Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Coasts, deltas and estuaries have been reshaped for generations by land reclamation projects for the purposes of expanding settlements and agricultural lands as well as protecting coasts. Since the mid-twentieth century, technical progress has allowed for land reclamation to occur at an unprecedented speed and scale. Regardless of the key role that land reclamation has had in the past as well as in more recent coastal urbanisation efforts, the issue has received insufficient attention from human geographers, urban political ecologists and marine social scientists. In this paper, I aim to advance the land reclamation research by suggesting a new conceptual framework that combines concepts and empirical insights from urban political ecology (UPE), anthropology, political geography and political economy. This approach considers the representational, legal and material dimensions of urban coastal mega-projects and helps to identify those who benefit and those who lose due to land reclamation. I conclude that a focus on land reclamation can help to understand that ‘land’ is a fundamental requirement for urbanisation. Land in coastal cities is not ‘out there’; it has to be created. To investigate the making of land requires integrating the often-neglected coastal geomorphologies, marine sites of sediment extraction and understanding how they are discursively shaped and transformed by human interventions on urban coasts into UPE.

Coasts, deltas and estuaries have been reshaped for generations by land reclamation projects for the purposes of expanding settlements and agricultural lands as well as protecting coasts. Since the mid-twentieth century, technical progress has allowed for land reclamation to occur at an unprecedented speed and scale. Regardless of the key role that land reclamation has had in the past as well as in more recent coastal urbanisation efforts, the issue has received insufficient attention from human geographers, urban political ecologists and marine social scientists. In this paper, I aim to advance the land reclamation research by suggesting a new conceptual framework that combines concepts and empirical insights from urban political ecology (UPE), anthropology, political geography and political economy. This approach considers the representational, legal and material dimensions of urban coastal mega-projects and helps to identify those who benefit and those who lose due to land reclamation. I conclude that a focus on land reclamation can help to understand that ‘land’ is a fundamental requirement for urbanisation. Land in coastal cities is not ‘out there’; it has to be created. To investigate the making of land requires integrating the often-neglected coastal geomorphologies, marine sites of sediment extraction and understanding how they are discursively shaped and transformed by human interventions on urban coasts into UPE.

Die internationale Ordnung ist in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel, wobei Großmachtrivalitäten eine Neu-ordnung globaler Machtstrukturen vorantreiben. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. In vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gehen die Mittel für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) zurück; gleichzeitig richten EU-Länder ihre verbleibenden Mittel stärker an Eigeninteressen aus. Bislang werden diese Reformen weitestgehend bilateral ausdefiniert, wohingegen eine politische Debatte über Rolle, Mehrwert und gemeinsame Ausgestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik weitestgehend fehlt. Doch ohne eine Stärkung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit wird es Europa nicht gelingen, auf die aktuellen weltpolitischen Umbrüche eine adäquate Antwort zu geben.
In diesem Policy Brief argumentieren wir, dass Reformbestrebungen in der europäischen Entwick-lungspolitik die Zusammenarbeit und Komplementarität stärken müssen, um wirksam auf die veränderte geopolitische Lage reagieren zu können. Unsere Analyse zeigt vier inhaltliche Handlungsfelder, auf die sich laufende Reformprozesse europäischer Akteure konzentrieren und auf denen Entwicklungspolitik wichtige Beiträge leisten soll:
1. Wirtschaftsförderung und Einbindung des Privatsektors; 2. Sicherheitspolitik; 3. Steuerung und Gestaltung von Migration; 4. Menschliche Entwicklung und Armutsreduktion, insbesondere in LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
Eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung Europas auf diesen Handlungsfeldern fehlt jedoch bisher. Diese gemeinsamen strategischen Prioritäten auszuhandeln erfordert eine Neubelebung des politischen Dialogs zwischen EU-Institutionen und Mit-gliedstaaten sowie eine Weiterentwicklung des „Team Europe“-Ansatzes. „Team Europe 2.0“ hätte dann zwei Funktionen: die inhaltliche Komplementarität „nach innen“ zu stärken durch eine Verständigung darauf, wie die unterschiedlichen Akteure jeweils zu gemeinsam festgelegten Zielsetzungen beitragen; und „nach außen“, um sichtbar zu machen, wofür Europa strategisch steht.
Kernelement von Team Europe 2.0 sollte ein verbesserter inhaltlicher Austausch in themenspezifi-schen, informellen Gruppen unter Führung einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission sein. Solche „thematischen Champions“ könnten die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Strategien für größere, transformative Initiativen erleichtern. Ein verbesserter politischer Dialog und inhaltliche Abstimmung in Schlüsselbe-reichen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik sind Voraussetzungen für ein geeintes und strategischeres Auftreten von „Team Europe“ nach außen, auch in multilateralen Kontexten.

Die internationale Ordnung ist in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel, wobei Großmachtrivalitäten eine Neu-ordnung globaler Machtstrukturen vorantreiben. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. In vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gehen die Mittel für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) zurück; gleichzeitig richten EU-Länder ihre verbleibenden Mittel stärker an Eigeninteressen aus. Bislang werden diese Reformen weitestgehend bilateral ausdefiniert, wohingegen eine politische Debatte über Rolle, Mehrwert und gemeinsame Ausgestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik weitestgehend fehlt. Doch ohne eine Stärkung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit wird es Europa nicht gelingen, auf die aktuellen weltpolitischen Umbrüche eine adäquate Antwort zu geben.
In diesem Policy Brief argumentieren wir, dass Reformbestrebungen in der europäischen Entwick-lungspolitik die Zusammenarbeit und Komplementarität stärken müssen, um wirksam auf die veränderte geopolitische Lage reagieren zu können. Unsere Analyse zeigt vier inhaltliche Handlungsfelder, auf die sich laufende Reformprozesse europäischer Akteure konzentrieren und auf denen Entwicklungspolitik wichtige Beiträge leisten soll:
1. Wirtschaftsförderung und Einbindung des Privatsektors; 2. Sicherheitspolitik; 3. Steuerung und Gestaltung von Migration; 4. Menschliche Entwicklung und Armutsreduktion, insbesondere in LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
Eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung Europas auf diesen Handlungsfeldern fehlt jedoch bisher. Diese gemeinsamen strategischen Prioritäten auszuhandeln erfordert eine Neubelebung des politischen Dialogs zwischen EU-Institutionen und Mit-gliedstaaten sowie eine Weiterentwicklung des „Team Europe“-Ansatzes. „Team Europe 2.0“ hätte dann zwei Funktionen: die inhaltliche Komplementarität „nach innen“ zu stärken durch eine Verständigung darauf, wie die unterschiedlichen Akteure jeweils zu gemeinsam festgelegten Zielsetzungen beitragen; und „nach außen“, um sichtbar zu machen, wofür Europa strategisch steht.
Kernelement von Team Europe 2.0 sollte ein verbesserter inhaltlicher Austausch in themenspezifi-schen, informellen Gruppen unter Führung einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission sein. Solche „thematischen Champions“ könnten die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Strategien für größere, transformative Initiativen erleichtern. Ein verbesserter politischer Dialog und inhaltliche Abstimmung in Schlüsselbe-reichen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik sind Voraussetzungen für ein geeintes und strategischeres Auftreten von „Team Europe“ nach außen, auch in multilateralen Kontexten.

Die internationale Ordnung ist in einem tiefgreifenden Wandel, wobei Großmachtrivalitäten eine Neu-ordnung globaler Machtstrukturen vorantreiben. Dies hat auch Auswirkungen auf die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. In vielen EU-Mitgliedstaaten gehen die Mittel für öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (ODA) zurück; gleichzeitig richten EU-Länder ihre verbleibenden Mittel stärker an Eigeninteressen aus. Bislang werden diese Reformen weitestgehend bilateral ausdefiniert, wohingegen eine politische Debatte über Rolle, Mehrwert und gemeinsame Ausgestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik weitestgehend fehlt. Doch ohne eine Stärkung der europäischen Zusammenarbeit wird es Europa nicht gelingen, auf die aktuellen weltpolitischen Umbrüche eine adäquate Antwort zu geben.
In diesem Policy Brief argumentieren wir, dass Reformbestrebungen in der europäischen Entwick-lungspolitik die Zusammenarbeit und Komplementarität stärken müssen, um wirksam auf die veränderte geopolitische Lage reagieren zu können. Unsere Analyse zeigt vier inhaltliche Handlungsfelder, auf die sich laufende Reformprozesse europäischer Akteure konzentrieren und auf denen Entwicklungspolitik wichtige Beiträge leisten soll:
1. Wirtschaftsförderung und Einbindung des Privatsektors; 2. Sicherheitspolitik; 3. Steuerung und Gestaltung von Migration; 4. Menschliche Entwicklung und Armutsreduktion, insbesondere in LDCs (Least Developed Countries).
Eine gemeinsame strategische Ausrichtung Europas auf diesen Handlungsfeldern fehlt jedoch bisher. Diese gemeinsamen strategischen Prioritäten auszuhandeln erfordert eine Neubelebung des politischen Dialogs zwischen EU-Institutionen und Mit-gliedstaaten sowie eine Weiterentwicklung des „Team Europe“-Ansatzes. „Team Europe 2.0“ hätte dann zwei Funktionen: die inhaltliche Komplementarität „nach innen“ zu stärken durch eine Verständigung darauf, wie die unterschiedlichen Akteure jeweils zu gemeinsam festgelegten Zielsetzungen beitragen; und „nach außen“, um sichtbar zu machen, wofür Europa strategisch steht.
Kernelement von Team Europe 2.0 sollte ein verbesserter inhaltlicher Austausch in themenspezifi-schen, informellen Gruppen unter Führung einzelner Mitgliedstaaten und der Kommission sein. Solche „thematischen Champions“ könnten die Entwicklung gemeinsamer Strategien für größere, transformative Initiativen erleichtern. Ein verbesserter politischer Dialog und inhaltliche Abstimmung in Schlüsselbe-reichen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik sind Voraussetzungen für ein geeintes und strategischeres Auftreten von „Team Europe“ nach außen, auch in multilateralen Kontexten.

The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channelling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics.
In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 
1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalisation of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically.
A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.

 

 

/ Kazakhstan, Charbon, Nucléaire civil, Matières premières, Infrastructures, Industrie - Asie / Kazakhstan, Charbon, Nucléaire civil, Matières premières, Infrastructures, Industrie

Libertär – autoritär – faschistisch, Angriffe auf die Demokratie

Cet article sera bientôt disponible. / Sri Lanka - 2026/04 / Sri Lanka

Kein anderes Departement wurde seit 1990 so systematisch benachteiligt wie das VBS. Die kumulative Investitionslücke beträgt 150 Milliarden Franken. Statt die Gewichte im eigenen Haushalt zu verschieben – was seine ureigenste Aufgabe wäre –, schiebt der Bundesrat eine Mehrwertsteuererhöhung vors Volk.

Frileuse en économie, la gauche de gouvernement sri-lankaise reste fidèle à la tradition d'émancipation léguée par ses aînés. Colonisés pendant environ quatre siècles et demi par des puissances européennes, les Sri-lankais se gouvernent depuis moins de quatre-vingts ans. C'est pourquoi ils (…) / Relations internationales, Diplomatie, Autodétermination des peuples, Sri Lanka

Jeudi soir, Donald Trump a annoncé un cessez-le-feu de 10 jours entre Israël et le Liban, deux jours à peine après l’ouverture de négociations directes à Washington. Une annonce qui intervient alors qu’Israël continue d’occuper le sud du pays.

Mais c’est un autre fait qui retient l’attention : Benjamin Netanyahou a exigé l’exclusion de la France de ces négociations, allié historique du Liban, alors qu’elles sont elles-mêmes conduites par les États-Unis, principal allié d’Israël.

Cette exigence israélienne pose une question de fond : que reste-t-il de la relation franco-israélienne ? Elle apparaît aujourd’hui profondément déséquilibrée et unilatérale ; Israël exige, la France cède, ou se contente de condamnations verbales qui n’ont jamais infléchi la moindre décision de Tel-Aviv.

Est-ce le signe d’une fin définitive de l’amitié franco-israélienne, ou simplement l’aboutissement d’un affaiblissement diplomatique français ?

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Liban : nouvel affront israélien à la France est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Les 22 et 23 mars 2026, les électeurs italiens ont rejeté, par 54 % des voix pour le non contre 46 % pour le oui, le projet de réforme constitutionnelle de la magistrature porté par la présidente du Conseil, Giorgia Meloni. Avec une participation proche de 60 %, un taux exceptionnellement élevé (…) / Fascisme, Droit, Italie, Justice

L’IA devient l’un des principaux terrains de rivalité stratégique entre grandes puissances. Les États Unis et la Chine cherchent à s’assurer une maîtrise complète de la chaîne de valeur, des semi conducteurs au développement des modèles de fondation, en passant par le contrôle des infrastructures de calcul. D’autres puissances cherchent également à se distinguer dans ce nouvel espace de compétition géopolitique à la croisée des enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de compétitivité.

Philippe Barbet, professeur émérite d’économie à l’Université Sorbonne Paris Nord et chercheur associé à l’IRIS, répond à nos questions :

• Les États-Unis et la Chine ont-ils définitivement distancé leurs concurrents en matière d’IA et de sa chaîne de valeur ?

• Quel est le rôle de l’UE sur ce marché de l’IA ? Quelle carte a-t-elle à jouer ?

• Certains parlent d’un futur éclatement de la bulle IA. Ce scénario vous semble-t-il plausible ? Cette fébrilité ne représente-t-elle pas une faiblesse pour les États-Unis par exemple dont l’économie est dopée à l’IA ?

Cette vidéo a été réalisée à l’occasion de la 3e édition des Rencontres géoéconomiques et géopolitiques organisées par l’IRIS et NEOMA Business School, en partenariat avec Diplomatie Magazine et Courrier international, le 2 avril 2026.

L’article Géopolitique de l’IA , quels nouveaux rapports de force mondiaux ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.

While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.

The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.

This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.

The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.

If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”

There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.

“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.

The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Photos

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IPI and the Permanent Mission of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the UN, in partnership with the UN Department of Peace Operations, cohosted a high-level, closed-door roundtable on “Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus,” on April 16th.

Since it was established in 2021, Action for Peacekeeping Plus (A4P+) has helped mobilize action on critical issues affecting UN peacekeeping operations, including peacekeeper capabilities and mindsets, strategic and operational integration, and cooperation with host countries. To ensure the framework is aligned to the current context, builds on achievements and challenges implementing A4P thus far, and in response to a request from the General Assembly’s Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C34), DPO has developed an updated A4P implementation framework. It establishes a strategic, focused, and streamlined set of priorities to improve the impact, effectiveness, and cost-effectiveness of UN peacekeeping. This renewed framework will continue to mobilize action across critical priorities in UN peacekeeping operations, taking into account changing political, security, and resource imperatives. This includes recent reform efforts to ensure the UN remains “effective, cost-efficient and responsive,” as part of the UN80 initiative.

Member states participating in this ambassadorial roundtable heard from Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Jean-Pierre Lacroix, on the new A4P implementation strategy. Following a briefing by the USG, member states engaged in an interactive dialogue on the future of A4P and A4P+.

The post Looking to the Future of Action for Peacekeeping Plus: A discussion with Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix appeared first on International Peace Institute.

Jean Crampilh-Broucaret (1939-1972), trois mois après l'inhumation de sa mère sous l'escalier de la ferme familiale, grave, à l'aide d'une perceuse et de ciseaux à bois, soixante-huit lignes, en lettres capitales, sur le parquet de sa chambre. Ce « plancher de Jeannot » épigraphe de treize (…) / France, Art, Littérature

En octobre 1943, des agents du Commissariat général aux questions juives (CGQJ) adressent à leur ancien chef Xavier Vallat une pétition concernant le « fonctionnement de la “Popote'' ». Ils déplorent la « médiocrité des repas servis », regrettent de « ne plus avoir de potage au repas de midi » (…) / France, Histoire, Seconde guerre mondiale 1939-1945, Nazisme