By Shihana Mohamed
NEW YORK, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)
At the Annual General Meeting of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org) on 21 May 2026, I was invited to share my reflections on both the pre and post separation phases of my UN journey. This provided me with a valuable opportunity to critically examine my decision to leave the UN service after many years at the ICSC.
I recently closed one of the most defining chapters of my professional life, after more than 25 years serving the United Nations (UN) —including two decades at the International Civil Service Commission (ICSC). Importantly, my decision was made entirely on personal and professional grounds, independent of any budgetary or post-related considerations. As a jointly funded UN body, the ICSC is not affected by budget cuts or post reductions.
Why I Decided to Leave Early
My decision to leave under the UN’s Early Separation Programme was guided by reflection, self-respect, and a desire to preserve the enthusiasm and integrity that have always defined my work.
Leaving before the normal retirement age was not an impulsive choice—it was a deliberate act of self-preservation. Over time, I found that the institutional culture I had once admired had begun to erode the very principles it was meant to uphold. The UN’s mission remains noble, but its internal systems often fail to reflect that nobility.
My decision was shaped by several factors:
Lessons Learned Before Leaving the UN
Before separation, I faced the same fears many colleagues quietly harbor: visa uncertainty, financial stability, and the daunting question of identity beyond the UN badge. The organization offers structure and prestige, but it can also create dependency. I learned that preparation—both practical and emotional—is essential.
Lessons After Leaving the UN
The months following my departure were both disorienting and illuminating. Freed from the constraints of bureaucracy, I rediscovered creativity, autonomy, and a renewed sense of purpose. I learned to shape my own rhythm, engage with global issues from a more independent perspective, and reawakened the joy of contributing without the shadow of ineffective bureaucracy.
Transforming the UN’s Culture
Overall, my time with the UN was a meaningful chapter in my life, offering a firsthand view of the power and potential of global governance and multilateralism in action. I continue to believe deeply in the ideals of the UN Charter—principles that remain both necessary and inspirational in an increasingly interconnected world.
At the same time, honest reflection requires acknowledging the institution’s shortcomings. While the mission of the UN is noble, the work itself is not inherently complex; too often, it is made unnecessarily difficult by people, entrenched cultures, bureaucratic practices, and systems that prioritize connections over competence. Environments that tolerate inequity and erode dignity rather than uphold it continue to undermine the organization’s credibility and effectiveness.
Ideals alone cannot sustain trust. When recruitment and promotion are shaped by back channels rather than merit, when accountability is applied selectively, and when organizational culture enables toxicity instead of transparency, the institution risks losing its moral authority. These are systemic challenges that demand introspection, accountability, and meaningful reform.
This was one reality of my journey, and I know I am not alone in recognizing it. These challenges tested me, but they also strengthened me—sharpening my sense of purpose, reinforcing the importance of competence, fairness, and integrity, and reminding me that institutions are judged not only by their ideals, but by the values they practice every day.
If the UN is to remain credible and effective in the decades ahead, it must confront its internal contradictions with honesty and urgency. Reform must go beyond structures and policies—it must also transform culture. Its strength lies in its people, and its future depends on creating an environment where they can thrive.
Key priorities include:
Practical Tips for Others Considering Separation
For those contemplating a similar transition, my advice is simple but vital:
Global service beyond the United Nations
Leaving the UN was both an ending and a beginning. It gave me the opportunity to step outside the system and rethink what global service could be—more inclusive, representative, and accountable. That vision led to the founding of Asia Global Forum, a nonprofit organization committed to addressing imbalances in global governance and ensuring that Asia’s diversity and perspectives are recognized as central to global progress—from governance and economic development to cultural dialogue—while strengthening collaboration with other regional communities.
I leave the UN with appreciation for what was good, respect for those who serve with integrity, and lessons from more difficult moments. At the same time, I leave with the conviction that meaningful transformation often begins outside established systems. Asia Global Forum is my way of continuing that service—building a movement that places representation, merit, and accountability at the center of a fairer global order.
Purpose does not end with an institution—it evolves beyond it.
Shihana Mohamed, a Sri Lankan national, is President of Asia Global Network (www.AsiaGlobalForum.org) and a US Public Voices Fellow with The OpEd Project and Equality Now on advancing the rights of women and girls. She is also a founding member and Coordinator of the United Nations Asia Network for Diversity and Inclusion (www.UN-ANDI.org). A dedicated human rights activist, she is a strong advocate for gender equality and the advancement of women. She served the United Nations for over 25 years.
IPS UN Bureau
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U.S. and Israeli army officers talk in front a US Patriot missile defense system. Credit: Jack Guez/Getty Images Source: Council on Foreign Relations
By Alon Ben-Meir
NEW YORK, Jul 3 2026 (IPS)
For a generation, no foreign leader bet more heavily on a single American president than Benjamin Netanyahu bet on Donald Trump. Trump moved the US embassy to Jerusalem, tore up the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran, recognized Israeli sovereignty over the Golan Heights, and in February 2026 joined Israel in the opening strikes of a war against Iran that Netanyahu had spent three decades urging Washington to wage.
The partnership looked unbreakable. It was, in fact, conditional—and the condition was that their interests never diverge. In June 2026 they diverged completely, and the rupture has exposed a truth Netanyahu has spent his career denying: when Israeli security and the prime minister’s political survival point in opposite directions, he chooses himself.
The break came over a single document. On June 17, Trump signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Iran—the Islamabad Memorandum, brokered by Pakistan—formally ending the war he had pushed to start. The 14-point framework in the memorandum declares a permanent halt to hostilities on all fronts, including Lebanon, reopens the Strait of Hormuz, lifts the U.S. naval blockade of Iranian ports, and waives sanctions on Iran’s oil exports. It also commits the United States and regional partners to assemble a $300 billion reconstruction fund and to negotiate the gradual release of Iran’s frozen assets worldwide.
What it does not do is what Israel went to war to achieve. The framework deferred the negotiation over Iran’s nuclear program to a later date, and it says nothing about Iran’s ballistic missiles or its regional proxies. Essentially, Trump wanted a short war that would compel Iran to come to the negotiating table. Netanyahu, on the other hand, wanted Iran permanently broken as a regional power. Those two visions could coexist while the fighting continued, but could not survive peace.
Thus, Netanyahu set out to wreck it. Israel’s Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich branded the agreement bad for Israel and for the free world. National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir declared that Trump’s deal “does not bind us” and that Israel “is not subject to the United States.” And Israeli jets kept hitting Lebanon. On June 14, with the signing supposedly hours away, Israel struck Beirut. Trump erupted publicly, then telephoned Netanyahu.
The call was not diplomatic. In a telephone call by Trump to Netanyahu, he said, ”Bibi, you better be careful, or you will be on your own very soon.” In a subsequent call with Netanyahu, there was an even angrier exchange: Trump called the Israeli leader “crazy,” accused him of ingratitude, and—according to US officials briefed on the call—reminded him bluntly: “You’d be in prison if it weren’t for me.”
That last line is the key to everything. Netanyahu has one political lifeline left: the war. As long as Israel is fighting, there will be no elections; as long as there are no elections, he stays in office, and as long as he stays in office, he can postpone the corruption trials, waiting for the moment he loses power. For Netanyahu, peace is not merely inconvenient—it is politically existential.
The US intelligence community reportedly warned the White House that Netanyahu was actively working to blow up Trump’s Iran deal, and analysts said plainly that Trump would have to play the middle man against his own ally. The man who lobbied for the war had become the chief obstacle to the peace.
Then came the moment the world was meant to absorb. On June 18, Vice President JD Vance stood at a White House podium and delivered a rebuke unlike any an American administration has aimed at Israel in living memory. “Donald J. Trump is the only head of state in the entire world who is sympathetic to the nation of Israel at this moment in time,” he said. “If I was in the cabinet of the Israeli government, I might not be attacking the only powerful ally I have left.”
Then the reminder that doubled as a threat: “Over the last three months, two-thirds of the defensive weapons that have protected your homeland have been built by American hands and paid for by American tax dollars.” Anyone in Israel who thinks their problem is Trump, Vance added, needs to “wake up and smell the reality.” He was basically warning Israel and reminding it who arms its skies to protect the peace deal with Iran.
The warning has not been heeded, and the cost is mounting. The first round of US-Iran technical talks was set for Switzerland’s Birkenstock resort on June 19. The night before, Israeli airstrikes across southern Lebanon killed 47 people, by the Lebanese health ministry’s count, and wounded scores more. Iran demanded a guarantee that the fighting would stop before it would sit down. Vance canceled his trip; the talks collapsed.
On June 20, Iran announced it was closing the Strait of Hormuz again, citing Israel’s strikes as a violation of the agreement. Vance worked to salvage the deal; Smotrich went public: Israel will stay in southern Lebanon “for as many years as necessary,” until Hezbollah disarms, and will not withdraw—adding that the prime minister agrees. It was a statement engineered to sabotage a peace Israel’s closest patron was risking its credibility to build.
This is the heart of the matter, and it is the part Netanyahu, Smotrich, and Ben Gvir refuse to grasp: Israel is almost wholly dependent on the United States—financially, militarily, and diplomatically. Washington is the shield that absorbs global outrage, vetoes resolutions, and replenishes arsenals. Openly defying a deal Trump personally signed is not bold statecraft. It is a slap in the face of the one ally Israel cannot afford to lose, delivered by a government that has confused its own survival with the nation’s.
The damage will outlast this episode. America’s interest now is a stable region, open shipping lanes, and a managed diplomacy with Iran rather than perpetual war. Netanyahu’s interest is the war itself. Those are not tactical differences to be smoothed over; they are structurally opposed, and they will keep colliding for as long as Netanyahu is in power.
The relationship that defined Israeli security for decades has been quietly inverted—the enemy has become the deal partner, and the indispensable ally has become the liability. It will not be repaired by reassurances or photo opportunities. It will be repaired only when Israel has a leader whose political life does not depend on keeping the country at war.
Until then, the rupture is not a crisis to be weathered. It is the new baseline. Netanyahu’s arrogance (chutzpah) will finally come back to haunt him.
Dr Alon Ben-Meir is President of the Institute for Humanitarian Conflict Resolution
IPS UN Bureau
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