Europäische Union

Une enquête réalisée en janvier a révélé que 48 % des étudiants ont déjà dû se passer de manger pour des raisons financières et que 23 % d'entre eux le font plusieurs fois par mois

The post La France instaure des repas universitaires à un euro pour tous les étudiants appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Alors que le désaccord entre Washington et Berlin s'étend à la mer Égée, le ministre allemand des Affaires étrangères cherche à rassurer la Grèce sans compromettre l'équilibre délicat avec Ankara sur les questions de défense

The post Berlin pose des garde-fous sur l’utilisation de ses armes par la Turquie appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Dauer des Videos : 90'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

L'ambassadeur Ahmed Alattar appelle les partenaires internationaux à faire preuve de plus de clarté et de fiabilité

The post INTERVIEW : L’ambassadeur des Émirats arabes unis plaide pour des « partenaires fiables » face à l’Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

EU citizens should have more ways to get a car checked, but frequency of mandatory tests should not change, say Transport and Tourism Committee MEPs.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

EU citizens should have more ways to get a car checked, but frequency of mandatory tests should not change, say Transport and Tourism Committee MEPs.
Committee on Transport and Tourism

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

DÉCRYPTAGE - Minée par ses divisions internes, la gauche non-mélenchoniste peine à faire émerger une offre alternative au leader Insoumis, reparti dimanche soir en campagne présidentielle.

Dauer des Videos : 30'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Le vieux lien transatlantique se meurt, la défense européenne tarde à apparaître et dans ce clair-obscur stratégique Vladimir Poutine pourrait surgir en prenant pied dans les pays baltes pour mettre fin à toute aide à l’Ukraine… sous la menace de la force nucléaire.

Incapables de se défendre comme les États-Unis – ce qui n’est ni financièrement possible, ni stratégiquement souhaitable – et ne voulant pas se battre comme les Ukrainiens – au prix de dizaines de milliers de morts – les Européens doivent inventer leur propre façon de faire la guerre ; une guerre qui ne sera pas la copie de celle qui se déroule en Ukraine.

La défense européenne doit donc se renforcer conventionnellement mais aussi intégrer une composante nucléaire spécifiquement européenne afin d’éviter tout chantage de la part de la Russie, mais aussi tout abus du protecteur américain.

C’est la voie que trace l’évolution de la doctrine nucléaire française. Cette évolution pourrait marquer le début d’une cohésion indispensable pour que les États européens puissent conjurer ensemble une menace qu’ils ne peuvent affronter isolément. Un nouvel avenir possible se dessine. Aux Européens de le construire. Vite.

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L’article Mourir pour Zilupe ? La guerre qui vient est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Even though the security landscape has changed drastically since the Cold War, the main goals for Swedish arms cooperation have stayed roughly the same. Cooperation is seen as valuable for gaining access to competence, for preserving domestic competence, and for decreasing unit costs for procured equipment.

The Swedish experiences of international arms collaboration vary. Success factors include constructive dialogues and relations with the partner countries and companies, and trust. Challenges include country specific equipment requirements, protection of domestic defence companies, and the differences in export regulations.

Sweden will, like other countries, continue to seek the arms cooperations that benefit its national security and its defence industry. More specifically, Sweden is interested in exploring the potential of NATO collaboration, in the light of the newly acquired membership. Sweden also recognises the potential of the EU initiatives like the EDIP and the EDF, but it is through the combination of NATO and EU initiatives that real impact can be achieved. Upcoming strategic procurement decisions will also form the Swedish industry and what collaborations Sweden will pursue in the future.

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• ARES Group #128 – Comment (PDF)

L’article Which Type of Armament Cooperation Do We Want/Need? The Case of Sweden est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Written by Marketa Pape

While the right to housing is recognised by the European Pillar of Social Rights, the supply of housing in the EU has not kept up with demand. The recent cost-of living crisis has made the lack of adequate, affordable and sustainable housing more palpable. While the responsibility for housing provision lies with EU Member States, regions and cities, the debates around the 2024 European elections showed that citizens expected the EU to step up its action beyond guidance and funding.

In response, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen made housing part of a Commissioner’s portfolio. In parallel, all EU institutions started work to contribute to the new EU policy.

More than a year later, the basis of a coordinated EU approach is in place. European leaders have for the first time discussed the challenge of affordable housing in the European Council. Existing EU rules have been reviewed and EU funding possibilities made more flexible.The European Investment Bank has stepped up its investment support and, together with partner banks, is finalising a pan-European housing investment portal.

The Commission has put forward the European affordable housing plan and accompanying initiatives, which included changes to State aid rules, a housing construction strategy and a proposed recommendation on the New European Bauhaus policy and funding initiative. The Commission also outlined further steps, including legislative ones.

For its part, the European Parliament has put forward a set of recommendations prepared by its Special Committee on the Housing Crisis, ranging from simpler and digital procedures for granting housing permits – within a 60-day deadline – to tax measures to support low- and middle-income households.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Developing a coordinated EU approach to housing‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Marin Mileusnic and Tim Peters.

CONTEXT

On 16 July 2025, the European Commission adopted a proposal for a regulation establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities (‘performance regulation’), as part of a wide-ranging package on the next EU long-term budget – the 2028-2034 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal aims to simplify and harmonise how EU spending is tracked and its performance measured, moving towards a single system with standardised indicators. It defines horizontal spending principles with a view to streamlining their application across the EU budget: climate and biodiversity, ‘do no significant harm’ to the environment, social policies, and gender equality. Although competitiveness and preparedness play a major role in the next long-term budget, and the European Parliament had requested to include them as horizontal spending principles, the Commission did not include them.

Ahead of the proposal, Parliament had called for further improvements in performance reporting under the EU budget, while underlining that the ‘implementation of horizontal principles should not lead to an excessive administrative burden on beneficiaries’. A stronger performance framework can improve Parliament’s decision-making on EU spending through more transparency. However, increased transparency from a proposed single portal to access EU budgetary data will depend on what information is made available. A briefing requested by Parliament’s Committee on Budgetary Control underlined that improved access to information – such as exchanges between the Commission and Member States, or to information about suspended milestones – was essential for public accountability. According to the European Court of Auditors, the proposal can improve processes for performance reporting and integration of EU horizontal policy priorities, but has design weaknesses to be addressed, including vague indicators, lack of clear results-based linkages, and risks of measuring implementation rather than achievements. The Court estimates that the proposal may achieve simplification between the Commission and the Member States, but that the administrative burden at national, regional and beneficiary levels may remain unchanged or even worsen.

Legislative proposal

2025/0545(COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a budget expenditure tracking and performance framework and other horizontal rules for the Union programmes and activities – COM(2025) 565,

NEXT STEPS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule: 2025/0545(COD)

Read the complete briefing on ‘Budget expenditure tracking and performance framework‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Le retrait effectif des Émirats arabes unis de l’Organisation des pays exportateurs de pétrole (OPEP), ce vendredi 1er mai 2026, n’est pas une surprise en soi. C’est le timing choisi qui l’est. En effet, la question des quotas d’exportation de pétrole est depuis quelques années le principal point de friction entre l’Arabie saoudite et Abou Dhabi, Riyad souhaitant restreindre l’offre des pays de l’OPEP pour garantir, avec l’appui de la Russie au sein de l’OPEP+, un prix de rentabilité qui répond à ses besoins de financement pour son plan ambitieux de développement « Vision 2030 ». Les Émirats qui exportaient avant le conflit en Iran près de 3MB/J avaient l’ambition d’augmenter leur production aux alentours de 5 MB/J. Cette ambition avait été annoncée par Sultan Al-Jaber, ministre de l’Énergie, président de la Compagnie nationale pétrolière d’Abou Dhabi (ADNOC) lors de la COP28 qu’il présidait.

Ce retrait aura sans doute une incidence sur le fonctionnement de l’OPEP déjà affaibli par plusieurs départs, dont celui du Qatar en 2018. L’organisation qui contrôlait 50 % du pétrole mis sur le marché ne représente plus que 30 % de la production mondiale.

Une temporalité qui souligne des approches divergentes sur le conflit avec l’Iran

Ce qui surprend le plus dans cette décision de se retirer de l’OPEP est sa temporalité. Ce retrait vient en plein milieu d’un conflit dont l’issue n’est pas prévisible. Les Émirats, qui jusqu’ici essayaient de ménager leur voisin iranien et servaient de coffre-fort aux dépôts des oligarques iraniens (gardiens de la révolution et autres mollahs), ont changé de stratégie. 

Les Émirats ont été probablement le pays le plus ciblé par les tirs de missiles et de drones iraniens. Ils ne sont pas intervenus militairement en appui de leurs alliés américain et israélien et ont bénéficié de l’aide française en vertu des accords de défense qui lient les deux pays. Les récentes déclarations du 1er mai sur le réseau social X de Anwar Gargash, l’influent conseiller politique de Mohamed Ben Zayed, ne laissent place à aucune ambiguïté : « Bien entendu on ne peut faire confiance à aucune disposition unilatérale iranienne ni s’appuyer sur elle après l’agression perfide contre l’ensemble de ses voisins ». La confiance est désormais totalement rompue avec l’Iran. Et en coulisse, les Émirats incitent les États-Unis à reprendre les hostilités.

Le choix des alliances

Abou Dhabi se singularise des autres États du Golfe par sa proximité avec Israël. L’entente avec Tel-Aviv va bien au-delà d’une reconnaissance ou de l’établissement de relations diplomatiques. Les deux pays sont engagés dans de nombreuses coopérations notamment dans le domaine de la défense. Israël aurait récemment fourni à son partenaire du Golfe un système sophistiqué de défense contre les missiles.

La coopération entre Israël et les Émirats s’étend à l’Afrique. Les Émiriens leur ont ouvert les portes du Somaliland un point très stratégique dans la Corne de l’Afrique et qui se situe à une courte distance du Yémen des Houthis.

Cette stratégie en solo exaspère le grand voisin saoudien qui a adopté une toute autre approche. Riyad maintient son alliance avec Washington et se garde bien de répliquer aux propos insultants de Donald Trump. En même temps, le royaume wahhabite privilégie désormais d’autres alliances en essayant de construire un axe avec le Pakistan, la Turquie et l’Égypte trois puissances régionales. Les Saoudiens veulent neutraliser la menace iranienne sans vouloir l’anéantissement de l’Iran. En cela, ils semblent beaucoup plus proches des Omanais (qui ont été marginalisés par les États-Unis). Abbas Araghchi, le ministre des Affaires étrangères iranien, s’est ainsi rendu à Mascate le 25 avril avant de se rendre à Moscou. Il a été reçu par le Sultan et a eu des discussions approfondies avec son homologue Sayed Badr Al-Busaïdi. Pourtant Oman a toujours été prudent dans ses relations avec l’Iran. Est-ce par sympathie pour le régime ou un choix de conserver des relations de bon voisinage avec un puissant voisin qui a des capacités de nuisance importantes ?

L’absence de réaction des pays du Golfe aux attaques iraniennes : impuissance ou attentisme prudent ?

L’absence de réaction des pays du Golfe dans leur ensemble est surprenante. Leurs installations vitales ont été durement frappées par les attaques balistiques iraniennes sans que cela entraîne de répliques de leur part. Ces pays auraient pu participer même symboliquement à des ripostes, vu le formidable arsenal accumulé, avec l’appui des forces américaines. Ils ont privilégié une attitude attentiste, voire pusillanime. Les Omanais qui partagent le contrôle du détroit d’Ormuz avec les Iraniens et dont une grande partie du trafic s’effectuait sur le rail dans leurs eaux territoriales ont accepté cette fermeture sans sourciller.

Cette absence de réaction peut se comprendre par les doutes sur la capacité des Américains et des Israéliens à détruire les capacités de nuisance de l’Iran, leur voisin immédiat, et avec lequel il faudra continuer de compter.

Cela explique aussi la volonté émirienne qui se distingue des autres monarchies du Golfe par cette envie d’en finir une fois pour toutes avec cette menace.

Quelles conséquences pour les pays du CCG ?

Ce conflit aura de multiples conséquences. Il officialisera une rupture de fait entre les deux monarchies rivales (Arabie saoudite et Émirats), mais pourrait remettre en question le fonctionnement du Conseil de coopération du Golfe (CCG) qui n’a jamais réussi à concilier les intérêts, souvent divergents, des uns et des autres.

L’autre conséquence sera la diminution de l’importance du détroit d’Ormuz comme débouché pour les exportations de pétrole et autres. D’ores et déjà, des plans pour faire renaître de vieilles routes sont à l’étude (le chemin de fer du Hedjaz pourrait être étendu à tous les pays du Golfe et aboutir en Méditerranée par exemple), l’Arabie saoudite dispose déjà du port de Yanbu qui lui permet d’exporter une grande partie de sa production de pétrole par la mer Rouge. Les Émiriens renforceront les capacités de leur débouché maritime à Fujairah dans la mer d’Arabie en dehors du détroit. Les Omanais ont eu une intuition qui s’avérera gagnante en développant l’immense complexe maritime de Duqm sur l’océan Indien. 

Le conflit avec l’Iran aura eu le mérite de clarifier les positions des uns et des autres.

L’article Retrait de l’OPEP : le pari risqué des Émirats arabes unis est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

Written by Anna Flynn.

The EU immediately strongly condemned Russia’s unprovoked attack on Ukraine on 24 February 2022, and has done so repeatedly since. By 31 March 2026, the number of civilian casualties in Ukraine had reached 58 930, according to the United Nations. Since the beginning of the war , the EU has provided €200.6 billion in support for Ukraine, representing the Union’s largest civil protection operation to date.

The European Parliament labelled Russia’s war ‘the most outrageous act of aggression conducted by the political leadership of a given country in Europe since 1945′. The EU’s response has been structured along three axes: political, economic and military support for Ukraine; isolation and containment of Russia; and enhancement of EU and EU neighbours’ resilience.

Parliament’s extraordinary meeting of 1 March 2022, during which it adopted a resolution unequivocally condemning Russia’s aggression and setting the direction for EU action, was one of the first international gatherings to which Ukraine’s President, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, spoke. Parliament’s President, Roberta Metsola, was the first EU leader to visit Kyiv after the Russian invasion, on 1 April 2022. In September 2025, Metsola officially opened a permanent European Parliament liaison office in Kyiv. 

Since the start of the war, Parliament has dealt with multiple legislative files of paramount importance for Ukraine, and adopted numerous non-legislative resolutions on aspects of EU support for the country; including several rounds of macro-financial assistance, the Act in support of ammunition production (ASAP); and the Ukraine Facility, which earmarks €50 billion for Ukraine’s reconstruction from 2024 to 2027.

On 18 December 2025, the European Council agreed a €90 billion Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. Without this, Ukraine was expected to run out of funds in early 2026. Instead of using Russian assets, this loan is financed through EU borrowing secured on the ‘headroom’ in the EU’s budget and should cover two thirds of Ukraine’s financing needs for 2026 and 2027.

To implement the European Council’s decision, the Commission presented three legislative proposals on 14 January 2026:

• A regulation implementing the establishment of the Ukraine Support Loan for 2026 and 2027. This loan is based on enhanced cooperation, and therefore implies no financial obligations for Czechia, Hungary and Slovakia ;
• A regulation amending the Ukraine Facility in its current form so that it can be used for the Ukraine Support Loan;
• A regulation amending the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF) to allow this to guarantee the loan and finance the interest.

On 20 January 2026, Parliament agreed that these three proposals should be treated under the urgent procedure, meaning that it can vote on the regulations without a parliamentary report. A day later, Parliament gave its consent to use the enhanced cooperation procedure for the Ukraine Support Loan, and Parliament’s plenary adopted its position on the three proposals on 11 February 2026.

However, on 23 February 2026, Hungary blocked the third regulation (amending the MFF) in the Council of the EU, which required a unanimous vote amongst the 27 Member States. The other two proposals were signed by the Council and Parliament on 24 February 2026. On 6 May 2026, Parliament’s Committee on Budgets (BUDG) held a public hearing on financing Ukraine’s reconstruction through the MFF.

Moreover, Parliament has unwaveringly supported Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations, advocating successfully in June 2022 for Ukraine to be granted candidate country status, and in December 2023 for Member States to start accession negotiations. Screening meetings concluded in September 2025, meaning that Ukraine is ready to start negotiations on all policy ‘clusters’. Related to these negotiations, Ukraine has a list of reform targets to meet in 2026. However, accession negotiations have not properly started due to lack of the required unanimity in the Council.

On 12 December 2025, the Council adopted a regulation indefinitely prohibiting the transfer back to Russia of Russian assets (of the Central Bank of Russia) immobilised in the EU. This money has been frozen since the war began. The European Parliament has repeatedly called for the assets (amounting to around €300 billion) to be used to finance Ukraine’s reconstruction. However, it is a divisive issue due to potential economic, legal, and reputational consequences, and for the moment the European Council has not decided to do so.

Parliament also supports the EU’s sanctions against Russia. On 23 April 2026, the EU adopted its 20th package of sanctions against Russia, introducing 120 additional listings. In 2025, Russia represented 1.1 % of EU world trade in goods, shifting from the EU’s fourth largest trading partner in 2007 to 19th place in 2025.

Parliament continues to employ its budgetary, agenda-setting, external action and law-making powers to mobilise solid EU support for Ukraine’s defence against Russia’s aggression, and to ensure that the EU honours its pledges.

Links

• EU Support for Ukraine for 2026-2027
• Ten Issues to Watch in 2026
• Russia under Vladamir Putin
• State of play: EU support to Ukraine
• Financing Ukraine in 2026 and 2027
• Act in support of ammunition production

Other links

• EU solidarity with Ukraine
• Number of civilian casualties in Ukraine during Russia’s invasion verified by OHCHR from February 24, 2022 to March 31, 2026
• EU adopts 20th package of sanctions against Russia
• European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine 

ÄNDERUNGSANTRÄGE - 2025 Commission report on Ukraine
Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten
Michael Gahler

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Dauer des Videos : 75'

Haftungsausschluss : Die Verdolmetschung der Debatten soll die Kommunikation erleichtern, sie stellt jedoch keine authentische Aufzeichnung der Debatten dar. Authentisch sind nur die Originalfassungen der Reden bzw. ihre überprüften schriftlichen Übersetzungen.
Quelle : © Europäische Union, 2026 - EP

Written by Clare Fergurson and Katarzyna Sochacka.

Members also debated how to ensure accountability and justice in response to Russia’s continued attacks against the civilian population in Ukraine; and the danger of normalising relations with Russia, including its participation in major cultural and sports events. Members also discussed how to support democratic resilience in Armenia; the situation on the implementation of a ceasefire in Lebanon, peace efforts and humanitarian access; as well as Sudan’s ‘abandoned’ humanitarian crisis. Further debates covered the presentation of the Better Regulation and Enforcement Communication from the European Commission; the need for targeted criminal provisions and platforms’ responsibility to effectively address cyberbullying and online harassment; the need to combat antisemitism and protect Jewish life in Europe, following the recent attacks against the Jewish community in the Netherlands and Belgium; and Roma inclusion, equality and fundamental rights.

2028-2034 EU budget: Parliament’s position

Parliament adopted its negotiating mandate for the EU’s 2028-2034 budget following a debate on the interim report on the multiannual financial framework (MFF). The report of the Committee on Budgets (BUDG) defends a budget set at 1.27 % of the EU’s gross national income (GNI), excluding Next Generation EU (NGEU) repayment. This is a 10 % increase compared with the Commission proposal. BUDG also calls for a budget of €385.12 billion to be ringfenced for the common agricultural policy in the next MFF, with a €274.34 billion budget for cohesion policy. In terms of governance and rule of law, Members are concerned that the proposed budget weakens transparency, and stress that the Commission must apply the necessary legal provisions in cases where the EU’s financial interests are threatened.

Guidelines for the 2027 budget

Members adopted guidelines for the 2027 budget, following the debate held during the March session. The 2027 annual EU budget will be the last one under the current multiannual financial framework (MFF), which covers 2021 to 2027. The European Parliament’s set of guidelines contribute to the preparation of next year’s budget, with the Commission expected to adopt the draft 2027 budget in early summer.

Discharge 2024

Members granted discharge for the 2024 financial year to the various institutions and bodies of the EU, except for the Council and European Council. The Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) had recommended granting discharge to the Commission and all six executive agencies, but raised concerns about the rule of law and corruption, calling on the Commission to ensure the EU budget is protected. Likewise, CONT recommended granting discharge to seven of the eight other institutions, but yet again recommended postponing discharge for the European Council and the Council of the EU. The Council refuses to acknowledge Parliament’s oversight role, and Parliament has therefore not granted discharge since 2009. The CONT committee also recommended granting discharge for all 33 EU decentralised agencies, but raised concerns about financial risks including rising EU debt and structural weaknesses in financial management, staffing and procurement.

Omnibus VI – chemicals

Rising energy costs and a decline in demand are affecting Europe’s chemicals industry. Parliament supports simplification of certain requirements but prioritises consumer protection and clear labelling. In April 2026, Members of the Committees on Environment, Climate and Food Safety (ENVI) and Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO) opposed the Commission’s proposals to extend the time before bans are applied on the use of carcinogenic substances in cosmetic products as well as the removal of certain text requirements to ensure labels remain legible for consumers. Parliament adopted its negotiating mandate for the ‘Omnibus VI proposal’, which aims at simplifying rules for chemicals, cosmetics and fertiliser manufacturing.

Emissions accounting in transport services

Transport is responsible for about a quarter of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG). Nevertheless, EU countries have to rely on emissions calculation tools with limited reliability in their efforts to cut emissions. Parliament adopted a proposed common framework to calculate GHG emissions from both freight and passenger transport. This follows a trilogue agreement reached by negotiators from the Committees on Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Transport and Tourism (TRAN). The agreed text, which Parliament considered at second reading, backs the Commission proposal for a single EU methodology and calls for a free public calculation tool to make data widely available. This universal methodology means a reduction in the administrative burden and allow for greater transparency and fairer comparison between services.

Generalised scheme of preferences

Reform of EU trade with less developed countries is on the horizon, and Members adopted a provisional agreement on revision of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) Regulation. Following negotiations between Parliament and the Council in December 2025, the agreed text includes the addition of new human rights and environmental treaties, which participating countries must ratify to benefit from trade preferences, as well as stricter criteria that must be met before GSP countries can see their preferential tariffs withdrawn for non-cooperation in the readmission of migrants illegally present in the EU. As adopted, the legislation would apply from 1 January 2027.

Consent-based definition of rape

As combating sexual violence and violence against women remains an urgent issue globally, Parliament continues to support a strong and survivor-centred legal framework. Members debated and adopted a joint own-initiative report from Parliament’s Committees on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM) and on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE), which calls on the Commission to propose EU legislation to define rape based on consent, in line with the Istanbul Convention. The report reiterates Parliament’s previous call to make gender-based violence a specific area of EU crime, stresses that legislation should also apply to virtual acts of sexual assault, and should consider circumstances in which giving consent is precluded. This marks a renewed legislative effort on reform after provisions on a consent-based definition of rape were not included in the EU directive adopted in 2024.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Five decisions to enter into interinstitutional negotiations – one from the Transport and Tourism Committee (TRAN) on registration documents for vehicles and vehicle registration data recorded in national vehicle registers; one from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL) on Directive 2004/37/EC as regards the addition of substances and setting limit values; two from the Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON) Committee on economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability, and on alignment with the EU economic governance framework and further simplification of that framework; as well as from Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) and Fisheries (PECH) committees on empowering France to accede to the Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles – were approved.

This ‘at a glance’ note is intended to review some of the highlights of the plenary part-session, and notably to follow up on key dossiers identified by EPRS. It does not aim to be exhaustive. For more detailed information on specific files, please see other EPRS products, notably our ‘EU legislation in progress’ briefings, and the plenary minutes.

Read this ‘at a glance note’ on ‘Plenary round-up – April 2026‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Il est temps que les dirigeants européens exposent nettement leurs désaccords à l’égard de Donald Trump et cessent de le craindre. À ce jour, rares sont les voix qui s’y opposent clairement, à l’image du pape ou du Premier ministre espagnol Pedro Sanchez.

Un simple exemple illustre la situation de nombreux dirigeants européens : après une timide remarque du chancelier Friedrich Merz affirmant que les Américains avaient été humiliés en Iran, Donald Trump a décidé d’augmenter les tarifs sur les exportations d’automobiles européennes de 15 à 25%, malgré les accords négociés longuement l’été dernier.

L’Europe doit-elle continuer à privilégier la relation transatlantique à tout prix ? Faut-il garder des bonnes relations par souci de préservation de l’unité de l’OTAN ? Celle-ci semble en réalité déjà très fragilisée. Ou alors s’agit-il d’assurer l’aide états-unienne à la défense de l’Ukraine ? Les Etats-Unis ont d’ores et déjà drastiquement diminué leur contribution et les pays européens supportent désormais la grande majorité de l’aide.

Dès lors, les pays européens doivent prendre leurs responsabilités, pour réaffirmer leurs valeurs et sauvegarder leur crédibilité. Pour cela, il faut bâtir une autonomie européenne commune, capable de se défendre face aux chantages du président des États-Unis.

L’article L’Europe doit dire à Trump « ça suffit » est apparu en premier sur IRIS.