Foreign Policy Blogs

Flowers and candles outside the French Embassy in Moscow in memory of the victims of the terrorist act in Nice. (RIA Novosti)

St. Petersburg suffered an attack inside one of its subway stations on April 3rd. Russia is not unfamiliar with horrific terrorist incidences—in the past they have targeted military personnel, theatre goers, and even children. The response in the country regions—Chechnya and Dagestan—where Russian officials have fought against extremism has been to siege and destroy those communities and cities from where rebel leaders originate.

Some argue that, with the growth of extremist movements along Russia’s southern border, the Kremlin has been playing a key role in assisting the Assad regime in the extermination of extremists as an extension of its domestic policies. Many parts of Syria have been flattened by the regime with the help of Russia, making parts of Syria an example of how policymakers can adopt the Chechnya strategy.

The attacker was identified as Akbarzhon Jalilov, a 22-year old Russian of Kyrgyz origin. However, it is still unclear what his motivations were and it is unknown whether or not his cause is linked to movements in the Caucasus region or actions in Syria.

Like in Chechnya, the end of the larger conflict may not eliminate attacks like those in Russia, as the root issues plaguing the Caucasus and the Middle East will remain unresolved. In Mosul, Sunnis do not perceive Shi’a militias as liberators but rather as a continuation of religious and ethnic conflict post-ISIS.

Regional conflicts comprise several competing interests that go beyond religion, policies, and race. Without an educated and strategic understanding of these issues, it is likely that otherwise well-intentioned policies may lead to a power vacuum and genocide as a post-ISIS reality settles in.

As Manuel Valls learned in the wake of the Nice attack, an acceptance of terror attacks, especially those involving children, is unacceptable in any Western society. Accepting policies that have lead to current genocides of Yazidis, Christians and many Muslim communities in the Middle East should also be considered unacceptable with no reservations.

Future policies that deeply antagonize communities need to be prevented at all costs. Otherwise, it is unlikely that attacks in places like St. Petersburg, Nice, Paris, or Brussels will end. Security, refugee and local policies need to address that even a passive acceptance of removing humanity from those who have no power will always lead to desperate actions.

The post Catalysts for Never Ending Attacks appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Vietnam reacted strongly again in response to a recent visit by a Chinese cruise ship to the disputed Paracel archipelago (Hoàng Sa to Vietnamese and Xisha to Chinese). Hanoi pressed for an end to the cruise ship visits, which since 2013 have taken hundreds of Chinese tourists on a sun-soaked holiday intended to cement Beijing’s claim to the island chain.

Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Le Hai Binh strongly condemned China’s action, saying “Vietnam strongly opposes this and demands that China respect Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and international law and immediately stop and not repeat those activities,”adding, “Those actions have seriously violated Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel Islands and international law.”

China claims 90 percent of the South China Sea (or East Sea to Vietnamese) under its notorious “nine-dash line” and fought a war with Hanoi over control of the Paracels in 1974. Before the skirmish, Vietnam had control of some islands within the Paracel archipelago, China controlled others, and Taiwan also laid claim to some of the 30 islands and reefs.

According to Professor Toshi Yoshihara, of the Strategy and Policy faculty at the Naval War College, the Battle of the Paracels started as a clash between the Chinese and South Vietnamese navies. The fighting was short and intense, and “involved small, second hand combatants armed with outdated weaponry. The fighting lasted for several hours, producing modest casualties in ships and men.” The Chinese forces eventually prevailed, after three of the four Vietnamese warships had to retreat and the fourth sank with its captain on board. Dozens of southern Vietnamese sailors were killed, and China took control over the entire group of islands. Following Vietnam’s defeat, little mention of the battle has featured in Vietnamese media until 2014, some forty years later.

In 1979, Vietnam would fight another battle with China on their shared land border, with Chinese forces invading Vietnam to punish Hanoi for invading Cambodia to drive out the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge leadership in Phnom Penh. Chinese forces would again fight the Vietnamese in 1988, after China seized six reefs and atolls of the Spratly Islands after a skirmish at Johnson South Reef.

The latest heated rhetoric from Hanoi follows a series of warming relations between the two Communist brothers, who had in recent months seemingly set aside their differences, including an effort by the Vietnamese government to silence protestors in Hanoi marking the 43rd anniversary of the China’s occupation of the Paracel Islands in January. But distrust of Chinese intentions is always present, and Hanoi has reportedly been actively fortifying its key holdings in the Spratlys, including the construction of a runway, tunnels and bunkers.

For now, there is little Hanoi can do (besides comments from diplomats) to counter Beijing’s efforts at furthering its claims through waging tourist-fare. Hanoi has established an office for the administration of the Paracels in the coastal city of Da Nang, loaded with maps, photos and historical documents to support Vietnam’s claim. And a new museum is in the works to bolster patriotism among its citizens. But beyond furthering its legal case, taking on China’s massive military strength is a daunting prospect for this much smaller nation of 90 million. Harassing civilian cruise ships will not win over the international community.

Perhaps the only safe response is tit-for-tat diplomacy, either offering Vietnamese tourists a cruise to the disputed Spratlys or turning back the hoards of Chinese tourists flocking to visit the areas in Vietnam where the Hollywood movie ‘Kong: Skull Island’ was filmed.

The post Beijing Seeks to Bolster Claims to Disputed Islands appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“We must remain committed to developing global free trade and investment, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation through opening-up and say no to protectionism.” – Xi Jinping – (Flickr)

Initiating a defense against Beijing’s recent economic retaliations over the deployment of THAAD, Seoul raised the issue at a meeting of the WTO’s Council for Trade in Services, held on March 18th. Such a move marks South Korea’s first state-level gesture that—if supported by evidence—could possibly develop into a formal trade dispute.

“We have notified the WTO that China may be in violation of some trade agreements,” stated Joo Hyung-hwan, South Korea’s Trade Minister, revealing this activity to the National Assembly’s Trade, Industry and Energy Committee during his attendance of the committee’s session on March 20th.

In reaction to Seoul’s move, Beijing’s spokesperson for the Ministry of Commerce, Sun Jiwen, denied the implications of retaliatory ‘policy measures’, declaring: “As responsible member of the WTO, China has consistently and will continue to respect WTO rules and relevant promises.” Beijing’s spokesperson for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hua Chunying, also made remarks on the issue while answering reporters’ questions during a press conferences, stating: “We support normal business and trade exchanges between China and the ROK, but this needs a corresponding basis in public opinion. In the meantime, China’s position on opposing THAAD is consistent and clear.”

The comments appear to reckon with South Korea’s current post-impeachment politics in which liberal presidential candidate, Moon Jae-in, is emerging as a frontrunner in the current race (the election is scheduled to be held on May 9th). Moon’s ambiguous stance on the deployment of THAAD, in tandem with his incremental approach to Korean Reunification, has been perceived as a boon to Beijing’s interests.

Seoul’s appeal to the WTO is widely regarded as a symbolic lobbying gesture to exert pressure on Beijing, on one hand, and to raise his issue on the multilateral level, on the other. However, if Beijing’s myopic retaliations continue to worsen, Seoul would consider them as an opportunity to reduce excessive trade dependency on China (trade with China currently accounts for almost a quarter of all South Korean exports). Seoul would accelerate the reformulation of its trade strategies with an emphasis on trade diversification toward India and ASEAN member countries.

In 2016, both the number of subsidiaries set up by Korean corporations and the total value invested by these subsidiaries were 1.5 times greater in ASEAN member countries than they were in China. Such growing trade ties also characterize the current status of ROK-India trade relations; approximately 3% of India’s 2016 imports were South Korean shipments.

Beijing’s miscalculated retaliations generated other unintended consequences for Beijing. It propelled Seoul to strengthen its distant bilateral relations with other Asian countries such as India. Recently, Seoul has agreed with New Delhi to hold an annual ‘two plus two’ high-level meeting to bolster the two countries’ ‘strategic cooperation’ on security and political issues. Above all, Beijing’s counterproductive treatment of its eastern neighbor in the manner one would treat a ‘vassal state’ has served to provoke an anti-China sentiment in South Korea.

Beijing anticipates that such sentiment will be drained when Moon Jae-in wins the presidential election. However, Beijing underestimates Moon Jae-in’s nationalist tendencies, which overshadow his pro-China leanings; given his nationalist views, he is likely to prioritize public sentiment over Beijing’s interests once he wins the election. Unfortunately, KBS-Yonhap News’ March survey results frustrate Beijing, with more than half of the Korean people favoring the deployment of THAAD.

THAAD is a Matter of South Korea’s Sovereignty

THAAD was deployed immediately after Kim Jong-un’s four ballistic missiles landed on Japan’s exclusive economic zone (EEC) in the East Sea on March 7th. The arrival in South Korea of two THAAD launchers, along with 16 missiles, has since caused considerable damage to the already aggravated ROK-China relations (which have been impaired since last July’s U.S.-ROK agreement on the deployment of THAAD), largely attributable to Beijing’s hasty and regressive economic retaliations.

Beijing authorities deny implementation of official retaliatory ‘policy measures’ over the deployment of THAAD; however, alleged retaliatory incidents have resulted in significant economic losses to a wide range of South Korea’s industries. Media reports on, inter alia, smashed Hyundai cars and destroyed Lotte products capture the violent façade of Beijing-maneuvered anti-South Korea propaganda, which has turned Chinese consumers into offensive nationalism-driven vandals. Behind the unpleasant pictorials, Lotte, South Korea’s fifth largest conglomerate and its largest confectionary manufacturer, is expected to suffer US$102.7 billion as a result of the Beijing-imposed temporary shutdown of 90% of its department stores in China. The bare effect of providing the THAAD site in South Korea’s rural city Seongju, as part of a land swap deal with the South Korean government, has been to drag the apolitical economic entity into the THAAD imbroglio. Lotte’s case, although indicative of a high-water mark in Beijing’s economic retaliation, is merely the tip of the iceberg.

The year 2017 might prove to be a nightmare for South Korea’s tourism industry, with the annual number of Chinese tourists expected to decrease by 20%. K-Drama and K-pop stars—including those already active in China’s entertainment market as well as those attempting to enter this market—might similarly face hardship, as Beijing continues to impose visa restrictions and event cancellations. Overall, Beijing’s economic retaliation, if intensified, could shrink South Korea’s GDP by up to 0.25%.

Beijing’s growing concerns over THAAD genuinely derive from the possibility that the defense system will weaken the credibility of China’s second-strike nuclear capability. In other words, THAAD is a dagger to China’ ambitions for regional dominance. Nevertheless, Seoul does not have the luxury of encouraging such ambitions on China’s part now, as Kim Jong-un’s relentless terrorist activities continue to South Korea’s survival. Moreover, Kim Jong-un’s recent assassination of his half-brother, Kim Jong-nam, by VX nerve agent, has substantiated, beyond any reasonable doubt, the possibility that the regime could process the chemical into a WMD with the aim of conducting chemical warfare. Kim Jong-un’s ruthless mentality, exemplified in the slaughtering of his own family and his continued fireworks, amply vindicates Seoul from Beijing’s ‘arms race’ accusations.

The deployment of THAAD is an intricate issue that will ultimately be guided by the South Korean people’s will. Still, most South Korean nationalists adamantly assert that the deployment of THAAD is the country’s sovereign right to defend itself from Kim Jong-Un’s existential threats. Some of them take the threats very seriously and go further to advocate for the re-deployment of U.S.-supplied tactical nuclear weapons in the country. Others even warn that, should the Kim dynasty escalate regional tensions in Northeast Asia to the next level, the terrorist regime should fasten its safety belt for an arms race with an economy (South Korea) that boasts a GDP 40 times larger than that of the regime.

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“World’s Emptiest Airport”: Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, Sri Lanka

With protests against China’s investments taking a volatile shape in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Pakistan, it is safe to say that the country’s ambitious expansion via economics in the Indian subcontinent is not going as well as Beijing had imagined.

On February 2nd, one person died and more than a dozen got injured when a protest against a $2.4-billion Chinese-backed power plant in Bangladesh turned violent.

The protesters believe that the construction of the coal-fired plant 265 km south-east of Dhaka will cause widespread displacements, disturb graveyards, thereby snapping a sentimental link with the land (too), and damage the environment.

When the agreement was signed for the project, which was expected to begin power generation by the end of 2019, it was touted as the symbol of Chinese-Bangladeshi relations.

In the most recent violence linked to Chinese investment in Myanmar in the third week of February, Hundreds of workers in Myanmar attacked a Chinese garment factory in Yangon, destroying equipment and briefly making seven Chinese workers captive. It took joint efforts of the Chinese embassy and the local police to secure the release of the Chinese workers.

Though this particular incident was related to the sacking of an employee, anti-China sentiment has been rising recently in Myanmar, leading, for instance, the shelving of plans to build a huge dam on the Irrawaddy River.

Similar resistance is also seen in the construction of an oil pipeline in Myanmar, a country that had a good trade and political relations with China at a time it was facing international sanctions due to the military rule.

Elsewhere, a month earlier, in January, scores of people were injured in southern Sri Lanka during a protest against allowing China to build a port and surrounding industrial zone.

The project involved probable displacement of many thousands of people living in villages near Hambantota port, about 250 km south-east of the capital Colombo.

The protesters believe that the area is being turned into “a Chinese colony”. Giving credence to their fears is the fact that the Sri Lankan government is finalizing a 99-year lease of the entire port area to a Chinese-owned company.

In Pakistan, a country with which China’s friendship has recently acquired a proverbial turn, and is said to be “deeper than the seas and higher than the mountains”, the problems are two-fold:

A section of the intelligentsia share the fears of the Hambantota port protesters – that about Pakistan, as a matter of speaking, becoming a Chinese enclave by not negotiating well the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), an under-construction $54 billion economic corridor in Pakistan, that aims to connect Gwadar Port in Balochistan province in the southwestern Pakistan with Xinjiang in far-western China.

Then there is a more violent opposition in place too – that by groups that have long been demanding independence for Balochistan, Pakistan’s largest province. Only this week, the Baloch activists blew up a part of a bridge that belonged to CPEC. More than 15,000 troops are designated by the Pakistan government to safeguard the corridor, and the 7,000 Chinese personnel working on it.

Pakistan squarely blames its neighbour India for all the violence in its country, especially that which targets the CPEC.

India, on the other hand, and while denying any role in Pakistan’s internal violence, has raised concerns about the CPEC passing through some areas of the Kashmir region, which it calls Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), and claims it to be a part of its sovereign territory.

The incidents across four countries in the Indian subcontinent—especially the problems of the ports in Pakistan and Sri Lanka—reflect the probability of there eventually being a resistance to what experts like Brahma Chellany, a geostrategist and, among other, a fellow of the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin, calls “China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy”.

Addressed in other forms elsewhere by other experts, the term generally refers to China’s ploy to dominate geopolitics via economics, especially that part of economics that involves mega infrastructure investments in underdeveloped and often restive states where the need for investment outbids the need for geopolitical considerations.

For the purpose of brevity, let’s just focus on Chinese investments in Sri Lanka and Pakistan.

When the world was apparently against Mahinda Rajapaksa, Sri Lanka’s then president, in his bid to brutally crush the deadly terrorist organisation Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), China had readily come forward with not just arms but also economic packages like Official Development Assistance (ODA) and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) of nearly $14 billion in the decade spanning 2005-2015. ODA was offered for infrastructure, energy, and services projects at an interest rate of 2-5%. Hambantota Port Development was one of the biggest recipients of the assistance.

Unfortunately for Sri Lanka, Hambantota port, built in 2008, today generates almost no noteworthy revenue—while the adjoining Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport, which became operational in 2013, was dubbed as the “world’s emptiest airport” by Wade Shephard, author of a forthcoming book on China’s “One Belt, One Road”.

Writing for Forbes, Wade mentions that the cost of paying off the airport alone was topping $17 million per year.

In another article for the same publication, Wade mentioned, “All in all, the Hambantota fiasco is sending a clear message to Beijing: showing up with bags of money alone is not enough to win a new Silk Road”.

The twin issue of the port and the airport was enough for the opposition to topple Rajapaksa, almost a cult hero in the country for making it free of 26-year-old LTTE terrorism, in the 2015 presidential elections.

Things have not been smooth for Chinese investments in the country ever since. For instance, a deal about Chinese-owned companies (government proxies in general) taking over 80% of Hambantota port for a 99-year lease for about $1 billion, was scheduled to be signed in January—but has now been postponed indefinitely due to mass protests.

Pakistan poses even greater challenges to Chinese investments. There, China has to deal not only with Baluchistan militant factions that are calling for independence but also international considerations like India claiming a part of the Kashmir region that is currently held by Pakistan—and from where the much-touted CPEC highways pass—to the possibility of Afghanistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia fuelling the fire in Baluchistan for their own geopolitical and sectarian interests.

On the business side too, the history of Gwadar port does not inspire much confidence. Despite Phase II of Gwadar getting completed as far back as in 2008, barely any ships anchor there and little freight handling is recorded.

Then there are stray voices in the Pakistan intelligentsia too expressing doubts about the terms and conditions of CPEC, which remain shrouded in mystery, and often also about the host nation become a (notional) Chinese enclave or colony.

Some of the statements and concerns might be exaggerated but the fact remains that uneven usage of Chinese investments, local and social-political bearings of the investments, and, most of all, suspect ability of the financed projects in particular and financed nations, in general, are raising formidable questions to the Chinese steps in the Indian subcontinent. Bulldozing its way multi-billion dollar speed vehicles might not be the answer that Beijing might be hoping for.

The post China’s ‘Colonial Investments’ Run into Rough Weather in the Indian Subcontinent appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson concluded his visit to China earlier this month, meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping and pledging to his Chinese counterpart, Wang Yi, that relations between the two countries would be based on “non-conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect, and win-win cooperation.”

The statement by Tillerson is a Chinese concept, first put forth by Beijing in 2010, perhaps in an effort to avoid the much-quoted “Thucydides trap”, after a theory developed by an Athenian historian after the Peloponnesian War between Sparta and Athens. The “Thucydides trap” simply says that a rising power causes fear in an established superpower which escalates toward war.

Tillerson’s seemingly easy endorsement of a Chinese phrase is in sharp contrast to the previous Obama administration’s refusal to do so, largely because the term “mutual respect” was seen as implying that other nations should respect China’s “core interests,” including Beijing’s claims to the East and South China Seas.

Tillerson’s acquiescence to the phrase also contrasts with his testimony during the confirmation process, when the aspiring secretary of state sent this confrontational message to Beijing: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

During that testimony, he also reiterated Beijing’s building and placing military equipment on the contested South China Sea islands were “illegal actions” and “extremely worrisome,” arguing “They’re taking territory or control, or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China’s,” while adding the territorial grabs were “akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine.

Of course, with his latest comments, Chinese and foreign media were quick to jump on the apparent reversal of Tillerson’s earlier hawkish statements and serve their respective readerships. The Global Times, a state-owned nationalist tabloid, referred to “analysts believing that this means Tillerson has implicitly endorsed the new model of major power relations.”

The critics from the Western media also pounced, with the Washington Post running the headline: “In China Debut, Tillerson Appears to Hand Beijing a Diplomatic Victory.” Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, argued Tillerson’s acceptance of “mutual respect” translates into “the US is in effect saying that it accepts that China has no room to compromise on these issues.” 

With Xi Jinping praising the U.S. Secretary of State’s comments: “You said that China-US relations can only be friendly,” adding, “I express my appreciation for this,” Tillerson has chosen to save face for his Beijing hosts. His face-saving gesture may be an effort not to rock the boat in the days preceding the planned Trump-Xi summit in April. 

Yet if we are to take Tillerson’s and Trump’s previous statements at face value, the foreign policy they will adopt toward China will unlikely be one of ‘non-conflict”. One skeptic is Shi Yinhong, director of the Center for American Studies at the Renmin University of China. “Tillerson said these words because Trump wants to create a friendly atmosphere and environment for the upcoming summit,” according to Shi.

For despite the pleasantries offered by Tillerson to his hosts, the Trump administration has plans for a huge new arms sale to Taiwan, officials are preparing measures to punish Chinese trade practices in the automotive industry, and Tillerson has said that military force might be an option should North Korea persist with its development of nuclear weapons. Trump may want to create a friendly atmosphere for the upcoming summit, but if these issues are still on the table in April, the practice of saving face may be swept aside.

The post Tillerson Gives Beijing Face appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Trump Administration’s budget proposal cuts 28% from the State Department’s funding, reducing foreign aid and de-funding a range of programs. The plan’s well-known focus on the military, and the absence of discussion of detail, or entitlements, lead many to view the so-called “skinny budget” primarily as a statement of intent.

Still, presidential expressions carry clout. In any case life will not return to what it was before the inauguration, no matter how many terms President Trump serves, or who may follow him. Disruptive as the budget plan is, State should take the opportunity to contemplate its mission, and how to fulfill it in the long run with reduced resources.

Secretary Tillerson, in a letter to the Department speaks of programs, more efficient execution, and national and economic security. These are familiar formulas for hard-power advocates and aid staffers alike. But is State’s purpose defined by programs and by security?

State is the home of the diplomatic service. This blogger gained an insight during a Foreign Service posting in Brazil in 1991. The Brazilian government ran a publicity campaign on children’s welfare, asking for assistance from foreigners, including the U.S., who had cited them for human rights abuses. I was directed to mount a “juvenile justice” program with no funds.

When I protested the assignment’s impossibility to a colleague, his encouragement was that this was a chance to practice ”pure diplomacy.” Introducing a few U.S.-based experts and Embassy staff to Brazilian agencies and NGOs, it turned out, successfully showed sympathy with Brazil’s challenges while standing by our policy. My annual review credited me with starting a program, but really what I did was carry out a U.S. answer to Brazil’s diplomatic “put up or shut up” challenge.

Diplomacy is what puts a context around military action, aid, PR programs, or even inaction, regarding issues of economic and national security—and everything else. We need to set a narrative of our motives and concerns whether we are fighting a war or doing nothing at all. The nature of the function has been obscure to professionals and public alike for decades, hence my citation for starting a program rather than executing diplomacy. If State’s budget cuts any number of programs and aid efforts, the diplomatic mission still remains vital. Furthermore the function is not expensive; if State will now have to practice more pure diplomacy, the Department should re-focus on delivering it.

Diplomacy’s basic currency is credibility, which rests on consistency of words with actions, and coherence of national policy. For it, the U.S. diplomat today needs a durable picture of our core national interest. During the Cold War, U.S. diplomats knew that the Containment Doctrine explained almost any actions of our government. Since we lost that focus, U.S. policy has reacted to crises, such as terrorism, and veered between political priorities, from trade liberalization to climate policy to energy independence to women’s rights.

Given today’s volatile politics and a swirling internet-connected world, Containment’s consistency will not be replaced any time soon. We must be able to name a core interest that can fit shifting priorities, more fundamental than partisan politics, drawn in our own terms rather than in reaction to adversaries or crises.

The post-modern world does not only disrupt American foreign policy. Any nation’s priorities are perpetually overtaken by events, discoveries, and new voices. Many are turning for guidance to traditions of ethnicity, religion, or nationalism. The U.S. does not have this option. Individual Americans carry such old markers of personal identity, but our nation was conceived on principle, invoked by our founders as they divorced their ethnic homeland.

Our founding creed, voiced in the Declaration of Independence, is the source of America’s legitimacy, the national beacon and bedrock of a U.S. diplomat’s credibility. To re-hone its diplomatic mission, State must create a body of people expert in the creed’s meaning, who are able to transmit it in policy.

Knowing the creed rigorously takes a rare understanding. It is abstract, enumerating minimal, overarching concepts. It is paradoxical, as free individuals do abuse each other, and government charged to secure rights must restrain itself—and also some individuals. Its words alone cannot guide policy in the flesh, yet their meaning has grown ever more real in our society as we have developed, strained, and fought among ourselves. It is both eternal and fragile: the words shape our view for any circumstances in any times, but we must perpetually prove both our commitment to open-ended rights and our competence to meet people’s needs.

Capturing the creed in policy and diplomacy will require a specialized skill, as distinct as military expertise. The diplomat must be aware that an abstract creed admits of multiple interpretations. They must be ready to agonize over the proper mix of prudence and ideals, and able to translate choices into policy. An extensive and intensive course of professional formation will be needed. It will have to integrate studies of praxis, social sciences, and history; deep immersion in the philosophy and nuances of our creed; grounding experiences in the realities of American life; and personal preparation for the dilemmas and stresses of applying our paradoxical creed in a complex world.

A diplomatic service formed in this light will represent us, their sovereign, by our true national nature. It will also carry our values into policy-making, via the diplomats’ role in interagency processes. As the desk for America’s founding values in our government, and as America’s face to others, they can imbue our actions with our creed.

In the diplomatic function, explicitly oriented to this core national interest, State can revive its mission and guide policy, to keep America true to our founding. If there are programs and actions to be managed, diplomacy will set them in context and support them; if resources limit those, diplomacy will express our motives. As a response to the proposed budget, this re-focus can bring benefit out of shock. The focus is needed, whatever the budget.

The post Diplomacy As A Budget Friendly Program? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.

U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently concluded a trip to Asia which included visits to Japan, South Korea, and China. With respect to the Chinese leg of the tour, the North Korean crisis and trade were among the many issues discussed between the two sides. As the North Korean situation has proved particularly intractable over several decades, perhaps more novel solutions need to be investigated. One of these solutions may be a proposal for a permanent, non-aligned stance for a unified Korea in order to allay the security concerns of the great powers within the region.

Ghosts of Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)

To combat the increasing range of North Korean ballistic missiles following the most recent test, the U.S. has begun deployment of its THAAD system to not only better protect itself from possible attack, but also to protect its South Korean and Japanese allies as well. However, THAAD deployment has been highly controversial due to the capability of its X-band radar component to surveil deep into both Chinese and Russian territory. This ability not only has the potential to upset the existing regional balance of power within Northeast Asia itself, but global security as a whole as the THAAD radar would impact both Chinese and Russian missile strike capabilities against the U.S. proper.

Most likely, this will simply lead to an accelerated arms race by both China and Russia focused on newer missile technology in order compensate for the THAAD radar capabilities. This security dilemma reflects China’s stance that it simply is not possible to have “perfect” security for oneself, while simultaneously denying the legitimate security concerns of others. Additionally, this stance was a major impetus behind China’s endorsement of Kazakhstan’s Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) initiative.

China has also proposed its own “double cancellation” deal in order to resolve the North Korean dilemma. This proposal would involve the cessation of North Korean missile tests in exchange for the termination of joint U.S.-South Korean military drills in the region. Unfortunately, the proposal is considered infeasible by the U.S. as it wouldn’t allow it to fulfill its treaty obligations to South Korea. These regional drills affect Russia’s security interests in the area as well and are surely a factor in Russia’s recent deployment of troops to the Kuril Islands, further inflaming ties with both Japan and the U.S.

The Cold War Never Truly Ended

Pivoting back to Europe, yet another security dilemma affecting Russia may hold an answer to the North Korean situation, namely the Ukraine Crisis. While the Ukraine Crisis may not have lasted as long as the situation on the North Korean peninsula, it is sure as equally intractable. The two situations are also similar in other ways. Whereas the Six-Party Talks have failed to provide a permanent solution with respect to North Korea, the Minsk Agreements have had little to no effect in resolving the underlying security concerns of the parties involved. Additionally, both situations are legacies of the Cold War, further proving that a war’s end can have long-lasting effects on both “winners” and “losers” alike.

Several advocates of realism in international relations have proposed that only a Ukraine that professes permanent neutrality between The West and Russia can hope to solve the Ukraine Crisis. These advocates, including Dr. John Mearsheimer of The University of Chicago, maintain that only such a solution will permanently address the underlying strategic issues currently dividing The West and Russia. There is historical precedent here as well, as neutrality for a re-unified Germany was the original condition proposed by the Former Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War.

While such a corresponding solution to the North Korean situation may indeed be labelled as “radical”, with details sketchy, surely now is the time for radical thinking given that the U.S. has clearly stated that its policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea is now over and is also stating that “all options are on the table”. In theory, such a solution has the potential to allay the legitimate security concerns of China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. Both China and the South Korean people as a whole have repeatedly favored continued dialogue with North Korea as opposed to “other options”.

Lastly, and most importantly, a unified and permanently neutral Korea may not only be the key to Korea’s re-emergence as a great power within the region itself, but ultimately is a question that the Korean people (and no one else) have to decide for themselves.

The post Permanent Neutrality for a Unified Korea May Be The Only Solution for DPRK Crisis appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Ever since Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) rose to power in November 2015 on a conservative ticket, the country’s institutions have been mercilessly assaulted. From gagging state media to gridlocking the constitutional court, the PiS government has managed to turn one of the EU’s success stories into a backwater.

That reckless behavior was on full display last week when Donald Tusk was re-elected as President of the European Council in spite of raving opposition from Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo who tried to oust her political opponent.

While Poland is still nominally obliged to respect democratic principles regarding the rule of law as a member state, and the European Commission has been “forcefully” expressing its displeasure with the country’s course of action, PiS has so far been unstoppable.

Brussels’ muted response stems mostly from the toothlessness of Europe’s options for sanctioning misbehaving members. Article 7, for example, was added to the Treaty of the European Union in the late 1990s as a way of holding members accountable for rights violations, enabling the Council to issue a formal warning before revoking the voting rights of the violating country. Even after the Commission triggered the pre-Article 7 process last year, Warsaw’s response was little more than a shrug.

By failing to coerce Warsaw into changing its way, the move instead exposed the EU’s practical inability to enforce the rule of law in member states. As is the case with many of Europe’s rules and procedures, the systemic rule of law mechanism presupposes a willingness to cooperate from the affected national governments. Warsaw has considered the dispute closed since submitting a detailed response regarding its views to the European Commission, allowing Poland to stonewall the Commission from taking repercussive measures for almost a year now.

Making matters worse, actually going through with invoking Article 7—the “nuclear option”—is nearly impossible because this would require a unanimous vote from EU member states. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who is himself busy upending Hungarian democracy, has already expressed his opposition to employing Article 7 against Poland and has no interest in seeing Law and Justice reprimanded for following his lead. Between them, Budapest and Warsaw have exposed the ineffective enforcement of the EC’s mechanisms. Absent the “spirit of cooperation,” national governments can stall Europe’s legislative process to their own ends.

Faced with this dilemma, European Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourová has drawn inspiration from the US Congress and its “power of the purse” by proposing to make the distribution of EU funding dependent on whether states uphold fundamental EU principles like the rule of law.

In the U.S., the federal government uses funding it provides to the states as leverage when the two sides find themselves at odds. Washington has, for example, used federal highway funding to force states into adopting laws on speed limits and drinking age. Seeing how countless projects within the EU member states and the surrounding European neighborhood rely on money from Brussels, the funds Europe provides (and recipients take for granted) could very well be turned into an effective enforcement tool.

Countries like Poland and Hungary, where derogations from EU standards are the most egregious, also happen to be most susceptible to any kind of budget pressure. The Polish government heavily relies on EU funding, to the tune of €104.8 billion between 2014 and 2020. Losing that support would drastically impact the Polish economy and the functioning of the national government, offering a powerful incentive for Poland to comply with the EU’s rule of law principles.

This approach can also be easily applied to aspiring EU members, which enjoy billions of euros in funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which falls under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In the Western Balkans, the EU is the largest investor committed to improving governance and rule of law—areas that are notoriously lacking. Montenegro, for example, is one of the leading candidates for EU ascension and yet it faces rising concerns over corruption and insufficient judicial independence. Freedom House noted a declining trend in Montenegro’s governance, especially since the 2016 election.

That election’s troubling aftermath saw opposition figures arrested, with parties opposed to the continued rule of long-time leader Milo Dukanovic boycotting parliament in a political crisis that exposed the fragility of Montenegro’s rule of law. These developments make the EU’s €270.5 million in funding, €99.2 million of which are supposed to be used for improving the judiciary and fighting corruption and organized crime, appear like wasted money.

Dukanovic, who has placed an ally in the premiership but is still leader of the ruling party, is notorious for his links to mafia organizations and cigarette smuggling. Of course, that IPA funding can be seen in a very different light: combined with the carrot of eventual EU membership, it gives Brussels an important tool for pushing Montenegro towards real reform.

The stakes are even higher in Serbia. Despite being an EU candidate country, Serbia has begun to fuel tensions between neighboring Balkan states by taking an aggressive nationalist stance on a variety of issues. Relations have notably declined between Serbia and Bosnia over a genocide appeal, leading to significant delays in the reform efforts. Even so, the Serbs depend on €1.5 billion worth of ENP allocations for infrastructure improvements and economic transition. Thus far, the worst they have seen from the EU are verbal reprimands which are clearly not doing the job.

With the rise of the far-right and nationalist sentiments across the continent, it is more important than ever to enforce the fundamental principles of the European Union and make the EU a coherent, consistent voice for democratic values and good governance. The EC’s existing mechanisms to enforce compliance have been exposed as paper tigers, but Europe still needs to be able to bring unruly member and prospective states to heel. By leveraging the billions of Euros it sends to these countries, the Union can make sure its rules and principles are no longer trampled underfoot.

The post EU Funds Allocation: Is Brussels Flexing Its Muscles? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Robert Lighthizer said President Donald Trump had picked him for the job “in part because of my enforcement background.” (Associated Press)

The new pick for U.S. trade representative (USTR), Robert Lighthizer, recently signaled the new administration’s get-tough approach to China over trade issues. Lighthizer is currently a trade lawyer for the law firm of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, and has represented U.S. industries, such as steel, who lobby for higher tariffs on Chinese imports. He previously served as deputy U.S. trade representative under president Ronald Reagan in the 1980s.

At a Senate confirmation hearing on Tuesday, Lighthizer did not stray far from the views of his president, vowing to crack down on unfair trade practices by China and suggesting the U.S. needs “imaginative” solutions and a “multi-faceted approach” on trade litigation. The USTR, was mandated in 1962 to “negotiate directly with foreign governments to create trade agreements, to resolve disputes, and to participate in global trade policy organizations.”

Lighthizer has suggested the World Trade Organization (WTO) is poorly-equipped to deal with “troubling” Chinese overproduction of steel and other exports, arguing, “I don’t believe that the WTO was set up to deal effectively for a country like China and their industrial policy.” 

He also penned an op-ed in the Washington Times in 2011 defending Trump’s criticism of Chinese trade, “How does allowing China to constantly rig trade in its favor advance the core conservative goal of making markets more efficient? Markets do not run better when manufacturing shifts to China largely because of the actions of its government. Nor do they become more efficient when Chinese companies are given special privileges in global markets, while American companies must struggle to compete with unfairly traded goods.”

Lighthizer is also on record declaring the trade deficit with China as “widely recognized as a major threat to our economy.” He has also come out strong against Chinese attempts to keep its exchange rate competitive by keeping the yuan artificially weak, arguing “In the past, it is my judgment that China was a substantial currency manipulator,” Lighthizer said. “Whether China is manipulating the currency right now is another question. That’s up to the Treasury secretary.”

Lighthizer is the latest among several Trump appointees who have argued for a tougher approach to Chinese trade. Peter Navarro, an economist and author of “Death by China” was recently selected to head the newly-formed White House National Trade Council.

With such vocal critics of Chinese trade emerging in the new administration, senior government officials in China are no doubt worried over how trade policy will play out. But some U.S. economists argue that a trade war started by the U.S. may in fact lead to higher prices for consumer goods, such as Americans now enjoy at Walmart, as high tariffs are added to the price of goods. Analysts at the investment firm of Goldman Sachs, whose alumni feature prominently in the Trump administration, also predict a trade war will lead to falling GDP growth in both countries, as well as those countries such as South Korea and Taiwan which are in the supply chain. With so much heated rhetoric from both sides, finding a solution mutually acceptable to both Washington and Beijing is far from certain.

The post Robert Lighthizer on Trade with China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

From front to back, Cold War era Soviet designed SA-6 Kub (with SA-11 Buk type missiles mounted) and SA-4 Krug Surface to Air Missile Systems.

The idea of using weapons to achieve equilibrium between powers and maintain peace is not novel, but its effectiveness depends on the technological balance between competing powers.

One of the accepted theories of the Cold War era was that if both sides had ballistic nuclear missiles, than neither side would risk a first strike. The theory was called Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD, and it meant that both sides would lose the war due to the virtually guaranteed destruction of all parties in a hypothetical nuclear conflict.

This theory may work when both actors in the scenario are rational and accept that death is a final and negative outcome. But it may not add any level of security if one or more of those actors are not rational, have have an apocalyptic view of the world that honors death before life.

The other limitation is when one side is able to neutralize the ballistic missiles to an effective degree of the other side, unbalancing the relationship between the powers and giving incentives for instigating increasingly aggressive actions.

Theories like MAD may be challenged by new anti-aircraft technologies able to successfully target and hit smaller and faster weapons like cruise missiles and even incoming ballistic missiles. The Reagan administration announced a program to develop laser weapons that could destroy Soviet missiles while in space. The Soviet response was to create missiles with multiple warheads so that there was a greater chance of some of the warheads reaching their targets after encountering countermeasures.

While this “Star Wars” technology was not likely to succeed in the 1980s, current anti-aircraft systems may be a solution to advanced ballistic missile threats coming from actors who have challenges being rational in their behavior.

While the early Patriot Missile systems had claimed success against SCUD missiles coming from Iraq in the 1991 Gulf War, the reality was that few were successful. But the idea that they could protect their bases and allies tamped down the likelihood that the entire conflict would escalate.

The use of the Iron Dome missile system follows this line of rationale. The new technology reduces the need for a harsh response where innocent civilians are in danger as the effects of ballistic missiles are muted by Iron Dome, eliminating a full scale response to aggressive gestures from both rational and non-rational actors.

The recent deployment of THAAD missiles to protect the region from North Korean missile threats is an another example. However, in this scenario China perceives this deployment as an aggressive gesture itself close to their own territory.

Generally, anti-aircraft missiles do not perform the function of a surface-to-surface missile without major reformatting, and even in that case, the warhead on a surface-to-air missile would not cause any major damage due to its smaller size and the design of how SAM missiles combusts.

The THAAD system therefore is not a direct threat to China as a means to launch an assault on Chinese territory, but it could target and shoot down Chinese aircraft and maybe even their ballistic capabilities.

Anti-aircraft missiles on opposing sides of a conflict act as two shields, whereas ballistic missiles are only used as an offensive weapon a conflict. Thus, it could be argued that they are most effective as a political tool to diffuse a conflict, without making aggressive gestures like placing missiles in Cuba during the Cold War.

Conflicts could occur if both sides have equivalent missile shields, but one side has a large ballistic missile advantage over the other that might still cause a great deal of damage. In either case, rational actors would hopefully see Mutually Assured Defense as a valuable step back from Mutually Assured Destruction, and take steps to reduce the ability for non-rational actions to have a sword when selling or giving them a very capable shield.

The post Missiles as Part of the Peace Making Equation appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Adama Barrow, newly elected president of Gambia, arrives for an Independence Day celebration in city of Bakau on Feb. 18, 2017. (REUTERS/Thierry Gouegnon)

After emerging from a harsh dictatorship, now comes the gargantuan task of reconciling Gambia’s past horrors, and laying the groundwork for future prosperity.

I previously covered the encouraging though shocking developments over the last few months in the tiny West African nation of Gambia, population 1.7 million (63% of which is under age 34, which has been and will be a crucial factor in its development- more on this later). To recapitulate, after surviving through the tyrannical reign of Yahya Jammeh for 22 years, in December 2016 the country chose the opposition candidate Barrow in a peace, free and fair election. After vital intervention from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and regional leaders, Yammeh relented his power and left Gambia. In late January 2017 Barrow began his term as the country’s rightful leader.

Young people in Gambia voted in record numbers in the December election, and are thought to have been a significant factor in Barrow’s sweeping victory. Suleyman Ceesay, a Gambian journalist and youth activist, commented “This time we saw the importance of voting. Collectively we agreed we want to be free [of dictatorship] and that having a change of government is the only way to achieve this.”Protests under Jammeh often resulted in mass arrests or worse; one opposition leader died in government custody last April, and watchdog groups have long accused Jammeh of arresting, torturing, and killing political opponents.

But on January 31, 2017 Gambian youth took to the streets for a peaceful show of displeasure for the previous regime. About 1,500 demonstrators gathered at the parliament building demanding all members of the national assembly resign. The protesters hold the assembly accountable for stoking fear and confusion by declaring a state of emergency at the behest of Jammeh, causing many to flee. Youth involvement in elections and peaceful political organization will be important in holding the new government accountable.

On Febuary 20 Gambian national police arrested 51 people in Kafenda, a town that has been a known base of support for Jammeh. Those arrested were involved in a skirmish with Barrow supporters, indicating that tensions are still running high between followers of the old guard and new.

Around the same time, it also became more clear that Jammeh’s financial transgressions were far worse than originally thought. On February 23 officials in Barrow’s government announced that Jammeh looted a whopping $50 million from state funds (up from previous estimate of $11 million), including skimming money from pensions, port operations, and the state telecom company. His mismanagement also left the country with $1 billion in debt. Barrow’s ministers claimed no stone will be left unturned in getting the money back—even going after Jammeh in his current exile in Equatorial Guinea—if it is possible. On February 25 the World Bank pledged $60 million to the new government to help alleviate the financial crisis, and IMF and African Development Bank are expected to follow suit.

Barrow has taken action in support of his promise to sweep away remnants of Jammeh’s regime. On February 27 he dismissed the country’s chief military officer, other army leaders, and the director of the state prison system. The prison director and head of the national intelligence agency were also arrested on charges of murder and human rights abuses. Many citizens and human rights groups are demanding investigations, and justice for perpetrators, in more than 30 cases of political or military opponents who were arrested, killed, or went missing during Jammeh’s rule. Barrow has vowed to implement such investigations.

Finally, on March 10 the Gambian government said it would undertake even more inquiries into Jammeh’s finances. A Reuters investigation revealed that Jammeh stole more than $8 million from a national charity bank account over a 2 year period in 2012-2013.

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Adama Barrow, who came to power in a legitimate election, leading a free and democratic Gambia is certainly a good thing. Yet the developments presented above show that its road will not be smooth, and much work still needs to be done. Barrow needs to both undo the harm (financial, political, psychological) left by Jammeh, but move the country forward through healing and growth. The support of organizations like ECOWAS and the World Bank will be essential in ensuring stability and getting the economy on its feet. Involving youth and different political groups in the new government will help ensure all feel their needs and wishes are represented.

This is the critical time where strength and support, both internal and external, will determine whether or not Gambia will emerge from the shadows of its past.

The post Gambia Seeks to Clean Up the Past, Look to Future appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Defendants in the Court of Düsseldorf. (Speigel Online)

We do not need to be reminded of the lasting political debacles of 2016—but the news cannot help but highlight the fallouts from Brexit and a Trump presidency. What we do not hear enough about is what went right.

Next week is the one year anniversary of the attacks at the Brussels airport. Despite the pain and anger, the Belgians refused to elect their Trump at the end of last year. They refused the far right and opted in favor of a party with a more open mind towards immigration.

This year, as Britain plans its exit from the EU, three other nations face a similar dilemma. France is facing a “Frexit” vote if Marine Le Pen wins the presidency. It will also look at Trump style immigration bans. In the Netherlands, the far-right leader Geert Wilders—who has been on trial for hate speech and discrimination—has said if elected, he will “de-Islamize Europe” by imposing bans (thankfully the latest poll results of the Dutch election seem to deny him this opportunity). And then we have Germany.

Merkel is up for reelection in November. She has faced a blowback from her open immigration policy from within her party and without. Germany has seen security problems – arguably as a result of this open policy. Even so, Germany remains ardent in supporting refugees. In 2016, Germany took in 280,000 asylum seekers—a 70% decrease from the 2015 intake of 890,000.

Despite facing a lot of public dissent for her open policy, Merkel has schooled Trump on the requirements of the Geneva Convention on refugees and maintains the moral and legal obligation of the more developed nations to take in those in need from around the world. All German government functions outwardly support this policy.

In June of last year, a fire broke out in a refugee shelter over a dispute over lunch during Ramadan. Ramadan is the Muslim month of fasting, and some refugees insisted on getting a hot meal midday—before dusk when the fast breaks. This angered other refugees who saw it as a sign of disrespect towards those who were fasting. This was the reason behind the argument, which led to a fire in the asylum center, causing 10 million euros worth of damage. The building has since had to be gutted and repaired.

Two of the accused arsonists, an Algerian and a Moroccan man, both aged 26, were arrested and appointed a public defender in their case. After a long trial, the two asylum seekers were released without reprimand. The court admitted that there was not enough substantiated evidence to convict the accused.

So while this ruling gives hope that Germany will not follow in the Trump path, we do not know what will unfold in the coming months. What we do know is that by November, the shape of Europe will be very different.

The post What Germany Got Right appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With over a million migrants arriving on Greek and Italian shores last year looking to enter the EU, curbing the flow of third country asylum seekers from places like Eritrea is an urgent policy priority for European leaders.

New research from the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) suggests that lack of access to employment for refugees in stable east African countries like Ethiopia—which host large refugee populations—makes the decision to take risky smuggling routes to Europe more appealing.

Based on interviews with 63 Eritrean migrants in Ethiopia, the ODI report suggests that there are specific policies Western governments and donors can pursue that could preempt irregular movement from east Africa’s refugee centers to the West.

Some 400,000 Eritreans—or roughly 10% of the population—have left their country in recent years. Most escape into neighboring Ethiopia. The small coastal country in the horn of Africa is known as one of the world’s most closed and oppressive. Poverty, political persecution and military conscription all contribute to people’s decision to leave.

While Ethiopia has an open asylum policy for refugees and provides some services to support them, Eritreans still overwhelmingly make the choice to attempt the perilous Mediterranean crossing. According to Amnesty International, around two-thirds of Eritreans in Ethiopia decided to pursue secondary migration in 2016.

“While there is no doubt this support is helping people meet basic survival needs, the policy has a limited effect on people moving,” says Richard Mallet, research fellow at ODI.

“If refugees are not allowed to work, then they are unlikely to want to stay where their opportunities are limited—and instead opt to take life-threatening routes, sometimes to Europe. Policymakers have to address these realities if their aim is to curb secondary migration.”

Eritreans account for most of the 3,000 people who drowned in the Mediterranean through 2015, according to humanitarian agencies. Trafficking operations net smugglers millions, while Europe’s political gridlock on how to respond to the waves of new arrivals leaves migrants stranded and stateless.

At present, all foreign refugees and economic migrants are barred from working legally in Ethiopia, making it nearly impossible to set down roots or provide for families independently of aid. The ODI research suggests that Ethiopia’s current livelihood support programs for refugees, while helpful and worthy of ongoing donor support, are not sufficient.

Enhancing refugee labour rights in Ethiopia is a key step, albeit a challenging one since most are housed in rural border camps far from any major towns or cities. Opening up the labour market to migrants can also be politically challenging when Ethiopia’s own population is also struggling with joblessness and poverty.

A proposed Jobs Compact in Ethiopia, which aims to create 30,000 jobs for refugees living there paid for by Western donors, shows promise. This would allow refugees to make a practical use of the skills and job training they are already being given through donor-funded livelihood support programs.

Still, much more must be done given the numbers of migrants arriving in Ethiopia every month.

The ODI research also suggests that if Western governments are serious about wanting to stem irregular migration, they need to step up formal resettlement programs. This should be coupled with better information to allow Eritrean migrants and asylum seekers to make informed decisions about their futures.

“By providing an opportunity for safe and legal migration, resettlement often produces an initial preventive effect, linked to people knowing how dangerous and expensive the irregular alternative is,” the report notes.

However, this effect dissipates over time if migrants are left in indefinite limbo. “Essentially, as faith in accessing formal channels declines, the risks of irregular transit become more tolerable,” the authors conclude.

An earlier version of this article appeared in the Financial Times’ This Is Africa service, and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Can Better Policy Curb Irregular Migration to Europe? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Former Israeli defense minister, General Moshe Ya’alon announced his candidacy for Prime Minister and gave his first public remarks, on Middle East politics, as a candidate in Washington on March 6th. He began by agreeing with the notion that the Middle East is in its biggest crisis since the time of Mohammad.

Ya’alon, a conservative, outlined his view of the developments that shape the Middle East today. The collapse of the artificial nation-state system is accelerated by the disengagement of the United States from the region. Turkey and Iran are filling that political vacuum. The two-state solution is mischaracterized, at best. And the perception that Israel sides with U.S. Republicans is likely to do more harm than good to Israel’s own interests.

Ya’alon detailed the creation of the modern Middle East as a Western intervention based on ignorance, wishful thinking, and paternalism. Western diplomats from Sykes-Picot to the CPA did not take into account the demography, geography, or history—tribes, sects, and ideologies—of the region when they drafted boundaries for new nations and established new governments. They believed naively that elections could develop profound understanding of and respect for human rights and democratic processes.

This faith leads to making decisions based on hope rather than on reality. Syrian or Iraqi national identities, for example, are subordinate to tribal, Kurdish, Alawite, Sunni, or Shia identities. Western interventionists believed that it was within their power, in their own interests, and in the interests of the peoples of the Middle East, to build and shape nations. Israel, too, he said, had made that mistake.

U.S. disengagement from the Middle East allows Iran, Turkey, and Russia to fill that power vacuum. Turkey allowed its borders to be porous enough for foreign fighters and materiel to flow to ISIS, and for Syrian refugees to flow to Europe. Russia swept into control of the situation in Syria when the U.S. hesitated over the chemical weapons “red line.”

But most importantly to Ya’alon, U.S. disengagement facilitated Iranian strengthening its roles in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. In these capitals, and with Hamas, Iran advances its religious, political, and geostrategic interests.

On the Palestinian question, Ya’alon was more pragmatic than idealistic. He sees no chance for a final solution in the near future. Full separation would cause a security and humanitarian crisis. He wants more than the status quo – steady but incremental improvement, with increasing autonomy but not independence. This requires things like education reform and an end to terrorist financing, but is the best way forward for now, he judged.

Ya’alon noted that relations with the United States have developed at least two new problems. The general issue of partisanship, and Israel being seen as a “Republican not Democrat” issue, could have long-term negative consequences. Being identified with President Trump, if his popularity were to plunge, could bring U.S. support for Israel down with it. More broadly, Ya’alon worried about populism replacing real political leadership in many countries, with the manipulation of ideology for advantage instead of real statecraft and diplomacy.

Above all, though, Ya’alon returned to the idea that the real concern for Israel and the United States is Iran, Iran, Iran. The surging expansion of Iranian influence and the disengagement of the U.S. creates vital risks both to Israel and to American interests.

A version of this post first appeared on the Jerusalem Post web site.

The post Israel PM candidate: “Biggest Crisis since the Time of Mohammad” appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

In the US, the Trump administration has ordered a review of Dodd-Frank banking regulations with view to scale back the scope of the 2010 Act.

This would include dismantling rules that requiring companies that use certain types of ‘conflict minerals’ originating in the Democratic Republic of Congo to disclose their sourcing and monitor supply chains.

The goal of Section 1502 was to ensure US-listed companies were not financially supporting armed groups that have benefitted from illegal mining to fuel the DRC’s many armed conflicts.

President Trump is still considering an already drafted executive order which would suspend the conflict minerals section of Dodd-Frank regulations, among others, for two years as part of an effort to reduce federal regulations on businesses.

The proposed weakening of the conflict mineral rules has been criticized by human rights groups at a time when the fragile political detente in the DRC is already under threat. In 2016, president Joseph Kabila sidestepped constitutional rules to stay in office beyond the end of his term on 19 December.

Several protests have turned violent around the country in recent months, while a negotiated transition deal signed on 31 December is in jeopardy after opposition leader Étienne Tshisekedi died in Brussels in February. Armed groups are also increasingly active.

“Late 2016 and early 2017 have seen increased armed group violence not just in the DRC’s restive east, but also in the central Kasai region, the western province of Kongo Central and the northern province of Mongala, in which such violence is historically less common,” says Jordan Anderson, senior analyst at IHS Markit.

The concern is that as militant activity increases, easing Dodd-Frank regulations at the same time will create opportunities for mining to finance militants once again.

“This action would play right into the hands of president Joseph Kabila at a time when the United States should be increasing its leverage over the DRC, as opposed to weakening it,” US congresswoman Karen Bass wrote in a 17 February statement opposing the White House’s draft order.

So-called ‘conflict minerals’ are listed under OECD guidance as tin, coltan, tungsten and gold, or derivatives of these minerals. Large deposits of each are found in several regions of the DRC, including its restive southern and eastern provinces.

Today, 79% of miners in the eastern DRC who extract tin, tantalum and tungsten work in conflict-free mines. At the height of the civil war, however, the minerals sector was fueling arms sales for militias and funding recruitment drives.

Many attribute at least part of this shift to Dodd-Frank, and worry that changes to rules would undermine this progress.

However, some analysts argue the move will not result in rapid changes.

Pressures for transparency in the global mineral supply chains are not exclusively dependent on US legislation. The EU’s Directive on Mandatory Due Diligence for Conflict Minerals and moves by China to scrutinize the origins of these minerals have both helped the push for greater global accountability.

Some even say that re-examining Dodd-Frank could be a positive step. After a successful appeal at the US Court of Appeals in 2014, Section 1502 was never fully implemented and has been in stasis ever since.

“This consultation may bring some clarity to over 6,000 US registered businesses who produce or use tantalum, tin, tungsten or gold and have been left to decide how and when to strengthen their ‘conflict minerals’ due diligence as the US courts stall on 1502,” says Nicholas Garrett, director of due diligence firm RCS Global.

Boris Kamstra, the CEO of Alphamin Resources Corporation whose firm is developing the Bisie Tin mining project in the DRC’s North Kivu province, has mixed feelings about the prospects of repealing elements of Dodd-Frank.

He is skeptical this will have much impact on the political situation in the DRC, which has stabilized considerably in the past few years. Armed groups with access to illicit minerals might be able to generate some revenue from them, but but he thinks local communities will not support militants who try to provoke widespread unrest.

However Mr Kamstra does believe the Act has helped African governments clean up corruption in the mining sector. “The mining sector [has been] aligning itself to compliance with Dodd-Frank, improving governance in the sector as a whole. This is a process, and one that could decelerate with a roll back,” he points out.

Regulatory about-faces are also bad for business in an industry that requires long term planning. “There are aspects of the current legislation that could be streamlined and made easier for all producers to comply with, [but] these are refinements and not repeals,” he concludes.

A copy of this article originally appeared at the Financial Times service This Is Africa, and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Trump Administration Looks to Weaken Rules on Conflict Minerals appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Somalia is headed in the right direction. But ‘right direction’ doesn’t mean a path free of pitfalls and clear of landmines. A new President who inspired renewed sense of optimism within the Somali people has been elected by the parliament.

In his inauguration speech, the new President—Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed (Farmaajo)—has highlighted the direction that he wants to take his country. He underscored how the supremacy of the law is the central pillar of any viable State. “Sareynta sharcigu waa udub dhexaadka dowladnimada.” He also asserted that his government will be committed to strengthening the supremacy of the law as stipulated in the Somali constitution “(In xukuumadeydu ay) si dastuuri ah u xoojindoonto awoodda sharciga.”

These words don’t just highlight what the Somali people should expect from their new leader, they underscore the litmus test by which the new President should be assessed. There is no “supremacy of law” without respect for the constitution, regardless of its shortcomings.

Belligerence of Predatory Exploitation

“Somalia is open for business” was the last government’s motto or rather corrupted officials dog-whistle to usher in predatory capitalists and make certain corrupt officials and their international brokers very rich. The previous government has ignored the serious warnings that: such haphazard invitation without having institutions of checks and balances would prove economic suicide. Now Somalia’s natural resources is wholly entrusted with a shadowy firm to explore, market and be granted exclusive rights to a number of lots. Never mind the fact that the constitution does not specify the demarcation of the federal-states or the distribution of natural resources. Somalia owes over $5 billion mostly to IMF and World Bank. And Kenya is claiming a legal right to part of Somalia waters.

These three deals have one thing in common: They were all secured away from the lampposts of transparency.

In business, as in politics ‘perception is reality’. That is why businesses spend significant amount of their revenues on building their public perception, therefore image. However, when the negativity associated with the business is so deeply rooted, it is almost impossible to change that perception. In that context let me say this: Since its genesis, Soma Oil and Gas has been wreaking the foul smell of corruption. Conducting shady dealings in a dark room might deceive the eyes, but not the nose.

Anyone who is, or has been, directly associated with said tainted firm has a lot to answer for. Was he or she the Somali John Doe who made the theft of the century possible? Did he or she play a role in facilitating or brokering former President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud’s approval?

Nature Of The Controversy 

Immediately following his inauguration, President Farmaajo has nominated the only Somali who is known in being part of Soma Oil and Gas, one of its top officials (Executive Director) and one of its major shareholders- Hassan Ali Khaire—as his Prime Minister.

I don’t personally know the nominee. However, it is fair to say a number of people who know him say that he is a professional and a good natured person.

While these are good qualities, they hardly address the nominee’s history with the aforementioned shady business. As a private citizen, he had the prerogative to engage in any business, but as a man being entrusted with the executive power of a nation victimized by the company that he was officially representing, it is a public interest and moral duty to scrutinize him thoroughly.

The Dash Factor

Experiences and lives are often exclusively commemorated by calendar moments with a starting and ending dates that are separated by small dashes. In the employment history as well the life of the individual, more attention is given to one particular period or another. When a person’s employment or life may’ve started or it may’ve ended when the most important aspect of that record is the dash. That little dash encapsulates the real record and offers a more reliable portrait of a person.

The Hijacking Process

As soon as the nomination became public, a well-coordinated, relentless PR campaign has been launched to bypass the constitutional process.

Before being vetted by Somali parliament, without getting vote of confidence, and without being sworn-in, the nominee became Somalia’s Prime Minster upon his nomination. The timing coincides with while the newly elected President was out of country and the Speaker of the Parliament, who like the nominee is Somali-Norwegian, was the acting President. And just by sheer coincidence certain Guerrilla diplomats, namely from UK and Sweden, meet with “the new Prime Minister” to discuss “bilateral issues”. The strategic objective seems to establish enough facts on the ground that would make reversal of the nomination almost impossible.

Had a cordial and productive meeting with the UK Amb Mr. Concar @DConcar , we discussed bilateral issues pic.twitter.com/IWnOKA0cI3

— @SomaliPM (@SomaliPM) February 24, 2017

Proud to hand over congratulatory letter from Sweden's king to President @M_Farmaajo . New PM Khaire there, too. @SweMFA @TheVillaSomalia pic.twitter.com/1Wm7RRHhr0

— Mikael Lindvall (@MikaelLindvall) February 23, 2017

Though this seamless hijacking profoundly undermines the legislative authority of the Parliament as enshrined in the constitution, neither the Speaker of the Parliament nor the UNSGR expressed concern.

Soma Oil and Gas may have been cleared politically as this economic highway robbery has implicated some high level British politicians. It may have been cleared criminally as the UK Serious Fraud Office could not find enough evidence to put some people behind bars. You may remember the Mafia legend Al Capone whom the FBI could not bust him red-handed till he was finally busted on tax related crime. Soma Oil and Gas is ethically as shady as ever. And that should raise a red flag.

Raising The Bar

There are more than one third of members of the new parliament who are from the diaspora and hold dual-citizenships. President Farmaajo should raise the bar for all officials who are dual-citizens who see themselves as people on vocation or, at best, on short-term tour of duty. He should voluntarily—indeed graciously—relinquish his US citizenship. In doing so, he would underscore that he is duty-bound to represent and serve his native nation and make it a country where his grandchildren could thrive peacefully. He and other dual-citizen officials and MPs have taken oath to put Somalia’s interest above all others, fairly, and justly.

The Foreign Secretary of U.K., Boris Johnson, the current President of Afghanistan, Ashraf Ghani, and his predecessor, Hamid Karzai, have renounced their citizenships to pursue political careers in their native countries.

Currently, as those before them, Ministers as well as MPs routinely visit foreign embassies on private invitations, private meetings, etc.

So What Is The Alternative?

It is no secret that President Farmaajo is faced with multiple problems that demand his attention. Realistically speaking, he will not be able to solve all of them within his four year mandate.

This is not to set off the alarm for political or paranoiac moral urgency. This simply is an attempt to amplify the fact that unless Somalia ends its ever-present culture of impunity, reconstituting a viable Somali state would remain a figment of imagination.

There is a difference between political pragmatism which compels leaders to make certain undesirable deals as necessary compromises and gulping down the very toxic cocktail mixed to suck the life out of you.

As one of the majority of Somalis who would like to see the new President succeed, we cannot remain forever intoxicated with the post-election euphoria. So President Farmaajo must employ the ER approach to governance. in which life-threatening injuries are given more urgent attention than broken bones. Corruption presents an existential danger to this ailing nation. It is the main reason why Somalia is condemned into perpetual dependency.

This scandalous controversy marks a dark spot on his reputation as the desperately awaited people’s hero who came to crackdown on corruption. How fast he washes it off will determine how deep the stain may penetrate.

The nominee, by virtue of being a man who lived in the West long enough, and a civilian friend with extraordinary political influence of the previous president, one would think he should know better. In the past four years, the current nominee has witnessed three different Prime Ministers undergoing through the constitutional process before assuming their responsibilities.

President Farmaajo will either disassociate himself with this group by recanting his nomination for the egregious constitutional violation or risk being seen as an accomplice. Securing Soma Oil and Gas a direct access to the national executive power is tantamount to putting Dracula in charge of the blood bank of this ailing nation. [A couple of days after this piece was published on HuffPost, Somalia’s new parliament has granted Hassan Khaire unanimous vote of confidence to become the new Prime Minister]

The post Circling The Square In Somalia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Last month, the 27th West 2017 was held in San Diego, California. Considered by many to be the premier maritime related conference, the venue brings together thought leaders and practitioners from the military, industry, and academia to network, discuss problems, and develop potential solutions.

This year’s conference theme was: Ready For Today, Modernize for Tomorrow: How Can We Maintain the Edge?

As the conference began I first was curious to know, from the perspective of the senior military commanders, what were the major threats in the Pacific region. I was particularly interested in anything on China. In the days leading up to the conference there had been reports in the press that China was considering a ban on foreign submarines operating in what it viewed as their territorial waters.

According to one report the proposed law would stipulate: “Foreign submersibles should travel on the surface, display national flags and report to Chinese maritime management administrations when they pass China’s water areas.” If the reports are true this would represent a major increase in tension on the ongoing East China Sea/South China Sea debates. I also wanted to learn about the new efforts and approaches were being developed to deal with the cyber threat.

Second I was concerned about the state of the readiness of the fleet. During testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 8 February, Admiral William F. Moran, Vice Chief of Naval Operations stated: “while our first team on deployment is ready, our bench—the depth of our forces at home—is thin. It has become clear to me that the Navy’s overall readiness has reached its lowest level in many years.” This statement along with gaps in aircraft carrier operational deployments is very concerning.

As Senator John McCain recently stated: “In recent years—preoccupied with the fight against terrorism, hampered by a broken acquisition system, and shackled by budget cuts and fiscal uncertainty—our military has prioritized near-term readiness at the expense of future modernization, giving our adversaries a chance to close the gap. Our military leaders have described this as ‘mortgaging the future.’ But it appears few realized how soon the future would arrive.”

Finally, I was hoping to simply listen and get informed and educated on other subjects that I might not be aware of but that senior leaders considered important.

What do the senior military leaders consider to be the major threats?

I intend to write several blogs on the conference. For this first one, I will concentrate on my first question, what do the senior military leaders consider to be the major threats? There has been much talk about the implications of the new administration reliance on current and former senior military leaders in senior positions such as the head of the Department of Homeland Security, National Security Advisor, and Secretary of Defense.

As I listen to these discussions there seem to be two underlying concerns. I may be wrong but here’s my take. I think the real issue is a fear that the administration will develop solutions on foreign policy that too heavily focus on a military solution and not give enough consideration to other “tools” in our foreign policy kit; and a second related concern that military leaders might not have the intellectual skill set needed to deal with complicated foreign policy issues. I believe this attitude partly comes from the Hollywood image of military types being “lean, mean, killing machines”.

During my time in the military I was exposed to some of the most informed, brilliant, and innovative minds I have ever encountered in the national security/foreign policy arena. What most impressed me was they were the types of men and women who did not just spend lots of time discussing the problems but also spent a significant amount of time working on solutions.

I was also struck by the fact that most senior military leaders did not believe military force was always the best solution; most strongly advocated for a continuing strong role of the State Department. Senior intelligence community leaders have repeatedly stated that this is one of the most challenging and complex periods for national security issues.

In order to solve these problems, I believe you need people with a strong educational background as well as practical experience. The opening speaker for the conference ADM James G. Stavridis, USN (Ret.), Dean, The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and former Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (2009-2013) is a good example of the type of leader I am talking about.

Admiral Stavridis spoke on the topic of 21st Century Security Challenges and Opportunities. He began by putting today’s problems in a historical context reminding the audience that its been about 100 years since the Battle of Jutland, a sea battle resulting in 10,000 people dying. During the Battle of Verdun in WWI there were over 1 million casualties. In all WWI resulted in over 20 million dead. He asked did we learn anything. In WWII the Battle of Stalingrad resulted in 2 million casualties.

As for today he sees it as a challenging, difficult world but he does not predict the kind of global cataclysmic results we saw in the 20th century. When discussing terrorism he pointed out that violent extremism is not confined to radical Islam. There are political violent extremists and here in the U.S. we have that plus racial extremism. He pointed out Dylan Roof as an example.

He went on to point out terrorism runs across societies and motivations but at the moment we need to focus on the Islamic State. Of all the violent extremists they are the most dangerous. They have been extraordinary at raising money and have a global reach. He believes we will clear up Mosul in the next few months but they have a plan and we need to deal with it.

As for other threats, Admiral Stavridis says Iran is bad news “even without nukes”. They see themselves as an imperial power and will continue to present challenges in Yemen and Beirut. He stated that many will say North Korea is the most dangerous in the world because they are led by an unpredictable leader and he already has nuclear weapons. The Syrian Civil War has caused over 500,000 deaths and waves of refugees from Syria and Libya are destabilizing Europe.

Concerning Russia, so far we have failed to move Putin into a more strategic view of dealing with the West so he will continue to us use Hybrid Warfare possibility against Europe. Admiral Stavridis believes we can avoid a war with China with the use of skillful diplomacy but we may see a series of aggressive moves. What worries him the most is cyber. Cyber is not only big nations attacking small nations but can be small nations attacking big nations. We are relatively unprepared to deal with it. He is also concerned about European unity. These are our greatest pool of partners and they have real challenges. In terms of whom are our best partners, Stavridis said we have many traditional but we need to look at India. He believes the rise of India is more important than the rise of China.

As for what can we do, the Admiral said the most important thing is to listen to each other. We need to have serious policy debates. We need to listen very closely to the Europeans. We need to listen to our opponents. In the case of Russia we need to listen and not stumble into another Cold War. The second thing we need to do is to work on our intellectual capitol and he mentioned the Naval War College and their activities as an example. We also need to educate ourselves through things like reading and learning other languages. The Admiral concluded his remarks by saying we do need a powerful global military force but we need to find the balance between hard and soft power.

I found the Admiral’s talk interesting and thought provoking. The only think I would disagree with are his comments of ISIS. As I have blogged before, ISIS may be getting most of the media coverage in the western media but there are other groups like Boko Haram that operates primarily in Africa that are just as deadly. My mantra is “terrorism is a global problem and requires a global solution.”

I think I will end here. As always my views are my own.

The post AFCEA West 2017 Conference (Pt.1): What are the Major Threats to the U.S.? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Dalai Lama to speak at UC San Diego Commencement (UCSD).

China’s global censorship campaign has reared its ugly head again, this time at the University of California-San Diego (UCSD). There, a nationalistic overseas Chinese students’ organization with ties to the Chinese consulate-general in Los Angeles has attempted to censor a graduation speech by exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama. Meanwhile in Britain, a similar Chinese students’ organization with ties to the Chinese embassy in London tried to censor a debate at Durham University featuring Chinese Canadian human rights activist Anastasia Lin.

These latest efforts at exporting Chinese censorship to Western universities appear to have failed. Similar efforts to impose Chinese censorship abroad have met with greater success, however, and such activities continue to pose a threat to free speech at Western universities. They also risk creating a hostile environment for other Chinese students who do not engage in such activities.

Events at UCSD began on February 2, when the university announced that the Dalai Lama would give the commencement address at its graduation ceremony in June. “We are honored to host His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama at UC San Diego and thankful that he will share messages of global compassion with our graduates and their families, as well as with a broad public audience,” said UCSD chancellor Pradeep K. Khosla in the announcement, “A man of peace, the Dalai Lama promotes global responsibility and service to humanity. These are the ideals we aim to convey and instill in our students and graduates at UC San Diego.”

The next day, a UCSD chapter of the “Chinese Students and Scholars Association” (中国学生学者联合会, CSSA) – a Chinese government-sponsored “united front” organization with chapters at universities around the world – issued a statement condemning the Dalai Lama’s planned appearance and calling on the university to cancel it, citing his unacceptability in the eyes of the Chinese government. CSSA called the Dalai Lama a “separatist” who seeks to “split the motherland,” claimed that his planned appearance “hurt the feelings” of Chinese students at UCSD, and vowed “to take further measures to firmly resist the university’s unreasonable behavior” in coordination with the Chinese consulate (See Campus Reform, China Digital Times, FIRE, Inside Higher Ed, Quartz, Taiwan Sentinel, The Tibet Post, The Triton).

Crudely hijacking the language of diversity and inclusion, CSSA members adopted the hashtag #ChineseStudentsMatter, as though inviting the Dalai Lama to speak at UCSD was tantamount to some form of anti-Chinese racism. Conflating mainland Chinese government policy with Chinese culture, Chinese student Wang Ruixuan wrote in the UCSD Guardian that “The main reason why many Chinese students are upset is that our university shows little consideration about cultural respect, as [the Dalai Lama] is a politically sensitive person in China.” Despite CSSA opposition, the university has no plans to disinvite the Dalai Lama.

Anastasia Lin (The Tab, Durham).

Meanwhile, a CSSA at Durham University in Britain tried to censor a debate appearance by Chinese Canadian human rights activist Anastasia Lin on February 10. Lin, a Falun Gong practitioner, has been particularly outspoken on the subject of religious persecution in China. CSSA claimed that Lin’s planned appearance was “a violation of the belief and feelings of Chinese students,” compared her to an Islamic State terrorist, and lodged a complaint with the Chinese embassy in London. The embassy then warned the university against Lin’s appearance, saying that “Chinese students are not comfortable about Lin because she’s not friendly to the Chinese government.” The Durham Union debating society went ahead with the event as planned (See BuzzFeed, FIRE, Palatinate, The Tab, Taiwan Sentinel).

CSSA is an “unofficial” affiliate of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee’s United Front Work Department (中共中央统一战线工作部 or 统战部, UFWD), a “shadowy agency” of the one-party state whose mission is “to spread China’s influence by ultimately gaining control over a range of groups not affiliated with the party and that are often outside the mainland.” UFWD seeks to achieve its goals through the use of nominally “non-governmental” front organizations such as the China Council for the Promotion of Peaceful National Reunification (中国和平统一促进会, CCPPNR), which currently boasts some 200 overseas chapters in 90 countries around the world, where it frequently cooperates with overseas CSSA university chapters in pro-Beijing activities. Current UFWD head Ms. Sun Chunlan (孙春兰) is also the executive vice-president of CCPPNR.

In addition to their UFWD and CCPPNR affiliation, overseas CSSA chapters maintain close contact with the Communist Youth League (中国共产主义青年团 or 中国共青团, CYL), the party’s organization for students in China. U.S. national CSSA president Mr. Huang Di (黄迪) has appeared at UFWD and CYL events in China and was featured at an annual CCPPNR meeting at Harvard University in 2015. Leaders of overseas CSSA chapters, like Huang Di, are often students with strong CYL credentials from China. China uses overseas CSSAs to monitor, manage, and “protect” Chinese students from Western political influence while it uses them to “condition the West” according to China’s preferences and China’s methods of control.

According to Chinese Communist Party directives the targets of “overseas patriotic united front work” are Chinese students, professionals, and others living abroad including those who have taken foreign citizenship. Among its main tasks are to struggle against all forms of “separatism” and to unite all Chinese people worldwide “to achieve the complete reunification of the motherland.” Chinese students and CSSA chapters at universities in the United States and elsewhere have been identified as a particular focus of the Communist Party’s overseas “united front work,” frequently orchestrated by Chinese embassies and consulates abroad (See ChinaChange, The China Story, Radio Free Asia, Sydney Morning Herald 2014 & 2016, The Wall Street Journal).

Overseas students a focus of China’s “united front work” (U.S.-China Press).

In January 2017, U.S.-based CSSA and CCPPNR organizations joined in protest against Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen’s visits to the United States and to demand adherence to the “one-China principle.” Previously, these same groups had joined in protest against a visit by Tsai as Democratic Progressive Party chairperson and co-organized an annual CCPPNR meeting at Harvard featuring national CSSA president Huang Di in 2015. In 2016, New Zealand-based CSSA and CCPPNR organizations joined to issue a “solemn statement” supporting China’s claims on islands in the South China Sea. In 2014, CSSA and CCPPNR organizations based in the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Western Europe joined in protest against Japan’s “occupation” of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands.

As the World Organization to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong has noted, CSSAs under the direction of and funded by Chinese embassies and consulates abroad have long been involved in the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to silence its critics including Falun Gong practitioners like Anastasia Lin. In 2015, a CSSA at Columbia University with a history of anti-Falun Gong activities was shut down for violating university financial and organizational policies. CSSA anti-Falun Gong activities have also been observed at the University of Nevada-Las Vegas, at universities in Canada, at Australian National University, and at Magdeburg University in Germany.

CSSAs have likewise previously opposed Tibet human rights activism including visits by the Dalai Lama at Western universities. In 2008, the University of Washington bowed to CSSA demands that an appearance by the Dalai Lama would include no discussion on the political status of Tibet. That same year, a CSSA at Duke University was implicated in death threats against a Chinese student accused of pro-Tibet sympathies; and members of a CSSA at Cornell University targeted a professor with abusive online messages for showing a film on human rights issues in Tibet.

On many campuses, CSSAs have a close working relationship with Chinese government-run Confucius Institutes. Confucius Institutes are a noted part of Beijing’s “overseas propaganda” apparatus, and their presence on Western university campuses has been described as “academic malware” and as an educational “Trojan horse” due to their censorship practices and overtly propagandist character. Universities including the University of Chicago and Pennsylvania State University have severed ties with Confucius Institutes and the American Association of University Professors has called them a threat to academic freedom due to their relationship with the Chinese government.

CSSA’s have frequently been suspected of spying activities, particularly spying on Chinese students by other Chinese students to ensure their continued loyalty to “the motherland” while abroad. Chinese government-funded CSSAs at European universities have additionally been implicated in cases of industrial espionage.

Most Chinese students who go abroad do so simply to study and to enjoy the experience of life in another country. These students should be welcomed with open arms. Some, however, have chosen to function as agents of Chinese government propaganda, censorship, and surveillance at universities abroad. Such activities are a threat to free speech and academic freedom, not only for Chinese students, but for university communities at large.

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The head of Europe’s delegation to the United Nations describes an ideological battle in the EU between globalism and nationalism.

The United Nations has an important role to play in countering the issues threatening to break up the European Union, according to the head of Europe’s mission to the world governing body.

Ambassador Joao Vale de Almeida said in a speech at the Foreign Policy Association in New York that the EU and UN must serve as pillars of stability against a wave of movements challenging Western Europe’s liberal order.

After decades of attempted continental unity following World War II, Almeida said “politics is back, big time.”

‘Turn of a cycle’

“Elements of our model of organizing societies are being challenged,” he added. “We need to have a serious conversation about where the world is going, and I believe the best place to have this serious conversation is the United Nations.”

The world entered a “remarkable” period after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Almeida said, when trade was globalized, technological revolutions created more open societies and developing countries began to lift themselves out of poverty.

However, these trends are also partly to blame for recent surges in nationalism, inequality and authoritarianism forces Almeida described as “fault lines” that could break apart the EU.

“This period is now over,” Almeida said. “We have to acknowledge we are at the turn of a cycle.”

Events from the past few years have accelerated these trends, he explained, pointing to the Great Recession, the ongoing war in Syria, Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the UK’s shock vote to leave the EU.

“We’ve had a few surprises in the last year or so in terms of going to bed with one idea and waking up with another,” Almeida said. “If we lower our degree of awareness and vigilance and attention, we may wake up the following morning with some surprises,” he added.

At the center of all of this is an ideological battle between globalism and nationalism, according to Almeida. He said there are people on both sides of the political spectrum that believe solutions to today’s problems can only be found in “the narrow limits of a nation-state.”

Across Europe, there are populist candidates challenging the political establishment on what they see as an abandonment of traditional values, and one of the biggest flashpoints has been over immigration.

“You have a tension between multiculturalism and nativism,” Almeida said. “This is a major new phenomenon in some of our countries, because populists are getting too powerful.”

Crossroads

How deeply these fault lines are entrenched will be revealed this year when three of Europe’s strongest democracies—France, Germany and the Netherlands—hold their elections. In each, establishment politicians are facing competition from upstart populists.

The ambassador also pointed to indications of an isolationist US under President Donald Trump as a reason for Europe’s political unrest. He said, “the country that assured that uni-polarity (sic) is clearly not wishing to retain that moving forward.”

“Others are coming up,” he added.

Despite reassurance from White House aides in recent weeks, Trump questioned the value of NATO to US interests during the election, a doubt that stoked fears among European leaders that their strongest ally was pulling back support. Some believe Trump’s government budget will include slashes to foreign aid.

To counter the forces threatening the EU, Almeida said, “we should be more rational and less emotional” in decision-making, and said the United Nations is the best place to have these conversations.

“This is where this crossroads in which we are today, the beginning of 2017,” Almeida concluded. “This is where I believe the European Union and the United Nations come together.”

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FPA Live with Ambassador Joao Vale de Almeida

由 Foreign Policy Association 貼上了 2017年2月28日

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Nigeria’s president, Muhamaddu Buhari, headed to the United Kingdom for his “annual leave” on January 19, and Vice President Yemi Osinbajo became acting president. Two weeks later, Buhari notified the National Assembly that he was extending his leave for medical reasons. It’s approaching seven weeks, and Buhari is still on leave. With the exception of calling into a live show on February 23, he has not yet been seen in public. According to a leading online news outlet, Buhari had a prostate flare up and is also undergoing treatment for Crohn’s Disease.

Several Nigerian politicians have made a pilgrimage to the UK—potentially at taxpayers’ expense—and released photos with a seemingly jovial Buhari. U.S. President Donald J. Trump called Buhari in mid-February to discuss shared security concerns and the provision of weapons to the Nigerian Army to combat terrorism. Buhari’s press aides have also routinely tweeted good wishes to the Nigerian people supposedly from the ailing president. However, they have yet to arrange for Buhari to make a physical appearance, leaving Nigerians to draw their own conclusions about Buhari’s health and if and when he will return.

The silence around Buhari’s disappearance furthers a narrative that Nigeria’s political elites refuse to provide critical information to the public because it’s against their own self-interest. While lawmakers have jumped on a plane to visit the ailing president, none have chosen to share his medical state or call on his government to disclose the gravity of his health condition with the nation. Also, no one has shared the cost that the nation is incurring while maintaining an ill president in the U.K. and an acting president in Nigeria.

Many Nigerians who initially decried the elected president’s absence have begun celebrating the acting president for doing many things they wish President Buhari had done. In his six weeks leading Nigeria, Osinbajo has visited the Niger Delta, injected U.S. dollars into the Nigerian forex market to ease exchange rate pressure, and requested that the Senate approve the acting chief justice. President Buhari refused to make these decisions, much to the chagrin of his citizens.

It’s easy to view Osinbajo’s short stint as a success given how it has injected renewed momentum into governing the country. It’s also true that Buhari naming Osinbajo as acting president was a win for Nigeria’s constitutional democracy—unlike in 2009 when in an eerily similar situation, as the then-president, Umaru Musa Yar’Adua, lay dying in Saudi Arabia, the ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) refused to acknowledge his inability to govern. The Senate had to use a parliamentary maneuver to name the VP as acting president. After three months overseas, Yar’Adua returned to the country and died shortly thereafter. And if Buhari is in fact significantly ill and unlikely to return, it will be the second time that the North has lost the presidency due to such circumstance.

In a country where politics and ethnic identity are so fraught, one might assume Buhari and the now ruling party, All Progressives Congress (APC), are intentionally refusing to show the president live or discuss the gravity of his condition. While much of the country is decrying the cost of keeping Buhari in the U.K. and wondering whether he’s still fit to govern, several prayer vigils are taking place in the North. As one would expect, Northerners are hoping to not lose their grip on power once again.

Beyond ethnicity, many of the elite likely are convinced Buhari’s departure would be to their detriment. In his two years in office, Nigerian civil society leaders have criticized Buhari’s reticence to address the allegations of corruption from those in his inner circle. Most notably in January, he refused to dismiss the Secretary General of the Federation whom the Senate recommended be removed and prosecuted. Buhari’s chief of staff has also been accused of diverting funds from the Nigerian High Commission in the UK to pay his own medical bill. Yet, at the very least, a rebalancing of power creates enough uncertainty for elites that maintaining the status quo may be their preferred option.

However, irrespective of Osinbajo’s great work as acting president, Buhari’s absence and the silence around it is a problem because of the many troubling issues that the elected head of state would ideally be healthy enough to manage. The country is suffering from drastic economic decline, slumping oil prices, ongoing Boko Haram attacks that have led to a humanitarian crisis, and internal strife between farmers and herdsmen in the nation’s middle belt—any one of which would ordinarily require the unhindered attention of a head of state. The acting president can try to address all of these problems in his temporary tenure, but Nigerian voters elected Buhari because they trusted him—not necessarily his deputized president—to play this role.

And with every passing day, the progress from a democratic transition is buried deeper. Buhari became president after a much celebrated concession from the incumbent—the first in the country’s history. It’s ironic then that a president who benefitted from his predecessor doing the right thing is now refusing to grant Nigerians the same display of putting country first.

For his part, Osinbajo might very well become the best acting president Nigeria has ever had. However, by enabling his boss and their party to keep withholding critical information from Nigerians, he’s now complicit in a regression of democratic ideals—ideals that appeared to be headed on the right trajectory when he and Buhari were duly elected in 2015.

Hopefully, President Buhari is alive and recovers. But for now, he should have the courage to share his prognosis with Nigerians. He should appear in public physically and demonstrate to Nigerians that in a short while he will be able to undertake the grueling task of governing again. For its part, the National Assembly should debate the severity of Buhari’s health and determine if it’s time for him to resign and let Osinbajo govern full-time. The nation’s psyche and fiscal health require nothing less.

Kehinde A. Togun is a senior director at The Arkin Group and a Truman National Security Fellow. He was previously the deputy director of PartnersGlobal’s Sub-Saharan Africa program. During Nigeria’s 2011 elections, he trained and advised civil society as they monitored the electoral process. Views expressed are his own. You can follow him on Twitter @kehindetogun.

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