Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

There is an increased recognition of human mobility responses to climate change among policy-makers and stakeholders. At the global level, the Global Compact for Safe, Regular and Orderly Migration (GCM) highlights this intersection of climate change and migration. In addition, follow-up processes to the Paris Agreement highlight human mobility outcomes from climate impacts. This policy brief argues that while there is a recognition of climate migration at the international and national levels, implementation at the sub-national level where pertinent migration is happening, is far from adequate. At the national level, Ghana and Senegal have signed on and engaged in follow-up processes of the GCM and the Paris Agreement. Furthermore, they have in different ways highlighted climate migration as a key policy area. For Senegal, there is a mandate to include climate change and migration along with three other priority areas for all development plans in the country. On the other hand, Ghana’s national migration policy identifies climate change as a key area for policy attention. These reflect recognition of climate change and human mobility as a policy issue at the national level. However, there appear to be gaps in the implementation of these mandates and policy frameworks locally. Hence, there is a need to further investigate the patterns, weaknesses and strengths of climate (im)mobility strategy implementation at the sub-national level. This policy brief presents insights based on case studies of two West African cities, Accra and Dakar, which are relevant to urban climate (im)mobility governance because human mobility patterns are well established internally and from countries in the West African region, as are the influences of climate change on these mobility patterns. Because cities attract migrants, they offer insights into sub-national climate (im)mobility governance. It is, however, important to note the difficulty of isolating climate change as a driver of human mobility since it interacts with several other drivers (Black, Bennett, Thomas, & Beddington, 2011; Ekoh, Teron, & Ajibade, 2023). Regardless of the drivers of human mobility, city authorities have a responsibility to support their resident populations, and with increasing climate threats, they have a duty to support climate adapta-tion and resilience building within the city. This policy brief outlines three major challenges associated with addressing the human mobility dimension of climate change locally, under existing frameworks and agreements:
(1) City authorities have limited competencies in governing migration, including climate-induced migration.
(2) Cities have limited resources and capacity to adapt to climate change and the associated (im)mobility dimensions.
(3) At the local level, human mobility and climate change are mostly treated as separate issues in the absence of an integrated policy framework on climate (im)mobility.
The recommendations in this policy brief are addressed to national governments, local authorities and donors; they highlight how to move from global and national recognition to action so that cities/local authorities are better prepared to support migrants:
• A whole-of-government approach is necessary at all levels to address the crosscutting issue of climate change and human mobility. This should be part of a new or updated national migration policy that gives local authorities/cities a clear role to play in human mobility and climate change.
• National governments and donors need to support local authorities and non-state actors, such as non-governmental organisations and civil society organi-sations, with funding and investment in capacity building towards the design and implementation of climate (im)mobility strategies.
• Urban action plans should clearly reflect climate (im)mobility strategies given current trends and projections of increased mobility towards cities like Accra and Dakar.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

With a view to better analysing concrete challenges to address SDG financing in developing economies, this Study coordinated by IDDRI and prepared in cooperation with the Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) and the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS) focuses on the global picture and examines the state of play, recent initiatives, and prospects for financing the SDGs in Ghana, Indonesia, Mexico, and Senegal. It seeks to answer the following question: how and under what conditions can partner countries further align their development plans and policies with the 2030 Agenda and the SDGs to better finance their objectives? Key Messages: Alignment and effective SDG financing are possible when four main conditions are met:
- Avoiding SDG-incompatible finance. For many countries–notably OECD and BRICS countries– achieving the 2030 Agenda is just as much about financing more as it is about financing less and in a more sustainable way. Examples include less financing for approaches that compromise specific SDGs (e.g., fossil fuel subsidies) and making difficult policy decisions that require short-term costs to achieve long-term sustainability gains.
- Combining long-term financing with longterm planning. Development financing strategies provide public and private investors with clarity and predictability, and make it possible for those key actors to better grasp the sequence of investments across relief, recovery, and long-term structural transformation. Planning efforts should also seek to avoid lock-in situations and path dependencies where short-term recovery expenditure could hamper long-term goals of reducing inequalities or advancing environmental protection, and even increase vulnerabilities.
- Better understanding the cost and benefits of SDG financing at country level. A clear understanding of allocation and spending on public services and public investments that contribute to the SDGs can help identify funding shortfalls. Double-counting investment needs in particular should be avoided while synergies between different types of investment should be prioritized.
- Aligning SDG financing instruments with countries’ needs and priorities. SDG budgeting tools can be the cornerstone of strengthening financing for the SDGs in countries and establish more coherent links between the SDGs and development strategies, as well as their implementation. However, as case studies in Africa, Asia and Central America, these tools only prove relevant if they do not add complexity to the administration but are well integrated into and supportive of existing national or local processes and strategies. And international partners should fully align with such national strategies.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

In 2015, the world embarked on an ambitious climate and development agenda with the adoption of the Paris Agreement (PA) and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Now, eight years later, both processes are at important milestones assessing the progress achieved so far. In December 2023, the UN climate conference in Dubai will conclude the first Global Stocktake (GST), a process for assessing collective progress towards the PA objectives. In September, the midterm review of the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) will take place at the SDG Summit in New York. Still, no pleasant surprises are to be expected. It is already clear that progress to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement is way off track, as countries’ NDCs are far too weak to achieve the objectives of the Agreement. Similarly, at the mid-point to achieve the Agenda for Sustainable Development by 2030, no country is on track. Progress on the 17 SDGs has stalled over the past three years. On some Goals, the world has been backsliding, raising questions both about political will and about suitable options for changing course. Despite this disturbing state of affairs, calls for urgency have not resonated with policy makers. In the climate realm, the messages from the IPCC have become ever more alarming, UN Secretary-General Guterres has been exhorting countries to act, and the previous climate conferences in Glasgow and Sharm el-Sheik called on countries to enhance their NDCs – but very few actually did so. But how can we still make progress if all calls for urgency are in vain? It has long been argued that integration of the climate and sustainable development agendas is necessary to achieve both objectives. We argue that it is, in fact, indispensable and our only hope to close the ambition and implementation gaps.

Der Rat der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) hat heute beschlossen, den Leitzins um weitere 0,25 Prozentpunkte zu erhöhen. Dazu ein Statement von Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin):

Die EZB geht mit ihrer erneuten Zinserhöhung ein erhebliches Risiko ein. Damit könnte sie dazu beitragen, dass die Wirtschaft der Eurozone in die Rezession rutscht, ohne dass sie die Inflation noch schneller senkt. Die Wirtschaft der Eurozone hat sich in den vergangenen Monaten weiter abgeschwächt. Die Risiken einer Rezession sind gestiegen. Die Inflation dagegen ist zwar nach wie vor zu hoch, aber auf einem stabilen Pfad, so dass die EZB ihr Mandat der Preisstabilität in der mittleren Frist wieder erreichen sollte – auch ohne weitere Zinserhöhungen. Der Rat der EZB will mit dieser Entscheidung Härte zeigen und die eigene Glaubwürdigkeit stärken. Dies ist verständlich, aber auch riskant.  

Die erneute Abschwächung der Wirtschaft der Eurozone ist Grund zur Sorge. Wichtigste Gründe für den wirtschaftlichen Rückschlag sind nicht die schwächelnde Weltwirtschaft oder die hohen Rohstoffkosten, sondern die deutlichen Zinserhöhungen der EZB. Die Finanzierungsbedingungen haben sich stark für Unternehmen und Menschen verschlechtert. Dies ist gerade in der Baubranche schmerzlich zu spüren. Die EZB-Geldpolitik sollte nicht zu einer noch stärkeren Bremse der Wirtschaft der Eurozone werden und damit möglicherweise permanenten Schaden anrichten.   

Die Inflation, vor allem die Kerninflation, ist zwar noch immer deutlich zu hoch, bewegt sich jedoch kontinuierlich auf das Ziel der Preisstabilität zu. Da die Inflation nur mit einer erheblichen Zeitverzögerung auf Zinsänderungen reagiert, wäre es klüger für die EZB gewesen, eine Pause einzulegen und die bisherige geldpolitische Straffung ihre Wirkung entfalten zu lassen. Ich erwarte, dass die EZB den Höhepunkt ihres Zyklus erreicht hat und die Zinsen nicht weiter erhöhen wird. Ich rechne mit einer ersten Zinssenkung schon recht bald – und früher als von der EZB signalisiert – im Laufe des Jahres 2024, zumal das Zinsniveau heute auf einem restriktiven Niveau ist, die Wirtschaft sich aber auch 2024 nur schleppend erholen dürfte.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.

One of the main features of today’s global trade system is the proliferation of regional trade agreements (RTAs). The proliferation of RTAs in recent years has been coupled with broader and deeper coverage under these agreements. Broader coverage increasingly includes more policy areas that may be trade-related (tariffs and nontariff measures) or non trade-related (behind-the-border policies, intellectual property rights, movement of capital and people, competition policy, and others). In this regard, the scope of RTAs has been expanded by WTO members and signatories of RTAs from just 8 policy areas in the 1950s to 17 policy areas today. Deeper agreements include an increasing number of commitments within each policy area. They are also increasingly accompanied by legal requirements, such as stronger transparency and enforcement mechanisms. This chapter assesses the role of RTAs in boosting agricultural trade in Africa. Our analysis extends beyond estimating the overall impact of agreements on African trade to assess the relative importance of the detailed  agreements’ provisions, including both broader and deeper coverage, in boosting agricultural trade.

This policy brief discusses the new geopolitical and geo-economic context and its significance for the Global South and the development policies of Western actors. The systemic confrontation between China and the USA, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also the seizure of power through a military putsch in Niger, among other places, show: The environment for global cooperation efforts has become much more difficult. Actors in the Global South are no longer just participants on the sidelines of geopolitical conflicts, but are taking an active role. Western countries and Russia make strong efforts to woo them. At the same time, China and India in particular aspire to leadership roles as leaders for the Global South. The following points are of particular importance:
(1) The changes in the international system have given the Global South as a group (despite the enormous differences between the actors in this group) a new impetus of identity – similar to the West. It is noteworthy that this North/South bloc formation makes other possible commonalities less pronounced. This applies above all to the attempt – which has been less success-ful so far – to strengthen the identification of open democratic systems as a mark of belonging. For many debates and alliances, the identification “Global North/South” is formative. Formation of North and South camps is not helpful for finding international solutions. Approaches to counteract entrenched bloc formations and to create effective formats for exchange and understanding are therefore important.
(2) From the perspective of Southern actors, the existing international order is a deeply unjust system that primarily protects the interests of the West, and especially those of the USA. Political offers from the West that do not really lead to structural changes are unlikely to arouse interest in the Global South, and will instead favour counter-designs – be they from China with its claim to leadership for the Global South or Russia.
(3) In principle, the development policy of OECD actors has important potential to help shape the realignment of relations with the Global South. The policy field is, on the one hand, a proof of international credibility (among other things, fulfilment of international obligations) and, on the other hand, an approach that makes it possible to work with operational means on international problems in the first place.
(4) Western development policy is likely to face further difficult situations with risks of escalation and failure (such as Niger and Afghanistan) in the face of multiple tensions in developing regions. Development policy should reflect the geopolitical context even more consciously in strategy and action. The defining geo-political context harbours the danger that the original development policy task – sustainable development of the partner countries – will be overshadowed.
(5) Overall, it should be an important concern to rethink how international burden-sharing for development and climate finance agendas is organised. Here, it is important to consider both the actors from the Global North and those from the Global South.

This policy brief discusses the new geopolitical and geo-economic context and its significance for the Global South and the development policies of Western actors. The systemic confrontation between China and the USA, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also the seizure of power through a military putsch in Niger, among other places, show: The environment for global cooperation efforts has become much more difficult. Actors in the Global South are no longer just participants on the sidelines of geopolitical conflicts, but are taking an active role. Western countries and Russia make strong efforts to woo them. At the same time, China and India in particular aspire to leadership roles as leaders for the Global South. The following points are of particular importance:
(1) The changes in the international system have given the Global South as a group (despite the enormous differences between the actors in this group) a new impetus of identity – similar to the West. It is noteworthy that this North/South bloc formation makes other possible commonalities less pronounced. This applies above all to the attempt – which has been less success-ful so far – to strengthen the identification of open democratic systems as a mark of belonging. For many debates and alliances, the identification “Global North/South” is formative. Formation of North and South camps is not helpful for finding international solutions. Approaches to counteract entrenched bloc formations and to create effective formats for exchange and understanding are therefore important.
(2) From the perspective of Southern actors, the existing international order is a deeply unjust system that primarily protects the interests of the West, and especially those of the USA. Political offers from the West that do not really lead to structural changes are unlikely to arouse interest in the Global South, and will instead favour counter-designs – be they from China with its claim to leadership for the Global South or Russia.
(3) In principle, the development policy of OECD actors has important potential to help shape the realignment of relations with the Global South. The policy field is, on the one hand, a proof of international credibility (among other things, fulfilment of international obligations) and, on the other hand, an approach that makes it possible to work with operational means on international problems in the first place.
(4) Western development policy is likely to face further difficult situations with risks of escalation and failure (such as Niger and Afghanistan) in the face of multiple tensions in developing regions. Development policy should reflect the geopolitical context even more consciously in strategy and action. The defining geo-political context harbours the danger that the original development policy task – sustainable development of the partner countries – will be overshadowed.
(5) Overall, it should be an important concern to rethink how international burden-sharing for development and climate finance agendas is organised. Here, it is important to consider both the actors from the Global North and those from the Global South.

This policy brief discusses the new geopolitical and geo-economic context and its significance for the Global South and the development policies of Western actors. The systemic confrontation between China and the USA, the Russian invasion of Ukraine, but also the seizure of power through a military putsch in Niger, among other places, show: The environment for global cooperation efforts has become much more difficult. Actors in the Global South are no longer just participants on the sidelines of geopolitical conflicts, but are taking an active role. Western countries and Russia make strong efforts to woo them. At the same time, China and India in particular aspire to leadership roles as leaders for the Global South. The following points are of particular importance:
(1) The changes in the international system have given the Global South as a group (despite the enormous differences between the actors in this group) a new impetus of identity – similar to the West. It is noteworthy that this North/South bloc formation makes other possible commonalities less pronounced. This applies above all to the attempt – which has been less success-ful so far – to strengthen the identification of open democratic systems as a mark of belonging. For many debates and alliances, the identification “Global North/South” is formative. Formation of North and South camps is not helpful for finding international solutions. Approaches to counteract entrenched bloc formations and to create effective formats for exchange and understanding are therefore important.
(2) From the perspective of Southern actors, the existing international order is a deeply unjust system that primarily protects the interests of the West, and especially those of the USA. Political offers from the West that do not really lead to structural changes are unlikely to arouse interest in the Global South, and will instead favour counter-designs – be they from China with its claim to leadership for the Global South or Russia.
(3) In principle, the development policy of OECD actors has important potential to help shape the realignment of relations with the Global South. The policy field is, on the one hand, a proof of international credibility (among other things, fulfilment of international obligations) and, on the other hand, an approach that makes it possible to work with operational means on international problems in the first place.
(4) Western development policy is likely to face further difficult situations with risks of escalation and failure (such as Niger and Afghanistan) in the face of multiple tensions in developing regions. Development policy should reflect the geopolitical context even more consciously in strategy and action. The defining geo-political context harbours the danger that the original development policy task – sustainable development of the partner countries – will be overshadowed.
(5) Overall, it should be an important concern to rethink how international burden-sharing for development and climate finance agendas is organised. Here, it is important to consider both the actors from the Global North and those from the Global South.

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Panelists for a high-level policy forum cohosted by IPI and the Open Society Foundations (OSF) on September 12th assessed the current health of the multilateral system and outlined strategies to strengthen multilateralism as a whole in a timely conversation ahead of the 78th Session of the General Assembly. In a bid for hope, they highlighted opportunities to bolster collective efforts and collaboration within the international community in the face of the converging and increasingly complex challenges of our time. The discussion was anchored in the principle of inclusion as speakers offered their recommendations for meaningful reform, gender equity, empowering states of all sizes, and building innovative alliances across nations, civil society, and the private sector.

IPI has been involved in the central debates of the multilateral system for many years, and this event provided the latest intervention on the evolving state of multilateralism with an updated question: Is the multilateral system on the verge of collapse? To shed light on both pressure points and areas for growth alike, the policy forum was framed by empirical data in the findings of the Multilateralism Index, produced in 2022 by IPI and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), and drew on the results of a new global poll by OSF conducted in May and July of this year. The poll, “Open Society Barometer: Can Democracy Deliver?” surveyed more than 36,000 respondents from 30 countries representing the views of more than 5.5. billion people on global solidarity, democracy, human rights, financing for climate change and debt, and international governance.

President of the 78th Session of the General Assembly, H.E. Dennis Francis, set the tone for what will be required of all global decision makers for a cohesive multilateral system built for the advancement of all people. He delivered a call to lead by example and a pledge of transparency from the very top of the UN-based system. He highlighted three key strategies: restore trust by “vehemently denouncing behavior that violates the cherished tenets of the UN Charter;” reassess meaningful and complementary engagement in the international system; and insist on inclusion through the empowerment and involvement of all populations.

Addressing the speed and complexity of modern challenges will require agile solutions that recognize our interdependence and are willing to think imaginatively about future partnerships and alliances that break from the existing international architecture. For this task, Former President of Liberia and Nobel Peace Laureate H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf emphasized the need to “prioritize the most vulnerable, marginalized populations,” in the decision-making processes that most affect them as those “who bear the brunt of interconnected challenges.” She noted the particular significance of women’s participation as key for development and sustainable peace and an essential piece of the multilateral puzzle.

As a representative of states facing existential challenges, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the UN Maritza Chan, reminded the audience of the pivotal role that small states can play if we provide them with the necessary resources and expertise on emergent technologies and dare to unlock their potential to address global problems in areas where they may already be leading the charge, such as AI advancement. Meghna Abraham, Executive Director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights, provided a voice for the civil society sector on the panel. She advocated for civil society as the model to follow in going beyond proscriptive silos and fostering innovative responses. Abraham firmly asserted the presence of numerous opportunities for reform but noted the contingency of those opportunities for change on “a shift in power and a shift in resources.” Underpinning panelists’ talking points, was the sentiment that in order to change the system so that it will actually work for people, enable them to survive, and have ownership in the multilateral process, we will need mobilization across disciplines and attention to the many contradictions of the very system designed to protect them.

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Opening Remarks:
H.E. Dennis Francis, President of the 78th Session of the General Assembly

Speakers:
Lord Mark Malloch-Brown, President, Open Society Foundations
H.E. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, Former President of Liberia, Nobel Peace Laureate, Former Chair of ECOWAS, Founder of the Ellen Johnson Presidential Center for Women and Development, Former Co-Chair of the Independent Panel for Pandemic Preparedness and Response, and Co-Chair of the UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Advisory Board on Effective Multilateralism (HLAB)
H.E. Maritza Chan, Permanent Representative of Costa Rica to the United Nations
Meghna Abraham, Executive Director of the Center for Economic and Social Rights

Moderator:
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, President and CEO, International Peace Institute

Bonn, 12. September 2023. Der G20 Gipfel führte vor, wie Demokratien und Autokratien kooperieren. „Für Demokratie einstehen und mit Autokraten kooperieren - geht das?“ fragt die Autorin der heutigen Aktuellen Kolumne.

In der G20 Gipfelerklärung vom Wochenende kommt das Wort Demokratie nicht einmal vor. In der aktuellen Situation ist das gut so. Zweckbündnisse sind zwar notwendig, um globale Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Wertegeleitete Politik muss aber trotzdem für Demokratie einstehen. Gerade in der aktuellen Weltlage ist das notwendig. Als die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der Demokratie (15.9.) vor 16 Jahren einführten, war es um die Demokratie noch besser bestellt. Es gab zwar erste Anzeichen für das, was heute als „dritte globale Autokratisierungswelle“ bezeichnet wird, doch die Hälfte der Menschen lebte weltweit noch in Demokratien. Das ist jetzt anders. Im Jahr 2022 lebten 72% der Weltbevölkerung in Regimen mit autokratischen Merkmalen. Beispielsweise beschneidet Indien, der aktuelle G20-Vorsitz und einst größte Demokratie der Welt, Grundfreiheiten einzelner Gruppen. Auch die jüngsten Militärputsche in Niger und Gabun stehen für ein neues Erstarken autokratischer Herrschaft.

Doch ist es nicht nur um die Verfasstheit einzelner Demokratien schlecht bestellt. Demokratie ist auch wieder zum wenig hilfreichen Kampfbegriff in der globalen Politik geworden. Die EU, Deutschland und die USA sprechen von „systemischer Rivalität“ zwischen Autokratien und Demokratien. Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesregierung bekennt sich zu einer wertegeleiteten Politik. 76 Treffer bringt die Suche nach dem Demokratiebegriff in dem Dokument, so häufig wie in keiner anderen Sicherheitsstrategie westlicher Mächte. Da hat sich Deutschland eine sehr hohe Messlatte gelegt. Doch was heißt es wirklich, für Demokratie einzustehen in einer multipolaren Welt voller Herausforderungen?

Demokratiepolitik und gemeinwohlorientierte Kooperation mit Autokraten sind deutsches Interesse

Demokratiepolitik nach Außen – wie nach Innen –  ist im Interesse Deutschlands. Für eine Volkswirtschaft, deren Wohlstand sich vornehmlich aus Exporten finanziert, sind stabile Beziehungen mit anderen Staaten zentral. Demokratien bieten nicht nur nachhaltigere Entwicklung, sondern auch höhere Erwartungssicherheit und auf Dauer stabilere Kooperationen. Dennoch kommt Deutschland nicht umhin, seine Interessen durch die Kooperation mit Autokratien zu verfolgen. Das kann auch ohne einen Ausverkauf der Demokratie gelingen, wenn gemeinwohlorientierte Zweckbündnisse geschmiedet werden. Beispielsweise braucht es eine gemeinsame Kraftanstrengung von Demokratien und Autokratien, um den Klimawandel einzudämmen. Eine Reform des Welthandelssystems funktioniert nicht, wenn sich nur der Club der Demokratien zusammentut. Und auch das Eintreten gegen Putschisten in Westafrika wäre gemeinsam mit strategisch relevanten Autokratien wie China sicherlich effektiver. Doch wird da nicht die wertegeleitete Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik verraten? Nicht, wenn der Kooperationszweck gemeinwohlorientiert ist und der Demokratiebegriff außen vor bleibt. Schaden für die Demokratie entstünde, wenn Autokratien vorgeben würden, sich für Demokratie einzusetzen. So würden noch mehr demokratische Fassaden aufgebaut und demokratische Prinzipien weiter ausgehöhlt. Würden Demokratien das durch gemeinsame Stellungnahmen wie beim G20 Gipfel unterstützen, gewännen autokratische Regime weiter an Legitimität.

Deutsche Beiträge zum schleichenden Tod der Demokratie?: „Do no democratic harm“

Nicht nur bei Zweckbündnissen entstehen Gefahren für die Demokratie. Die meisten Demokratien sterben schleichend. Gewählte Amtsinhaber wie Orban in Ungarn, Bolsonaro in Brasilien oder Talon in Benin höhlen demokratische Institutionen aus. Als zweitgrößter Geber von internationalen Entwicklungsgeldern hat Deutschland eine besondere Verantwortung, solche Autokratisierungsprozesse zumindest nicht zu verstärken. Der Autokratisierung mit aktiver Politik von außen entgegenzuwirken ist nur erfolgreich, wenn sie pro-demokratische Kräfte vor Ort verstärken kann. Alleine kann kein Staat interne Dynamiken eines Landes umkehren. Das gilt umgekehrt auch für Autokratisierung. Für entwicklungspolitische Kooperationen wurde mehrfach nachgewiesen, dass sie Autokratien indirekt stabilisieren und Autokratisierungstrends verstärken können, wenn sie nicht umsichtig gestaltet werden. Beispielsweise können die unbedachte Unterstützung von Verwaltungsreformen oder Investitionen im öffentlichen Sektor den politischen Spielraum für Autokraten erweitern. Zwar fördert Deutschland durch Projekte und politische Stiftungen pro-aktiv Demokratie, doch ist unwahrscheinlich, dass diese relativ geringen Mittel die nicht intendierten Wirkungen von Entwicklungspolitik in autokratischen Kontexten aufwiegen können. Erste Schritte, um Demokratie weltweit zu schützen – auch bei der Umsetzung der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie – wäre ein „Do no harm to democracy“-Prinzip zu entwickeln. Das bedeutet Kooperationen daraufhin zu prüfen, was für potenzielle Wirkungen sie auf die politische Verfasstheit eines Staates haben, aber auch, ob die Zahlung von Entwicklungsgeldern in strategisch weniger relevanten Ländern (z.B. Ruanda) nicht besser eingestellt werden sollte.

Bonn, 12. September 2023. Der G20 Gipfel führte vor, wie Demokratien und Autokratien kooperieren. „Für Demokratie einstehen und mit Autokraten kooperieren - geht das?“ fragt die Autorin der heutigen Aktuellen Kolumne.

In der G20 Gipfelerklärung vom Wochenende kommt das Wort Demokratie nicht einmal vor. In der aktuellen Situation ist das gut so. Zweckbündnisse sind zwar notwendig, um globale Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Wertegeleitete Politik muss aber trotzdem für Demokratie einstehen. Gerade in der aktuellen Weltlage ist das notwendig. Als die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der Demokratie (15.9.) vor 16 Jahren einführten, war es um die Demokratie noch besser bestellt. Es gab zwar erste Anzeichen für das, was heute als „dritte globale Autokratisierungswelle“ bezeichnet wird, doch die Hälfte der Menschen lebte weltweit noch in Demokratien. Das ist jetzt anders. Im Jahr 2022 lebten 72% der Weltbevölkerung in Regimen mit autokratischen Merkmalen. Beispielsweise beschneidet Indien, der aktuelle G20-Vorsitz und einst größte Demokratie der Welt, Grundfreiheiten einzelner Gruppen. Auch die jüngsten Militärputsche in Niger und Gabun stehen für ein neues Erstarken autokratischer Herrschaft.

Doch ist es nicht nur um die Verfasstheit einzelner Demokratien schlecht bestellt. Demokratie ist auch wieder zum wenig hilfreichen Kampfbegriff in der globalen Politik geworden. Die EU, Deutschland und die USA sprechen von „systemischer Rivalität“ zwischen Autokratien und Demokratien. Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesregierung bekennt sich zu einer wertegeleiteten Politik. 76 Treffer bringt die Suche nach dem Demokratiebegriff in dem Dokument, so häufig wie in keiner anderen Sicherheitsstrategie westlicher Mächte. Da hat sich Deutschland eine sehr hohe Messlatte gelegt. Doch was heißt es wirklich, für Demokratie einzustehen in einer multipolaren Welt voller Herausforderungen?

Demokratiepolitik und gemeinwohlorientierte Kooperation mit Autokraten sind deutsches Interesse

Demokratiepolitik nach Außen – wie nach Innen –  ist im Interesse Deutschlands. Für eine Volkswirtschaft, deren Wohlstand sich vornehmlich aus Exporten finanziert, sind stabile Beziehungen mit anderen Staaten zentral. Demokratien bieten nicht nur nachhaltigere Entwicklung, sondern auch höhere Erwartungssicherheit und auf Dauer stabilere Kooperationen. Dennoch kommt Deutschland nicht umhin, seine Interessen durch die Kooperation mit Autokratien zu verfolgen. Das kann auch ohne einen Ausverkauf der Demokratie gelingen, wenn gemeinwohlorientierte Zweckbündnisse geschmiedet werden. Beispielsweise braucht es eine gemeinsame Kraftanstrengung von Demokratien und Autokratien, um den Klimawandel einzudämmen. Eine Reform des Welthandelssystems funktioniert nicht, wenn sich nur der Club der Demokratien zusammentut. Und auch das Eintreten gegen Putschisten in Westafrika wäre gemeinsam mit strategisch relevanten Autokratien wie China sicherlich effektiver. Doch wird da nicht die wertegeleitete Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik verraten? Nicht, wenn der Kooperationszweck gemeinwohlorientiert ist und der Demokratiebegriff außen vor bleibt. Schaden für die Demokratie entstünde, wenn Autokratien vorgeben würden, sich für Demokratie einzusetzen. So würden noch mehr demokratische Fassaden aufgebaut und demokratische Prinzipien weiter ausgehöhlt. Würden Demokratien das durch gemeinsame Stellungnahmen wie beim G20 Gipfel unterstützen, gewännen autokratische Regime weiter an Legitimität.

Deutsche Beiträge zum schleichenden Tod der Demokratie?: „Do no democratic harm“

Nicht nur bei Zweckbündnissen entstehen Gefahren für die Demokratie. Die meisten Demokratien sterben schleichend. Gewählte Amtsinhaber wie Orban in Ungarn, Bolsonaro in Brasilien oder Talon in Benin höhlen demokratische Institutionen aus. Als zweitgrößter Geber von internationalen Entwicklungsgeldern hat Deutschland eine besondere Verantwortung, solche Autokratisierungsprozesse zumindest nicht zu verstärken. Der Autokratisierung mit aktiver Politik von außen entgegenzuwirken ist nur erfolgreich, wenn sie pro-demokratische Kräfte vor Ort verstärken kann. Alleine kann kein Staat interne Dynamiken eines Landes umkehren. Das gilt umgekehrt auch für Autokratisierung. Für entwicklungspolitische Kooperationen wurde mehrfach nachgewiesen, dass sie Autokratien indirekt stabilisieren und Autokratisierungstrends verstärken können, wenn sie nicht umsichtig gestaltet werden. Beispielsweise können die unbedachte Unterstützung von Verwaltungsreformen oder Investitionen im öffentlichen Sektor den politischen Spielraum für Autokraten erweitern. Zwar fördert Deutschland durch Projekte und politische Stiftungen pro-aktiv Demokratie, doch ist unwahrscheinlich, dass diese relativ geringen Mittel die nicht intendierten Wirkungen von Entwicklungspolitik in autokratischen Kontexten aufwiegen können. Erste Schritte, um Demokratie weltweit zu schützen – auch bei der Umsetzung der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie – wäre ein „Do no harm to democracy“-Prinzip zu entwickeln. Das bedeutet Kooperationen daraufhin zu prüfen, was für potenzielle Wirkungen sie auf die politische Verfasstheit eines Staates haben, aber auch, ob die Zahlung von Entwicklungsgeldern in strategisch weniger relevanten Ländern (z.B. Ruanda) nicht besser eingestellt werden sollte.

Bonn, 12. September 2023. Der G20 Gipfel führte vor, wie Demokratien und Autokratien kooperieren. „Für Demokratie einstehen und mit Autokraten kooperieren - geht das?“ fragt die Autorin der heutigen Aktuellen Kolumne.

In der G20 Gipfelerklärung vom Wochenende kommt das Wort Demokratie nicht einmal vor. In der aktuellen Situation ist das gut so. Zweckbündnisse sind zwar notwendig, um globale Herausforderungen zu bewältigen. Wertegeleitete Politik muss aber trotzdem für Demokratie einstehen. Gerade in der aktuellen Weltlage ist das notwendig. Als die Vereinten Nationen den Internationalen Tag der Demokratie (15.9.) vor 16 Jahren einführten, war es um die Demokratie noch besser bestellt. Es gab zwar erste Anzeichen für das, was heute als „dritte globale Autokratisierungswelle“ bezeichnet wird, doch die Hälfte der Menschen lebte weltweit noch in Demokratien. Das ist jetzt anders. Im Jahr 2022 lebten 72% der Weltbevölkerung in Regimen mit autokratischen Merkmalen. Beispielsweise beschneidet Indien, der aktuelle G20-Vorsitz und einst größte Demokratie der Welt, Grundfreiheiten einzelner Gruppen. Auch die jüngsten Militärputsche in Niger und Gabun stehen für ein neues Erstarken autokratischer Herrschaft.

Doch ist es nicht nur um die Verfasstheit einzelner Demokratien schlecht bestellt. Demokratie ist auch wieder zum wenig hilfreichen Kampfbegriff in der globalen Politik geworden. Die EU, Deutschland und die USA sprechen von „systemischer Rivalität“ zwischen Autokratien und Demokratien. Die Nationale Sicherheitsstrategie der Bundesregierung bekennt sich zu einer wertegeleiteten Politik. 76 Treffer bringt die Suche nach dem Demokratiebegriff in dem Dokument, so häufig wie in keiner anderen Sicherheitsstrategie westlicher Mächte. Da hat sich Deutschland eine sehr hohe Messlatte gelegt. Doch was heißt es wirklich, für Demokratie einzustehen in einer multipolaren Welt voller Herausforderungen?

Demokratiepolitik und gemeinwohlorientierte Kooperation mit Autokraten sind deutsches Interesse

Demokratiepolitik nach Außen – wie nach Innen –  ist im Interesse Deutschlands. Für eine Volkswirtschaft, deren Wohlstand sich vornehmlich aus Exporten finanziert, sind stabile Beziehungen mit anderen Staaten zentral. Demokratien bieten nicht nur nachhaltigere Entwicklung, sondern auch höhere Erwartungssicherheit und auf Dauer stabilere Kooperationen. Dennoch kommt Deutschland nicht umhin, seine Interessen durch die Kooperation mit Autokratien zu verfolgen. Das kann auch ohne einen Ausverkauf der Demokratie gelingen, wenn gemeinwohlorientierte Zweckbündnisse geschmiedet werden. Beispielsweise braucht es eine gemeinsame Kraftanstrengung von Demokratien und Autokratien, um den Klimawandel einzudämmen. Eine Reform des Welthandelssystems funktioniert nicht, wenn sich nur der Club der Demokratien zusammentut. Und auch das Eintreten gegen Putschisten in Westafrika wäre gemeinsam mit strategisch relevanten Autokratien wie China sicherlich effektiver. Doch wird da nicht die wertegeleitete Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik verraten? Nicht, wenn der Kooperationszweck gemeinwohlorientiert ist und der Demokratiebegriff außen vor bleibt. Schaden für die Demokratie entstünde, wenn Autokratien vorgeben würden, sich für Demokratie einzusetzen. So würden noch mehr demokratische Fassaden aufgebaut und demokratische Prinzipien weiter ausgehöhlt. Würden Demokratien das durch gemeinsame Stellungnahmen wie beim G20 Gipfel unterstützen, gewännen autokratische Regime weiter an Legitimität.

Deutsche Beiträge zum schleichenden Tod der Demokratie?: „Do no democratic harm“

Nicht nur bei Zweckbündnissen entstehen Gefahren für die Demokratie. Die meisten Demokratien sterben schleichend. Gewählte Amtsinhaber wie Orban in Ungarn, Bolsonaro in Brasilien oder Talon in Benin höhlen demokratische Institutionen aus. Als zweitgrößter Geber von internationalen Entwicklungsgeldern hat Deutschland eine besondere Verantwortung, solche Autokratisierungsprozesse zumindest nicht zu verstärken. Der Autokratisierung mit aktiver Politik von außen entgegenzuwirken ist nur erfolgreich, wenn sie pro-demokratische Kräfte vor Ort verstärken kann. Alleine kann kein Staat interne Dynamiken eines Landes umkehren. Das gilt umgekehrt auch für Autokratisierung. Für entwicklungspolitische Kooperationen wurde mehrfach nachgewiesen, dass sie Autokratien indirekt stabilisieren und Autokratisierungstrends verstärken können, wenn sie nicht umsichtig gestaltet werden. Beispielsweise können die unbedachte Unterstützung von Verwaltungsreformen oder Investitionen im öffentlichen Sektor den politischen Spielraum für Autokraten erweitern. Zwar fördert Deutschland durch Projekte und politische Stiftungen pro-aktiv Demokratie, doch ist unwahrscheinlich, dass diese relativ geringen Mittel die nicht intendierten Wirkungen von Entwicklungspolitik in autokratischen Kontexten aufwiegen können. Erste Schritte, um Demokratie weltweit zu schützen – auch bei der Umsetzung der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie – wäre ein „Do no harm to democracy“-Prinzip zu entwickeln. Das bedeutet Kooperationen daraufhin zu prüfen, was für potenzielle Wirkungen sie auf die politische Verfasstheit eines Staates haben, aber auch, ob die Zahlung von Entwicklungsgeldern in strategisch weniger relevanten Ländern (z.B. Ruanda) nicht besser eingestellt werden sollte.