Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Der vereitelte Putschversuch hat die angeschlagene Macht Wladimir Putins offengelegt. Was ein Kontrollverlust des Präsidenten für Russland bedeuten würde.

Vom 17. bis 21. Juli findet zum zehnten Mal die Konferenz der European Survey Research Association (ESRA) in Mailand statt. 12 Wissenschaftler*innen aus dem SOEP leiten Sessions oder präsentieren in mehr als 20 Vorträgen ihre Arbeit. Eine Übersicht zu den SOEP-Vorträgen finden Sie hier.

Außerdem ist das SOEP mit einem eigenen Infostand auf der Konferenz vertreten. Kommen Sie vorbei und erfahren Sie mehr über Neuigkeiten aus dem Institut und der Datenwelt des SOEP.

Seit Februar 2022 verteidigt sich die Ukraine gegen einen erneuten, diesmal voll­umfäng­lichen Angriffskrieg Russlands. Nachdem sich die Maßnahmen zur unmittelbaren Unterstützung der Ukraine – militärische, diplomatische, finanzielle und huma­ni­täre – ein­gespielt haben, gilt es nun, die langfristige Sicherheit des Landes zu kon­zipieren. Sicher­heitszusagen sollten politische, wirtschaftliche und militärische Pfei­ler um­fas­sen. Eine Nato-Mitgliedschaft wäre dabei zentral. Sie liegt im geostrategi­schen und nor­ma­tiven Interesse der Nato, auch wenn ihre Umsetzung risikovoll und schwierig ist. Die Alliierten sollten der Ukraine auf dem Gipfel im Juli praktische Schritte zum Bei­tritt aufzeigen, um den Übergang von Sicherheits­zusagen zu ‑garantien zu definieren.

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How have recent conflicts impacted global peace and what can the changing geopolitical landscape tell us about the likelihood of future conflict? On June 28th, IPI together with the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) cohosted a policy forum entitled “A Measure of Peace: Key Findings from the 2023 Global Peace Index,” to address these questions and discuss how they could impact multilateral efforts and national priorities of member states in the future.

Produced by the IEP, the Global Peace Index (GPI) is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. It presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to date on trends in peace, the economic value of peace, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 percent of the world’s population, using twenty-three qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal safety and security; the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict; and the degree of militarization.

Michael Collins, IEP Executive Director Americas provided an overview of key findings from the 17th edition of the GPI. Collins noted that peacefulness has continued to deteriorate this year and is the lowest it has been since the inception of the index. On a positive note, there have been improvements in peacefulness, which include a reduction in political terror, and surprisingly, in terms of military expenditure. While there has been an increase in military expenditure, in terms of GDP it has decreased on a global average. Unfortunately, the 2023 GPI found that “expenditure on peacebuilding and peacekeeping totaled $34.1 billion in 2022, which equals only 0.4 percent of military spending.”

Chief of Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships Roselyn Akombe stressed that because the economic impact of conflict is so vast, we need to rethink and focus on peace. Akombe also outlined four takeaways from the GPI, beginning by emphasizing that “numbers count” and economists provide valuable contributions by effectively quantifying peace and providing the data that situates where we are in terms of peace. Second, the GPI is making a business case for prevention. Measuring the cost of war and comparing returns of investment demonstrate the need to collectively work towards peacebuilding and sustaining peace. Third, through reading the 2023 GPI and looking at the key asks of the UN Secretary-General in the New Agenda for Peace, there exists confirmation that we are on the right path. Ending on a positive note, Akombe highlighted that when there are systematic responses towards building peace, it makes a difference. She cited the example of terrorism, which has decreased as a result of concerted efforts to prevent violent extremism and address its underlying causes.

In terms of the devastation that we are witnessing in the world, the trend of internationalized intra-state conflict is egregious. IPI Vice President Adam Lupel expressed gratitude for IPI’s partnership with IEP and appreciatively acknowledged IEP’s work on the positive findings of peacefulness. Lupel and Collings further discussed the positive peace angle, clarifying that while the 2023 GPI found 84 countries became more peaceful, 74 countries became less peaceful. It is much more difficult to build peace than it is to destroy it.

Welcome Remarks:
H.E. Mitchell Peter Fifield, Permanent Representative of Australia to the UN

Speaker:
Michael Collins, Executive Director Americas, Institute for Economics and Peace

Discussant:
Roselyn Akombe, Chief of Peacebuilding Strategy and Partnerships, UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

Moderator:
Adam Lupel, Vice President and Chief Operating Officer, International Peace Institute

Depuis quelques semaines désormais, de nouvelles alliances semblent se dessiner au Moyen-Orient et plusieurs États, notamment l’Iran, l’Arabie saoudite et la Turquie, tentent de s’affirmer et de prendre une forme de leadership dans la région. Quelles sont les recompositions géopolitiques à l’œuvre au Moyen-Orient ? Didier Billion, directeur adjoint de l’IRIS, vous donne rendez-vous régulièrement pour les chroniques du Moyen-Orient.

 

Lors de sa visite en Chine en avril 2023, le président brésilien Lula Da Silva interrogeait les raisons de l’hégémonie du dollar, suggérant l’utilisation de devises concurrentes pour les échanges internationaux. Il faisait écho aux voix de plus en plus nombreuses à s’élever contre la toute-puissance de la monnaie américaine. Le dollar est perçu comme un instrument de domination dont abusent les États-Unis pour s’endetter et faire appliquer leur droit à l’étranger. Plus encore : avec l’augmentation des sanctions américaines – y compris contre des pays alliés -, l’émergence d’économies concurrentes, et la remise en cause de l’ordre mondial hérité de la fin de la guerre froide, la dédollarisation est un processus déjà bien enclenché.
Alors, comment le dollar s’est-il imposé comme LA monnaie internationale, symbole de la puissance économique des États-Unis ? Conservera-t-il encore longtemps son hégémonie ? Jusqu’où ira le phénomène de dédollarisation de l’économie mondiale ?
Éléments de réponse en vidéo agrémentée de photos, cartes et graphiques.

Täuschung und Medienmanipulation sind seit jeher fester Bestandteil der Kriegskommunikation. Nie zuvor aber war es derart einfach, qualitativ hochwertige Fäl­schungen von Ton-, Bild- und Videoaufzeichnungen zu erstellen. Die menschliche Neigung, emotional auf diese Medien zu reagieren, eröffnet deren Produzenten eine völlig neue Dimension des Missbrauchs. Mit einem Kapitulationsaufruf von Präsident Selenskyj, der umgehend als Deepfake entlarvt wurde, liegt der erste Versuch eines Einsatzes der neuen Technologie in einem bewaffneten Konflikt vor. Derartige Fäl­schungen werden immer besser, die Erkennung immer aufwendiger und ein Ende dieser Entwicklung ist nicht absehbar. Ein Verbot von Deepfakes ist aussichtslos. Es ist deshalb Zeit, sich mit den aktuellen und potentiellen Anwendungsfällen und mit möglichen Gegenstrategien auseinanderzusetzen.

En quoi l’approche de l’Arabie Saoudite est-elle comparable à celle du Qatar ?

L’Arabie Saoudite copie clairement le modèle du Qatar en faisant à Newcastle ce que QSI a fait au PSG et en se positionnant pour organiser une Coupe du monde de football à l’horizon 2030-2034. Les objectifs sont les mêmes ; à savoir s’acheter une bonne image.

En quoi est-elle différente ?

Au contraire du Qatar, l’Arabie Saoudite attire des joueurs d’envergure internationale dans son propre championnat. D’abord parce qu’il est, à la base, d’un meilleur niveau footballistique, ensuite parce que le PIB du pays est quatre à cinq fois supérieur à celui du Qatar donc lui offre encore davantage de possibilités financières pour diversifier ses investissements.

Enfin, le besoin de redorer son image est bien plus important en Arabie qui a une approche moins moderne de l’Islam et applique une charia plus rigide, pour compenser la répression du régime du Prince MBS (Mohamed ben Salmane) et effacer les traces de la guerre au Yémen et de l’assassinat de Jamal Khashoggi (journaliste saoudien opposant au régime assassiné au sein du consulat d’Arabie Saoudite à Istanbul en octobre 2018, Ndlr).

A terme, est-ce un danger pour le football européen ?

Pour le moment non car ça ne concerne que les joueurs en fin de carrière. Jusqu’à présent, l’Europe a pillé les pays africains et sud-américains, où très peu de joueurs du cru évoluent dans leur équipe nationale. Désormais, nous sommes concurrencés par plus riches que nous. Il va falloir s’y faire.

Il faut voir si la greffe va prendre ou si l’évolution va plutôt ressembler à ce qui s’était passé aux Etats-Unis à l’époque du Cosmos de New-York dans les années 80. Même si, à travers CR7, Benzema ou Kanté, avec Messi s’il avait accepté, l’Arabie Saoudite recrute avant tout des millions de followers pour gagner en visibilité internationale.

Pour savoir si leur championnat peut devenir une vraie alternative aux championnats européens, nous aurons une première réponse avec N’Golo Kanté. S’il est toujours appelé en sélection par Didier Deschamps, ça ne peut que le crédibiliser.

 

Propos recueillis par Frédéric Denat pour Le quotidien du sport.

When French President Emmanuel Macron first spoke of a “European Political Community” (EPC) in May 2022, the proposal was initially met with scepticism in many places. In particular, the six Western Balkan states (WB6) – some of which have been working, albeit at different speeds, towards EU membership for nearly 20 years – were concerned that the EPC would serve as a substitute for full EU membership. Other voices criticised the discussion format, which has no founding document, as merely an ineffectual photo-op.

However, after two summits – in Prague in October 2022 and in Chişinău in June 2023 – initial scepticism is waning. Many diplomats agree that a pan-European dialogue format at the highest level of government has been lacking, especially in light of the contentious security environment that has evolved since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Summits without hierarchical structures can foster a sense of belonging. The focus on issues such as energy, security, and connectivity underscores the approach of working on overarching issues that affect EU members and non-EU countries alike. The WB6 should therefore use this new forum as proactively as possible, for example by hosting the summit after Spain and the United Kingdom or by chairing a thematic working stream.   

  Advantages of an agile structure

Currently, the EPC comprises 47 participants and is characterised by the following features: an agile structure that allows for ad hoc participation in summits and does not involve an institutional structure; no concrete outputs such as joint statements or declarations; a rotating chairmanship that has so far alternated between EU and non-EU countries; and summits that are to be held twice a year in the chairing country.

Meanwhile, despite the fluid set-up, certain organisational structures have emerged. For one thing, the summits leave enough time for bilateral or minilateral meetings. For example, during the summit in Chişinău, President Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz, and EU Council President Charles Michel met with representatives from Armenia and Azerbaijan as well as Kosovo and Serbia. The added value of diplomatic efforts and exchanges among hostile neighbours in a European context can hardly be overemphasised.

In addition, there are working streams that deal with topics of particular importance to the EPC and each is chaired by two countries. In Chişinău, for example, Poland and the United Kingdom took over the “Security” working stream; Norway and Belgium the “Energy” working stream; and Moldova and Spain the “Connectivity” working stream. The topics are prepared in advance by the respective heads of cabinet (“sherpas”). The chairing country can add new topics to the agenda before the summit. Looking at the working streams, it is noticeable on the one hand that an EU member state always cooperates with a non-EU member state on an equal footing and that synergies far beyond the EU agenda can be tapped through this cooperation. On the other hand, no WB6 country has taken over a working stream so far.

Added value of the EPC for the Western Balkans

Cooperation of one of the WB6 with a major EU partner such as Germany or France would be an important step symbolically and practically. Not only would Germany be showing increased political interest in the Western Balkans in times of geopolitical competition with Russia and China, among others, as with the revival of the Berlin Process in the autumn of 2022. It would also open the possibility for the respective Western Balkan country to work constructively and with increased visibility in the European context. A high-profile cooperation through co-chairing a working stream by a WB and an EU country would also eliminate the hierarchical differences inherent to the enlargement process and enable collaboration on a level playing field.

For example, at the next summit in Granada, Spain, in October, Montenegro and France could co-chair the working stream on security. After the recent change of power to a pro-European and avowedly reformist leadership, Montenegro should seize the opportunity to advance security issues in the EPC. As a NATO member, it could use the platform to work on specific cybersecurity issues. At the same time, it would shed light on the work of the “Center for Cybersecurity Capacity Building” in Podgorica, established in November 2022 by France, Montenegro, and Slovenia.

Similarly, it would be relevant for North Macedonia to co-chair a new working stream on migration with Germany, especially as the United Kingdom is likely to put this topic on the agenda in spring 2024. As an important junction for migration of all kinds, North Macedonia has been working with Frontex on a joint operation to secure European borders since April 2023. The country should therefore emphasise its role as a security partner of the EU in the EPC as well.

A potential added value for a Western Balkan country would also be the hosting of a summit. This can bring concrete benefits beyond symbolism. For example, Moldova’s ambassador to Brussels, Daniela Morari, concluded that organising the summit in Chişinău involved a steep learning curve, but that it also supplied a lot of international support. It gave the country the opportunity to present itself in a positive light internationally and to set in motion some critical processes for the country.

With all the opportunities for cooperation under the EPC, the EU must continue to communicate clearly that the EPC is not a substitute for enlargement. Especially in view of the stagnating enlargement process, which is related not only to a lack of reforms in the WB6 but also to enlargement fatigue on the part of individual EU members, the EU should not create the impression that the WB6 should forever remain in the EU’s waiting room.

Nahost-Expertin Muriel Asseburg über Israel & Palästina