Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

• The changing role of think tanks vis-à-vis the G20
• Purpose and potential of the T20
• Developing the T20 further
• Outlook

• The changing role of think tanks vis-à-vis the G20
• Purpose and potential of the T20
• Developing the T20 further
• Outlook

• The changing role of think tanks vis-à-vis the G20
• Purpose and potential of the T20
• Developing the T20 further
• Outlook

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins um weitere 0,25 Prozentpunkte zu erhöhen. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die erneute Zinserhöhung stellt keine Überraschung dar. Allerdings musste die EZB die Wachstumsprognose deutlich nach unten korrigieren, da nicht nur die Wirtschaft Deutschlands, sondern die des gesamten Euroraums im Winter in eine Rezession gerutscht ist. Nachdem die Energiekosten wieder gesunken sind, ist die Geldpolitik der EZB mittlerweile der wichtigste Grund für die erwartete wirtschaftliche Stagnation in diesem Jahr. Die EZB muss aufpassen, dass sie den Bogen nicht überspannt. Denn der starke Zinsanstieg der vergangenen zwölf Monate hat die größtenteils importierte Inflation nur geringfügig reduzieren können. Sie trägt dagegen zu den erheblichen Verwerfungen in der Realwirtschaft wie der Immobilienbranche bei. 

Es gibt gute Gründe für die EZB, ihren aggressiven Kurs der Zinserhöhungen nun zu pausieren. Denn die Entwicklung der einheimischen Nachfrage und der Löhne ist moderat, sodass die Risiken von Zweitrundeneffekten für die Inflation gering sind. Eine zu aggressive Geldpolitik dürfte die wirtschaftliche und ökologische Transformation der europäischen Wirtschaft bremsen und somit die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit Europas verringern. Trotzdem hat die EZB sich durch ihre Versprechen auf zumindest eine weitere Zinserhöhung festgelegt, auf die dann eine Pause folgen sollte.

Die am DIW Berlin angesiedelte forschungsbasierte Infrastruktureinrichtung Sozio-oekonomisches Panel (SOEP) sucht ab sofort zwei studentische Hilfskräfte (m/w/div) für je 10 Wochenstunden.

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in June 2023. Ten years after MINUSMA was established, the mission is at a critical juncture. As implementation of the 2015 Agreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali remains stalled, there is no longer “a peace to keep,” and mistrust is growing between Mali’s traditional partners and the country’s transitional authorities. These political challenges, alongside access restrictions, tensions over the mission’s human rights reporting, and the withdrawal or planned withdrawal of some countries’ peacekeeping contingents, have undermined the mission’s ability to implement its strategic priorities. The upcoming negotiations will also unfold in the context of broader geopolitical tensions in the Security Council.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-hosted a roundtable discussion on May 18, 2023. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN officials, civil society stakeholders, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in Mali in a frank and collaborative manner. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions on the prioritization and sequencing of MINUSMA’s mandate, as well as the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.

Participants largely agreed that MINUSMA’s mandated priorities are still relevant to the UN’s overall engagement in the country, even amid security concerns and difficult negotiations with the host state. They recommended that the Security Council focus on providing guidelines for the maintenance of the current number of uniformed personnel with a focus on strategic priorities and a consolidated footprint. In renewing MINUSMA’s mandate, the council will likely need to consider the following issues:

• Prioritizing the identification of new troop-contributing countries (TCCs) to ensure the mission is operating at full capacity, particularly countries with strong self-protection capabilities;
• Continuing to engage with the host state where possible, including in de-confliction of troop movements, training on human rights, election support, and support to the stabilization strategy for central Mali;
• Promoting host authorities’ compliance with the status of forces agreement (SOFA) and ending restrictions on flights and ground movements;
• Working to rebuild commitment to the 2015 Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation among the signatory parties and stepping up engagement on cease-fire monitoring mechanisms;
• Considering shifting toward a more mobile posture that could allow the mission to be more proactive in protecting civilians while reducing the resources devoted to self-protection;
• Remaining committed to the mission’s human rights mandate and adherence to the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy; and
• Investing further in strategic communications and community engagement initiatives to clarify the mission’s mandate and counter negative narratives about the mission, including in parts of the country where the mission is less active.

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Pascal Boniface · Mettre fin aux pillages en République démocratique du Congo ? Avec Denis Mukwege | Entretiens géopo

As anyone with a smartphone knows, the Justice Department indicted former President Donald J. Trump yesterday.  While the US Government has yet to release information about the indictment, Trump’s lawyers have told media outlets that he will be tried for his mishandling of national security documents and for his subsequent obstruction of attempts by the National Archives and the FBI to repossess those files.  The move makes Trump the first former US president to be formally charged with a federal crime.

The indictment comes at a perilous time for American democracy.  Trump himself apparently considers the charges a sign that the American democratic experiment is failing, as his post-indictment communication on social media suggests.  The Justice Department move, he said, is part of a “Continuing attack on our once free and fair elections.  The USA is now a Third World nation, a nation in decline.”  More neutral observers worry that democratic norms are under pressure in the post-Trump era and that the trend lines are not promising for American democracy.  Freedom House, which ranks democracy around the world, still rates the United States as “free,” but the “city on a hill” now falls behind many other countries, including almost all of the European Union, in rankings of global freedom.  Freedom House notes that “in recent years its democratic institutions have suffered erosion, as reflected in rising political polarization and extremism, partisan pressure on the electoral process, bias and dysfunction in the criminal justice system, harmful policies on immigration and asylum seekers, and growing disparities in wealth, economic opportunity, and political influence.”

Just what does the Trump indictment tell us about the state of American democracy?  Do the charges, as Trump suggests, represent a hijacking of American democracy by the “Thugs and Radical Left Monsters” who maliciously indicted the 45th president and presumptive candidate of the republican party in the 2024 elections?  Alternatively, do the charges demonstrate a remarkable resiliency in America’s institutions, even during a period of political stress?  The indictment is a mirror to American democracy.  What do we see?

Rule of law still prevails.  In many parts of the world, of course, rulers are never called into account for their misdeeds.  Here, a former president, until January 2021 arguably the most powerful man in the world, will answer for his alleged failure to respect laws concerning national security information.  President Trump has and will seek to portray the action as a “witch-hunt,” a politically motivated prosecution designed by the Biden Administration to eliminate a formidable political rival.  He will point to the fact that Biden himself was found to have improperly kept classified documents.  But the facts suggest that the judicial system is working as it should, no matter how challenging the political environment.  The Biden Administration has scrupulously avoided engagement in this case, going so far as to appoint a special prosecutor to conduct the investigation.  It is Trump’s apparently willful disregard for the law and deliberate obstruction of legal attempts to retrieve national security information, as opposed to a simple carelessness as in the case of Biden (or former Vice President Pence, or former Secretary of State Clinton), that is the basis for the prosecution.  The Justice Department appears to be treating Trump no better, and no worse, than other, non-presidential American citizens who have been charged with similar crimes.

Nevertheless, norms of behavior on the part of American leaders have been eroded.  Trump is not the first US president to find himself in legal jeopardy.  President Nixon avoided any potential criminal action related to Watergate with a pardon granted by his successor, and President Clinton settled with a special prosecutor rather than face charges over potential perjury in the Monica Lewinsky affair.  However, criminal activity, or the suggestion of it, has generally been seen in the past as disqualifying for political figures.  The traditional response of a national politician facing similar charges would have been to withdraw immediately from the presidential campaign to “prove my innocence and spend time with my family.”  Trump, though, is unrepentant, and in classic Trump style he has attempted to turn the charges into a political strength rather than a weakness.  In fact, Trump’s “victimization” by the “deep state” is a major pillar in his fundraising efforts.  As his campaign website urges supporters, “As the never-ending witch hunts heat up, please make a contribution to defend our movement and SAVE America…”

The republican party is largely failing to choose rule of law over narrow partisan interests.  Much of the republican party, and in particular the right wing of the party, has rallied to the former president’s support without taking the time to consider the merits of the case.  Republican Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy, for example, responded to the indictment thus: “Today is indeed a dark day for the United States of America. It is unconscionable for a president to indict the leading candidate opposing him.”  Most prominent republicans speak in terms of “weaponization” of the judicial system, even though they have not seen the actual indictment and much of the information we have seen suggests at least the possibility that Trump may have committed the crimes of which he is accused.  Even Trump’s main rivals for the republican nomination, whose interests are presumably served by the charges, largely dismiss the possibility that the charges are legitimate.  One candidate, Vivek Ramaswamy, has even promised to pardon Trump on the first day of his administration.  In a democratic, two-party system, the fact that one party refuses to allow the judicial process to run its course before seeking to undermine its legitimacy is worrisome.

The American electorate is so polarized that Trump’s supporters are actually energized by their candidate’s legal challenges.  Yesterday’s indictment is not Trump’s first.  In April, Trump was charged in New York with falsifying business records in relation to his alleged coverup of the Stormy Daniels affair.  His polling numbers with republican primary voters went up, considerably, after he was charged.  Immediately after the indictment, Trump’s support over main republican rival Ron DeSantis jumped to 57% to 31% (they had been neck and neck in some polling in February).  In a nutshell, Trump’s hard core of support within the republican base is unimpacted by the suggestion that the candidate might be a criminal.  In fact, May polling found that more republican voters felt more positively about Trump after charges were filed (27%) than less (22%). Essentially, MAGA republicans see charges not as a sign that the former president might be a law breaker but rather that the justness of his cause is so great that his political opponents will stop at nothing to bring him down.

The 2024 elections are yet another turning point in the American democratic process, and this indictment raises the stakes.  Trump may well win the republican nomination, and current polling has Trump and Biden essentially even in a rematch of the 2020 election.  Presumably, Trump’s case will go to trial before the general elections more than a year from now, and a conviction before the elections is a possibility.  Were Trump to continue his campaign as a convicted felon, or to win election, the challenges to American democracy could well be existential.

In August the SOEP organizes another online SOEPcampus workshop "Learn to use SOEP over lunch". On four Wednesdays in August (2nd, 9th, 16th, 23rd, 2023) this online workshop series offers a short online introduction to the data of the Socio-economic panel study. Participants will be introduced to the content of the study, its data-structure, sample selection and weighting strategy and they will be provided with an overview over the study documentation.
To join the workshop, please register by name and institution with contact person Janina Britzke and you will receive the login data the week from July 17 to 21, 2023 before the event. The workshop will be held in English and participation is free of charge. For further information read here.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

The growing middle classes in middle-income countries may play a key role in current trends of democratic backsliding, online activism and lifestyle politics. This contribution uncovers which modes of political participation are prevalent among the middle classes in Peru and the Philippines, including new forms of online participation and lifestyle politics for sustainability. Drawing on household surveys conducted in 2018, we use latent class analysis and logit regressions to analyse, first, the characteristics of online vs offline participation, and second, the role of political consumption and online activism for political participation dynamics. The latter analysis contributes to the gateway/getaway debate of lifestyle politics. In both countries, we find four comparable classes: a substantial disengaged class that is not engaging in any political participation, an all-round activist class, an online activist class and a class that mostly engages in civil society activities. Further classes with specific participation patterns and socio-demographic characteristics could be identified for each country. Although the online activists in both countries are unlikely to engage in any other form of political participation, a clear empirical case for lifestyle politics as a separate mode of participation only exists among young Peruvians with a steady job. In the Philippines, political consumption as a form of lifestyle politics blends in with other types of political participation.

This policy brief addresses the tensions between international and domestic interests on issues relating to partnerships on migration governance. It specifically discusses the Senegal–EU partnership on migration, highlighting the unequal relationship between the two partners and the implications of this relationship for the outcomes of migration policy.
The authors highlight how the EU’s use of funding to shape migration governance in Senegal creates ownership and accountability challenges for policies that are formulated at the initiative of external actors without much, if any, input by the government of Senegal and its people. The Senegalese government’s quest to attract funding from the EU through the partnership on migration results in it being more accountable to its external partners, and less accountable to the Senegalese people and local civil society organisations. The latter argue that the government needs to formulate a policy that addresses migration in Senegal in a comprehensive manner. Senegal’s financially weaker position vis-á-vis the EU does not, however, constrain the Senegalese government from exercising agency in pursuit of its own interests within the EU agenda. It seeks to strike a balance between the interests of the EU and its domestic priorities on migration. It pursues this goal by conflating rent-seeking behaviour with domestic interests that are at variance with the EU agenda – a strategy facilitated by the government’s reluctance to adopt and commit to an official document providing the framework for migration governance. The partnership between Senegal and the EU has the hallmarks of an interface characterised more by mutual co-option than by meaningful co-operation on international migration governance norms. This state of affairs is detrimental to the formulation of a comprehensive migration policy addressing various aspects of Senegal’s complex migration matrix. In order for the Senegal–EU partnership to go beyond the pursuit of narrow interests and address migration governance issues in a comprehensive manner, several changes are required.

- Donor states, especially in the EU, need to acknowledge the variety of migration challenges Sene¬gal is facing, and not limit their action to their own border externalisation interests. Instead of only engaging with the government, and a few “token” civil society organisations, funders need to take on board the views of significant civil society and local government actors who are more in touch with local realities.
- A holistic migration policy is urgently needed, which goes beyond the current focus, required by external actors, on emigration from Senegal. Such a migration policy has become even more indispensable to Senegal because of the Senegalese diaspora’s economic and political role in the country, its contribution to Senegal’s development, and the need for the Senegalese government to provide adequate responses to the diaspora’s needs. Such a policy is also needed because of the position of Senegal as a destination country for migrants from the West African subregion.
- The EU needs to transform its current approach to “partnerships” on the governance of migration to a model that is mutually beneficial. The current partnership functions as a vehicle through which the EU and its Member States pursue their own agenda. A more feasible partnership would entail identification of the partners’ respective priorities and co-operation on areas of mutual