OSCE

VIENNA, 9 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today expressed his concern regarding the law decree issued in Turkey on 8 July, which closed down three newspapers and one TV station, in a letter to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu.

“I call on the Turkish authorities to reconsider this unjustified measure, which further restricts pluralism of the media. It is of utmost importance to respect freedom of expression and media freedom as well as to restore a pluralistic media landscape in the country,” Désir said.

On 8 July, the Turkish government issued Decree No. 701 which, among other things, envisages the closure of the Özgürlükçü Demokrasi, Halkın Nabzı and Welat newspapers as well as the Avantaj TV station, over their alleged ties and associations with terrorist organizations or structures, formations or groups that are operating against the national security of Turkey. According to media reports, all their assets have been transferred to the Treasury.

The Representative’s last public statement on the Özgürlükçü Demokrasi case in March is available at www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/376567

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period. Between the evenings of 7 and 8 July the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it saw a recent trench inside the Zolote disengagement area. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas. It was also restricted in Zaichenko, Starolaspa and Olenivka, as well as at a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The Mission observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station. The Mission monitored the transfer of mortal remains from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region. It also monitored gatherings in Kherson and Odessa.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 48 explosions, between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period (42 explosions). Between the evenings of 7 July and 8 July, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours.

On the evening and night of 6-7 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, eight projectiles in flight from south to north and one projectile from north to south, followed by totals of three undetermined explosions and 14 projectiles (eight from north to south and six from south to north), all 3-5km east. The following evening and night, the camera recorded, in sequence, five projectiles in flight from south to north, one illumination flare from north to south and two projectiles from south to north, followed by totals of 27 projectiles (16 from south to north and 11 from north to south) and one undetermined explosion, all 3-5km east.

On the evening of 6 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 25 undetermined explosions and about 95 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 3-7km south-east and east. On 7 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 3-7km south-east and south-south-east. During the day on 8 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3-5km south.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including two explosions, between the evenings of 6 and 7 July, compared with the previous reporting period (36 explosions). Between the evenings of 7 and 8 July, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (one), compared with the previous 24 hours.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 6 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a recently dug 20m-long trench (assessed as a firing position) emerging from a tree line on the southern side of the railway line, 1.3km from the northern edge of the disengagement area and 1.2km from its western edge (not visible in imagery from 7 June 2018).

On 7 July, on the north-western edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw three unarmed members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces repairing a signal cable, and a fuel tanker with two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers in it travelling west.

On 8 July, inside the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM saw a black car with military licence plates and two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside entering Katerynivka.

On the night of 6-7 July, the SMM camera in Stanytsia Luhanska recorded an undetermined explosion 2-4km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area.

During the day on 7 and 8 July, positioned in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, the SMM observed a calm situation. During the day on 8 July, positioned near the disengagement area near Petrivske, the SMM observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 8 July, the SMM saw 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bohoiavlenka (46km south-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in a non-government-controlled area, on 7 July the SMM saw four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in government-controlled areas, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted six tanks (type undetermined) near Vozdvyzhenka (40km north-west of Donetsk). On 8 July, the SMM saw two stationary tanks (T-64) near Memryk (33km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted ten tanks (type undetermined) near Pokrovka (36km east of Donetsk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, on 7 July, the SMM saw five self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and noted that 11 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were again missing. On 8 July, in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM noted that 28 mortars (15 2B11 Sani, 120mm, 12 M-120 Molot, 120mm and one BM-37, 82mm), 12 self-propelled howitzers (2S1), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and trenches in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 6 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two probable infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1), one probable armoured personnel carrier (BTR variant) and one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) near Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk). On the same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (four BMP variants and one BMP-1ksh) in the government-controlled Zhovanka neighbourhood of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk).

In a non-government-controlled area, on 6 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a trench line, assessed as recently maintained, in the yard of a house on the western edge of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (58km west of Luhansk).

On 8 July, the SMM saw three new mine hazard signs near a World War II memorial monument in Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. On 7 and 8 July, positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see the table below for details).

The SMM visited a border area not under government control. On 7 July, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 64 cars (22 with Ukrainian, 22 with Russian Federation, two with Lithuanian licence plates, and 18 with “DPR” plates), one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and around 40 passengers on board (mixed genders and ages)), seven covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) in a queue to exit Ukraine. The SMM also saw 16 cars (12 with Russian Federation and three with Ukrainian licence plates, and one with “Abkhaz” plates), three buses (two with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates) and 14 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) in a queue to enter Ukraine.

On 7 July, the SMM monitored the transfer of mortal remains from government-controlled to non-government-controlled areas of Luhansk region across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

On 6 July, in Kherson, the SMM monitored a gathering of some 250people (mostly men, mixed ages) in front of the Regional State Administration building at 1 Svobody Square. It saw some participants in clothing and with accessories identifiable with ATO veterans and others wearing t-shirts with slogans related to the State Initiative ofYarosh(DIYA). At one stage, the SMM saw two intensified verbal exchanges between the head of the Regional State Administration and two participants. On and around the square, the SMM saw about 50 law enforcement officers. It saw the gathering end peacefully.

On 7 July, in Odessa, the SMM monitored a gathering in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who has been in detention in the Russian Federation. (For similar observations in other cities, see SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018). It saw some 80 people (mostly men, mixed ages) at the Potemkin stairs and some participants holding banners written in multiple languages, including English, Spanish and Russian. The SMM saw four police officers present and observed a calm situation.

The SMM continued monitoring in Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 7 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 7 July and 8 July, respectively, two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security concerns”.
• On 7 July, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage at a checkpoint near Starolaspa (nongovernment-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk).
• On 7 July, the SMM was unable to access a permanent storage site in a nongovernment-controlled area of Donetsk region. The gate to the site was locked and no guards were present to open it.
• On 8 July, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier on two occasions denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region.
• On 8 July, at a checkpoint near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.[3]
• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC on both occasions.3
• On 7 and 8 July, the SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed on both occasions.

Conditional access:

• On 7 July, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), members of the armed formations requested to inspect the trunks of the SMM’s vehicles. The SMM was allowed to pass only after it complied with the request.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. On 6-7 July the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational. On 7-8 July, the SMM cameras at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka and in Avdiivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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BERLIN, 8 July 2018 – The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s 2018 Annual Session opened today in Berlin with calls for greater political will to ensure the full implementation of international commitments found in the Helsinki Final Act and other OSCE documents. As elected representatives of the people, members of parliament have a key role to play in building support among decision-makers in governments for ensuring compliance with these commitments, speakers said at the Annual Session’s opening plenary session.

With nearly 300 parliamentarians from North America, Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa in attendance, the Annual Session is taking place in the Reichstag, the seat of the German Bundestag. The opening session featured speeches by Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the German Bundestag; George Tsereteli, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly; Olaf Scholz, Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Finance for Germany; and Guglielmo Picchi, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation for Italy, representing the Italian OSCE Chairmanship.

In his keynote speech President Schäuble drew attention to new international challenges, such as cyber-attacks, hybrid threats and climate change, and lamented the tendency of deviation from international rules and standards. He stressed the need for enhancing multilateral co-operation and compromise.

Schäuble noted that the informal encounters of parliamentarians facilitate mutual understanding and the creation of trust. “The parliamentary dimension of the OSCE will continue to gain importance in light of hardened positions and mutual mistrust,”he said.

OSCE PA President Tsereteli spoke about how parliamentarians can promote full adherence to OSCE principles such as sovereign equality, territorial integrity of States, the peaceful settlement of disputes, inviolability of frontiers, and human rights.

“These principles,” he said, “are some of the most important international commitments that exist, but we must admit that the state of implementation is not where it should be. Unfortunately, many of these principles are breached with disturbing regularity.”

He pointed out that violations of OSCE commitments can lead to disagreements and tension within the OSCE area, but that through international pressure, better compliance can be ensured.

“Everyone in the OSCE should understand that if they violate principles, they will receive our attention,”Tsereteli said. “After all, that is what we are here to do – to hold each other to account.”Vice-Chancellor Scholz noted that global challenges cannot be met by any single State, and that difficulties cannot justify political inertia, stressing that international co-operation is the way forward. The OSCE PA Annual Session is the right forum for discussing how to uphold OSCE commitments, he said. The Vice-Chancellor also argued for making full use of the structured dialogue established by consensus at the 2016 OSCE Ministerial Council in Hamburg.

Deputy Foreign Minister Picchi said, “Parliamentary diplomacy plays a fundamental role to promote inclusive dialogue strengthening ownership among the participating States. The debate today will be very valuable for the Italian Chairmanship also in view of the Ministerial Council which will be held in Milan on 6-7 December.”

He discussed priorities of the Italian Chairmanship, including the crisis in and around Ukraine, the protracted conflicts, organized crime, and developing co-operation with Mediterranean and Asian Partner States particularly on migration and transnational threats such as terrorism, cybersecurity and illicit trafficking.

At the plenary session, members also considered the supplementary item “Minors on the Move: The Role of the OSCE and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly in Building an Effective Protection Framework.” The resolution calls on OSCE countries to implement policies for unaccompanied minors that take into account their specific needs and ensure family unity. The resolution was agreed to and will be included in the Berlin Declaration to be adopted on 11 July.

On Saturday, the OSCE PA’s ad hoc committees on migration and terrorism met on the eve of the Annual Session to discuss current and ongoing work. Chaired by Nahima Lanjri (Belgium), the Ad Hoc Committee on Migration discussed current issues and reviewed recent activities, including the visit by committee members to Serbia on 10-12 June. Members also discussed differences among OSCE countries in the treatment of unaccompanied and separated minors and possible upcoming committee visits.

Makis Voridis (Greece) chaired the Ad Hoc Committee on Countering Terrorism, which discussed the CCT’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina in early June and committee members’ participation in terrorism-related international events in Malta, Portugal, Italy, and Albania. The CCT also discussed ways to increase the contribution of parliamentarians in countering terrorism, as well as enhance co-operation with OSCE executive structures and other international organizations.

The Annual Session is being held under the theme “Implementing OSCE Commitments: The Role of Parliaments” and will culminate on 11 July in the adoption of the Berlin Declaration with recommendations to national governments, parliaments and the international community in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, environment and human rights.

For schedules, resolutions, speeches, news updates, press releases and other information, please visithttp://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2018-berlin-annual-session. Livestreaming is available in German and the floor language here:https://www.bundestag.de/mediathek

The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly is comprised of 323 parliamentarians from 57 countries spanning Europe, Central Asia and North America. The Assembly provides a forum for parliamentary diplomacy, monitors elections, and strengthens international co-operation to uphold commitments on political, security, economic, environmental and human rights issues.

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NICOSIA, 9 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, will hold a press conference on Tuesday, 10 July, at noon in Nicosia.

In the framework of his Office's Cyprus Dialogue project, on 10 July, the Representative will launch an exhibit displaying published materials from the exchange program for young journalists who worked for a week at media outlets of the neighbouring community; and a glossary entitled 'Words That Matter - A Glossary for Journalism in Cyprus'.

Journalists are invited to attend the press conference tomorrow, 10 July, at 12:00 (Nicosia time), at the Home for Cooperation, 28 Markou Dragou Street, Nicosia (buffer zone).

For further information about the Cyprus Dialogue project, please visit https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/cyprus-dialogue.

For any media queries please contact +43 664 859 0956.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared with the previous reporting period. Small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near non-government-controlled Vesele in Donetsk region. The Mission continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The SMM’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was restricted near Izvaryne, Voznesenivka and Siedove, near the border with the Russian Federation, and near Horlivka. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure. In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on an incident at an office where a political party was scheduled to hold a meeting.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including 42 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (33 explosions).

On the evening and night of 5-6 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from east-south-east to west-north-west, a projectile from east to west and four projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east, followed by totals of seven projectiles (three from north-west to south-east, two from east-north-east to west-north-west, one from east-north-east to west-south-west and one in vertical flight) and an illumination flare in vertical flight, all 0.8-4km south and south-south-west.

On the evening and night of 5-6 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded, in sequence, six projectiles in flight from north-north-west to south-south-east and three projectiles from south-south-east to north-north-west, followed by totals of 29 projectiles (14 from north-north-west to south-south-east and 15 from south-south-east to north-north-west) and 13 illumination flares in vertical flight, all 2-4km east-north-east.

On the evening of 5 July, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 3-6km south. During the day on 6 July, while at the same location, the SMM heard 17 undetermined explosions 5-6km south-east.

During the day on 6 July, positioned about 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about six hours, the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions, about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms fire and two minutes of uncountable and overlapping bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all 0.5-6km at directions ranging from south-west to north, as well as an undetermined explosion 5-6km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 36 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

During the day on 6 July, positioned 1.5km east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as impacts of artillery rounds 5-7km south and three explosions assessed as outgoing artillery rounds 2-3km south-west.

Positioned about 1.5km south of Kalynove (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 10-11km north-west.

Positioned on the north-western edge of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions 8-10km south-south-west.

Positioned about 2km north of Vesele (non-government-controlled, 28km north-east of Mariupol), while flying a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire about 2km south of its position, which it assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM landed the UAV and left the area.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

Positioned near the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations. Due to the presence of mines, including those on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remained limited.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a stationary self-propelled howitzer (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) in a compound in Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV again spotted two stationary tanks (T-64) in a residential area of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, 85km south of Donetsk), one of which was parked 1m from the nearest civilian house (see SMM Daily Report 16 February 2018). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a tank (T-72) in the south-eastern residential area of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol), a village where the Mission had recently observed shelling impacts (see SMM Daily Report 23 June 2018).

The SMM revisited a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region and observed that 12 tanks (six T64 and six T72) were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles[2] and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Nevelske (18km north-west of Donetsk), an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novomykhailivka (28km south-west of Donetsk) and three APCs (MT-LB) near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk). On 6 July, the SMM saw an IFV (BMP-2) in the garden of a residential house in Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk), an APC (BTR variant) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk) and an APC (MT-LB variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk).

On 5 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted four houses with damage assessed as caused by shelling in Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 10 April 2018) as well as trenches leading to two of the houses. On the south-eastern edge of the village, the same UAV spotted 14 recent craters assessed as caused by probable 120mm mortar rounds fired from an east-north-easterly direction (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018). About 800m east of the village, the UAV spotted a probable IFV (BMP-1) and trenches.

In Troitske, the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces compound 350m from a functioning school building.

In non-government-controlled areas, on 5 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-2) and three APCs (two BTR-80 and one MT-LB) near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol), two IFVs (BMP variants) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and an APC (BTR variant) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to a water pipeline near Zaitseve (non-government-controlled, 50km north-east of Donetsk), a water channel and fibre-optic cables in Stanytsia Luhanska, a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk) and a power line near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited two border areas not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates) and a truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. Upon arrival, a member of the armed formations immediately told the SMM to leave the area.* While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a bus entering Ukraine. After about 20 minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

In Kyiv, the SMM followed up on reports of an incident that occurred in the building where the Rozumna Syla (“wise force”) political party was scheduled to hold a meeting. At 33 Velyka Zhytomyrska Street, the SMM saw two police officers and two paramedics inside the building, as well as four police officers, a police car and an ambulance parked outside. The SMM attended a press conference where a man, who introduced himself as the deputy leader of the Rozumna Syla party, said that earlier in the morning about 30 young men, some wearing balaclavas, had entered yelling. He said that some of the group had become violent and attacked him. The SMM saw that the he had a swollen eye and red blood spots on his shirt.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a checkpoint northwest of Siedove (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), five armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the town and said that prior permission was needed from senior members of the armed formations.
• On two occasions, at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations requested to inspect the trunks of the SMM’s vehicles. The SMM refused both times and was not allowed to proceed through the checkpoint. On one occasion, the SMM saw a minivan with the logo of an international organization passing through the checkpoint without undergoing any inspection.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.
• The SMM did not travel across the bridge in Shchastia (governmentcontrolled, 20km north of Luhansk) due to the presence of mines. At a checkpoint south of the bridge, an armed member of the armed formations told the SMM that he had no information regarding demining activities in the area. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional:

• At a checkpoint on road H15 east of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations allowed the SMM to proceed only after having visually inspected an SMM trailer.

Other impediments:

• Positioned north of Vesele, the SMM heard 12 shots of smallarms fire in an area where it was flying a mini-UAV, assessed as directed at the UAV. The SMM landed the mini-UAV and left the area (see above).

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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VIENNA, 6 July 2018 - OSCE Representative on the Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir voiced strong disapproval of today’s court decision to imprison Zaman journalists.

“Today’s sentences confirm the critical state of press freedom in Turkey. Terrorism charges for articles and news are unacceptable. Today’s sentences against Şahin Alpay and his colleagues are unjustified and exceptionally severe. I recall that the European Court of Human Rights emphasized that freedom of expressionalso applies to views that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population”, said Désir.

On 6 July, Istanbul 13thHigh Criminal Court has sentenced former Zaman journalists Şahin Alpay, Mustafa Ünal, İbrahim Karayeğen, Ahmet Turan Alkan, Mümtazer Türköne, Ali Bulaç to prison sentences ranging from 8 years 9 months to 10 years 6 months for “membership of a terrorist organization”. İhsan Dağı, Orhan Kemal Cengiz, Nuriye Akman, Mehmet Özdemir and Lale Sarıibrahimoğlu were acquitted.

Following the coup attempt in July 2016, Zaman newspaper was closed by a statutory decree and many of its employees were taken into custody.

Désir emphasized the severe health condition of journalist Şahin Alpay who has received a prison sentence of 8 years and 9 months. The Representative recalled that both the Constitutional Court of Turkey and the European Court of Human Rights ruled that his pre-trial detention was a violation of his right to freedom of expression and freedom of the media.

“I call on Turkey to release the arrested journalists and hope that this decision will be reversed on appeal. I have been following the Zaman trial from the very beginning. It highlights once again the urgent need to reform Turkey’s criminal legislation which allows for numerous ways to silence critical journalists” said Désir.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter:@OSCE_RFoMand onwww.facebook.com/osce.rfom

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VIENNA, 6 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today raised concerns regarding the draft law “On changes to some legislative acts of Ukraine on countering threats to national security in the information sphere”, as it may endanger free access to information online.

“I call on the lawmakers to seriously reconsider the text of the draft law and balance security concerns with the citizens’ right to free expression and free media,” Désir said.

The bill, among other things, grants additional powers and competencies to the law-enforcement agencies of Ukraine, particularly in the area of blocking access to different kinds of online information services. The Representative earlier presented an expert legal review of the draft law to the authorities, which offers a number of recommendations in line with OSCE media freedom commitments and international standards (see www.osce.org/fom/350791).

“While I share the national security concerns of Ukraine, the draft bill should entail specific and clear measures aimed at protecting the principles of transparency, proportionality and necessity, and avoid the application of overly broad and excessive measures affecting the dissemination of online content in Ukraine,” Désir said. “The draft law also lacks provisions ensuring effective judicial oversight and due process regarding decisions on blocking of access to services.”

The Representative noted relevant concerns expressed by the civil society organizations of Ukraine regarding the draft law and offered the assistance of his Office in providing further legal advice and expert policy recommendations.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter:@OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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VIENNA, 6 July 2018 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, today denounced the fine imposed on Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) for not complying with a Russian law regulating the activities of media outlets branded by the authorities as “foreign agents.”

According to reports, on 5 July the Tverskoi district court in Moscow ordered RFE/RL to pay 100,000 rubles ($1,600) for delaying the submission of its financial report to the Justice Ministry due to lack of clarity in procedures.

“The court’s decision clearly shows that the “foreign agents” law unduly hinders the work of media outlets and narrows the space for freedom of the media in the Russian Federation,” Désir said. “I reiterate my call on the authorities to refrain from discriminating against the media.”

Earlier, in November 2017 and July 2018, Désir addressed the matter with the authorities, referring to the “foreign agents” law as a discriminatory measure which runs counter to OSCE commitments on freedom of expression and freedom of the media (see https://www.osce.org/fom/357111 and https://www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/386669).

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more atwww.osce.org/fom, Twitter:@OSCE_RFoMand onwww.facebook.com/osce.rfom

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. The Mission observed fresh damage from gunfire to a house in Yasynuvata. It continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was restricted again near Zaichenko and Bezimenne, as well as in Kruta Balka and at a weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Starolaspa and Marinka. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring the security situation around the station; it heard explosions close to the station despite explicit security guarantees. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure. It monitored the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge and noted again that the wooden ramps on the broken part of the bridge were unstable.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations[1], including, however, fewer explosions (33, including some which may have been heard simultaneously by SMM patrols positioned in different locations), compared with the previous reporting period (36 explosions).

On the evening and night of 4-5 July, the SMM camera at the DFS, recorded, in sequence, a projectile in flight from west-north-west to east-south-east, three projectiles from east to west and 14 projectiles from west-north-west to east-south-east, followed by an undetermined explosion, nine projectiles and a flare in vertical flight, all 1-2km south, as well as a projectile from east to west, assessed as an anti-tank guided missile 0.7-1.5km south.

On 5 July, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) for about five and a half hours the SMM heard and saw five explosions assessed as impacts (including two of 120mm mortar rounds) 1.8-2km south-west and west, and heard seven undetermined explosions and six bursts and shots of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire, all 0.5-10km at directions ranging from south-south-west to north.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded two explosions (see below). In the previous reporting period it recorded about 60 ceasefire violations, including two explosions.

The SMM observed fresh damage from gunfire. On Slovianska Street on the north-western edge of Yasynuvata, a female resident (aged 40-41) showed the SMM a hole in a north-facing window of her house. The SMM also observed small splinters of glass and assessed the damage as fresh and caused by gunfire from a north-westerly direction. The SMM saw an unexploded 12.7mm incendiary round in the flower bed north of the damaged window. The woman said that she had been at home with her three children on the evening of 4 July when the bullet had hit the house. The SMM had observed trenches north-west of Yasynuvata (see SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018), about 300m north of the abovementioned house.

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

In the early hours of 5 July, positioned in Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions 12-15km west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned in and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, respectively, the SMM observed calm situations.

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines, an SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted, on 4 July, eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Starolaspa (non-government-controlled, 51km south of Donetsk). Also in violation of withdrawal lines, on 5 July, the SMM saw three tanks (T-64) on flatbed carriers heading west on a road south-west of Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a government-controlled area, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) near a residential area of Novoolenivka (48km north-west of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in non-government-controlled areas, aerial imagery revealed, on 2 July, the presence of 12 tanks (type undetermined) near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) and 17 tanks (type undetermined) near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk). In the latter area, aerial imagery also revealed the presence of 80 armoured combat vehicles (type undetermined).

Aerial imagery taken on 2 July also revealed the presence of 18 pieces of towed artillery (type undetermined) near Buhaivka.

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In a government-controlled area of Donetsk region, the SMM saw four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted that four anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing. The SMM also noted that three anti-tank missile systems (9P149 Shturm-S, 130mm) were present for the first time.

The SMM visited a Ukrainian Armed Forces weapons permanent storage site whose location was beyond the respective withdrawal lines in Donetsk region and observed that eight tanks (T-64) were again missing.*

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun[2], newly dug trenches and other indications of military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk) and two IFVs (BMP-2) south of Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk). On 5 July, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-1) on flatbed carriers near Marinka, and an APC (BTR-70) south-west of Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 4 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Styla (34km south of Donetsk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) and an APC (MT-LB) near Petrivske, and an IFV (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) in Starolaspa. On 5 July, the SMM saw fresh tracks of armoured combat vehicles on a road between Yasynuvata and Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk).

In Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) the SMM observed a Ukrainian Armed Forces position 300m from a functional school building.

Aerial imagery taken on 4 July revealed the presence of new trenchesand positionsin a south-eastern part of Zaitseve (49km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 16November 2017), new defensive positions and four fresh impact sites near Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018), and numerousfresh impact sites between Bezimenne and Samsonove (101km south of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery from 1 June 2018).

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians at the entry-exit checkpoint near the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. At the government checkpoint, three people (two women and a man in their sixties) told the SMM that they had to wait one hour at the abovementioned checkpoint to enter government-controlled areas. Three other people (women in their sixties) said that they had waited four hours to exit government-controlled areas. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, ten people (three men and seven women of various age groups) coming from government-controlled areas separately told the SMM that it had taken them three hours to pass through both checkpoints. The SMM observed that the handrails of the wooden ramps on the broken parts of the bridge were unstable and that the ramp was bouncing due to the high number of people walking on it.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema, a water channel in Stanytsia Luhanska and demining activities to allow for the repair of a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 5 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) again prevented the SMM from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) citing “security reasons”.
• Eight armed members of the armed formations at a checkpoint 2.5km north-west of Bezimenne prevented the SMM from continuing west on the road towards Sakhanka and Pikuzy.
• An armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to a weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region.
• Six armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• The SMM lost communication with a midrange UAV flying over areas near Sakhanka, assessed as due to jamming. The SMM recovered the UAV undamaged.[4]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4] The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

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KYIV, 6 July 2018 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and the Trilateral Contact Group, Martin Sajdik, and the Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM), Ertugrul Apakan, today welcomed the reduction in the number of ceasefire violations that has occurred since recommitment to the ceasefire in eastern Ukraine, which came into effect shortly after midnight on 1 July 2018.

“This recommitment needs to be matched by a concrete set of actions if the ceasefire is to hold in a meaningful and sustained manner, namely the withdrawal of heavy weapons, disengagement, and de-mining,” saidAmbassador Sajdik.

Chief Monitor Ambassador Apakan said: “Full commitment to the implementation of the Minsk agreements ensures that the population in eastern Ukraine is able to live in peace and stability. It is high time for the civilian population to be able to go about their everyday lives.”

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BERLIN, 6 July 2017 – Hundreds of parliamentarians from North America, Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East and North Africa are gathering in Berlin for the 27th Annual Session of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, taking place 7-11 July.

Held under the theme “Implementing OSCE Commitments: The Role of Parliaments,” the Annual Session starts Saturday with a meeting of the heads of national delegations and will officially open on Sunday with keynote speeches by President of the German Bundestag Wolfgang Schäuble, President of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly George Tsereteli (MP, Georgia), Vice-Chancellor and Federal Minister of Finance for Germany Olaf Scholz, and Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation for Italy Guglielmo Picchi, representing the OSCE Italian Chairmanship.

With some 300 parliamentarians expected to participate, the Annual Session is the largest event on the Assembly’s calendar. It will culminate in the adoption of the Berlin Declaration, which will help shape policies of national governments, parliaments and the international community in the fields of political affairs, security, economics, environment and human rights.

High on the agenda will be issues such as counter-terrorism, climate change, migration, and access to education. Debates are expected in particular on the crisis in and around Ukraine, rising populism in Europe, protracted conflicts, the environmental impacts of war, and rebuilding trust in the OSCE area. In addition to the three primary resolutions to be presented by committee rapporteurs, a number of supplementary items are on the agenda, dealing with topics such as:

• human rights in Crimea
• building communities free of human trafficking
• combating gender-based violence
• building an effective protection framework for migrant children
• security sector governance and reform

OSCE PA members will also debate resolutions marking ten years since the August 2008 war in Georgia and how to strengthen the visibility of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly within national parliaments.

After the amendment process and their adoption by the general committees, resolutions will be voted on by the full Assembly on the final day of the Annual Session on 11 July for inclusion in the OSCE PA’s Berlin Declaration, which will be presented to foreign ministers and speakers of parliament of the OSCE’s 57 countries.

Participants will also hold elections for the OSCE PA’s Bureau, including for President of the Assembly and Vice-Presidents.

At the plenary sessions on 10 and 11 July, expected speakers include OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger, OSCE PA Special Representative on Gender Issues Hedy Fry (MP, Canada), Treasurer Doris Barnett (MP, Germany), and Secretary General Roberto Montella.

For schedules, resolutions, live streaming during the event, news updates, press releases and other information, please visithttp://www.oscepa.org/meetings/annual-sessions/2018-berlin-annual-session.

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386924 Kunduz Rysbek

On 5 July 2018 a meeting of the Coordination Council for the Reform of the Criminal-Executive System of the Kyrgyz Republic entitled "Assessment of the Health Status of Convicts and Individuals held in Detention: Problems and Solutions" took place in Bishkek on 5 July 2018. The Coordination Council aims to reform Kyrgyzstan’s penitentiary system.

The meeting provided a platform to promote open dialogue and co-operation between the state, non-governmental and international organizations that work in this field. It focused on reviewing the health screening results among convicts and detainees, the current state of the Central Hospital No. 47 administered by the State Service for the Execution of Punishment under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic (SSEP), and finding ways to improve it. The issue of transferring the functions of medical care for convicts from the SSEP to the Health Ministry was also discussed.

Participants included officials of the Ministry of Health and the Ministry of Education, representatives of the Mission of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Kyrgyzstan, non-governmental organizations, and independent experts.

The Chairman of the State Service for the Execution of Punishment under the Government of the Kyrgyz Republic Zhaparov said, "For the first time in the history of the Kyrgyz Republic the SSEP carried out activities to examine every convict’s health and developed an electronic database containing this information."

“Important steps are being taken by the Kyrgyz Government in reforming the state penitentiary system and I assure that the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek will continue to support the rehabilitation and resocialization programmes, improving living and working conditions of both prisoners and penitentiary staff, and extend capacity building activities,” concluded the Head of the Program Office in Bishkek, Ambassador von Arx.

VIENNA, 5 July 2018 – OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today sounded the alarm on the gravity and deterioration of media freedom in the OSCE region, as he presented his biannual report to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna, one year after his appointment.

“From threats and intimidation to attacks, arson, and physical violence including murder, most of my interventions have been on the safety of journalists. This is my number one priority and should also be the first concern for participating States when it comes to media freedom,” Désir said, recalling that 12 journalists and media workers have been killed in the OSCE region in the last year alone.

Désir also emphasised the dangerous climate of repression and threats against the press. “Today in the OSCE region more than 150 journalists are in prison for doing their job,” the Representative said. “I will continue to highlight each case of imprisonment, calling on authorities to dismiss charges and respect the independence and work of the media, until each and every journalist unjustly imprisoned has been released.”

In addition to physical safety, including online safety particularly for female journalists, there are several critical challenges threatening media pluralism and freedom of expression in the OSCE region.

In his presentation today, the Representative also called on the participating States to ensure that the internet remains an open space for pluralistic debate and information rather than a tool for censorship and repression.

“I will continue to stress that human rights and security must be seen as mutually reinforcing and states must do more to ensure that this is reflected in their laws, policies, and practices, including on the internet. One may criticise, one may disagree, one may even dislike the media, but it is the obligation of democracies to accept, to respect, and to protect the diversity and freedom of all voices,” the Representative said.

During the first year of his mandate as OSCE Representative, Désir intervened 371 times in total in 40 participating States, and visited 28 participating States. His Office has conducted 14 legal reviews in 12 participating States and regions; organized four conferences to provide a platform for crucial discussions for representatives of government, civil society, academia, and the media community on strengthening media freedom.

The Representative also welcomed the release of 14 journalists in the last year, whose cases he has regularly raised with the relevant authorities.

“I call on you and your governments to stand by our media and fully honour the commitments you have made to protect freedom of expression and media freedom. The quality of our democracies depends on it,” Désir concluded.

Désir’s full report is available at www.osce.org/representative-on-freedom-of-media/386927

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

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This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with the previous reporting period. Small arms were fired in the direction of an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Zhovte. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area and near the Zolote disengagement area, where an SMM camera recorded two explosions in close proximity. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas and was also restricted near Izvaryne at the border with the Russian Federation as well as near Zaichenko, Shevchenko and Bezimenne. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near Vasylivka, Starolaspa and Sosnivske. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure. The SMM followed up further on the killing of a member of the Roma community in Berehove in Zakarpattia region.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including, however, more explosions (36), compared with the previous reporting period (26 explosions).

On 4 July, positioned 1km north-west of the railway station in Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 undetermined explosions and 28 shots and bursts of small-arms fire, all 1-4km west-south-west, north-west and north.

On the evening and night of 3-4 July, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), recorded, in sequence, four projectiles in flight from south to north, one projectile in flight from north to south, one projectile in vertical flight and three projectiles from north to south, all 1-2km east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (two), compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near Zhovte (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), Muratove (government-controlled, 51km north-west of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On the evening of 3 July, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two explosions assessed as impacts of a probable 30mm grenade fired by an automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) 10-20m east-north-east of the camera’s position (assessed as outside the disengagement area). The explosions caused the camera to tilt but it remained operational. On 4 July, the SMM saw no damage to the camera.

On 4 July, positioned 1.8km north of Petrivske, the SMM heard ten undetermined explosions and one shot of small-arms fire, all 1-7km west-south-west and west-north-west (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 3 July, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted four self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) (and nearby two recent craters assessed as caused by either 122 or 152mm artillery shells fired from a westerly direction) near Vasylivka (47km south of Donetsk), four self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Starolaspa (51km south of Donetsk) and a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) east of Sosnivske (78km south of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, on 3 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) (assessed as non-operational) in a facility in Shyroke (34km south-east of Luhansk).

The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. In government-controlled areas of Donetsk region, the SMM saw 12 multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-27 Uragan, 220mm) and found that six MLRS were again missing.

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, newly dug trenches and other military presence in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 3 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted a recently dug trench 30m long running from east to west in a zig-zag pattern on the eastern side of the road between Dolomitne (53km north-east of Donetsk) and Novoluhanske (53km north-east of Donetsk) (not visible in imagery taken on 18 June), an infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP variant) near Travneve (51km north-east of Donetsk) and another IFV (BMP-1) near Novoluhanske. On 4 July, the SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk). In the northern part of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers inside a house and two APCs (BTR variants) parked behind the house (see also SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 3 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1) near Naberezhne (77km south of Donetsk) as well as three IFVs (BMP variants) and newly dug trenches (not visible in imagery from 1 June) near a residential area of Sosnivske. On the same day, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an APC (BTR variant) near Holmivskyi (49km south-east of Donetsk).

The SMM continued to observe the presence of mines. In government-controlled areas, on 3 July, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time five anti-tank mines (TM-62) surrounded by concrete blocks next to a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces west of Novoluhanske as well as 18 previously seen anti-tank mines (TM-62)on a road east of Travneve (see SMM Daily Report 21 June 2018). On the same day, in non-government-controlled areas, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time: 15 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in two rows on the northern edge of the residential area of Dolomitne as well as 12 randomly laid anti-tank mines (TM-62) and six anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in a single row on a road between Dolomitne and Novoluhanske.

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS), including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), a power line in Vesela Hora-Novoselivka (non-government-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), a water channel near Stanytsia Luhanska and a water pipeline in Novotoshkivske (government-controlled, 53km west of Luhansk).

The SMM visited three border areas currently not under government control. While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about 90 minutes, the SMM saw 49 cars (19 with Ukrainian, 14 with Russian Federation, one with Belarusian and one with Lithuanian licence plates, and 14 with “DPR” plates), four covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates as well as 12 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) exiting Ukraine. During the same period, the SMM saw 24 cars (13 with Ukrainian and one with Polish licence plates, and ten with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw 22 cars (12 with Ukrainian, seven with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates, and two with “LPR” plates) and 60 pedestrians (mixed genders and ages) queuing to exit Ukraine as well as one bus (with Ukrainian licence plates and a “Alchevsk-Luhansk-Moscow-Stakhanov” sign) and 20 pedestrians (13 men, seven women, aged 40-60) entering Ukraine.*

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrian traffic.

On 3 July, the SMM met with relatives of a woman killed on 1 July (see SMM Daily Report of 3 July 2018) and other members of the Roma community in Berehove (174km south-west of Ivano-Frankivsk) in Zakarpattia region. The deceased woman’s relatives told the SMM that the woman had sustained wounds from a bladed object to different parts of her body.They said that they were worried about their collective safety and that members of the community were not leaving their settlement. A local resident then brought the SMM to a spot where he said the deceased woman had been found. There, the SMM saw a pool of dried blood. The SMM saw also pools of dried blood on the ground near a railroad yard in Berehove where, according to the interlocutor, the woman had first been stabbed.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• An armed member of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it again from accessing Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) due to “security reasons”. (See SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018.)
• Two members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Shevchenko (nongovernment-controlled, 38km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it from driving towards Mykolaivka (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk) saying that its passage was “not authorized” due to the security situation around Mykolaivka.
• Members of the armed formations at a checkpoint near Bezimenne (nongovernment-controlled, 100km south of Donetsk) denied the SMM passage, citing orders from superiors.
• On 4 July, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[2]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Other impediments:

• On 4 July, while conducting a miniUAV flight near Zhovte, the SMM heard 15 shots of small-arms fire around 70m north of the UAV’s position and directed at the UAV, which at that time was 1km south of the patrol’s position. The SMM landed the UAV safely.

[1] For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2] The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

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386945 Communication and Media Relations Section

From 3 to 5 July 2018, the OSCE Mobile Training Team delivered in Skopje an interactive course on identifying foreign terrorist fighters for country’s 24 border and security services officers.

The deployment of the Training Team, the seventh of its kind, was organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, with the support of the OSCE Mission to Skopje and in close co-operation with the country’s Border Police.

International, regional and national legal frameworks, the effective use of Interpol databases, risk analysis and management in the identification of potential foreign terrorist fighters at borders in compliance with international human rights standards, were the main focus of the training course.

“In a time where terrorist attacks present a global threat, no country is immune, in particular countries along the Western Balkan migration route,” said Goran Stojkovski, OSCE Border Security and Management Unit Customs Advisor. “It is of utmost importance to find common mechanisms, respectful of human rights, to deal with threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters, especially at borders, as they represent the first line of protection of each country”.

The importance of risk analysis models applied to identify potential foreign terrorist fighters at the borders as well as background, trends and current cases were discussed during the course. Participants also engaged in practical exercises on the detection of forged documents and impostors as well as in interactive exercises to deepen their understanding of behavioral indicators of foreign terrorist fighters.

The Mobile Training Team members from the host country, Romania and Austria as well as experts from INTERPOL, OSCE and the United States of America delivered a training and shared their knowledge and expertise in the identification of foreign terrorist fighters at the borders.

The OSCE Mobile Training Team was established by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department in 2016. It is composed of 17 selected border and counter-terrorism experts from OSCE participating States and Partners for Co-operation.

386897 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported training seminar on building the capacity of water management lecturers in sustainable water management concluded on 5 July 2018 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in partnership with the International Fund for Saving the Aral Sea and the National Agrarian University.

A four-day training brought together some 15 lecturers from various regions of Kazakhstan’s academic institutions who were trained on national water legislation, sustainable development goals, environmental protection challenges and modern approaches to integrated water resources management. The event also provided a discussion platform on the current status of higher education and on enhancing academic programmes in water governance based on the international best experience.

The seminar is part of the OSCE Programme Office’s long-term efforts to promote sustainable development goals and to improve educational standards in line with best international practices in the area of water resources management.

386789 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Election administration and the work of the media during election campaigns were at the
centre of discussions during two workshops held in Tirana on 3 and 4 July 2018 respectively,
with the support of the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
and the OSCE Presence to Albania.

Within ODIHR’s project “Support to Elections in the Western Balkans”, the workshops were
part of the Office’s assistance to Albania’s Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee on Electoral
Reform in following up on ODIHR electoral recommendations.

The first meeting brought together 35 participants, 18 women and 17 men, including
representatives of the Parliamentary Ad-hoc Committee, the Central Election Commission
and civil society organizations, as well as experts and practitioners from international
organizations. The key topics discussed included models of election management bodies and
the training of members of the election administration.

The second meeting gathered 51 participants, 30 men and 21 women, among whom were
representatives of the Audio-visual Media Authority and the Media Monitoring Board. The
key topics were editorial independence of the media, including during campaigns,
impartiality in campaign coverage and increasing the capacity of the public broadcaster.

“ODIHR has been co-operating closely with the Committee since its establishment, assisting
in the follow-up of electoral recommendations,” said Urdur Gunnarsdottir, Special Adviser to
the ODIHR Director. “We hope that these workshops contributed to useful discussions on
good practices and international standards. We now look forward to supporting the next stage
of the electoral reform process, including by providing advice on the drafting of legal
amendments.”

Ambassador Bernd Borchardt, Head of the OSCE Presence in Albania, said: “There is a
definite need for a thorough and timely reform, which will address the OSCE/ODIHR
recommendations from the three past electoral processes and will tackle key issues affecting
democratic elections. Together with ODIHR, we are offering our full support to the Albanian
parliament in carrying out such a reform.”

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to promptly following up on
ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations, and ODIHR has consistently supported
these efforts.

The Support to Elections in the Western Balkans project is funded by the European Union
and the Austrian Development Agency. It supports the Western Balkans countries in their
efforts to follow up on election observation recommendations in areas related to election
administration, voter registration and media coverage during election campaigns.

KYIV, 4 July 2018 – Principal Deputy Chief Monitor of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine Alexander Hug will hold his regular news briefing on Thursday, 5 July, in Kyiv.

He will talk about the security situation throughout Ukraine and the Mission’s recent activities.

Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 5 July, at 13:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at the Ukrainian House, 2 Khreshchatyk Street.

Live streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng

PRISHTINË/PRIŠTINA, 04 July 2018 –The OSCE Mission in Kosovo will organize its second edition of the trade fair for women business owners from south and north of the River Ibër/Ibar, and from other regions throughout Kosovo. The two-day fair will start tomorrow and take place in Prishtinë/Priština.

Around 50 women entrepreneurs from different communities, mainly Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb, who manage small businesses in their respective villages, will showcase and sell their products at the trade fair, and have an opportunity to network and increase inter-ethnic co-operation and dialogue.

In addition, different NGOs and local and international organisations will have five stands to present their work, while another tent will host different activities on women empowerment.

The trade fair will be open to the public on 5 and 6 of July. Business tents will be open from 10:00 to 21:00 on both days while the tent hosting women empowerment activities will be open on the 5 July from 11:00 until 21:00.

The Deputy Head of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Kilian Wahl, the Deputy Minister of Regional Development Ministry Magbule Shkodra and the Regional Development Agency (RDA) Board Chairman Bekim Jashari, will deliver opening remarks.  

Media representatives are cordially invited to attend the event on Thursday, 5 July 2018, at the Zahir Pajaziti Square in Prishtinë/Priština, starting at 11:00 hrs.

This report is for the media and the general public.

The SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region, compared with the previous reporting period, and no ceasefire violations in Luhansk region. The SMM continued monitoring the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska, Zolote and Petrivske; it recorded ceasefire violations near the Petrivske disengagement area and observed military presence inside the Zolote and Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement areas. The Mission’s access remained restricted in all three disengagement areas as well as near Zaichenko and Oleksandrivske. The SMM observed weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line. The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station, including through monitoring the security situation around the station, as well as repairs and maintenance works to other essential civilian infrastructure. In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering.

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations[1], including 26 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 70 explosions).

On the evening of 2 July, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded an undetermined explosion and seven projectiles in flight from south-south-east to north-north-west, all 0.5-2km south.

On the same evening, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk) recorded three projectiles in flight from north to south and a projectile in vertical flight, all 1-3km east.

On the same evening, the SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) recorded two projectiles in flight from west to east 1-2km south.

On the same evening, while in Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 3-6km south-east.

On the morning of 3 July, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) for about four hours, the SMM heard seven undetermined explosions 1-3km south and east-south-east.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations. (The SMM had recorded 31 explosions during the previous reporting period.)

The SMM continued to monitor the disengagement process and to pursue full access to the disengagement areas near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), as foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016. The SMM’s access remained restricted, but the Mission was able to partially monitor them.*

On 3 July, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in the garden of a house inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, approximately 400m from its south-western edge. (See SMM Daily Report 25 June 2018.)

Positioned on the north-eastern outskirts of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw three Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel in military attire (two men and a woman, no weapons visible) in a black car with military licence plates entering the Zolote disengagement area from the north and then heading west.

Positioned 2.6km north of Petrivske for about 30 minutes, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3km south (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area, on 2 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) about 1.5km east of Pivnichne (formerly Kirove, 44km north-east of Donetsk).

In violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, on 26 June, an SMM long-range UAV spotted three self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Tavrycheskoe (48km west of Luhansk). In the early morning hours of 3 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two tanks (T-64) each loaded on a transporter moving from Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) towards Krasnyi Luch (56km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside designated storage sites in a non-government-controlled area, aerial imagery on 1 July revealed the presence of 32 tanks (T-64) and nine probable mortars (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk). (See SMM Daily Report 28 June 2018.)

The SMM observed armoured combat vehicles, anti-aircraft guns[2] and a UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, on 2 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Pivnichne, two IFVs (BMP-1) near Luhanske (59km north-east of Donetsk), an IFV (BMP variant) near Myronivskyi (62km north-east of Donetsk), two IFVs (BMP-1) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near a residential area of Kriakivka (38km north-west of Luhansk), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) in a residential area of Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk), an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Artema (26km north of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted an IFV (BMP variant) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol). On 3 July, the SMM saw an APC (BTR-D) and an IFV (BMP-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) as well as an IFV (BMP-1) and three APCs (BTR-80) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk).

In non-government-controlled areas, on 2 July, an SMM long-range UAV spotted two IFVs (BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk), an IFV (BMP-1) near Znamianka (36km north-west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (MT-LB) near Dovhe (22km north-west of Luhansk). The same day, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted five IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) near Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol).

Positioned about 1km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard and saw a white UAV (probable mid-range) flying from the direction of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and hovering over the patrol at an altitude of about 200-300m for one minute. The UAV then flew towards Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS, including through monitoring adherence to the ceasefire. Positioned in areas near the DFS, the SMM heard ceasefire violations, despite explicit security guarantees (see above and table below for details). The SMM also continued to facilitate and monitor repairs to the Petrivske pumping station near Artema and to a water channel near Stanytsia Luhanska.

The SMM monitored the situation of civilians living close to the contact line. In Trokhizbenka (government-controlled, 32km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw about 150 people (mixed genders, 45-65 years old) gathered in front of the building of the military-civil administration. The SMM talked to seven people present (six men and one woman, 45-65 years old) who said that they were following up on a written request they had submitted to the military-civil administration ten days prior regarding the opening of an entry-exit checkpoint near the town, as travelling across the contact line via the entry-exit checkpoint in Stanytsia Luhanska is costly and time-consuming, which as a result prevents them from being able to regularly visit relatives in non-government-controlled areas.

The SMM monitored a border area not under government control. At a border crossing point near Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) for about 15 minutes, the SMM saw seven cars (four with Ukrainian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck (with Ukrainian licence plates) exiting Ukraine and observed no traffic entering Ukraine.

In Kyiv, the SMM monitored a public gathering in support of Ukrainian filmmaker Oleh Sentsov, who is in detention in the Russian Federation. (See SMM Daily Report 3 July 2018.) The Mission observed about 4,000 people (mixed gender and ages, including children) gathered in front of the Olimpiiskyi Stadium at 55 Velyka Vasylkivska Street. The SMM saw that about 20 participants (mostly young men) were wearing T-shirts with the insignia of National Corps and holding flares and banners with messages such as: “Oleh Sentsov, Ukraine is with you!” There were six police officers nearby. The gathering ended without incident.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (see, for example, SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• Two armed members of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint near Zaichenko (nongovernment-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol) and prevented it again from accessing Pikuzy and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), claiming it was not safe for the SMM to continue. (See SMM Daily Report 2 July 2018.)
• A member of the armed formations stopped the SMM at a checkpoint south of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, nongovernment-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk) and prevented it from accessing Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), claiming it was not safe for the SMM to continue due to a “firing exercise” taking place in the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The SMM was prevented from accessing parts of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, with the exception of the main road, due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.[3]
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads in the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. A Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM by phone that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed and informed the JCCC.4
• The SMM was prevented from accessing secondary roads south of the Zolote disengagement area due to the possible presence of mines and UXO. An armed formation member positioned on the southern side of the Zolote disengagement area told the SMM that no demining had taken place during the previous 24 hours. The SMM did not consider it safe to proceed.

Conditional access:

• Two members of the armed formations (one of them armed) at a checkpoint near Horlivka (nongovernment-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) allowed an SMM patrol to proceed only after they inspected the trunks of the SMM vehicles.

Other impediments:

• On the evening of 2 July, an SMM long range UAV was temporarily jammed while flying over areas near Zholobok (non-government-controlled, 47km west of Luhansk).[4]
• On 3 July, in Zhovte (nongovernment-controlled, 17km north-west of Luhansk), a community representative told the SMM that she was not “authorized” to speak to the SMM.

[1]     For a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera at the entry-exit checkpoint in Marinka was not operational during the reporting period.

[2]    This hardware is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[3]     The SMM informed Ukrainian Armed Forces officers of the JCCC. Russian Federation Armed Forces officers of the JCCC have withdrawn from the JCCC as of 18 December 2017.

[4]   The interference could have originated from anywhere in a radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.