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Lying on the other side of the globe, at first glance the Indo-Pacific seems as remote to European interests as it gets. A more careful consideration beyond the geographical distance reflected on the map, however, paints a rather different picture. The growing interconnectedness of the European and the Indo-Pacific theaters in the security realm, as well as trade dependencies in strategic commodities, such as critical minerals and semiconductors, necessitate the formulation of a more intentional EU Indo-Pacific policy recognizing the region’s centrality in Europe’s defense and economic security. At the same time, acknowledging the structural limitations of the prospective engagement is equally important. The delicate state of affairs in Taiwan and the brinkmanship in the South China Sea should also be factored in. The United States has long called for its European partners to shore up their presence in the Indo-Pacific not least to support Washington in its regional bras-de-fer with China. Besides Washington’s own agenda, a flare-up in the Indo-Pacific will have far-reaching consequences for the EU partners, both financially and strategically. After mapping the European interests linked to the region, this paper will explore the ways in which the EU may tangibly shift some of its attention to the Indo-Pacific demonstrating why this is critical and what constraints it is bound to face in the process.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Vasilis Petropoulos, ELIAMEP Fellow.

Introduction

The Indo-Pacific is the geographical space extending roughly from the eastern coast of Africa to the Western coast of the Americas. It encompasses South Asia, Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. This region hosts more than half of the world’s population, accounts for 60% of global GDP[1], and is home to the busiest maritime trade routes, such as the Strait of Malacca, the Taiwan Strait and the East and South China seas, featuring contested security flashpoints.

For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge.

The region is also the site of an intensifying rivalry between the United States and China, whose outcome will largely shape the future of the international order. For Europe, the Indo-Pacific is a space where economic interests, strategic dependencies, and global stability converge. Approximately 40 percent of the EU’s foreign trade passes through the South China Sea[2], and European industries depend heavily on supply chains rooted in East and Southeast Asia. Export controls on rare earths, disruptions in semiconductor production in Taiwan or delays in shipping through the Strait of Malacca would reverberate across Europe’s economy. Beyond economics, a military escalation in the region could fracture the transatlantic alliance and divert U.S. strategic focus away from Europe, leaving the EU more vulnerable on its eastern and southern flanks. But even absent an armed confrontation in Taiwan, the Indo-Pacific is directly tied to Europe’s security through the unprecedented dynamics to which the ongoing war in Ukraine has strikingly given shape. With North Korean troops fighting alongside the Russian invaders and with China implicitly bankrolling the beleaguered Russian economy -thus enabling the perpetuation of the Kremlin’s war effort- the Indo-Pacific theater appears to gradually become embedded into the security architecture of the Old Continent. Hybrid threats originating in the Indo-Pacific, such as organized crime and irregular migration, complete the heap of security-related matters that tie Europe to the region.

Recognizing these interconnections, the EU ought to turn anemic engagement into tangible presence. In doing so, Europe must navigate internal divisions and resource constraints, while treading carefully the geopolitical minefield of the U.S.-China rivalry. The question is not whether Europe should engage in the Indo-Pacific, but how, and to what extent, it can pursue its engagement effectively.

Skin in the game

Economic Security

As already hinted, Europe’s economic prosperity is tightly bound to the Indo-Pacific. The region hosts four of the EU’s top ten trading partners, including China, Japan, South Korea, and India[3]. Further, key European exports (e.g. machinery, automobiles, and pharmaceuticals) flow eastward, while the EU imports a vast array of goods from Indo-Pacific countries. Two sectors epitomize this interdependence most prominently: semiconductors and critical minerals.

Semiconductors

The EU’s economic model is anchored in high-value manufacturing, advanced automotive production, and digital innovation. Maintaining the momentum in these fields hinges on securing an uninterrupted supply of semiconductors. Modern vehicles -particularly electric and hybrid models- integrate hundreds of chips[4] that control everything from engine management and battery systems to safety sensors and infotainment. Increasingly, the move toward autonomous and connected vehicles depends on higher-performance chips fabricated at advanced nodes. Further, advanced chips are the central components of data centers, 5G and forthcoming 6G networks, and industrial automation systems[5]. The defence industry, too, depends on reliable access to semiconductors for advanced military aircrafts, radar systems, satellite communications, and command-and-control platforms[6].

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide.

Foundries in Indo-Pacific countries account for the bulk of chip manufacturing worldwide. Indicatively, the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces more than 60% of the world’s semiconductors with a 71% market share and over 90% of the most advanced chips[7]. It is clear that a disruption to Taiwan’s semiconductor output would cascade directly into Europe’s supply chains resulting in production halts, escalating costs, and loss of competitiveness. It could also impede Europe’s digital transformation, compromise the rollout of critical communications networks, and affect sectors vital to national security. Semiconductors are dual-use technologies underpinning both civilian and military innovation. Therefore, any limitation in access to advanced chips would erode Europe’s technological sovereignty and strategic autonomy, leaving it reliant on the policy choices and geopolitical stability of other, non-Western actors. The graph below offers a visualization of Indo-Pacific’s dominance in global chip manufacturing.

Source: Ali Kamaly

 

Critical Minerals

Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. […] While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component.

The transition to a low-carbon, technologically advanced economy has placed critical minerals at the centre of EU’s industrial policy. Elements such as rare earths, nickel, cobalt, lithium, graphite and others form the backbone of batteries, electric vehicles (EVs), wind turbines, and advanced electronics. Many of these minerals are mined or processed in Indo-Pacific countries, and the geographic concentration of production and refining adds a layer of systemic risk for Europe. First, the role of China is pivotal. While raw mineral deposits exist in many places, China has deliberately captured the downstream part of the value chain, which includes the refining, processing, separation and manufacturing of the final component. For example, China accounts for about 65% of the world’s lithium refining capacity, over 70% for cobalt, and an astonishing 90% for rare earth minerals[8]. Second, Southeast Asia and other parts of the Indo-Pacific supply important raw and intermediate materials. For instance, Indonesia is the world’s largest producer of nickel, accounting for more than 50% of global nickel output in 2024 with Australia and New Caledonia also featuring in the list with the top ten global nickel producers[9]. The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains found that Indonesia and the Philippines together account for approximately 72% of global nickel output and 14% of global cobalt output[10]. Crucially, these trends will continue to shape the critical minerals industry in the foreseeable future with Indo-Pacific (especially China) remaining at the epicenter. The tables below show projections about the dominant players in the six main critical minerals in 2030.

 

Table 1: Mining

Top 3 producers: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper Chile, 23% DRC, 14% Peru, 10% Lithium Australia, 33% China, 23% Chile, 12% Cobalt DRC, 66% Indonesia, 10% Russia, 3% Rare earths China, 54% Australia,18% Myanmar, 9% Nickel Indonesia, 62% Philippines, 8% New Caledonia, 6% Graphite China, 82% Madagascar, 3% Mozambique, 2%

Source: IEA

 

Table 2: Processing/Refining

Top 3 processors: #1, % #2, % #3, % Copper China, 46% DRC, 7% Chile, 5% Lithium China, 57% Chile, 15% Argentina, 13% Cobalt China, 74% Finland, 6% Japan, 4% Rare earths China, 77% Malaysia, 12% Australia, 3% Nickel Indonesia, 44% China, 21% Japan, 6% Graphite China, 93% Japan, 3% U.S. 1%

Source: IEA

Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”.

Needless to say, the implications for Europe’s green transition are multifold. Europe is seeking to electrify transport, scale-up renewable energy and build digitally interconnected and resilient infrastructure (e.g., smart grids). Electrification means batteries. These in turn require nickel-rich chemistries (for higher energy density), cobalt (for stability in many chemistries), and graphite or other anode materials. Because the supply chains for these minerals are globally interlinked, a disruption at any point (mining, refining, transport, processing) can severely undercut the EU’s environmental policies enshrined in the “Green Deal”. Consider, for example, the battery value chain. The extraction may be in one country, but the ore is shipped to a refining complex in another country (often China) for conversion into battery-grade materials. The high degree of downstream concentration in one geography makes the supply chain vulnerable. Further, the OECD publication “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions” shows that China and Myanmar play dominant roles in processing, separation and downstream production of magnets, alloys and components[11]. From Europe’s perspective, this means that raw-material supply risks are not confined to mining. The biggest risk lies in the “mid‐stream” and “down‐stream” segments, that is, refining, separation, processing and fabrication of value‐added materials.

Because China maintains a tight grip on these segments, Europe and other jurisdictions are exposed to strategic bottlenecks. A mining source thousands of kilometers away becomes vulnerable if the processing plant is in China or if shipments must pass through geopolitical flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific. China’s preeminence in the strategic supply chains of critical minerals affords Beijing the opportunity to weaponize trade to pursue political ends. The placement of export controls on rare earths –a textbook measure taken by China in its bid to afflict the Western economies- has caused manufacturing disruptions, driving up prices and undermining the competitiveness of domestic products.

Similar to semiconductors, critical minerals are also irreplaceable for the European Defense Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB). Critical raw materials, such as graphite, cobalt, beryllium, and germanium are needed for the production of an array of weaponry, including fighter aircrafts, tanks, missiles, torpedoes, artillery, and ammunition, military hardware in which the EU strives to attain self-sufficiency. According to a risk assessment conducted by the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies[12], the supply of many of the aforementioned materials is very likely to incur disruptions due to instability or geopolitical bickering.

Military Security

The globalization of markets is what has made the Indo-Pacific indispensable to Europe’s economic security. The intensified great power competition reminiscent of Cold War era-style establishment of opposing blocks is what renders the Indo-Pacific vital to Europe’s hard security as well.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater.

A military escalation in the Indo-Pacific, especially around Taiwan, would have immediate consequences for Europe by drawing U.S. attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic theater. If Washington were forced to reallocate strategic bandwidth to Asia, the EU would face greater pressure to shoulder the security burden on its eastern and southern flanks, where threats from Russia, instability in the Middle East, and irregular migration already test Europe’s resilience. Even without open conflict, developments in the Indo-Pacific increasingly shape Europe’s security landscape, as seen in the Ukraine war. North Korea’s provision of frontline troops and weapons to Russia, along with China’s economic lifeline that sustains Moscow’s war machine, demonstrates that actors in the Indo-Pacific can directly amplify threats to European stability.

Hybrid Threats 

Equally destabilizing for Europe are hybrid threats emanating from the Indo-Pacific region. The overseas territories of an EU powerhouse are turning into a springboard for irregular migration and organized crime. Criminal groups have established themselves[13] in the French Polynesia, New Caledonia, and the French West Indies engaging in drug trafficking, illegal fishing, gold smuggling, and arms flows as they exploit the vast exclusive economic zones where maritime surveillance is inadequate. These groups wield substantial control of international migration routes using the French territories as transit nodes for migration flows that ultimately reach Europe. Civil strife, climate change, political instability, and economic disparities in the Indo-Pacific exacerbate this trend. Once migrants enter a French territory, they are closer to gaining access to the European Union’s legal space, creating concerns that organized networks could exploit these territories as stepping-stones or “side doors” into Europe. Combined, these pressures increase border insecurity directly impacting Europe’s internal security.

This growing entanglement shows that Europe cannot compartmentalize the two regions. The Indo-Pacific is now woven into the continent’s security architecture, giving the EU undeniable “skin in the game” in preserving stability and building partnerships across the region.

Pinpointing the main hurdles 

To do so, the EU has to step up its involvement in the Indo-Pacific. In formulating its strategy for a more active engagement, Brussels should take into account the limitations it is destined to face.

…the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection.

First, the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is not designed for distant power projection. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks forward bases, logistical capacity, and naval assets suited for sustained Indo-Pacific operations. Any European military contribution would therefore be limited to symbolic deployments, joint exercises, or capacity-building missions.

Consensus-based decision-making and domestic political fragmentation across Europe also constrain the EU’s ability to act swiftly or decisively as a whole. Some member states, especially in Central and Eastern Europe, prioritize transatlantic solidarity and view China with suspicion; others, like Germany and Hungary, emphasize economic pragmatism appearing more conciliatory vis-à-vis Beijing due to their tight ties in trade and investments. Furthermore, defense spending disparities among member states hinder the formation of a unified strategic posture. So does the divergence in threat perception: Austria or Ireland might not view the threats stemming from the Indo-Pacific as immediate as they seem to France with its overseas territories or to the Baltic countries with an aggressive Russia on their borders- backed by Indo-Pacific actors.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies.

Compounding to the constraining factors is China’s central role in European trade, which creates strong disincentives for confrontational policies. While the EU recognizes the risks of overreliance, especially after the pandemic and the Ukraine war, full-scale decoupling is neither feasible nor desirable. Consequently, the EU must pursue a policy of de-risking without disengaging, a pursuit requiring deft balancing that might sound straightforward in theory but can prove a herculean undertaking in practice even for the most experienced European bureaucrats.

Finally, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine consumes Europe’s attention and resources. Other challenges facing Europe, though, have not magically disappeared. The EU’s southern neighborhood grapples with persistent instability. Climate change, energy security, and migration pressures further stretch European capacities. In this context, sustained Indo-Pacific engagement risks being deprioritized unless directly linked to core European interests. Well-constructed and clearly communicated policy messaging on why the Indo-Pacific matters to Europe can serve in achieving the latter.

Rising to the challenge 

Despite these obstacles, Europe, both collectively and at national level, has taken some initial steps toward strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific.

The 2021 EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific[14] marked a watershed. It framed the region as “vital for the EU’s interests” and called for cooperation in seven areas: sustainable and inclusive prosperity, green transition, ocean governance, digital partnerships, connectivity, security, and human security. The strategy’s ambition is evident in its breadth, yet its implementation remains uneven. Unlike the U.S., the EU lacks a hard-power footprint in the Indo-Pacific. The strategy is therefore designed around partnerships leveraging diplomacy, trade, and development tools rather than military presence. The EU Strategic Compass for Security and Defense (2022) sought to fix that. Recognizing the growing assertiveness of China in the Indo-Pacific and the strategic importance of the region to Europe, the strategic compass expanded the Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) to the Indian Ocean while calling for more joint exercises and port calls in the Indo-Pacific with the aim to strengthen the EU regional presence.[15]

Beyond the collective front some EU member states have forged their own Indo-Pacific policies, contributing to a patchwork of European engagement. France maintains territories in the Indian and Pacific Oceans (La Réunion, New Caledonia, French Polynesia) and a permanent military presence. It views itself as an Indo-Pacific power and a natural anchor for EU engagement. Germany adopted “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”[16] in 2020, emphasizing diversification of partnerships and a rules-based order. The Netherlands followed suit in 2020[17], focusing on trade and security cooperation. Italy and Spain are expanding defense dialogues with India, Japan, and ASEAN.

Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

Yet, coordination at the EU level remains limited. The EU Naval Mission Atalanta (operating in the western Indian Ocean) and joint exercises or port calls with partners like Japan and India represent embryonic steps toward a coherent European presence. On the other hand, initiatives, such as Global Gateway[18], promising €300 billion in sustainable investment, aim to enhance Europe’s soft power and support resilient infrastructure in the Indo-Pacific. However, questions remain about financing, coordination, and visibility compared to China’s extensive network of BRI projects. Given the vitality of the Indo-Pacific to the European economies and to the EU’s strategic autonomy writ large, the moment has come for Brussels to transform its hitherto timid engagement with the region into a vigorous and all-encompassing Indo-Pacific strategy.

The following policy recommendations aim to guide European policymaking in this direction:

• Maritime security

Maritime security represents the most practical entry point for upgraded European involvement; and probably the most instrumental one. Trade routes through the South China Sea and Indian Ocean function as Europe’s economic lifelines. The EU’s dependence on maritime security in these waters ties its prosperity to the stability of these distant sea lanes. Building on operations like Atalanta and AGENOR, the EU could expand naval patrols into the broader Indo-Pacific under a new Maritime Security Compact with ASEAN and regional partners within the framework of the EU Maritime Security Strategy (EUMSS). It could also reinforce the EU Coordinated Maritime Presences (CMPs) concept in the northwestern Indian Ocean and explore its extension to the western Pacific. Similarly, it can expand joint naval drills with Indo-Pacific partners both in geographical breadth and in scope. In particular, joint exercises may be conducted in more parts of the Indo-Pacific waters, while including training in war scenarios, red teaming, and breaking of potential naval blockades of critical sea lanes. Additionally, the EU could ramp-up investments in information-sharing mechanisms and capacity-building for regional coast guards. Such measures would not only safeguard critical trade routes but also demonstrate Europe’s commitment to free navigation and to a rules-based maritime order.

• Supply chain diversification

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act.

To reduce strategic dependencies, the EU should diversify semiconductor supply chains by strengthening partnerships with Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, while supporting EU domestic chip production through the European Chips Act. Developing critical minerals partnerships with Indonesia, Australia, and India under transparent environmental and labor standards could also go a long way in feeding into Europe’s image as a global leader in sustainable development, while buttressing the diversification of the continent’s supply chains. A credible economic footprint would reinforce Europe’s relevance and complement its security engagement.

• Multilateralism and Diplomacy

Europe’s comparative advantage still lies in norm-setting and diplomacy. The EU should try to act as a mediating voice in U.S.-China tensions, emphasizing international law and open trade, while fostering regional crisis prevention initiatives, including confidence-building measures in the South China Sea. Regarding ASEAN, the EU may institutionalize the EU-ASEAN strategic dialogue with a permanent secretariat-level mechanism and build on the EU-ASEAN strategic partnership to revive sincere talks on a region-to-region free trade agreement, which will enhance integration and mutual economic resilience. Further, the EU would do well to upgrade the current format of talks from a ministerial to heads-of-state level dialogue. Such diplomatic activism would underscore Europe’s role as a stabilizing actor rather than a partisan power.

• Selected Bilateral Partnerships

The EU should deepen cooperation with established partners (Japan, India, Australia, and South Korea) and initiate partnerships with others through joint exercises, technology synergies, and joint research in critical technologies and cybersecurity. Triangular cooperation (e.g., EU-Japan-ASEAN infrastructure projects) could amplify impact while sharing burdens. A more robust presence would also send a message to China and North Korea that Europe is not a passive spectator of the latter’s intercontinental interference on Russia’s side in Ukraine. Rather, it will show that Europe can bring the competition to their own neighborhood, reinforcing its bargaining position. By strengthening the capacities of their own regional rivals while keeping channels of communication open, the EU can plausibly have a shot at persuading China and North Korea to dial down support to Moscow switching to a bold, but calculated, sticks-and-carrots approach.

• Leveraging NATO

While the EU should avoid duplicating NATO’s structures, closer coordination can align transatlantic and Indo-Pacific strategies. NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept[19] already recognizes China as a systemic challenge. European contributions to Indo-Pacific security can thus complement, rather than compete with, Alliance objectives. For instance, enhanced interoperability between EU naval deployments and NATO partners in the region, along with coordinated sanctions and export-control regimes, can further reinforce collective deterrence.

Conclusion

The Indo-Pacific has emerged as a key node along the chain of the core European interests. Although pressing issues in its immediate neighborhood would not allow the EU to realize a “pivot to Asia” akin to that professed by the Obama administration back in 2011, the EU leadership would do well to formulate a holistic Indo-Pacific policy in its quest for strategic autonomy. Europe’s economic security largely rests upon intricate supply chains of strategic commodities, such as semiconductors and critical minerals. With upstream and downstream segments of these supply chains concentrated in Southeast Asia and even dominated by China, Europe is vulnerable to trade bottlenecks that can cause unmanageable setbacks in EU’s industrial production, green transition, and defense innovation. From a military perspective, the direct and indirect support of certain Indo-Pacific countries to Russia -namely North Korea and China- has laid bare the interconnectedness of the strategic theaters spanning the Eurasian supercontinent, while the Sino-American rivalry, if not tempered, risks to divert Washington’s resources away from Europe leaving the latter exposed to multiple threats. Expanding on the already existing cooperation mechanisms with Indo-Pacific countries and harnessing its central role in global diplomacy and multilateralism, the EU must prop-up its engagement in the region in its bid to safeguard the aforementioned interests. Coordination with NATO is also essential as the two distinct alliances work closely to achieve common goals in the Indo-Pacific complementing each other rather than going circles in an unproductive overlapping. Structural and systemic limitations may hinder deeper involvement, but the EU has the ability to navigate constraints to the degree that its Indo-Pacific engagement does not raise the risks of accentuating intra-EU divisions or exacerbating geopolitical tensions that might bring the region to the precipice of an armed confrontation.

[1] U.S. Department of State,” Indo-Pacific Strategy (2021–2025)”, 2021–2025, accessed November 2, 2025, https://2021-2025.state.gov/indo-pacific-strategy/.

[2] European External Action Service, “The EU Approach to the Indo-Pacific”, June 3, 2021, European External Action Service, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-approach-indo-pacific_en.

[3] European Parliament, “EU – Indo-Pacific Trade Relations (Hearing, INTA, 1 September 2022),” European Parliament Think Tank, September 1, 2022, accessed November 2, 2025, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/events/details/eu-indo-pacific-trade-relations-/20220715CHE10501.

[4] Glenn Burm, “Semiconductor and beyond: Global Semiconductor Industry Outlook 2026”, PwC, 2025, 11–14, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/technology/pwc-semiconductor-and-beyond-2026-full-report.pdf.

[5] Ibid. 16–20

[6] Sujai Shivakumar and Charles W. Wessner, “Semiconductors and National Defense: What Are the Stakes?” CSIS Commentary, June 8, 2022, accessed November 10, 2025, https://www.csis.org/analysis/semiconductors-and-national-defense-what-are-stakes. csis.org.

[7] David Sacks and Seaton Huang, “Onshoring Semiconductor Production: National Security Versus Economic Efficiency.” Council on Foreign Relations, September 27, 2022. Accessed November 10, 2025. https://www.cfr.org/article/onshoring-semiconductor-production-national-security-versus-economic-efficiency. Council on Foreign Relations.

[8] Elvire Fabry, “A looming war for minerals?”, Jacques Delors Institute, April 2023, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://institutdelors.eu/en/publications/la-guerre-des-minerais-aura-t-elle-lieu-2/.

[9] Melissa Pistilli, “Top 9 Nickel-producing Countries”, INN, June 04, 2025, Accessed 23 November, 2025 https://investingnews.com/daily/resource-investing/base-metals-investing/nickel-investing/top-nickel-producing-countries/

[10]IGF on Mining, Minerals, Metals, and Sustainable Development, “The ASEAN Scoping Study on Critical Minerals Supply Chains”, ASEAN-IGF Minerals Cooperation, May 2023.

[11] OECD, “The Role of Critical Minerals in Clean Energy Transitions”, May 14, 2021.

[12] Benedetta Girardi, Irina Patrahau, Giovanni Cisco, and Michel Rademaker. 2023. Strategic Raw Materials for Defence: Mapping European Industry Needs. January, 2023.

[13] Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN), “Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025”, Paris, 2025, p.20.

[14] European Commission & European External Action Service. “Joint Communication on the EU Strategy for Cooperation in the Indo‑Pacific” JOIN(2021) 24 final. Brussels, September 16, 2021.

[15] Council of the European Union, “A Strategic Compass for Security and Defense”, 21 March, 2022.

[16] Federal Foreign Office (Germany), “Policy Guidelines for the Indo-Pacific”, Germany–Europe–Asia: Shaping the 21st Century Together”, Berlin: Federal Foreign Office, 2020.

[17] Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Indo-Pacific: Guidelines for Strengthening Dutch and EU Cooperation with Partners in Asia”, Government of Netherlands, 13 November 2020.

[18] European Commission and European External Action Service, “Global Gateway: European Union Strategy for Sustainable Global Connectivity”, Brussels, 2021.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, adopted at the Madrid Summit, 29 June 2022

 

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Secrétariat général de la défense et de la sécurité nationale (SGDSN). Revue Nationale Stratégique 2025. Paris 2025.

Aus den Europawahlen im Juni 2024 sind die europaskeptischen Parteien, die entweder eine Abschaffung oder erhebliche Kürzung der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und humanitären Hilfe fordern, gestärkt hervorgegangen. Parallel haben viele EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Budgets für die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe im letzten Jahr deutlich gekürzt. Obwohl Ursula von der Leyen für ihre zweite Amtszeit formell nicht auf die Unterstützung dieser europaskeptischen Fraktionen angewiesen war, zeigten ihre im Juli 2024 vorgestellten politischen Leitlinien für die Legislaturperiode 2024–2029 eine deutliche Abkehr – wenn nicht gar eine Kehrtwende – vom Engagement für den europäischen Green Deal in ihrer ersten Amtszeit. Im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik wurde das Ressort von Jozef Síkela übernommen, der bis zu seinem Amtsantritt als tschechischer Minister für Industrie und Handel tätig war. Die Wahl Donald Trumps für seine zweite Amtszeit und die Schließung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeitsbehörde (USAID) erhöhen den Druck auf Europa, mehr Verantwortung in der internationalen Entwicklung zu übernehmen – eine Rolle, die bislang vor allem mit Verweisen auf finanzielle Beiträge, jedoch ohne ein klares politisches Narrativ ausgefüllt wurde. Der Bereich der humanitären Hilfe wurde von der neuen Kommissarin für Vorsorge, Krisenmanagement und Gleichstellung, Hadja Lahbib, übernommen, die zuvor von 2022 bis 2024 belgische Außenministerin war. Die Kommissarin sieht sich in ihrem Portfolio mit einer global wachsenden Finanzierungslücke für humanitäre Hilfe konfrontiert, während die humanitären Bedarfe durch eine weltweite Zunahme von bewaffneten Konflikten, Naturkatastrophen und Krisen kontinuierlich steigen.

Aus den Europawahlen im Juni 2024 sind die europaskeptischen Parteien, die entweder eine Abschaffung oder erhebliche Kürzung der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und humanitären Hilfe fordern, gestärkt hervorgegangen. Parallel haben viele EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Budgets für die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe im letzten Jahr deutlich gekürzt. Obwohl Ursula von der Leyen für ihre zweite Amtszeit formell nicht auf die Unterstützung dieser europaskeptischen Fraktionen angewiesen war, zeigten ihre im Juli 2024 vorgestellten politischen Leitlinien für die Legislaturperiode 2024–2029 eine deutliche Abkehr – wenn nicht gar eine Kehrtwende – vom Engagement für den europäischen Green Deal in ihrer ersten Amtszeit. Im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik wurde das Ressort von Jozef Síkela übernommen, der bis zu seinem Amtsantritt als tschechischer Minister für Industrie und Handel tätig war. Die Wahl Donald Trumps für seine zweite Amtszeit und die Schließung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeitsbehörde (USAID) erhöhen den Druck auf Europa, mehr Verantwortung in der internationalen Entwicklung zu übernehmen – eine Rolle, die bislang vor allem mit Verweisen auf finanzielle Beiträge, jedoch ohne ein klares politisches Narrativ ausgefüllt wurde. Der Bereich der humanitären Hilfe wurde von der neuen Kommissarin für Vorsorge, Krisenmanagement und Gleichstellung, Hadja Lahbib, übernommen, die zuvor von 2022 bis 2024 belgische Außenministerin war. Die Kommissarin sieht sich in ihrem Portfolio mit einer global wachsenden Finanzierungslücke für humanitäre Hilfe konfrontiert, während die humanitären Bedarfe durch eine weltweite Zunahme von bewaffneten Konflikten, Naturkatastrophen und Krisen kontinuierlich steigen.

Aus den Europawahlen im Juni 2024 sind die europaskeptischen Parteien, die entweder eine Abschaffung oder erhebliche Kürzung der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und humanitären Hilfe fordern, gestärkt hervorgegangen. Parallel haben viele EU-Mitgliedstaaten ihre Budgets für die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe im letzten Jahr deutlich gekürzt. Obwohl Ursula von der Leyen für ihre zweite Amtszeit formell nicht auf die Unterstützung dieser europaskeptischen Fraktionen angewiesen war, zeigten ihre im Juli 2024 vorgestellten politischen Leitlinien für die Legislaturperiode 2024–2029 eine deutliche Abkehr – wenn nicht gar eine Kehrtwende – vom Engagement für den europäischen Green Deal in ihrer ersten Amtszeit. Im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik wurde das Ressort von Jozef Síkela übernommen, der bis zu seinem Amtsantritt als tschechischer Minister für Industrie und Handel tätig war. Die Wahl Donald Trumps für seine zweite Amtszeit und die Schließung der US-amerikanischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeitsbehörde (USAID) erhöhen den Druck auf Europa, mehr Verantwortung in der internationalen Entwicklung zu übernehmen – eine Rolle, die bislang vor allem mit Verweisen auf finanzielle Beiträge, jedoch ohne ein klares politisches Narrativ ausgefüllt wurde. Der Bereich der humanitären Hilfe wurde von der neuen Kommissarin für Vorsorge, Krisenmanagement und Gleichstellung, Hadja Lahbib, übernommen, die zuvor von 2022 bis 2024 belgische Außenministerin war. Die Kommissarin sieht sich in ihrem Portfolio mit einer global wachsenden Finanzierungslücke für humanitäre Hilfe konfrontiert, während die humanitären Bedarfe durch eine weltweite Zunahme von bewaffneten Konflikten, Naturkatastrophen und Krisen kontinuierlich steigen.

Commission experts were caught off guard by last-minute health plan

Un colloque scientifique sur les défis de la cryptomonnaie pour le droit africain a mobilisé ce mercredi 17 décembre 2025, les acteurs judiciaires et institutionnels. Ces assises visent à réfléchir aux implications juridiques des cryptomonnaies dans un contexte africain marqué par la transformation numérique.

« Les défis de la cryptomonnaie pour le droit africain et les professionnels de la justice : enjeux et perspectives », c'est la thématique principale abordée au cours d'un colloque scientifique ce mercredi 17 décembre 2025.
Dans la communication inaugurale, Gildas NONNOU, agrégé des facultés de Droit à l'Université d'Abomey-Calavi (UAC), a expliqué la notion de cryptomonnaie. Pour lui, il s'agit d'une écriture numérique sous forme de séries de chiffres, dont les transactions sont transférées et sécurisées par une chaîne d'information décentralisée appelée « blockchain », permettant notamment l'horodatage et la traçabilité.
Ce colloque a été l'occasion pour les acteurs judiciaires et institutionnels, de mettre en lumière les cryptomonnaies comme des objets juridiques non classiques, relevant encore d'un régime juridique embryonnaire en Afrique. Ils ont convenu de la nécessité pour l'Afrique de devenir un acteur majeur dans l'encadrement juridique de ces innovations, afin que ce colloque débouche sur des conclusions fortes et des perspectives durables.
Pour Ulrich Gilbert TOGBONON, représentant le ministre de la justice, les professionnels de la justice ne peuvent plus rester en marge de ces évolutions. Il a insisté sur la nécessité de les outiller afin de faire face aux situations nouvelles liées aux cryptomonnaies.
A l'en croire, d'importantes réformes ont été engagées sous la gouvernance du président TALON, notamment la digitalisation des services publics. Fait saillant qui traduit la volonté de l'Exécutif de moderniser l'administration et la justice.
La directrice de l'École de formation des professions judiciaires (EFPJ), Bernadette HOUNDEKANDJI-CODJOVI, a pris part aux travaux.

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DR Congo's government say the announced withdrawal is intended to distract the US mediation team.

Csütörtökön a Parlament elítélte Belaruszt a Litvánia és az EU elleni összehangolt hibrid támadások miatt.
Külügyi Bizottság

Forrás : © Európai Unió, 2025 - EP

Une nouvelle liaison maritime entre l’Algérie et la Tunisie est à l’étude. Le ministre de l’Intérieur, des Collectivités locales et des Transports, Saïd Sayoud, a […]

L’article Algérie–Tunisie : bientôt une traversée maritime directe entre Annaba et Tunis est apparu en premier sur .

La Professeure Dandi Gnamou a reçu, mardi 17 décembre 2025, la distinction de Grand officier de l'Ordre national du Bénin.

Distinction pour Prof. Dandi Gnamou. La Professeure titulaire de droit public, président de la Haute Cour de Justice a été élevée à la dignité de Grand Officier de l'Ordre national du Bénin. « Cet honneur n'est pas l'aboutissement d'un parcours personnel. Je le reçois comme un rappel exigeant de mon engagement à servir la République avec rigueur, discrétion et fidélité à l'État de droit. Je le partage avec toutes celles et tous ceux qui œuvrent, souvent dans le silence, au sein de nos institutions, pour la paix, la continuité de l'État et la confiance dans le droit », a-t-elle déclaré.

Elle n'a pas manqué de remercier Mariam Chabi Talata, Vice-Présidente de la République, Grande Chancelière des Ordres nationaux, pour sa présence et son accompagnement constant.

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Le chef de l'Etat Patrice Talon a échangé avec les professionnels des médias ce jeudi 18 janvier au Palais de la Marina. Deux sujets étaient au cœur des discussions. La promulgation de la portant révision constitutionnelle puis l'attaque du 7 décembre 2025.

En attendant la publication de l'intégralité des échanges, on peut retenir que : « Ce n'est pas la Garde Nationale qui opéré l'attaque .. ce n'est ni le commandement, ni le sous commandement… ce sont quelques égarés, manipulés par des nostalgiques et des jaloux » a déclaré Patrice Talon.
« Tous les retranchés dans le camp de Togbin ne sont pas associés aux mutins. Il y avait beaucoup de jeunes soldats en formation qu'ils ont embarqués ».
« Au premier assaut, certains soldats se sont habillés en civil et ont pris la fuite à moto. D'autres ont escaladé le mur. » « « Nous n'avons pas lancé une course poursuite afin d'éviter des morts car ils étaient armés. ». « La preuve certains mutins ont abandonné les armes qu'ils détenaient dans les bas-fonds à Togbin ».
« Toutes les unités de l'armée ont fait allégeance à la Garde Républicaine et ont demandé l'attitude à tenir ».
« Les vrais auteurs de l'attaque étaient au plus au nombre de 15 ou 20 ».
« Le Commandant de la Garde Nationale est parvenu à joindre le lieutenant colonel Pascal Tigri au Téléphone avant sa fuite dans une voiture : Nous vous prions de ne pas nous bombarder ... ».

Nous vous reviendrons pour les détails

For years, smallholder farmers across Kenya have been engaged in a legal battle with the government over a law that criminalizes the practice of saving, sharing and exchanging indigenous seeds. In 2022, a group of 15 Kenyan smallholder farmers petitioned the country’s High Court, seeking to compel the government to review sections of a law […]

Le Bénin vient une fois de prouver la résilience de son économie à travers une opération de levée de fonds sur le marché financier de l'UEMOA. Le pays vient de lever la somme de 100 milliards de francs CFA dans un contexte marqué par la mutinerie déjouée.

Les évènements du 7 décembre 2025 n'ont pas émoussé les ardeurs des investisseurs à faire confiance au Bénin. Une opération d'émission d'Obligations assimilables au Trésor (OAT), s'est soldée par un succès franc ce mardi 16 décembre 2025.
Pour un objectif de 100 milliards de francs CFA mis en adjudication, le marché a répondu favorablement avec 117,8 milliards de francs CFA, pour une couverture de 117,8%. Les 100 milliards recherchés ont été intégralement mobilisés confirmant ainsi la vitalité économique du pays.
Une telle souscription de la part des investisseurs témoigne de la résilience de l'économie béninoise malgré les chocs exogènes.
En dépit du contexte de coup d'Etat manqué, le Trésor béninois a pu se permettre de retenir l'intégralité du montant visé tout en rejetant 15,1% des offres. Avec un taux d'absorption de 84,9%, le Bénin prouve sa capacité à lever des fonds dans les conditions les plus maitrisées.

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Parliament and Council negotiators have reached a political agreement on the creation of an EU list of safe countries of origin to speed up asylum claim processing.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament and Council negotiators have reached a political agreement on the creation of an EU list of safe countries of origin to speed up asylum claim processing.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament and Council negotiators have reached a political agreement on the creation of an EU list of safe countries of origin to speed up asylum claim processing.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Parliament and Council negotiators have reached a political agreement on the creation of an EU list of safe countries of origin to speed up asylum claim processing.
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, Parliament condemned Belarus for conducting an escalating campaign of coordinated hybrid attacks against Lithuania and the EU.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, Parliament condemned Belarus for conducting an escalating campaign of coordinated hybrid attacks against Lithuania and the EU.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

On Thursday, Parliament condemned Belarus for conducting an escalating campaign of coordinated hybrid attacks against Lithuania and the EU.
Committee on Foreign Affairs

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP