Foreign Policy Blogs

Police officers cordoned off the area from family members and other churchgoers after the bombing of a Coptic church. (Reuters)

In 2017, we may see more of the assault on the ancient minority communities in the Middle East. Another major attack on the Coptic community in Egypt this week set targeted its most important Church in Cairo, and there is little doubt that the mass causalities of women and children was done with intent.

Attacks on these ancient communities in the region often focus on women and children, as one of the main goals is not just murder members of these minorities, but to wipe out future generations through death, submission or conversion out of their faith and culture.

The attack on Christians in the Middle East, and other minority communities such as Yazidis, attempt to destroy the present and future of some of the oldest cultures in the region.

A renewed assault on Palmyra by the Islamic State may have some connections to this genocidal policy. Palmyra has been re-taken by an assault of 4,000 ISIS fighters on the ancient city. While Aleppo, Raqqa and Mosul would be the logical destination for re-enforcements, as they are in the midst of being recaptured by local government forces, Palmyra has been targeted for further destruction.

One of the reasons Palmyra is a target lies in its historical significance. Actions by ISIS aim at erasing the history of minority and historical communities in the region, leaving not a shred of evidence to their existence, despite them being some of the oldest surviving communities.

Although Western countries have an obligation to stop genocide, they have continuously failed. While bickering  about less urgent issues continues, minority communities are being wiped out and have received little to no support on the ground until recently.

The government of Canada—one that loves to receive praise by the international community on its humanitarian efforts—was revealed to only having brought in three or four Yazidis in their push to bring in over 30,000 refugees from the region.

After Nadia Murad came to Canada to plead for an increased push to bring in more Yazidis, Canadian authorities declared they would only bring in 50 people in total, despite committing to bringing in tens of thousands of more refugees from the region. This is significant less than what independent Canadian NGOs have brought into the country without government support.

A great analysis and approach to how Western governments should address genocide in the Middle East was produced this past weekend. It reflects the lack of effort from Western nations in their commitment to end genocide in the region. The conference can be seen on the One Free World International’s Facebook page under the December 10th 2016 Celebrating Freedom video link.

2017 will either be the year in which governments decide to stop genocide in the region or let it continue. This will impact how future generations, seeing us all as the ones who allowed such atrocities to become normalized.

The post The Normalization of Policies that Ignore Genocide appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

With the nomination of General James “Mad Dog” Mattis as the new U.S. Secretary of Defense, many are wondering how, if appointed, General Mattis will influence a Trump Administration concerning U.S. relations with China.

In August, General Mattis co-authored a report along with Kori Schake and Jim Ellis, all fellows at the Hoover Institution, entitled “A Blueprint for American Security.” In the report, the authors criticize the last three administrations for a perceived lack of national security vision, saying those leaders have largely ignored threats posed by Russia, China and terrorist groups worldwide. In the report, the coauthors refer to predatory states that prize their own sovereignty but destroy that of others—in particular, Russia, China and Iran:

“The priority challenges we would confront are: Russian belligerence, Chinese activities in the South China Sea, ISIS and Iranian aggressiveness, and drug-gang activity south of our border.”

“China chips away at others’ sovereignty in Asia.”

“China is doing the same, demanding veto authority over the rights of its neighbors in the South China Sea. This behavior follows a classical Chinese “tribute” model that demands deference from “lesser” nations in Beijing’s sphere of interest.”

“nuclear rearmament and proliferation, respectively, back in fashion for the saber-rattling Russians and expansive Chinese”

“America’s foreign policy objective should be to reassert an order conducive to our security and that of our allies.”

“Even long-term friends of our country are hedging their bets, questioning the reliability of our partnership.”

Finally, last year Mattis called for a “policy to build the counterbalance if China continues to expand its bullying role in the South China Sea.”

When President-elect Trump announced his selection of Mattis as secretary of defense, Trump referred to him as “Mad Dog Mattis,” which could be read as foreshadowing a more aggressive defense policy, including toward China.

In recent days we have seen Trump taking a more combative position toward China, asserting his right to take a call from Taiwan’s president and calling into question the U.S. adherence to the long-standing “One China” policy. 

While Trump may have calmed some nerves by appointing Iowa Governor Terry Branstad as the new U.S. ambassador to China, who is a “long time friend” of Chinese President Xi Jinping, we really won’t know what actions the new U.S. president will take until after his inauguration January 20.

Until then, we can expect more soundbites and tweets which disturb the international order (and more counter punches from Beijing) making for more interesting dinner conversations. 

The post Mad Dog Mattis on China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On December 5, the Obama administration released a report outlining the legal and policy frameworks for the president’s use of military force. A Presidential Memorandum accompanying the report directs the National Security Council staff to update and release the report to the public on at least an annual basis.

The report was not designed specifically in response to the incoming Trump administration, but its tone is colored by Trump’s win. In a post-election New Yorker article, President Obama said “I think that if Hillary Clinton had won the election then I’d just turn over the keys. We’d make sure the briefing books were in order and out we go.” Trump’s upset win upended that plan.

The report received brief coverage in the midst of the—wholly justified—media scrutiny of Trump’s executive appointments. Beneath its wonkish veneer, however, the report addresses one of the key concerns surrounding a Trump presidency: the amount of military power that has been centralized in the presidency, which Trump will now inherit, and the opacity with which that power has been exercised by the preceding Republican and Democratic administrations.

The accumulation of presidential prerogative to authorize the use of force outside of Congressional constraints and with limited public disclosure—often through the use of drones—has become an issue of structural governance rather than partisanship. Further, concerns about President-elect Trump’s judgment, temperament, and his campaign pledge to “bomb the hell out of ISIS” bring greater urgency to the issue.

The Obama administration received more criticism on its drone policy from liberals than from conservatives. As drone technology developed and standards for their use in lethal operations remained ad hoc, organizations like the Stimson Center and the New America Foundation aimed to codify how, and by whom, drones were used.

President Obama embraced drones as an effective anti-terror tool that reduced U.S. military footprints in trouble spots. His ability grew to authorize strikes against individuals and groups deemed a threat to America. In Obama’s hands, that power was tempered by a prevailing skepticism about the use of military force. That power now passes to Trump, who has shown a greater openness to the use of force.

The report is an important marker in President Obama’s effort to impact Trump administration policy as he leaves office. Under any administration, the report is a paradox: it is an attempt at transparency that ultimately points to how little can be revealed about the use of military force.

Secrecy still governs national security strategy, both to protect those on the front lines and to ensure the strategy itself has the greatest chance to succeed. The report’s country-by-description of the administration’s use of force is brief and full of legal vagaries (“among other things”, “limited number”, “necessary operations”) that tack around specifics. It adds nothing to descriptions of military operations that mainstream media cannot improve on. It is an academic hat-tip to transparency that reveals little.

The second part of the report, particularly the portion addressing the rules used for targeting and engaging enemy combatants, is far more pertinent. It describes the decision-making procedure regarding the use of lethal force that involves five factors:

• Distinction: targeting combatants and not civilians;
• Proportionality: ensuring civilian losses are not ‘excessive’ in relation to military objectives achieved;
• Necessity: identifying a legitimate military purpose for the use of force;
• Humanity: avoiding injury unnecessary to accomplishing the military objective;
• A robust internal review process.

A review process, while shielded from outside scrutiny in a classified environment, ensures that the decision to use force passes through many hands, each one able to weigh it against the preceding standards. Describing the review, the report reads:

Throughout the military chain of command, commanders, advised by trained and experienced staffs—including intelligence officers, operations officers, and judge advocates—review operations for compliance with applicable U.S. domestic and international law, including the law of armed conflict, and for consistency with the policies and orders of superiors in the military chain of command.

While not addressed to President-elect Trump specifically, this reads like an appeal to order in the face of a incoming leader known and feared for his impulsiveness and bombast. Should it calm fears about the concentrated power about to be handed to an inexperienced and potentially trigger-happy president-elect? Yes and no. Here are two reasons why it should not.

First, the Obama administration—while showing a commitment to both multilateralism and international law that its predecessor did not—acknowledges constraining standards while stopping just short of pledging to follow them. This sentence appears early in the report’s discussion of targeting: “The U.S. Government makes extensive efforts to ensure that its targeting efforts comply with all applicable international obligations, domestic laws, and policies.” The hole in the language is deliberate; “extensive efforts” are not a commitment. It is the presidency protecting itself.

Since 9/11, the presidency—regardless of party—has operated on permanent wartime footing and chafed at any constraint on its ability to project power quickly. There are strategic justifications for this. The result, however, is that concentrated power has accumulated, and is now to be handed to the least qualified incoming president in the nation’s history.

Second, the Obama administration promulgated its standards using Presidential Policy Guidance (PPG) governing the use of force. A PPG is just that—presidential. President-elect Trump will have the right and ability to supplant President Obama’s procedures. The report’s call for the National Security Council to update and release it at least annually is the Obama administration’s effort to be on the record attempting to influence how force is used and information about its use is disseminated. Ultimately, however, Obama cannot compel his successor to follow his recommendations.

That said, does the report have value? Yes. It is an on-the-record standard to which the Trump administration military policies may be held to account. It is an explicit acknowledgment that the nature of the fight against extremism and terrorism has changed the way presidents make decisions about force. It is an effort to codify precedents as presidential power changes hands to support consistency in decision-making.

Finally, it is an invitation to the public to demand more information about military decision-making from the incoming administration. Think tanks and NGOs took up the mantle of oversight on drones during Obama’s tenure. America benefits from a NGO sector, outfitted with expertise from former government officials, that keeps a watchful analytical eye on those in power. They do so as watchdogs, and in effort to influence government action. As the Trump administration takes office, these roles has never been more important.

The post Obama, Trump and Drones appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On December 13, Donald Trump nominated ExxonMobil CEO Rex Tillerson for Secretary of State. Tillerson’s nomination raised questions on whether the top executive of one of the world’s largest corporations (5th largest by market cap, to be exact) can put the American national interest above business interests. Questions of incompatibility aside, what weighs even heavier are the accusations of Tillerson’s connections to Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Trump’s pick is the most recent of many controversial choices for top jobs in his administration. The President-elect’s inner circle has long been accused of harboring pro-Putin and pro-Russian attitudes reflected in their cabinet picks and associates.

For example, former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort has been investigated by the FBI over connections to a high-ranking pro-Russian politician in Ukraine, from whom he allegedly received a $12.7 million cash payment. Future Trump national security advisor General Michael Flynn attended a dinner in Moscow in 2015 and was seated at Putin’s table, while long-time Trump supporter Roger Stone admitted to having had “back channel” communication with Wikileaks head Julian Assange.

Stone boasted on Twitter that Hillary campaign chairman John Podesta would have some “time in the barrel,” and Podesta’s emails were hacked by Russian groups and then posted on Wikileaks. Trump himself has on multiple occasions showered Putin with praise, a favor that was reciprocated by the Russian President.

At the same time Trump is cozying up to Russia, he is taking an increasingly rougher tone with China. As he has made abundantly clear while on the campaign trail, he considers China a serious—if not the most serious—threat to the United States.

First and foremost, he identified China as an economic threat, bent on undermining America’s global economic pre-eminence by inventing the concept of global warming in order to reduce the competitiveness of U.S. manufacturing. He also repeatedly blasted China for “taking our jobs” and accused the Middle Kingdom of “illegal dumping.” Add to that the fact that Trump reversed in early December decades of established U.S. policy towards China by accepting a congratulatory call from Taiwanese leader Tsai Ing-wen. After the call, he openly called into question America’s adherence to China’s “One China” policy.

If Trump advisors are indeed right, and the phone call with Taiwan was long planned, then the President-elect’s reasoning behind staffing the White House with pro-Russian hacks becomes quite clear: breaking apart the budding Moscow-Beijing alliance.

Seen in this light, aligning with Russia is not an expression of subservience to Vladimir Putin, but instead a strategic calculus of the Trump administration meant to contain China. Due to geographical proximity and historical animosity, Russia and China are acutely aware of the threat they pose to each other. In Trump’s view, faced with a revisionist Beijing, Moscow and Washington are natural allies.

China has always been suspicious of Russia’s intentions, because Moscow remains firmly anchored in the West. In the words of a Chinese academic, “If the next U.S. president shows more respect to Russia and is less tough toward Moscow, the Kremlin’s ‘turn to the East’ will very likely swing to the West.”

It seems that time has come. While Trump has indicated that he is hoping for more engagement against China from regional allies, especially Japan, some of America’s allies no longer seem to be inclined to follow Washington’s lead. When the Australian government declined to comment on Trump’s overtures to Taiwan, citing “national interest” as justification, eyebrows were raised in astonishment. But when looking at the economic data it makes sense: Australia is the “developed world’s most-China dependent economy”, owing much of its 25 years of uninterrupted economic growth to Beijing’s booming demand for commodities.

This helps to explain a string of pro-Chinese decisions taken by Malcolm Turnbull, from agreeing to a 99-year Chinese lease of parts of the Port of Darwin to rejecting a $40 billion Japanese bid to build Australia’s new submarine fleet. With China being the most important trading partner for Australia, it appears that Beijing has made its influence in Australia stick. For incoming Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, China’s growing clout in Australia and across the Asia-Pacific will make strengthening U.S. alliances with trusted allies like Japan a priority.

For both the U.S. and Russia, strategic alignment is a way to keep the looming China threat in check. While Trump will likely disengage from Europe, he is likely to continue to focus on the Asia-Pacific and China’s containment. Thus, the strategic encirclement that China suspected the U.S. would pursue under Obama’s pivot to Asia will continue, albeit in an altered form – not primarily via the control of Pacific island chains by the U.S. and its allies, but through Beijing’s immediate neighbor, Russia.

However, the degree to which this new partnership with the Kremlin will work out remains to be seen. America’s new alliance comes with many unknowns. Whether Putin can really be regarded a trustworthy ally is debatable, and whether Chinese President Xi Jinping will sit quietly through provocations amid a new serious strategic challenge may be called into doubt as well. Playing the “Russia card” against China the same way Nixon erstwhile played the “China card” against the Soviet Union remains a high-stakes gamble.

 

The post Trump’s Great Game: Courting Russia to Contain China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

DRC president Joseph Kabila speaking at the United Nations in New York. (MONUSCO Photos)

For the second time in 16 years, the United States is preparing to inaugurate a president-elect who has lost the popular vote. While his opponents are organizing a number of dubious recounts in Midwestern states, his own supporters retort by spreading untruths about massive amounts of voter fraud in California. The president-elect himself is under fire for unprecedented conflicts of interest. And then there are strong suggestions that a foreign power meddled in the election process, possibly tipping the scales in favor of its preferred candidate.

Meanwhile, in Ghana, a majority of voters cast their votes for the candidate who proceeded to win the election. The current office holder promptly conceded. This marks the seventh peaceful political transition in a row in the West African country. Of course, democracy has long since ceased to be the province of America alone. In Africa, Ghana is perhaps the best example.

Alas, for every Ghana, there is a Democratic Republic of Congo. The DRC is a paradigm of the kind of state that people often associate with the African continent: weak governance, instability, violence, and a trend towards autocratic rule. However, current president Joseph Kabila had an opportunity to make history. Constitutionally barred from running for a third term, Kabila could have set a precedent by handing over power peacefully. He instead chose to do the opposite.

In the late 1990s, his father Laurent Kabila wrestled control over the DRC from long-time dictator and connoisseur of hats Mobutu. Upon Laurent’s death, Joseph was handed the reigns and then went on to win the presidential elections in 2006. These were widely regarded free and fair. However, inconsistencies and allegations of fraud marred his re-election bid in 2011, and his rule has become increasingly autocratic ever since.

Members of the Congolese community in Toronto protest the 2012 election results in the DRC, in which President Joseph Kabila was named the winner (Wikimedia)

According to the DRC’s constitutional rules, presidential elections were supposed to take place in November. Kabila and his supporters have argued that logistical and budgetary constraints have made this impossible. While there may be some merit to these concerns, these are clearly strawman arguments.

The constitution bars Kabila from running for a third term. He is wildly unpopular in the country, as fewer than 10% of Congolese want him to remain in power. He and his allies are trying to protect the economic and political gains they have amassed over the past 15 years in power. Kabila himself appears to have little to no interest in leaving the DRC for a position as an elder statesman in the mold of former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo. In his mid-40s, he is still young. There is also a sense that his camp has safety concerns. They fear that handing over power to the opposition will lead to prosecutions.

Kabila’s solution has been to drag his feet on organizing elections. He now wants to delay them until 2018. Protests have been met with violent repression. In September, security forces reportedly killed more than 50 people over two days. While the opposition is vocal, it is also weak and disorganized. Meanwhile, the international community has been slow to respond. All the ingredients for the outbreak of major conflict are there.

What happens in the DRC has never been limited to a domestic political issue. Over the past two decades, conflict and instability in the country have tended to pull in both neighboring countries and those further afield. For reasons ranging from security concerns to maintaining resource access, various states have involved themselves in counterproductive ways by funding rebel groups and sending military troops. In particular, Rwanda and Uganda have repeatedly meddled in Congolese affairs, helping to destabilize the DRC in the process. Renewed outbreak of tensions will therefore make it more likely that Congo’s neighbors will once again intervene, which could have implications for regional stability and development.

The situation in the DRC takes place in a context in which several African leaders have recently tried to circumvent constitutional rules on term limits. Examples include neighbors Rwanda, Burundi, and the Republic of Congo. In Uganda, Yoweri Museveni has held on to power for 30 years. These autocrats will be emboldened by Kabila’s desperate attempt to cling on to the presidency.

Lastly, as the site of the most expensive peacekeeping operation in UN history, the DRC could be among the first tests for incoming UN Secretary-General António Guterres. With no end in sight in the Syrian civil war, and a U.S. president-elect likely disinterested in supporting UN missions, there is potential for the international community to turn a blind eye to what is going on in the DRC. While the MONUSCO mission is supersized by UN standards, it is already struggling to maintain order as it is. Already, the eastern provinces of the country are among the largest sources of refugees and internally displaced people worldwide. As the long-time head of UNHCR, Guterres may find himself in familiar territory sooner rather than later.

UN peacekeepers shortly before the 2006 presidential elections (United Nations Photo)

The reasons for instability in the DRC are varied and complex. The worst kind of colonial rule under Belgium, Cold War meddling by the United States and the Soviet Union, and some thirty years of Mobutu have left the country in ruins. It is barely a state. It ranks 147th in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 184th in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index, and 176th in the UN Human Development Index.

Now, Joseph Kabila is pouring oil into the fire. While the U.S. will probably survive Donald Trump’s autocratic tendencies, Kabila’s might be the final straw for the DRC.

The post Instability in the DRC: The Kabila Problem appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Africa is becoming a hotbed for technology, shifting again the conventional wisdom on the continent. Reinforcing regional trends in business, investment, and modernization is the emergence of an IT ecosystem—a growing patchwork of entrepreneurs, startups, and innovation centers coalescing from country to country. There are over 300 tech incubation hubs on the continent.

Young IT impresarios have launched several thousand African startups spanning e-commerce, to healthcare, to digital payments. Fueling these new companies is venture capital expected to top $1bn by 2018. And the world’s blue chip tech names, such as Facebook, IBM, and eBay, have all recently expanded in Africa.

Those in Africa business and foreign policy circles would be wise to tune into these IT developments. Tech is reshaping the continent’s orientation to the world and producing innovative models with application in advanced economies. Here are a few snapshots drawn from my research and writing.

The World’s First Drone Delivery Program

In October 2016 San Francisco based startup Zipline launched the world’s first national drone delivery program in Rwanda, as reported in TechCrunch. In partnership with UPS and the government of Rwanda, Zipline’s unmanned aerial vehicles make 50-150 daily deliveries of critical medical supplies (primarily blood and vaccines) to 21 locations across Rwanda. The small craft lift-off from a customized “drone-nest,” drop their loads by parachute, then return to base—guided digitally by Zipline’s California navigation system connected to Rwanda’s 3G network.

A core determinant of Zipline starting drone delivery in Rwanda before the U.S. is the government of Rwanda’s commitment to creating a modern ICT environment, including a fresh regulatory code for drone transport. Zipline’s Rwanda program has not only gained the attention of UPS and investors such as Google Ventures. In August the program was tapped by the White house and FAA as a model to follow for U.S. drone delivery.

Kenya’s Ride-Hail Rivalry Fosters Innovation

Global ride-hail company Uber expanded in Africa in 2012. As reported in the World Economic Forum’s Agenda, The San Francisco startup’s rivalry with a homegrown Kenyan app could impact innovation in digital taxi markets across the world. Uber entered the tech savvy East African nation (aka Silicon Savannah) in 2015 and has been relatively well received. Kenyans have taken over 1 million Uber trips, the app gets 100,000 hits a month in Nairobi, and Uber has created over 1,000 jobs in Kenya.

In Kenya and other African countries, Uber has tested unique service options not available to passengers in many of its global markets. These include cash payments, new safety measures, and photo direction apps that direct drivers to passengers through mobile phone images.

Of course, Uber’s Kenya presence has brought some of the digital disruption and blowback seen in many of its other global operating cities. Some Kenyan drivers and cab services have pushed back on “unfair competition” on local wages and jobs. Anti-Uber protests (and even violence) have erupted.

Enter local Kenyan telco Safaricom in July 2016. Widely recognized for the success of its M-Pesa mobile money product, the company launched the Little ride hail app and positioned the new service to aggressively take on Uber. Little immediately offered cheaper pricing and expanded services, such as free in-car Wi-Fi and a “female friendly” Lady Bug option, where women can request female drivers after dark.

Safaricom also zeroed in on driver wages, announcing it would take 10 percent less of earnings than Uber. The Uber-Little competition has spurred a tit for tat exchange in Kenya’s ride hail market on price, product offerings, and driver terms. The rivalry continues to reduce costs, expand services, and provide drivers more leverage. The Uber-Little rivalry could serve as model for how local competition can offset globalization’s downsides. It could also produce homegrown ride-hail innovation that ends up in digital taxis in London, Hong-Kong, or New York.

African E-commerce Draws Global Talent and Investment

A growing focal point in African tech is the race to wire the continent for e-commerce through Nigeria led by competing e-commerce startups Jumia and Konga. I’ve covered this extensively in The Next Africa, TechCrunch and The New Yorker.

Both ventures are collectively backed by over $400 million in VC funding. Each is also innovating new ways to bring online sales to the masses in a region still lacking many of the requisites for doing e-commerce. This is creating unique digital models around logistics, payments, and customer service that could impact online shopping globally. Jumia and Konga are also representative of how Africa’s tech sector is reshaping the continent’s global relations, in particular when it comes to people and investment.

Konga and Jumia’s roots weave paradigm shifting personal and financial ties through the U.S., Europe, and Africa. Ties that are much different than stereotypical patterns of brain drain, development work, and foreign aid. Jumia’s first CEOs Tunde Kehinde and Raphael Afaedor earned Harvard MBAs before co-founding the company and returning to Africa in 2012. Konga’s original CEO, Sim Shagaya, went to Harvard Business School and worked for Google before founding the startup.

In addition to bringing young talent home, local tech is attracting MBA types (compared to Peace Corps volunteers) to Africa. Jumia’s current CEO Sacha Poignonnec is a French alum of McKinsey and Company. Jumia’s Kenya MD, Parinaz Firozi, is an American and former banker from Texas. On the financial side, Jumia made global business headlines in 2016 when it became Africa’s first startup unicorn valued at $1 billion. The $326 million investment round that got them there included U.S. financial firm Goldman Sachs.

So again, to foreign policy and business folks keen on Africa, keep an eye on the continent’s tech scene. It will continue to redefine African business, politics, and foreign relations. 

The post Africa’s Tech Scene: Drones Deliver, Uber Innovates, Entrepreneurs Repatriate appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Ameer Hamza / The Express Tribune)

We all remember where we were when we heard about a specific tragedy. I was sitting in a language class when my news app flashed “Pakistan International Airlines crash…” Of course, that is the moment my hands froze and the sweat on my fingers did not allow the fanciest of technologies to function so I could read the rest of that headline. Knowing that both my parents were traveling that day, potentially on that airline, I ran out of class to call them. They were both safe, I was relieved, but shaking.

48 people died that day, virtually everyone onboard that flight from Chitral to Islamabad. Among the dead was Pakistan’s pop-star-turned-evangelic-preacher, Junaid Jamshed.

Flashback to 1990s Dubai with 6 year old me, my parents and my siblings. Car rides anywhere would have “Vital Signs” playing off of a cassette my older brother had brought back from our last trip to Pakistan. They were considered the revitalizing band of Pakistan, pulling it out of the dictatorial theocracy of General Zia-ul-Haq, into a nation swaying with nationalistic pride and romantic harmony.

Junaid Jamshed was their lead singer and every girls dream. Not your typical alpha male lead singer, Junaid or JJ was tall, fair skinned, light eyed and awfully shy. His band created the song that many believe to be our national anthem. Dil Dil Pakistan (literally “heart heart Pakistan”—something I cannot translate) is still played today at any national celebration.

Over the years, JJ, as he was endearingly known, became the epitome of Pakistan. When he puffed up his hair and wore a bright waistcoat, you best believe all Pakistani boys were doing it. Years later, with this following, he started a successful fashion brand. Soon after launching his solo singing career, JJ disappeared from the public eye.

He reappeared years later with a long, stark black beard which sat as though fake, on his radiant white face. With his charm still handy and post-9/11 confusion, JJ had a new message of faith, of the consciousness of the fleeting characteristic of life in this world. JJ had become an evangelical, who would soon be given multiple television appearances to talk about his new found peace in preaching Islam.

He eventually had his own television shows, and like before, JJ drew crowds and set trends. Over the next few years he would be caught making sexist remarks, some of which would force him into temporary self-exile. At this point, you either loved or hated JJ, but you could not look away from him long enough.

Junaid was one of the 47 that died the day the flight PK 661 crashed when it’s left engine caught fire. Pakistan was united in grief, yes, but in a particular mourning for the loss of JJ. Pakistani journalist, Fasi Zaka wrote:

“One section [of society] remembers how he provided the soundtrack to their lives, every song marking a memory, a milestone in life. Another section remembers him for the religious figure that he had become. Junaid himself didn’t bridge the gap between modernity and religion – he shifted from one to another. But in his death, the two differing tribes of Pakistanis – the ‘moderns’ and the [religious]– shared the same pew, united not in what they said but in their use of the language of grief.”

JJ was an avid member of both those factions of society—a modern 20-something, bringing music to the youth in Pakistan, and a preacher speaking to the religiously fervent. During his life, he did not wish to serve as a mediator between the two sections he knew so well—on the contrary when he “reverted” to religion he seemed to see his past life in slight disdain—but his death served as that bridge.

In the last sermon he offered in Chitral, he talked about death and how near it was and so our actions should all be measured. Hours later, Pakistani’s the world over came together to mourn this man that had served as a measure to the current state of mind of Pakistani society.

Pakistanis will always remember where they were when news of JJ’s passing came to them.

The post Junaid Jamshed: Pakistan’s Bridge appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Vladimir Putin at a meeting with French Foreign Minister Jean-Marc Ayrault.

The incoming U.S. administration and its new foreign policy approach will impact Russia on multiple fronts. Indirectly, both Russia’s relations with China towards its east and Europe towards its west will be affected by the U.S.’ own economic and foreign relations with these regions, respectively.

However, the lion’s share of world attention will be directed towards the Middle East and whether Russia and the U.S. can forge a productive relationship going forward. Contrary to any softening of hearts due to the alleged “bromance” between the two countries’ leaders, a more hard-hearted, transactional approach based on shared interests will be critical to productive U.S.-Russia relations in the Middle East and globally.

Major Powers Heighten Russian Insecurity (Again)

With the TPP on life support and apparently finding no favor with the next U.S. administration, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement is the only game in town as far as Asian mega trade agreements go. Although RCEP was formally started by ASEAN, all parties recognize China as the true economic power underwriting the scheme. As such, Russia will have to decide whether and under what terms it might like to join the concept if it’s indeed serious about pivoting east. However, doing so would almost certainly give China even more leverage within their “strategic partnership”, especially coming on the heels of the announced agreement to eventually merge Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union with China’s Silk Economic Road initiative.

With respect to Europe, the incoming U.S. administration has the potential to affect U.S.-Russia relations in two key hotspots: the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. With respect to newfound Russian assertiveness in Europe, Poland and the Baltic states have been the most vocal in requesting U.S. military reassurance. However, Russian militarization of its Kaliningrad enclave and the strengthened U.S. demand that NATO allies increase their own military spending only makes this situation more volatile. The only bright spot in this situation is that increased European defense spending overall may help to ameliorate Europe’s own sense of insecurity with respect to Russia. In fairness, this sense of insecurity has been attributed to Russia as well.

Ukraine comprises the second European front in the current U.S.-Russian standoff. Of course, it is different from the Baltics in that the Ukraine Crisis was the genesis of current U.S.-Russian hostilities. It’s important to remember, however, that the current hostilities are only a symptom of many unresolved issues since the end of the Cold War, namely Russia’s desire for inclusion in a new overall European security architecture. While Ukraine’s importance to Russia is currently mostly attributed to its geographic position as a barrier to the rest of Europe and home to many Russian gas pipelines, this is not the whole story.

Briefly, when Russia saw the West’s old Cold War paradigm, NATO, making overtures towards Ukraine, with Crimea both being considered the cradle of Russian civilization and Orthodoxy to some, and home to untold Russian sacrifices during the Crimean War, the stage was set for the current act of U.S.-Russian hostilities. Underlying Ukraine’s strategic importance to Russia is Russia’s “bomber diplomacy”, where Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers have been used again for signalling purposes. The placement of these bombers in Crimea comes on the heels of their deployment, both in circumnavigating Japan, as well as in patrols near U.S. Pacific Ocean military bases.

The New Holy Alliance

Sergej Karaganov, an advisor to President Vladimir Putin, was recently asked what Russia hopes to accomplish through its Syrian intervention. Above even restoring Russia’s reputation as a great power both regionally and globally, Karaganov stated, “…to kill as many terrorists as far away from our borders as possible.” This statement was similar to that of a previous U.S. administration which stated that, “We’re fighting them over there so we don’t have to fight them over here.” Immediately following this objective, Karaganov noted the importance of local regime stability.

In contrast to Western perceptions of either a Trump-Putin “bromance”, or even a dictatorial Putin-Assad “bromance”, Russia’s foreign policy is based on interests, not values. From the Russian standpoint, stable regimes in countries such as Syria, Iran, and Egypt are more effectively able to combat terrorism within their own borders, thereby contributing to Russia’s overriding anti-terrorism interests in the process. Simply put, Russia doesn’t “love” Syria or Assad, personally. Rather, Russia, again, appreciates the benefits that a stable Syrian government can bring to the table with respect to serving overall Russian interests.

Though a rough analogy, a comparison can be made to the formation of the Holy Alliance at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. At that time, Russia formed an alliance with both Austria and Prussia to uphold monarchical values in the face of possible expansion of republican ideas from France. Such was the power of these revolutionary ideas, that Russia still considered them a threat to its own existence even after Napoleon was defeated militarily and sent into his second and final exile. Countering this threat, Russia found useful allies in Austria and Prussia, both of whom shared its interests. Even though the three powers happened to share similar values, these were clearly superceded by their shared interests.

Fast forward to today, and we can clearly see that today’s Russia views terrorism as an existential threat due to its soft, Central Asian underbelly and the Caucasus region. Again, it has found useful, local partners whom share its interests to help combat this threat, namely Syria and Iran. ISIS forms a threat to these two powers as well, and as such forms a focal point for shared interests between Russia, Syria, and Iran. Yet again, Russia’s Tu-22M3 “Backfire” strategic bombers have made their presence felt here, signifying the strategic importance Russia places on this front.

While striving for peace in the Middle East is admirable, doing so from a values-based approach, favoring certain regimes over others based on shared values will indefinitely put the U.S. in a quixotic position in the region. To more effectively combat ISIS regionally, as well as diffuse tensions in other hotspots globally, a more transactional, pragmatic U.S. approach towards Russia is most welcome and offers the opportunity for improved U.S.-Russian relations overall.

The post From Russia With (No) Love: A Hard Heart Works Best For Russia appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump and Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. (Associated Press)

After U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s phone call on Friday with Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen, we may have more insight into how a President Trump will approach U.S.-China foreign relations. The call marked the first time and American president or president-elect has publicly spoken to Taiwan’s leader since the U.S. ended their formal diplomatic relationship in 1979. Outside of the formalities of a congratulatory call, little has been said of what else was discussed during their brief 10-minute call.

Immediately afterward, Beijing, which views Taiwan as a renegade province, sought to downplay the significance of the call. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissing it as a “little trick pulled off by Taiwan.” An editorial in the state-owned China Daily blamed the call on the “inexperience” and “lack of proper understanding” of the Trump transition team, saying there was no reason to “over-interpret” the congratulatory call. 

However, back in Washington, some argued the call was “an intentionally provocative move.” And in New York, the President-elect, being a huge user of media, could not help but respond, tweeting out the following comments Sunday night in response to Beijing’s criticism:

“Did China ask us if it was OK to devalue their currency (making it hard for our companies to compete), heavily tax our products going into…their country (the U.S. doesn’t tax them) or to build a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea? I don’t think so!”

His sharp response echoes some of his earlier commentary on U.S.-China relations, when he spoke out during an interview with the New York Times in April 2016, saying: “We have rebuilt China, and yet they will go in the South China Sea and build a military fortress the likes of which perhaps the world has not seen,” and “Amazing, actually. They do that, and they do that at will because they have no respect for our president and they have no respect for our country.”

Despite the diplomatic downsizing by Beijing of the unprecedented call, China’s leadership is surely fretting over the long-term consequences of a Trump presidency on Sino-U.S. ties and cross-Strait relations. And to the extent its population of nationalistic and sensitive citizens learns of the call, Beijing will have to temper their outrage.

After the election of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party Tsai as president earlier this year, Beijing formally cut communication with Taiwan and actively discouraged mainland Chinese from visiting the island. Tensions on the island have intensified following Beijing’s passage in 2005 of a law authorizing attack to prevent secession. We can expect Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen will face some fallout from Beijing over the call, but will likely seek to downplay the call.

As for the U.S., these latest tweets seem to suggest the next President has his own strong views, and will quickly make those public. His selection for Secretary of Defense, General James “Mad Dog” Mattis will certainly voice his own views, as will his final choice for secretary of state, while his family members may also weigh in.

Yet for all the aggressive rhetoric, disbelief and rancor surrounding Trump’s call with Taipei, no one really knows how a Trump administration will deal with China. Actions during his presidency will speak louder than words—the building of a 350-ship navy or increased arms sales to Taiwan would reveal volumes more than a call and a few tweets.

The post Trump, Taiwan and Tweets: The Future of U.S.-China Relations appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Italy voted “No” to the national referendum on Sunday, December 4 resulting in important economic and political consequences for the nation and the European Union (EU). Italy has been in dire straits for a number of years, despite Prime Minister Mateo Renzi’s bold attempt to change its political system and revive the economy.

Renzi, who started with changes in Italy’s employment laws in hiring and firing workers, also cut payroll taxes by €35 billion ($37.1 billion) creating 580,000 new jobs. But the Prime Minister tried to make further changes in Italy’s government by putting forth a national referendum to change the Senate’s structure.  The referendum has economic and political consequences.

Political consequences

Italy not only has a huge governmental bureaucracy but a constitution that makes passing a law a long, tedious process. Compounding this problem is that the national government can change when there is a lack of confidence exhibited by the Senate and the House of Deputies. The referendum is designed to reduce the Senate’s size, streamline the process of passing a law, and bring more stability in the governmental process.

The Renzi-Boschi referendum, named after Renzi and the Reform Minister Maria Elena Boschi, was meant by the government as a radical approach in ensuring stable majorities for present and future governments in a tightly run parliamentary format. The Senate would have been broken apart and the House of Deputies becomes the actual law-making body in the Parliament.

This referendum also envisioned the simplification in the law-making process and planned to allow the House to pass laws and votes of “No Confidence” in the government. The legislative process was meant to be sped up since the House would be permitted to debate a bill sent from the cabinet of ministers within five days and vote on it in a maximum of 70 days. The reform also planned to reduce the number of senators from 315 to 100.

Those against the referendum saw it as taking away the constitutional right of government and abrogating democracy. Renzi and his supporters marketed it as streamlining government to make it faster and more responsive to new situations as they present themselves.

The “No” vote is a victory for the 5 Star Movement headed by the comedian turned political party leader Beppe Grillo. Grillo regards a “No” vote as a victory for the populist movement and an opportunity to have elections called next year. The 5 Start Movement’s anti-establishment agenda regards Renzi’s referendum as not radical enough. Renzi placed a huge bet on the referendum’s passage. Given his failure, he was forced to resign and the Italian President will be forced to call for elections for a new government in 2017.

This could allow Grillo and his party to assume enough popular votes to take control of the Italian government. Victory for the 5 Star Movement will rank with Brexit and the Trump presidency as another step forward for anti-establishment politicians. It also means that the 5 Star Movement may try to push to exit the euro and, in the long run, leave the EU.

Economic consequences

A larger concern for Italy regarding a “No” vote is the financial market’s reaction.  A “No” vote will result in a loss of confidence by the financial markets who will see Italy changing governments in 2017. Deutsche Bank estimates that if the 5 Star Movement came into power and Grillo becomes prime minister a referendum will be called on Italy’s involvement with the euro and the Stoxx Europe 600 index could drop by as much as 20%. This could also cause Euro Stoxx 50 Volatility Index (VSTOXX) to go higher than its average.

Markets and investors despise bad news and a “No” vote could cause a higher degree of anxiety than many are prepared for. A lethal combination of the unpredictability of Italian politics and serious economic problems for the EU’s third largest economy will cause the market deep consternation. Some analysts feel there will be a domino effect among the European financial markets that the European Central Bank cannot handle and therefore a serious downturn will cause investors to reach for antacid medications.

Compounding the ill reaction by the financial markets will be the effect on Italy’s government bond market, the fifth largest globally. It is bad enough that international bond markets are reeling since the recent American presidential elections, but Italy’s bond market will take a steeper decline in response to the referendum vote. Most recently, the yield on Italy’s 10-year government reached 10% for the first time in more than one year and analysts feel it could go higher. This increase in yields will cause bond and note prices to fall.

“No” could also make it very difficult for Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA (MPS), Italy’s third largest bank by assets and one of the most troubled in Europe. MPS is looking to raise financial capital by shedding €28 billion ($29.7 billion) in bad loans while raising €5 billion to make up the void in its capital cushion that the write-downs from the sale of bad loans will cause. MPS is planning to sell common stock and swap certain bonds at full face value even if they are presently trading at 50% of nominal value.

With a “No” vote, potential investors will become jittery and avoid the offering. If this transaction cannot occur, then MPS will seek a bailout from Renzi’s government.  Renzi and MPS must move quickly to make this happen in order to avoid a bank run and calm financial markets.

Too many uncertainties

While a “No” vote does not mean that Italy will fall apart, it will cause deep anxiety for investors, financial markets, and those in the EU trying to keep it intact.  In the short term, analysts may compare the result to the quake caused by the Brexit vote. In the long term, “No” may cause more uncertainty and hurt Italy’s opportunity for political and economic stability.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Arthur Guarino, an assistant professor in the Finance and Economics Department at Rutgers University Business School

The post Italy and the Consequences of the “No” Vote appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

(Brigette Supernova/The Daily Beast)

After winning the election, Trump will soon have to navigate the labyrinthian US foreign affairs field as the President. As a diplomacy amateur, Trump’s strategy may cause uncertainty to US-Sino relations. Tracing back to Trump’s election campaign, he has never introduced a complete and systematic foreign policy strategy. Most of his commitments are based on the form of a slogan.

It is difficult to categorize his strategy as merely an election slogan or a truly tangible diplomatic policy. However, with reference to Trump’s media interview, his election platform and a speech provided by James Woolsey, the diplomacy advisor of Trump’s election campaign, in China-US Forum, a basic stance of Trump’s China strategy can be formulated.

This position can neither be simply classified as pro-Democrats nor pro-Republican. Rather, as Woolsey had stated, US’s external intervention will be exercised with more prudence. The national interest of US will also be redefined.

In the field of military, Trump has explicitly disagreed with the rebalancing strategy of the Obama’s administration in the Asia Pacific region. In terms of the South China Sea territorial dispute, not only does Trump having an ambiguous stance, but also criticize US’s allies of their lack of commitment.

He also propose to re-evaluate US-Japan allies. He has agreed with idea of South Korea and Japan acquiring nuclear weapons, stating that it may be beneficial to the containment of China and resolve North Korea nuclear issue. Moreover, Trump threatened to terminate economic relation with China if China fails to control North Korea effectively. In other words, to deal with the geopolitical issues in East Asia, Trump emphasizes on allies to bear more responsibility for security and to contain China. At the same time, he hopes China to act constructively in the region.

The implementation of the above strategies depends on the interaction of Trump, his cabinets and Republican-led House of Representatives and Senate. However, it inevitably causes uncertainty to the region. On the one hand, the roll-back of US’s external commitment can relieve the pressure on China created by the rebalancing strategy. China may be able to expand its sphere of influence in the Asia Pacific region. At the same time, the roll back of US’s responsibility may induce Southeast Asian nations such as Malaysia and Philippine to bandwagon with China. On the other hand, US is predicted not to withdraw all its influence in the region as isolationism is not beneficial to US’s economic interests. Trump’s emphasis on “America First” requires significant external trade leverage.

Trump’s actual diplomatic strategy for China rests on the dimension of economic relations. In many of Trump’s speeches, Trump accused China of stealing America’s wealth and job position. Most of its “America First” strategies are targeting China, including those related to the protection of copyrights and anti-dumping measures. In the past, Trump has proposed to impose a 45% tariff on Chinese products, though it is unlikely for the parliament and Republican to acknowledge these proposals.

In Trump’s plan for his first 100 days in office, Trump stated that he would classify China as a currency manipulator and initiate negotiations with China regarding trade dispute. However, currency is not a major topic of the current US-Sino economic relations. Former president candidate Romney had also proposed a similar strategy in his platform, it is predicted that the classification of currency manipulation can be seen as merely a leverage for future negotiation.

Undoubtedly, if Trump pursues the above economic strategies, China reacted to these strategies strongly, guaranteeing an all-out currency war. However, given what we knew about Donald Trump’s personality and his love of “deal-making”, it is more likely that these will be used as leverages in future negotiations.

Another key issue related to the grand strategy of China is Trump’s reluctance on free trade agreement such as TPP and NAFTA. With no endorsement from the president, the prospect of TPP is undermined and the attempt of US to reconstruct the rules and norms of economic relations in the Asia Pacific region will be in vain. Therefore, it provides China with a decent chance to implement “Belt and Road” initiative to strengthen economic ties with countries in Central Asia, Southeast Asia and Europe.

Woolsey has recognized the role of China in G20 in the fields of US-Sino relations and global governance. He stated that US should provide meaningful responses to China-led regional development institution such as AIIB and “Belt and Road” initiative. At the same instant, Woolsey urged China to uphold more responsibility to collective issues. He believed China had not been responsible for major global crises such as the Libya crisis and the rise of ISIS. It can be understood as an implicit criticism urging China to have their commitment commensurate with the international status it is pursuing.

Trump failed to provide diplomatic strategy other than those in the field of military, bilateral trade and global governance. In the field of normative diplomacy and soft power strategy, Trump has not provided any tangible plans. Commentators speculate it as an indicator of Trump’s lack of interests to promote democracy overseas.

Trump believes democracy may not be universally applicable. Current over-commitment on international issues can be attributed to the intense promotion of democracy in the current agenda. His viewpoints have been consistent with the general stance of Chinese nationalist. During his election campaign, Trump had repeatedly complimented the intelligence of Chinese leader and his frequent business interactions with Chinese. Therefore, he is quite popularly among regular Chinese inside the country.

In general, the effect of Trump’s diplomatic strategy on China is not specifically contained within certain aspects but how it introduced unpredictability to the Sino-US relationship. This is why, unlike the popularity Trump gained among ordinary Chinese citizens, Chinese officials have not been enthusiastic about the outcome of the election. For example, in the press conference of the closing ceremony of “The Two Meetings” (also known as “Lianghui” (The NPC and the CPPCC), Li Keqiang responded a US media stating that mutual benefits should be the essence of US-Sino relations, the progress of US-Sino relations will not be altered regardless of which president is elected. It demonstrated Li has not been concerned about the “tariff penalty” introduced by Trump.

Lou Jiwei, the former Minister of Finance of China, stated the behavior of Trump had brought uncertainty to the global economy in an interview with Wall Street Journal. For China, a predictable US will be more beneficial given the lack of combined capabilities to replace the US and the presence of internal and external threats. If Trump adopts isolationism, the existing rules of globalization will be undermined. It will cause disastrous effects to China’s development which is based on utilizing globalization to expand its economic relations and sphere of influence.

In his victory speech, Trump stated his desire to maintain a positive relationship with other countries. Structurally, the current outlook of US-Sino relations—characterized by both confrontation and cooperation—faces a number of constraints which cannot be solved by any individuals, including Trump. As a pragmatist, Trump understands the benefits offered by US-Sino relations. Therefore, prudence should be the essence of China’s strategy.

The post A Preview of Trump’s Foreign Policy Towards China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation.

International media has been focusing on the near-term directions of US foreign policy with regard to the Iran nuclear accord, sanctions against North Korea, relations with China and Russia, mutual defense with Japan and South Korea, free trade agreements, immigration, terrorism, and the wider Middle East. But no closer look has been paid to the possible dynamics of foreign aid under a Trump presidency.

Having a look at the Middle East and North Africa, for example, shows that some form of foreign aid is given for strategic and geopolitical reasons. New policy challenges have also arisen in the face of violence and civil wars across the region which made the Obama administration use new sources of funding beyond traditional bilateral or State Department/USAID-controlled accounts.

However, questions will arise over the type (i.e. other than military aid) and amount of resources the US should devote to tackling the region’s challenges. The Congress and the Trump administration will most likely debate whether US aid would be vital for the promotion of stability and democracy across the region. Globally speaking, President-elect Trump’s agenda will likely be how to do less with foreign aid (especially where policy and institutional settings have not been conducive for effective aid), yet not ignoring low-income countries.

The orthodoxy in foreign aid viewed the lack of capital as a major cause of poverty; the most basic of which was the idea of a “vicious circle of poverty.” Foreign aid was used to fill that gap to provide a “big push” to poor nations and, in the view of Walt Rostow, lead to an “economic takeoff.”

Skepticism of such plans is widespread nowadays among academics and development practitioners. Peter Bauer (1915–2002) was actually the most articulate of the dissenters, who once explained that the notions of a vicious circle of poverty and of foreign aid as essential to development were absurd: rich countries that were once poor developed without outside aid, whereas those that have received substantial external aid have failed to escape poverty.

According to William Easterly, “foreign aid cannot achieve the grandiose goal of transforming other societies to escape poverty.” When foreign aid becomes a significant part of a nation’s income, the result is likely to be inflation, waste, corruption, rent-seeking, and indefinite postponement of needed economic and political reforms (the major theme of Easterly’s book The Elusive Quest for Growth).

Whatever the ideological divide, there might be a clear case which a Trump administration can give more attention to, and possibly, boost US aid’s relative success compared to other global aid agencies: the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), which was established in 2004 as a US foreign aid agency that works in partnership with competitively selected countries which demonstrate a commitment to good governance, economic freedom and investment in their citizens.

Since its inception, MCC’s mandate has included demonstrating results with rigorous criteria to evaluate countries’ aptitude to utilize grant funding. Perhaps of equal significance, raising indicator scores has become a prominent objective of some developing countries: the MCC effect. This means that countries seeking eligibility are said to be moving on their own to enact reforms and take measures to improve performance scores that would enable them to meet MCC criteria.

While there is little doubt that availability of MCC funding has influenced some decision makers in developing countries to undertake policy reforms, it is uncertain how large or widespread the MCC effect is. A limited number of quantitative analyses have attempted to test this incentive effect. The earliest of these was conducted by Harvard researchers in 2006 (Doug Johnson and Tristan Zajonc, “Can Foreign Aid Create an Incentive for Good Governance? Evidence from the Millennium Challenge Corporation,” April 2006). But because the analysis was conducted soon after MCC’s creation and with a limited amount of data, the researchers determined that the results were not conclusive.

The best evidence for an MCC effect thus remains qualitative and country-specific. Setting aside specific methodological aspects, we need to think of the MCC effect (and the effectiveness of foreign aid at large) as a process, rather than a policy outcome. This is not surprising as economic progress depends on the complex interaction of policies, institutions, and values, not all of which are easy to measure.

Coming from a private sector background where incentives matter, President-elect Trump can radically improve US foreign aid by looking at its effectiveness in the past, focusing on the intended beneficiaries of aid (the poor) rather than leaving it to politicians and corrupt governments. The MCC has a track record: it is one of the few aid agencies in the world that have been already held accountable for specific tasks and not the visions that follow from aid bureaucracies.

The post Foreign Aid under a Trump Presidency appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Arizona-Mexico border fence is seen near Naco, Arizona. (Samantha Sais/Reuters)

No one really knows the exact number, but with an estimate of between ten and twenty million non-status immigrants in the United States, resolving America’s immigration quagmire is nearly impossible. For a legal system based on individual rights and consequences to apply justice in its intended manner, the millions of non-status immigrants that are in the United States must be acknowledged and processed as identifiable individuals.

Without a new and innovative path to legal status and a method for removing those who could be potentially harmful to communities in the United States, there will be no resolution without a massive political fallout and a human rights tragedy upon the application of traditional immigration policies.

The current language on immigration reform is not as inventive as many on both sides of the political spectrum may perceive it to be. During the last months and transition from the Bush to Obama Presidency, there was bipartisan support for a significant barrier on the southern border of the United States. While the barrier had some support from both parties, the cost of building such a barrier was not justifiable at the time. The 2008-2009 economic downturn that came about in the same time period affected immigration to such a great degree, that non-legal immigration to the United States from Latin America fell considerably.

Since the 2008 economic crisis, illegal immigration to the United States never recovered in any substantial way to its pre-2008 levels and the idea of building a wall on the southern border was shelved until the 2015-2016 election campaign. Even with the idea of the barrier being proposed by the Trump Administration, the application of a new immigration policy is still hampered with traditional limits to resolving the larger issue.

Some agreeable perspectives from both sides of the issue should be acknowledged if any resolution will become reality. It should be acceptable that the United States should have control over its own border, and be able to apply this control when required as a nation state with a contiguous southern border. It should also be acknowledged that a policy to remove illegal immigrants from the United States without strict guidelines based on human rights and the rule of law would most likely lead to an abuse of administrative powers by authorities who may ignore individual rights of citizens and non-citizens alike.

A path to citizenship must exist for non-status immigrants that satisfy the rule of law and the needs of the United States, but also be developed in a manner that creates confidence and trust in the process against abuse and against a lack of fairness in its application. A new approach is needed for a resolution to take place, one that develops and promotes confidence on both sides of the issue.

For a new immigration process to work, it must be based in reality. It will be almost impossible to remove ten to twenty million individuals from the United States in a simple manner, and this large number of people, often with American born children and relatives, are an integral part of the culture and economy of the United States. To begin, an initial smaller group of people should be self-identified and have their contribution to the US economy, community, employer and family reviewed by officials of the United States to determine their contribution to American society, and if deemed a productive part of their community and society, be given a path to full citizenship within a four to six year time frame.

Self identifying by non-status immigrants without the threat of deportation allows for individual identification of productive members of American society and brings those who already are in American communities into the larger fold. This will allow millions of the best contributors of the formerly unknown group to fully integrate into the communities they have been building for years. With an initial group being integrated with respect to individual rights and the needs of the American public as a whole, the confidence in the process would allow for it to be rolled out to the larger non-status community and produce a path to citizenship for those who wish to become permanent parts of the larger community.

For those who are not seen as contributors to their American communities, they can return to their country of origin and apply under a work permit or as an immigrant through the normal process. For those who are linked to crime or are deemed a threat to the United States, they can be deported without permission to return.

While there will always be a great debate on how to handle the issue of illegal immigration, the acceptance of a path to citizenship that is a benefit to the United States would be a toughly sought win-win for the best contributors to American society. Without a realistic solution based on the current immigration policy approaches, all policies will be protested against by those who will not be able to achieve the policy approach that most benefits their perspective on the immigration issue.

Millions of non-status immigrants will remain in the United States no matter what policy approach is applied, and that reality must be accepted and worked upon to come up with a resolution. The only option is either maintain the status quo, or accept the impossibility at resolving the current issue using current policy tools and attempt a new and innovative approach.

The post Resolving America’s Immigration Issues One Policy At A Time appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The MEK advocates for a non-nuclear Iran with free, democratic, and secular values, much in line with our own. Having been based in Iraq since 1986, they are now resettled in European countries, an effort in which the U.S. government played a major role. However, with the President-elect a vocal opponent of the nuclear deal with Tehran, charges against the dissident group and its many defenders—the stock and trade of the mullahs in Tehran—are conveniently resurfacing across the U.S. media.

As an academic and author of three empirical, peer-reviewed journal articles that examine the MEK—in addition to writing the foreword for an independent 2013 study undertaken by Ambassador Lincoln P. Bloomfield Jr. that addressed the misinformation campaign directed at Western government policies toward the Iranian opposition group—I feel that it is critical to set the record straight.

The US Department of State did not add the MEK to its list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) until 1997. The purported basis was the killings of six American military personnel and defense contractors in Iran in the early 1970s. The State Department would later allege that the MEK played a key role in the February 1979 occupation of the US embassy in Tehran and that after fleeing to Paris, and then Iraq in the early 1980s, it conducted terrorist attacks inside Iran. Such claims, never verified with credible terrorism incident data, were formally debunked by French judicial review.

Two years later, in 1999, the United States went a step further by alleging that the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), a political organization made up of several Iranian opposition groups that reject clerical rule, was a front for the MEK and designated it too as a terrorist group. Martin Indyk, then Assistant Secretary of State for Near East Affairs, indicated that the State Department added the National Council of Resistance (NCR) as an alias for the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) because “The Iranian government had brought this to our attention. We looked into it and saw that there were good reasons for designating the NCR as an alias for the MEK.” The United Kingdom (UK) and European Union (EU) followed suit, pinning the MEK (though not the NCRI) to their terror lists.

The evidence, however, demonstrates that the US military officers and contractor killings that formed the basis of the original designation were carried out by a secular hard-left splinter group, with no ties to MEK leadership; that there was no proof that the MEK played a role in the 1979 embassy takeover; and that the armed resistance carried out by the MEK from Iraq was an insurgency directed at official regime targets, not innocent civilians, at a time that their relatives and sympathizers were being jailed, tortured and executed en masse.

There is also overwhelming evidence that Iran lobbied hard to get the United States and other Western governments to designate the MEK as terrorists, even though the allegations were baseless. Only a day after the US added the MEK to its FTO list in October 1997, one senior Clinton administration official said inclusion of the MEK was intended as a ‘goodwill gesture’ to Tehran and its newly elected moderate president Mohammad Khatami. Five years later, the same official told Newsweek: “[There] was White House interest in opening up a dialogue with the Iranian government. At the time, President Khatami had recently been elected and was seen as a moderate. Top administration officials saw cracking down on the [MEK]—which the Iranians had made clear they saw as a menace, as one way to do so.”

Across the Atlantic, similar political considerations operated. In 2006, then British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw admitted that the UK designation of the MEK in 2001 was specifically issued in response to demands made by the Iranian regime. That same year, classified documents, later unclassified by a UK court, revealed that senior foreign service officials were concerned about possible adverse foreign policy consequences if the terrorist designation was lifted since the Iranian regime prioritized “tough legal and political measures” against the organization. The EU too is now known to have bowed to pressure in designating the MEK in 2002.

Supporters of removing the terrorist designation took their case to courts. These efforts met with strong resistance, not only from spokespersons for Iran but also from representatives of a new Iran-tilting government in Iraq. By 2006, seven European courts had ruled that the group did not meet lawful criteria for terrorism. They also ruled that the terrorist designation should have been moot after 2001, when the group’s leadership ceased armed resistance to focus on a political and social campaign to bring about democratic change in Iran.

In the United States, where the courts similarly ruled repeatedly in favor of the MEK, and as many as 200 members of Congress signed statements endorsing its cause, the process was stalled until America’s second highest court granted the writ of mandamus filed by the MEK, and ordered the Secretary of State to take action or it would delist the group. Secretary Hillary Clinton, having been provided no credible basis for re-listing by the intelligence community, revoked the designation in September 2012.

Overwhelming evidence demonstrates that the MEK is a natural ally of the United States, one to which we have pledged our support. Unfortunately, if people are to believe the misleading media storm, it could have a dire influence on the selection of our next Secretary of State and the future of US-Iran policy.

Dr. Ivan Sascha Sheehan, Associate Professor of Public and International Affairs, is director of the graduate program in Global Affairs and Human Security at the University of Baltimore. Follow him on Twitter @ProfSheehan.

The post Media Storm Resurrects Discredited Claims about Iranian Resistance Group appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Palestinian firefighters after helping to extinguish the Nahf fire. (Agence France Presse)

Last week, while Americans celebrated Thanksgiving, fires raged across Israel and on social media.

While Northern Israel was besieged by “unprecedented” fires, forcing tens of thousands of residents to flee their homes, another battle raged in the war of the Middle Eastern twitterverse.

Firefighters fought upwards of 250 large fires, with more than 1500 total fires burning across the region. People across Israel, the Middle East and the world began trading barbs about the fire, both mourning and rejoicing in the devastation.

Northern Israel had been extremely dry due to a severe lack of rain. These dry conditions and heavy winds helped readily spread the flames. While the initial fires were naturally occurring, many of the fires that followed are thought to have been acts of arson.

As the flames spread, people coalesced on social media around the hashtag #IsraelIsBurning. Throughout the Arab world, the fires were being equated with Israel’s controversial bill to ban outside loudspeakers from places of worship, clearly aimed at preventing mosques from making their 5-time daily Muezzin call.

The hashtag, in English and in Arabic, really began to take off when it started getting used by several Imams from Arab Gulf countries, including Kuwaiti preacher Mishary Rashid Alafasy who has 11.6 million Twitter followers.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was quick to brand all such arsonists as “terrorists.” Education Minister Naftali Bennett stated that those lighting the fires could not be Jewish. “Only those to whom the country does not belong are capable of burning it.”

While Israel battled these fires, the world came together to offer assistance. The US, Turkey, Egypt, Ukraine, Greece, Russia and others sent aid, planes, trucks and manpower. But some assistance came from much closer to home; the Palestinian Authority sent eight firetrucks and four firefighting teams to help battle the flames.

Superintendent Micky Rosenfeld, the Israel Police Foreign Press Spokesman, sent a tweet with several pictures of Palestinian firefighters working alongside Israeli firefighters to “help put out fires and blazes.”

And Israel’s official Twitter account shared a video of Palestinian firefighters at work.

But when Israel made a professional and official graphic stating that “Israel is thankful for all the support and assistance from around the world!” (shared over Thanksgiving weekend), the Palestinians were not included. They received merely a footnote.

Other than Israel, no one was more directly threatened by these fires than the Palestinians themselves. While Israel was quick to condemn Palestinians lighting the fires as terrorists, they were reluctant to label those fighting the fires as heroes.

Belarus, Britain, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Georgia, Portugal, Romania and Switzerland are all included in the above graphic for simply offering assistance.

But while the Palestinians stood alongside Israelis fighting the flames, on social media they were but a footnote.

Other related hashtags in use: #Israel_IsBurning, #TelAviv_Is_Burning, #IsraelFires, #IsraelBurns and #IsraelUnderAttack.

Follow me on Twitter @jlemonsk.

The post #IsraelIsBurning appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

The Arleigh Burke Class guided missile destroyer USS Mason (US Navy)

Since March 2015 U.S. allies, led by Saudi Arabia, have been increasingly involved in a military campaign in Yemen against the Zaydi Shia fundamentalist rebel movement known as the Houthis, and their ally, former Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Yemenis forced to flee their homes because of it.

Yemen’s collapsing state holds negative implications for international maritime trade, as the conflict is occurring near a major trading artery for the global economy, the Suez Canal-Red Sea shipping lane, and for regional security for countries on both sides of the Red Sea, including Saudi Arabia and the Gulf of Aden.

The lack of a deep Yemeni national identity means that the incomplete fall of Saleh has seen multiple competing power centre re-emerge. Owing to the lack of national cohesion, events could yet see the country break up entirely, pushing nation building into to the far future. Militarily, NATO should therefore stay out of this bitter factional civil war between multiple sides. However, the Alliance should seek to mitigate the effects of the conflict at sea where international shipping could be affected by the belligerents or a fresh wave of piracy.

A multisided struggle

The real roots of the present civil war stem from Yemen’s complex regional and tribal politics, long predating the Arab Spring which led to the toppling of Saleh, Yemen’s long-time dictator. Following months of protests against his rule, a Saudi-backed deal saw Saleh step down in 2012 in favour of his Vice President, Field Marshal Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi.

Hadi took office after running in an election as the only candidate for a transitional presidency, but in 2015 he was overthrown in turn by the Houthis who allied with the deposed Saleh. Their long-running insurgency had first developed in the early 2000s under the former dictator’s rule, but the Houthis saw the chaos of the Arab Spring as a chance to expand at the expense of the weakened central government of Saleh’s successor.

Hadi bitterly denounced the Houthi move against him as a coup, eventually fleeing to Saudi Arabia. A massive Saudi-led intervention against the Houthis and Saleh followed in March 2015, by nine Arab states and assorted mercenary forces. Djibouti and Somalia open their airspace, waters and military bases to the coalition whilst the U.S. accelerated its sale of weapons to coalition states and provided intelligence and logistical support. The U.S. and UK have also deployed their military personnel in the command and control centre responsible for Saudi airstrikes.

Saudi influence has galvanized regional states to defend the internationally recognized Yemeni government. However the kingdom’s military campaign has also provided an opening for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and Islamic State (IS) to seize territory in Yemen from which they operate in relative safety, and threatens to internationalize the Yemeni civil war.

A regional battle for influence

An example of this internationalization came on October 12 when the U.S. alleged that Houthi forces had fired missiles on American naval assets and struck back by targeting the rebel’s radar systems. Previously American attacks in Yemen had been limited to targeting members of Sunni militant groups in the fragmented state such as AQAP, al-Qaeda’s local franchise, which found refuge in Yemen after largely being driven out of neighboring Saudi Arabia in 2009.

Houthi hostility to America predates the U.S. backing of Saudi Arabia during its intervention on behalf of President Hadi’s feeble regime in March 2015. As a minority Shi’a community in a Sunni majority nation, they are fierce enemies of Sunni fundamentalist movements such as IS or AQAP, which view them as apostates to be exterminated. But they also oppose U.S. military involvement in the fight against the Sunni radicals as an unacceptable infringement of Yemeni sovereignty.

Now that the U.S. has supported direct military intervention against the group, this position has hardened and allegedly led to the recent missile attacks against U.S. navy ships. Though the Houthis deny their forces carried out the attacks, analysts speculate the rebels might have acquired Iranian anti-ship missiles or seized these from captured Yemeni army stocks. The result is direct hostilities have occurred between the Houthis and the U.S. for the first time.

Meanwhile the Saudis see the Shi’a Houthis as coming under the influence of Iran, though proof of Iranian backing to the rebels remains limited. As such Riyadh perceived the overthrow of the Hadi government through the lens of its struggle for influence in the Middle East with Tehran, rather than an internal development in Yemen’s turbulent politics. Thanks to forceful Saudi and U.S. support, President Hadi’s forces have been able to retake Aden and hold onto large parts of central Yemen. But the Houthis still hold the capital Sana’a and the Saudi led coalition has been unable to dislodge the rebels from the parts of Yemen unsympathetic to the internationally recognized government.

The exact extent of any Iranian backing for the Houthis is unknown but likely to remain small. The Houthis do not follow the same branch of Shi’a Islam as the Iranian regime and the Yemeni militia is not influenced by Tehran to anywhere near the same extent that Lebanon’s Hezbollah is, for example. Nonetheless there are credible reports that weapons transfers sent through neighboring Oman, said to include missiles, ammunition and small arms, have been stepped up by Iran to the Houthis in recent months. Yemeni and senior regional officials accuse the Omanis of turning a blind eye to the flow of arms through their territory and of failing to aggressively crack down on the transfers.

Western officials have been more skeptical about the scale of Iranian backing, pointing out that the Houthis secured an arsenal of weaponry when entire divisions of Yemen’s army, allied to former Yemeni President Saleh, defected to them at the start of the civil war last year. These included the crews of three Chinese-made Type 021 missile boats armed with C.801 anti-ship missiles. Some analysts claim that an unknown number of these C.801 missiles and their launchers were installed on trucks by Houthi forces and coupled with various surface-search radars to create an improvised missile system.

The Houthis had been using these weapons without success to strike at the Saudi coalition’s naval blockade against Yemen for about a year until they managed a direct hit against the catamaran Swift, a former U.S. Navy catamaran now in Emirati service. This system was destroyed in retaliatory strikes by American forces after the Houthis targeted U.S. ships but Tehran can easily supply its proxies with Iranian made replacements and the training to use them.

Since Iran offers a quasi-recognition of the Houthis as Yemen’s legitimate government and certainly sees the civil war in Yemen through the matrix of its regional conflict with Saudi Arabia, this would not be impossible to envisage. Tehran believes backing the Houthis in Yemen against Saudi Arabia is a counter move offsetting Saudi Arabia’s support for Syrian rebels fighting Iran’s ally Bashar al-Assad.

It carries the risk of potentially antagonizing the United States at a time the two countries have warily cooperated over Iran’s nuclear program, but Tehran may think of Washington’s approval of Saudi action in Yemen as a sop from the Obama administration to Riyadh. When the nuclear deal was signed in 2015 skeptical Gulf countries warned Washington it would only embolden Iran in conflicts in Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and elsewhere. The Iranians may be gambling that at least in Yemen the U.S. will not care enough to do anything except continue reassure the Saudis that they remain committed to defending Saudi Arabia’s interests.

No Kosovo

The U.S. and other Western nations are right to hesitate before committing themselves, either individually or collectively though NATO, to a military campaign aimed at resolving Yemen’s intractable differences. Yemen was only formally united as a country in 1990 and has remained deeply divided even during the height of Saleh’s dictatorship. . The new Houthi Revolutionary Committee has been unable to defeat tribesmen opposed to it in central Yemen despite holding its ground against the Saudis and their allies on its home ground in Yemen’s north-western areas.

Meanwhile, although Saudi money did much to keep Yemen afloat before the war, this has now gone. As a result, the Yemeni economy is in freefall while civilians are on the brink of starvation. Yemen’s feuding factions include hostile southern secessionists and IS and AQAP militants who would react violently to any Western intervention on behalf of the Hadi regime. Heavy casualties would be inevitable and any post-conflict clean up would take years and cost billions, particularly one aiming at a Kosovo or Bosnian style nation building program to bring a permanent end to civil war. No Western government would be willing to meet this commitment at present and any failure would damage the prestige and perceived value of NATO.

The presence of major regional powers backing different sides in the present civil war also means that Yemen makes an especially poor choice for a major NATO intervention. Admittedly Yemen is lower on the Iranian priority list than it is for Saudi Arabia; Iran is ultimately much more willing to relinquish Yemen than cede influence in Iraq or Lebanon. But it is a useful card to have, and Tehran will keep playing it for as long as it can, because the Iranian regime knows how weak its proxies are, making Iran’s major rival look through their defiance. Riyadh has always considered Yemen to be in its backyard, and insisted that foreign countries, including the United States, follow the Saudi lead when making deals with its troublesome neighbor.

Inserting NATO forces into this conflict would be unlikely to end the fighting in Yemen entirely as long as Riyadh remains determined to end the war on its terms. Iran could step up its support to compensate for any NATO troop surge, setting the stage for a wider escalation beyond Yemen if Western armies are being constantly attacked by Iranian weapons. At a time when Europe is already strained by refugees from the war in Syria, any escalation of war in the Middle East would be a disaster which would expose divergent U.S. and European interests.

A job for NATO: Maritime security

The Houthi attacks on shipping passing through the Gulf of Aden have highlighted one valuable role for NATO forces— maritime security. Indeed, the Houthis gained access to missile systems which present a real danger to international shipping in the Gulf of Aden and the nearby strait, Bab al-Mandeb. The strait is a major shipping lane between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden leading into the Indian Ocean, and any Houthi attempt to disrupt the passage of international shipping would have massive financial implications for logistics and insurance companies involved in the maritime sector.

It would also be an economic disaster for Egypt, which controls the Suez Canal connecting the Gulf region and Asia to Europe and North America. Egypt has committed warships to support coalition operations against the Houthis and the rebels may calculate that targeting the economies of Saudi Arabia’s allies would be a good way to weaken the coalition supporting its domestic enemies.

Missile launchers and their radar systems have proven vulnerable to U.S. countermeasures but there are also reports that the Houthis have used small speed boats to support their missile attacks on coalition and U.S. vessels. These only present a danger to unarmed support ships like the Swift or to civilian vessels but these are precisely the vessels which would be vulnerable if the Houthis decided to switch tactics and start performing suicide attacks or hijackings in the Gulf of Aden or the straits.

There are precedents for this—in 2000 the USS Cole was hit by a speed boat packed with explosives while it was being refuelled in Yemen’s Aden harbour. Meanwhile hijackings by Somali pirates using small boats to approach and board undefended civilian vessels mean ships passing through the Gulf of Aden have required a permanent international naval taskforce to protect them. Even before Yemen’s civil war reached its present heights there were fears that a devastated Yemen could serve as a new hub for piracy.

NATO should consider the possibility that the Houthis could adopt this tactic or encourage and tolerate the emergence of pirate groups on their territory as a form of economic warfare against the Saudi coalition and its Western supporters. This would function similarly to the way Iran presently sponsors the Houthi ‘government’ as a means of pressuring Saudi Arabia without fighting an open war against them.

This could be modeled on the effort to suppress Somalian piracy, which NATO has been helping to deter and disrupt since 2008, protecting vessels and helping to increase the general level of security in the Gulf of Aden, off the Horn of Africa and in the Indian Ocean. As part of this, NATO is currently leading Operation Ocean Shield in the region and working in close collaboration with the European Union’s Operation Atalanta, the U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151 and individual country contributors. Ocean Shield is scheduled to terminate in December 2016 but with the rise of the Houthi threat the alliance should shift its attention to the other side of the Bab al-Mandeb strait.

Conclusion

Yemen would be a highly unsuitable place for NATO intervention by air or on land. The interests of the Alliance at stake in Yemen are simply not high enough yet to justify intervening in what is essentially a civil war between Yemeni factions, aggravated by the sectarian struggle between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The cost of maintaining peace and security in Yemen would be staggering at a time when the Alliance needs to focus on more urgent matters, such as deterring Russian adventurism in Eastern Europe.

This could change if there is an emergence of a jihadist emirate along the style of the IS caliphate declared in Iraq and Syria or the takeover of northern Mali in 2012. But for now, AQAP and IS in Yemen have not reached such threatening heights, while the arrival of NATO units to Yemen would merely provide targets of opportunity and ideological justification to the Sunni terrorist networks currently operating there.

What would be of great value in light of the demonstrated Houthi interest and ability to hit vessels passing through the Bab al-Mandeb strait is the creation of a new NATO naval task force modeled on its Somali predecessor to help deter future attacks and enforce freedom of navigation in the Red Sea, the Bab al-Mandeb and elsewhere around the world.

A version of this article appeared earlier in the Atlantic Voices journal of the Atlantic Treaty Association and reappears here with kind permission.

The post Yemen: A Regional Problem With Regional Consequences appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

A surgical strike on corruption. Shock therapy for the economy. A financial system in chaos. All are descriptions of the recent actions taken by Narendra Modi, the Prime Minister of India to crack down on and root out corruption, money laundering, and the illicit financial transactions that comprise the so-called shadow economy.

The problem

India is one of the world’s most cash-dependent countries. Over 90% of consumer purchases are transacted in cash. Much of this ends up as “black money,” used for unofficial or illicit transactions. Corruption, including racketeering and counterfeiting, is extensive, plus few workers pay income taxes and many rely on informal payments.

Modi’s solution

Modi’s solution to this crippling problem? Ban his own country’s currency. On November 8, 2016, with no warning and to the shock of many at home and abroad, Modi declared India’s 2 most popular bank notes—500 and 1000 rupee bills—null and void. Instantly, cash held by millions of people became worthless paper (or demonetized, in finance terminology). The 500 and 1000 rupee notes represent 86% of cash in circulation, and according to Reuters “pushed Asia’s third largest economy to the brink of a liquidity crisis.”

As the government introduced new, theoretically “clean” (literally and figuratively) banknotes, what this meant for most Indians is that ATMs became inoperable. They were not reprogrammed to dispense the new notes prior to the announcement; the public was purposefully kept in the dark. The idea is that this would have tipped off users of black money, causing them to cover their tracks.

As a consequence, lines at banks stretched far and wide. As Panos Mourdoukoutas writes in Forbes, the currency shakeup “brought the nation’s economy to a standstill.” Natasha Sarin and Lawrence Summers of Harvard University wrote that the move is “is by far the most sweeping change in currency policy that has occurred anywhere in the world in decades.”

Customers wait in a long line outside a bank in Allahabad, India on Nov. 16, 2016. (Reuters/Jitendra Prakash)

The positives

Modi and his administration have steadfastly supported the drastic policy. The government believes it will expose corruption, people with unaccounted for or undeclared wealth, and counterfeiting operations with a goal of eliminating black money.

Modi is even counting on the problems caused by the demonetization becoming the solution. The theory is that the broken ATMs and long bank lines making it difficult to acquire new, legally recognized cash will spur people to adopt digital payment methods, thereby boosting India’s nascent e-commerce sector. On November 27 in a national radio address, Modi urged small business owners to embrace digital transaction systems such as mobile bank applications and credit card swipe readers.

In an attempt to convince tax evaders to join the formal economy, on November 28 Indian Finance Minister Arun Jaitley pledged an amnesty scheme for anyone who legitimately declares their holdings. The move could lead to the recognition of billions of dollars of previously undeclared income.

While the action was certainly shocking, also surprising is that many Indians have seemed to support it. According to James Crabtree in Foreign Policy, “Modi trusted his instincts that both the boldness of the move, and perhaps even the pain it introduced, would win him support. Here he has been proved right […]. If that public sentiment holds, Modi’s gutsy (and arguably reckless) move will secure a remarkable political victory.”

The negatives

But as popular as the measure may seem, critics are plentiful. The opposition Congress party has claimed Modi is fleecing the people of their hard-earned cash. Many economists question whether the shadow economy will be impacted by demonetization in any significant way. In fact, some are convinced the people who will be hurt the most are the very people the measure intended to help the most: average law-abiding citizens. And the people supposed to be bankrupted—criminals and cheats—will be no worse for the wear.

As Pranjul Bhandari, economist at HSBC in Mumbai, puts it, “The minor entrepreneur, the shopkeeper, the farmer will be hurt by this. And even among the bad guys, the risk is you catch the minnows, but the big fish escape.” This is certainly a troubling proposition. If it comes true, it would certainly erode any goodwill Modi has accumulated with this bold change.

For better or for worse?

Rooting out and eliminating corruption, collecting taxes, legitimizing the economy, reducing cash dependency and developing e-commerce are all fantastic goals. But will Modi’s decision to invalidate currency and replace it with new cash actually accomplish those goals? At this point the only reasonable answer is decidedly who knows? It seems hard to believe most (some? any?) of India’s financial problems will be solved by it.

It has certainly garnered worldwide attention to the country’s economic plight, and maybe this is the best outcome Modi could have hoped for. But many Indians are suffering because of it, including those whose lives were supposed to be improved by it. This situation needs to be rectified as soon possible. And now the world is watching.

The post Crazy, or Crazy Enough to Work? India’s Financial Shakeup appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Despite unforgivable slips in the 2016 U.S. presidential race, the polling industry must be strengthened, not discredited. It remains crucial in an era in which markets are hypersensitive to political outcomes.

By 11:00pm EST on November 8, 2016, after commercial breaks allowed the world to swallow the unexpected reality of a Donald Trump presidency, pundits pinned the blame on public opinion polls. Electoral experts firmly renounced major polls for miscalculating the electoral outcome by biblical proportions into the morning hours. Mr. Trump, who according to the superstar electoral statistician Nate Silver had a 28.6% of winning the election, ended up flipping the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania. He also took the key battleground states—Florida, Ohio, and North Carolina.

Mr. Silver is not the only expert who was wrong. Every major publication, think tank, and agency able to forecast the election predicted a Trump loss by margins making Silver’s forecast look optimistic for the Trump campaign. Gallup published an article on November 2 (less than a week before election day), stating that the Trump campaign’s ratings were the “worst in recent election years”, with a 29% national approval rate.

News broadcasting stations, however, were the furthest off the mark. The day before election day, all major cable stations had Clinton winning by a couple points: Fox, ABC, and CBS had Clinton up by 4 points; while NBC had Clinton ahead of Trump by 6 points. Polls funded by other publications and agencies also forecasted a Clinton win, albeit by a smaller margin: The Economist and YouGov had Clinton up by 4 points while Reuters and Bloomberg had her up by 3 points.

The following headlines from The Economist articles provide a glimpse into the level of disproportional forecasting going into Election Day:

• “Hillary Clinton has got this. Probably. Very probably.” Published Election Day five hours before the first votes were tallied.
• “The Economist Explains: How did the Polls Get it Wrong?” Published November 9, the day after Election Day.
• “Epic Fail.” Published November 10, two days after Election Day.

This sequence, which starts cautiously optimistic, then defensive, and finally accepting, is representative of the sentiment among the pundits. Going forward, experts should not jump to discredit the entire polling industry but rather allow academia to reassess the methodology for future national polls. A technical review of polling companies should address the following stress points.

Geography, demography, and electoral system

Concerning the research design, national polls usually have a sample size of 1,000 people. In a geographically massive and culturally heterogeneous country of 320 million people such as the United States, sample sizes may need to be significantly larger to cover more counties, including rural areas, to have a deeper footprint among the electorate.

Polls were somewhat accurate when analyzing the overall national popular vote, but highly inaccurate at the state and local level. A miscalculation at the state level can make a large difference under the Electoral College’s points system. The disproportionate tally mechanism of the Electoral College brings into question how polls can correctly predict a national election in a highly decentralized electoral system, especially with an untraditional candidate such as Donald Trump.

Political marginalization and the lure of the anti-establishment option

Mainstream polls may also want to revisit how to capture politically marginalized groups. One unifying characteristic among three unexpected electoral outcomes in 2016—Brexit, the Colombian peace plebiscite, and the U.S. presidential elections—is the undocumented strength of a resentful anti-establishment silent majority. The polls may be missing this significant chunk of the electorate, which is composed of diverse demographic and income groups. The silent majority’s level of distrust with the establishment may have spilled over to independent institutions such as polling agencies, leading this important cohort to reject polling requests en masse.

In the three electoral cases presented, there was no stark contrast in the options available and voters were left to choose between a menu of suboptimal scenarios. In Brexit, Leave supporters were willing to sacrifice macroeconomic stability for bureaucratic sovereignty. In Colombia, No supporters sacrificed the demobilization of the most enduring guerrilla in the western hemisphere for the possibility of tougher sanctions. In the United States, Trump supporters turned down political and diplomatic experience for a systemic shock to the establishment.

These cases are not traditional or simple. Voters had to logically process a very rough menu of choices, which only increased popular dissatisfaction. Given the context of broad public distrust of government, polls may need to readjust their methodology to more effectively capture the pulse during untraditional electoral patterns.

Polls are adjusted to a dichotomous party-based political model, when perhaps, the establishment and party do not have the influence over voters they once had. Paul Ryan, Speaker of the House of Representatives, said “Trump pulled off an enormous political feat”, meaning that Trump won mainly with his persona and without the full backing of the party machine. The Republican Party remained fractured over Trump’s candidacy until the end.

Maybe this anti-establishment wave of electoral politics in established liberal democracies has not been grasped by big data. Pollsters are hanging on to an old party-based model in a context in which parties are mistrusted, as they represent a decaying governing elite.

Polls, democracy, and markets

The polling blunders of 2016 cannot be taken lightly. In the era of ultra-low interest rates and thin yields, the markets—particularly currencies—have become hypersensitive to political outcomes. The recent market politically induced volatility also transcends borders.

More than ever, electoral outcomes have a direct implication on global markets, even if the policies promised in campaigns are unfeasible in the short-term. The U.S. election, for example, has severely altered a large number of currencies, regardless of the country’s current account balance or general economic standing. The currency market’s reaction to Trump’s election is symptomatic of the deep economic interconnectedness of the global economy.

If political stakeholders have placed so much trust in polls, it is because they have worked successfully in the past. Yes, 2016 has been an unconventional year for democracy and therefore polls as well, but this is no excuse to discredit the industry as was done by pundits on Election Day. Rather, firms should reassess how polls are structured in unorthodox political contests and recalibrate the qualitative methodology to treat voters as complex social beings instead of robots.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by GRI Senior Analyst Daniel Lemaitre.

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A simpler time: officials at the opening of the climate conference in Marrakech. (UNFCCC | Flickr)

Grief unfolds in five stages: denial, anger, bargaining, depression, and acceptance. In the aftermath of the U.S. election, climate policy-makers have been struggling through this process themselves. The urge to deny the significance of the coming U.S. climate policy turnaround is understandable. The Paris Agreement was hailed as a momentous deal, and negotiators had to fight a lot of difficult battles to get there. A little less than a year later, much of that progress could be on the verge of irrelevance.

Coincidentally, the first international climate conference after the Paris deal kicked off two days before the U.S. election. In the early morning hours of November 9th, it became clear that American voters—or more accurately the U.S. electoral system—had dropped a bombshell on negotiators. Within two months, Donald Trump will be moving into the White House, joined by Republican majorities in both houses of Congress and a soon to be reinstated conservative majority on the Supreme Court.

The repercussions are pretty clear. Donald Trump’s plans for the EPA will likely end the agency’s mandate as a climate regulator. Support for fossil fuels is one of the key pillars of his energy strategy. Trump has promised lifting regulations on both shale gas and coal in order to boost production and jobs. While these moves are unlikely to do much for either one of these goals, they could slow down the death of coal.

The President-Elect has also shown a complete lack of awareness when it comes to the relationship between business, international trade, and the climate. So it is hardly surprising that Trump wants to cut U.S. support for UN climate measures and has openly flirted with pulling the U.S. out of the Paris deal. Yet other measures like cancelling U..S membership in the UNFCCC or the Green Climate Fund are within the realm of the possible.

Of course, the incoming President could, in a Trumpian fashion, reverse all of these positions overnight. But the question is not to what extent a President Trump will differ from candidate Trump. Rather, the real question is this: how will the international community respond?

Under the Paris Agreement, 21% of emissions cuts through 2030 were to come via the United States. The Obama Administration had made some modest progress to put the U.S. on a path towards meeting these commitments. Hillary Clinton had a plan in place to continue a strategy build around an assortment of executive actions. On the one hand, even Donald Trump and a Republican Congress will not be able to stop the growth of renewable technologies, whose economic fundamentals are strong. On the other, U.S. policy was already comparatively weak. The imperative for the U.S. was to do more, not less.

But this is more than a story about U.S. emissions plans. It remains indispensable to have the world’s biggest economy on board with the climate agenda. Post-election, that is no longer the case. It appears very likely that the United States will pull back from diplomatic engagement in global climate politics. This could mean that other countries that are on the fence on climate issues—Russia, Australia, Saudi Arabia and others—have license to relax their ambitions even further.

In such a scenario, the Paris agreement collapses unless other countries step up. But the deal was already fragile. What parties to the agreement are currently pledging is far from meeting the 2°C goal. And there is no guarantee that they will actually put in place the commitments that do exist. To make matters worse, the formula that countries agreed on last year essentially depends on them taking greenhouse gases out of the air in the second half of the century. Such technologies currently do not exist. Add to that a likely U.S. exit (if not on paper), and the situation looks pretty critical.

Now, there are many voices calling for a workaround that would essentially see countries continue on the Paris path without the U.S. China has been mulled as the new global leader. For years, the country has invested massively in renewables. Urban pollution and business opportunities give Chinese leaders good incentives to move ahead with that agenda domestically.

China has also ramped up its political ambition internationally. In its quest for status on the global stage, the Chinese government sees climate change as one of the areas in which it can conceivably move ahead of other countries. China has also used climate change as an issue over which it can declare its solidarity with poorer countries.

Another more natural alternative would be Germany, home to the Energiewende (energy transition) and a global leader in renewable energy technology. With the UK and the U.S. pulling back from international engagement, the New York Times sees Angela Merkel as the “liberal West’s last defender”. Does Germany’s supposed new role on the global stage extend to climate change?

Such a prospect seems unlikely. Germany has traditionally assumed more of a backstage role. Within the EU, it has dealt in uncomfortable fashion with the new responsibilities thrust upon it by the Euro crisis. The country is more at ease as a lead-by-example player than as an out-and-out leader. Merkel, who is likely to win a fourth term as Chancellor next year, is also not someone known for visionary ideas or strong political convictions. She is a manager at heart. In the short-term, she may be able to patch something together. But Merkel is ill-suited as someone to reorient a process as complex as global climate diplomacy.

That leaves a third option: moving away from state-oriented leadership. This is something that has already happened with increasing speed in recent years. Cities, businesses, NGOs and activists are all governance actors in their own right. Corporations like Apple and Wal-Mart have long since recognized that being proactive on climate change will save them money in the long-term. For cities, climate change is an issue of air quality, jobs, and innovation. Along with NGOs and activists, these actors have strong incentives to collaborate and drive solutions.

The problem is that, despite globalization, we don’t live in a borderless world. To a large extent, regulations remain national in scope. And the Paris deal is one that was agreed on by states, who retain control over crucial policies that will determine the course of emissions going forward.

The upshot is that U.S. withdrawal from climate diplomacy throws up a plethora of questions. Rather than focusing simply on the nitty-gritty aspects of the Paris deal, climate negotiators will also have to find a way to replace not only expected U.S. emissions cuts, but its role as an important diplomatic force. The faster they can move from depression to acceptance, the better the chances at success.

The post Who Will Lead on Climate in the Age of Trump? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

On November 14, the Mekong River Commission (MRC) praised China’s “emergency water release” earlier this year with helping alleviate a severe drought in the Mekong River Basin. In a statement by Pham Tuan Phan, the chief executive officer of MRC, Phan said the water release from China’s Jinghong Reservoir in China’s southwest province of Yunnan “shows the positive impact of China’s cooperation on the drought management.”

The statement follows the release of an MRC report published in late October, produced with the cooperation with China’s Ministry of Water Resources. The MRC was established in 1995 as an intergovernmental organisation to work with the governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand and Viet Nam “to jointly manage the shared water resources and the sustainable development of the Mekong River.”

However, some experts are calling the praise by the MRC unjustified. The Cambodian Ministry of Water Resources stated, at the time of the water release, that it was unlikely to have much of an impact. Ian Thomas, a former technical adviser at the MRC, called last week’s report was “a stinking pile of codswallop”, believing it did little to address the critically low water levels in Cambodia’s Tonle Sap, saying “Cambodia is the real loser”, although conceding it did help remove salt from the delta in Vietnam.

Experts have also downplayed the perception that China’s water release was altruistic, with Thomas saying it was necessary for the dam to properly function, and Brian Beyler of the Stimson Center calling the move “perfectly crafted public relations”, adding it “was not unique and undeserved of praise”. Beyler also criticized the water release as a one-off, arguing consistent releases would do more to alleviate drought and allow for “farmers and downstream governments to prepare and make prudent decisions”.

In downstream Vietnam, authorities are particularly concerned over agriculture in the Mekong Delta and its reliance on upstream water supplies. The latest El Nino weather patterns caused the rainy season to begin late and finish early in 2015, with average rainfall across the river basin down by between 20 to 50% and salt water intrusion increasing some 6-9 miles inland. Some experts claimed as much as 50% of the 2.2 million hectares (5.4 million acres) of arable land in the delta had been hit by salinization due to the drought.

The situation became so grave last March, that Hanoi was forced to send a formal request to Beijing requesting for the release of more water from one one of China’s hydropower stations. Fortunately for Hanoi, Beijing granted their request, but to be in a position of dependency cannot be comforting for the Vietnamese, especially if the next request comes during a period of conflict over South China Sea (East Sea) claims.

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