OSCE

BRUSSELS, GENEVA, VIENNA, 15 March 2019 - The Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions welcome the reopening of crossing points on 15 March. However, they also reiterate their conviction that the closure was not justified. They have made this position clear through continuous engagement since the first day of the closure on 12 January, at the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) meeting on 8 February and during their meetings in Tskhinvali on 12 March. 

The Co-Chairs have taken note of the public health concerns voiced and, for this reason, have referred to the World Health Organization (WHO), which is the competent international body on such issues. The WHO’s position is that closing crossing points offers no public health benefits. Therefore, the Co-Chairs have on numerous occasions restated their firm view that freedom of movement as a basic human right should always be upheld. They have stressed in particular the impact of the closure on people’s lives and have expressed the hope that in any future similar situation both the IPRM and the hotline would be fully used in order to avoid imposing undue hardship on the population.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw damage to a house in Zaitseve.
• The SMM recorded ceasefire violations near the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, including to the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled Shymshynivka and at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 72 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including all explosions, were recorded in areas south of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 180), compared with the previous reporting period (about 110 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at westerly and south-easterly directions of Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk) and at southerly and north-westerly directions of Myrne (non-government-controlled, 28km south-west of Luhansk) (all ceasefire violations in these areas were assessed as live-fire exercises outside the security zone).

Damaged house in Zaitseve

On 13 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a house in the southern part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk) assessed as caused by the impact of a mortar round. The Mission could not determine whether the damage was fresh.

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 13-14 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an undetermined explosion and two projectiles in flight, all at an assessed range of 1-4km north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled-areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (type undetermined) in Pisky (11km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

13 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) east of Vedenske (35km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five tanks (T-64) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled-areas

14 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted six towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) at the railway station in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

The SMM saw:

• ten tanks (T-72) at a railway station in Khlibodarivka (65km south-west of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 26 tanks (19 T-72 and seven T-64) and a recently built compound (not visible in imagery from 7 November 2018), in which one of the afore-mentioned tanks, other military-type hardware and about 20 deep unoccupied vehicle revetments were observed,[4] in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 8 March 2019).

14 March

The SMM saw five tanks (T-72) in firing positions in a training area near Myrne (see ceasefire violations section above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 March

The SMM noted that:

• seven multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present and
• 35 MLRS (BM-21) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

14 March

The SMM noted the presence of all weapons observed previously.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-1), an armoured combat vehicle (ACV) (type undetermined) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Pisky.

13 March

The SMM saw two military tents and six Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers near a functional school in Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk).

14 March

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BMP-2) in Orikhove-Donetske (44km north-west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk); and
• two armoured personnel carriers (BTR-80) in Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a 400m-long trench (not visible in imagery from 27 October 2018) about 3km east of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three IFVs (BMP-1) and two ACVs in the afore-mentioned training area near Novoselivka (see above) and
• seven IFVs (five BMP-1 and two BMP-2) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 13 March, an SMM mid-range UAV again spotted about 350 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

On 14 March, about 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM again saw two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds, lying 4m north of a local road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines in Novoluhanske and near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) (both reportedly damaged in shelling); power transformers in Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol); a deteriorated pipeline at the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk); a deteriorated water supply network near Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); and the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Dovzhanske (84km south-east of Luhansk) for about 30 minutes, the SMM saw six cars (four with Ukrainian, one with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates) and three women entering Ukraine, as well as 12 cars (two with Ukrainian, two with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates, and one with “LPR” plates; the SMM could not observe the licence plates of six cars), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates and four men exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for about 20 minutes, the Mission saw a woman and a man exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 15 cars (four with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine. While present the Mission also saw 15 cars (three with Ukrainian and seven with Russian Federation licence plates, and five with “DPR” plates) and two covered cargo trucks with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine. The SMM again noted an unusually long line of cars, trucks and buses waiting to exit Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier denied the SMM entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• In Shymshynivka (non-government-controlled, 27km south-west of Luhansk), two members of the armed formations denied the Mission access to the south-western part of the settlement. During its presence, the SMM heard ceasefire violations in the area (see above and the ceasefire violation table).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The other military-type hardware and revetments mentioned in this sentence are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Ivana Milatovic, OSCE Mission to Serbia

The OSCE Mission to Serbia handed over IT equipment to the Interior Ministry’s Anti-corruption Department on the occasion of its first anniversary, on 15 March 2019. The donation will contribute to enhancing the technical capacity of the department to conduct efficient and effective investigations of economic crime and corruption.

“The Ministry can be very proud of the level of professionalism and competence of its staff working in the Anti-corruption Department. The IT equipment that we donated today will ensure that this relatively new department is also technically equipped to fulfil its important tasks across Serbia,” said Andrea Orizio, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Serbia. “Systemic changes that the Ministry has introduced in the area of the fight against corruption are the best demonstration of ownership of key reform processes in the country.”

This initiative is part of an OSCE project that aims to strengthen the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior’s Criminal Investigations Directorate specifically its Anti-corruption Department, to conduct complex financial investigations, examine fraud and investigate money laundering cases and other forms of serious crime, thereby contributing to the prevention of financial crimes.

This project is being implemented by the OSCE Mission to Serbia with the financial support of the Government of Norway, which has funded a series of specialized courses on various aspects of investigating economic crime and corruption, and with support of the Government of Italy, which funded the IT equipment donated to the Anti-corruption Department.   

The OSCE Mission to Serbia has been working in partnership with the Serbian Ministry of Interior on enhancing police capacities to effectively prevent and combat corruption since 2013.

414221 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

A series of three one-day training seminars and a public discussion on the legislative mechanisms regulating the police’s work in combating domestic violence concluded on 15 March 2019 in Kazakhstan’s Zhambyl Region.

The events were organized by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) of Kazakhstan and the crisis centre Podrugi (Girlfriends) with the support of the OSCE Programme Office in Astana.

During the series, a total of some 150 community police officers discussed best practices in preventing and addressing domestic violence with the guidance of two national experts. Participants discussed the best way to help victims and protect their rights while engaging civil society as a resource for providing support to victims.

The seminars aim at building the capacity of police inspectors who respond to calls on possible domestic violence cases. They are part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to assist the host country and civil society representatives in preventing and combating domestic violence and in offering professional social services to victims.

414302 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

An OSCE-supported meeting of the Commission of the Republic of Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic on the Use of Water Management Facilities of Intergovernmental Status on the Rivers Chu and Talas (Intergovernmental Commission) took place on 14 March 2019 in Taraz, Kazakhstan.

Some 50 representatives and experts from governmental entities, hydro-meteorological centres and international organizations from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan discussed water withdrawal limits, the maintenance of hydro-technical facilities and co-operation prospects aimed at sustainable sharing of water resources in the transboundary river basin.

The event was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana, Kazakhstan’s Agriculture Ministry and the Secretariat of the Intergovernmental Commission and aimed to involve broad public participation into the management of water resources in the Chu and Talas River basins.

The Chu and Talas rivers represent crucial sources of water for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan utilized for agriculture, fish farming, hydroelectric power and domestic needs.  An agreement between Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan regulating the operation of water facilities on the transboundary Chu and Talas rivers was signed in 2000. Both countries agreed to share costs for the facilities on a pro rata basis in accordance with the water volume received by each country. The joint Intergovernmental Commission, which was established in 2006 and meets twice a year, aims to discuss the ongoing water-sharing schedule and operation of hydro-technical facilities in line with the 2000 Agreement.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s multi-year efforts to support transboundary dialogue by involving the representatives of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.  It is in line with the decision of the Maastricht’s Ministerial Council on the OSCE Strategy Document for the Economic and Environmental Dimension that underlines the importance of water diplomacy in the regional context.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Novoselivka, Shyroka Balka, as well as in an area between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north, south-south-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, however more explosions (110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Kirovsk (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 12-13 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km in directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).   

During the day on 13 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 ceasefire violations assessed as near the disengagement area. Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Damage to roof and an impact crater near Novoluhanske

On 12 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a building, assessed as caused by artillery or mortar impacts, in the north-western part of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted a crater next to a power pylon 200m north of the aforementioned building, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round (all observations not seen in imagery from 16 February 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12) and two mortars (probable120mm) in a field near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as at least 40 ammunition crates next to the mortar.

13 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) on a road near Vedenske (33km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 19 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13. March

The SMM noted that:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 47 towed howitzers (35 2A65, 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (T-72) three mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that:

• 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64) remained missing.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) close to residential houses in Vodiane.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), fitted onto an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55), in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a small bunker and a trench about 30m from a residential house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets.

13 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and
• an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (PMZ-3) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs  

On 12 March, a mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 92 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows running north to south for at least 200m in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka and 38 anti-tank mines laid in three rows about 2km south of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV also for the first time spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a single line along a treeline near Shyroka Balka.

On the same day, a mid-range UAV spotted 300 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a line of 500m near Vodiane and 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1km north of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019) .

On 13 March, the SMM saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) for the first time about 20m south of road H-15 between the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), close to previously observed mines. In the vicinity of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) about 15m north of road H-15 close to previously observed mines (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019).

About 5m north of a road from Marinka to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a rectangular mine hazard sign for the first time with yellow and red colour and inscriptions that included “Warning! Access (passage) to this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian. On the southern outskirts of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), 5m north-west of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a square shaped mine hazard sign, red and yellow in colour with a skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian. About 15-20m north of road T-0509 near Zhukova Balka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two square shaped mine hazard signs, red and white in colour with “Danger Mines” written in Russian and English, attached to a wire fence about 250m apart.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed mine hazard sign had been removed, now leaving an area east of Slavne confirmed by the SMM as hazardous without markings indicating the presence of mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and inspections to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to an electric transformer near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While present the SMM also saw 28 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and 55 trucks (52 covered cargo and three tanker trucks) (24 with Ukrainian, 13 with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM noted an unusually long 2km line of trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two drivers in the line told the SMM that they had already been waiting 14-18 hours to exit.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint without restrictions in both directions.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing the need for permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines for the first time near Novoselivka, Shyroka Balka, as well as in an area between Marinka and Oleksandrivka. 
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however fewer explosions (about 90), compared with the previous reporting period (120 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas north, south-south-west and south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, however more explosions (110), compared with the previous reporting period (about 90 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded inside and near the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Kirovsk (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening and night of 12-13 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east and south-south-east (all assessed as inside the disengagement area) and 13 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-5km in directions ranging from east-north-east to east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded six projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).   

During the day on 13 March, positioned in three locations near the Zolote disengagement area, the SMM heard about 75 ceasefire violations assessed as near the disengagement area. Positioned south of Zolote-5/Mykhailivika (non-government-controlled, 58km north-west of Luhansk) on the same day, the SMM also heard 22 undetermined explosions and about 45 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 3-4km north-west (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Damage to roof and an impact crater near Novoluhanske

On 12 March, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted damage to the roof of a building, assessed as caused by artillery or mortar impacts, in the north-western part of the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Luhansk). The same UAV also spotted a crater next to a power pylon 200m north of the aforementioned building, assessed as caused by a 120mm mortar round (all observations not seen in imagery from 16 February 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air-missile system (9K35 Strela-10) near Vodiane (94km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted an anti-tank gun (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), a probable anti-tank gun (MT-12) and two mortars (probable120mm) in a field near Shyroka Balka (34km north-east of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk), as well as at least 40 ammunition crates next to the mortar.

13 March

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) on a road near Vedenske (33km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014. 

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 19 tanks (T-72) in a training area near Manuilivka (65km east of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13. March

The SMM noted that:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33) and 12 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) were present and
• four multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 47 towed howitzers (35 2A65, 12 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm), 20 anti-tank guns (MT-12), five surface-to-air missile systems (9K33) and four towed mortars (2B9 Vasilek, 82mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site beyond the respective withdrawal lines in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that 33 tanks (T-72) three mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At permanent storage sites beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

13 March

The SMM noted that:

• 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12), nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) and 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64) remained missing.  

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-80) close to residential houses in Vodiane.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm), fitted onto an armoured recovery vehicle (VT-55), in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time a small bunker and a trench about 30m from a residential house in Zolote-3/Stakhanovets.

13 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Kapitanove (49km north-west of Luhansk);
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) with a mounted heavy-machine-gun in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk); and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

12 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Sentianivka and
• an APC (BTR-80) and a trench digger (PMZ-3) near Khoroshe (36km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines and mine hazard signs  

On 12 March, a mid-range UAV spotted for the first time 92 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows running north to south for at least 200m in a field about 4km north-east of Novoselivka and 38 anti-tank mines laid in three rows about 2km south of the aforementioned mines. The same UAV also for the first time spotted at least 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) in a single line along a treeline near Shyroka Balka.

On the same day, a mid-range UAV spotted 300 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in a line of 500m near Vodiane and 50 probable anti-tank mines (TM-62) about 1km north of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 13 February 2019) .

On 13 March, the SMM saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) for the first time about 20m south of road H-15 between the forward position of the armed formations near Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk) and the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), close to previously observed mines. In the vicinity of the aforementioned checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM saw for the first time four anti-tank mines (TM-62M) about 15m north of road H-15 close to previously observed mines (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019).

About 5m north of a road from Marinka to Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw a rectangular mine hazard sign for the first time with yellow and red colour and inscriptions that included “Warning! Access (passage) to this territory is dangerous” in Ukrainian. On the southern outskirts of Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), 5m north-west of the road, the SMM saw for the first time a square shaped mine hazard sign, red and yellow in colour with a skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian. About 15-20m north of road T-0509 near Zhukova Balka (non-government-controlled, 50km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two square shaped mine hazard signs, red and white in colour with “Danger Mines” written in Russian and English, attached to a wire fence about 250m apart.

In Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw that a previously observed mine hazard sign had been removed, now leaving an area east of Slavne confirmed by the SMM as hazardous without markings indicating the presence of mines.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs and inspections to power lines in Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk) and Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk) and repairs to an electric transformer near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about 45 minutes, the SMM saw four cars (one with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and one covered cargo truck with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. While present the SMM also saw 28 cars (seven with Ukrainian, nine with Russian Federation and one with Georgian licence plates and 11 with “DPR” plates) and 55 trucks (52 covered cargo and three tanker trucks) (24 with Ukrainian, 13 with Belarusian, seven with Russian Federation and two with Lithuanian licence plates and nine with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine. The SMM noted an unusually long 2km line of trucks waiting to exit Ukraine. Two drivers in the line told the SMM that they had already been waiting 14-18 hours to exit.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On two occasions at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “orders from superiors”. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol). The SMM observed civilian vehicles passing the checkpoint without restrictions in both directions.
• At a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region, an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access, citing the need for permission from senior members of the armed formations.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

A team of election experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) met with electoral stakeholders in Hungary from 12 to 14 March 2019 to present the final report of ODIHR’s limited election observation mission for the  parliamentary elections held in April last year.

The report’s findings and recommendations were presented to representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the National Election Office, the National Election Commission, the Ministry of Justice, the parliament’s Legislative Committee, the public broadcaster and the State Audit Office, as well as civil society and private media.

The recommendations focused on further improving the legal framework for elections through an inclusive review process with an emphasis on both the freedoms of expression and association and on access to information. Other measures to support democratic elections discussed during the visit included removing unreasonable restrictions on civil society, decriminalizing defamation and introducing explicit provisions for citizen election observation.

Recommendations from ODIHR’s previous election assessment not yet fully addressed were also discussed, including those on promoting women’s participation in politics and fostering greater transparency in campaign finance.

“We appreciate frank and constructive discussions with a broad range of stakeholders on the recommendations related to the 2018 elections in Hungary,” said Alexander Shlyk, Head of the ODIHR Elections Department. “Based on these discussions, the next steps in our co-operation can be related to improving public consultations regarding electoral laws and other relevant legislation and exploring possible ways to enhance electoral legislation and practice. Hungarian authorities can rely on ODIHR's support and expertise in their efforts to follow up on the recommendations.”

ODIHR experts emphasized the importance of addressing recommendations in the final report and broader reform initiatives well ahead of the next elections. During the meetings, the authorities expressed interest in receiving ODIHR support through expert advice and comparative examples of good practice related to specific electoral issues and, in the longer term, in considering requests for legal reviews of draft legislation.

All OSCE participating States have committed themselves to following up on ODIHR's election assessments and recommendations.

VIENNA, 14 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today welcomed the bringing of criminal charges against Marian K., an alleged instigator of the murder of the Slovak investigative reporter Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kušnirova. The alleged instigator had previously threatened the reporter.   

“I highly commend the investigation that has led to the bringing of criminal charges against the instigator of this heinous crime. This follows arrests and charges that were raised last year against four other persons who were involved in the murders, including the possible killers,” said Désir,

“Just over one year ago Jan Kuciak was killed for just doing his work as an independent and free journalist. He paid an unacceptable price for investigating corruption at the highest level and his willingness to inform citizens. He has become a symbol for freedom of the Slovak media to tackle crime and the mafia. His murder will not remain unpunished and there can be no impunity for those responsible. That’s why it is so important that they face justice today. I hope that the investigation and subsequent trial will establish all complicity in this horrendous crime.”

Kuciak and his fiancée were killed at their home in February 2018.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.

YEREVAN, 13 March 2019 – OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Slovakia’s Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák emphasized the importance of creating perspectives for peace during his visit to Armenia today. He welcomed the commitment to reforms and discussed the ongoing work and next steps in the negotiations for a peaceful solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as the OSCE’s longstanding engagement with and in Armenia.

“Armenia is undergoing a series of political and economic reforms. In close co-operation with the Armenian authorities we are ready to deepen our engagement to support their efforts,” Lajčák said, welcoming Armenia’s reform agenda and the implementation of related programmes.

Accompanied by his Personal Representative on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák met with the political leadership in Yerevan, including President Armen Sarkissian; Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan; Foreign Minister Zohrab Mnatsakanyan; the President of the National Assembly Ararat Mirzoyan; as well as representatives of the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lajčák highlighted the importance of maintaining the stable context for contact between the sides and working towards a peaceful and fair solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict respecting all principles, while calling on the sides to avoid hostile rhetoric.

“I welcome the significant decrease in ceasefire violations and reported casualties over the past six months,” the Chairperson-in-Office said. “For peace to take hold, it needs to be accepted and owned by the people. And it requires that our efforts extend beyond politicians. The preparation of populations for peace is an important and complex matter, and deserves our full support.”

Recalling the long-term interest and engagement of the international community, he also expressed his full support for the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, as well as for the work of his Personal Representative.

MINSK, 13 March 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its Working Groups in Minsk on 13 March 2019:

“A few days ago, the Security Working Group reached a decision on recommitment to the ceasefire, starting from 8 March 2019.

Although the first days that followed showed a reduction of ceasefire violations by 61% as compared with the beginning of March 2019, I don’t find the results of this ceasefire satisfactory.

In this regard, I once again call on the sides to take all necessary steps to ensure a reliable, sustainable and long-lasting ceasefire.

This was, of course, the key topic of discussion in the Security Working Group today. Demining was also one of the priority issues.

The Humanitarian Working Group considered questions related to the exchange of detainees, as well as necessary improvements to the conditions for crossing the contact line.

The Economic Working Group discussed current issues of water delivery in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions, including the necessary repairs of infrastructure and compliance with the audit schedule of the "Voda Donbasa" company. Another discussion topic was the payment of pensions to the residents of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

On the agenda of the Political Working Group were two non-papers prepared by the Co-ordinator, Ambassador Pierre Morel, dedicated to the discussion of the status quo on the implementation of the so-called ‘Steinmeier formula’ as well as to the topic of amnesty.”

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Gunfire was directed at two SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles near Pervomaiske and Manuilivka, Donetsk region.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas in Donetsk region.
• The SMM facilitated and monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in Donetsk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted in Oleksandrivske and at a checkpoint near Novoazovsk, both in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 120 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (145 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at directions ranging from north-west to south-west of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), including ones as close as 100-500m from the camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk), and at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the morning of 12 March, positioned on the south-eastern edge of Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk) while conducting a mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight in the area, the SMM heard two shots of small-arms and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 300-500m east of its position. The Mission assessed the fire as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was in the process of landing (about 150m above the SMM’s position). The SMM safely landed the mini-UAV.*

On the same morning, positioned about 4km north-west of Manuilivka (non-government-controlled, 65km east of Donetsk) while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1km north-west of its position. The Mission assessed the fire as aimed at the UAV, which at the time was flying about 1.7km north-west of the SMM’s position. The SMM recalled and safely landed the mini-UAV. *

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 90 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (110 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations (including 57 explosions) were recorded in areas north-north-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

Between the evenings of 11 and 12 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded 19 projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km at easterly and south-easterly directions (assessed as inside the disengagement area). The same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south and six projectiles at an assessed range of 1-4km east and east-south-east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area), as well as four projectiles at an assessed range of 1-2km south-east and south-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area).

On 12 March, positioned in Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 2-3km north (assessed as inside the Zolote disengagement area).

Positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) near Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

12 March

The SMM saw four tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Sofiivka (formerly Karlo-Marksove, 40km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

8 March          

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) mounted on a truck about 400m south-east of the disengagement area near Zolote.

12 March

The SMM saw:

-      an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk);

-      an APC (BTR-70) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk); and

-      eight APCs (BTR-80) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Novokalynove (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

8 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight probable APCs (MT-LB) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

11 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a  truck and an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP-2) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk);
• two IFVs (BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-80) in a residential area  in Novohryhorivka; and
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on a truck near Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

On 11 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 25 recent impact craters, assessed as caused by  122mm artillery rounds, about 3km west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

An SMM mini-UAV spotted previously observed anti-tank mines (TM-62): at least 36 laid out in three rows of 12 across road H-21 near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk) (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report 14 March 2018), four laid out across the western lane of the same road near Vesela Hora, about 2km south-west of the aforementioned mines (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report  19 March 2018), and at least 36 laid out in a field adjacent to the previous four (for previous observations, SMM Daily Report of 11 March 2019).    

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to power lines near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM saw two cars (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two buses (one with “DPR” plates and one with “LPR” plates) entering Ukraine, as well as 16 cars (six with Ukrainian, five with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and four buses (one with Armenian licence plates and three with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, SMM Daily Report 12 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On the eastern edge of Oleksandrivske (formerly Rozy Liuksemburh, non-government-controlled, 90km south-east of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage towards Markyne (non-government-controlled, 94km south of Donetsk), citing “ongoing firing exercises” at a nearby training area.
• At a checkpoint near Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to the border crossing point near Novoazovsk, citing an “ongoing operation” in the area. The SMM was allowed to proceed to Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol).

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas east of Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard heard two shots of small-arms and two bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all at an assessed range of 300-500m east of its position and assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely.
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight in areas north-west of Manuilivka (non-government-controlled, 65km east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 15 bursts of small-arms fire 1km north-west of its position, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which landed safely.

[1]Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

414107 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Advancing the freedom of religion or belief for all was at the centre of discussion at roundtable events held in Sarajevo and Banja Luka on 12 and 13 March 2019, respectively. The events were organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), in co-operation with the OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Representatives of state, cantonal and municipal authorities, together with the Human Rights Ombudsman of Bosnia and Herzegovina, religious communities, civil society organizations and media professionals, participated in the discussions.

“It is very encouraging to see the commitment of so many actors in Sarajevo and Banja Luka to working together to ensure everyone’s right to freedom of religion or belief in these two municipalities,” said Kishan Manocha, ODIHR Senior Adviser on Freedom of Religion or Belief. “It is our sincere hope that the roundtable discussions are only a starting point and that systematic and sustained action will follow.”

The events are part of the ODIHR project “Advancing freedom of religion or belief for all at the local level in Bosnia and Herzegovina” and follow training workshops on freedom of religion or belief for representatives of public authorities, religious communities and civil society conducted by ODIHR in Sarajevo and Banja Luka in February 2019. The project aims to equip relevant actors with the knowledge and skills to address challenges related to the freedom of religion or belief in these municipalities in a collaborative, results-oriented and gender-sensitive manner.  

During the event, the participants developed initial roadmaps and plans for advancing the freedom of religion or belief for all in Sarajevo and Banja Luka over the next year. They also discussed means to implement the planned activities, as well as their monitoring and evaluation.

“Promoting freedom of religion or belief is an essential aspect of the OSCE Mission’s mandate in Bosnia and Herzegovina,” said Fermin Cordoba, Head of the Mission’s Human Dimension Department. “Moving forward, we hope to expand our work in this area to involve as diverse a network as possible, including minority religious communities, civil society organizations, academics and state authorities.”

The ODIHR project will conclude at the end of March with a training event on freedom of religion or belief for youth and students in Sarajevo.

414038 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry held on 12 March 2019 in Dushanbe a roundtable discussion with high-level representatives of the international donor community to raise funds for the successful implementation of police reform in Tajikistan.

The meeting also served to take stock of the steps already undertaken in the reform process and upcoming priorities.

Tajikistan’s Interior Minister, Colonel-General Ramazon Rahimzoda, Acting Officer in Charge of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe Gerrit Zach, senior-ranking officials from Tajikistan’s Interior Ministry, representatives of embassies and international organizations in Tajikistan, as well chairpersons of the Public Councils on Police Reform participated at the meeting.

“Priorities of the reform include new police uniforms, as Tajikistan is the only country in which police still wears the old USSR uniforms,” said Minister of Interior Colonel-General Rahimzoda. “Another important point is the finalization of an electronic crime registry. International support will be needed to implement these reform plans.”

"The Tajik government is in the driving seat for a successful implementation of the 2014-2020 Police Reform Programme, but joint efforts are key,” said Zach. “The OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, as the main international partner of Tajikistan in the field of police reform, will continue to work with the Ministry of the Interior and international donors to establish a modern police force, including decentralization and bringing the police closer to the citizens.”

413996 Marina Živaljević

The role of media monitoring and regulation, media coverage and the role and impact of social network platforms during elections was the focus of an OSCE Chairmanship-supported presentation by Slovak media expert Rastislav Kužel in the Montenegrin Parliament on 12 March 2019 in Podgorica.

Addressing Members of Parliament and media representatives, Kužel drew on his rich international experience to explain how media monitoring is crucial to ensuring good quality journalism during an election, enabling citizens to make informed choices. “Monitoring is recommended by the OSCE and its Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR),” he said.

Kužel also stressed the need for a strong and independent media regulator: “The media regulator has to ensure that media reports are in line with the existing law.”

In her welcoming speech, the Head of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, Maryse Daviet, said that free and fair media are the backbone of every democracy. “The media should make an additional effort to give citizens a clear and impartial picture of the society in which they live. This is particularly important in electoral processes because all actors deserve fair coverage and equitable media access to ensure full and effective representation of citizens’ views and interests,” she said.

The President of the Parliament, Ivan Brajović, said that media provide political actors with an opportunity to present themselves and their programmes during election campaigns, to open a debate on issues that allows citizens to decide whom to give their trust. “The parliamentary majority continues to be ready to improve electoral legislation and the overall electoral environment, implementing recommendations of international observation missions,” said Brajović.

The Ambassador of Slovakia, which holds the 2019 OSCE Chairmanship, to Montenegro, Roman Hloben, said that the media, together with social networks, are the strongest communication weapons and significantly influence the decision-making of citizens and their everyday life. “The social responsibility of all of us is to create order in the media world, so that not just anyone can write whatever they want when they want, without credible sources,” Hloben said. “At the same time, media independence must be preserved,” he added.

The presentation was a part of the Mission’s and OSCE/ODHIR’s continuing support to the Montenegrin authorities in implementing OSCE/ODIHR recommendations stemming from the 2016 and 2018 elections.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• More ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions, compared with the previous 24 hours, were recorded by the SMM.
• The SMM observed fresh damage from small-arms fire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations and observed fresh impact craters inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Zaichenko and Kreminets and in Izvaryne, an area close to the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including 145 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations (including 105 explosions) were recorded at westerly and northerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-easterly and westerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including 110 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours (11 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and south-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh small-arms fire damage to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

In Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM observed four holes (all 2cm in diameter) in the panes of four partially shattered west-facing windows of a functioning school on Myru Street: one on the first floor, two on the second floor and one on the third floor of the building. The Mission assessed the damage as fresh and as caused by small-arms fire. It also observed several bullets at the site. The director (woman, in her fifties) told the Mission that on the morning of 11 March, the night guard had told her that the school had sustained damage during the night (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 February 2019).

Fresh impact craters near populated areas in Zolote-4/Rodina

On 8 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two fresh impact craters (not visible in imagery from 5 March 2019), assessed as caused by probable 120mm mortar rounds, about 150m south-east of the closest residential houses in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km west of Luhansk) and about 300m north of the northern edge of the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 10 March, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded nine projectiles and a burst, all at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area). During the day on 11 March, the same camera recorded an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 5-6km south (assessed as outside the disengagement area) and six projectiles at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area).

On 10 March, inside the Zolote disengagement area, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (type undetermined) just west of a railway bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, as well as an earthen ramp extending across two railway tracks for the first time, about 40m south-south-west of the aforementioned bridge. The same UAV spotted eight fresh impact craters (around Ukrainian Armed Forces positions) about 60m west of road T1316, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, as well as 34 previously observed anti-tank mines, of which one was assessed as having shifted as a result of the aforementioned impacts. About 250m north of the disengagement area, the UAV spotted 13 fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 120mm mortar rounds, across trenches in a field about 100m west of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 11 March, the SMM saw that six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62), previously observed laid out across a ditch extending across the road 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area, had been removed (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).

During the day on 11 March, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 4-5km south-south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard five bursts of small-arms fire 2km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

Positioned near the disengagement area close to Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Non-government-controlled-areas

10 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a residential area in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

11 March

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled-areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 24 tanks (T-64), about 2,000 crates of ammunition (125mm rounds) and two surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) near Zatyshne (64km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled-areas

5 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 25 tanks (type undetermined) and 11 pieces of self-propelled and 20 pieces of towed artillery or mortars in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

6 March

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 19 tanks (type undetermined) in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report of 21 February 2019).

10 March

An SMM-mini UAV spotted:

• 21 tanks (11 T-64 and 10 T-72), six anti-tank guns (MT-12), 12 towed howitzers (D-30), eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 15 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area near Myrne (see above) and
• 22 tanks (T-64) in a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region

11 March

The SMM noted that seven mortars (four 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38, 120mm) and 54 tanks (T-64) were again missing.

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

11 March

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an IFV (BMP-1), an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Popasna.

10 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) near Staryi Aidar (20km north-west of Luhansk) and
• a probable IFV (BMP-variant) near Zolote.

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near Kalynove (60km west of Luhansk).

10 March:

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) and a communication truck with two antennas (R-161-A2M) near Debaltseve and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Sentianivka (44km west of Luhansk).

On 9 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted 17 fresh impact craters assessed as caused by automatic-grenade-launcher rounds on both sides of road T0504, about 280m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 11 March 2019).

Presence of mines and new mine hazard signs

The SMM again observed at least six anti-tank mines (TM-62) fixed on a wooden plank on the southern side of road T0504, about 60m east of the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna.

In the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district in Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of the city centre), about 20m north of Dunaievskoho Street, the SMM saw for the first time a wooden plank (with the word “Mines” written in Russian) on attached to a wooden stick in the ground.

In Syhnalne (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the Mission observed for the first time two decayed wooden boards (without inscriptions) attached to two sticks about 25m west of a road on the western edge of the village and at a distance of about 100m from each other, assessed as improvised mine hazard signs. It observed that parts of the field between the road and the mine hazard signs were cultivated, while other parts of the same field, west of the mine hazard signs, were uncultivated.

SMM facilitation of operation of civilian infrastructure

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire in order to enable a transfer of funds reportedly related to water payments across the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk).

Border areas outside government control*

While at the border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car (with Russian Federation licence plates) and 12 pedestrians (six men and six women) entering Ukraine, as well as 20 pedestrians (mixed genders) leaving Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area. While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about an hour, the Mission observed five men and four women entering Ukraine, as well as five men and a woman exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations requested that the SMM leave the area, citing restrictions on the SMM’s presence near the border crossing point.
• At a checkpoint near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, claiming that only local residents were allowed to use the road.
• At a checkpoint about 1km north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing risks to “the security of the SMM”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.

413960 Communication and Media Relations Section

Some 20 representatives of Ukrainian government ministries and agencies and the donor community participated in a high-level meeting in Kyiv on 12 March 2019 to review progress in co-operation and joint efforts between the OSCE and relevant Ukrainian authorities in combating illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives (WAE) in the country and across its borders.

The OSCE last year conducted a needs assessment to establish the baseline for providing technical assistance and institutional support to develop capacities of Ukrainian authorities in their efforts to combat the trafficking of WAE in a holistic way. The OSCE is already working to enhance capacities of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in this field, while Ukraine’s Ministry of Interior and the national customs agency have confirmed their readiness to co-operate with the OSCE to address the challenges in combating the trafficking of WAE.

Serhiy Honcharenko, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs, said that Ukraine needs support in tackling different aspects of the trafficking of WAE because of the ongoing armed conflict. He said that the problem needs to be addressed both within the country and at its borders. “It is important not only to focus on the consequences of WAE trafficking, but also on its prevention, and addressing the full life cycle of WAE from manufacturing and import through to disposal,” he said.  

Marcel Pesko, Ambassador, Director of the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, highlighted that no country is immune against threats posed by, and accumulation of WAE. “It is important for Ukraine to have one common strategic approach to tackling these problems,” he added.

Rasa Ostrauskaite, the OSCE Secretariat’s Co-ordinator of Activities to Address Transnational Threats, said: “It is re-ensuring to see that Ukrainian authorities recognize and share the understanding of the challenges posed by WAE trafficking. The OSCE stands ready to assist the national authorities of Ukraine in tackling the challenges and threats stemming from illicit WAE trafficking”.

Representatives of the donor community from Germany, France, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia and the European Union commended the willingness of Ukrainian authorities to co-operate and engage in project activities combating illicit WAE trafficking, and expressed their readiness to support these efforts. 

The meeting was organized with the support of Germany, France, Poland and Slovakia and was chaired by the OSCE Secretariat.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons decreased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                   

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits decreased from 8,813 to 8,661 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of minus 43 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 21 this week like the previous week: twelve of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and nine into Ukraine (71 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, seven families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and nine were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when nine families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed a slight increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (330 compared to 328 observed during the previous week). There were 167 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 163 bound for Ukraine. Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the route “Stakhanov–Kyiv” was noted.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed a significant decrease in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 782 to 611 (202 at the Gukovo BCP and 409 at the Donetsk BCP); 327 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 284 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 45 (compared to 35 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP slightly increased from 246 to 247: of the total number of trucks scanned, 139 trucks (56 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 108 trucks (44 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 116 to 124 vehicles; 64 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 60 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to nine last week; the OTs assessed that eleven trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and ten to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis, as were vehicles with German and Lithuanian licence plates.

On 9 March at 06:10, a police minivan from the Russian Federation arrived at Donetsk BCP and drove behind the main building. At 06:20, the van returned to the Russian Federation with an additional person on board, a male in civilian clothes seated in the rear of the vehicle.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 5 February 2019 to 12 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

413897 Communication and Media Relations Section

On the occasion of International Women’s Day, OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger presented to participating States a report that gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence suffered by women and girls in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe in the past decades. The presentation was held on 8 March 2019 in Vienna.

“Violence against women and girls is a human rights violation that has wide-reaching consequences: it not only threatens the security and safety of its victims, but also influences the communities and societies they live in,” said Greminger.

The report presents the results of a survey undertaken in 2018 in seven OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo. More than, 15,000 women aged 18 to 74 were interviewed for the report.

The OSCE Survey on the Well-being and Safety of Women was designed to provide high-quality data to increase understanding of women’s experience of violence in conflict and non-conflict situations. In addition to a quantitative view, it also provides a unique qualitative insight into the prevalence and consequences of violence against women, and into persistent norms and attitudes in the region that tend to perpetrate this violence.

The survey was based on the methodology used by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for its report Violence against women: an EU-wide survey, published in 2014. Joanne Goodey, Head of the Freedoms and Justice Department at FRA, provided insight into overall trends in the EU and the surveyed countries in Eastern Europe and South Eastern Europe: “With this OSCE-led survey, we have the largest dataset globally on violence against women, and now we have to harness the power of data to enact change.”

Rosa Logar, Director of the Domestic Violence Intervention Centre in Vienna and member of the Council of Europe GREVIO Committee, which monitors the implementation of the Istanbul Convention, stressed how important it is to recognize the economic costs of violence against women to society: “Prevention of violence occurring in the first place is the best investment a State can make.”

The project manager of the OSCE survey, Serani Siegel, presented the main findings of the report. The survey reveals that 70 per cent of the women interviewed have experienced some form of violence, and 45 per cent have experienced at least one form of sexual harassment, since the age of 15. Twenty-one per cent of the women interviewed experienced physical, sexual or psychological violence during childhood (up to the age of 15).

This project was funded by the European Union and also supported by the UN Population Fund, UN Women and UNICEF as well as by the governments of Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway, the United States and Sweden. A copy of the report can be downloaded at www.osce.org/VAWsurvey.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and significantly fewer in Luhansk region.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka and fresh impact craters near Popasna.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Petrivske disengagement area. It observed for the first time anti-tank mines on a road in the southern part of the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM observed weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in Luhansk region.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in non-government-controlled areas, including at checkpoints near Novolaspa and Novoazovsk and at a heavy weapons holding area in Donetsk region.*
• In Kyiv, the Mission monitored a gathering and later saw a car partially covered with soot.

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 120), compared with the previous reporting period (about 185 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and south-westerly directions of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), at south-easterly and southerly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk). During the day on 9 March, positioned in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard three explosions assessed as outgoing rounds and about 40 bursts and shots of small-arms fire, all at an assessed distance of 1km south of the nearest civilian house in the village (for recent observations of damage caused by shelling in Pikuzy, see SMM Daily Report 4 March 2019).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 50 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded at south-westerly and north-westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 8 and 9 March, the SMM recorded significantly fewer ceasefire violations (about 70 explosions), compared with the previous reporting period (about 930 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded on the morning of 9 March in an area between Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km west of Luhansk), near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations (see below Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna).

Between the evenings of 9 and 10 March, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including 11 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west of Berezivske (non-government-controlled, 53km north-west of Luhansk).

Fresh shrapnel damage in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

At 34 Poshtova Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), on 9 March, the SMM saw shrapnel damage to the north-north-east-facing side of a one-storey inhabited house and to an adjacent north-north-east-facing metal fence. About 4-5m north of the house, the Mission observed a fresh impact crater. The SMM was not able to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire. A resident of the house told the SMM that at around 19:00 on 7 March, while at home with his wife, he had heard a loud explosion nearby.

Fresh impact craters observed near Popasna

On 9 March, the SMM observed five to six fresh impact craters, assessed as caused by 82mm mortar rounds, in a field about 50m from the forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (about 1.5km west of the nearest civilian house). The SMM heard over 60 undetermined explosions in the area earlier that day (see above).

Disengagement areas[2]

On 7 March, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near the road bridge, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 9 March, the SMM observed for the first time six anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) laid out in a ditch extending across road T-1316, about 60m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations on the southern edge of the Zolote disengagement area (for similar observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 28 February 2019).

During the day on 9 March, positioned about 1.5km north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard and saw two explosions assessed as impacts at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-west (assessed as inside the disengagement area).[3] Shortly thereafter, the Mission observed two military vehicles – one IFV (BMP variant) and the other undetermined – near a previously observed position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside the disengagement area, about 550m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.3km west of its eastern edge.

The same day, positioned inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

On 10 March, positioned inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area and near the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas, the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons in violation

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) moving north in Klynove (68km north-east of Donetsk) and
• nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Novoaidar (49km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) east of Zaichenko with multiple  fresh marks from tracked vehicles (types mostly undetermined) nearby, including those assessed as tracks of an MT-LB-based chassis, running in both directions along a road leading to Roza (36km north-east of Mariupol).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

9 March

The SMM saw:

• three self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) near Novoaidar.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

9 March

The SMM noted that:

• four anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) were present for the first time and
• 31 self-propelled howitzers (28 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm and three 2S1), 22 anti-tank guns (MT-12) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9) were again missing.

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) were present for the first time and
• two MLRS (BM-21) were missing for the first time.

At heavy weapons holding areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

10 March

The SMM noted that:

• 13 MLRS (BM-21) and eight anti-tank guns (MT-12) were again missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence inside the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna.

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• an ACV (type undetermined) near Lebedynske (16km east of Mariupol).

9 March

The SMM saw:

-  two IFVs (BMD variants) in the yard of a former school building in Voitove (33km north-west of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) and five IFVs (three BMP-2 and two undetermined variants) near Muratove (51km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

7 March

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a military truck (KamAZ-4310) moving south on a road on the western edge of Sakhanka (24km north-east of Mariupol), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

8 March                                      

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) and a probable APC (MT-LB) near Vesela Hora (16km north of Luhansk).

10 March

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) and
• two IFVs (BMP-1 and BMP-2) and one APC (BTR-80) near Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, 51km west of Luhansk).

Presence of mines

On 8 March, an SMM mini-UAV spotted for the first time at least 40 anti-tank mines (probable TM-62) in a field about 50m south-west of road H-21, west of Vesela Hora.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

On 9 March, the SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to damaged power lines near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. On 9 and 10 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 9 March, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about one hour, the SMM saw seven cars (three with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and three with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 25 cars (13 with Russian Federation, five with Ukrainian and one with Georgian licence plates, and six “DPR” plates), 13 covered cargo trucks (six with Ukrainian licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates) and a bus (with “DPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.

The following day, while at the same border crossing point for 30 minutes, the SMM saw 13 cars (one with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, and 11 with “DPR” plates) entering Ukraine and 13 cars (eight with Russian Federation and one with Ukrainian licence plates, and four “DPR” plates) and a bus (with Russian Federation plates) exiting Ukraine.

On 9 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for 20 minutes, the SMM saw four pedestrians (two men and two women, aged 20-30) entering Ukraine and two pedestrians (a man and a woman in their sixties) exiting Ukraine.

On 10 March, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Novoborovytsi (79km south of Luhansk) for 30 minutes, the SMM observed no cross-border traffic.

Gathering in Kyiv

In Kyiv, on 9 March, the SMM monitored a pre-announced gathering by National Corps at Independence Square. The Mission saw about 600-700 people (mostly young men), some of whom were holding flags of National Corps, and heard them expressing opposition to the government. Later in the day, the SMM followed up on reports that smoke grenades had been thrown in front of the presidential administration building. The SMM saw that the side of a car parked in front of the building was partially covered with soot, assessed as caused by a smoke grenade. The Mission observed about 40-50 police officers present in the area. It did not observe further incidents.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro and Chernivtsi.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 8 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• On 9 March, an armed member of the armed formations at a checkpoint on the eastern edge of Novolaspa (non-government-controlled, 50km south of Donetsk) denied the SMM access to the village.
• On 10 March, the SMM was unable to visit a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region. The site was locked and no personnel were present.
• At a checkpoint north of Novoazovsk (non-government-controlled, 40km east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations again denied the SMM access to the town, citing “ongoing special police operation”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Conditional access:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint near Staromykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 15km west of Donetsk), a member of the armed formations again allowed the SMM to pass only upon being escorted by a car of the armed formations during its patrol of the settlement.

Delay:

• On 9 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations prevented the SMM from proceeding to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol). After about 40 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons, unless otherwise specified.