Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Die Koordination hat Melanie Müller übernommen.

Am 26. April 2023 veröffentlichte das Entwicklungsministerium (BMZ) eine Pressemitteilung mit der Nachricht, dass das Bundeskabinett die Unterzeichnung eines internationalen Abkommens zwischen der EU, ihren 27 Mitgliedstaaten und den 79 Mitgliedern der Organisation der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (OACPS) beschlossen hat. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels – Ende Mai und einen ganzen Monat nach dem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts – haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten allerdings noch nicht auf eine Unterzeichnung des Abkommens geeinigt.

Am 26. April 2023 veröffentlichte das Entwicklungsministerium (BMZ) eine Pressemitteilung mit der Nachricht, dass das Bundeskabinett die Unterzeichnung eines internationalen Abkommens zwischen der EU, ihren 27 Mitgliedstaaten und den 79 Mitgliedern der Organisation der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (OACPS) beschlossen hat. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels – Ende Mai und einen ganzen Monat nach dem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts – haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten allerdings noch nicht auf eine Unterzeichnung des Abkommens geeinigt.

Am 26. April 2023 veröffentlichte das Entwicklungsministerium (BMZ) eine Pressemitteilung mit der Nachricht, dass das Bundeskabinett die Unterzeichnung eines internationalen Abkommens zwischen der EU, ihren 27 Mitgliedstaaten und den 79 Mitgliedern der Organisation der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (OACPS) beschlossen hat. Zum Zeitpunkt der Abfassung dieses Artikels – Ende Mai und einen ganzen Monat nach dem Beschluss des Bundeskabinetts – haben sich die EU-Mitgliedstaaten allerdings noch nicht auf eine Unterzeichnung des Abkommens geeinigt.

Le 25 juin prochain, la population guatémaltèque est appelée aux urnes pour élire son ou sa prochain.e chef d’État et vice-président.e, les 160 membres du Congrès, plus de 300 maires, ainsi que 20 élus du Parlement centraméricain. Dans le cas où aucun des candidats pour la présidence n’obtient la majorité absolue au premier tour, un deuxième sera organisé le 20 août. Une conclusion au premier tour reste virtuellement impossible avec plus de vingt candidats en lice. Ces élections au sein du pays le plus peuplé d’Amérique centrale (17,8 millions d’habitants) ont lieu dans un contexte social de défiance envers le régime et les institutions. Cela s’explique notamment par de très nombreux cas de corruption des élites dirigeantes, et par un glissement du pouvoir actuel, incarné par Alejandro Giammattei depuis 2020, vers un régime de plus en plus autoritaire, voire considéré autocratique pour certains. Cette situation se traduit par un sentiment de rejet et de lassitude partagé. En effet, sur un corps électoral de près de 9 millions d’habitants, presque un tiers d’entre eux ne se sont pas inscrits sur les listes électorales.

Malgré le fait que l’économie du Guatemala soit la première de la région (86 milliards de dollars de PIB en 2020), c’est également une des plus inégalitaires avec 60% de la population vivant sous le seuil de pauvreté et 56% concernée par des phénomènes d’insécurité alimentaire. Les populations indigènes, qui représentent près de 45% de la population totale (le taux le plus haut d’Amérique centrale) sont les plus touchées. Les gouvernements successifs ont historiquement toujours rechigné à investir dans des projets d’infrastructures et de développement pourtant indispensables. La crise sanitaire du Covid-19 a fait chuter le PIB d’un point et demi, mais le Guatemala a fait preuve de résilience et l’économie a enregistré une croissance du PIB de respectivement 8% et 4% en 2021 et 2022. Cela s’explique en partie par la stabilité des secteurs exportateurs pendant la crise, notamment de matières premières telles que des produits agricoles (bananes, canne à sucre, café) ; mais aussi produits chimiques et textiles. La reprise de l’économie nord-américaine a également joué un rôle dans la résilience de celle du pays, en favorisant l’augmentation des envois de fonds (remesas) des diasporas à l’étranger, notamment depuis les États-Unis où vivent 3 millions de Guatémaltèques. Ces « remesas » représentent plus de 15% du PIB du pays. De par ses relations historiques et actuelles avec les États-Unis, le Guatemala est un des seuls pays de la région à prendre une position pro-occidentale sur la scène internationale. Il s’agit de l’un des derniers pays centre-américains à reconnaître la souveraineté de Taiwan, et sur la question de la guerre en Ukraine, Alejandro Giammattei est le seul président de toute l’Amérique latine à avoir explicitement soutenu Kiev en se rendant à la rencontre du président Zelensky dans la capitale ukrainienne en 2022.

Les Guatémaltèques auront, lors du premier tour de l’élection présidentielle, le choix parmi plus de 20 candidats. Cependant, le Tribunal suprême électoral a d’ores et déjà écarté trois d’entre eux de la course pour des raisons d’ordre juridique qui ont été contestées avec véhémence par les principaux concernés. La plupart des analystes politiques jugent que ces décisions constituent un « simulacre de démocratie » et s’inquiètent de la dégradation de l’État de droit au Guatemala.

Le premier candidat à avoir vu sa candidature refusée par l’instance électorale est Roberto Arzu, membre du parti politique Podemos (droite). Thelma Cabrera (Movimiento para la Liberación de los Pueblos, gauche), issue des peuples autochtones mayas, s’est également vue dénier la possibilité de joindre la liste de candidats. Son colistier Jordan Rodas, ancien procureur spécialiste des droits humains, fait l’objet d’une enquête suite à une plainte déposée par son successeur. Il dénonce une stratégie d’exclusion politique pour un parti d’opposition qui a une base électorale importante avec l’appui des minorités ethniques indigènes et qui est arrivé en quatrième place lors des élections précédentes. Le troisième candidat à s’être fait écarter de la course présidentielle est l’homme d’affaires Carlos Pineda et son parti Prosperidad Ciudadana (droite), favori dans les sondages avec près de 23% d’intentions de vote. Il a pareillement critiqué la décision du Tribunal suprême électoral, postant sur son compte Twitter : « La corruption a gagné, et le Guatemala a perdu ». Un ancien chef du parquet anticorruption a été arrêté le même jour que l’éviction de Carlos Pineda, remettant en cause l’impartialité des institutions accusées de garder en place un pouvoir autoritaire et corrompu.

Le Guatemala traverse depuis plus de 5 ans une crise socio-politique liée en grande partie aux nombreuses affaires de corruption au sein du gouvernement. L’expression devenue commune de “Pacte de corrompus” regroupe oligarques, hommes d’affaires et parfois même trafiquants de drogue qui s’allient afin de passer outre les institutions publiques et garantir leur immunité. En 2007, a été créée la Commission internationale contre l’impunité au Guatemala (CICIG), institution onusienne qui a démantelé plusieurs réseaux de corruption et qui a envoyé l’ancien président Otto Pérez Molina en prison en 2015 pour ces mêmes raisons. De grandes manifestations ont alors eu lieu dans tout le pays, donnant voix à une société civile jusqu’alors inexistante. La CICIG a été contrainte d’arrêter ses activités en 2019 sur l’ordre du président de l’époque Jimmy Morales lorsque ce dernier a fait l’objet d’une enquête liée au financement illicite de sa campagne, malgré une grande popularité au sein de la population. Sous la présidence d’Alejandro Giammattei, environ 30 juges et procureurs spécialistes de la lutte contre la corruption ont été contraints de s’exiler. De même, la liberté de la presse est mise à mal, avec nombre de journalistes enquêtant sur des scandales de corruption à répétition qui sont ensuite poursuivis en justice et parfois contraints de s’exiler. En témoigne le sort du quotidien El Periodico, symbole de la presse d’opposition, qui a dû cesser ses publications le mois dernier après de nombreuses tentatives d’intimidation et de procès politiques de la part de l’État. De nombreuses ONG, ainsi que des gouvernements, dénoncent une tentative de « criminalisation » du travail de journaliste au Guatemala. Malgré ces évictions témoignant de la détérioration des mécanismes institutionnels, d’une liberté de la presse bafouée, d’une corruption généralisée à peine dissimulée, la population guatémaltèque ne compte pas se précipiter aux urnes le 25 juin, faisant état d’un désintérêt et d’une lassitude partagée.

À la suite des trois exclusions, il reste donc 22 candidats en lice. Trois dénotent et sont placés en tête, notamment grâce à l’éviction de Carlos Pineda qui leur bénéficie en distribuant ses voix. Sandra Torres, avec son vice-président Romeo Guerra, représente le parti Union Nacional de la Esperanza se revendiquant de « centre gauche », et est considérée favorite avec 23% d’intentions de vote. Ex-première dame, ancienne épouse d’Alvaro Colom, elle a déclaré vouloir mettre en place des mesures sécuritaires similaires à celles de Nayib Bukele, président du Salvador. Le dirigeant populiste-autoritaire est devenu une figure en Amérique latine (avec un taux d’approbation situé dans son pays entre 70% et 90% selon les enquêtes) grâce à sa stratégie de répression agressive des gangs déployée depuis mars 2022. Son gouvernement a fait emprisonner plus de 68 000 personnes affiliées ou non aux réseaux de trafic salvadoriens au travers d’arrestations arbitraires, piétinant l’État de droit, et présageant un tournant vers l’autoritarisme. Sandra Torres n’est pas la seule à s’inspirer largement des méthodes Bukele : c’est également le cas de Zury Rios (Valor, extrême droite, avec comme pour colistier Héctor Cifuentes), en troisième position avec 19% d’intentions de vote, et qui, constitutionnellement, ne devrait pas être en mesure de se présenter à l’élection, étant la fille de l’ancien dictateur Efrain Rios Montt. Zury Rios a exprimé son admiration envers Bukele, promettant qu’elle lancerait au moins trois projets de construction de « méga prisons ». Entre Zury Rios et Sandra Torres se trouve Edmond Mullet avec son vice-président Max Santa Cruz (Cabal, centre droit) qui comptabilise 21% d’intentions de vote.

Il est intéressant de noter que peu d’informations relatives aux programmes des candidats sont accessibles, à la fois dans les médias, mais aussi sur les sites internet, et surtout que peu de choses différencient ces programmes. Ces derniers sont principalement axés autour de propositions sécuritaires et, curieusement, autour de la lutte contre la corruption, sans qu’ils ne parviennent à établir de véritables propositions au profit de la population. En ce qui concerne le parti sortant (Vamos, conservateur), le score du candidat, Manuel Conde, et de son colistier Luis Suarez, montre l’impopularité du gouvernement d’Alejandro Giammattei : les intentions de vote pour eux s’élèvent à peine à 4%.

C’est donc dans un contexte de fermeture de l’espace démocratique et d’atteintes à l’État de droit que vont se dérouler les élections d’ici quelques jours. L’unique possibilité de construire une force d’opposition se situe au sein de l’élection des membres du Congrès, avec une coalition de députés qui puisse être indépendante du pouvoir exécutif.

Pascal Boniface · Quel monde après la guerre en Ukraine ? Avec Hubert Védrine | Entretiens géopo

Following the conclusion of the ‘Fit for 55’ package, European Union (EU) climate policy will enter its next phase. One of the most important decisions will be how to set the economy-wide emissions reduction target for 2040, which will form the starting point for the next round of revisions of all EU climate policy legislation. The European Climate Law stipulates that the European Commission shall propose a 2040 target that is based, among other things, on a “projected indicative Union greenhouse gas budget for the 2030–2050 period”, informed by a report of the newly established European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change. While cumulating emissions resulting from different future trajectories can help to assess ambition levels, strictly deriving a ‘science-based’ EU emissions budget from the global carbon budget has sev­eral pitfalls. The debate on the design of EU climate policy after 2030 should not put too much focus on the ‘appropriate’ target for 2040 but on how to further devel­op the governance architecture, strengthen policy instruments, and bolster public support.

Partnerschaften für lokale Wertschöpfung in mineralischen Lieferketten

After more than 15 years of negotiations, the United Nations adopted the first international treaty on the protection of the high seas on 19 June 2023.  The new agreement on the “conservation and sustainable use of marine biological diversity of areas beyond national jurisdiction”, known as the BBNJ, specifically focuses on the international implementation of regulations for the protection of life in the open oceans. Its main objective is to enhance international cooperation among various actors and bridge existing gaps in marine biodiversity protection.

A long voyage

There has long been a governance gap related to the protection of marine biodiversity and addressing the challenges posed by illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing, as well as other human-induced pressures in areas beyond national jurisdiction. The governance of the high seas has been fragmented thus far, with various regional and sectoral actors having become involved. This led to international efforts to develop a new, unifying “High Seas Treaty” under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS serves as the governing “constitution” for the world’s oceans; however, it primarily focuses on regulating economic activities.

The key focus of the BBNJ agreement is to strike a balance between the benefits of ocean use and the exploitation of marine resources and the risks posed by such activities to marine ecosystems. It aims to provide states with detailed processes, thresholds, and guidelines for conducting environmental impact assessments (EIAs) in the marine environment. The agreement also includes provisions for considering the cumulative impacts of multiple activities and proposes comprehensive monitoring and reporting obligations.

The BBNJ will enter into force 120 days after it has been ratified by 60 signatory states – a process that may take several years, though key actors such as France are pushing for the treaty to enter into force before the 2025 UN Ocean Conference in Nice. In the meantime, the regular sessions of the proposed Preparatory Commission could provide a forum to engage on crucial matters concerning marine biodiversity, including climate change. If the preparatory phase is handled with care, creating appropriate synergies and alliances, the BBNJ could become a game-changing global forum for ocean governance writ-large, with the potential to strengthen the connections between climate, ocean, and biodiversity governance.

Even as the world celebrates the successful adoption of the BBNJ treaty, it is evident that significant challenges remain to be navigated. The conflicts and tensions that shaped the treaty negotiations can be expected to be carried forward into the ratification and implementation phases. A key example of countries’ different priorities became apparent in the protracted debate surrounding the inclusion of the principle of the common heritage of humankind versus the reference to the “freedom of the high seas”. Other particularly contentious issues were those related to the use of marine genetic resources, especially the equitable sharing of benefits. The successful conclusion of negotiations heavily relied on the reconciliation of interests between industrialised countries, developing countries, and emerging economies. Also, reaching consensus with China on politically charged issues such as the establishment of marine protected areas in the South China Sea was crucial. Balancing these and other conflicting interests will continue to be essential for progress on the governance of the high seas.

Jointly navigating uncharted waters

Formally, it is possible to pass BBNJ resolutions with a three-fourths majority, meaning that not all parties need necessarily agree, for example, that a new marine protected area be created. However, achieving this would require significant political effort and the building of strategic alliances. In this vein, Germany and the EU should use this transition period to develop strategies to deepen existing partnerships, for example with African states, and create new international coalitions within the forum at the nexus of climate, ocean, and biodiversity governance.

To fully leverage the potential of the new forum, concerted coordination on joint positions and the sharing of competencies between the EU and the delegations of the member states will be necessary. In addition, it will be crucial that member states send delegations with a wide range of relevant experience and expertise to the new forum. This should ideally include not only the international lawyers who have primarily been involved thus far, but also biodiversity and marine protection experts. Within »Team Germany«, this may be partially ensured by shifting responsibility for coordinating BBNJ-related issues from the German Federal Foreign Office to the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety and Consumer Protection.

A final open question relates to the EU and Germany’s agenda within the forum, and the issues that delegations may want to focus on during the BBNJ implementation phase.  We believe that identifying synergies at the nexus of climate, ocean, and biodiversity governance should be a key issue, especially in light of increased scientific and commercial interest in “using” the ocean as an enhanced carbon sink to help meet climate targets. Ocean biodiversity protection is a climate issue, and vice versa, and the BBNJ offers a unique new opportunity for the global community to jointly address this nexus.

The Black Sea is a region of tension. It is the arena of the Russia-NATO confrontation while at the same time serving as a projection area for Russian and Turkish visions of regional order. Turkey’s special role in the region stems primarily from the imple­men­tation of the Montreux Convention, which for much of the last century has meant a reduction in unilateral spheres of influence and dominance. The non-ripar­ian states are supposed to be excluded. For Turkey, the Montreux Convention is a lever of power. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has enabled it to use this lever even more in the service of its own interests. NATO’s room for manoeuvre, on the other hand, has been reduced in the current situation. Turkey is an essential element in the Alliance’s collective defence. However, since the outbreak of the Rus­sian war against Ukraine, NATO is no longer present in the Black Sea. This means that an important pillar of deterrence and defence is missing. In this respect, there is a dualism regarding the conceptions of order in the Black Sea region at two different levels: the regional and the global.

The Coronavirus pandemic has created new vulnerabilities and deepened existing ones. In Ghana, the overall headcount poverty decline has disguised a large group of vulnerable households now threatened with falling back into poverty given the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article draws on new household panel data to analyse transient poverty, the drivers of vulnerability before and since the COVID-19 pandemic and provides implications for social protection. Using poverty transition matrices, we first measure poverty episodes which help to not only track the movements in and out of poverty but also to identify and categorize households into distinctive groups. We then apply logistic regression to examine the determinants of vulnerability to poverty before evaluating COVID-19 vulnerabilities in the context of social protection in Ghana. We find that a large group of struggling households exist between the poor and the stable middle classes that have been overlooked by cash transfer programmes. We characterize this group and show that current vulnerability measurements and social protection design need adjustments. We also find that poverty and vulnerability to it is no longer a rural phenomenon as the transient poor since the COVID-19 pandemic are mostly located in urban areas and largely not covered by current social protection systems. Both vertical and horizontal expansion of social policy is required to reach these new groups and new locations. For reducing poverty and limiting vulnerability in developing country contexts, our findings imply that (a) new measurements and targeting may be required, (b) vulnerable informal groups in urban areas need to be included, and (c) new types of social protection for struggling households are required to prevent their falling back into poverty in the event of aggregate shocks.

The Coronavirus pandemic has created new vulnerabilities and deepened existing ones. In Ghana, the overall headcount poverty decline has disguised a large group of vulnerable households now threatened with falling back into poverty given the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article draws on new household panel data to analyse transient poverty, the drivers of vulnerability before and since the COVID-19 pandemic and provides implications for social protection. Using poverty transition matrices, we first measure poverty episodes which help to not only track the movements in and out of poverty but also to identify and categorize households into distinctive groups. We then apply logistic regression to examine the determinants of vulnerability to poverty before evaluating COVID-19 vulnerabilities in the context of social protection in Ghana. We find that a large group of struggling households exist between the poor and the stable middle classes that have been overlooked by cash transfer programmes. We characterize this group and show that current vulnerability measurements and social protection design need adjustments. We also find that poverty and vulnerability to it is no longer a rural phenomenon as the transient poor since the COVID-19 pandemic are mostly located in urban areas and largely not covered by current social protection systems. Both vertical and horizontal expansion of social policy is required to reach these new groups and new locations. For reducing poverty and limiting vulnerability in developing country contexts, our findings imply that (a) new measurements and targeting may be required, (b) vulnerable informal groups in urban areas need to be included, and (c) new types of social protection for struggling households are required to prevent their falling back into poverty in the event of aggregate shocks.

The Coronavirus pandemic has created new vulnerabilities and deepened existing ones. In Ghana, the overall headcount poverty decline has disguised a large group of vulnerable households now threatened with falling back into poverty given the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. This article draws on new household panel data to analyse transient poverty, the drivers of vulnerability before and since the COVID-19 pandemic and provides implications for social protection. Using poverty transition matrices, we first measure poverty episodes which help to not only track the movements in and out of poverty but also to identify and categorize households into distinctive groups. We then apply logistic regression to examine the determinants of vulnerability to poverty before evaluating COVID-19 vulnerabilities in the context of social protection in Ghana. We find that a large group of struggling households exist between the poor and the stable middle classes that have been overlooked by cash transfer programmes. We characterize this group and show that current vulnerability measurements and social protection design need adjustments. We also find that poverty and vulnerability to it is no longer a rural phenomenon as the transient poor since the COVID-19 pandemic are mostly located in urban areas and largely not covered by current social protection systems. Both vertical and horizontal expansion of social policy is required to reach these new groups and new locations. For reducing poverty and limiting vulnerability in developing country contexts, our findings imply that (a) new measurements and targeting may be required, (b) vulnerable informal groups in urban areas need to be included, and (c) new types of social protection for struggling households are required to prevent their falling back into poverty in the event of aggregate shocks.

In 2016, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report established their now longstanding project “Prioritization and Sequencing of Security Council Mandates.” Since the project’s inception, more than thirty closed-door workshops have been convened with the aim of making UN peace operations more effective by helping member-state representatives, UN staff, and independent experts analyze how mandates can be adapted to reflect overarching political objectives and better respond to political processes and operational dynamics on the ground.

Given the interest in continuing this project, the project partners decided to convene a lessons-learned workshop to capture feedback and document suggestions for improving the project. This note summarizes observations raised during the first part of the workshop, focusing on current trends, practices, and dynamics related to the mandating process within the Security Council and its impact on UN peace operations. Overall, the discussion revolved around three main issues: the increasingly polarized Security Council and its mandating practices, the role of elected members (E10) and host states in the penholder system, and the effective prioritization and sequencing of mandates.

The following were key points from the discussion regarding future Security Council mandates:

• Participants emphasized that divides in the Security Council have hindered the ability of UN missions to effectively carry out their mandates. They therefore suggested that the Secretariat be more involved in conversations between member states and peacekeeping missions while cautioning against the potential divides this could create between missions and host states.
• Participants recommended an increase in communication between penholders and host states during the mandate negotiation process but warned against the possibility of host governments exerting undue pressure during negotiations.
• Participants agreed that streamlining mandate language has allowed missions to adapt to evolving situations on the ground but asserted that it is still too early to determine the full impact of cuts in language, particularly on priority activities like human rights, the protection of civilians, and women, peace, and security.

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Die Krise in Griechenland ist überwunden, meinen viele. Doch im Zuge der Neuwahlen wird klar: Noch sind viele Missstände im Land nicht behoben.

European official development assistance to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries increased sharply after 2011, ostensibly in support of the social, economic, and above all political changes demanded by the Arab uprisings. The subsequent turn to development policies driven by security and anti-migration agendas, especially following the Syria refugee crisis of 2015, raises the question whether initial expressions of support for democratic transformation were ever backed by concrete measures. Our analysis reveals that, while all donors promised to support democracy in MENA countries, none had a clear strategy for doing so via their development cooperation. At the practice level, while programmes and projects were aimed at supporting change in specific contexts, increases in aid were mostly unrelated to political change. The social, economic, and political tensions behind the Arab uprisings remain unresolved more than a decade on, meaning that there is likely a need to learn lessons from the period following 2011.

European official development assistance to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries increased sharply after 2011, ostensibly in support of the social, economic, and above all political changes demanded by the Arab uprisings. The subsequent turn to development policies driven by security and anti-migration agendas, especially following the Syria refugee crisis of 2015, raises the question whether initial expressions of support for democratic transformation were ever backed by concrete measures. Our analysis reveals that, while all donors promised to support democracy in MENA countries, none had a clear strategy for doing so via their development cooperation. At the practice level, while programmes and projects were aimed at supporting change in specific contexts, increases in aid were mostly unrelated to political change. The social, economic, and political tensions behind the Arab uprisings remain unresolved more than a decade on, meaning that there is likely a need to learn lessons from the period following 2011.

European official development assistance to Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries increased sharply after 2011, ostensibly in support of the social, economic, and above all political changes demanded by the Arab uprisings. The subsequent turn to development policies driven by security and anti-migration agendas, especially following the Syria refugee crisis of 2015, raises the question whether initial expressions of support for democratic transformation were ever backed by concrete measures. Our analysis reveals that, while all donors promised to support democracy in MENA countries, none had a clear strategy for doing so via their development cooperation. At the practice level, while programmes and projects were aimed at supporting change in specific contexts, increases in aid were mostly unrelated to political change. The social, economic, and political tensions behind the Arab uprisings remain unresolved more than a decade on, meaning that there is likely a need to learn lessons from the period following 2011.