The Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and violent conflicts as well as climate and debt crises have changed the macroeconomic environment. In this new reality of soaring interest rates, high inflation and increasing debt levels, the availability of development finance is decreasing, while the financing needs to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals are increasing. Policymakers and international financial institutions have launched a number of initiatives in a search of solutions. Building on those, this article outlines (further) measures and reforms to make development finance fit for this challenging environment shaped by multiple crises.
The Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and violent conflicts as well as climate and debt crises have changed the macroeconomic environment. In this new reality of soaring interest rates, high inflation and increasing debt levels, the availability of development finance is decreasing, while the financing needs to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals are increasing. Policymakers and international financial institutions have launched a number of initiatives in a search of solutions. Building on those, this article outlines (further) measures and reforms to make development finance fit for this challenging environment shaped by multiple crises.
The Covid-19 pandemic, geopolitical tensions and violent conflicts as well as climate and debt crises have changed the macroeconomic environment. In this new reality of soaring interest rates, high inflation and increasing debt levels, the availability of development finance is decreasing, while the financing needs to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals are increasing. Policymakers and international financial institutions have launched a number of initiatives in a search of solutions. Building on those, this article outlines (further) measures and reforms to make development finance fit for this challenging environment shaped by multiple crises.
Refugees and displaced people are increasingly moving to cities around the world, seeking out the social, economic, and political opportunity that urban areas provide. Against this backdrop digital technologies are fundamentally changing how refugees and displaced people engage with urban landscapes and economies where they settle. Urban Refugees and Digital Technology draws on contemporary data gathered from refugee communities in Bogotá, Nairobi, and Kuala Lumpur to build a new theoretical understanding of how technological change influences the ways urban refugees contribute to the social, economic, and political networks in their cities of arrival. This data is presented against the broader history of technological change in urban areas since the start of industrialization, showing how displaced people across time have used technologized urban spaces to shape the societies where they settle. The case studies and history demonstrate how refugees’ interactions with environments that are often hostile to their presence spur novel adaptations to idiosyncratic features of a city’s technological landscape. A wide-ranging study across histories and geographies of urban displacement, Urban Refugees and Digital Technology introduces readers to the myriad ways technological change creates spaces for urban refugees to build rich political, social, and economic lives in cities.
Refugees and displaced people are increasingly moving to cities around the world, seeking out the social, economic, and political opportunity that urban areas provide. Against this backdrop digital technologies are fundamentally changing how refugees and displaced people engage with urban landscapes and economies where they settle. Urban Refugees and Digital Technology draws on contemporary data gathered from refugee communities in Bogotá, Nairobi, and Kuala Lumpur to build a new theoretical understanding of how technological change influences the ways urban refugees contribute to the social, economic, and political networks in their cities of arrival. This data is presented against the broader history of technological change in urban areas since the start of industrialization, showing how displaced people across time have used technologized urban spaces to shape the societies where they settle. The case studies and history demonstrate how refugees’ interactions with environments that are often hostile to their presence spur novel adaptations to idiosyncratic features of a city’s technological landscape. A wide-ranging study across histories and geographies of urban displacement, Urban Refugees and Digital Technology introduces readers to the myriad ways technological change creates spaces for urban refugees to build rich political, social, and economic lives in cities.
Refugees and displaced people are increasingly moving to cities around the world, seeking out the social, economic, and political opportunity that urban areas provide. Against this backdrop digital technologies are fundamentally changing how refugees and displaced people engage with urban landscapes and economies where they settle. Urban Refugees and Digital Technology draws on contemporary data gathered from refugee communities in Bogotá, Nairobi, and Kuala Lumpur to build a new theoretical understanding of how technological change influences the ways urban refugees contribute to the social, economic, and political networks in their cities of arrival. This data is presented against the broader history of technological change in urban areas since the start of industrialization, showing how displaced people across time have used technologized urban spaces to shape the societies where they settle. The case studies and history demonstrate how refugees’ interactions with environments that are often hostile to their presence spur novel adaptations to idiosyncratic features of a city’s technological landscape. A wide-ranging study across histories and geographies of urban displacement, Urban Refugees and Digital Technology introduces readers to the myriad ways technological change creates spaces for urban refugees to build rich political, social, and economic lives in cities.
Auf Joint Futures haben deutsche, europäische und afrikanische Autor*innen eine Vielfalt von Themen behandelt, die für die deutsche Afrikapolitik von Relevanz sind. Haben wir damit die Arbeit an den neuen Leitlinien einfacher oder schwieriger gemacht? Hier ziehen wir eine Bilanz.
Auf Joint Futures haben deutsche, europäische und afrikanische Autor*innen eine Vielfalt von Themen behandelt, die für die deutsche Afrikapolitik von Relevanz sind. Haben wir damit die Arbeit an den neuen Leitlinien einfacher oder schwieriger gemacht? Hier ziehen wir eine Bilanz.
Auf Joint Futures haben deutsche, europäische und afrikanische Autor*innen eine Vielfalt von Themen behandelt, die für die deutsche Afrikapolitik von Relevanz sind. Haben wir damit die Arbeit an den neuen Leitlinien einfacher oder schwieriger gemacht? Hier ziehen wir eine Bilanz.
Das DIW Berlin sucht zum nächstmöglichen Zeitpunkt in der Abteilung Finanzen eine*n Vergabe- und Vertragsreferent*in (w/m/div) (Vollzeit mit 39 Stunden pro Woche, Teilzeit ist möglich).
Die Abteilung Finanzen ist zuständig für die Verwaltung des Haushalts inkl. Rechnungswesen, Steuerangelegenheiten, Beschaffung und Reisekosten.
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinvigorated debates about the drivers of political trust. Research so far has mainly focused on national-level institutions, during the early stages of the pandemic and using data from established democracies. However, how does this relationship look like if we pay attention to subnational institutions in non-consolidated democracies, and further away from the initial COVID-19 outbreak? To contribute to this line of research, this article focuses on the local level and explores the association between individuals’ satisfaction with COVID-19 performance and political trust in Nepal. For that, it uses novel data collected via telephone interviews (N = 1400) conducted between 25 April and 24 May 2021, during the second wave of COVID-19. Our main results reveal that satisfaction with local institutions’ COVID-related performance is significantly and robustly associated with levels of political trust at the local level. The association holds even when geographical and time specifications are added, trust towards national institutions or expectations about local governments are included in the analysis and the dependent variable is disaggregated to discard measurement biases. The study thereby provides important insights into the role performance plays for institutional trust beyond the national level and in an unconsolidated democracy.
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinvigorated debates about the drivers of political trust. Research so far has mainly focused on national-level institutions, during the early stages of the pandemic and using data from established democracies. However, how does this relationship look like if we pay attention to subnational institutions in non-consolidated democracies, and further away from the initial COVID-19 outbreak? To contribute to this line of research, this article focuses on the local level and explores the association between individuals’ satisfaction with COVID-19 performance and political trust in Nepal. For that, it uses novel data collected via telephone interviews (N = 1400) conducted between 25 April and 24 May 2021, during the second wave of COVID-19. Our main results reveal that satisfaction with local institutions’ COVID-related performance is significantly and robustly associated with levels of political trust at the local level. The association holds even when geographical and time specifications are added, trust towards national institutions or expectations about local governments are included in the analysis and the dependent variable is disaggregated to discard measurement biases. The study thereby provides important insights into the role performance plays for institutional trust beyond the national level and in an unconsolidated democracy.
The COVID-19 pandemic has reinvigorated debates about the drivers of political trust. Research so far has mainly focused on national-level institutions, during the early stages of the pandemic and using data from established democracies. However, how does this relationship look like if we pay attention to subnational institutions in non-consolidated democracies, and further away from the initial COVID-19 outbreak? To contribute to this line of research, this article focuses on the local level and explores the association between individuals’ satisfaction with COVID-19 performance and political trust in Nepal. For that, it uses novel data collected via telephone interviews (N = 1400) conducted between 25 April and 24 May 2021, during the second wave of COVID-19. Our main results reveal that satisfaction with local institutions’ COVID-related performance is significantly and robustly associated with levels of political trust at the local level. The association holds even when geographical and time specifications are added, trust towards national institutions or expectations about local governments are included in the analysis and the dependent variable is disaggregated to discard measurement biases. The study thereby provides important insights into the role performance plays for institutional trust beyond the national level and in an unconsolidated democracy.
Substantial tariff reductions and increased usage of non-tariff measures (NTMs) have been key dynamics of global trade policy in recent decades. We use highly disaggregated data on applied most favored nation tariffs, NTMs, and trade to investigate how International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality as a form of external pressure to reduce tariffs contributed to this dynamic in developing countries. Our results show that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) effectively lowered tariffs without increasing the usage of NTMs. A typical three-year program containing tariff conditionality decreased tariff rates in the range of 2.0 to 3.8 percentage points in total. Furthermore, IMF programs reduced NTM initializations significantly. We also show that tariff conditionality was more effective in initiating tariff cuts for countries without previous greater globalization efforts than being a “catalyst” for ongoing liberalization efforts.
Substantial tariff reductions and increased usage of non-tariff measures (NTMs) have been key dynamics of global trade policy in recent decades. We use highly disaggregated data on applied most favored nation tariffs, NTMs, and trade to investigate how International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality as a form of external pressure to reduce tariffs contributed to this dynamic in developing countries. Our results show that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) effectively lowered tariffs without increasing the usage of NTMs. A typical three-year program containing tariff conditionality decreased tariff rates in the range of 2.0 to 3.8 percentage points in total. Furthermore, IMF programs reduced NTM initializations significantly. We also show that tariff conditionality was more effective in initiating tariff cuts for countries without previous greater globalization efforts than being a “catalyst” for ongoing liberalization efforts.
Substantial tariff reductions and increased usage of non-tariff measures (NTMs) have been key dynamics of global trade policy in recent decades. We use highly disaggregated data on applied most favored nation tariffs, NTMs, and trade to investigate how International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality as a form of external pressure to reduce tariffs contributed to this dynamic in developing countries. Our results show that structural adjustment programs (SAPs) effectively lowered tariffs without increasing the usage of NTMs. A typical three-year program containing tariff conditionality decreased tariff rates in the range of 2.0 to 3.8 percentage points in total. Furthermore, IMF programs reduced NTM initializations significantly. We also show that tariff conditionality was more effective in initiating tariff cuts for countries without previous greater globalization efforts than being a “catalyst” for ongoing liberalization efforts.
As of 2023, the Sahel crisis has persisted for 12 years and has taken on a new and concerning aspect. Terrorist assaults in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, alongside ongoing military coups, are perpetuating instability throughout the entire region. Additionally, the growing rivalry between global powers like Russia and the West has added complexity to regional dynamics. Against this backdrop, the EU-African Union (AU) relations suffered, particularly in the field of peace and security. The aim of this paper is thus to analyse the challenges and opportunities for a renewed EU-AU partnership in a new geopolitical context.
As of 2023, the Sahel crisis has persisted for 12 years and has taken on a new and concerning aspect. Terrorist assaults in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, alongside ongoing military coups, are perpetuating instability throughout the entire region. Additionally, the growing rivalry between global powers like Russia and the West has added complexity to regional dynamics. Against this backdrop, the EU-African Union (AU) relations suffered, particularly in the field of peace and security. The aim of this paper is thus to analyse the challenges and opportunities for a renewed EU-AU partnership in a new geopolitical context.
As of 2023, the Sahel crisis has persisted for 12 years and has taken on a new and concerning aspect. Terrorist assaults in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger, alongside ongoing military coups, are perpetuating instability throughout the entire region. Additionally, the growing rivalry between global powers like Russia and the West has added complexity to regional dynamics. Against this backdrop, the EU-African Union (AU) relations suffered, particularly in the field of peace and security. The aim of this paper is thus to analyse the challenges and opportunities for a renewed EU-AU partnership in a new geopolitical context.