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Bonn, 23. Juni 2025. Die ursprünglich für den 17. bis 20. Juni geplante UN-Konferenz zu Palästina wurde nach dem israelischen Angriff auf den Iran am 13. Juni aus „logistischen und sicherheitstechnischen Gründen“ verschoben. Dass die Zweistaatenlösung für einen Frieden zwischen Israel und Palästina damit vorerst gestorben ist, wollen die meisten Europäer*innen nicht wahrhaben. Es gibt keine realistische Aussicht auf die Gründung eines palästinensischen Staates gemäß dem seit Langem bestehenden Friedensplan auf Grundlage der Grenzen von 1967 (der „grünen Linie“). Es wird nach dem Krieg keinen Wiederaufbau Palästinas geben, keine internationale Unterstützung bei der Entwicklung staatlicher Strukturen und kein ehrgeiziges Assoziierungsabkommen zwischen der EU und Palästina zur Stärkung der palästinensischen Wirtschaft. Angesichts dieser Realität sind die europäischen Länder dazu gezwungen, ihre Beziehungen zu Israel und ihre Verantwortung für die palästinensische Bevölkerung neu zu bewerten.

Die Konferenz geht auf die von der UN-Vollversammlung verabschiedete Resolution ES 10-24 zurück und sollte gemeinsam von Frankreich und Saudi-Arabien geleitet werden. Bei runden Tischen über Schlüsselfragen wie Sicherheit, Wiederaufbau und die zukünftige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Palästinas sollte auf der Konferenz ein Weg zum Frieden mittels einer Zweistaatenlösung erarbeitet werden. Proisraelische Stimmen verurteilten die Konferenz als „Belohnung für die Gräueltaten vom 7. Oktober“. Die USA warnten ihre Verbündeten in einer diplomatischen Demarche davor, Palästina als Staat anzuerkennen, da dies ihren außenpolitischen Interessen entgegenstünde.

Der französische Staatspräsident Macron hat betont, dass er sich weiterhin entschlossen für eine Zweistaatenlösung einsetzen werde. Allerdings ist diese seit den Oslo-Abkommen und dem Optimismus der 1990er Jahre in immer weitere Ferne gerückt. Israels Siedlungspolitik im Westjordanland hat einen palästinensischen Staat unmöglich gemacht. Auf die Räumung der israelischen Siedlungen im Gazastreifen im Jahr 2005 folgten die Wahl der Hamas, die israelische Blockade des Gazastreifens und der Kreislauf der Gewalt, der in den Terroranschlägen vom 7. Oktober 2023 auf Israel gipfelte. Die Reaktion Israels auf die Angriffe der Hamas wurde von vielen Expert*innen als Kriegsverbrechen verurteilt, die einem Völkermord gleichkommen. Unter dem Deckmantel seines Krieges gegen die Hamas hat Israel auch seine Politik der Enteignung der Palästinenser*innen im Westjordanland vorangetrieben.

Die USA, das einzige Land mit echtem Einfluss auf die israelische Regierung, haben die Zweistaatenlösung in der Vergangenheit zwar diplomatisch unterstützt, aber wiederholt Veto gegen UN-Resolutionen eingelegt, die echte Fortschritte in diese Richtung hätten ermöglichen können. Damit ist jetzt Schluss. Den USA schwebt eine „Riviera des Nahen Ostens“ vor – mit Eigentumswohnungen und Kasinos statt Wohnraum für die Palästinenser*innen. Huckabee, der US-Botschafter in Israel, hat sich in mehreren Interviews deutlich gegen einen palästinensischen Staat ausgesprochen, es sei denn, einer der arabischen Nachbarn Israels wäre bereit, dafür Territorium abzutreten.

Welche Alternativen gibt es also zu einer Zweistaatenlösung, und welche wäre für Europa am verträglichsten? UN-Generalsekretär Guterres beharrt auf einer Zweistaatenlösung, da die Alternative entweder die Vertreibung der Palästinenser*innen oder deren Rechtlosigkeit in Israel sei. Der israelische Journalist Gideon Levy hat eine weitere Alternative aufgezeigt: eine säkulare Demokratie, in der alle Bürger*innen die gleichen Rechte haben.

Gegen eine Massenvertreibung würden sich die Palästinenser*innen selbst und die Nachbarländer zweifellos wehren. Lassen die Europäer zu, dass es dazu kommt, müssen sie auch die damit verbundene Gewalt, Zwangsumsiedlungen und Massenlager akzeptieren. Erhielten Palästinenser*innen einen Status innerhalb Israels als Staatsbürger*innen zweiter Klasse, würde sich die derzeitige Situation noch verschärfen. Israel wäre keine Demokratie mehr, weil es Menschen, über die es souveräne Kontrolle ausübt, Rechte verweigert. Da Israel die Aussicht auf einen palästinensischen Staat abgelehnt hat, kann es nicht mehr glaubhaft machen, dass die Rechte der Palästinenser*innen allein in der Verantwortung der palästinensischen Behörden liegen. Bei der Alternative, der von Levy und anderen progressiven Stimmen in Israel und anderswo vorgeschlagenen Einstaatenlösung, gäbe es keinen jüdischen und keinen palästinensischen Staat mehr. Ein solcher Kompromiss ist allerdings kaum möglich. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist eine Enteignung und Entrechtung der Palästinenser*innen und/oder eine Apartheid in Israel.

Angesichts der Schwere des aktuellen Konflikts ist die Zweistaatenlösung zum diplomatischen Feigenblatt geworden. Mit dem Beharren auf dieser Lösung kann Europa harte Entscheidungen in Bezug auf seine Beziehungen zu Israel und zu den Palästinenser*innen umgehen. Von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, haben sich die europäischen Regierungen darauf beschränkt, den humanitären Zugang zum Gazastreifen und die Freilassung der von der Hamas festgehaltenen Geiseln zu fordern, während sie weiterhin Waffen an Israel liefern. Damit haben sie sich davor gedrückt, für ihre Grundwerte einzutreten. Der Tod der Zweistaatenlösung erfordert nun alternative Szenarien – und Europa muss sich entscheiden, mit welchem es leben kann.

Bonn, 23. Juni 2025. Die ursprünglich für den 17. bis 20. Juni geplante UN-Konferenz zu Palästina wurde nach dem israelischen Angriff auf den Iran am 13. Juni aus „logistischen und sicherheitstechnischen Gründen“ verschoben. Dass die Zweistaatenlösung für einen Frieden zwischen Israel und Palästina damit vorerst gestorben ist, wollen die meisten Europäer*innen nicht wahrhaben. Es gibt keine realistische Aussicht auf die Gründung eines palästinensischen Staates gemäß dem seit Langem bestehenden Friedensplan auf Grundlage der Grenzen von 1967 (der „grünen Linie“). Es wird nach dem Krieg keinen Wiederaufbau Palästinas geben, keine internationale Unterstützung bei der Entwicklung staatlicher Strukturen und kein ehrgeiziges Assoziierungsabkommen zwischen der EU und Palästina zur Stärkung der palästinensischen Wirtschaft. Angesichts dieser Realität sind die europäischen Länder dazu gezwungen, ihre Beziehungen zu Israel und ihre Verantwortung für die palästinensische Bevölkerung neu zu bewerten.

Die Konferenz geht auf die von der UN-Vollversammlung verabschiedete Resolution ES 10-24 zurück und sollte gemeinsam von Frankreich und Saudi-Arabien geleitet werden. Bei runden Tischen über Schlüsselfragen wie Sicherheit, Wiederaufbau und die zukünftige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Palästinas sollte auf der Konferenz ein Weg zum Frieden mittels einer Zweistaatenlösung erarbeitet werden. Proisraelische Stimmen verurteilten die Konferenz als „Belohnung für die Gräueltaten vom 7. Oktober“. Die USA warnten ihre Verbündeten in einer diplomatischen Demarche davor, Palästina als Staat anzuerkennen, da dies ihren außenpolitischen Interessen entgegenstünde.

Der französische Staatspräsident Macron hat betont, dass er sich weiterhin entschlossen für eine Zweistaatenlösung einsetzen werde. Allerdings ist diese seit den Oslo-Abkommen und dem Optimismus der 1990er Jahre in immer weitere Ferne gerückt. Israels Siedlungspolitik im Westjordanland hat einen palästinensischen Staat unmöglich gemacht. Auf die Räumung der israelischen Siedlungen im Gazastreifen im Jahr 2005 folgten die Wahl der Hamas, die israelische Blockade des Gazastreifens und der Kreislauf der Gewalt, der in den Terroranschlägen vom 7. Oktober 2023 auf Israel gipfelte. Die Reaktion Israels auf die Angriffe der Hamas wurde von vielen Expert*innen als Kriegsverbrechen verurteilt, die einem Völkermord gleichkommen. Unter dem Deckmantel seines Krieges gegen die Hamas hat Israel auch seine Politik der Enteignung der Palästinenser*innen im Westjordanland vorangetrieben.

Die USA, das einzige Land mit echtem Einfluss auf die israelische Regierung, haben die Zweistaatenlösung in der Vergangenheit zwar diplomatisch unterstützt, aber wiederholt Veto gegen UN-Resolutionen eingelegt, die echte Fortschritte in diese Richtung hätten ermöglichen können. Damit ist jetzt Schluss. Den USA schwebt eine „Riviera des Nahen Ostens“ vor – mit Eigentumswohnungen und Kasinos statt Wohnraum für die Palästinenser*innen. Huckabee, der US-Botschafter in Israel, hat sich in mehreren Interviews deutlich gegen einen palästinensischen Staat ausgesprochen, es sei denn, einer der arabischen Nachbarn Israels wäre bereit, dafür Territorium abzutreten.

Welche Alternativen gibt es also zu einer Zweistaatenlösung, und welche wäre für Europa am verträglichsten? UN-Generalsekretär Guterres beharrt auf einer Zweistaatenlösung, da die Alternative entweder die Vertreibung der Palästinenser*innen oder deren Rechtlosigkeit in Israel sei. Der israelische Journalist Gideon Levy hat eine weitere Alternative aufgezeigt: eine säkulare Demokratie, in der alle Bürger*innen die gleichen Rechte haben.

Gegen eine Massenvertreibung würden sich die Palästinenser*innen selbst und die Nachbarländer zweifellos wehren. Lassen die Europäer zu, dass es dazu kommt, müssen sie auch die damit verbundene Gewalt, Zwangsumsiedlungen und Massenlager akzeptieren. Erhielten Palästinenser*innen einen Status innerhalb Israels als Staatsbürger*innen zweiter Klasse, würde sich die derzeitige Situation noch verschärfen. Israel wäre keine Demokratie mehr, weil es Menschen, über die es souveräne Kontrolle ausübt, Rechte verweigert. Da Israel die Aussicht auf einen palästinensischen Staat abgelehnt hat, kann es nicht mehr glaubhaft machen, dass die Rechte der Palästinenser*innen allein in der Verantwortung der palästinensischen Behörden liegen. Bei der Alternative, der von Levy und anderen progressiven Stimmen in Israel und anderswo vorgeschlagenen Einstaatenlösung, gäbe es keinen jüdischen und keinen palästinensischen Staat mehr. Ein solcher Kompromiss ist allerdings kaum möglich. Viel wahrscheinlicher ist eine Enteignung und Entrechtung der Palästinenser*innen und/oder eine Apartheid in Israel.

Angesichts der Schwere des aktuellen Konflikts ist die Zweistaatenlösung zum diplomatischen Feigenblatt geworden. Mit dem Beharren auf dieser Lösung kann Europa harte Entscheidungen in Bezug auf seine Beziehungen zu Israel und zu den Palästinenser*innen umgehen. Von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, haben sich die europäischen Regierungen darauf beschränkt, den humanitären Zugang zum Gazastreifen und die Freilassung der von der Hamas festgehaltenen Geiseln zu fordern, während sie weiterhin Waffen an Israel liefern. Damit haben sie sich davor gedrückt, für ihre Grundwerte einzutreten. Der Tod der Zweistaatenlösung erfordert nun alternative Szenarien – und Europa muss sich entscheiden, mit welchem es leben kann.

Over the past two decades, mobile money has evolved into a broader suite of Digital Financial Solutions (DFS) that have transformed the financial landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, over 86 per cent of adults use mobile money for everyday transactions (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), and, by 2023, over 97 per cent of loans were disbursed digitally (Creditinfo Kenya). Early evidence showed that mobile money lifted an estimated 2 per cent of Kenyans out of poverty (Suri & Jack, 2016). Yet, financial health deteriorated while DFS spread (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), which raises important questions about consumer protection. This Policy Brief outlines how inclusive DFS markets can be established to benefit all consumers without causing negative unintended consequences. The Policy Brief is built on the Kenyan example due to its pioneering role in mobile money adoption since the 2000s.

Despite the high overall figures for financial inclusion through DFS in Kenya, disparities across groups persist, with women, youth, and rural communities being relatively less included. Furthermore, with only 42.1 per cent financially literate adults (basic under­standing of key financial concepts), large segments of the Kenyan population remain vulnerable to the risks posed by DFS. Consequently, many users have faced adverse outcomes, including predatory lending with hidden or excessive costs; over-indebt­edness; negative listing by credit bureaus; data privacy violations; and exposure to fraud and scams. In addition, systemic issues have arisen due to network effects and informational advantages, that led to high market concentration with negative effects on competition, pricing and innovations. To harness DFS for improving livelihoods, policy­makers, as well as regulatory and supervisory authori­ties, should consider the following – based on existing evidence, especially lessons from Kenya:

• Use existing platforms to foster knowledge exchange on best practices with regard to DFS both within and across countries.
• Focus on designing tailored financial products that meet the needs of disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, and rural communities. 
• Ban predatory lending and aggressive debt collection practices through comprehensive licensing, regulation and supervision of all DFS providers. Importantly, the respective authorities need to have sufficient capacities to enforce such regulations.
• Address issues around increased defaults and negative listings through measures both on the supply side (regulations around credit information sharing) and on the demand side (financial and digital literacy campaigns).
• Guarantee consumers’ data privacy and protection – following the principles of data minimisation, data security, and informed consent. 
• Oblige DFS providers to install robust fraud detection and prevention mechanisms and hold DFS providers liable for the financial losses of consumers caused by providers’ negligence.
• Level the playing field – for instance, through agent interoperability and separation of mobile money platforms from mobile network operators – to avoid concentration and ensure continued innovation and healthy competition for the benefit of the consumers.

 

Over the past two decades, mobile money has evolved into a broader suite of Digital Financial Solutions (DFS) that have transformed the financial landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, over 86 per cent of adults use mobile money for everyday transactions (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), and, by 2023, over 97 per cent of loans were disbursed digitally (Creditinfo Kenya). Early evidence showed that mobile money lifted an estimated 2 per cent of Kenyans out of poverty (Suri & Jack, 2016). Yet, financial health deteriorated while DFS spread (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), which raises important questions about consumer protection. This Policy Brief outlines how inclusive DFS markets can be established to benefit all consumers without causing negative unintended consequences. The Policy Brief is built on the Kenyan example due to its pioneering role in mobile money adoption since the 2000s.

Despite the high overall figures for financial inclusion through DFS in Kenya, disparities across groups persist, with women, youth, and rural communities being relatively less included. Furthermore, with only 42.1 per cent financially literate adults (basic under­standing of key financial concepts), large segments of the Kenyan population remain vulnerable to the risks posed by DFS. Consequently, many users have faced adverse outcomes, including predatory lending with hidden or excessive costs; over-indebt­edness; negative listing by credit bureaus; data privacy violations; and exposure to fraud and scams. In addition, systemic issues have arisen due to network effects and informational advantages, that led to high market concentration with negative effects on competition, pricing and innovations. To harness DFS for improving livelihoods, policy­makers, as well as regulatory and supervisory authori­ties, should consider the following – based on existing evidence, especially lessons from Kenya:

• Use existing platforms to foster knowledge exchange on best practices with regard to DFS both within and across countries.
• Focus on designing tailored financial products that meet the needs of disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, and rural communities. 
• Ban predatory lending and aggressive debt collection practices through comprehensive licensing, regulation and supervision of all DFS providers. Importantly, the respective authorities need to have sufficient capacities to enforce such regulations.
• Address issues around increased defaults and negative listings through measures both on the supply side (regulations around credit information sharing) and on the demand side (financial and digital literacy campaigns).
• Guarantee consumers’ data privacy and protection – following the principles of data minimisation, data security, and informed consent. 
• Oblige DFS providers to install robust fraud detection and prevention mechanisms and hold DFS providers liable for the financial losses of consumers caused by providers’ negligence.
• Level the playing field – for instance, through agent interoperability and separation of mobile money platforms from mobile network operators – to avoid concentration and ensure continued innovation and healthy competition for the benefit of the consumers.

 

Over the past two decades, mobile money has evolved into a broader suite of Digital Financial Solutions (DFS) that have transformed the financial landscape of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Kenya, over 86 per cent of adults use mobile money for everyday transactions (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), and, by 2023, over 97 per cent of loans were disbursed digitally (Creditinfo Kenya). Early evidence showed that mobile money lifted an estimated 2 per cent of Kenyans out of poverty (Suri & Jack, 2016). Yet, financial health deteriorated while DFS spread (FinAccess Household Survey 2024), which raises important questions about consumer protection. This Policy Brief outlines how inclusive DFS markets can be established to benefit all consumers without causing negative unintended consequences. The Policy Brief is built on the Kenyan example due to its pioneering role in mobile money adoption since the 2000s.

Despite the high overall figures for financial inclusion through DFS in Kenya, disparities across groups persist, with women, youth, and rural communities being relatively less included. Furthermore, with only 42.1 per cent financially literate adults (basic under­standing of key financial concepts), large segments of the Kenyan population remain vulnerable to the risks posed by DFS. Consequently, many users have faced adverse outcomes, including predatory lending with hidden or excessive costs; over-indebt­edness; negative listing by credit bureaus; data privacy violations; and exposure to fraud and scams. In addition, systemic issues have arisen due to network effects and informational advantages, that led to high market concentration with negative effects on competition, pricing and innovations. To harness DFS for improving livelihoods, policy­makers, as well as regulatory and supervisory authori­ties, should consider the following – based on existing evidence, especially lessons from Kenya:

• Use existing platforms to foster knowledge exchange on best practices with regard to DFS both within and across countries.
• Focus on designing tailored financial products that meet the needs of disadvantaged groups such as women, youth, and rural communities. 
• Ban predatory lending and aggressive debt collection practices through comprehensive licensing, regulation and supervision of all DFS providers. Importantly, the respective authorities need to have sufficient capacities to enforce such regulations.
• Address issues around increased defaults and negative listings through measures both on the supply side (regulations around credit information sharing) and on the demand side (financial and digital literacy campaigns).
• Guarantee consumers’ data privacy and protection – following the principles of data minimisation, data security, and informed consent. 
• Oblige DFS providers to install robust fraud detection and prevention mechanisms and hold DFS providers liable for the financial losses of consumers caused by providers’ negligence.
• Level the playing field – for instance, through agent interoperability and separation of mobile money platforms from mobile network operators – to avoid concentration and ensure continued innovation and healthy competition for the benefit of the consumers.

 

Monitoring Iran and promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The IAEA applies safeguards to verify states are honoring their international legal obligations to use nuclear material for peaceful purposes only. Credit: IAEA

By David L. Phillips
LONDON, Jun 23 2025 (IPS)

A deal between the US and Iran is possible if Iran’s bottom line — its right to nuclear enrichment — and Israel’s bottom line, guarantees that Iran will never have a nuclear bomb are met. This “win-win” outcome would require Donald Trump’s personal engagement. With weapons turned to plowshares, Trump would be considered for the Nobel Peace Prize.

For sure, it’s hard to imagine a path forward in current circumstances. The region is embroiled in conflict. Iran has been humiliated by Israel’s attack. Its nuclear program has been seriously damaged. Israeli air power has destroyed air defenses, incapacitated Iran’s missiles, and killed its military leaders and scientists.

Israel’s actions in the past year have changed the balance of power, neutralizing Hezbollah, Hamas and eliminating the Pro-Iranian Assad regime in Syria.

Javad Zarif, Iran’s former foreign minister and nuclear negotiator, often spoke to me about “Persian pride.” To move forward, a peace deal would have to address Iran’s battered psyche and Israel’s sense of vulnerability.

I envision a deal that would allow Iran to maintain its enrichment facility deep underground at Fordo. The International Atomic Energy Agency would need unfettered access to Fordo ensuring that enrichment was capped at 7 percent, well below the level needed for a nuclear bomb.

Iran’s nuclear program has been set-back as a result of Israeli strikes. Natanz and other enrichment facilities have been damaged and would be permanently dismantled. The Isfahan nuclear complex, which includes a uranium-conversion facility turning “yellowcake” into uranium hexafluoride, has been disabled by Israel’s air strikes and would be decommissioned.

The Tehran Research Center, which manufactures advanced rotors for enrichment, is destroyed. So is the workshop at Karaj, where other uranium enrichment components were manufactured.

Missile and drone attacks are another concern. The US would give security guarantees guarding against such attacks. It would commit to providing Israel with additional Thermal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery systems, an effective mobile surface to air interceptor that shoots down incoming ballistic missiles at a distance of 1,800 miles. Iran’s missile system has been degraded but it is not destroyed.

For the foreseeable future, the US would deploy an aircraft carrier group in the Arabian Sea. Each carrier has more than 60 war planes that can deter missiles and drones strikes. Fighter jets already deployed in the region would also be available for Israel’s defense.

Netanyahu wants Trump to use the Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP), a “bunker buster”, to take out the Fordo facility. Ford is buried deep underground in a mountain side. Only the US has bunker busters to disable Fordo’s enrichment process.

A bunker buster is designed to penetrate hardened targets using precision-guided 30,000-pound bombs armed with a 5,300-pound warhead. More than one bomb will be needed to disable Fordo. The mission’s success is uncertain. Fordo adjoins a base of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC). Its air force could take down the B2 planes needed to deliver bunker buster ordinance.

Trump is under pressure from Netanyahu to attack Fordo. So far, Trump is keeping his options open. Trump insists on Iran’s “complete surrender”. The Ayatollah says Iran will never “grovel” to Washington. It is unlikely that Iran will waive a white flag. Resistance and martyrdom are at the core of Shiite beliefs.

Iran has signaled it is ready to meet US negotiators and discuss a ceasefire. An agreement would commit the US to never use bunker busters unless Iran weaponized its nuclear program.

Iran’s belligerent posture may change when the Iranian people take stock of the regime’s mismanagement. The Iranian people are fed up with their pariah status. Trump’s decision not to intervene would increase the prospects of Iran’s home-grow democratic transition, the best guarantor of peace.

The deal could reap economic and diplomatic benefits. An agreement could catalyze reform across the region, including progress in Gaza. A ceasefire leading to an independent Palestinian state could result in Saudi Arabia’s decision to join the Abraham Accords and normalization of relations with Israel.

Is this positive vision possible? If we can imagine it, we can make it a reality.

Peacebuilding would start with a deal to fully, finally and verifiably eliminate the possibility that Iran’s nuclear program would be used for anything but peaceful purposes.

Current events in the Middle East are nothing short of disastrous. They can, however, be a catalyst for transformation. Only the US can lead this process, and only Trump has the chutzpah to try it.

IPS UN Bureau

 

Excerpt:

David L. Phillips is an Academic Visitor at St. Antony’s College at Oxford University (September 2025). He was formerly a Senior Adviser at the State Department.

L'UE continue de privilégier la diplomatie à l'option militaire.

The post L’UE appelle à des négociations après les bombardements américains contre l’Iran appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Le Premier ministre israélien affirme avoir frappé au cœur du « programme de développement d'armes nucléaires » de l'Iran, mais Téhéran insiste sur le fait que ses installations nucléaires sont destinées à un usage pacifique.

Credit United Nations

By Thalif Deen
UNITED NATIONS, Jun 23 2025 (IPS)

When billionaire Elon Musk, a former short-lived advisor to President Donald Trump, was mandated with the task of decimating the federal bureaucracy and laying off thousands of staffers, he was famously pictured carrying a hacksaw to symbolize his cost-cutting agenda.

Perhaps it is now the turn of the United Nations for slashing—the UN80 Initiative– but no one is armed either with a hacksaw or a mini chain saw.

A UN Task Force is currently exploring staff layoffs, merging of several departments and relocating UN agencies from high-cost duty stations, including New York and Geneva, to lower-costs cities.

Meanwhile the Geneva-based UN refugee agency announced its own restructuring last week: “In light of difficult financial realities, UNHCR is compelled to reduce the overall scale of its operations”.

“We will focus our efforts on activities that have the greatest impact for refugees, supported by streamlined headquarters and regional bureau structures,” said Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

As part of the agency’s broader cost-cutting measures, UNHCR has had to close or downsize offices worldwide and implement a nearly 50 percent reduction in senior positions at its Geneva headquarters and regional bureau.

In total, approximately 3,500 staff positions will be discontinued. Additionally, hundreds of colleagues supporting UNHCR on a temporary basis have had to leave the organization due to the funding shortfall.

Overall, UNHCR estimates a global reduction in staffing costs of around 30 percent.

Throughout the review exercise, decisions were driven by the overarching priority to maintain operations in regions with the most urgent refugee needs, the refugee agency pointed out.

Regarding staff cutbacks in the Secretariat, UN spokesperson Stephane Dujarric told reporters last week that no UN department will be exempted from layoffs.

Asked whether the 20 percent cuts were inevitable, he said: “This process is ongoing. It is across the board in the Secretariat, and including in the Secretary-General’s own office”.

“I think his own office is not exempt from it. I spoke to (Under-Secretary-General for Policy) Guy Ryder yesterday, and we hope to have him, and other senior colleagues come and brief you in- person”.

Asked if the Spokesperson’s office is included in the cutbacks, he said: “The need to reduce is across the board– and no office is exempt”.

But the ultimate decision on restructuring will depend, as it does on key policy issues, on approval by the UN’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee (Fifth Committee), with final ratification by the 193-member General Assembly, the UN’s highest policy making body.

In a memo to staffers last week, the UN Staff Union (UNSU) in New York reminded “all colleagues that no decisions regarding the proposed changes have been approved by the General Assembly (GA) at this time.”

“The information shared is preliminary and non-binding, intended solely to prepare you for potential outcomes should the General Assembly endorse the proposals later this year.”

“We urge all colleagues to interpret such communications with caution and to remain aware that final authority rests with the General Assembly, whose decisions are still pending.”

A lingering question remains: will the GA rubber-stamp the decisions of the Secretary-General and his Task Force — or also heed to complaints from staffers and staff unions?

In the memo to staffers, Narda Cupidore, President, 48th Staff Council, UNSU, New York, outlined “the basic premise of potential proposals being made in line with the Secretary General’s instructions to achieve a reduction of 15% – 20% of the UN’s regular Budget for 2026”.

The memo reads:

• “Relocation of Functions: Some functions may be moved from New York to lower-cost duty stations where the UN already has operational infrastructure.
• Consolidation of Functions: Certain administrative services, may be consolidated for efficiency. Functions might be affected by the proposal to consolidate
• Discontinuation of Functions: Some functions may need to be discontinued, requiring a review of both vacant and encumbered posts to determine options.

What this Means for STAFF:

• Direct Impact: Some staff may be asked to relocate, work in different time zones, or see their roles evolve. A few may face the possibility of separation.
• Transparency and Support: Staff will be fully informed of decisions affecting them, given adequate notice, and supported through reassignment, relocation, separation entitlements, or other mitigation measures.
• Emotional Toll: Even those not directly affected may experience stress and uncertainty.
• Engagement and Communication: The organization commits to transparency, open communication, and treating staff with dignity and respect. Measures will include town halls, team meetings, individual consultations, and collaboration with staff representatives.

Management proposes that staff will be supported as follows:

• Transparency and Communication: Staff will be kept informed about decisions, options, and timelines. Managers are tasked with maintaining open lines of communication.
• Engagement Activities: Regular town halls, smaller team meetings, and individual consultations will be held to address concerns and provide guidance.
• Support Measures: Staff will receive assistance through reassignment, relocation, separation entitlements, or other mitigation measures. The organization will work closely with staff representatives to ensure rights and well-being are prioritized.
• Dignity and Respect: The process will be handled with care, treating everyone with humanity and respect.“

Looking Ahead

The UNSU says it appreciates the sharing of this important communication to staff. We continue to advocate for full transparency, consistent and clear communication, and call on all Secretariat entities to uphold this standard without exception. UNSU remains on standby for the proposed collaboration.

“UNSU continues to raise its concern about the realism of the aggressive timeline, the thoroughness of the analysis in such a short time frame; the reason for the specific established quota of cuts; the lack of clarity on the financial cuts and their impacts; as well as the effects on the productivity and quality of our outputs.

UNSU remains fully committed to supporting all colleagues during this period of uncertainty. We strongly encourage you to engage with staff representatives, share your concerns, and report any inconsistencies or challenges you may encounter.

This is very important because in the environment of the Delegation of Authority (DoA) Head of Entities may have differing interpretations of directives, thereby creating the risk of inconsistent implementation.

During this confusing and chaotic time, please do not hesitate to reach out to the Union – as your feedback is essential to ensuring that issues are addressed effectively and equitably.

UNSU will be attending the upcoming Staff Management Committee Meeting in Kosovo, from 23-28 June 2025 and will report on the outcome of that meeting.

If you have experienced inconsistencies, have questions, or wish to share your perspective, please reach out to your staff representative.

For offices without designated representation, the UNSU leadership is your point of contact and stands ready to advocate on your behalf. You can also submit feedback directly to newyorkstaffunion@un.org.

Together, we will ensure that your voice is heard and your rights are protected.”

IPS UN Bureau Report

 

L'Espagne va plafonner ses dépenses de défense à 2,1 % de son PIB.

The post L’Espagne parvient à un accord sur les dépenses de défense de l’OTAN appeared first on Euractiv FR.

Pourquoi Edi Rama s'est-il agenouillé devant Giorgia Meloni ? Pourquoi joue-t-il les bouffons de cour des Sommets européens ? Fatos Lubonja pointe un « complexe de vassalité » profondément inscrit dans l'histoire de l'Albanie. L'analyse de Fatos Lubonja.

- Articles / Relations internationales, PS Albanie, Albanie, Questions européennes, Politique, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama, Une - Diaporama - En premier

Pourquoi Edi Rama s'est-il agenouillé devant Giorgia Meloni ? Pourquoi joue-t-il les bouffons de cour des Sommets européens ? Fatos Lubonja pointe un « complexe de vassalité » profondément inscrit dans l'histoire de l'Albanie. L'analyse de Fatos Lubonja.

- Articles / Relations internationales, PS Albanie, Albanie, Questions européennes, Politique, Courrier des Balkans, Une - Diaporama, Une - Diaporama - En premier

Big Tobacco argues that extra taxes will push up black market trade, but not everyone agrees.

In today’s edition of The Capitals, read about the Iran conflict looming over NATO and EU summits this week, Europe’s far-right transnational revolutionaries, and so much more.

Optimising heating is crucial for reducing Europe’s emissions. A new study shows that replacing fossil fuels with renewable sources, especially biomass, is a cost-effective way to decarbonise. The upcoming Heating and Cooling Strategy should prioritise this opportunity.

Most Slovaks want to remain in NATO, a new poll shows, undercutting Robert Fico’s claim that the country would be better off staying out of military alliances.

A new poll shows most Poles doubt president-elect Karol Nawrocki will maintain good ties with Kyiv, amid his opposition to Ukraine’s EU and NATO bids.

Pedro Sánchez secures NATO deal letting Spain cap defence spending at 2.1%, dodging pressure to match higher targets.

Voting data shows the German Free Voters are drifting away from their Renew Europe group in the European Parliament.

Originating from rocks used in phosphate fertilisers, cadmium is a carcinogenic heavy metal that accumulates in soil and crops through agricultural use, making food the main source of human exposure.