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The US Department of Defense also relies on artificial intelligence in war, collaborating with companies such as xAI. The Pentagon recently blacklisted the AI developer Anthropic after the company refused to make its technologies fully available for military purposes. Commentators examine potential applications and risks.

Africa’s eye on minerals as the be-all-and-cure-all for the continent’s development agenda is being tested by geopolitical gamesmanship as global superpowers jostle to carve new spheres of influence. Amid the turmoil unleashed by the United States President Donald Trump administration’s trade tariffs, African minerals have faced price volatility, which analysts say points to the fragility […]

Bonn, 18. März 2026. Für Deutschland und Europa ist es nicht leicht, eine konstruktive Rolle zu spielen. Dennoch sollten sie sich, unabhängig vom Kriegsverlauf, für eine neue Ordnung in Iran einsetzen.

Die Angriffe der Vereinigten Staaten und Israels auf Iran sind nach Meinung der Jurist*innen völkerrechtswidrig, umgekehrt gilt dies aber auch für die Bombardierung neutraler Drittstaaten durch Iran. Im Iran herrscht weit verbreitete Angst vor den Folgen der Angriffe, viele Iraner*innen begrüßen die Militärschläge aber auch in der Hoffnung auf einen Regime-Wechsel. Dass dieser kommt, ist aber ohne eine Boden-Offensive oder eine Spaltung des iranischen Regimes unwahrscheinlich. Stattdessen drohen Bürgerkrieg, ein noch radikaleres politisches Regime oder der Zerfall des Landes - jeweils mit gravierenden langfristigen Folgen für die Einwohner Irans, die gesamte Region von Afghanistan bis zur Türkei sowie Europa. Nicht zuletzt wäre mit neuen Fluchtbewegungen zu rechnen. Ein längerer Krieg würde mehr zivile Opfer fordern, immense Schäden an Gebäuden und der Infrastruktur von Iran, aber auch der Nachbarländer verursachen und die Weltwirtschaft stark belasten. Und möglicherweise wird es den USA noch nicht einmal gelingen, ihr anderes Kriegsziel zu erreichen: das iranische Atom-Arsenal zu zerstören.

Was können Deutschland und Europa tun?
Für Deutschland und Europa ist es nicht leicht, in dieser Situation eine konstruktive Rolle zu spielen. Ihr Einfluss auf das Geschehen ist begrenzt, sie haben aber ein ureigenes Interesse daran, dass Iran und die Region nicht noch mehr destabilisiert werden. Darum sollten sie sich unabhängig vom Kriegsverlauf für eine neue Ordnung in Iran einsetzen, die für alle Bevölkerungsgruppen, aber auch Regime-Anhänger akzeptabel ist. Anfangs würde sie sicher manche Wünsche für die Iraner*innen offenlassen. Sie sollte aber für alle Beteiligten ein Mindestmaß an Sicherheit darüber herstellen, was sie voneinander erwarten können. Dafür müsste sie auf einem neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag beruhen, der das wechselseitige Geben und Nehmen zwischen den Akteuren regelt.

Ein neuer Gesellschaftsvertrag in Iran
Die neue iranische Führung müsste zumindest ein Minimum der drei Leistungen erbringen, die üblicherweise von einem Staat erwartet werden und auch von den Iraner*innen in den letzten Protestwellen eingefordert wurden – also den „drei Ps“: (i) protection (Schutz vor Krieg, staatlicher Willkür und Bevormundung, inkl. Kleidervorschriften), (ii) provision (Sicherung von Einkommen, Arbeitsplätzen und bezahlbaren Preisen) und (iii) participation (durch Wahlen, Meinungsfreiheit und Zugang zu sozialen Medien). Dass Iran trotz seiner immensen Erdöl- und Gasvorkommen hierzu schon länger nicht mehr in der Lage war, liegt – an der Selbstbereicherung der Eliten, großzügigen Zuwendungen an die Hizbullah im Libanon, die Hamas in Gaza, das Asad-Regime in Syrien und die Huthi im Jemen und dem Unterhalt von Revolutionsgarden, die vor allem das Regime vor der eigenen Bevölkerung schützen.

Bislang hat jede direkte ausländische Intervention demokratischen Wandel in Iran eher behindert als befördert. Deshalb sollten Deutschland und Europa indirekte Maßnahmen ergreifen – z.B. politische und wirtschaftliche Anreize setzen um einen neuen Gesellschaftsvertrag zwischen Regierung und Volk zu befördern. Gerade Deutschland hatte sich als Gestaltungsmacht in der E3-Gruppe mit Frankreich und dem Vereinigten Königreich z.B. beim Aufsetzen eines Zahlungsmechanismus zur Umgehung illegitimer Drittwirkung von amerikanischen Sanktionen profiliert. Natürlich sind auch die europäischen Länder Teil des Westens. Aber sie sind zuletzt stets so aufgetreten, dass Akteure in Iran Grund haben, ihnen mehr zu trauen als Israel und den USA. Als mögliche zukünftige Wirtschaftspartner können sie Iran auch etwas anbieten. Durch die Wiederaufnahme staatlicher Kreditgarantien könnten sie Investoren ermutigen, Iran bei der Restauration seiner Wasserversorgung und Landwirtschaft und der Anpassung an den Klimawandel zu helfen.

Rolle der Diaspora 
In Europa lebt zudem eine große iranische Diaspora, die nach Reformen evtl. wieder in der Heimat investieren würde. Wie schon 1979 beim Sturz des Schah beanspruchen die Auslandsiraner, den politischen Wandel in ihrem Land mitzugestalten. Ob sie dabei einen positiven Beitrag leisten, hängt davon ab, ob sie ihre Diversität anerkennen und die Erfahrungen nutzen, die sie in westlichen Rechtsstaaten gemacht haben. Dazu zählt, dass der neue Gesellschaftsvertrag in Iran auch die im Konflikt Unterlegenen einschließt und statt Rache rechtsstaatliche Verfahren für die Verantwortlichen der jahrzehntelangen Unterdrückung vorsieht.

Stabilisierung der Region 
Zugleich sollte sich Deutschland darauf vorbereiten, andere Länder im Nahen Osten zu unterstützen und zu stabilisieren – insbesondere bei der Aufnahme von Geflüchteten. Seit 2012 hat Deutschland Erfahrung mit Krisenreaktion und Stabilisierung gesammelt und u.a. gelernt, wie wichtig es ist, Regierungen und Gemeinden in die Planung der Flüchtlingsunterbringung einzubeziehen. Europa und Iran haben viel zu gewinnen. Sie haben aber auch viel zu verlieren, wenn der derzeitige Krieg ausufert, unsere Nachbarregion weiter destabilisiert wird und schließlich nicht nur Iran zerfällt.

 

 

Dr. Bernhard Trautner ist ehemaliger IDOS-wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter, Honorarprofessur an der Universität Tübingen und Mitglied des International Board, Bonn International Center for Conflict Studies (BICC).

Prof. Dr. Markus Loewe ist Ökonom, Regionalkoordinator Naher Osten und Nordafrika und Interim-Leiter der Forschungsabteilung "Transformation der Wirtschafts- und Sozialsysteme" am German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS).

By CIVICUS
Mar 18 2026 (IPS)

 
CIVICUS discusses China’s tech-enabled repression with Fergus Ryan, a Senior Analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), where he specialises in how the Chinese Communist Party shapes global information environments through censorship, propaganda and platform governance. His research includes a major study on China’s AI ecosystem and its human rights impacts, as well as investigations into China’s use of foreign influencers.

Fergus Ryan

China’s authoritarian government is deploying AI at scale to censor, control and monitor its population. As these tools grow more sophisticated and are exported abroad, the implications for civic space extend far beyond China’s borders.

What AI systems is China developing?

Based on our research, China is rapidly developing a multi-layered AI ecosystem designed to expand state control.

Tech giants are building multimodal large language models (LLMs) such as Alibaba’s Qwen and Baidu’s Ernie Bot, which censor and reshape descriptions of politically sensitive images. Hardware companies including Dahua, Hikvision and SenseTime supply the camera networks that feed into these systems.

The state is building what amounts to an AI-driven criminal justice pipeline. This includes City Brain operations centres such as Shanghai’s Pudong district, which process massive surveillance data, as well as the 206 System, developed by iFlyTek, which analyses evidence and recommends criminal sentences. Inside prisons, AI monitors inmates’ facial expressions and tracks their emotions.

AI-enabled satellite surveillance, such as the Xinjiang Jiaotong-01, enables autonomous real-time tracking over politically sensitive regions. Additionally, AI-enabled fishing platforms such as Sea Eagle expand economic extraction in the exclusive economic zones of countries including Mauritania and Vanuatu, displacing artisanal fishing communities.

How does China use AI for censorship and policing?

China relies on a hybrid model of censorship that fuses the speed of AI with human political judgement. The government requires companies to self-censor, creating a commercial market for AI moderation tools. Tech giants such as Baidu and Tencent have industrialised this process: systems automatically scan images, text and videos to detect content deemed to be risky in real time, while human reviewers handle nuanced or coded speech.

In policing, City Brains ingest data from millions of cameras, drones and Internet of Things sensors and use AI to identify suspects, track vehicles and predict unrest before it happens. In Xinjiang, the Integrated Joint Operations Platform aggregates data from cameras, phone scanners and informants to generate risk scores for individuals, enabling pre-emptive detention based on behavioural patterns rather than specific crimes.

On platforms such as Douyin, the state does not just delete content; it algorithmically suppresses dissent while amplifying ‘positive energy’. AI links surveillance data directly to narrative control and police action.

What are the human rights impacts?

These AI systems erode the rights to freedom of expression, privacy and a fair trial.

Historically, online censorship meant deleting a post. Today, generative AI engages in ‘informational gaslighting’. When ASPI researchers showed an Alibaba LLM a photograph of a protest against human rights violations in Xinjiang, the AI described it as ‘individuals in a public setting holding signs with incorrect statements’ based on ‘prejudice and lies’. The technology subtly engineers reality, preventing users accessing objective historical truths.

AI also undermines the right to a fair trial. In courts that lack judicial independence, AI systems that recommend sentences or predict recidivism act as a black box that defence lawyers cannot scrutinise.

Pervasive surveillance changes behaviour even when not actively used, so its chilling effect may be as significant as direct deployment. Knowing their conversations may be monitored, people self-censor online and in private messaging. Emotion recognition in prisons takes this further: people can theoretically be flagged for their internal states of mind. It’s not just actions that are punished, but also thoughts.

Which groups are most affected?

While AI-enabled surveillance affects all people, ethnic minorities such as Koreans, Mongolians, Tibetans and Uyghurs are disproportionately targeted.

Mainstream LLMs are trained primarily in Mandarin, leaving little commercial incentive to develop AI for minority languages. The Chinese state, however, views those languages as a security vulnerability. State-funded institutions, including the National Key Laboratory at Minzu University, are building LLMs in minority languages, not for cultural preservation, but to power public-opinion control and prevention platforms. These scan text, audio and video in Tibetan and Uyghur to detect cultural advocacy, dissent or religious activity.

Feminist activists, human rights lawyers — particularly since the 709 crackdown in 2015 — labour activists and religious minorities including Falun Gong practitioners face disproportionate targeting. Chinese models consistently adopt state-aligned narratives about such groups, labelling Falun Gong a cult and avoiding human rights framing. Since 2020, Hong Kongers have also been subject to National Security Law surveillance using many of the same tools deployed on the mainland, a reminder that this infrastructure can be rapidly extended.

How can activists in China protect themselves?

Protecting oneself inside China is increasingly difficult. AI leaves very few blind spots. But the system is not perfectly omniscient.

Activists have historically relied on coded speech, euphemisms and satire, the classic example being the use of ‘Winnie the Pooh’ to refer to President Xi Jinping. Because AI struggles with cultural nuance and evolving memes, new linguistic workarounds can temporarily bypass automated filters. But this is a relentless game of Whac-a-Mole: Chinese tech companies employ thousands of human content reviewers whose only job is to catch new memes and feed them back into the AI.

The most practical steps are to use VPNs to access blocked platforms, secure communications apps such as Signal and separate devices for sensitive work. None of these are foolproof. VPN use is technically illegal and increasingly detected and Signal can only be accessed via VPN. It helps to keep a minimal digital footprint and communicate face-to-face on sensitive matters. For activists in Xinjiang, however, surveillance is so pervasive that individual precautions offer little protection. Strong international networks and rigorous documentation practices are essential.

Is China exporting these technologies?

China is the world’s largest exporter of AI-powered surveillance technology, marketing these systems globally, particularly to the global south.

The Chinese state is purposefully expanding its minority-language public-opinion monitoring software throughout Belt and Road Initiative countries, effectively extending its censorship apparatus to monitor Tibetan and Uyghur diaspora communities abroad. Chinese companies including Dahua, Hikvision, Huawei and ZTE have deployed surveillance and ‘safe city’ systems across over 100 countries, with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates among the most significant recipients. Critically, these companies operate under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, which requires cooperation with state intelligence, meaning data flowing through these systems could be accessible to Beijing as well as to purchasing governments.

China is also exporting its governance model through the open-source release of its LLMs, embedding Chinese censorship norms into foundational infrastructure used by developers worldwide.

What should the international community do?

The international community must recognise that countering this requires regulatory pushback.

First, democratic states should set minimum transparency standards for public procurement. This means refusing to purchase AI models that conceal political or historical censorship and mandating that providers publish a ‘moderation log’ with refusal reason codes so users know when content is restricted for political reasons.

Second, states should enact ‘safe-harbour laws’ to protect civil society organisations, journalists and researchers who audit AI models for hidden censorship. Currently, doing so can breach corporate terms of service.

Third, strict export controls should block the transfer of repression-enabling technologies to authoritarian regimes, while companies providing public-opinion management services should be excluded from democratic markets. Existing targeted sanctions on companies such as Dahua and Hikvision for their role in Xinjiang should be enforced more rigorously.

Finally, the international community must recognise that Chinese surveillance extends beyond China’s borders. Spyware targeting Tibetan and Uyghur activists in exile is well-documented, as is pressure on family members remaining in China. Rigorous documentation by international civil society remains essential for building the evidentiary record for future accountability.

CIVICUS interviews a wide range of civil society activists, experts and leaders to gather diverse perspectives on civil society action and current issues for publication on its CIVICUS Lens platform. The views expressed in interviews are the interviewees’ and do not necessarily reflect those of CIVICUS. Publication does not imply endorsement of interviewees or the organisations they represent.

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Technology: innovation without accountability CIVICUS | 2026 State of Civil Society Report
The silencing of Hong Kong CIVICUS Lens 25.Jun.2025
The long reach of authoritarianism CIVICUS Lens 20.Mar.2024

 

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Muslim History Month poster- artist Siddhesh Gautam

By Mariya Salim
DELHI, India, Mar 18 2026 (IPS)

In public discourse today, Muslims often appear as subjects of debate rather than authors of their own histories. Discussions about Muslim societies tend to revolve around geopolitics, security or conflict, leaving little space for the cultural, artistic and intellectual traditions that have shaped Muslim communities across centuries.

Reclaiming these narratives is therefore about reclaiming narrative authority. As a Muslim woman, I have often seen how Muslim voices are sidelined even when conversations centre on our own communities and pasts. It was within this context that I started Muslim History Month, together with my friend and colleague Ashwini KP, currently UN Special Rapporteur on Racism, in 2020, choosing to mark it during the month of Ramadan. Hosted on www.zariya.online, the initiative emerged from a simple conviction: communities must have the space to document and narrate their own histories.

Mariya Salim

Muslim History Month also draws inspiration from earlier community-led initiatives such as Black History Month and Dalit History Month. These movements have long shown how marginalized communities can reclaim pasts and their present, that have been ignored or distorted.

They remind us that history is not only about remembering the past but also about challenging exclusion and reshaping how societies understand themselves. Muslim History Month builds on this legacy by creating a platform where Muslims, and others who are allies, themselves reflect on the diversity, complexity and richness of their historical and cultural experiences.

What began as a modest collaborative project has since developed into a global platform bringing together writers, scholars, artists and activists to explore overlooked dimensions of Muslim histories. Contributors have written from Egypt, the United States, Palestine, Nepal and Russia, among others, representing a range of communities including Pasmanda, Tsakhurs, Roma and Uyghur Muslims. This year alone there are contributors from over 6 countries, from Lebanon and Palestine to India, Egypt and Indonesia.

The urgency of documenting these histories is reflected in the commitment of the contributors themselves. Rima Barakat, an academic in Islamic Art History from the Lebanese American University (LAU), wrote her contribution this year from Beirut. Explaining why she chose to participate in our endeavour despite living amid ongoing conflict, she observed:

“War always incites me to act culturally and to contribute amidst political turmoil. Historically, during World War I and World War II, artists and writers produced prolifically and contributed to sustaining a cultural economy. That is what I do today and how survival is measured by cultural and artistic endurance.”

Mihrab at the Jami Masjid, 17th century, Bijapur, India. Photo- Author Rajarshi Sengupta

Her words capture something fundamental about the role of culture in difficult times. Artistic expression is often treated as secondary to more immediate political realities. Yet history repeatedly shows that culture can become one of the most powerful ways communities endure, remember and rebuild.

The first edition of Muslim History Month brought together writers from different parts of the world to document overlooked aspects of Muslim communities. Contributors wrote about subjects ranging from Sheedi Muslims in Pakistan to what Ramadan/Ramzaan means. The second edition shifted the focus toward Muslim women from across the world who are no longer with us, many of whose contributions have faded from historical memory, from architect Zaha Hadid to Indian Spy Noor Inayat Khan. By revisiting their lives and work, the edition sought to address the erasures that often shape how Muslim women’s life and experiences are recorded.

The third edition, launched this year, turns its attention to Muslim art and architecture. Rather than limiting the discussion to monumental structures or gallery-based art alone, the edition explores a wider spectrum of creative practices. Art and architecture here include performance traditions, Calligraphy and mosque architecture, craft practices like Rogan Art, cultural rituals like wearing Amulets and everyday acts of creativity through which communities’ express faith, identity and belonging.

One of the contributions by Kawther Alkholy Ramadan in Canada for instance reflects on the aftermath of the Afzaal family murders in London, Ontario. In 2021, the Afzaal family was deliberately targeted and killed in an act of anti-Muslim violence that deeply affected the local community. Rather than focusing solely on the violence of the attack, Ramadan’s piece examines how Muslim women responded through creative and cultural expression.

Stories such as these challenge conventional assumptions about what counts as art. They show how creativity often emerges most powerfully in moments of crisis, when communities search for ways to process trauma and reaffirm their presence.

Another contribution from Indonesia by Adzka Haniina Albarri, for instance explores the performative art known as Shalawat Musawa. Shalawat refers to devotional invocations offered by Muslims in honour of the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) The article examines how Shalawat Musawa has become a space where discussions around gender equality can be articulated. By encouraging women’s participation in a devotional practice historically dominated by men, performers are using art to engage with evolving debates about gender and social justice.

Across the edition, similar stories emerge from different parts of the world. Some pieces engage with contemporary artists, including an interview with world renowned Tunisian calligrapher Karim Jabbari, articles by Palestinian jewellery designer Mai Zarkawi and Egyptian academic Balsam Abdul Rahman Saleh. Others explore artistic traditions shaped by migration, diaspora and local cultural histories.

Muslim History Month III highlights how artistic expression remains embedded in everyday life. From neighbourhood cultural initiatives, architectural marvels, discussions on the Bihari Script Quran in Dallas Museum, to devotional performances, these practices reveal how creativity continues to shape the social and spiritual landscapes of Muslim communities.

They also illustrate the diversity within Muslim cultural production. Muslim societies are far from monolithic, and neither are their artistic traditions.

At a time when public discourse frequently reduces Muslims to political headlines or security narratives, these stories offer an important counterpoint. They remind us that Muslim histories are also histories of creativity, scholarship, craftsperson-ship and cultural exchange.

Documenting these histories is itself an act of preservation. History, and for that matter the present that remains unwritten, are easily forgotten or misrepresented. When communities claim authority to narrate their own pasts and present, they challenge the structures that have historically excluded them from broader cultural narratives. Therefore, Muslim History Month, then, is not only about looking back. It is also about shaping how Muslim histories will be understood in the future.

As Rima Barakat’s reflection from Beirut reminds us, even in times marked by war and uncertainty, cultural production persists. For many communities, it is precisely through artistic endurance that survival itself is measured.

Beyond the stereotypes and headlines that dominate public discourse lies a far richer narrative, one shaped by art, architecture, memory and the collective imagination of communities determined to tell their own stories.

Mariya Salim is co-founder of Zariya. She is a Human Rights activist and an international SGBV expert based in Delhi India.
https://zariya.online/category/muslim-history-month-iii/

IPS UN Bureau

 

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A sign outside the UN Secretariat building last year.

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Mar 18 2026 (IPS)

As the world continues to be weighed down in political and military turmoil, drones are being increasingly used as weapons of war in a rash of ongoing conflicts—including Ukraine vs Russia, Israel vs Palestine, US vs Iran and Israel vs Lebanon, plus in civil wars in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan and Haiti.

Described as Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV), drones have fundamentally transformed modern warfare, “offering a low-cost, high-impact form of air power, challenging traditional military doctrines and giving rise to new tactics and ethical debates”.

Once limited to major military powers like the U.S. and Israel, drones are now being used by numerous state and non-state actors, including militant groups and even organized crime cartels.

The use of drones, particularly in targeted killings and with increasing autonomy, has raised significant international debate regarding accountability, civilian casualties, and compliance with international humanitarian law

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk said last week he was “appalled by the devastating impact on civilians of increasing drone attacks”, amid reports that more than 200 civilians have been killed by drones since 4 March alone in the Kordofan region, and in White Nile state.

“It is deeply troubling that despite multiple reminders, warnings and appeals, parties to the conflict in Sudan continue to use increasingly powerful drones to deploy explosive weapons with wide-area impacts in populated areas,” said Türk.

“I renew my call on them to abide fully with international humanitarian law in their use of these weapons, particularly the clear prohibition on directing attacks against civilians and civilian objects and infrastructure, and against any form of indiscriminate attacks.”

Many homes, schools, markets and health facilities were damaged or destroyed in the attacks, compounding the impacts on civilians and local communities, he said.

Meanwhile drones are also being used in the politically-troubled Haiti and also in the conflict between the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda despite a peace agreement brokered by the US last year.

According to a report in Cable News Network (CNN) March 17, the war in Iran is continuing to disrupt travel across the Gulf after Iranian drone strikes triggered two major air incidents in recent days. Flights at Dubai International Airport were briefly suspended on Monday after a drone struck a nearby fuel tank, igniting a large fire.

The shutdown forced cancellations and diversions as aviation authorities closed the airport. Part of the UAE’s airspace was also closed for a few hours overnight after the country said it was responding to incoming missiles and drone strikes from Iran.

Meanwhile, the prices of many global airfares that bypass the Middle East are rising, as the conflict drives up oil prices and airlines warn of higher fuel costs ahead, said CNN.

Focusing on a military perspective, Siemon Wezeman, Senior Researcher, Arms Transfers Programme, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IPS more and more states, (and also non-state armed- rebel – groups) acquire drones of all sizes.

“Some of the numbers are quite amazing – Ukraine getting not a few 1,000, but far over 10,000 drones from various suppliers, and Russia, Ukraine and Iran each use drones by the 100s almost every day in the current conflicts.”

And different from some 10 years ago, when most of the drones where for reconnaissance roles, he pointed out, today many drones are armed and many more are ‘one-way attack drones’ (also called suicide or kamikaze drones). The latter are becoming a cheap alternative for long-range missiles against ground targets.

In the SIPRI arms transfers database (https://armstransfers.sipri.org), he said, “we record transfers of all armed drones, and reconnaissance drones with a weight of at least 150kg (we had to put a weight limit to be able to keep monitoring drone transfers with the resources and sources we have)”.

“And we clearly see in recent years that a) the total numbers of drones transferred between states has grown, b) several non-state actors (e.g. Houthis and Hezbollah) have also been supplied with drones, c) the number of states and non-state actors that have acquired drone has grown – most states in the world have now acquired drones, many of them from foreign suppliers, d) the number of producers and suppliers has grown – the simpler drones are offered by dozens if not 100s of large and very small companies and that number is growing, and e) drones, and especially armed drones.”

That is the picture for flying drones, Wezeman said.

But also, sea drones (surface or submarine) are starting to become popular – even if not yet transferred in any significant number. And land drones are also starting to become popular, he declared.

At a press conference March 10, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Tom Fletcher said: “I’m really worried about drones in particular. I think the world has decided that it’s far more interested in spending enormous amounts of money developing these increasingly deadly weapons than it is on saving lives, and it seems to have decided that it hasn’t got time to work on ensuring that the rules that govern these weapons, these lethal autonomous weapons, keep up with the pace of technology.”

So you’ve got this dangerous alliance between very innovative technology and huge amounts of money and people’s desire to kill more people – and that’s a toxic combination, he said.

“And last year, 90 per cent of all deaths caused by drones were civilians, many of them humanitarians. And we’re seeing that across the crises on which we work – whether it’s Gaza, Sudan or in Ukraine, we’re seeing these bad practices move between crises”.

In the DRC last week, a senior official of the UN children’s agency UNICEF and two civilians were killed in drone strikes.

Amplifying further Wezeman said all these drones and one-way attack drones have become more capable, especially in range (the simple Shahed, one-way attack drones used by Iran and sold to Russia have a range of up to 1500 to 2000km), changing them from tactical battlefield weapons to more strategic weapons.

Development is very rapidly continuing for all type of drones, including making them more autonomous and intelligent to be capable of independent targeting and other decision-making. AI plays a growing role in this process. This process leads to questions about control, but right now it seems the process is moving faster than the discussion on controlling the autonomous aspects (see also our programme on emerging technologies.

https://www.sipri.org/research/armament-and-disarmament/emerging-military-and-security-technologies.

Will they replace systems with a human on board or in the loop? The development goes certainly that way and for missiles and one-way attack drones that has already started. For the larger, more capable and more complex systems such as combat aircraft, warships and larger combat vehicles that is still a future – but not a distant dream as development of for example drone combat aircraft is already moving into prototypes in the USA, China, Australia and Europe.

There still is an element of doubt however – drones need navigation that now is largely based on GPS-type systems, something that is not free from the risks of being jammed or stopped.

The simpler drones, with their simple technology, cheap and easy to produce are also not as effective as hoped. Most of them are rather easy prey for air-defence systems (or jamming) – while Russia, Iran and Ukraine send every day dozens or 100s to attack their opponents, most do no reach their target but are shot down or lost due to jamming or other causes, declared Wezeman.

Meanwhile Human Rights Watch said last week its latest research on “how Haitian security forces and private contractors working with them have conducted extensive and apparently unlawful lethal drone strikes in densely populated areas killing and injuring residents who were not members of criminal groups, including children”.

“We call on Haitian authorities to urgently rein in the security forces and private contractors working for them before more children die”, said HRW.

According to data from multiple sources reviewed by Human Rights Watch, at least 1,243 people were killed by drone strikes in 141 operations between March 1, 2025, and January 21, 2026, including at least 43 adults who were reportedly not members of criminal groups, and 17 children. The data also shows that the drone strikes injured 738 people, at least 49 of whom were reportedly not members of criminal groups.

“Dozens of ordinary people, including many children, have been killed and injured in these lethal drone operations,” said Juanita Goebertus, Americas director at Human Rights Watch. “Haitian authorities should urgently rein in the security forces and private contractors working for them before more children die.”

The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti has attributed the drone attacks in Haiti to a specialized “Task Force” established by Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé that is operated with support from the private military company Vectus Global.

The US ambassador to Haiti has confirmed that the US State Department issued a license to Vectus Global to export defense services to Haiti.

Thalif Deen, Senior Editor, Inter Press Service (IPS) news agency, was a former Director, Foreign Military Markets at Defense Marketing Services; Senior Defense Analyst at Forecast International; military editor Middle East/Africa at Jane’s Information Group and UN correspondent for Jane’s Defence Weekly, London.

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

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Iranian protesters demonstrate in the centre of Manchester. Backed by Israel, Reza Pahlavi, the son of the king overthrown in Iran in 1979, has become the most visible face of the fragmented Iranian opposition. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

By Karlos Zurutuza
MANCHESTER, United Kingdom, Mar 17 2026 (IPS)

Iranian and Israeli flags fill the centre of Manchester, in northern England. There are also portraits of a king overthrown almost half a century ago and of his son, now a claimant to the throne from exile. It is yet another march of Iranians calling for Reza Pahlavi as an alternative to the regime of the ayatollahs.

“The regime will not last much longer and Reza Pahlavi is the only one who can steer a transition and keep the country united,” Nazanin, a young woman who prefers not to give her full name or be photographed for fear of reprisals against her family in Iran, tells IPS.

The regime will die killing; then we will face a Libyan-style scenario in which everyone tries to extend as much control as possible over the territory. Civil war will be inevitable - Mehrab Sarjov
In fact, she does not know them either. Born in England, she has never visited the country her parents fled in 1982. It was three years after a revolution hijacked by clerics brought an end to almost four decades of an autocracy backed by the West.

Since then, Iran has been ruled by a Shiite Islamic theocracy that harshly punishes dissent. At the beginning of January, a wave of repression left a death toll that varies widely: about 3,000 according to government sources, but tens of thousands according to internal reports cited by doctors and journalists.

From the centre of Manchester, Nazanin says she has placed all her hopes in the bombing campaign launched by Israel and the United States against Iran on February 28.

So far, the bombs have claimed the lives of more than a thousand Iranians, including the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. The fact that his son is taking over the role reflects the regime’s determination to resist. Military targets and key infrastructure on which a population of more than 90 million people depends have also been struck.

“The clerics have always responded to peaceful protests and legitimate demands with violence. It is sad, but there is probably no other way to end the regime,” the young woman says.

Remains of a bombed residence in Tehran, allegedly belonging to a nuclear scientist. The joint bombing campaign by Washington and Tel Aviv has resulted in over a thousand deaths, the vast majority of them civilians. Credit: Mirza Reza/IPS

Fragmentation

In a report published on February 24 titled “Tsunami of arbitrary arrests and enforced disappearances,” Human Rights Watch denounced tens of thousands of arrests following what it described as massacres across the country on January 8 and 9.

Opposition to the clerical regime has in fact been growing for almost a decade. In 2017 and 2019, massive protests erupted over the country’s precarious economic situation, eventually turning into calls for the government’s downfall.

Between 2022 and 2023, the Woman, Life, Freedom movement shook the country for months after the killing of a young Kurdish woman by security forces for not wearing the Islamic veil.

Although portraits of Reza Pahlavi have become a recurring feature of protests both inside and outside Iran, fragmentation remains the word that best describes the Iranian opposition.

Monarchists, republicans, federalists and reformists all share a common enemy, yet they have been unable to coordinate among themselves.

“Yemen is a hero,” reads this mural in central Tehran. Despite the ongoing conflict in the Strait of Hormuz, Iran has yet to activate its Houthi allies. Credit: Mirza Reza/IPS

“There are several self-proclaimed leaders in exile, but they have no real roots in the country. Pahlavi is Israel’s preferred option, and it is true that he has attracted some well-known reformists who have abandoned the regime, but it is not enough,” Mehrab Sarjov, an analyst originally from Iran’s Baluch southeast, tells IPS from his residence in London.

Sarjov also points to the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (MEK), an organization founded in 1965 that helped bring down Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in 1979.

“They are highly organized inside the country, run intelligence networks and have the capacity to carry out sabotage operations, but Washington and Tel Aviv appear to have ruled them out,” the analyst says.

The situation is far more complex. Although the Persian majority makes up roughly half the population, Iran is a mosaic of peoples that includes Azerbaijani Turks, Kurds, Baloch and Arabs, among other ethnic groups.

Sarjov points to what he calls the “diversity of the periphery versus the Persian centre,” noting that many advocate decentralization toward a kind of federal model. Neither the ayatollahs, nor Pahlavi, nor the MEK, nor most of the Persian political core are willing to consider such an option.

How would the borders of those new federal entities be drawn? Along ethnic lines, historical ones or geographic ones? The lack of consensus leads the analyst to outline a scenario in which violence drags on over time.

“The regime will die killing; then we will face a Libyan-style scenario in which everyone tries to extend as much control as possible over the territory. Civil war will be inevitable.”

A daily scene in Iranshar, in southeastern Baluchistan, Iran. Sistan and Baluchestan is the most underdeveloped province, as well as the most affected by violence in the entire country. Credit: Karlos Zurutuza/IPS

Uncertainty

At the moment, Washington and Tel Aviv seem focused on the short term, with their strategy revolving around toppling the regime through a bombing campaign. Analysts worldwide have noted that this approach has never succeeded in achieving such a goal.

The US-Israeli offensive is now concentrating on clearing the Strait of Hormuz to restore the flow of oil from the Arabian Peninsula. Washington is keen to mitigate the impact on energy prices caused by the conflict in this crucial oil transit route.

American outlets such as CNN and The New York Times have reported that the CIA may be working to arm Kurdish guerrillas with a view to taking part in a possible ground offensive.

Recently formed amid growing instability in the country, the Coalition of Political Forces of Iranian Kurdistan brings together five clandestine political parties with military capabilities.

So far, they have not explicitly endorsed Washington’s alleged plan. However, they have reiterated their goal of overthrowing the regime and fighting for democratic rights that include the right to self-determination.

They have also expressed willingness to cooperate with other actors inside the country, including Azerbaijani Turks, with whom they maintain historical territorial disputes in places such as Urmia and Tabriz, in the northwest of Iran.

Dünya Başol is a researcher who holds a PhD in Middle Eastern Studies from Bar-Ilan University in Israel with a dissertation on Iran’s Kurds. He admits he finds it difficult to feel optimistic.

“Turkish nationalism in Iran feeds not only on the aggression of Persian nationalism but also on ethnic ties with neighbouring Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as on the complex Kurdish-Turkish dynamics in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region,” the Turkish analyst tells IPS by phone from Ankara.

“Both Azerbaijani Turks and Kurds are beginning to draw their internal borders in maximalist terms, so all those calls for dialogue and coexistence will not prevent conflict from erupting between them,” he adds.

Başol warns that ethnic conflict could spread across the rest of the country and recalls that it already flared up after the revolution that brought the clerics to power in 1979. That episode, he says, was only contained by the war with Iraq between 1980 and 1988.

“There will be ethnic borders within the country, but what will happen in the large cities where the population is mixed?” the expert asks.

He points to an “unpredictable scenario.”

“If the regime collapses, only a strong government in Tehran will be able to avoid chaos. For now, nothing suggests that either Pahlavi or any of the other options will be capable of achieving that.”

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