational Attainment; Health and Survival; and Political Empowerment. (World Economic Forum)

The Global Gender Gap Index of the World Economic Forum ranks countries according to how well they are leveraging their female talent pool, based on economic, educational, health-based, and political indicators.

The latest Report provides a comprehensive overview of the current performance and progress over the last decade. The direction of change within countries from 2006 to the present day has been largely positive, but not universally so. Of the 109 countries that have been continuously covered in the Report, 103 have narrowed their gender gaps, but another 6 have seen prospects for women deteriorate: Sri Lanka, Mali, Croatia, Slovakia, Jordan, and Iran.

It goes without saying that gender equality is fundamental to whether and how societies thrive. Figures 31-33 (pages 38-39) in the Report confirm a correlation between gender equality and GDP per capita, the level of competitiveness, and human development. But when economists speak of the ‘gender gap,’ they usually refer to systematic differences in the outcomes that men and women achieve in the labor market. These are all economic gender gaps: differences in the percentages of men and women in the labor force, the types of occupations they choose, and their relative incomes or hourly wages.

Since the release of the first Report in 2006, an extra quarter of a billion women have entered the global workforce. But wage inequality persists with women only now earning what men did a decade ago! With the economic gap closing by just 3%, this suggests, according to the Report, that it will take another 118 years to close this gap completely.

So here is the dilemma: women are catching up with men on the educational front (if not becoming better educated than men in many fields), yet, they still on average earn less than men and are much less represented in the top deciles of the overall distribution of earnings.

The next research topics should focus on the policy means of narrowing the economic gender gap. If, as is likely, women will continue to take time off from work to care of children, that would continue to reduce both their average earnings relative to men and their representation in the top of the earnings distribution. Still, even if the average hourly earnings of women reached parity or surpassed that of men, it is unlikely (even without discrimination against women) that they will be as represented as men at the top of the earnings distribution, for while combining household with market activities hurts average earnings, it is a really strong hindrance to having enough time to make the utmost commitment to work and the needed investment in their human capital.

I totally understand the vital role of the other 3 sub-indexes of the World Economic Forum’s index (political empowerment, health, and education), but the gender gap that should get most of our attention is the economic one. The narrowing of the gender gap in recent years has taken place in an environment of sharply rising wage inequality. This will not solve our paradox: It is true that women have entered the labor market in unprecedented numbers, yet half of our global population still earns less than men and have fewer opportunities for advancement.

According to the literature, observable factors that affect pay (such as education, job experience, hours of work, and so on) explain no more than 50% of the wage gap. The most recent studies, as reported in a review by economists Francine Blau and Lawrence Kahn, found that the fraction explained is now even lower, about 33%. The reason is that the decrease in the gender gap in earnings was largely due to an increase in the productive attributes of women relative to men. The remainder of the gap (termed in the economic jargon as the “residual”) is the part that cannot be explained by observable factors. This residual could result from workers’ choices or, alternatively, from economic discrimination. Surprisingly, the differing occupations of men and women explain only 10–33% of the difference in male and female earnings. The rest is due to differences within occupations, and part of that is due to the observable factors.

It is true that discrimination has declined, but occupational disparities between men and women persist, suggesting that we should be looking for causes that are unrelated to discrimination (such as occupational choice and family responsibilities) as well as those that are related.

Seldom are the data sufficiently detailed to permit comparisons of women and men who are the same on all the variables that matter, but the more detailed the data (on the wage structure and occupational segregation), the better our aspirations for reducing the overall global gender gap. This should be the future research topic of the World Economic Forum and other international organizations, think tanks, governments, NGOs, and the private sector.

The post Minding the Global Gender Gap appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chinese President Xi Jinping (left) shows the way to Rodrigo Duterte at a signing ceremony. (Associated Press)

In the past week China has seen potentially groundbreaking developments in internal and external politics. The visit of incendiary Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte could signal a shift in regional alliances. And the ruling Communist Party has looked to solidify its grip on power and support by showing its commitment to cracking down on government corruption.

On a state visit to Beijing on Oct. 20, 2016, President Duterte of the Philippines grabbed a lot of headlines on the international stage by declaring “a separation from the United States.” He also “repeatedly sought to distance the Philippines from the United States, a treaty ally.” Based on this and previous statements, some believe that Duterte intends to diminish his country’s long-standing military cooperation with the U.S.

But despite Duterte’s bluster, the extent to which he will actually go in breaking ties with one of its most important military partners is unknown (Jane Perlez of the New York Times characterized the Philippine army on its own as “underequipped and poorly trained”). For more on the potential military impact of Duterte’s threats and potential explanation for why he made them, you can read Gary Sands’ recent FPA blog post here.

In addition to rankling some officials in the U.S., Duterte’s visit could also signal a closer alliance between the Philippines and China. Such a shift could have major repercussions on the power balance in east Asia. On the same day as his “separation” comments, Duterte and Chinese Premier Xi Jinping agreed to resume negotiations over the disputed South China Sea. This prospect opens the door for de-escalation of hostilities in the hotly contested waterway, as well as a warming of relations between the 2 countries. But…very few details were offered on when the talks would start or what they would encompass.

Xi and Duterte did announce last Thursday that they would establish a joint coast guard committee on maritime cooperation. This could be an extremely important development as Chinese Coast Guard ships have been blocking Philippine boats from a key fishing area of the South China Sea after China claimed the area in 2012. China also pledged to assist the Philippines in developing aquaculture and commercial fish processing, issues previously highlighted by Duterte.

Beyond the South China Sea, Chinese leader Xi agreed to increase infrastructure investment in the Philippines by $24 billion, lift embargoes on certain food imports, and remove a travel advisory to try to encourage tourism exchange.

What’s more, other countries in the region are eyeing Duterte’s overtures towards China. As a result, some analysts believe neighboring Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam may begin to draw closer alliances with China. On Oct. 24, 2016, Perlez notes that “China may have started a strategic realignment in Southeast Asia by bringing an important American ally [the Philippines] to its side.”

However it is important to remember that Duterte’s shocking apparent success on his China visit does not ensure real cooperation.  According to Trinh Nguyen, an economist specializing in the Asian Pacific region at Natixis Bank, “Pledges do not necessarily translate into realized foreign direct investment for the Philippines.” Certainly both sides saw the opportunity to gain political points at home and abroad on Duterte’s visit. Thus it appears the real-world, measurable impact of newly positive China-Philippines remains to be seen.

While China seeks new partnerships with its neighbors, the ruling Communist Party is renewing its efforts to stomp out political corruption at home. As Premier Xi begins a second five-year term, he has taken steps to show the Chinese people that graft and other illegal acts by government officials are not acceptable. The state-controlled TV station is even currently airing a documentary series showing disgraced former officials lamenting their bad choices and repenting their misdeeds. “I became possessed and lost my head,” says Bai Enpei, a former Communist Party secretary convicted of taking bribes of nearly $38 million.

The show details the lavish lifestyle of these officials—one of whom detailed his courtship by business executives with dinners featuring crocodile meat—as well as their falls from grace. Xi is presented as the hero swooping in to clean up the immoral acts, the only clean (literally and figuratively) party leader seen in the documentary.

Tighter control over the party will be reinforced this week at the Central Committee annual meeting. Premier Xi is expected to introduce new regulations regarding “comprehensive and strict management” of party affairs. This should expand on the power and influence of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, the anti-corruption task force headed by one of Xi’s closest allies. This group has recently begun to act with larger impunity as they aim to reinforce loyalty to the party and to Xi. It has the power to detain government officials in secret without needing court approval.

Are more countries in Asia setting in motion a shift in alliances away from the west and towards China? It is really too early to tell. But it will be important to monitor developments, and to see how far Duterte is really willing to go in alienating the Philippines from the U.S. All of his shocking commentary may end up being much ado about nothing. And while reducing corruption is never bad, the methods employed by the Chinese government are concerning.

Both situations will be worth watching.

The post Welcoming Neighbors and Cleaning its House: China’s Interesting Week appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Trump tweeted out this picture of Hillary Clinton, surrounded by money and accompanied by a Jewish star.

Donald Trump is a master gaslighter. He takes things said about him and tries to convince us that the flaw in question actually applies not to him but rather to his opponents or detractors.

When he was caught on tape bragging about disrespecting women (and worse)—he told the world that no one (NO ONE!) has more respect for women than he does.

He distanced himself from his role as a leader in the Obama birther movement, (a role which he claimed previously he is proud to have served) only to later claim it was Hillary Clinton who had started the movement in the first place (she did not).

In the last debate of this presidential cycle, Clinton referred to Trump as a puppet for Putin. He disagreed but—because this is Donald Trump—he also responded, “you’re the puppet.” Which makes no sense—the interaction came after Trump pointed at Clinton and stated, “Putin, from everything I see, has no respect for this person”—but this is 2016. So anything goes.

This election cycle is full of additional examples. If something nasty or distasteful is said about Trump, he will happily turn it around to make a similar claim against his accusers. “I know you are, but what am I.”

Trump has also surrounded himself with staff and advisers just as adept at such manipulation. Kellyanne Conway, Chris Christie, Newt Gingrich, Mike Pence and Rudy Giuliani, each in their own way, can take any claim about Trump and readily turn it around on the Clintons, the media, the liberals, or whoever else might be deemed relevant to the conversation.

This week, David Friedman, a Trump Israel adviser, made headlines when he dismissed the idea that anti-Semitism existed amongst Trump’s supporters. He insisted though that there IS actually “anti-Semitic sentiment among Clinton’s supporters.” That’s some Trump-level gaslighting right there!

Are there anti-Semitic Clinton supporters? Of course. When you are talking about tens of millions of people, there are going to be those who hate the Jews. It’s just a way of the world sadly.

But they and their bile are not embraced or welcomed by any respectable person in the Clinton campaign or the Democratic party.

Trump, on the other hand, retweets statements by known anti-Semites to his millions of Twitter followers!

Blatantly anti-Semitic tweets and accounts have been promoted by a top Trump foreign policy advisor, a senior advisor, one of his sons, and of course Trump himself.

And that is just some of the abject anti-Semitism coming from the candidate and his senior advisors… on Twitter. His campaign is of course much bigger than a single social media platform.

Recently Trump stated, “Hillary Clinton meets in secret with international banks to plot the destruction of U.S. sovereignty to enrich these global financial powers, her special interest friends and her donors.”

Per Cheryl Greenberg in the Washington Post: “These are old canards straight out of the phony ‘Protocols of the Elders of Zion,’ conspiracy theories about wealthy, international Jewish bankers plotting to destroy the nation and take over the world, controlling politicians with their wealth or through the power of the media that they dominate.”

There are some who wonder if Trump actually realizes that language like this is anti-Semitic. After all, his daughter converted to Judaism; she and Trump’s son-in-law are observant Jews and are raising Jewish children. Trump not understanding the weight of his words is horrifying in its own right for a man who could become president. But his ignorance (if given the benefit of the doubt that he is not actually an anti-Semite himself) also raises questions about who he has empowered to run his campaign.

Trump appointed Stephen Bannon, the former chairman of Breitbart News, to serve as CEO and to help run the final months of the campaign. This is a man with a troubling record. Bannon’s wife stated in court that, when choosing a school for their twin daughters, her husband  “said that he doesn’t like the way they raise their kids to be ‘whiny brats’ and that he didn’t want the girls going to school with Jews.” As recently as a few weeks ago, Beitbart News published an article that was an openly anti-Semitic attack against a Washington Post columnist.

Although he has (clumsily) stated he does not want it, Trump has the support of David Duke and numerous other white supremacist organizations.

He has retweeted Mussolini.

When Trump supports got mad at a reporter for writing an unflattering article about Melania, someone created a photoshopped image that made it look like the journalist was in a concentration camp and the image was widely shared within Trump supporter online communities. When asked about it, Trump could (and should!) have outright condemned it. Instead, he shrugged it off. “You’ll have to talk to them about it.” When Melania was asked for comment, she responded: “I don’t control my fans. But I don’t agree with what they’re doing. I understand what you mean, but there are people out there who maybe went too far. [The journalist] provoked them.”

Trump’s primary slogan of course is Make America Great Again. But he also routinely promises to put “America First.” America First was a WWII-era “isolationist, defeatist, anti-Semitic national organization that urged the US to appease Adolf Hitler.”

Trump supporters have even co-opted a cartoon frog named Pepe, imbuing it with horribly racist and anti-Semitic connotations. If you see this particular cartoon frog on social media, be warned. There’s an anti-Semite on the other end of that account.

This week, Trump and Pence addressed a crowd in Israel via video to try and get out the vote amongst the several hundred thousand American Jews currently living in Israel. The event was hosted by Republicans Overseas – Israel. They sold tickets to the event, highlighting a video from Trump. Trump’s remarks, clocking in at just 59 seconds, opened with him saying “I love Israel” and closed with him saying that “together, we will make America and Israel safe again.”

In the past, Israelis have tended to prefer Republican presidents: supporting Romney over Obama 57% to 22% and McCain over Obama 46.4% to 34%.

But not this time: Clinton is currently trouncing Trump amongst Israelis by an almost 2-1 margin.

Clearly Israelis do not believe he is the one to “make Israel safe again.” American Jews obviously feel the same way as they currently support Clinton over Trump by a 3-1 ratio.

In a few more weeks we will definitively see how the rest of the country feels. Regardless of what happens on Nov. 8th though, it’s pretty clear the Trump campaign has emboldened anti-Semitism in America, regardless of David Friedman’s gaslighting on the matter.

In the meantime, watch out for Pepe. And follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post Anti-Semitism in the Trump Campaign appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Chinese President Xi Jinping and Filipino Rodrigo Duterte ( The New York Times)

Intensified U.S.-Russian and U.S.-China rivalry is actually proving beneficial to several states as it increases their room for maneuver between the major powers and pushes them more toward a multi-vector foreign policy strategy. Unlike during the Cold War, where most states were either strictly aligned with one camp or the other, or non-aligned, these modern states have several features in common.

They are all: 1) U.S. allies, 2) situated at the geographical confluence of great power influence, 3) struggling with local nationalistic sentiment with respect to local great powers, and 4) eager to conclude trade and investment deals with these very same local great powers, particularly in energy and/or infrastructure. The Philippines, Japan, and Turkey are all case studies of this new phenomenon.

Recent attempts to portray the Philippines’ new President as a “strongman in the making” willing to “jump into bed with China” have been quite simplistic. Rather than making a full tilt towards China, the Philippines’ new foreign policy strategy is much more nuanced. The goal is to achieve more of an actual balance between the U.S. and China (as well as Japan and Russia). This approach will give the Philippines maximum flexibility to achieve its security objectives (U.S.), while simultaneously seeking new avenues of economic cooperation (China).

This strategy is a necessity not merely from a negotiating standpoint, but from an eternal geographic reality as well. In order to ensure that it will not be taken for granted by any party (not even its treaty ally, the U.S.), the Philippines needs to diversify its foreign policy “investment portfolio”. With respect to actual financial investment, the Philippines has chosen to take a level-headed approach to China after the recent favorable Hague South China Sea ruling. This has occurred despite widespread domestic opposition to China regarding its conflicting South China Sea claims.

The Philippines has used the court’s findings as a platform to begin negotiations with China, not end them. Economically, the Philippines is hungry for investment opportunities. Although the U.S. and, especially, Japan currently account for a sizable share of the Philippines’ inbound FDI portfolio, the Philippines is looking specifically at more infrastructure-related investment. Because of this, China’s traditional political conditions-free investment packages and its previous quick infrastructure investment turnaround times in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America have made quite an impression on the Philippines. Lastly, the opportunity to be part of China’s OBOR initiative, specifically focused on infrastructure, is highly appealing as well.

Japan, the anchor of the U.S.’s re-balance to Asia to contain China, is currently in the midst of its most independent foreign policy stance in quite some time.  Japan, still considered a great power in its own right for historical reasons, feels the pressure of great power rivalry even more acutely than does the Philippines. This is because Japan is situated in Northeast Asia, home to China and Russia, both of whom have had their own historical issues with Japan.

From a security perspective, Japan still considers the U.S. to be the bedrock of its overall security portfolio. However, Japan also can not ignore the potential benefit of enlisting other great powers in its own bid to counter China. In South Asia, India fits this bill perfectly. In Northeast Asia, Russia would be extremely useful to Japan in creating some strategic uncertainty on China’s northern and northwestern frontiers. Japan sees this Russian benefit despite their ongoing dispute over the Kuril Islands and strong domestic nationalistic undercurrents in both the Japanese and Russian populations on this particular issue.

Crucial to resolving the Kuril Islands dispute, and actually signing a peace treaty with Russia, is increased economic cooperation between the two neighbors. Resource-hungry Japan and geographically-proximate resource-rich Russia are a match made in heaven. Because of U.S. and European sanctions, Russia is desperate for much-needed infrastructure investment and technical expertise to more fully develop the Russian Far East. Japan has displayed a willingness to explore this possibility despite the application of its own post-Ukraine sanctions on Russia, although these sanctions aren’t quite as severe as their American and European counterparts. Lastly, these economic maneuvers with Russia are given increased salience due to the uncertain future of actual TPP passage.

Turkey, a U.S. NATO ally, nonetheless has its own calculus to follow in crafting a holistic foreign policy strategy. Like the Philippines and Japan, this is a necessity for Turkey as it sits at the crossroads of Europe, the Middle East and Asia. This rich historical and unique geographical position has led to hostilities with Russia in the past, eventually leading to the Crimean War, and with Europe, eventually leading to World War I, and presently continuing uncertainty over eventual EU accession and Syrian refugee crisis resolution.

More recently, Turkey’s relations with Russia had taken a nosedive due to the shooting down of a Russian airplane near Syria. At the time, it was widely assumed that this incident would strengthen Turkish solidarity with the West with respect to Russia in the wake of U.S.-Russian hostilities. However, the recent coup attempt in Turkey has altered this calculus with Turkish suspicions that the U.S. might itself, in fact, have been behind the coup attempt. As a result, Russia and Turkey have temporarily put the aircraft incident behind them with Turkey pursuing more of a balanced diplomatic track between Russia and the West.

This reorientation, however, is not without its problems as Turkey and Russia both have competing visions over Syria’s future. Regardless, the two powers have not allowed these differences to impede potential economic cooperation, already faltering post-Ukraine sanctions and post-Russian aircraft incident. The Turkish Stream project, once thought to be dead because of past Russo-Turkish hostilities, is currently proceeding apace. Ukraine is referenced yet again, as the project would allow Russia to export more gas to Europe through Turkey, bypassing Ukraine in the process. Lastly, this rapprochement has occurred despite historical Russo-Turkish domestic grievances with respect to influence over the Black Sea.

Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe meet in Vladivostok (RT)

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Written By Shehab Al Makahleh and Theodore Karasik

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the richest Arab nation and the home to Islam’s holiest sites, must feel under siege these days. Pressure is coming from many fronts, among them a costly war in Yemen, diplomatic tensions with the U.S. over a new law in which families of 9/11 victims can sue Saudis, and low oil prices that have lead to financial austerity. However, a little-reported debate over the future of a strain of Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabi creed could be a tipping point that destabilizes the whole country.

A consortium of UAE and Egyptian interests meeting of all places in Grozny, Chechnya, is the front line of this new pressure point. They are there to discuss Wahhabism, a Saudi belief system that breeds Salafist terrorists from al-Qaeda to Islamic State. In this sense, the Grozny venue is significant. The Wahhabi creed in the Caucuses region seems to have undergone its own “reformation” in recent years.

Gone are the days of Chechnya being a terrorist outpost in the Russian Federation, attacking aviation, transportation, schools, hospitals, and theaters. A new strain of Wahhabism is now an integral part of the Kremlin’s current drive to make Chechnya, under Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov, a shining example of Islam and politics working in unison for social and economic development.

Kadyrov’s pro-Russian government sees Grozny as a model for expunging takfiri (violent excommunication) thinking from Wahhabism. Benefitting from intelligence from the Chechen community in Arab countries, the Chechen president plays a role in helping Russia, Syria, and Jordan to target Chechen networks in the evaporating Islamic State.

In other words, a functional model of political Islam is being generated out of all places from Russia. With backing from Egypt and the UAE, this new model of political Islam based on moderate, politically-oriented Sufism is now at the center of the discussion on Wahhabism. Sufi teachings focus on the spiritual rather than the political side of religion and tend to interpret main religious principles, such as jihad, as spiritual matters that one must tame and guide along the path of goodness.

Discussing Saudi Arabia’s Wahhabist creed in such a public forum with the active support and participation of the greater Arab world is a direct challenge to the vulnerable House of Saud. In addition to its external pressures, the Kingdom has new leadership following the death of King Abdullah in 2015, and an uncertain succession plan. The country is trying to deploy an ambitious new agenda, including a National Transformation Program (NTP) and a massive “Vision 2030” plan advanced by the Deputy Crown Prince.

This is a delicate balancing act: Saudi is trying to accommodate its young population with reforms and development, while placating older conservatives as well as the Kingdom’s clerics, many of whom adhere to the strict Salafist doctrine.

To boot, Sufis make up a tiny minority of the Saudi population. Although Sufis in Saudis faced repression under the Al-Saud, since the mid-2000s a reconciliation between Wahhabi and Sufi clerics has helped the latter feel more included in Saudi society. Now, with Sufism seen as a guiding light against Wahhabist Salafism, Saudi Sufis might make themselves heard in new ways on social media against the Saudi clergy.

Because of a focus on Sufism emanating from Chechnya, the Kingdom faces another pressure point and an accelerated threat to its stability. Why Arab allies, in conjunction with Russia, would try to undermine Saudi Arabia is questionable. Relations between Sufis and adherents of other non-Sunni religions and sects is largely friendly. This fact is especially true given the deep-rooted idea of pluralism in Sufi eschatology in addition to diverse cultural norms, which makes Sufism more open to neighboring religions and cultures. For the Kingdom, this fact may be too much.

The Salafi-Jihadists of al-Qaeda and Daesh will see an opportunity to exploit this debate to their own ends. They know that if Saudi Arabia’s creed is being debated, then the Kingdom will be in a weakened position. Terrorist attacks against key targets to bring instability to Saudi Arabia will be a primary objective. This new debate on Wahhabism will only empower extremists, not neuter them.

Dr. Al Makahleh is the co-founder of Geostrategic Media and Dr. Karasik is senior advisor at Gulf State Analytics.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe ( Russia Insider)

U.S.-Russian great power rivalry has intensified in the Baltic and Black Sea regions, with the latest clash occurring in Syria. As was made clear at a recent Council on Foreign Relations symposium, this new conflict is different from the previous Cold War in that several of these theaters border Russia directly. What is overlooked, however, is the consequence this rivalry has on Russia’s Asia-Pacific borders.

U.S.-Russian hostilities have the potential to impact the U.S.’ re-balance to the region to counter China. Despite (or perhaps because of) this, Japan has renewed its own outreach efforts to Russia. These efforts have lessons for the U.S. with respect to overcoming unproductive rhetoric and soberly recognizing shared security interests in arguably the most important geopolitical region of the future.

With respect to the Asia-Pacific region, much news has recently focused on the Philippines’ apparent shift from the U.S. in order to improve relations with China. While these maneuvers certainly have the potential to impact U.S. strategy in the region vis-à-vis China, they pale in comparison to Japanese efforts to improve its own relations with Russia. In contrast to Filipino moves, which are very early in a new administration and still ambiguous, Japan has clearly shown a desire to improve Russo-Japanese relations steadily over the course of several years.

In a nutshell, Japan realizes the immense importance of Russia to its own efforts to balance China and it is not about to let U.S.-Russian hostilities stand in its way. Russia needs Japan as well in order to better balance China. Lastly, Russia craves Japanese investment and technical expertise to further develop the Russian Far East.

Recent U.S. efforts to diminish and portray Russia as merely a “regional power” are quite correct, but not nearly in the way originally imagined. A simple glance at a map shows the many regions Russia can impact and make life more or less difficult for the U.S. if it so chooses to do so. Japan, unlike the U.S., clearly recognizes this and, in turn, recognizes good Russian relations as crucial on geopolitical issues such as China and North Korea. Japan also recognizes good Russian relations as essential in its own quest to gain access to resources not only in the Russian Far East, but in both Central Asia and the Arctic as well.

Compared to North Korea’s ceasefire with South Korea, a legacy of the Cold War, Japan’s technical state of war with Russia actually goes back further to World War II. Despite the lack of a formal peace treaty with Russia and the resultant 70+ plus years of “war”, Japan has been persistent in its efforts to resolve the Kuril Islands dispute.

As mentioned before, these efforts are given even more salience recently with the rise of China and the efforts of both Japan and the U.S. to counter this phenomenon. Despite nationalistic rhetoric from both public and private quarters in both countries, Russia and Japan have both been persistent in improving relations as they recognize this as crucial to improving their overall regional security and economic environment.

Russia has recently abrogated a series of nuclear treaties with the U.S. in the wake of the Syrian ceasefire collapse. These cancellations are but one of several Russian signals sent to the U.S. to indicate that continued U.S.-Russian hostilities in Ukraine and Syria can have unforeseen consequences globally.

With respect to the Asia-Pacific region specifically, these come in the wake of previous Russian signals sent by both air and sea which were meant to convey this very same message. The difference now is that the rate and weight of these new signals appears to be increasing, with the very latest being Russian overtures to Vietnam to reinstate its presence at Cam Ranh Bay, as well as increased Russian strategic bomber patrols near U.S. Pacific Ocean military bases.

Russian Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers on patrol (Wikimedia Commons)

Currently, debate rages within the U.S. foreign policy establishment as to whether U.S.-Russian hostilities constitute a “new” or “old” Cold War. The case can indeed be made that it is a “new” Cold War, made infinitely more complex and dangerous than its predecessor due to increased multi-polarity and globalization.

What is clear, however, is that the patience and persistence shown by both Russia and Japan to improve relations may finally bear fruit. The U.S. and Russia should both keep this in mind, shed unproductive rhetoric (which may help win elections, but is not actually useful for much else), and realize that improved relations may take years, even decades. Mutual recognition of shared global security interests demands nothing less.

Video courtesy of The Council on Foreign Relations

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A coalition made up of American airpower, a newly energized Iraqi Army, Kurdish forces and often unnamed Iranian assets is currently assaulting the city of Mosul, ISIS’s main stronghold in Iraq.

It is likely that Mosul will fall to the combined forces, as a military buildup of Syrian Army, Russian airpower and more unnamed Iranian assets challenge Raqqa, the Islamic State’s Syrian stronghold. While minorities in the region continue to suffer to the point of extinction and will probably continue to be ignored, foreign powers involved in the region are stirring conflicts in Yemen, Libya and possibly most of the Levant for generations to come.

It is hard to say how severely damaged relations between the US and Russia have become over the last year. A position usually reserved for the U.S., Russia has become the de facto king maker/human rights aggressor in the region. Russian forces in the region gave the current American administration the ability to back away from regional commitments and, at the same time, opened themselves up for the U.S. condemnation of its actions.

Following the U.S. presidential election, it can be certain that involving Russia into U.S. domestic politics will have done nothing to help the current standing between Washington and Moscow. Moreover, regardless of the outcome on November 8, it is unlikely that American citizens or soldiers will eagerly look forward to fighting Russian forces on the plains of Ukraine under what will be the President with the lowest favorability ratings in American history. Batteries of S-300 and  S-400 anti-aircraft missile systems in Syria will ensure a one-button war will be viable, and preventing another Wikileaks information dump will do nothing to change that situation or the likability of the next American President.

A victory over ISIS in Mosul will not foster an end to the tensions and conflict in the region. While the U.S. may be open to dialogue with Iran, and may even expect Iran to handle future issues in the region, the perennial crux of the issues between Sunni Arabs and Shi’a Persians will not disappear in one generation.

Unless old wounds were to heal instantly overnight, Sunni Arabs will never accept any scenario where foreign powers control their future. By all rights, Kurdistan should become an independent state, although it is likely that Turkey will prevent the bravery of Kurdish Peshmerga from earning their own land and borders.

Minorities, if any of them survive targeted killings, will have no choice but to seek fortunes outside of the region. With Western governments actively ignoring their issues as seen with the genocide of the Yazidis, their future will never be bright and survival will be their only focus.

With regards to the majority, Arabs will never accept rule by another culture perceived as their enemies. And while labels may change and extremism may be quelled as an ideology, the lack of real independence will always be a catalyst for war. The most realistic scenario is that with bad policy decisions and choices that leave little to traditional, local powerbrokers in the region, the battles for Mosul and Raqqa will bring about the end of an occupation by radicals, but will do little to prevent future conflicts.

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Workers for Alphamin Bisie Mining built a 32 kilometer access road to the Bisie tin deposit. (Tom Wilson/Bloomberg)

Mining firm Alphamin is intent on building a mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo’s (DRC) northeastern province of North Kivu. It will be the first modern mining operation in this historically insecure region of the Congo.

The Toronto-listed firm is breaking ground at a site called Bisie, in the Walikale territory of North Kivu. It boasts among the world’s richest tin deposits. However, the challenges—from poor infrastructure to roving militant groups—are all too real.  

Alphamin plans to put $134m into pre-production investment, then to raise debt and equity through 2016 and 2017 to fund the ramp-up phase and working capital.

The Bisie mine is expected to produce some 9,900 tonnes of low cost tin concentrate for 12 years, with first yields expected at the end of 2018 according to the firm. With a promised 48.4% internal rate of return for investors, it is easy to see how many would bite despite the risks.

However the project has certainly not been easy. The remote location and lack of infrastructure in much of the DRC means the company has had to build its own road to the site using little more than manual labour. A mobile phone tower only recently went up in the area.  

Then there is the question of security.

Walikale is now safer than many parts of conflict-prone North Kivu. However as recently as 2014, militant groups operating in the area attacked Alphamin’s base camp, which fell within the territory of three competing armed groups.

One might wonder why a company would choose to set up operations in one of the DRC’s most unstable areas even as a constitutional crisis over the rule of president Joseph Kabila threatens to tip the entire country back towards conflict.

Boris Kamstra, chief executive of Alphamin Resources Corp, says the firm had been exploring various commercial options but decided that tin stands out as a particularly interesting commodity. Prices for the metal are on the rise, and changes in technology are fueling demand.

“The demand profile for tin changed completely when it was included in electronic solders to replace lead. You have a historic lack of exploration and underdevelopment of tin assets, which looking forward gives you a declining supply,” Mr Kamstra explains.

He downplays the risk from armed groups, saying most are now based outside Walikale and further eastwards, while stressing the work Alphamin has put into developing ties to the local communities in which it operates.  

However rebel groups still act as competition to outsiders arriving to mine in ‘their’ areas, as well as targeting companies for extortion and banditry.

DRC has a long history of its rich mining assets being coopted by militant groups to fund their violent campaigns. A 2013 UN report estimates that 98% of the gold sold from Congo that year was smuggled out, mostly through neighbouring Uganda.

Alphamin does attempt to address the problem of conflict minerals explicitly. The company says the Bisie mine will comply with the US Dodd-Frank Act.

The Act, a wide-ranging reform bill focused mostly on financial sector reform after the 2008 financial crisis, includes a requirement that all US-listed companies determine origins for gold, tin, tungsten and tantalum sourced from the DRC or an adjoining country.

The idea is that transparency in value chains will weed out conflict minerals, starving the groups that depend on their revenues. This is much easier to do in theory than in practice.

At present more than 50 different armed groups still operate in the DRC’s borderlands, often forcing the local population to join their ranks, participate in their military and logistical activities or to turn a blind eye to criminal activities. Determining loyalties, as well as origins of mineral exports, is difficult in this fluid context.

Henri Ladyi, who leads the Centre Résolution Conflits (CRC) peace group in North Kivu, says that rebel groups have been forcibly recruiting workers and fighters during a string of bloody raids in 2015 and 2016. They target and kidnap “strong young people” who, after being trained in the bush, are used to help the militias.

He says armed groups also try to trick younger recruits into joining them.“Some local people are getting information that there are number of [plots] available for them for agriculture, so they are moving from their village into the zone that is controlled by rebels.” 

Criminalized rebel groups can pose as credible employers or protectors because many young Congolese have grown up with the instability caused by these armed groups and see the situation as normal. There are also very few legitimate alternatives in North Kivu, exacerbating the conflict and risks for companies that come into the areas.

Bjorn van Wees, Africa analyst at the Economist Intelligence Unit, does not think that the arrival of a large Western mining company like Alphamin will make much of a difference to the employment prospects of young people in the region.

“Investment projects are clearly a very important part of any peacebuilding process. The creation of jobs and revenue-generating activities can help boost stability. Unfortunately in the DRC, the authorities are ill-equipped to make good use of the revenues generated by mining projects,” he says.

He also warns that bringing in a project of this scale and then failing to live up to local expectations can have serious consequences. “A failure by the government to ensure that benefits from the new tin mine…go beyond jobs could heighten tensions if government revenues from the project are not invested back into the community,” he points out.

Breaking the longstanding link between the area’s abundant natural resources, illicit smuggling networks and armed groups will only happen if the DRC’s government can provide the security that legitimate large and small employers need to return to the area.

Until then, the only companies that will venture out to North Kivu will be the ones like Alphamin who can afford to bring their own private security with them—and even then their ventures will be met with scepticism in many quarters.

An earlier version of this article was published at This Is Africa and reappears here with kind permission.

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A US Marine instructs a Philippine soldier. (Gabriel Mistral/Getty Images)

Coming just days ahead of his first state visit to Beijing next week, Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte promised to end the 65-year military alliance with the U.S., during a speech on October 8th in southern Davao city. In his comments, Duterte warned Washington, “For as long as I am there, do not treat us like a doormat because you’ll be sorry for it. I will not speak with you. I can always go to China.” 

Duterte also promised to end the 28 annual military exercises with U.S. forces, while also threatening to call off the 10-year Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), signed by Duterte’s predecessor, which allows for a rotating U.S. military presence at five sites.

His defense secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, is seemingly on board, announcing the eventual removal of the 107 American troops involved in operating surveillance drones against Islamic militants. Lorenzana said he would ask the Philippines Congress for $50-100 million to replace military aid from its American treaty ally.

Under the U.S. Foreign Military Financing program, the Philippines is currently the largest recipient of U.S. funds in the Asia-Pacific region. U.S. State Department spokesman John Kirby claims U.S. assistance to the Philippines in the coming fiscal year is $180 million.  “We have been allies since 1951,” he said. “All we got are hand-me-downs, no new equipment. The Americans failed to beef up our capabilities to be at par with what is happening in the region.” Lorenzana is expected to travel soon to Beijing and Moscow to seek defense equipment.

U.S. military forces prepare for the annual Philippines-U.S. live fire amphibious landing exercise north of Manila, Philippines. (Reuters)

Other top officials in Duterte’s administration are falling in line with the president’s tough, independent approach. Earlier this month, Foreign Affairs chief Perfecto Yasay Jr. declared the Philippines would break the “shackles of dependency” on the U.S. which treats them “as little brown brothers not capable of true independence and freedom.” In his statement, Yasay hailed Duterte’s new foreign policy “towards an independent track in pursuing the overriding national interest and in upholding and protecting our sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Yasay further called for “an end to our nation’s subservience to United States’ interests.”

Chief Presidential Legal Counsel Salvador Panelo is also on message, stating that the country’s national interest, under the 1998 Visiting Forces Agreement, the Mutual Defense Treaty and the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, will be reviewed, “either to expand them, enhance them, or remove provisions onerous to the interests of the government.

Manila’s newly-found belligerence toward the U.S. is traced by some to the appeal of a populist, nationalistic strongman leader such as Duterte, who promises to make strong a country with a weak military, as Chinese fishing boats and coast guard ships continue to encroach upon Philippine territorial waters. His harsh crackdown on the drug trade has drawn widespread criticism from the E.U. and the U.S., and he claims the U.S. ambassador to the Philippines told him privately the U.S. will defend the Philippines “Only if you are attacked.” 

Evidently, Duterte was hoping the July 12 favorable ruling from The Hague (negating Beijing’s claims to 90% of the South China Sea) might spur the U.S., under the 50-year-old Mutual Defense Treaty, to assist Manila in asserting its claims in the disputed waters.

Yet the harsh reality remains that if Duterte chooses to annul defense cooperation (and protection) with the U.S., the Philippine defense forces, Foreign Affairs chief Yasay admits, “remain grossly incapable in meeting the security threats that we face from potential foes.”

Some analysts argue the tough talk is only a negotiating tactic—that Duterte is threatening the U.S. alliance to appease Beijing and Moscow in the hope of winning greater concessions of military and economic aid out of the two nations. But this is a dangerous strategy coming from a country with a weak military and a weakening military alliance with the world’s superpower – its largest supplier of arms.  

Many potential pitfalls exist under Duterte’s strategy of switching dance partners. Is there enough support in the Philippines Congress to switch military aid from the U.S. to Russia or China? Will Chinese and Russian military equipment be compatible with existing American systems? Will Beijing and Moscow sniff desperation and reduce their offers of support?

Will big business, activists and the powerful Catholic Church (all of whom overthrew Joseph Estrada as president) come under Duterte’s wing and support his new foreign policy? And lastly, while Duterte’s approval ratings remain as high as previous presidents, will the 92% of Filipinos who hold favorable ratings of America maintain their approval of Duterte if the U.S. alliance ends?  

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As the conflict drags on, civilian death tolls mount, and more refugees are created, how could the answer be yes? On October 6, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof reprinted tweets by victims of Syrian military atrocities, concluding that non-intervention in Syria “has been [Obama’s[ worst mistake, a huge blot on his legacy.”

Meanwhile, the same day’s Times Opinion page included a column by former Obama Administration National Security Council officials Steven Simon and Jonathan Stevenson (“Don’t Intervene in Syria”) defending the president’s stance. Simon and Stevenson argue non-intervention is not paralyzed inaction; it is a considered action, deemed to be the best U.S. response to the problem.

Both columns agree that the overarching U.S. goal should be saving Syrian lives. Diverging views emerge over whether introducing U.S. force would do so, or whether U.S. engagement should have a purely humanitarian focus.

So has President Obama has been taking the “least bad” course for the U.S. on Syria? Reflecting on the last two decades of U.S. foreign policy interventions, the answer is yes.

In caring for patients, a physician swears an oath to “first do no harm”. The urge to “do something” in the face of a health crisis is overwhelming, but taking the wrong action can be just as deadly. President Obama’s Syria stance is a sort of ‘Hippocratic Oath’ of foreign policy: above all, do not add to the problem. Following the aftermath of U.S. invasion of Iraq, this position is understandable both politically and in terms of practical problem solving.

Politically, is there any way an American public would support another protracted U.S. war in the Middle East? Despite some election year drumbeating for greater U.S. intervention, it is hard to imagine that a U.S. public still healing divisions over Iraq would support another large-scale U.S. intervention in the Middle East. For now, however, assume intervention would be popular, or at least tolerable: what would “success” in Syria mean for the U.S.? What new responsibilities would the U.S. be taking on?

The short and long-term answers to both questions are daunting. Success would surely mean on overthrow of the Assad regime and introduction of a more democratic Syrian government—similar to the U.S. goals in Iraq. Unlike Iraq, however, Syria is embroiled in civil conflict now, when U.S. intervention is being considered. Historically, major powers have not intervened in civil wars out of pure altruism: they have a strategic goal in mind. France did not aid the U.S. in the Revolutionary War out of neighborly duty: it wanted to weaken archrival England and knock it out of North America. Syria is already a fault line in the U.S.-Russia relationship, and President Obama’s advisors are rightly concerned about the possibility of U.S. intervention morphing into a protracted proxy war with the Syrian people caught in the middle.

Alternatively, if the U.S. were to mount a full-scale invasion and overthrow Assad by force, it would own the results (Colin Powell’s “Pottery Barn” rule.) The Obama Administration has aimed to pivot U.S. foreign policy attentions from Europe and quagmires in the Middle East to productive relations in Asia. Having extricated America from Iraq, President Obama is rightly hesitant to leave his successor with another long term U.S. Middle East commitment in its place.

Kristof’s caveat in supporting further U.S. engagement in Syria (“Of course, we shouldn’t send in ground troops”) mirrors the debate over NATO engagement in the Balkans in the mid-1990s. In that conflict, the strategic danger of committing to only partial military response (“no boots on the ground”) was discussed at the outset: if limited engagement does not work, then what?

In addition to telegraphing a signal of America’s partial investment in the conflict, limiting engagement also risks committing forces without achieving goals. The dangers of committing ground troops to Syria are obvious following the U.S. experience in Iraq. The NATO experience in Bosnia and Herzegovina may well suggest that air power alone could go a long way toward ending the conflict. There is an inherent risk, however, in placing more Syrian lives at risk from the air in the name of helping them.

Even the strategy of arming Syrian rebels, which scratches the intervention itch while keeping U.S. forces at a safe remove, has issues. Using the “enemy of my enemy is my friend” calculation, it is difficult to know for certain that today’s friends will not be tomorrow’s enemies. The U.S. had many experiences with tenuous and temporary alliance relationships over Iraq.

But it can go back to the experience of the Afghan Mujahideen for a clear example. At the time, Islamic militias in Afghanistan were allies in opposing the Soviet invasion. Only years later, Islamic militias—and militant Islam in general—was a problem in Afghanistan the U.S. was fighting an uphill battle to solve. The game changes quickly, especially when the players are not established allies, and erstwhile allies can use the weapons you provided against you.

None of this is meant to suggest the Syrian civil war is not a humanitarian catastrophe begging for a solution. It is the kind of crisis the United Nations was designed to address collectively, both in humanitarian terms and, if necessary, militarily. U.S. refugee policy could better reflect the nation’s commitment to Syrian innocents.

But President Obama is correct to be extremely cautious about the use of U.S. military power in the Middle East following the Iraq invasion. That caution does not reflect political dithering, but rather a grasp of the enormity of the challenge involved in stabilizing that region. President Obama’s own UN Ambassador, Samantha Power, coined a term in a book about America’s response to genocide that is apt for Syria today: it is “a problem from Hell.”

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(Carnegie Europe)

On September 16, 27 European Heads of States came together in Bratislava for a first- ever-informal meeting to discuss the future of the Union. As they geared to overcome the latest European crisis, the theme of security figured prominently among the five central objectives of the resulting Bratislava Roadmap. “In a challenging geopolitical environment,” states the document, “EU cooperation on external security and defense” needs to be strengthened.  For the upcoming European Council meeting in December 2016, the Roadmap announces that a “concrete implementation plan on security and defense” will be presented.

These and other statements issued during the one-day summit in the Slovak capital suggest that defense policy has emerged as a discursive vehicle to reunite the ailing Union and to regain the citizens’ trust in their governments. As Donald Tusk put it in an open letter to his colleagues, “someone must give back to Europeans their sense of security.”

At first, this bellicose demeanor seems at odds with the Union’s collective identity of a norm-based pacifist community, one that has left behind a Hobbesian state of nature and has instead ventured into a Kantian world of cooperative supra-nationalism. Building upon this foundational myth, Europe’s role in the international system has become that of a normative power (Manners 2002); its foreign policy has relied on soft power tools such as the appeal of its institutional set-up and wide-ranging economic and social freedoms.

However, when European leaders engaged in a security-driven narrative at the Bratislava Summit, they openly challenged this vision, suggesting a more proactive role for Europe as a global military power.

What seems paradoxical at first makes a lot more sense if one considers the nature and centrality of identity-shaping narratives in the realm of international politics. Although identities—as mechanisms to give meaning to the self and the other—are considered to be rather stable, they are not static objects. Instead they are “constituted by collective meanings that are always in process” (Wendt 1992, 407) thus allowing change to occur.

Identities are subject to change, as are the narratives that constitute them. These constituent narratives are central to the creation and preservation of any form of social organization. They are the backbones that allow us to distinguish ourselves by giving specific meanings to a political community and providing “a reason for being” (Della Sala 2010, 1). These identity-shaping narratives, however, are intersubjectively created, that is through interaction with others.  Consequently, their success depends not only on the emitter of the narrative but also on the recipients.

The EU’s traditional narratives, developed around the promotion of peace and the creation of prosperity, have reached a standstill. For many European citizens, domestic peace no longer suffices to justify the existence of the Union, and economic prosperity in a globalized Europe is becoming increasingly illusory. The recurrence of ever more complex political and economic crises over the past decade has undermined Europe’s very identity and its foundational myth, which “no longer seems enough to sustain a ‘permissive consensus’” (Della Sala 2010, 3).

Seen from this perspective, the Bratislava Summit captures European leaders in search of a new narrative; a narrative that can re-unite Europeans and keep them united in the future.

The Bratislava statement followed a joint declaration by the French and German defense ministers earlier in September. Through a joint declaration on the future of Europe’s defense policy, Paris and Berlin wanted to convince both European and international audiences that post-Brexit Europe “isn’t going to be just fine, but even more prosperous and closely united than ever before.” To do so, they relied on no other than the oldest and most persistent motive of state creation: security.

This is not the first time in Europe’s history that a security narrative has entered the public discourse in times of turbulence. After the end of the Cold War and with the disappearance of bipolarity as a stable ordering principle, the Treaty of the European Union in 1992 “signaled the intent of the Member States of the Union to move beyond a civilian power Europe and to develop a defense dimension to the international identity of the Union” (Whitman 1998, 135-6). Yet Europe’s failure to put an end to the ensuing decade of wars on the territory of former Yugoslavia seemed to bolster critics’ beliefs that Europe would never emerge as a military power on the international scene.

Notwithstanding the creation of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) (renamed the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) in 2009), post 9/11 Europe distinguished itself mainly through its dividedness in light of the second Iraq War and its failure to deploy its newly created Battlegroups.

While France, posed to be the EU’s top military power after Britain’s departure, has been campaigning for a military union for some time, true change seems to be occurring in Germany. In July 2016, German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen presented a White Paper On German Security Policy and the Future of the Bundeswehr. The document “defines Germany’s ambition to play an active and substantial role in security policy” and was largely seen as marking “a major shift for the country.”

The timing seems favorable for the introduction of a new European security narrative capable of transforming the Union’s identity and role in the international arena. Germany’s attempts to enter hard power politics, France’s desire to Europeanize defense, Eastern Europe’s quest for more security, and Italy’s benevolence towards CFSP all constitute a fertile ground for change. Moreover, a Europe that takes on its responsibilities and contributes to a greater extent to the stability of the international system in place can be sure of Washington’s support.

Skeptics may point out that identities do not change easily, and rightly so. Many obstacles and setbacks must be overcome before we can see the emergence of a European defense policy worth its name. Yet, the so-called-age of global terror, Europe’s place in an increasingly multipolar world, and the Union’s dire need to reinvent itself both domestically and internationally have already initiated a process at the end of which European hard power and its projection abroad will emerge as “a sort of Gramascian ‘common sense’’ (Della Sala 2010, 9). European leaders’ practices and the reception of these practices by their audiences will decide if and when this narrative eventually becomes central to Europe’s new identity; at which point Europe will have left Venus and joined America on Mars.

† The title is adopted from Ian Manners’ article Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?

Della Sala, Vincent. 2010. “Political Myth, Mythology and the European Union” Journal of Common Market Studies 48 (1): 1-19.

Kagan, Robert. 2002. “Power and Weakness” Policy Review 113 (June/July).

Manners, Ian. 2002. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235-258.

Whitman, R. 1998. From Civilian to Superpower? The International Identity of the European Union. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

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Protest at China Long March event in San Gabriel, CA (Pasadena Star-News)

Last week in “Chinese Propaganda Comes to Southern California,” I reported on a planned song and dance performance commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Long March of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China to be presented at the San Gabriel Mission Playhouse in San Gabriel, California. As predicted, the performance on October 8 was met with protest by Chinese Americans and human rights activists.

To begin with, “tempers flared and a fight nearly broke out” at a San Gabriel City Council meeting on October 4, as about fifty protesters demanded that the event at a city-owned venue be cancelled. “I’m giving testimony that the Chinese Communist Party encourages people to hate and be violent,” said protester James Yu of West Covina. “These are very unfitting values for the United States of America.” Yu said that he had left China “to escape persecution by the communist regime, and seeing the party as the focus of a gala in San Gabriel was deeply upsetting.”

The event was not cancelled, thanks to the First Amendment right of free expression which does not exist in China under Communist Party rule. However, a rental fee waiver for the Mission Playhouse requested by the event’s organizers was denied due to its overtly political nature. In addition to the rental fee, organizers were required to pay the cost of policing the event. As reported last week, the organizers of the event have a history of pro-Beijing activities that includes making pro-government statements in Chinese media and organizing a forum in Los Angeles to commemorate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party.

Long March 80th anniversary gala, San Gabriel CA (Chinese Daily USA)

On the night of the performance, protesters gathered again outside the Mission Playhouse (see photos). “People are free in America,” said protester Kai Chen, “If someone wants to hang a picture of Hitler or Mao in their bedroom, they’re free to do that.” Chen said he hoped, however, that “attendees would learn from what the protesters have to say about the Chinese Communist Party’s authoritarian practices.” Said fellow protester Ted Brown, “To celebrate the Long March is to celebrate Mao Zedong…. While Mao is gone, Chinese people are still oppressed in the same ways as during his regime.”

Pro-government Chinese media reported that the Chinese consul-general in Los Angeles was among those attending the event, and lamented as “unfortunate” the controversy stirred up by “so-called ‘dissidents’.”

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NATO allies have made significant progress during the July 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit in developing a more flexible and mobile conventional deterrent posture. Nevertheless, Alliance cohesion—a crucial requirement to successfully implement the Warsaw commitments and tackle current security threats—is increasingly being tested.

These tests arise from security challenges in NATO’s eastern and southern flank but also from other areas, such as domestic politics, which have spillover effects on the willingness of the Alliance to work together. With different threat perceptions and national preferences, NATO countries must ensure the Alliance’s cohesion in order to maintain the credibility of its collective defense commitment.

Russia’s aggressive behavior has led NATO to respond with the approval of Readiness Action Plan (RAP) in 2014, in a show of Alliance unity. However, as the situation in Syria further deteriorated in the following years and ISIS, although diminished, still demonstrates the ability to carry out attacks in Europe, many Allies are now complaining about the overwhelming focus of RAP on the east.

Indeed, southern Europe is more concerned about developing NATO’s capabilities in the southern flank to face what it sees as more pressing threats to its security. The yawning gap between Allies’ threat perception risks undermining NATO’s ability to simultaneously address threats coming from different directions.

The mass influx of refugees towards Europe and the spike in terrorist attacks—issues outside of NATO’s security mandate—are nevertheless affecting Alliance cohesion. First, they are stretching European administrations and security forces thin, creating political tensions within the European Union. With countries adopting incompatible policies, and disagreeing over burden sharing measures, the Schengen system is endangered and the sense of European solidarity is progressively vanishing. In this toxic environment, accusations of political blackmail can lead to diplomatic retaliations across different institutional frameworks such as NATO, weakening the Alliance’s ability to implement the Warsaw commitments.

Second, and more directly, the migrant crisis is imperiling the political stability of Greece and Turkey as well as the political future of German Chancellor Merkel due to the disproportionate amount of strain put on those NATO countries—the former due to their geographical position as a bridge to Europe and the latter because of its welcoming policy towards migrants.

The growing threats in Europe’s periphery have inflamed its politics, fueling the rise of populist movements and changing the political landscape of the continent. A loose grouping of parties across the political spectrum, populists usually decry the loss of national sovereignty in favor of the EU’s supranational authority.

They are against internationalism, globalization and champion national solutions. However a national approach to defense, often with isolationist implications, is incompatible with NATO’s collective defense commitment and anachronistic in today’s increasingly interconnected world where transnational challenges and threats—exemplified by the migrant crisis and terrorism—require a high degree of coordination and unity between countries.

In addition, Russia’s “marriage of convenience” with European populist parties is being exploited through disinformation campaigns to undermine the EU and polarize the debate in the continent. The example par excellence of the effectiveness of Moscow’s information warfare was the Dutch referendum on the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine.

In today’s world, boundaries between national and international actions are becoming blurrier, with domestic developments—such as terrorist attacks—affecting a country’s foreign policy and conversely, foreign policy decisions—such as Chancellor Merkel’s open-door policy—influencing domestic politics in a perpetual loop of interaction.

As a result, even if populist movements fail to break into mainstream politics, their disturbance could lead to political paralysis within and between countries, a key challenge to the cohesion of the Alliance. Finally, the rise of illiberal sentiment threatens NATO’s core common values of democracy and rule of law.

The United Kingdom’s referendum vote to leave the European Union, the so-called Brexit, was not directly related to security issues, but has the potential to negatively impact the Alliance. Although politicians hurried up to assert that Brexit would not impact the United Kingdom’s commitment to NATO, analysts are more skeptical: “we are hearing everyone say nothing will change as a result of Brexit, but really they know this might be a seminal moment” explained Jonathan Eyal, International Director at RUSI, a British think tank.

First, since there is no clear plan to leave the EU, much of the political focus of the United Kingdom and most European allies in the near future will be on how to deal with Brexit. The use of their limited resources and political capital will inevitably diverge attention away from other issues, reducing the Allies interest in pushing forward the Warsaw agenda. In addition, this uncertainty affects NATO directly, as noted by Mr. Stoltenberg: “unpredictability creates challenges to our security. […] We are faced with so much so much uncertainty, unpredictability and instability surrounding us. And anything that adds to that is a concern.”

Second, Brexit might provoke economic instability, leading to a possible recession in the United Kingdom in 2017 and weakening growth prospects throughout Europe. As a consequence, this could negatively affect both the defense spending of the United Kingdom and reverse the recent defense spending increases observed in many Allied countries.

Third, as the European Union’s biggest defense spender and a crucial transatlantic intermediary, the United Kingdom break from Brussels could hurt NATO-EU cooperation—a vital element in maintaining the Alliance’s cohesion since both organizations currently have 22 member countries in common. If Brexit negotiations with the European Union become divisive and/or lead other countries to emulate the United Kingdom’s decision, they could severely impact deliberations within the Alliance.

Moreover, if Brexit goes through, it would reduce the EU’s share in NATO defense spending from 24% to 17% significantly reducing the EU’s voice within NATO. It would also considerably degrade the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.

Although some argue it will improve EU security decision-making as the United Kingdom tended to favor NATO over EU action, Brexit will undeniably reduce the EU’s diplomatic clout (the United Kingdom is a permanent member of the UN Security council and a member of the G-7), intelligence gathering capabilities (the United Kingdom is a member of the Five Eyes intelligence alliance), and military might (the United Kingdom makes up 24% of the EU’s military spending and 7% of its military strength).

Faced with all these challenges and in an environment cluttered with disinformation/misinformation, it is more important than ever that different national constituencies understand NATO’s crucial role and the necessity for member countries to show a united front.

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It is increasingly obvious that China can no longer be patient over the North Korean issue. (South China Morning Post)

It is always surreal to watch the televised images of the heir of the Kim family dynasty, Kim Jong-un, strutting around his senior subjects with a cigarette between the fingers.

What is even more surreal is the oddity of the heir’s relentlessly pursued agenda—‘Byungjin Line’ (meaning ‘Guns and Butter’ but more like ‘Guns over Butter’ in actual implementation). At the 7th Party Congress held last May, one of Dennis Rodman’s best friends obstinately manifested that he will unflinchingly invest in the completion of his ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio, whatever the cost is to its people. Kim’s such dogged ‘Songun’ (Military-first) position clearly demonstrates that he will not follow the Chinese path of moving towards economic reform with a degree of openness.

Kim Jong-un’s diplomatic craftsmanship is disastrous. Since he came into power in 2011 he has not yet made a single official visit to China. Meanwhile China, the G2-aspiring major power, has unwittingly earned an international obloquy as the Kim regime’s one and only godfather; largely because the major power accounts for more than 70% of the regime’s foreign trade, and most of its food and energy supplies.

Instead of reviving its regime’s effete comradeship with China, in 2013 Kim executed his own uncle, Jang Sung-taek. Jang was then the second most powerful person in the Kim regime and China’s most trusted power broker, who dominated the development of trade cooperation and border economy (‘Shinuiju’ meaning special administrative district) with China.

In an official response to Jang’s execution, China hoped to ‘continue’ maintaining a ‘healthy’ relationship with the Kim regime, but the consequences of spoiling little Kim are harmful. Internally, Kim’s support base has been engulfed by his father’s hawkish loyalists who compete for the boss’ trust, notwithstanding the fact that the boss is too survival-conscious (or hyper-rationally ‘mad’) to have faith in anyone but his ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio.

Externally, the Kim regime keeps flaunting its nuclear missile capabilities in defiance of the international community’s sanctions. The latest UN resolution 2270 was signed in March 2016 to call upon member-states to ban their support for the Kim regime’s WMD (Weapon of Mass Destruction) related activities, like transportation of WMDs, and to embargo coal and other mineral exports from the regime.

Scoffing at the fifth UN Security Council (UNSC) sanction that it received, on August 24th the regime lofted at a high angle a long range KN-11 Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (using ‘cold-launch’ technology). This landed in the water of Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). And on September 9th (North Korea’s National Foundation Holiday), the regime further conducted its fifth and biggest underground nuclear warhead test yet (the alleged impacts round up to 10kt), dismissive of the G20 summit hosted in China.

The credibility of Kim’s threats has become existential to the extent that, if the regime really possessed miniaturized nuclear warheads as it claims, its long-range Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) and SLBM could nuke the west coast of the U.S. mainland. Such existential threats gives the U.S.-led trilateral alliance in Northeast Asia legitimate reasons to resort to preemptive strikes, in case the Kim regime shows any signs of a nuclear attack.

Unlike his father, Kim Jong-il, who at least kept the de-nuclearization card under the negotiation table of the six party talk, Kim Jong-un is not as dexterous in finding the fulcrum point on the dovish-to-hawkish scale. The danger with little Kim is that his threats swing back and forth in a pendulum between the two polarities of “artilleries and nuclear weapons”.

China must understand that Kim Jong-un’s behavioral incorrigibility concurs with the collapsibility of the regime, not because of exogenous pressures, but from internal malfunctions. The dilemma for the Kim regime is that maintaining political stability through reinforcing a frayed Juche ideology is always more important than promoting a degree of openness in the informal Jangmadang economy.

Thus, the regime will be more repressive in putting an end to the North Korean people’s increasing market demands and simultaneously over obsession with its ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons portfolio. For the foreseeable future this can only be exacerbated, especially when the North Koreans (those who surreptitiously access outside information) confirm the own economic reality―namely of being relatively deprived, at a 1:40 per capita income gap, in comparison to their kindred South Korean people,.

It is expected that the United States might soon apply the Iran Model to the Kim regime, in order to strengthen sanctions against the regime’s incorrigible behavior. Pundits warn that China will be offended by the United States’ initiation of a secondary boycott on Chinese companies transacting with North Korea, foreboding possible ruptures in cooperation between the United States and China on the Korean peninsula.

Despite the gloomy picture, whenever Kim Jong-un poses another new non-negotiable threat, it becomes ever more obvious that China can no longer be patient over its buffer zone; it is turning into a rambunctious nightmare to regional security. A number of Chinese experts have recently recognized that Kim Jong-un is a worn-out nuisance. Perhaps now is the ripe time for China to recalibrate it policies towards North Korea.

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Tsai Ing-wen waves to supporters at her party’s headquarters in Taipei on Saturday after her victory in Taiwan’s presidential election.

Diplomatic ties between Taiwan and mainland China have been experiencing multiple hurdles since the new Taiwanese president Tsai Ing-wen won the election this past January, after eight years of gradual restoration of trade and cultural exchanges under Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency.

This June, mainland officials unilaterally suspended all major communication mechanisms with their Taiwanese counterparts. A spokesperson for mainland’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) announced it would  cut off the official exchanges channel between them and mainland Affairs Council (MAC), as well as between mainland’s Association for Relations Across the Strait (ARATS) and Taiwan’s Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF). His decision leaves both sides with no outlets for direct government communication in case of a crisis.

In the meantime, Beijing is consciously reducing its cross-Strait tourist numbers and trade volumes. The numbers of tourist groups visiting Taiwan from mainland dropped by 30% since this past May, and Beijing plans to further cut down the total tourist number even further from 3.85 million in 2015 to 2 million by the end of this year.

Like-minded soft trade sanctions, such as canceling cross-Strait trade deals, also created stress on Taiwan’s economy. From January to July this year, the total cross-Strait trade volume dropped by 9.8%, with exports from mainland to Taiwan dropping by 12.7%, according to mainland’s Ministry of Commerce.

Meanwhile, Beijing sent Tsai a clear message of dissatisfaction by “further squeezing [Taiwan’s] international space”. The Gambia, an African nation formally connected with Taiwan, resumed diplomatic ties with Beijing in early March.

In addition to poaching Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic partners, Beijing has successfully persuaded Cambodia, Malaysia, and Kenya to send Taiwanese suspects residing in those countries back to China for trial this year. Comparing this to China’s past history of non-interference in Taiwanese citizens’ legal affairs overseas under President Ma, Beijing is clearly flexing its muscles since Tsai Ing-wen’s election

A historic Ma-Xi meeting focused on the “1992 consensus”.

Most cross-Strait policy changes were made by mainland officials directed by Chinese President Xi Jinping, with the clear political objective to apply pressure on the new Taiwanese President Tsai. Why has Beijing’s policy towards Taiwan shifted so dramatically from Ma to Tsai?

The key to understanding this deterioration on cross-Strait relations goes back to the 1992 Consensus—a mutual agreement between Kuomintang (KMT) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1992. In it, both sides agreed on the “One-China principle”, that Taiwan is a province of China, with “different interpretations” of which party is the legitimate governing body of China.

As the current leader of DPP, to endorse the 1992 consensus would be considered political suicide for Tsai Ing-wen. Consequently, she failed to endorse the 1992 Consensus after she won the Taiwanese presidential election this January. In her interview with Liberty Times (Tzu-yu Shih Pa) shortly after the election, she addressed the “discussion of the 1992 Consensus” as “a historical fact and both sides had a common acknowledgement to set aside differences and seek common ground” yet did not support the actual substance of the document.

Unlike Tsai, her predecessor President Ma Ying-jeou was never asked to clarify his stance of the “One-China Principle” during his presidency. Despite Tsai’s multiple attempts to extend olive branches to Beijing, Xi Jinping has never recognized her as a credible partner of Beijing. Although Tsai clearly outlined her cross-Strait policies on a “no surprises, no provocations” policy stance, she is facing much more systematic obstacles than her predecessor.

One of the challenges for President Tsai is the long history of mistrust between Beijing and DPP, the party she currently chairs. Mainland politicians are prone to associate DPP with “pro-independence”, “separation”, and other labels of the like. The infamous separatist “Two-state Theory” put forward by the former President, DPP leader, Lee Teng-hui is still fresh in the memory of mainland politicians. On the other hand, Beijing shares a mutual trust with Ma Ying Jeoy and the KMT he led, built on years of reconciliation and cooperation. Without trust, calculated ambiguity won’t lubricate the cross-Strait relations for President Tsai like it did for Ma.

Tsai has also had to face obstacles as the first female president of Taiwan. She has dealt with sexist criticism directed at her gender and marital status. Maj. Gen. Wang Wenxing, a Chinese military official at China’s Academy of Military and an acting member of ARATS, described Tsai in the International Herald Leader as “extreme” and “emotional” because “she was never married, and therefore lack of the burden of love, family, and children”. Though his article was taken down shortly after due to broad criticism from the public, the fact that it was approved by a CCP-affiliated publication exposed some mainland officials’ hostility against this “single woman politician”.

Calculated ambiguity was sufficient to maintain a healthy cross-Strait relationship during Ma’s Presidency. But if Tsai wishes to keep vital diplomatic ties from deteriorating, she needs to find more creative ways to maneuver between Taiwan’s domestic calls for independence and Beijing’s pressures to endorse the 1992 Consensus.

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Russian President Vladimir Putin meets with U.S. President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the G-20 summit in China (ALEXEI DRUZHININ | AFP | Getty Images)

Russia has announced the suspension of an agreement it had with the U.S. to convert weapons-grade plutonium into nuclear fuel. It did this as a result of the collapse of the Syrian ceasefire deal involving both the U.S. and Russia.  As a result, both powers have allowed yet another regional proxy conflict, post-Ukraine, to undermine the longer-term foundations of global security.

Recriminations have been exchanged between the U.S. and Russia regarding the actual commitment of the other to sustain and implement the recent Syrian ceasefire agreement. While some may attempt to point out how one party or the other is actually more at fault for this failure, this misses the point entirely. The point is that the disagreement between Russia and the U.S over Syria has actually increased global insecurity for all parties.

One would think that any headline or topic involving the three words “U.S.”, “Russia”, and “nuclear” would immediately command worldwide attention and foster a policy of more restraint with respect to resolving conflict between the two powers. Unfortunately, this hasn’t been the case. On the one hand, the failure of the plutonium deal mirrors the Russian cancellation of its rocketry usage to launch U.S. satellites into space several years ago. The failure of the continued rocketry deal has long-term implications, potentially involving joint space exploration, something which affects all of humanity.

Conversely, the failure of the plutonium deal is much worse in that its aftereffects are more likely to be felt sooner rather than later. While nuclear deals between Russia and the U.S. may not necessarily be considered as “sexy” as they once were during the Cold War in terms of garnering frontpage headlines, they are no less critical in fostering global security than resolving any myriad number of regional conflicts.

To emphasize this point, Russia has also simultaneously suspended the 2010 Implementing Agreement concerning cooperation on feasibility studies of the conversion of Russian research reactors to use low-enriched uranium fuel. Additionally, Russia has suspended the 2013 Russian-US Agreement on Cooperation in Nuclear- and Energy-Related Scientific Research and Development. All three of the suspensions were announced within the span of a few days, perfectly illustrating the unforeseen, magnified consequences continued U.S.-Russian hostilities will have for the “foreseeable” future.

The failure of the plutonium deal not only will have ramifications with respect to non-state actors like terrorists, but longer-term strategic relations between the U.S and Russia directly. This is because the failure will not only potentially impact both states’ efforts at nonproliferation globally, but will actually increase the U.S.-Russian security dilemma itself. Though the agreement, known as the Plutonium Disposition and Management Agreement (PDMA), is not as crucial as the INF or New START treaties, its abrogation has dissolved the perceived boundary between the “nuclear” and “conventional” compartments in Russia-U.S. relations.

Even though some in the U.S. may indeed consider China to be a longer-term threat to U.S. interests, the sharp decline and rapid pace of deterioration in U.S.-Russia relations threatens to overshadow even the importance of U.S.-China relations. China’s primary instrument of its “comprehensive national power” is its economic base. Russia’s is its nuclear component, something even China doesn’t have (yet). Because of this, U.S. options for resolving conflict with Russia in general are getting ever smaller in number.

While many may be frustrated with Russian actions in Syria, the position taken by some that the U.S. needs to try military means to stop Russian moves in Aleppo brings to mind the word “Armaggedon”. There is no way to possibly foresee the afteraffects of direct U.S. military action against Russian forces in Syria, especially coming in the wake of the recent U.S. bombing of Syrian government forces. A power that is explicitly bent on using its nuclear parity with the U.S. as a key element in its great power resurgence campaign would probably not respond too well to being attacked, especially after its ally has already been attacked, accidentally or not.

Russia has used the plutonium deal impasse as an avenue to demanding not only decreased NATO military levels in Eastern Europe to year 2000-levels and repeal of the Magnitsky Act, but also to demand an end to (as well as compensation for) all sanctions imposed on Russia post-Ukraine. This countermove has, in one fell swoop, annihilated the justification for continued sanctions against Russia by some, namely that they will somehow miraculously affect Russia’s calculus and bring it more into compliance with Western wishes. Needless to say, while Russia’s maneuvering may indeed seem contemptible to some, it has nevertheless caught Western leaders off-balance, yet again.

Exasperated, many will ask, “How then to best “manage” Russia if both military and economic means are off the table?” A clue may be found in many proponents’ views towards U.S.-China relations. At the risk of sounding simplistic, both Russia and the U.S. will need to adopt a more realistic, sober, and patient approach to the other based on cooperation where possible, while also recognizing that competition in other areas will inevitably exist. This also forms the crux of the “great power pragmatism” school of thought which Putin originally came into office believing in and adhering to.

This competition exists because of the inalterable nature of great powers’ national interests which, unsurprisingly, remain intact despite threats from other great powers. Patience then, above all else, will be required from both parties when playing this long-term chess game, while simultaneously recognizing their shared roles and responsibility for upholding regional and global security.

Conversation: The State of U.S.-Russia Relations (courtesy of STRATFORvideo)

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On October 8, a song and dance performance commemorating the 80th anniversary of the Long March of the Red Army of the Communist Party of China will be presented at the San Gabriel Mission Playhouse in San Gabriel, California. Organized by the American Chinese Culture Association (ACCA, 美中文化协会), the event is also being protested by local Chinese American human rights activists.

“I was one of the immigrants who fled China to be free of the Chinese Communist Party’s persecution,” activist Rocky Chang told Christopher Yee of the Pasadena Star-News, “It’s shocking that they’re starting to infiltrate the Chinese-American community to promote communist ideologies.” Unlike China the United States does not practice censorship, so the show is unlikely to be cancelled, but seems certain to face further protest. Similar events in Australia marking the 40th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s death were cancelled by organizers in September following protest by human rights activists in the Chinese Australian community.

Publicity for Long March 80th anniversary gala (Chinese Daily USA)

Like organizers in Australia, those in Southern California have a clearly propagandist purpose and clear ties to Chinese Communist Party and pro-Beijing organizations such as the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (CCPPNR, 中国和平统一促进会) in Beijing. ACCA president and lead organizer Lin Xu (林旭, aka David Lin) had the following to say on the Long March and the purpose of its commemoration in Southern California (Chinese Daily USA; see also Channel G&E, International Daily News, World Journal):

“The spirit embodied in the Long March is the most core value in Chinese culture…. Eighty years ago, Red Army soldiers completed the Long March and shocked the world, opened up a bright road for China’s future, and laid the foundation for the birth of the People’s Republic of China. This great historical event is the pride of the Communist Party of China leading the Red Army of Chinese workers and peasants, the glory of the Chinese army, and the pride of the Chinese nation.

“With the increase of China’s influence in the world and the progress of human history, the Long March of the Red Army will become the heritage of world civilization and will be recognized and respected by all mankind. Like the biblical Exodus, this story will be known around the world and immortalized in history. This is precisely the purpose and meaning of today’s commemoration of this history—it belongs to the future and to all mankind!”

Lin Xu (center) with Chinese vice-consul Wang Lei (left: Chinese Daily USA)

Lin Xu and co-organizers of the Long March event also organized a forum in June in Los Angeles to commemorate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Speaking at the forum, Liu Qing (刘青) of CCPPNR praised the Communist Party for its “great achievements” and stressed the importance of “united front work” in bringing Chinese people in China and abroad together under the party’s leadership. Ding Lixin (丁立新), president of Hollywood Chinese TV (HCTV, 好莱坞中文卫视), spoke on “expanding Chinese propaganda and enhancing the Chinese Communist Party’s international image.”

Hollywood Chinese TV president Ding Lixin (HCTV/DuXuan.cn)

In 2014 Lin with co-organizers Deng Guifeng (邓桂凤) of the Jiangxi Association of America (美国江西联谊会) and Li Lanping (李兰平) of the Shaanxi Association of America (美国陕西同乡会) appeared in a “Joint Statement of CCPPNR and Worldwide Overseas Chinese Associations”  (signatures #3, #54, and #113) condemning the pro-democracy Occupy Central movement in Hong Kong, supporting the Chinese central government and its puppet government in Hong Kong, and opposing interference by “foreign forces” in “China’s internal affairs.”

Lin was an organizer for an anti-Japanese protest in Los Angeles on the occasion of Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the United States in 2015; and in 2004 appeared in the Communist Party’s official newspaper People’s Daily speaking out in support of mainland Chinese claims on Taiwan and against Taiwan independence. Mr. Lin and his associates enjoy the right do all of these things in the United States, of course—a right denied to those in China whose opinions might differ.

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