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Le square Port-Saïd entame la semaine sur une note légèrement haussière. Ce lundi 21 septembre 2026, les cambistes de la place algéroise cèdent la monnaie […]

L’article Taux de change en Algérie : légère hausse de l’euro face au dinar ce 21 septembre est apparu en premier sur .

LES RÉSULTATS LOTO FORTUNE SONT LÀ !

TIRAGE N°151/26

Lundi 21 septembre 2026 (11H)

65 • 62 • 25 • 09 • 07

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Jouez avec modération et responsabilité. Le jeu doit rester un plaisir.

The former Liverpool footballer's Rolls-Royce was clocked speeding in Wilmslow in March.

Plus de 25 000 personnes expulsées vers des pays sans aucun lien avec elles : c’est le chiffre choc dévoilé ce lundi par une enquête […]

L’article Immigration aux États-Unis : plus de 25 000 personnes expulsées vers des pays tiers est apparu en premier sur .

A travers un arrêté municipal en date du 16 septembre 2026 portant création et fonctionnement de la fourrière communale de véhicules motorisés, la mairie de Cotonou a fixé de nouveaux tarifs pour l'enlèvement et la garde des véhicules. Ces tarifs varient selon le type véhicule.

Dès ce lundi 21 septembre 2026, la mairie de Cotonou engage une opération de libération des espaces publics. Sont concernés, les véhicules abandonnés ou hors d'usage, les épaves et les installations illégales d'activités de réparation automobile. Les frais d'enlèvement et de garde de ces véhicules ont été fixés à travers un arrêté municipal en date du 16 septembre 2026, portant création et fonctionnement de la fourrière communale de véhicules motorisés.

L'article 17 de l'arrêté précise que lorsqu'un véhicule placé en fourrière a un propriétaire inconnu, introuvable ou insolvable, après 90 jours de garde, la commune de Cotonou procède à sa vente aux enchères publiques, par l'intermédiaire d'un commissaire-priseur.

Les tarifs prévus pour chaque type de véhicule :

Deux-roues motorisés
– Enlèvement : 5 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 2 000 FCFA

Tricycles
– Enlèvement : 10 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 3 000 FCFA

Véhicules de 4 à 12 places
– Enlèvement : 30 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 5 000 FCFA

Véhicules de 13 à 30 places
– Enlèvement : 50 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 10 000 FCFA

Véhicules à partir de 31 places
– Enlèvement : 80 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 15 000 FCFA

Camions de moins de 5 tonnes
– Enlèvement : 50 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 10 000 FCFA

Camions de 5 à 10 tonnes
– Enlèvement : 120 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 15 000 FCFA

Camions de plus de 10 tonnes
– Enlèvement : 150 000 FCFA
– Fourrière : 20 000 FCFA

F. A. A.

L'homme d'affaires milliardaire Aliko Dangote a lancé la plus grande introduction en bourse jamais réalisée sur le continent, en cotant sa société de raffinage de pétrole à la Bourse du Nigeria. Que savons-nous donc de cet entrepreneur de 69 ans et de sa promesse de contribuer à assurer davantage de prospérité et d'indépendance économique aux Africains ?

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

This paper draws on the 2020/21 Egyptian Industrial Firm Behaviour Survey of 2,383 manufacturing firms to provide the first systematic, firm-level evidence on how Egypt’s industrial policy institutions are experienced by manufacturing firms. Using firms’ own perceptions of institutional obstacles, the analysis distinguishes between ministries (“institutions”) and subordinate ministerial and corporatist bodies (“entities”), and classifies these entities into capability-building bodies, regulatory gatekeepers, and quasi-public corporatist bodies. This framework allows the identification of systematic differences in firms’ perceptions across types of institutions and entities, as well as across firm types. It also enables the mapping of mandate overlaps among the entities most frequently identified as problematic. Three results emerge. First, firms report entities as substantially more problematic than ministries. Second, reported institutional burdens are unevenly distributed. In particular, regulatory gatekeepers that control licensing, standards, inspections and continued market access are associated with disproportionately higher reported burdens on structurally more vulnerable firms. Reported frictions are systematically higher for domestically oriented non-exporters, small and medium enterprises, firms located outside industrial zones, privately owned firms and especially informal firms. Third, these patterns are consistent with coordination failures arising from overlapping mandates and weak accountability within specialised agencies. The findings suggest several reform priorities centred on predictable and published requirements, a single coordinated front end for firms, end-to-end case handling, outcome-based monitoring and disclosure, and scaling only those programmes with rigorously demonstrated impact.

Alors que le pays amorce ce lundi sa rentrée sociale sur fond de reprise générale, Algérie Poste emboîte le pas en officialisant ses nouveaux horaires […]

L’article « À partir de ce 21 septembre » : Algérie Poste réaménage ses horaires d’ouverture est apparu en premier sur .

In state elections in Berlin and Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania, the CDU has once again suffered major losses. While in the capital Die Linke (The Left Party) emerged as the strongest party, in Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania the AfD will now be the largest group in the state parliament. The CDU didn't even clear the five-percent hurdle necessary to hold seats there. Europe's media examine the results – and the chancellor's chances of retaining his post.

Denmark and the US have reached a deal in the Greenland dispute, with an accord due to be signed on Friday. According to the BBC, it will prohibit non-Nato countries from establishing military bases on Greenland and ban investments on the island that could pose a threat to the US. This means that the idea of the US annexing Greenland is apparently off the table. Copenhagen and Washington have both expressed their satisfaction. Rightly so?