Foreign Policy Blogs

“On World Press Freedom Day, I call for an end to all crackdowns against journalists – because a free press advances peace and justice for all.” — António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General(Flickr)

May 3th is World Press Freedom Day. The UN has been celebrating this international day annually since the 1993 proclamation that commemorated the 1991 Declaration of Windhoek. The Declaration of Windhoek is a statement of free press principles, a manifesto written by a group of African journalists. It was an outcome of a UNESCO seminar held in Windhoek, Namibia, calling for the promotion of independent and pluralistic journalism in post-Cold War Africa.

From May 1st to 4th, UNESCO and the Indonesian government will co-organize the main and side events of World Press Freedom Day in Jakarta. This year’s themes, titled Critical Minds for Critical Times will explore the ‘Media’s role in advancing peaceful, just and inclusive societies’. Unlike Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 16th goal of the UN’s post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognizes the importance of the role of a free press in promoting inclusive and democratic governance. Reflecting this highlighted function of the free press in actualizing an agenda, the themes will focus on the three essential preconditions that shape the free press as a catalyst for the promotion of peace around the globe.

First, that a legal framework protecting investigative journalism must be built and secured. According to the UNESCO Director-General’s 2016 Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, 827 journalists lost their lives while on duty over the last decade, and 8% of these cases remain unresolved. An institutional safety net protecting journalists’ welfare is, thus, in urgent demand. Likewise, as instances of hate speech and violent extremism are increasingly prevalent these days, the implementation of regulatory measures to pre-empt such harmful incidents are more pressing than ever.

Second, journalists must always comply with high ethical standards. They should always impartially convey the reality of conflict situations, free from the political influence of involved parties.

Lastly, tools that enable participatory democracy through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) should be further strengthened. Online platforms not only provide low-cost access to information, but they also give the opportunity to exercise freedom of expression for netizens, thereby fostering transnational and intercultural democratization.

The fact that the free press’ current situation could be considered grave on a global scale, make it worth following up on the activities of this year’s World Press Freedom Day. According to the recently released 2017 World Press Freedom Index, an annual publication by Reporters without Borders, the global landscape of journalism has entered into a transitional phase in the post-2016 political climate, reaching a dangerous tipping point for the status of the free press.

Instances of state-sanctioned terror against the free press have soared 14% over the past five years, and nearly two out of three countries showed signs of deterioration in the quality of the free press compared to last year’s index. Remarkably, the index shows that the advent of so-called ‘post-truth politics’, fake news and ‘strongman’ leadership have greatly reduced the free press status of established democracies.

The post May 3rd: World Press Freedom Day appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

“On World Press Freedom Day, I call for an end to all crackdowns against journalists – because a free press advances peace and justice for all.” — António Guterres, United Nations Secretary-General(Flickr)

May 3th is World Press Freedom Day. The UN has been celebrating this international day annually since the 1993 proclamation that commemorated the 1991 Declaration of Windhoek. The Declaration of Windhoek is a statement of free press principles, a manifesto written by a group of African journalists. It was an outcome of a UNESCO seminar held in Windhoek, Namibia, calling for the promotion of independent and pluralistic journalism in post-Cold War Africa.

From May 1st to 4th, UNESCO and the Indonesian government will co-organize the main and side events of World Press Freedom Day in Jakarta. This year’s themes, titled Critical Minds for Critical Times will explore the ‘Media’s role in advancing peaceful, just and inclusive societies’. Unlike Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the 16th goal of the UN’s post-2015 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) recognizes the importance of the role of a free press in promoting inclusive and democratic governance. Reflecting this highlighted function of the free press in actualizing an agenda, the themes will focus on the three essential preconditions that shape the free press as a catalyst for the promotion of peace around the globe.

First, that a legal framework protecting investigative journalism must be built and secured. According to the UNESCO Director-General’s 2016 Report on the Safety of Journalists and the Danger of Impunity, 827 journalists lost their lives while on duty over the last decade, and 8% of these cases remain unresolved. An institutional safety net protecting journalists’ welfare is, thus, in urgent demand. Likewise, as instances of hate speech and violent extremism are increasingly prevalent these days, the implementation of regulatory measures to pre-empt such harmful incidents are more pressing than ever.

Second, journalists must always comply with high ethical standards. They should always impartially convey the reality of conflict situations, free from the political influence of involved parties.

Lastly, tools that enable participatory democracy through Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) should be further strengthened. Online platforms not only provide low-cost access to information, but they also give the opportunity to exercise freedom of expression for netizens, thereby fostering transnational and intercultural democratization.

The fact that the free press’ current situation could be considered grave on a global scale, make it worth following up on the activities of this year’s World Press Freedom Day. According to the recently released 2017 World Press Freedom Index, an annual publication by Reporters without Borders, the global landscape of journalism has entered into a transitional phase in the post-2016 political climate, reaching a dangerous tipping point for the status of the free press.

Instances of state-sanctioned terror against the free press have soared 14% over the past five years, and nearly two out of three countries showed signs of deterioration in the quality of the free press compared to last year’s index. Remarkably, the index shows that the advent of so-called ‘post-truth politics’, fake news and ‘strongman’ leadership have greatly reduced the free press status of established democracies.

The post May 3rd: World Press Freedom Day appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korean military parade celebrating the 105th birthday anniversary of Kim Il Sung

The U.S. has recently attempted to leverage China in order to help it solve the North Korean situation. The thinking is that China is the only state with significant economic clout to affect North Korea’s policy-making process. Additionally, an improved trade treaty with China has been offered by the U.S. as an incentive. While the individual merits of this approach may be debatable, it doesn’t acknowledge the possibility of additionally utilizing Russia to help resolve the crisis.

Russia’s Place In Asian Security

Because of the current downturn in U.S.-Russia relations post-Crimea, Russia’s role in the Six-Party Talks process has been minimally acknowledged by the U.S., if it all. Certainly, while Russia doesn’t possess the economic heft of the Chinese in potentially dealing with North Korea, it does possess similar security concerns as China.

Russia has an implicit agreement with China not to interfere in one another’s respective spheres of influence, such as Chinese apparent deference to Russian security interests in Central Asia. However, it’s critical to remember that Russia has Asia-Pacific interests as well. Like the Chinese, one of these is eventual de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.

Succinctly, further nuclearization and militarization of the Korean Peninsula has the potential to start a cascade effect in the overall Northeast Asian security decision-making process. Japan has already started a review of its defense posture in the region in order to respond to China’s rise. What additional steps may it take if the North Korean Crisis continues on its current trajectory?

More fundamentally, Russia shares China’s concern that further North Korean provocations will only bring U.S. military forces closer to their borders. This is neither in Russia nor China’s ultimate interest. Lastly, Russia shares China’s concerns that any military conflict with North Korea has the potential to cause instability and increased migrant flows across their shared border.

A rough analogy can be made between Belarus in Europe and North Korea in the Asia-Pacific in terms of how both serve overall Russian strategic interests. As during the Cold War, both Belarus and North Korea currently serve as buffer zones between Russia and the West. This North Korean utility is the latest chapter in the book of Russian security interests in Asia going back 400 years to the initial era of Russian expansion into Siberia.

How, Then, To Approach Russia?

As with China, there may be an opportunity for the U.S. to leverage Russian unease with the proximity of U.S. forces on its Asian border in order to elicit its help in resolving the crisis. Russia is already uncomfortable with NATO forces massing on the border of its Kaliningrad enclave in Europe. However, the U.S. would have to make it clear to Russia how their mutual interests would be solved by working together. Any U.S. dialogue with Russia focusing only on how the North Korean situation affects the U.S., Japan, and South Korea would be a non-starter.

The economic component of this possible avenue must not be overlooked as well. The U.S. has apparently convinced China of the necessity of strengthening economic sanctions against North Korea. An example of this new approach is China’s recent refusal to accept North Korean coal exports, vital to China’s own economic stance.

However, with respect to Russia, any U.S. talk of strengthening sanctions against North Korea when Russia itself is still facing Western sanctions over Crimea would be an additional deal-breaker. Economic duress caused by continuing Russian sanctions has had ramifications all across Europe, surely impacting the current French Presidential elections, as an example. Russia definitely does not need any further sources of instability right now, politically or economically.

Japan As A Possible Middleman

Additionally, Japan may not share the U.S.’ current approach to confrontation with North Korea. Of course, North Korean nuclear ambitions are a concern to Japan. However, China’s rise outranks even this concern. In order to deal more effectively with China, Japan has realized that it needs to improve relations with Russia. Likewise, Russia realizes that cooperation with Japan would improve its overall Asia-Pacific security portfolio with respect to China’s ascendancy.

Because of this, there may be an opportunity for the U.S. to utilize Japan as a middleman of sorts in negotiations with Russia to attempt to resolve the North Korean dilemma. Certainly, the U.S. still has limited direct negotiations with Russia, such as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s recent visit to Moscow over the Syrian Crisis. However, while there still are disputes between Russia and Japan, such as the Kuril Islands, Russo-Japanese relations remain better than current U.S.-Russia relations overall.

It has been speculated that Russia inserted itself as a major player, both diplomatically and militarily, into the Syrian Crisis in order to gain concessions from the U.S., such as sanctions relief over Ukraine. If this is true, then from the U.S. perspective, there is a risk that Russia might try the same approach with the now-defunct Six-Party Talks to gain additional leverage with the U.S. (and Japan).

However, not seeking Russian help in resolving the Ukraine Crisis, Syrian Crisis, and now North Korean Crisis may ultimately prove unsustainable for the U.S.. A choice is going to have to made by the U.S. as to which of these various crises really threaten U.S. interests in the long-term. With the apparent answer being the North Korean Crisis, Russian assistance in resolving it will be even more indispensable.

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(Shanghai Century Publishing Group meets with Shanghai Communist Youth League)

In a bid to raise student math scores while ingratiating itself ever more deeply with China, Britain will now import translated Chinese math textbooks and Chinese teaching methods for schools throughout the country. The wholesale adoption of Chinese teaching methods for math is the brainchild of Britain’s China-happy schools minister Nick Gibb; and emphasizes a “collective approach,” uniformity, and Chinese-style rote learning over individualized Western methods. Textbooks will be imported through a deal between HarperCollins Publishers and a publisher in Shanghai. The deal was lauded in Shanghai as a “delightful” soft-power boost for China.

What HarperCollins and the UK education department haven’t told the British public about “The Shanghai Maths Project” is that these textbooks come straight from a Chinese state-run publisher that operates under the direct authority of the Chinese Communist Party’s propaganda and censorship apparatus. The publisher in question is Shanghai Century Publishing Group (上海世纪出版 [集团] 有限公司 or 上海世纪出版集团, SHCPG). As the SHCPG website clearly states in Chinese, the group was established in 1999 under the authority of the Communist Party’s Central Propaganda Department (中共中央宣传部), the Shanghai Municipal Communist Party Committee (中共上海市委), and the State Council’s Press and Publication Administration (新闻出版总署).

SHCPG’s subordinate relationship to these agencies is widely noted in Chinese media reports on SHCPG and its agreement with HarperCollins. SHCPG’s president, Gao Yunfei (高韵斐), is also the organization’s Communist Party secretary. As the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China observes, the Press and Publication Administration that oversees SHCPG is one of the primary agencies responsible for censorship in China.

SHCPG also works closely with the Communist Youth League (中国共产主义青年团 or 中国共青团), the party agency responsible for indoctrinating Chinese youth from primary school through university. The SHCPG website includes a section dedicated entirely to “Youth League Activities.”

In Shanghai in August 2016, SHCPG prominently took part in a state-run book fair to “promote the core values of Chinese socialism” and to commemorate the 95th anniversary of the founding of the Chinese Communist Party. Among the titles SHCPG promoted at the fair was: To Be Turned Into Iron, The Metal Itself Must Be Strong: How to Be a Member of the Communist Party (打铁还需自身硬: 今天如何做一名合格的共产党员). In 2015, SHCPG marked the 94th anniversary of the founding of the Communist Party with awards for “outstanding party workers and party-building projects” within the organization.

Now SHCPG will be supplying textbooks to students in British schools. As China Global Television Network notes, “These textbooks, created for students in China, will be translated exactly with no editing to adjust them to the UK’s local curriculum.” Britain is simply importing Chinese government curriculum lock, stock, and barrel, with translated textbooks from a state-run Chinese Communist Party publisher.

Not everyone in Britain is as happy about this arrangement as Nick Gibb and HarperCollins are. “Why are we blindly following the Chinese approach to teaching maths?” asks British educational scholar Ruth Merttens, “A one-size-fits-all approach is unlikely to improve children’s learning. Worse still, it undermines more important features of our culture and heritage, where we punch above our weight in creativity and celebrate originality and difference rather than uniformity.”

Merttens called the education department’s mandatory application of Chinese teaching methods “profoundly undemocratic.” No wonder, since China and the Chinese educational system that Britain so wishes to emulate are also profoundly undemocratic.

The Shanghai textbook deal follows a “disastrous experiment” in bringing math teachers from Shanghai to instruct British students according to Chinese methods. “I’m used to speaking my mind in class, being bold, giving ideas, often working in groups to advance my skills and improve my knowledge,” said one student, “But a lot of the time in the experiment, the only thing I felt I was learning was how to copy notes really fast and listen to the teacher lecture us.”

Beyond the issue of Chinese school textbooks and teaching methods, the British government has been broadly criticized for its starry-eyed approach to Sino-British relations and its apparent love affair with any and all things Chinese. Current prime minister Theresa May and former prime minister David Cameron have both been accused of  “grovelling,” “kowtowing,” and “sucking up” to China in pursuit of trade deals with the one-party state. Among Brexit fears is the concern that Britain will become only more dependent on China after leaving the European Union.

Math textbooks are of course unlikely to contain a great deal of overtly political content. But if it’s math textbooks today, one might reasonably ask, then what will it be tomorrow? Chinese language and culture programs at educational institutions throughout the UK are already run by the Chinese government’s Confucius Institutes, a noted part of Beijing’s “overseas propaganda” apparatus whose presence on Western campuses has been described as “academic malware” and as an educational “Trojan horse” due to their censorship practices and overtly propagandist character. Is it wise to give the Chinese government an even greater footprint in British education?

One might reasonably also question the moral acceptability of a publishing deal that directly profits and legitimizes a party-state apparatus recognized as one of the worst human rights violators in the world. To purchase textbooks from a Chinese Communist Party publisher is to enrich and validate the same party-state agencies that suppress freedom of expression, freedom of information, and academic freedom in China. “The Shanghai Maths Project” is one that educational stakeholders in Britain may wish to think twice about.

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When the Kremlin decided to meddle in the U.S. election in favor of Trump, it nurtured the hope of a reset in bilateral ties with Western Europe and the United States. The idea of a U.S. President as the leader of the populist movements rising in the West was seen as an advantageous scenario for Moscow.

As disillusionment over Trump’s alleged pro-Russian view is growing at home, Putin might return to the  “besieged fortress” narrative domestically in order to secure his upcoming reelection.

In Russia, the wave of populism throughout Europe and the United States was considered as a victory over the West.  Brexit, the rise of right-wing parties across the EU and Trump—all seem to be proof that the conservative ideology originated in the Kremlin to take on “false” liberal democratic values is partly shared with Western countries. As liberal values in the West were defeated, rise of populism was depicted as people’s rebellion against own corrupt governments thanks to Russia’s efforts.

The strike on al-Shayrat air base and Washington’s sudden interventionist approach to Syria caught the Kremlin’s strategists off guard. It seemed that Trump had distanced himself from his “America First” isolationism and for many in Russia it appeared as if Trump had reneged on his campaign promises.

Trump’s decision to get tough on Russia would be the ultimate failure of the Kremlin’s foreign policies goals and a personal defeat for Vladimir Putin. This is particularly worrisome considering next year’s presidential elections next year and the growing protests with already brought people on the streets last March.

Nevertheless, Trump’s policy towards Syria might bring both nations together, for a cause of a good war against ISIS, the scenario of a proxy conflict now seems more plausible. Many in Russia actually fearing that Syria might turn into another Vietnam when the Soviets fought along the Viet Cong against the Americans. With more American strikes possibly following, and presence of US ground troops expanding – the Kremlin grows cautious of avoiding a quagmire that will not go well domestically.

For the past year, Russian state-media consistently depicted Trump as a friend and one of “ours”, while its recent statements and actions put it into hot water. Regardless speculations that Trump decided to strike Syria because of its collapsing ratings domestically and sweeping accusations of his assistants’ connections to the Russian government – the new image of Trump is taking over the country’s media landscape.

State-media now draws Trump as incompetent in handling Russia and other global issues; while genuinely unfit to serve as a president. He is likewise presented as a victim of the neoconservatives such as Steve Bannon, or falling under the influence of America’s “deep state” or his democratic-leaning daughter – Ivanka.

During the recent evening with Vladimir Solovyev, Russia’s major and state-controlled political talk show, some of the participants even expressed feeling of missing Obama’s days while describing Trump.

Switching depiction of Trump goes along with new messages resurrecting for the Putin 2018 presidential campaign. As most of the media agenda is heavily regulated by the state, it is vital to stop presenting Trump as “one of ours” but rather as an incompetent president who might trigger the world war three, as also betraying Russia’s sincere hopes and benign efforts for better bilateral relations.

For the Russian state-media there are few options left now but to return to the “besieged fortress” imagery. In fact, the choice is a blessing in disguise for Putin.

Image of being a victorious leader could have secured an easy reelection but likewise made Russians to stop rallying around the flag and instead scrutinizing other troubling issues such as rampant corruption. Recently, Alexey Navalny’s, Russia’s major opposition figure, disclosed a massive corruption scheme of the Prime-Minister Dmitriy Medvedev by posting findings on YouTube. The public response was massive and caused a heated wave of protests countrywide that rattled the Kremlin.

If the West is finally defeated, it is going to be harder to deter attention from domestic problems. In contrast, resumed hostility augments opportunities for self-victimization and emergence of a public narrative of being under attack. Expressing the unquestionable support for the experienced commander-in-chief remains the sole option for withstanding enemies while fighting corruption could be postponed.

The post Trump’s Foreign Policy Helps Putin’s Reelection Plan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana tours the Philippine-claimed Thitu Island during his visit to the Spratlys Group of islands off the disputed South China Sea in western Philippines Friday, April 21, 2017. (AP/Bullit Marquez)

After bowing to Beijing’s request to retract his threat to plant a flag on Pag-asa (Thitu) Island over Philippine Independence Day on June 12, the mercurial Philippine president Rodrigo Duterte has likely angered the Chinese again.

Immediately after his retraction, his military announced on April 16 its plans to hold ten days of joint military exercises with U.S. troops in May. Duterte then sent his defense secretary, Delfin Lorenzana, his military chief of staff General Eduardo Ano and about 40 journalists, to tour Thitu Island on April 21 in an apparent show of sovereignty over the disputed island.

Before landing, the Philippine C-130 military aircraft received a warning from Chinese forces to leave the airspace. In conjunction with the visit, plans were announced to invest $32 million in upgrading the island’s military infrastructure, including the upgrading of its runway. Filipino troops have been stationed on Thitu since the 1960s.

The move to again engage the Americans comes after months of heated anti-U.S. rhetoric from Duterte since he assumed office last summer. Duterte has long mistrusted the U.S., recently lambasted the presence of American troops, called for the end of joint military exercises, and even called for a “separation” from the U.S. while courting billions of aid and investment from Beijing last October. “I announce my separation from the United States both in the military… not social, but economics also,” he told the Chinese in Beijing, “so I will be dependent on you for a long time.”

The military exercises, known as Balikatan (Shoulder-to-Shoulder), are held every year, but this year will not involve any live-fire exercises or simulations of protecting territory, such as the disputed islands with China (China seized Mischief Reef from Manila beginning in 1994 and took Scarborough Shoal in early 2012). Rather, the exercises among some 5,000 American and Filipino soldiers will be limited to disaster and humanitarian responses and counter-terrorism efforts.

The toning down of the military exercises (and his promise not to plant a flag) are likely appeasements to Beijing, where Duterte intends to meet Chinese president Xi Jinping in May. But Beijing cannot be happy about the military cooperation with the U.S. and the defense secretary’s visit to Thitu island. For now, Filipino fishing boats, Chinese military vessels and Chinese industrial fishing boats are all operating in the Scarborough Shoal peacefully. But there are recent reports that Filipino fishermen were harassed and driven away by the Chinese Coast Guard from Union Bank in the Spratly archipelago of the South China Sea.

Any slight skirmish there (or elsewhere) could spark a military clash and draw in the U.S. military – which is bound by the U.S.-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty of 1951 to protect its ally’s islands.

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By Robert Elway Study the US economy and its relationship to other countries and you will see two effects of the Federal Reserve’s accommodative monetary policy: higher gold and lower US dollar purchasing power. From January 2003 to March 2017, the Effective Federal Funds Rate (EFFR) dropped by 36% while gold rose 169%, and dollar purchasing power reflects this low-rate environment. One 2017 dollar equals only seventy-five cents in 2003 dollars. The US dollar has remained at 75% purchasing power since 2014, making the nominal prices of goods and services more expensive in the United States than they were fourteen years ago. The Fed’s Impact on International Trade From the perspective of the US, the trade balance increased in 2009 and has remained above 2004-2008 averages since then. Our trade gap with China has gotten larger since 2012, mainly by rises in imports of consumer goods. At least for a time of mass appeal among American consumers, platform-based products like the iPhone can create more production in goods and services than the sum of their parts. In addition to the suppliers of the physical goods used in manufacturing the phone, there is also the platform it creates for an increasingly services-oriented environment indirectly fueled by easy money from central banks around the world. Especially in a low interest rate environment as the US has been experiencing since 2009, importing some goods can create growth in domestic industries like technology-based services. The Fed’s accommodative policies have led to a paucity of traditional returns from US government bonds, which tends to make venture capital and other, often riskier, forms of investing more attractive to the traditionally risk-averse. This leads to pension funds investing in venture capital firms which fund startups that support New Economy jobs. We’ve heard news stories about these jobs, especially with Uber and other apps-turned-employers in the United States–all created, or in the very least facilitated, by a platform that takes advantage of the Chinese-manufactured iPhone and an ever-larger amount of capital looking for above-average return. Rosland Capital’s chart below was compiled using this information on how a lower dollar purchasing power affects precious metals and gold IRAs as well as other dollar-denominated assets. The flat periods show times when the dollar was affected by Ben Bernanke’s monetary policy just before the 2009 recession, along with the Fed’s post-QE policy after 2014. Both resulted in a temporarily stagnating dollar purchasing power. Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) controls for nominal price disparities that result in nations having a different cost of living, allowing for economists to compare multiple countries’ output, usually expressed in terms of International Dollars. This is a unit of currency based on the US dollar’s purchasing power during a specific year that is kept consistent throughout the comparison with other countries. For the example below, purchasing power parity can be derived from GDP or by equating the Consumer Price Indices of individual countries. The PPP exchange rate determines how many US dollars, Chinese yuan, Japanese yen, or euros consumers in their home countries would need to convert to International Dollars in order to equal the same purchasing power as consumers in other countries for a given year.

Using 2017 as a reference year for per capita PPP produces Charts 1 and 2 below.

Chart 1: Higher PPP Chart 2: Lower PPP Growth Back in 2006 and 2007, Chart 2 shows that total PPP per capita for the US, Germany, Japan and China was growing over 30%. In 2009, China, Germany and the US all had decelerating growth while purchasing power parity still grew in Japan. However, Japan’s shrinkage in growth from 2010-2015 had the greatest impact on the overall total. While the pre-financial collapse years saw over-15% growth just from the US and Japan alone, all four countries’ PPP growth barely amounted to this same benchmark by 2015. Robert Elway is a financial analyst at Rosland Capital, a precious metals company that tracks gold pricing, monetary policy and other financial news.

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Paul Manafort meets with Yan Jiehe, March 5 (China Pacific Construction Group; archive).

Former Donald Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort, currently under investigation for his pro-Russian ties and Russian money laundering, will now be advising Chinese billionaire Yan Jiehe (严介和) on gaining access to lucrative infrastructure projects in the United States according to the Financial Times. Yan is the founder of China Pacific Construction Group (CPCG, 中国太平洋建设集团) and one of the wealthiest men in China (See also Fortune, Huffington Post, Salon, The Week).

Manafort met with Yan in Shanghai on April 11, according to the Financial Times, and was described by Yan as “Trump’s special envoy.” During his visit Manafort was treated to a Huangpu riverboat tour of Shanghai, and indicated that he “would be returning to China within a month for further talks.” Yan clearly indicated that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss access to U.S. infrastructure projects to be funded by the Trump administration to the tune of a trillion dollars.

“I will not seek out Trump,” said Yan confidently, “He will seek me out. In the entire world, I am definitely the most ideal privately owned unit to invest in construction. In the whole world, there’s not another company equal to Pacific Construction.” Despite such bravado, Yan’s meeting with Manafort suggests that he is indeed seeking out Trump (and seeking out U.S. public funds that American taxpayers might rather see go to an American construction company).

Manafort’s spokesman, Jason Maloni, initially denied that Manafort was in China on business; then denied that his business in China involved “any current or future infrastructure projects or contracts in the United States.” Maloni’s denials seem to conflict with Yan’s own statements at this meeting, however, and with the details of previous contacts between Manafort and Yan.

According to the CPCG website (March 8; archive), Manafort met previously with Yan in Beijing on March 5-7. Manafort and Yan are pictured above at this meeting and below with unspecified others in attendance. The meeting is reported in detail also by Jingsun Group (京商集团, March 15; archive), an infrastructure company associated with Yan that hosted the event. This previous meeting is not included in the Financial Times report, and until now seems to have escaped U.S. media attention.

Paul Manafort in Beijing, March 7 (China Pacific Construction Group; archive).

In Beijing, as in Shanghai, Manafort was described as a “special envoy of President Trump” (He was also curiously described as the “godfather of Ivanka Trump.”). Manafort is praised in these reports for his work on behalf of such figures as former dictators Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Mohamed Siad Barre of Somalia, and Viktor Yanukovych of Ukraine. Manafort’s history with these and other autocrats around the world appears to have been taken as a prime qualification for work on behalf of China’s interests.

Yan has a reputation as something of a maverick and claims to keep a distance from the Chinese Communist Party. He is a former local government official, however, and frequently appears alongside current party officials on Chinese government and state-run media websites. No one does business in China as successfully as Yan without having a cozy relationship with the Communist Party.

Yan Jiehe with Paul Manafort, Beijing, March 6 (Jingsun Group; archive).

Present also with Yan and Manafort at the March event in Beijing were Jiang Zedong (姜泽栋), chairman and Communist Party secretary of the Northern Design and Research Institute (北方设计研究院), a part of China’s state-owned defense industry; Chen Shiping (陈诗平), general manager of state-owned China Railway International Group (中铁国际集团有限公司), a major player in China’s “going out” strategy with operations throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America; a Moldovan entrepreneur named Ruslan Birladeanu (Руслан Бырлэдяну); and other “Chinese and foreign political and business circles.”

In comments to Fortune, Yan said that a total of three meetings with Manafort in China have taken place.

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Former British Prime Minister Gordon Brown urged last week the creation of an international facility that aims to raise billions of dollars in funding for children’s education in poor and conflict-stricken countries.

Brown, who led the United Kingdom from 2007 to 2010, spoke at an event organized by the Foreign Policy Association and hosted at the United Nations, where he serves as special envoy for global education.

In support of the UN-sponsored education commission he is leading, Brown said the international community must create an innovative financing scheme to raise additional funding for the estimated 260 million children who are not in primary or secondary school today. The International Commission on Financing Global Education Opportunities has proposed a facility that will raise money from donor countries, the private sector and multilateral development banks to provide schooling for 800 million young people predicted to lack necessary workforce skills by 2030.

“Half the children of the world denied their future, half our future that we have not properly invested in,” Brown said. “It is time that we think innovatively about how we can do something to end the education crisis that we face.”

The International Finance Facility for Education (IFFEd) Brown proposed draws inspiration from a fundraising program launched in 2006 to raise money for Gavi, an organization providing vaccinations in the world’s poorest regions. Over a 10-year period, the International Finance Facility for Immunisation has raised over $5.7 billion.

The Education Commission has set a goal to mobilize $13 billion annually by 2020.

Brown said the IFFEd will help fund the Global Partnership for Education and Education Cannot Wait, a program providing school resources to countries hosting refugees. The facility will work by incentivizing lower-middle-income countries to take out interest-free loans from The World Bank and regional development banks, which can then be turned into grants. Public and private donations would be used to secure “buy-downs of non-concessional loans” from development banks.

According to a report The Education Commission published, estimates show that $2 billion in guarantees and $2.5 billion in buy-downs would leverage around $10 billion in additional concessional financing per year.

“Don’t tell me this cannot be done, because we did it when we created the IFF facility for vaccination,” Brown said. “We’ve done it before when we had to make major changes to the way we deliver aid.”

Countries prioritizing education investment should be first in line for IFFEd loan and grant funding, Brown explained. He said The Education Commission has recommended low-and-middle-income countries increase education spending from the average today of 4 percent to 5.8 percent in return for increased international funding.

Since 2002, the share of overseas education development aid has fallen from 13 percent to 10 percent, leading to what Brown said is a failure to live up to the UN’s sustainable development goal of providing universal quality education. There is enough aid money today for $8 per child out of school, he said.

“All we can muster with all of the aid money we put together is not enough to pay for a textbook, certainly not enough to pay for a teacher, not enough to pay for the building and for the maintenance of schools,” Brown explained.

Girls in low-income countries and children in conflict zones are most likely to be deprived education, he continued, saying those displaced by war are most vulnerable to becoming child laborers, forced into marriage or sold as sex slaves.

Brown said the “civil rights struggle of our time” is to end discrimination against girls by increasing their access to education and ending sexual exploitation. He called it a “vicious cycle” that uneducated mothers in Africa have an average of five children, compared to two children for mothers who attended school, that “starts with a failure to educate girls.”

Quoting Nelson Mandela, Brown said that “promises made to children are sacred,” and a promise made by the international community to provide young people a chance at a better life is not being met.

“What destroys hope amongst children is their inability to plan and prepare for any future,” Brown said, “ because they are denied the very basic human right that is so important, and that is a right to education.”
***

Are you interested in attending the Foreign Policy Association’s next lecture?

What: Foreign influence operations and counterintelligence
Who: William Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and Charles McGonigal, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office
When: Tuesday, May 9, 6pm to 8pm
Where: Baruch College
William and Anita Newman Conference Center, Room 750 Baruch College Library
151 E 25th Street
New York, NY

Please click here for more information.

The post Former British PM Brown Urges Creation of Education Finance Facility appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

At this year’s Foreign Policy Association Lecture on Conflict Prevention Richard G. Lugar, former Republican senator from Indiana, discussed the issues revolving around the United States’ global leadership. Could Donald Trump’s “America First” isolationism, professed during his electoral campaign, decrease the U.S.’ role in the world, and ultimately its security?

Since World War II the United States has been an essential factor in preventing conflict in different parts of the world. In Europe, U.S. security guarantees and its commitment to the NATO alliance has offered stability to the continent for over 70 years.

Consequences of Trump’s foreign policy

America’s leadership has been for decades an issue that support by both Democrats and Republicans. The Trump administration seems intended on reducing U.S. footprint globally, at the risk of lessening Washington’s ability to prevent conflicts.

Indeed, Senator Lugar argued that: “The people of the United States and most countries of the world will become poorer and will have to endure more frequent conflict. Solutions to threats that impact us all, including climate change, extreme poverty and hunger, communicable diseases, nuclear proliferation, cyberwarfare, and terrorism will be almost impossible to solve.”

Trump’s foreign policy goals, at times simplistic or reactive, do little to increase the welfare of U.S. citizens. The current administration has conducted a series of ad hoc policy decisions and failed to promote existing alliances and America’s leadership within international institutions.

The use of military power characterized by the recent missile strikes in Syria not only went against Trump campaign platform but also demonstrated the administration’s preference for the use of force over diplomatic action. Senator Lugar acknowledged the necessity of a military as a deterrent against aggression but also pointed out its weaknesses: “we cannot bomb our way to security”.

Trade

On trade, Trump has been declaring that America has been taken advantage of by other countries. The loss of jobs, particularly in manufacturing, has been mostly caused by innovation in mechanization and information technology.

After accepting that industry jobs are not likely to return anytime soon, the main challenge remains to deal with these economic dislocations. Senator Lugar stresses the importance of helping retrain workers and connect them to new jobs rather than attempting to isolate a nation from international trade competition.

Immigration

On immigration, Trump’s administration policies “have been designed for ostentatious symbolism rather than for maximizing U.S. security… wasting both American resources and international good will” contended Senator Lugar.

Senator Lugar offered an example of the adverse effects of recent policies decision. Discussing the ban on entrants to the U.S. from Muslim countries, Lugar judged the policy “the most obvious recruitment tool against the United States since Abu Ghraib.” The senator went on to say that: “The ban has been a steep net loss to U.S. national security.”

Alliances network, stability and development

Trump has created ambiguity about America’s commitment to its European NATO allies. Although it is fair and important to demand greater contributions from some Allied countries, the U.S. should assert its commitment to NATO Article V if the event of a conflict with any of the NATO countries.

This pledge to defend any country member of the alliance has been the main deterrent against the breakout of another major war in Western Europe. In addition, The US navy has ensured freedom of navigation and the respect of international waters around the world.

Senator Lugar concluded by noting some of the positive effects of U.S. involvement had in global stability and development:

“We have helped to rehabilitate enemies like Germany and Japan, and we initiated co-operative threat reduction to help the former Soviet Union protect and destroy the very nuclear arsenal that was once pointed at us. We have helped countries such as South Korea move from extreme poverty to impressive prosperity through our assistance and protection.”

Full transcript of lecture: Andrew Carnegie Distinguished Lecture on Conflict Prevention with Senator Richard G. Lugar

Are you interested in attending the Foreign Policy Association’s next lecture?

What: Foreign influence operations and counterintelligence
Who: William Evanina, Director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center and Charles McGonigal, FBI Special Agent in Charge of the Counterintelligence Division for the New York Field Office
When: Tuesday, May 9, 6pm to 8pm
Where: Baruch College
William and Anita Newman Conference Center, Room 750 Baruch College Library
151 E 25th Street
New York, NY

Please click here for more information.

The post Isolationism and its Consequences for Conflict Prevention appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Shehab Al-Makahleh

This week, the Turks cast their votes in a historic constitutional referendum which appears to have granted controversial President Recep Tayyip Erdogan a significant expansion of executive power. Notably, a “yes” vote would eliminate the post of the Prime Minister, which formerly served as a balance to presidential authority. As official votes are counted, exit polls indicate that Erdogan’s “yes” campaign leads at 51.3%, with approximately 600,000 votes still to be tallied. But with such a slim victory, Turkey faces a complicated cluster of problems likely to reignite fissures between the Turkish government and several domestic parties which oppose Erdogan’s plans. Although the media is quickly hailing the referendum as a victory for the “yes” campaign, the final votes hold the potential to tip the scales back towards a “no”.

The “Yes” vote would essentially transform Turkey’s parliamentary system into an executive presidential system. Many of the campaign’s opponents, overwhelmingly including residents of Turkey’s three largest cities – Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir – fear that concentrating too much power in the hands of a man already disparaged by many in the West as an autocrat, an unreliable partner, and a man with pretensions to acting as a neo-Ottoman sultan bodes poorly for Turkish stability.

While most have focused on the outcomes of a ‘yes’ victory, few analysts have looked at the effects on Erdogan’s future – and that of the Turkish state – if the final votes tip the polls towards the ‘No’ option. So, let us consider both outcomes in turn.

The ‘Yes’ vote would lead to the concentration of power into the hand of one man via the removal of the Prime Minister. The campaign was led by the president himself ― who effectively rules the country through a deliberate misreading of the nation’s constitution ― and claimed that the proposed changes would bring stability to the country. Although stability is desperately needed in Turkey, many fear that the changes would only ensure that the current president can rule indefinitely. For those who fight for Western-style democracy, this would be a nail in the coffin for the hope that Erdogan’s slide towards authoritarian rule could be reversed.

Moreover, a ‘yes’ vote would have serious geostrategic implications for Turkey and the region. Situated on the crossroads between Europe and Asia, Turkey shares land borders with several Arab states and Iran as well as a maritime border with Russia at the strategically important Black Sea. Most analysts are concerned that the “Yes” vote will push Turkey further away from the West, Russia, and longstanding regional allies, inevitably leading to problems for Erdogan himself.

Since the Arab Spring, Turkey’s relationship with its Arab neighbors has been precarious at best. Culminating with the overt and covert support for various ‘rebels’, Turkey has been found to have supported terrorist groups in Syria including the Islamic State. While Turkey’s meddling was formerly only felt in the Syrian north, where it remains locked in conflict with Kurdish forces, Erdogan’s expansionist ambitions grew to include the Persian Gulf and even Africa with establishment of new Turkish military bases in Qatar and Somalia. Such military adventurism quickly raised the alert in some Gulf Arab states; the UAE, for example, saw such move as direct competition to its own regional power and influence, and has strongly opposed Turkey’s ambitious expansion. Given the referendum’s result, this trend shows no sign of slowing.

With the celebrated EU-Turkey agreement on refugees in 2016, diplomatic relations with Europe temporarily appeared to be on the upswing. However, after a year of internal dissent and terrorist attacks involving immigrants, the EU changed its tune toward Turkey and Erdogan has returned the favor. Just days before the referendum, the Turkish President stated that relations with the EU were at an all-time low. Internally, rabid anti-EU rhetoric became an effective tool for collecting popular support ahead of referendum.

While a notable cooling began during the Obama administration, US–Turkish relations also took a nosedive following the attempted coup d’etat in Turkey last July. Erdogan openly accused the United States of orchestrating the attempt, while Russia reaped the credited for warning the President – and potentially saving his hide. To this day, the Turkish government continues to insist that America extradite Erdogan’s main opponent, the Pennsylvania-based Fethullah Gulen, whom he considers the coup mastermind. Inside Turkey the counter-coup purge from the military, civil service, and universities continues unabated and runs in parallel with the crackdown on Kurds, journalists, dissidents and other opposition figures. Erdogan’s grab for power would create further complications in an already shaky relationship.

Although Russian-Turkish ties have warmed significantly since the 2015 Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet, as evidenced by Russia’s role in warning Erdogan of the coup attempt against him in July, their support for opposing sides in the Syrian civil war create a minefield of challenges for a closer diplomatic relationship. Since the coup attempt, a landslide of internal troubles has plagued Erdogan, including a series of terrorist attacks hitting the country’s two major cities, the capital Ankara and the cosmopolitan Istanbul, and the assassination of Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey last December. The recent intensification of Turkish military actions against the Kurds, which have led to an escalation of activity in Syria, will certainly not help this dynamic.

The ‘No’ vote would deliver a short-term blow to Erdogan and push him to seek other avenues to establish stability and further his interests in the country, perhaps through compromise with political figures such as former President Abdullah Gul and former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, two key figures from his own ruling AKP party who have grown more distant from Erdogan over time. Further, the ‘No’ vote would help reduce public resentment against the President and ensure that Erdogan does not meet the fate of his neighbors, such as Assad or Hosni Mubarak, in the longer run. Indeed, he would be well advised, should he fail to reach compromise and stabilize the country, to seek a suitable successor rather than seek to remain in office interminably and invite a future Turkish Spring. Such an uprising would hardly be a surprise in the face of growing social, political and economic issues.

Shehab al Makahleh, a Jordanian political analyst and director of Geostrategic Media Middle East.

The post Why a ‘No’ Win at Referendum is the Best Option for Erdogan appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

 

The thaw in U.S.-Russia relations hit a snag this week when Secretary of State Rex Tillerson received a chilly reception in Moscow after President Trump ordered a missile attack on a Syrian military airbase. Trump had campaigned on putting “America First” and avoiding military entanglements abroad—a stance Russia welcomed. But the President’s position, took an abrupt turn after Bashar al-Assad reportedly deployed chemical weapons against defenseless civilians, in what seems to be Trump’s first exposure to how “God’s children” suffer under Assad. Relations with Russia, however, may be the least of Trump’s problems if U.S. involvement in Syria escalates.

Trump’s pivot from isolationism to interventionism while staying the course on his paranoid and miserly approach to immigrants and refugees reveals the fundamental incoherence of his worldview. What had seemed a stunted, transactional form of realpolitik has turned out to be nothing more than improvisation and reflex, and the President’s actions may very well commit the U.S. to a path for which we are ill-equipped in light of how other administration policies damage our credibility and chances for success.

For instance, the U.S. would need the help of local interpreters to succeed in Syria. We relied heavily on local interpreters In Iraq and Afghanistan, where they proved essential to carrying out military operations. These locals possess a deep understanding of local dialects and politics, which newcomers cannot readily learn. The average pay for a locally hired linguist is as low as $15,000 per year—a paltry sum, considering the grave risks to life, limb, and loved ones inherent in collaborating with U.S. forces.

To augment this pittance, the Obama administration leveraged the Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) program, which uses U.S. residency to entice support from local nationals with critical-needs linguistic skills. But only about 20 percent of applications are approved, and many applications languish, leaving thousands in limbo—and in grave danger of reprisal.

Worsening the situation is the Trump Administration’s revised order on immigration, which has halted the visa and refugee programs for at least 120 days, sending a message to local linguists that an anemic paycheck is all the compensation they can expect from the U.S. The SIV program’s years-long backlog only reinforces that impression. Therefore, if events in Syria continue to escalate and require additional U.S. troops, there will emerge a disastrous inability to attract local linguists to share their talents that are so necessary for success.

Local informants also stand as human-intelligence assets who are vital to successful military intervention. We depend on these trusted local informants to give credible information on everything from opposition troop movements to ground assessments of civilian casualties. And again, with collaborators facing death and worse, proper incentives are essential.

Informants are typically compensated with U.S. currency in an amount commensurate with the value of their information. But money does not adequately offset the risks involved.

By contrast, visas and legal immigration status provide powerful incentive for local informants wishing to escape dangers at home. But Trump’s well-publicized immigration policies erect near-insurmountable hurdles to Syrian citizens trying to obtain visas, leaving us without a proverbial carrot for would-be informants and linguists who otherwise face extreme risks and negligible rewards for providing information and helping our troops abroad. This, in turn, hinders our military’s ability to procure accurate, real-time intelligence at a speed useful in fast-paced military operations.

Moreover, our forces also need to collaborate with local allied groups in order to have any hope of navigating the complex local and geopolitical landscape that will greet them. But current U.S. immigration policies complicate our ability to garner allied support and cooperation by choking off key incentives for potential collaborators.

For instance, the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) is among the most effective anti-Assad forces in Syria, but it is considered a terrorist organization by the U.S. government, making aid to anyone affiliated with the PKK illegal. Similar complications arise with organizations such as the Al-Nusra Front, the Muslim Brotherhood, and militias reportedly affiliated with Iran. Despite their affiliations, not all members are true believers or hardliners, and their knowledge of the theater is a valuable asset for U.S. forces, providing “force multiplier” effects during ground operations. But Trump’s immigration policies remove our only bargaining chip to attract combatants out of such organizations in favor of U.S.-backed militias: the promise of visas and legal-resident status in the U.S.

Finally, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan also made clear the necessity of support from prominent figures within rival local factions. In Syria, most such organizations are riven with splinter sects and offshoots that frustrate military planning and post-operational civil recovery. And so courting local leaders in Syria’s fractured political environment can potentially solve many thorny problems, including curbing Russian interference and resolving the tension between the desire to “de-Baathify” post-conflict institutions and the need to provide stable government services.

But the administration’s dim view of refugees and other immigrants from predominantly Muslim nations makes these tasks all the more daunting by undermining U.S. credibility with Syrian opposition leaders, who will therefore tend to cynically view the U.S. only as a means to oust Assad, not as a credible ally willing to make a long-term investment in a better quality of life for Syrians. Cooperation with Americans under those conditions can serve only to undermine amenable leaders’ credibility with their own constituents.

In essence, current U.S. policy under Trump makes military intervention more difficult and more dangerous. Raising America’s drawbridge to immigrants and refugees does our military no favors, considering how these policies deplete scarce reserves of goodwill and credibility—vital assets with local human assets in war. The President’s incoherent approach to these interrelated issues represents a serious battlefield liability. We are charting a bumpy course, and we can expect to repeat the worst of our missteps from the last decade and a half of war—and some new missteps besides.

Jesse Medlong is a Navy veteran, an international lawyer, and a member of the Truman National Security Project’s Defense Council. Logan Goldstein is a former Army infantry officer who served two tours of duty in Afghanistan and currently works as a private military contractor and consultant. Views expressed are their own.

The post Trump’s Pivot from Isolationism to Interventionism? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Territorial claims in the Spratly Islands. (Sydney Morning Herald)

The unpredictable Philippine president, Rodrigo Duterte, has again changed course in the South China Sea, cancelling his plans to plant a flag on Pag-asa (Thitu) Island over Philippine Independence Day on June 12th. Duterte’s reversal came immediately after Beijing threatened “there will likely be trouble” should every head of state wish to plant a flag on islands in the disputed South China Sea. Duterte also clarified an earlier statement, saying the Philippines intends to reinforce, not militarize, areas in the South China Sea controlled by Manila.

The need for the reversal and clarification follows earlier remarks during a visit to a Philippine military camp on Palawan island on April 6th. In those statements, Duterte riled Beijing, Hanoi and other governments by ordering his troops to occupy islands and reefs in the disputed South China Sea. Duterte also asked the Philippine military to build structures on all of the Philippine-held islands, reefs and shoals in the contested Spratly Islands. The Philippines occupies nine of some 50 islands and reefs that it claims in the Spratly island chain, while Vietnam and Taiwan occupy other features in the chain.

On Palawan, addressing his military, Duterte stated “We tried to be friends with everybody but we have to maintain our jurisdiction now, at least the areas under our control. And I have ordered the armed forces to occupy all these.” Without naming Beijing, Duterte further explained, “It looks like everybody is making a grab for the islands there, so we better live on those that are still vacant,” while adding, “What’s ours now, at least let’s get them and make a strong point there that it is ours.” China has been widely criticized for constructing seven man-made islands in the Spratlys and militarizing them with surface-to-air missiles, airstrips and military equipment and infrastructure.

The April 6 nationalistic rhetoric surprised many analysts—as it followed months of reconciliation with Beijing, including the courting of billions in aid and investment from China on a recent visit to Beijing. Since assuming the presidency last summer, Duterte has played a weak hand, by failing to assert a landmark ruling by an international court last July. The ruling, first filed by his predecessor Benigno Aquino, rejected Chinese maritime claims in favor of Manila.

Duterte’s comments on Palawan island were seen by many analysts as catering to his audience, the Philippine military. But his follow-up comments signal Duterte is still reluctant to anger his much larger and stronger neighbor. The seeming ease with which Beijing toned down Duterte’s patriotic and hawkish rhetoric puts this nationalistic strongman in a difficult position, coming ahead of talks between government leaders from Beijing and Manila on the disputed waters in China in May.

The post Duterte Backs Off Hawkish Rhetoric Over Spratly Islands appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

North Korean MiG-29s fly over a Parade in the nation’s capital.

The National Post recently published an article detailing in depth the size and complexity of the armed forces of North Korea. They showed in a graphic the number of planes, tanks, submarines, ships, and other weapons systems North Korea possesses. The goal of the article was to highlight how large the North Korean military really is, but it did not go into finer details of why a conflict might erupt, or how it might play out.

Missile tests into the sea of Japan, bouts of artillery fire, and the loss of an occasional ship are unfortunately expected by South Korea as the North postures and attacks aggressively towards their southern cousins. The conflict that never really ended since the mid-1950s has kept South Koreans in a stalemate that persists until today.

During the Korean War, US-led troops actually took over the North but were pushed back to the current borders by a surge in Chinese troops. Chinese interests and American strategic patience has kept the war at a stalemate.

For this reason, any resolution may only come from an agreement between the United States and China. Indeed, after 60 years the regional powers have become tired of threats to stability coming from the ruling family of North Korea.

China has been the North Korean lifeline, providing essential exports and weapons systems. One reason for this support are to maintain a physical buffer between Western powers and China’s border. China’s professed military support for the regime in case of a conflict also serves as a point of leverage against American and Japanese interests in Asia. An oppressive yet stable North Korea also limits the number of refugees that would flood into China if the regime were to fall.

While fighting the silhouetted army of North Korea might become an end game for American, South Korean and Japanese forces, it is likely the case that missile defense will take precedence and pressure on China will need to delicately balanced in order to meet everyone’s interests.

To avoid a chaotic result, China would likely have to decide and agree to remove the North Korean ruling family. Alternatively, taking away power from the Kims could occur without China’s assistance or consideration, but this would involve special forces incursions and the use of large and sophisticated weapons.

Political will to deal with a situation most political leaders would prefer to avoid is largely motivating the inaction in the Korean peninsula. But with nuclear weapons and threats to the US mainland it may be that Washington will decide on a policy of “now or never” if an aggression takes place, and China may see solutions beyond supporting a dictator that will produce beneficial leverage for its ever growing international presence.

The post North Korea after 60 Years of Status Quo appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The U.S. and China recently held a summit meeting at Mar-a-Lago, Florida. Many issues currently plague U.S.-China relations, such as trade, the South China Sea, and cyber-security. However, the issue of North Korea clearly dominates the issues now potentially derailing U.S.-China ties. Unfortunately, as important as North Korea is at the moment, it is but an ancillary topic compared to the issue of how China views overall U.S. intentions towards it in Asia. Until this underlying Chinese strategic concern is addressed, there will be no resolution of the North Korean issue.

Look At A Map: Syria Is Not North Korea

With the recent U.S. missile strikes against Syria for its alleged chemical weapons usage, there has been speculation that the true intended recipients of this message are China and North Korea. The thinking is that both China and North Korea will see that the U.S. is willing to inflict the same lesson on North Korea. If true, then it’s critical to point out several differences here.

Syria is not located near the epicenter of international trade and the world’s major nuclear states. Southeast Asia is certainly vital to world trade as it is essentially the gateway for natural resources departing the Middle East and Africa and making their way towards some of the world’s most resource-dependent economies, namely China, Japan, and South Korea. However, the destination of these resources highlights the true indispensability of Northeast Asia to the global economy as a whole.

This area is home to the world’s second, third, and fourth largest economies in the world, respectively. In many respects, such as international trade and purchasing power parity (PPP), China is already the world’s largest economy. As has been stated numerous times before, a military conflict in this area would have far-reaching regional and global repercussions.

Even China itself has admitted that a stable, peaceful regional environment is vital to its continued ascendancy. As globalization’s past leading proponent, the U.S. may ironically be a victim of its own post-Cold War success, as the relentless spread of globalization is precisely what has allowed China, Japan, and South Korea all to reach their current commanding heights positions leading the global economy.

In Asia, Memories Are Quite Long

In order to give even further context to the North Korean dilemma and how it impacts U.S.-China relations, it’s vital to remember that most states in Asia have both quite long histories and associated memories. This has played itself out in several instances within the past year alone.

First, we have the Filipino Ambassador to the U.S.’ reference to U.S. President William Howard Taft’s “little brown brothers” sentiment towards The Philippines over a hundred years ago. This was a prelude to The Philippines’ announced foreign policy re-balance between the U.S. and China currently.

Next, Finland was among the first European countries to diplomatically recognize China and actually the first to establish a bilateral trade agreement with China in 1953. As a result, Finland is now a beachhead of sorts for China in terms of furthering not only trade relations between the two states themselves, but diplomatic ties between China and the EU as a whole.

Lastly, we have the Syrian peace talks currently being held in Astana. Although the talks are at times difficult, they are nevertheless viewed as absolutely critical by the talks’ major proponents, Russia, Iran, and Turkey. Kazakhstan was ostensibly chosen as the location for these talks because, at several points in its rich history, it was part of the Russian Empire (later Former Soviet Union), as well as the Persian and Ottoman Empires, respectively. This theoretically signifies that the interests of any one proponent of the talks do not necessarily outweigh those of the other two.

This last example is also an important lesson to learn regarding China and its interests on the Korean peninsula via the now-stalled Six-Party Talks. It’s also important to remember that it was U.S. miscalculation during the Korean War which initially led to China’s entry on the side of North Korea. More fundamentally, the two Koreas are still technically at war.

As their respective allies, this harms the long-term sustainability of positive U.S.-China relations, despite the salve of business ties. These ties do not override fundamental geopolitical considerations. The U.S. recognized China in order to leverage it against the Former Soviet Union. What exactly are U.S. motivations currently? Are they to similarly leverage India against China now, for example?

Where Do We Go From Here?

A new model of great power relations between the U.S. and China needs to be defined, and then actually implemented. It appears that this already may be happening with the U.S. apparently adopting China’s doctrine of “No Conflict, No Confrontation, Mutual Respect, and Win-Win Cooperation”.

The salient point here is that issues such as North Korea won’t be solved until China’s underlying security concerns are addressed, namely what exactly are U.S. intentions towards it in Asia? Will the U.S. pursue a policy towards China of containment, engagement, or “congagement”? More pertinently, does the U.S. consider China a “strategic partner”, “strategic competitor”, adversary, etc.?

Because no state in Asia wants to be forced to choose between China and the U.S., a possible solution is a power-sharing agreement, proposed by Australian National University Professor Hugh White. White proposes that a concert of regional powers, to include China, the U.S., Japan, and India, is the long-term solution for stability in Asia. This is reminiscent of the Concert of Europe, responsible for upholding stability on the European continent from Napoleon’s eventual defeat until the outbreak of World War I, a hundred years later.

While the details of such an arrangement may be debatable, it certainly has the potential, at least, to address the major security concerns of the regional Asian players. In addition to issues such as North Korea, a power-sharing arrangement in Asia would have ramifications with respect to the South China Sea as well.

The South China Sea example is critical as China’s double cancellation proposal (no further DPRK missile launches in exchange for no U.S.-South Korea military exercises) may have been designed to elicit a negative U.S. response and thereby expose the U.S.’ true motives in Asia (in China’s mind). These motives would include the U.S.’ conflation (deliberate or otherwise) of civilian freedom of navigation with military freedom of navigation. Additionally, a power-sharing agreement would send a strong signal to weaker, external states like France, which is also expanding its own regional military presence.

The post North Korea Is Only One Tree In The Forest Of U.S.-China Relations appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Protestors confront riot police in Caracas, Venezuela on April 8, 2017 in response to an opposition leader’s banishment from holding political office. (REUTERS/Carlos Garcia Rawlins)

Over the last week Venezuela has seen upheaval in the national legislature and banning of the leading opposition figure from running for office. Both developments resulted in massive protests throughout the country and violent clashes with police. While it is clear the ruling Socialist government of President Nicolas Maduro—heir apparent to long-serving dictator Hugo Chavez—has a tight grip on power, it is possible they might have gone too far now, and have many within and outside the country demanding change.

Venezuela Supreme Court moved to take over National Assembly

The trouble started two weeks ago, when Venezuela’s Supreme Court shocked many when it announced an intention to assume the functions (and power) of the country’s National Assembly. While the Supreme Court is loyal to Maduro, the National Assembly holds a variety of political views and was seen as the only opposition voice in the government, the only check on the regime’s power.

As reported by Foreign Policy, the reason for this bold move derives from financial troubles the Maduro regime got themselves into and then tried to use their political control to get out of. The Venezuelan government has to make a major bond payment by April 12; to get the needed funds (which the government doesn’t have on its own), it planned to sell assets based in Venezuela to a Russian oil company, Rosneft. Knowing the legislature would never approve such an arrangement, the government attempted to take it over. Or as stated by Eric Farnsworth of the Americas Society/Council of the Americas, “They [the Maduro regime] tried to get the legislature out of the mix and just take unilateral action. When they find their laws inconvenient, they just change them.”

Massive opposition to this move results in protests and international criticism. While Maduro walked back the Supreme Court takeover a few days later (on April 1st), those supporting the opposition demanded the Supreme Court judges be dismissed. They also called for the next presidential election, currently expected in late 2018, to be moved earlier, though it is highly doubtful the regime will agree to this. Protests continued throughout the week, with thousands filling the streets of Caracas carrying signs saying “No to dictatorship!” In at least one instance in the capital police fired tear gas at crowds.

Opposition leader Henrique Capriles banned from holding political office

In my most recent report on Venezuela in January, I briefly mentioned that Henrique Capriles feared he would be blocked from holding political office by the Maduro regime. Capriles, a current state governor, had previously been a presidential candidate is viewed unilaterally as the best hope for unseating Maduro in the 2018 election. On April 7th it turned out his worries were well-founded: the government banned Capriles from holding office for 15 years. The national comptroller’s office issued the directive, claiming “administrative irregularities” including breaking contracting laws and improper management of donations.

Regional and international organizations and governments condemned the action almost immediately. The U.S. State Department released a statement on April 8th saying it was “deeply troubled” by repression against Venezuelan opposition, and that it “reject[s] the rationales the Maduro government proffers for its repressive actions, which, when closely examined are spurious and, politically-motivated, and without basis in domestic or international law.” On April 10th, the foreign minister of Brazil Aloysio Nunes and chair of the Organization of American States Luis Almagro jointly called for national elections to be held in Venezuela, stating that elections are the “only solution” to the deepening political crisis.

The action against Capriles sparked even more protests, some resulting in violent clashes with police. This is not necessarily new, as protests have popped up periodically in Venezuela over the last few years.

The last straw?

But this time the outcome may be different. Some are hopeful that the government’s recent aggressive moves will be the fuel needed to re-galvanize and unite the opposition in demanding, and maybe even successfully seeing, regime change.

Prying political power and control from a group as deeply entrenched as Maduro’s government will be extremely difficult. But there is reason to think it is possible, especially as Venezuela’s economic and political crises worsen. Even more troubling, Venezuelans’ quality of life—especially access to needed food and medicine—has not improved.

It is extremely important for the international community to remain vigilant in demanding that free and fair elections be held within a reasonable timeframe. Perhaps non-partisan election observers should be put in place to ensure the elections’ validity, and that Venezuelans can vote for their choices without intimidation or fear of reprisal.

Then, perhaps, the country can start on the road to recovery.

 

The post Venezuela Thrown into Turmoil Anew: Last Straw for Regime? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Demonstrators in Hanoi last May, demanding cleaner waters in the central regions after mass fish deaths along the coast of Vietnam. (REUTERS/Kham)

Vietnam took another small step toward inclusive political institutions this month, announcing the creation of a website where Vietnamese can air their grievances. At a regular press conference, Minister and Chairman of the Government Office, Mai Tien Dung, formally declared the website nguoidan.chinhphu.vn, which would allow authorities at all levels to receive, answer, and respond to citizens’ questions and complaints, and collect proposals on how to improve the country’s administrative system.

The initiative is timely, coming just days before the one-year anniversary of the start of the Formosa protests, sparked by mass fish deaths along a 200-kilometer coastline of central Vietnam, which some called Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster. The deaths of some 100 metric tons of fish in four central provinces were first recorded on April 6, 2016, and protesters soon gathered to accuse a steel mill in Ha Tinh. The steel mill, being developed by Taiwan’s Formosa Plastics Group, was widely suspected of discharging untreated waste into nearby waters.

The accusations led to organized protests breaking out in several major cities, and resulted in the arrests and detainment of dozens of Vietnamese protesters. Those actions drew the attention of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR), who called on the Vietnamese leadership to respect the right of freedom of assembly. Formosa finally admitted responsibility in June, pledging $500 million in compensation to some 186,000 fishermen and fish farmers.

To date, there is some confusion over exactly how much compensation has been paid out. Minister Dung, at last week’s press conference, announced local authorities disbursed 76.8% of the total as of March 6. Afterwards, one newspaper reported just 32%, or VND3.7 trillion ($162 million) of VNĐ11.5 trillion ($500 million) had been paid to support local fishermen and help clean up the polluted marine environment as of April 1.

Minister Dung also sought to reassure the Vietnamese public, announcing an inspection team from the environment ministry would begin a three-day examination of the plant, checking whether a blast furnace could be put into use, “If they cannot ensure the safety for the facility’s operation, the mill will never be allowed to go into production.”

Here in Vietnam, findings from the 2016 Viet Nam Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI) were also published last week, revealing a dramatic increase in concern by citizens for the environment. More than 12% of those surveyed expressed the environment as their most important concern, increasing 10% from last year. And the party secretary of Ha Tinh province, Vo Kim Cu, was reportedly fired last week for his role in the Formosa fish kill.

Through these timely actions, Hanoi appears to taking positive steps toward acknowledging their citizens’ newfound environmental activism, hoping to avoid any widespread social unrest given the extent of pollution. But they are also taking punitive measures to quell protests. This past week, Nguyễn Văn Hóa, a 22-year-old resident of Kỳ Anh District, was arrested by Hà Tĩnh police for “abusing his civil rights, freedom and democracy to infringe upon the interests of the State.” He stands accused of using a Flycam device to shoot videos of the protests at the Formosa steel plant that posted on social networks.

The anniversary of Vietnam’s largest environmental disaster has seemingly motivated government officials to pay heed to citizens’ concerns and take actions to address the pollution and potential unrest. Yet there are some fears the new website will be used against the agitated populace much like Mao Zedong used the “Let a Hundred Flowers Bloom” campaign in China.

 Hopefully restraints on waste discharge will displace restraints on peaceful assembly – lest another environmental disaster crashes the new website after a flood of complaints, and the increasingly environmentally-paranoid Vietnamese return to the streets. On Sunday, the favorite day for Vietnamese to protest last year, the streets of Saigon were quiet, and locals were back to eating fish again.

The post Vietnam Seeks to Calm Waters One Year After Environmental Disaster appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Following the recent decision of the South Korea’s Constitutional Court to remove President Park Guen-hye in the wake of the massive scandal that has deeply shaken South Korean’s political and economic landscape, former President Park was arrested last Friday and is currently detained at the Seoul Detention Center while awaiting trail. If convicted, she will be facing more than 10 years in prison.

Indeed, hundred of thousands have railed in the street demanding President Park’s resignation since October 2016. The scandal has unveiled a large network of bribery, corruption and influence peddling that has led to the arrest of important political members such as Moon Hyung-pyo, Chairman of the National Pension Service (NPS), but also Samsung Vice President Lee Jae-young and several prominent members of the Chaebol financial clique face trial and severe charges.

While South Korea’s political history has been characterized by a deep turmoil during the turbulent years that have marked the democratic transition from the authoritarian rule period, President Park has become the first president to be forced from the office and later arrested after being involved in a large-scale corruption scandal since the military era.

South Korea will be electing a new president on May and the attention remains focused on Park’s successor and on his or her ability to define a new critical strategy to address the North Korean issue. President Park relied on strong measures to force Pyongyang to abandon its nuclear program, marking a significant shift from a trustpolitik strategy championed during the first years of her Administration.

Following the escalation of tense relations with Pyongyang, culminated with a series of missiles and nuclear tests, Park Administration was characterized by an increasingly open and harsh confrontation with Pyongyang. In less than a year, Park Administration closed the jointly operated Kaesong Industrial Facility, denounced the violation of human rights in North Korea while encouraging additional sanctions targeting North Korea, stressed Seoul’s level of preparedness in the event of an imminent collapse of the North Korea’s regime and also openly disclosed the existence of a plan to kill Kim Jong-un and his close entourage in order to decapitate the command-chain in the event of a war.

The sudden end of Park Administration is expected to affect the delicate balance in the region. In the attempt to curb Pyongyang’s nuclear program, Park’s Administration reinforced the security ties with Washington and has also promoted a new entente with Tokyo, considered a valuable asset in containing North Korea’s nuclear threat despite decades of tensions caused by the historical legacy of Imperial Japan’s occupation of the Korea.

Last November, under the auspices of Washington, Seoul and Tokyo agreed to sign the General Security of Military Information Agreement, allowing the two countries to share classified information including North Korea’s missile and nuclear activities. The agreement was strongly opposed by the Minjoo Party, concerned about the involvement of Seoul into a larger missile defense pact with Japan that could endanger the unsteady balance in the Korean peninsula while alimenting additional tensions with Beijing.

Besides the evident turmoil within South Korea’s political landscape, the new scenario characterized by the sudden end of the Park Administration will be a determining element in outlining a new direction in South Korea’s security priorities, while Pyongyang continues to cast a dreadful nuclear shadow across the region.

In the wake of President Park’s dismissal, the attention on the recalibration of the relations with Beijing and the growing tensions with Pyongyang aliment the debate. Relations with China have been strained by the acceleration of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system strongly supported by Washington, alarmed about the resurgence of North Korea’s nuclear and missile program.

Under the rising leadership of Kim Jong-un, North Korea’s notorious provocations and sinister nuclear ambitions have reached an unprecedented level of threats, jeopardizing not only the unsteady military balance in the region but accelerating the dangerous confrontation with Washington and its allies. Pyongyang has conducted an increasing number of ballistic tests, creating concern about its fast-paced ability to develop ballistic missile capabilities to reach the continental U.S. with a nuclear-tipped warhead.

The end of the strategic patience advocated by Obama Administration toward North Korea has led to a critical outcome, as stressed by Secretary of State Tillerson during his recent visit to South Korea. While the United States have reiterated their commitment in defending its critical ally from Pyongyang’s nuclear threat, the chance of a military option remains on the table. Trump Administration’s concerns about the volatility of the regional scenario, constantly exposed to a consistent number of strategic shifts jeopardizing Washington’s presence, have certainly contributed to the renovated close entente between South Korea and Japan.

South Korea’s emerging security challenges and opportunities 

In the last few weeks, the future of the US-ROK Alliance, relations with China and the nature of the strategic approach in the Korean peninsula that will be determined by South Korea’s new president have further fueled the debate.

President Park’s dramatic downfall has already galvanized the opposition and opened the doors for a return to power of the Minjoo Party led by its front runner candidate Moon Jae-in. The impeachment has exposed the Saenuri Party to a large scandal, putting in disarray its core leadership and also creating a strong fracture within its party members and supporters. More important, it has almost certainly determined a marked change in the South Korea political leadership, opening the door for a return of the Minjoo Party as leading forces after many years of the unchallenged prominence of the Seanuri Party.

The expected return of Minjoo party to the power after almost ten years represents an additional shock in defining the new contours of South Korea’s tense relations with China and also in dealing with the emerging threat represented by North Korea. Minjoo Presidential candidate, Moon Jae-in, former Chief of Staff during Roh Administration and former Chairman of the Minjoo is considered as a front runner in the upcoming election after the sudden announcement of Former UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon to not run as a candidate for the South Korea’s presidency.

Moon Jae-in is a former human right lawyer and also a well-known political figure in the South Korea ran as a presidential candidate in 2012 and he was eventually defeated by President Park. Moon Jae-in has several times expressed his wish to foster a wide recalibration of South Korea’s foreign policy and security. During the years of Park Administration, Minjoo Party called several times for a reduction of military engagement with Washington and the promotion of a greater level of diplomatic and economic engagement with North Korea, as the ultimate tool to promote peace and foster a path toward the stability of the inter-Korean relations.

Minjoo Party has also often criticized when not openly opposed the deployment of the THAAD, considered an ineffective measure, but also expressed concern about the deterioration of the relations with China. Last January, in the attempt to reduce the frictions with China, Minjoo lawmakers traveled to Beijing to promote a positive framework to enhance the level of dialogue between the two countries after the decision of Seoul to participate to Washington-led anti-missile system. Beijing’s relations with South Korea have reached a tense peak after China has banned Chinese tour groups from travelling to South Korea. Mending ties with China represents an important goal for Minjoo leaders since Beijing is not only an important trade partner but certainly remains a critical actor in bolstering any diplomatic engagement with Pyongyang.

On the other hand, Minjoo Party leaders have expressed their desire to mend relations with Beijing while fostering a different approach to defuse an incoming crisis in the Korean peninsula. With the front runner presidential candidate Moon Jae-in likely to be elected as a president, a new direction in foreign policy is extremely plausible. It is also expected that the new priorities in Seoul’s agenda will be not to antagonize North Korea, trying to encourage dialogue and foster engagement rather than maintaining a hard line position.

For instance, this might coincide with Moon’s decision to reopen Kaesong and even remove some economic sanctions in the attempt to reduce the level of economic and diplomatic isolation that has alimented Pyongyang’s rampant bellicose posture and that could ultimately ignite a larger crisis. Yet, it is unlikely that this could induce North Korea’s leadership to suspend its nuclear and military activities, especially after the recent declaration of Pyongyang in the wake of Washington’s airstrike in Syria.

It remains difficult to predict whatever Seoul will remain strongly committed in upholding any strategic initiatives promoted by Washington in the region, while the new forthcoming South Korean Administration might choose to determine a different direction from the path originally marked by Obama’s Pivot to Asia. There is no doubt that the alliance will remain, yet the new Administration might be inclined to foster a deep recalibration of the level of cooperation between Seoul and Washington while fostering a renovated entente with Beijing in order to defuse an imminent crisis in the Korean peninsula.

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In a speech at the Foreign Policy Association Khanna argued that globalization is not at risk of reversing despite recent surges in popularity of nationalist ideas.

Author and political scientist Parag Khanna rebuked those who do not believe the world is becoming more interconnected, stating last Thursday that globalization can lessen conflicts and distribute power and trade more equally.

Khanna, promoting his book Connectography: Mapping the Future of Global Civilization in a speech at the Foreign Policy Association in New York, said globalization is not at risk of reversing course despite recent surges in the United States and Europe of trade policies that favor national protection.

“Fortunately, I have the numbers on my side,” Khanna said. “I’m not remotely concerned about it. I’m certainly concerned about the methodologies and the intellects, to be perfectly blunt, of those people who are anti-globalists.”

He argued that a massive increase in infrastructure investments, especially in Asian economies over the last 25 years, is driving a transition to a “supply chain world” governed by trade connectivity. New roads, railways, ports and internet cables have enabled people to become dependent on goods and services provided from far greater distances than ever before.

And because this is happening at the same time across the world, Khanna explained, there is no one cog in the wheel that can stop it.

“The supply chain is a force that’s even more powerful than states themselves, as states seek to be part of those supply chains,” he said. “I’ve found that whenever a country tries to stop the flow of something, it just flows around them.”

For example, the conclusion by most United States leaders to abort the Tran-Pacific Partnership, a free trade agreement with Asian countries brokered to contain China’s influence, will not halt regional trade. In fact, 12 countries that formed TPP met in Chile in March, and were joined by China, to discuss future trade cooperation.

“So a trade agreement that we had conjured up to help isolate China winds up going on without us, and with China,” Khanna said.

Anchor powers

Shifting to a supply chain world is part of what Khanna sees as a “systems change.”

Since the end of the Cold War, the world has operated under a US-led unipolar system based on a hierarchical power structure. That is now transitioning to one where power is distributed among “anchor” countries.

China is the fastest growing anchor power right now, Khanna said, driven first by opening its markets in the 1970s, and now with its focus on infrastructure development.

A McKinsey Global Institute study reported in 2016 that China is spending more of its gross domestic product on infrastructure, 8.6%, than the US and Western Europe combined.

Khanna said this is increasing China’s influence near and far.

Not only is it building roads, bridges and ports at home, it’s financing projects for its neighbors as part of its “One Belt, One Road” Asia development strategy. Even if some of China’s neighbors are concerned about its growing influence, they “need that Chinese investment,” Khanna said.

“Most of the countries are not able to find on the global market some willing substitute for their economic and infrastructural requirements,” he explained.

Even more, China’s dedication to an infrastructure build out is increasing its connectivity with Europe. Khanna described the unification of the Eurasian “mega-continent” the biggest trend to watch in geopolitics over the next 25 years.

China has created the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, a $100 billion development finance institution, to act as a driver for its regional strategy.

Acknowledging the economic opportunity, 14 European Union members have joined the AIIB. According to Khanna, EU trade with the US is about $1 trillion annually, similar to its trade with China, Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and other Southeast Asian countries combined. However, he said the trade value with the US will be “stuck where it is” by 2025 or 2030, but EU trade with Asia is expected to increase dramatically.

Khana concludes that the emergence of regional powers in which “connectivity is the governing force” can be a good situation for all parties involved.

“In the long run, I have a cautiously optimistic view because of the fact that even if we build these infrastructures and connectivity for selfish reasons,” he said. “They wind up creating a much more connected and distributed system where supply can meet demand and where there is less reason for conflict.”

The post Parag Khanna’s ‘Blunt’ Defense of Globalization appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By W.A. Schmidt

Through decades of personal encounters, U.S. diplomats and other State Department representatives have deeply impressed me with their decency, common sense, patriotism and profound understanding of the world. Along with members of the military and the intelligence community, these committed individuals are at the front lines of America’s engagement with the world. Often, they do so with insufficient resources at their disposal. They endure hardships and take considerable risks, and some even make the ultimate sacrifice.

They deserve all the support we can muster as a nation. They help keep us safe and make the world around us a safer place—a world from which we cannot take a holiday, let alone escape, not even into “Fortress America”.

Hence, the idea of cutting the international affairs budget is foolish. Slashing it by almost a third, as proposed by President Trump, is outright shocking. It reflects utter ignorance of its crucial importance for our security and well-being. Moreover, it also implies an appalling disdain for the dedication and sacrifice of some of America’s finest.

If a foreign power wanted to weaken America’s security and standing in the world and bring it down a few giant notches from its contested perch, this is where it would start. Diplomacy would be the first in its crosshairs, not the military which still enjoys a considerable safety margin compared to other armed forces overseas. (The intelligence gathering apparatus is, of course, always a prime target; deliberately undermining it by publicly disparaging it is thus not only reckless but exposing us all to potentially existential dangers.)

The country’s reputation has already suffered immeasurably as a result of the utterings and tweets of Mr. Trump, both as candidate and president. Allies and friends are in shock, while America’s adversaries cannot believe their luck. Adding drastic budget cuts would not only amplify their elation, it would add insult to the immense injury already inflicted upon the U.S. both internationally and domestically.

At home, if President Trump’s budget passes, the ongoing disparagement of the intelligence community will be accompanied by an even more tangible assault on our diplomats and development aid workers. The resulting loss of institutional knowledge and memory will have dire consequences, adding to an already alarming recent brain drain. What a thoughtless waste of some of the best human capital this country has to offer.

Abroad, fixing the damage already done will require Herculean efforts, such as strengthening existing programs and pursuing policies that show America at its best. Many of them (now at risk of being curtailed or cut) are essential if the country wants to credibly claim—or rather, reclaim—its moral high ground. However, without a commitment to fundamental values and the rule of law in international affairs that will be unattainable. Mr. Trump’s and Secretary of State Tillerson’s noticeable disinterest in and indifference towards human rights will most likely keep it that way, namely out of reach.

Claiming or reclaiming the moral high ground appears to be a moot point given President Trump’s implied ridicule of the very notion. Few of his statements demonstrate this better than his toxic assertion that the behavior of the U.S. government was no different than the criminal shenanigans of Mr. Putin. (In Mr. Putin’s case this is particularly galling given his ruthlessness at home and the war crimes being condoned and perpetrated under his watch [if not on his command] in Ukraine and Syria.)

Should Mr. Trump’s announcements become actual U.S. foreign policy, the resulting conflicts of conscience for those tasked with carrying it out will make any previous ones look almost quaint. The deep concern among diplomats about this issue is understandable and palpable.

Should the unthinkable occur, it would be historically unprecedented as U.S. diplomats would have to potentially justify the committing of crimes against humanity (e.g. see Mr. Trump’s apparent affinity for torture and collective punishment) as well as war crimes (e.g. see Mr. Trump’s irresponsible remarks about the use of nuclear weapons or about stealing Iraq’s oil [the next time the U.S. occupies the country]).

If the president comes to his senses and, in the process, sidelines those zealots in his inner circle who are feeding his basest instincts, our diplomats will be spared this moral quandary. If not, resistance to approaches this inimical to U.S. national interests will have to come from within the executive branch, from Congress, from the judiciary and, last but not least, from civil society, i.e., the rest of us.

It is encouraging to note that congressional and military leaders are indeed opposed to the flagrant violations of international law that Mr. Trump’s flights of cruel fancy would entail. There is a similar gulf between the president’s views of America’s international affairs budget and military representatives who understand the larger geopolitical context.

The chasm between the Trump White House and the military is deeply concerning. While the president proposes a far-reaching deconstruction of the State Department, Secretary of Defense Mattis had this to say about increasing military spending at the expense of cutting back on diplomacy and development: “If you don’t fund the State Department fully, then I need to buy more ammunition ultimately. So, I think it’s a cost benefit ratio. The more that we put into the State Department’s diplomacy, hopefully the less we have to put into a military budget as we deal with the outcome of an apparent American withdrawal from the international scene.”

This is when, under normal circumstances, the Secretary of State would step up and exert his influence and authority. Yet Mr. Tillerson, incredibly, agrees with the proposed ravaging cuts to his department.

It is more than troubling that, from an outsider’s perspective, Secretary Tillerson has also allowed his department to go adrift: leaderless, rudderless, without a compass and soon deprived of the means to make it safely to any sensible destination. No wonder Foggy Bottom “felt like a ghost ship” during a recent visit by one of its eminent former diplomats.

Possible explanations for Tillerson’s behavior—namely that he has been sidelined, he may be out of his depth and/or may lack motivation to turn things around because he seems not to have wanted this job in the first place—are all equally worrisome.

Congress will have a historically unique opportunity to prove itself and show that it, at least, puts the nation’s interests first. One way to stymie the proposed budget from becoming enacted would be to adhere to the Budget Control Act. Sequestration is an odd way to govern a country. However, as this case shows, it can act as an important check to prevent an out-of-control administration from committing senseless acts.

How unusual and perilous a time we live in if our best hope for keeping the country from harming itself is the resistance within government itself, and the American people at large.

Many of my encounters with U.S. diplomats have been in the Midwest, specifically in the state of Wisconsin. Their profound knowledge of the world as well as their understanding of the concerns of their fellow citizens is remarkable. Likewise, there seems to be a genuine public appreciation for the sacrifices diplomats make and the personal risks they take.

Similar events dedicated to international affairs and open to the general public have impressed upon me, time and time again, the fundamental sincerity of the American people. They show a willingness to listen and to learn about America’s place in this world that so often seems chaotic and confusing. Their openness is one of this country’s most distinctive strengths. Hence it is not surprising that several surveys show that the vast majority do not subscribe to the noxious nationalism that is being stirred up and spread by President Trump and his innermost circle.

Foreign visitors are usually struck by America’s friendliness and hospitality. They are left with an image of a country that, while not perfect, is aware of many of its shortcomings and even willing to discuss them with strangers—an America that is self-confident enough to invite scores of people through government-sponsored programs to experience the country first- hand.

Countless volunteers across the nation graciously host these foreign guests. This sort of citizen diplomacy is an important part of educating the world about us and us about “them,” “one handshake at a time.” Unscripted and unchoreographed, visitors are allowed to freely explore the essence of America. At the end of their exploration they are free to make their own judgment: is it reflective of their experience, or of the president’s cheerleaders in the crude, jingoistic media?

The extraordinary benefits of these exchange programs must surely make America’s adversaries cringe. They would much rather see America’s image eternally tarnished by biased and fake news accounts about the daily “carnage” in this dystopian place that preposterously calls itself the United States of America. Incidentally, those caricature-like images of America are not that far removed from how its own president painted the country in his gloomy and foreboding inaugural address.

The proponents of “America First” delude themselves that previous administrations, Republican and Democratic alike, neglected U.S. national interests. This is a bogus argument. It merely serves as a smokescreen to hide the fact that bullying others and breaking America’s ties to the outside world is ill-considered and harmful. This includes the administration’s condescension toward multilateral institutions. Weakening them would be yet another gift to those determined to topple the liberal international order and, in its wake its core pillar, the United States. The navel-gazing advocates of this bizarre and self-defeating doctrine are oblivious to how much these institutions contribute to our peace and prosperity.

If this myopic vision becomes reality, America’s place in the world will become a lonely, isolated one, its security and well-being fundamentally jeopardized. And yet, this is what the “America First” nationalists in the Trump administration seem more than willing to risk. It is beyond naïve to think that such policies are not going to backfire and cause blowback that may haunt us for a long time to come.

In addition to the aforementioned exchange programs, even those related to refugees are in jeopardy. This is at once heartless and short-sighted. Heartless because closing the doors and cutting funds at a time when the need for refugee care and resettlement has never been greater is morally indefensible and betrays America’s core values. It is also short-sighted because the refugee crisis will not go away. Quite the opposite, it will be exacerbated if the world’s most powerful and richest nation, the one that could make the biggest difference, pulls back.

Instead of educating a receptive but ill-informed public about how little we actually spend in relative terms on international affairs and how important it is to our national interest to keep (or better yet: increase) the level of funding for diplomacy and development, the president engages in willfully bashing both.

Only 5% of respondents to a survey about the subject guessed the correct amount of the federal budget that goes into foreign aid, between 0% and 1%. Answers varied widely, the average guess was 26%.

The U.S. spends the smallest percentage of GDP of the rich industrialized countries on official development assistance, namely 0.17%. This is far from the internationally agreed upon commitment of spending 0.7% of GDP.

Visiting any of the countries on the receiving end of U.S. aid will prove its benefits first-hand. This is what I experienced on visits to Africa, where strangers expressed how appreciative they and their families were for the generosity of the American people, in several cases for PEPFAR (President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief), initiated by the George W. Bush administration.

While PEPFAR and similar health-related programs are expected to be spared, there are plenty of others whose proposed elimination will result in more misery, more loss of life, and less stability and security for all of us. As the broad political resistance to the planned cuts indicates, this is not a partisan matter.

Should Mr. Trump’s vision prevail, the notion of American magnanimity and enlightened self- interest will be overshadowed, if not replaced, by the image of a self-absorbed, egotistical, stingy, rich nation only out for itself. Our resulting international isolation would deepen the sense of insecurity that Mr. Trump has been so successful in fueling for his own narrow political purposes. This is the opposite of making America great. Resisting it is therefore a patriotic issue.

Resistance also entails opposing the dangerous worldview that has seeped into the highest echelons of power. The ugly nationalist ideology that hides behind the slogan of “America First” used to be confined to the lunatic political fringes. Contemporary history alone should help us recognize its uncanny resemblance to movements and regimes overseas that the U.S. all too often ended up fighting with American lives. It cannot possibly become the driving force of a nation that views itself as principled and great.

True patriotism calls for keeping such destructive dogmas from becoming policy. They would harm our national security and prosperity as well as our standing in the world—a world where our friends and remaining allies look at us with unparalleled trepidation, while our adversaries can hardly hide their schadenfreude and glee over the sheer extent of our self-inflicted wounds.

Follow this link for a footnoted PDF version of the article: Death by a Thousand Cuts (and Tweets) The Impending Train Wreck of U.S. Foreign Policy

W. A. Schmidt, a member of the board of the Foreign Policy Association, is a former Chair of the International Institute of Wisconsin (IIW). IIW is one of the state’s refugee resettlement agencies and a partner of the Department of State’s International Visitor Leadership Prog He also served as longtime chair of the Institute of World Affairs at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, a member council of the World Affairs Councils of America, Washington, DC. This blog does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the board of these organizations or their members.

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