OSCE

Communication and Media Relations Section

A two-day train-the-trainer course on countering terrorist financing was organized in Vienna for Kazakh participants on 6 and 7 March 2019 by the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department, in co-operation with the OSCE Programme Office in Astana and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime's Global Programme against Money Laundering (UNODC/GPML), and supported by the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG).

The course, which took place on the premises of the OSCE Secretariat, was led by international experts and tailored to Kazakhstan. It included country- and region-specific scenarios.

The five participants of the course will deliver training courses to local officials upon their return to Kazakhstan, together with international experts from the OSCE, UNODC/GPML and the Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism.

The training programme covered areas such as sources of information, case management, investigation, preventing the abuse of non-profit organizations for terrorist financing, and foreign terrorist fighters.

The train-the-trainer course is part of a comprehensive multi-annual OSCE-UNODC capacity-building programme to support national efforts to counter terrorist financing in Central Asia.

Kunduz Rysbek

A high-level OSCE-supported forum aimed at promoting the political rights of women in Kyrgyzstan, in particular at pushing forward the draft bill on establishing a 30 per cent gender quota in the nearly 500 local councils in Kyrgyzstan, was held on 6 March in Bishkek. 

Entitled “We support the 30% gender quota in village councils!”, the forum was organized by the public foundation Women Support Center within the framework of the 2018-2020 National Action Plan for Achieving Gender Equality in Kyrgyzstan. It was supported by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, the UN Women, the UN Development Program in Kyrgyzstan and the United States Embassy to Kyrgyzstan.     

The event was attended by the former President of Kyrgyzstan, Roza Otunbaeva, women deputies from across local councils of Kyrgyzstan, representatives of the government, national parliament, presidential administration, Central Commission for Elections and Referenda, civil society, independent experts, international organizations and the media community.

Women’s equal participation in decision-making is directly related to the solution to many socially significant challenges, such as improving healthcare and education and preventing gender-based violence, the participants said. They highlighted the particular relevance of the issue in light of the President of Kyrgyzstan’s pronouncement of 2019 as the Year of Regional Development and Digitalization, as well as in anticipation of the next parliamentary and local council elections, which will take place in 2020.

“Today the political landscape has changed. All of the decision-making positions are occupied by men, and I would like to draw the attention of the country’s current leadership to this burning issue,” Otunbaeva said.

According to Baken Dosalieva of the Women Support Center, the national statistics for the past 15 years demonstrate a gradual decline in the number of women across local councils in Kyrgyzstan: in 2004, 19 per cent of those elected to local councils were women; in 2008 it was 17 per cent, in 2012 the number decreased to 13 per cent, and in 2016 women made up only 10 per cent of local councils. In other words, Kyrgyzstan’s village councils currently consist 90 per cent of men. According to Dosalieva, if the current trend continues there will be only 2 per cent women in local councils after the 2020 elections and no women at all by 2028.  

The Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Pierre von Arx, said: “Women’s equal participation in decision making is not just an international best practice, it is the requirement of our times. Today’s event, to which we contributed, is a timely and uniting platform in promoting these important processes.”

At the conclusion of the forum, women deputies from local councils read out the text of an official appeal, which they submitted to the president of Kyrgyzstan, to extend meaningful support to the draft bill on reserving 30 per cent of the mandates in village councils for women.

Fotima Sokhibova

Twenty-six mid to senior-ranking border security and management officials completed a staff course at the OSCE Border Management Staff College (BMSC) on 1 March in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. It was the 23rd such course offered by the College since its founding.

The staff course aims at building capacity and promoting high standards in border management and security. It covers an extensive array of topics in all three OSCE dimensions of security. It also provides its participants with a platform for sharing best practices in the field.

Jonathan Holland, Director of the BMSC, noted that the 23rd staff course bears a particular significance for the College: “It is our last such course conducted prior to the celebration of the 10 year anniversary of the BMSC in May. Launched as a temporary project almost a decade ago, it has evolved into a successful endeavour. It has become a centre of academic excellence designed specifically to serve the global border security community, and we look forward to welcoming many more courses in the future.”

Representatives of customs, border, phytosanitary, immigration, drug control and training institutes from 16 different countries – Afghanistan, Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Moldova, Mongolia, Republic of North Macedonia, Poland, Spain, Tajikistan, Turkey and Ukraine – have participated in BMSC courses.

Reflecting on her experience with the BMSC, Meeri-Maria Jaarva, Mediation Support Officer with the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre, who delivered training sessions during the course, noted: “Recently I met some BMSC alumni who had previously attended short courses and were now participating in the year-long blended-learning course. The fact that alumni come back for more is the best feedback the BMSC can get”.

Topics covered during the four-week staff course included promotion of border security and management in the OSCE area, border security and management models, elements of border control and co-operation, economic, environmental and human aspects of border security. In-class activities were complemented by two study visits to Tajik border crossing points on the borders with Uzbekistan and Afghanistan.

A roundtable discussion on countering corruption in the context of border security and management was conducted in the framework of the course. The event brought together subject area experts, representatives of diplomatic missions and international organizations, and participants of the 23rd Staff Course.

VIENNA, 6 March 2019 - The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Harlem Désir today expressed his concern about the high number of lawsuits filed against journalists and news outlets by politicians and public officials in Croatia and an ongoing dispute involving the public service broadcaster HRT. Both issues could negatively affect media freedom in Croatia, he warned.

According to the Croatian Journalists’ Association (CJA), there are more than 1,100 ongoing lawsuits against journalists and news outlets in the country. Many cases were filed by politicians and public figures and include the offence of ‘shaming’ which is still part of the Croatian Criminal Code. On 2 March, hundreds of journalists led by the CJA gathered in Zagreb to express their discontent at the media freedom environment.

“Such a high number of court cases against journalists is astonishing,” said Désir. “Defamation laws should not be misused in order to intimidate journalists. I call for the removal of ‘shaming’ as an offence from the legislation and for the full decriminalization of defamation.”

Désir stressed that the OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on the Safety of Journalists adopted in December 2018 calls on participating States to “ensure that defamation laws do not carry excessive sanctions or penalties that could undermine the safety of journalists and/or effectively censor journalists and interfere with their mission of informing the public and, where necessary, to revise and repeal such laws, in compliance with participating States’ obligations under international human rights law.”

The Representative also noted that there are 36 lawsuits filed by the public service broadcaster HRT against journalists, some of whom are its own staff. HRT has also filed lawsuits against the CJA president Hrvoje Zovko and the president of the CJA’s branch at HRT, Sanja Mikleušević Pavić.

“I urge HRT to engage in a constructive out-of-court dialogue with journalists and resolve the current disputes,” said Désir. “It is commendable that the reconciliation process has started in some of the cases and this will hopefully result in the dropping of all charges against journalists.”

The Representative regretted that the whole situation resulted in a decision by different organizations and political parties to temporarily boycott the work of HRT, which led to the expulsion of its journalists from a press event last week.

“Public service broadcasters are a vital part of the media scene and should contribute to the quality of information, diversity and pluralism. I insist on two issues: public service broadcasters need to be independent and free from any kind of political interference, and that there should be no boycott of their activities,” Désir concluded.

OSCE Centre in Ashgabat

ASHGABAT, 6 March 2019 –The Foreign Affairs Ministry of Turkmenistan, supported by the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, hosted today in Ashgabat a meeting of the technical working groups on the Regional infrastructures Confidence Building Measures (RI-CBM) within the framework of the Istanbul Process on Afghanistan.

During the meeting, representatives of the participating countries of the Istanbul Process and international stakeholders presented reports on the implementation of the Regional infrastructures CBM plan.

Vepa Hajiyev, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Turkmenistan, stressed in his opening address that Turkmenistan is committed to the principle of peaceful political settlement of the situation in Afghanistan.  He also expressed hope that the meeting will serve as a positive impulse for further advancement of goals and objectives of joint co-operation in the framework of providing assistance to the strengthening of security, stability and economic progress in Afghanistan.

“We have gathered here today to discuss the progress of infrastructure projects implemented by all stakeholders of the RI-CBM,” said Natalya Drozd, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“The OSCE stands ready to employ its comprehensive security instruments to maintain a sustainable dialogue on the existing and planned infrastructure projects and to facilitate discussions in the areas pertinent to the RI-CBM, such as security of regional infrastructure and trade facilitation on new trade and transport routes.”

The participants stressed the importance of the effective implementation of various large-scale and local economic projects in the region for fostering the socio-economic stability, security and further prosperity of the "Heart of Asia" region. The discussions also addressed the role of international and regional organizations in promoting infrastructure projects in the energy sector on the basis of partnership and in the current investment climate.

The event was attended by representatives of the participating countries of the Istanbul Process, as well as regional and international organizations.

The Istanbul Process was established as a platform for regional dialogue and co-operation for encouraging security, political, and economic co-operation between Afghanistan and its neighbours. The project includes a number of large-scale regional initiatives, including the construction of the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline, the Asian International Railway Corridor and the Lapis Lazuli Trade and Transportation Corridor.

The participating countries of the Istanbul Process include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan and the United Arab Emirates.

Assistance in the organization of the regional technical groups meeting is provided as a component of an extra-budgetary project of the OSCE Centre funded by the United Kingdom.

BRUSSELS, 6 March 2019 – OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger launched today in Brussels a report that gives a detailed picture of the physical, sexual and psychological violence many women and girls have had to endure in South-Eastern and Eastern Europe in the last decades.

The report is based on a survey undertaken in 2018 in seven OSCE participating States: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Moldova and Ukraine. The survey also covered Kosovo. In total, 15,179 women aged 18 to 74 were interviewed for the survey.

“Violence against women and girls is a human rights violation that has wide-reaching consequences: it not only threatens the security and safety of its victims, but also influences the communities and societies they live in,” said OSCE Secretary General Thomas Greminger.

“This OSCE-led survey sheds light for the first time on the prevalence of violence that women and girls suffer in this part of Europe,” he added. “It also gives policy-makers the data and tools they need to improve national laws and policies and put in place efficient frameworks to better protect victims.”

The survey was designed to provide high quality research and data to increase the understanding of women’s experience of violence in conflict and non-conflict situations. In addition to a quantitative view, it also gives a unique insight into the prevalence and consequences of violence against women, and into persistent harmful norms and attitudes in the region.

“Conflict-related sexual and gender-based violence are part of a continuum of gender-based violence closely intertwined with persistent inequalities and broader attacks on gender equality and women’s human rights, including digital and cyber violence,” said Mara Marinaki, the European Union External Action Service’s Principal Advisor on Gender and on the implementation of UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. “This means that domestic violence can also constitute conflict related sexual violence,” she added. The European Commission contributed 80 per cent of the total project budget.

The survey is based on the methodology used by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) for its report “Violence against women: an EU-wide survey” published in 2014. More than 42,000 women from all European Union countries were interviewed for that report. Together, the two surveys cover 35 OSCE participating States. Since the methodologies are the same, the data collected for the two reports are comparable, which makes it easier to plan and develop regional initiatives and actions, as well as local policies and services.

The survey reveals that 70% of women interviewed experienced some form of violence since the age of 15, while 45% of all women interviewed experienced at least one form of sexual harassment since they were 15 years old and 21% of women experienced physical, sexual or psychological violence during childhood (up to the age of 15).

According to the survey, some of the factors that make it more likely for women to be subjected to violence are being part of a minority, being young, poor or economically dependent, or having children. Women with partners who often drink, are unemployed or have fought in armed conflict are also more likely to experience violence.

The report makes a number of recommendations to OSCE participating States on how to use the survey data, including to update and implement national legal frameworks to cover all forms of violence against women and girls, including online violence, sexual harassment, stalking and psychological violence; regularly review and monitor recently introduced laws and policies on combating violence against women; engage national human rights institutions and transparent reporting on the support provided to victims; properly resource and support national institutions working on gender equality so they can fulfil their key role to implement and monitor policy and legislation; and train police and judiciary on how to protect and support victims, putting the victims at the centre of their work.

In addition to the European Commission, the survey received support from the United Nations Population Fund, UN Women and UNICEF, as well as from the governments of Germany, Norway, Sweden, the United States of America, Italy, Austria and Finland. A copy of the report can be downloaded at www.osce.org/VAWsurvey.

Contacts

Saule Mukhametrakhimova Media and Outreach Officer Tel: +43 1 514 36 6215 Mobile: +43 676 9100 382 Email: Saule.Mukhametrakhimova@osce.org

413426 Mariam Tsitsikashvili (l), Project Manager at Georgia's Reforms Associates (GRASS) and Christie Edwards (r), Deputy Head of the ODIHR Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department discussing good practices for enhancing the capacity of civil society coalitions promoting tolerance and non-discrimination. Borjomi, 5 March 2019. Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Enhancing the capacity of a civil society coalition campaigning against discrimination and hate speech in Georgian politics and media was the focus of a workshop organized by the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Borjomi, Georgia on 5 and 6 March 2019.

The workshop brought together 19 participants (11 men and eight women) from the 13 civil society groups that form the "No to Phobia!" coalition. The participants reviewed the coalition's goals and explored ways to broaden its strategies in light of the institutional, social and legal changes that have taken place since the coalition's creation in May 2017.

“No to Phobia’s mission to counter expressions of discrimination and support political unions in creating interparty mechanisms to help eliminate discrimination in the political sphere is admirable,” said Christie Edwards, Deputy Head of the ODIHR Tolerance and Non-Discrimination Department. “Advocacy tools must be as dynamic as the discriminatory practice they seek to address. We are proud to help coalitions bring together groups with different skills, experiences, resources and connections, which is a proven mechanism for building more tolerant societies.”

Lev Samovski, Member of the European Jewish Parliament and Head of the Center for Combating Anti-Semitism, said: “While Georgia’s diverse society is generally tolerant, problems in upholding human rights and building the capacity of democratic institutions persist. ODIHR provides great support to Georgia in this regard. This training is of great importance because it enables the sharing of best practices for building coalitions and provides participants with practical guidance on how to build and increase the capacity of coalitions promoting more tolerant and peaceful societies. It is also encouraging participants to be more active in promoting freedom and democracy, as well as providing them with knowledge about how to recognize and respond to hate crimes.”

The workshop was part of ODIHR's efforts to support civil society in the OSCE region. ODIHR carried out a needs assessment mission in Georgia in August 2018, the results of which informed the contents of the workshop. The format of the workshop and the strategies explored and adopted by its participants drew on ODIHR's practical guide Coalition Building for Tolerance and Non-Discrimination.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission saw anti-tank mines close to road H-20 near Olenivka and Berezove.  
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas. Its access was also restricted at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, preventing the SMM from following up on reports of a civilian casualty.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (115 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk). On the evening and night of 4-5 March, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded about 70 projectiles in flight, about 40 of which were recorded as close as 100-500m from the camera, and two undetermined explosions, all at an assessed range of 0.1-2km at southerly directions.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 20 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 50 explosions). The majority of explosions were recorded in areas west of Yuzhna Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and in areas south-west of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Disengagement areas[2]

During the day on 5 March, positioned near the disengagement areas close to Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk and Donetsk region[4]

5 March

The SMM noted that:

• ten howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and eight mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) were present and
• four howitzers (D-30) and three mortars (2S9) were again missing.

Weapons permanent storage site

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

4 March

The SMM noted that all weapons previously observed at the site were present.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

3 March

An SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) and an armoured combat vehicle near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk).

5 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (BTR-70) on road H-20 near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Presence of mines

On 3 March, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a row of eight probable anti-tank mines laid out south-east to north-west across 90m in a field north of road H-20, about 900m north-east of the forward position of the armed formations near Olenivka (non-government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), and 16 probable anti-tank mines laid in two parallel rows of eight in a field about 220m west of road H-20 about 2km north-east of Berezove.

Demining activities

About 3.5km south-east of Lomakyne (government-controlled, 15km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a van with the logo of a non-governmental organization parked on the side of road T0519 and four people conducting demining activities in a field 80m north-east of the road.

SMM facilitation of repairs to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk) and in Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-east of Donetsk), as well as to the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). A representative of the water company Popasna Vodakanal told the SMM that all their water wells were operational and that the water pressure had returned to normal levels, and that all works had been concluded. The SMM also monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable an inspection to a water pipeline running along road H-20 between Berezove and Olenivka. Despite security guarantees having been provided that the ceasefire would be adhered to for the inspection, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions close to where the repairs were being carried out. The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border area outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 12 cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates as well as four with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian and one with Lithuanian licence plates), two mini-buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates), as well as seven pedestrians (two females and five males, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 25 cars (six with Ukrainian, eight with Russian Federation and 11 with “DPR” plates), three covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and two pedestrians (one female and one male, aged 30-40) exiting Ukraine.

SMM continued to observe a calm situation south-east of Kherson

On 3 March, the SMM continued to observe a calm situation at a Ukrainian State Border Guard Service security post in Valok (188km south-east of Kherson). On 4 March, the Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea (see SMM Daily Report 30 January 2019).

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example SMM Daily Report 5 March 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing concerns about its safety. The SMM was therefore unable to reach Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) to follow up on reports of a civilian casualty.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

 

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its     camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one of the sites was abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

413381 Colin McCullough, OSCE Programme Office in Astana

Current approaches to increasing the effectiveness of criminal policy were the topic of a two-day OSCE-supported conference that began in Ak-Bulak near Almaty, Kazakhstan on 6 March 2019.

The two-day event is co-organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Astana in co-operation with the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Constitutional Council, and the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan with the support of German Foundation for International Legal Co-operation.

Some 60 high-level officials from governmental institutions, law enforcement agencies, representatives of the judiciary, academia, the Bar Association, non-governmental organizations, as well as national and German legal experts, discussed issues concerning the modernization of criminal procedure.

Participants elaborated on the existing practice of pre-trial proceedings, key challenges in ensuring the adversarial principle in criminal proceedings and new approaches to the competitive selection of judges. Particular attention was paid to citizens’ involvement in justice delivery, including the extension of the jurisdiction of jury trials in Kazakhstan. Experts shared their thoughts on procedural guarantees and the protection of human rights in criminal proceedings.

A concept of the draft law on an enhancement of criminal and criminal procedure legislation was presented by the Prosecutor General’s Office.

The event is part of the Programme Office’s long-term efforts to support criminal justice reform in Kazakhstan.

413246 Kunduz Rysbek

Women from across the security and law enforcement sectors in Kyrgyzstan met at a national forum in Bishkek on 4 March to discuss ways of promoting gender equality in their fields of work.

The forum, entitled Women of Kyrgyzstan for Peace, Security and Development, was co-organized by the Kyrgyz Association of Women in Security Sector (KAWSS), the National Council of Women, the National Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers, and the Forum of Women Members of Parliament.

It gathered Members of Parliament, female representatives of Kyrgyzstan’s security sector and law enforcement agencies, municipal councils,  international organizations and civil society.

The participants explored ways of strengthening inter-agency co-operation, intensifying efforts to prevent gender-based violence, searching for improved ways to shape security and peace-building policies, and further developing a shared sense of responsibility among the local population in general.

The discussion focused specifically on  enhancing the role of women in decision making, which is also in line with Kyrgyzstan’s Action Plan on the Implementation of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and with the country’s National Action Plan to Achieving Gender Equality 2018-2020.

Vice-Prime Minister Altynai Omurbekova noted that the National Action Plan includes measures to tackle various gender issues including gender-based violence. “Today’s event is a great platform that enhances the importance of further implementing this Action Plan by all stakeholders, together,” she said.

The Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek, Pierre von Arx, expressed his recognition of the role women play in combating gender-based violence, in dispute settlement, early warning and prevention of violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, and in the fight against corruption, amongst many other social problems and security issues. “It is therefore essential to strengthen women’s capacities and participation in security and other government sectors at all levels, from the highest decision-making level to the local, grassroots level,” he stressed.

This is one of the important roles of the Forum of Women Members of Parliament and the KAWSS, and I would like to reaffirm the readiness of the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek to support all their positive efforts,” von Arx added.

A resolution was adopted by all participants at the conclusion of the forum. The document specifies seven steps to increase the representation and ensure the active participation of women at all levels of decision-making, especially in the security sector.

VIENNA, 5 March 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, together with the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, David Kaye, today welcomed in a letter sent to the European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union the initiative of a new directive on protection of whistleblowers, but also expressed a number of potential concerns about the current draft text. 

The Representative and the UN Special Rapporteur strongly support the recognition that whistleblowers “play a key role in exposing and preventing breaches of the law harmful to the public interest and in safeguarding the welfare of society.” Moreover, they note that the proposed Directive recognizes that “potential whistleblowers are often discouraged from reporting their concerns or suspicions for fear of retaliation.”

They also commend the intention to legislate whistleblower protection and support several elements of the proposed Directive and applaud the Commission’s work in these areas.

However, the Representative and the UN Special Rapporteur identified a number of concerns in areas that could undermine the purpose of the initiative. In particular, they noted problems regarding the EU’s preference for internal reporting of breaches, categories of prohibited disclosures under national security and the standards for protection of whistleblowers.

The Representative and the UN Special Rapporteur recall that whistleblowers protection rests upon a core right to freedom of expression, guaranteed under international law, in particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the European Convention on Human Rights, to which all EU Member States are bound.

Find the letter here 

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• The SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station recorded undetermined explosions and projectiles at a range of 50-600m from its location.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere. Its access was also restricted in government-controlled Taramchuk as well as near non-government-controlled Izvaryne and Voznesenivka, areas near the border with the Russian Federation.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (115), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 260 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in south and south-easterly directions of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol).

On the afternoon of 3 March, the SMM camera at the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) recorded 18 undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 0.1-4km south-south-east, south and south-south-west and 33 projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 0.05-3km south and south-west.

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 50), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 35 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-west and north-north-west of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, non-government-controlled, 44km west of Luhansk)

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 3 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded an illumination flare at an assessed range of 1-3km east-north-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On the same evening, the SMM camera at Prince Ihor Monument south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk) recorded an explosion (assessed as an airburst) at an assessed range of 4-6km west-north-west (assessed as outside the disengagement area).[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

 3 March

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10) in Ocheretyne (31km north-west of Donetsk).

4 March

The SMM saw:

• 24 tanks (T-64) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) stationary at the railway station in Zachativka (74km south-west of Donetsk) and
• a surface-to-air-missile system (9K33 Osa) in Novookhtyrka (55km north-west of Luhansk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

2 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-2), two armoured personnel carriers (APC) (a BTR-70 and a BTR-variant) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) north-east of Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) near and an anti-aircraft gun  (ZU-23, 23mm) in Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk).

3 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka (40km south of Donetsk);
• six IFVs (BMP-1) near Trudivske (47km south of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-2) near Novohryhorivka (55km south of Donetsk) and another IFV (BMP-2) in an area between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations near Novohryhorivka;
• two IFVs (BMP-2) in Starohnativka (51km south of Donetsk); and
• an APC (MT-LB) near Hranitne (60km south of Donetsk).

4 March

The SMM saw:

• an IFV(BMP-1) near Myrna Dolyna (67km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) and an APC (BTR-70) in Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk);
• two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23, 23mm) near Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk); and
• two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRM-1K) and five IFVs (two BMP-2 and three BMP-1) near Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

1 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an IFV (BMP-1) near Vesela Hora (16km  north of Luhansk).

3 March

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two IFVs (BMP-1) near Bila Kamianka (51km south of Donetsk) and
• three APCs (MT-LB) near Kalmiuske (42km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• two APCs (MT-LB) and an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) mounted on an APC (MT-LB) in Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk).

4 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-80) in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters near Molodizhne

Around 1.5km south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) in a snow-covered field about 5m from a checkpoint of the armed formations on road T-0504, the SMM observed six fresh impact craters within a radius of 5-60m south and north-north-west of the road. The SMM was unable to assess the type of weapon used or the direction of fire.

Presence of explosive remnants of war and mines as well as of mine hazard signs

About 800m east of the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on road H15 near Marinka (government-controlled, 23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM saw again three anti-tank mines (assessed as TM-62), at the distance of 4-15m south-west of the road between the abovementioned  checkpoint near Marinka and the checkpoint of the armed formations in Oleksandrivka (non-government-controlled, 20km south-west of Donetsk). At the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces,  the SMM again saw 17 anti-tank mines (assessed as TM-62) (fenced off by wooden bars and white plastic strips) about 15m north of road H-15 as well as a mine hazard sign (red with skulls and crossbones and “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian).

Approximately 3km east of Pobeda (government-controlled, 27km west of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time a mine hazard sign in a field about 13m west of road O0531. The sign in Ukrainian language is warning the public about the presence of explosive devices in the area while also informing them about the telephone number to be used to report such devices. The SMM saw a similar sign 10m east of road O0531 and another mine hazard sign  (with skull and crossbones and “Danger Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian) on the southern edge of the same road about 4km  north-east of Novomykhailivka (government-controlled, 28km south-west of Donetsk).

About 4.5km west-south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time two mine hazard signs (with skulls and crossbones and “Stop Mines” written in Ukrainian and Russian) and three wooden sticks with red rags tied around the top of each stick (assessed as improvised mine hazard signs) south-east of road T0512.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines near Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), Berezove and at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), as well as to electric transformers and the gas distribution network near Betmanove (formerly Krasnyi Partyzan, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Donetsk). The latter were concluded within the day. The SMM continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the overall security situation in the area of the pumping station in Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw six pedestrians (three men and three women, aged 15-60) exiting Ukraine and 14 pedestrians (mixed gender, aged 20-50) entering Ukraine. After five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

While at a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw a bus (with Ukrainian licence plates) entering Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, the SMM saw at least 80 stationary cargo wagons (including 15 fuel tanks). After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• In Taramchuk (government-controlled, 29km south-west of Donetsk), two Ukrainian Armed Forces soldiers stopped the SMM and requested it to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations again told the SMM to leave the area.
• At a border crossing point near Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, non-government-controlled, 65km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave, citing the need for prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit the area.
• At the Chervona Mohyla railway station in Voznesenivka, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave, citing the need for prior permission from senior members of the armed formations to visit the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.
• At a checkpoint of the armed formations about 3km south of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), an armed member of the armed formations told the Mission that mines on the road leading north had not been cleared.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again stopped the SMM on two occasions (for about 20 and 30 minutes).  After the delays, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

Other impediments:

• On 2 March, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in areas near Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk).[5]
• On 3 March, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal, assessed as due to jamming, while flying in areas near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk).[6]

[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as a map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report. During the reporting period, the SMM camera in Krasnohorivka was not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its     camera in Petrivske; thus, the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border

                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly people and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 8,760 to 8,813 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of plus 196 per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits noted crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 21 this week (compared to 59 last week); 15 of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and six into Ukraine (81 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles have tinted windows, and buses and minivans have drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families crossing the border, sometimes with elderly people and/or children, at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and two were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when two families were observed crossing into Russian Federation and two into Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they have a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (328 compared to 307 observed during the previous week). There were 171 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 157 bound for Ukraine.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” route or destination was noted: Rovenky - Kyiv and Kyiv.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses do not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OM observed an increase in the overall number of trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the total number of trucks went from 665 to 782 (214 at the Gukovo BCP and 568 at the Donetsk BCP); 403 of these trucks crossed into the Russian Federation and 379 crossed into Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus, the Russian Federation and some with “LPR” (sometimes “DPR”) plates.

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks decreased to 35 (compared to 49 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which may include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP increased from 203 to 246: of the total number of trucks scanned, 154 trucks (63 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 92 trucks (37 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 133 to 116 vehicles; 57 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 59 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains running on the railway tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 23 occasions, compared to nine last week; the OTs assessed that 14 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and nine to Ukraine (more details are provided on the sections “trends and figures at a glance”). The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 29 January 2019 to 5 March 2019, please see the attachment here.

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).

BAKU, 5 March 2019 – Concluding his visit to Azerbaijan today, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office and Slovakia’s Minister for Foreign and European Affairs, Miroslav Lajčák, welcomed the decrease in violence on the Line of Contact and on the international border, and discussed further perspectives for progress towards a comprehensive peace agreement for the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as co-operation between the OSCE and Azerbaijan.

Emphasizing Azerbaijan’s role in the Organization, Lajčák said: “Azerbaijan is an important OSCE participating State. We are ready to explore areas for increased OSCE engagement in and with Azerbaijan across all three dimensions of comprehensive security.”

Accompanied by his Personal Representative on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference, Ambassador Andrzej Kasprzyk, and his Special Representative for the South Caucasus, Ambassador Rudolf Michalka, OSCE Chairperson-in-Office Lajčák met with the political leadership in Baku, including President llham Aliyev, Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov, Speaker of Parliament Ogtay Asadov, as well as representatives of the Azerbaijani community of Nagorno-Karabakh.

Lajčák reaffirmed the OSCE’s continued support to finding a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and to the efforts of the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group as well as his two representatives, Kasprzyk and Michalka, in promoting confidence building and dialogue: “Through continuous and increasing dialogue, small improvements to the lives of the people most affected by the conflict can be made. And in this, preparing the populations for peace is an important element.”

He expressed the Slovak OSCE Chairmanship’s willingness to support small, tangible steps to promote co-operation and dialogue.

"The OSCE is encouraged by the dialogue we have seen so far. We are watching closely for signs of constructive progress and commitment, and stand ready to facilitate when needed,” Lajčák said.

413057 Marina Živaljević

A set of guidelines, developed with OSCE support,  that elaborates rules, ethical standards and guidance on how to moderate readers’ comments on internet portals was presented to the Montenegrin public on 4 March 2019 in Podgorica.

The Guidelines for Applying Section 2.8 of Montenegrin Journalists’ Code of Ethics were drafted by the Technical Working Group on Self-Regulation, composed of representatives of the Media Council for Self-Regulation and representatives and ombudspersons of Dan, Vijesti and Monitor, under the auspices of the OSCE Mission to Montenegro.

The Head of the OSCE Mission Maryse Daviet said that only in Montenegro have representatives of various self-regulatory bodies teamed up and worked together on a document of this kind.

“The Guidelines are relevant for moderators of portals, as well as for editors and readers, and further clarify Section 2.8 of the Journalists Code of Ethics. They were presented to the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media in Vienna in July 2018, who acknowledged the importance of the document,” said Daviet.

Paula Petričević, Ombudswoman of Daily Vijesti and Weekly Monitor, explained that the Guidelines are structured in four basic segments: rules for commenting, moderation, procedures and sanctions. “The idea of the document is to provide rules for an argumentative, decent, engaging discussion and a space for freedom of expression, not its abuses,” said Petričević.

Aneta Spaić, Member of Montenegrin Media Council for Self-Regulation said that guidelines by the BBC and the British media outlet The Guardian were used as a basis, and that some solutions were taken from the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. “Internet portals are obliged to use software for the automatic filtering of inappropriate expressions. This means that everything that automated filtering finds to be an inappropriate expression will be placed in quarantine that will be subject to moderation,” said Spajić.

The Guidelines for Applying Section 2.8 of Montenegrin Journalists’ Code of Ethics are available here in English, Montenegrin and Albanian.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Compared with the previous 24 hours, between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The SMM observed fresh damage to civilian properties from shelling in Pikuzy.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines near Lysychansk.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas, near Izvaryne, at a border crossing point outside government control, in non-government-controlled Pikuzy and again at a checkpoint near government-controlled Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including about 150 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 180 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north-west of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled) and at easterly directions of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (including about 30 undetermined and impact explosions at an assessed range of 0.2-1km south-south-east, south and south-south-west), at south-easterly and south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and again at easterly directions of Hnutove.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 1 and 2 March, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including five explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 260 explosions).

Between the evenings of 2 and 3 March, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, including about 35 explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of ceasefire violations, including the majority of explosions, were recorded in areas north and south of Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk) and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Fresh damage from shelling in Pikuzy

On 3 March, at 49 Akhmatovoi Street in Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), about 15m east of an inhabited one-storey house, the Mission saw a crater in soft ground and shrapnel marks on a fence. It assessed the damage as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a westerly direction.

On Vatutina Street, the SMM saw that three south-east-facing windows of a one-storey house were shattered and that there were numerus shrapnel marks on the house’s south-east-facing wall and front door. The Mission also saw one fresh crater 1m and another fresh crater 2m south-east of the house. It assessed the craters as impacts of 82mm mortar rounds fired from a south-westerly direction. A man (in his fifties) who introduced himself as a resident of Pikuzy told the SMM there had been shelling in the area on the morning of 2 March.

Members of the armed formations restricted the SMM’s access to certain areas of Pikuzy.*

Disengagement areas[2]

On the evening of 1 March, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded eight projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km south-east (assessed as inside the disengagement area) as well as an undetermined explosion, ten projectiles and an illumination flare, all at an assessed range of 1-6km east-north-east and east (all assessed as outside the disengagement area). On the following evening, the same camera recorded ten projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1-3km east (unable to be assessed as inside or outside the disengagement area), as well as two undetermined explosions and a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east (assessed as outside the disengagement area).

On 3 March, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed for the first time a piece of ammunition, assessed as a remnant of an exploded rocket-propelled grenade round, about 3-5m west of the main road (around 70m north of the wooden ramps at the bridge).

On 2 and 3 March, positioned north-east of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.[3]

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines[4]

Government-controlled areas

2 March

The SMM saw:

• four towed howitzers (2A65, Msta-B, 152mm) near Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

3 March

The SMM saw:

• 24 tanks (T-64) at a train station in Bakhmut (formerly Artemivsk, 67km north of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

3 March

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR 70) near Berezove (31km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-60) in Buhas (44km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

2 March

The SMM saw:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1 and BMP-2) near Mykhailivka (30km north-east of Donetsk).

3 March

The SMM saw:

• two trucks assessed as parts of a TORN electronic warfare system in Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk).

Fresh impact craters

On 1 March, an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle spotted at least 20 fresh impacts craters assessed as caused by 82mm or 120mm mortar rounds in a field about 1.5km east of Kalynove-Borshchuvate (non-government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk).

Casings of multiple launch rocket system in Donetsk city

On Putylivska Roshcha Street in Donetsk city, about 3.5km north-east of Donetsk central railway station, the SMM spotted an object lying on the side of the street which it assessed as a casing of a multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) (a Grad type) rocket.

On 2 March, on Ananchenka Street in the Trudivski area of the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), about 10m from nearest inhabited residential houses, the Mission saw an object embedded in the asphalt in the middle of the street which it assessed as a casing of an MLRS rocket.

On 3 March, at the Oktiabr mine compound (non-government-controlled, 9km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM saw that the 120mm mortar round it had seen on 25 December 2018 25-50cm south of a road (about 100m south of the SMM camera site) was no longer present. A member of the armed formations told the Mission that the piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO) had been removed.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

On 2 and 3 March, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside government control

On 3 March, while at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk) for about five minutes, the SMM saw four cars (two with Lithuanian, one with Russian Federation and one with Belarusian licence plates) and six pedestrians (four women and two men, mixed ages) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw six pedestrians (four men and two women, mixed ages) exiting Ukraine.*

On the same day, while at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw three men (in their forties) entering Ukraine and a man and a woman (in their forties) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 2 March, at a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.
• On two occasions on 3 March, members of the armed formations denied the SMM access to certain areas of Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol). On the first occasion, one of them denied the Mission access to Kirova Street. On the second occasion, another member demanded that the Mission leave the area “within one minute” due to safety concerns.
• On 3 March, at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• On 2 and 3 March, the sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.  For example, on 3 March, a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier told the Mission that anti-tank mines on the road between Bohdanivka (government-controlled, 41km south-west of Donetsk) and Petrivske were still in place.

Delay:

• On 3 March, at a checkpoint 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations stopped the SMM and requested to see the patrol plan which the Mission refused to show. After about 30 minutes, he allowed the SMM to pass through the checkpoint.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivka and at Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3] Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM cannot access its camera in Petrivske, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4] In Withdrawal of weapons section in SMM Daily Report of 1 March 2019, the sentence “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Katerynivka (formerly Yuvileine, 8km west of Luhansk)” should have read “22 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk).”

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

Communication and Media Relations Section

The Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department met with Montenegro’s Deputy Minister of the Interior, Milanka Bakovic, and her technical team during a country visit on 28 February and 1 March 2019 to facilitate the country’s participation in the Public Key Directory of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO PKD) – a central repository simplifying and facilitating the fast and secure authentication of electronic passports at borders.

Dennis Cosgrove, Head of the Border Security and Management Unit, outlined what benefits Montenegro could gain by becoming a member of the ICAO PKD and how the OSCE can support the country in this process.

Christiane Dermarkar, global focal point for the ICAO PKD membership, described the administrative requirements for joining the Public Key Directory.

Jeen de Swart, Senior Information Architect from the Dutch Ministry of Justice, demonstrated the technical steps for the integration of the Montenegrin National Public Key Infrastructure with the ICAO PKD. 

Deputy Minister Bakovic positively received the initiative and stressed Montenegro’s interest in improving existing border security systems. She highlighted that Montenegro is working on upgrading to third-generation e-passports and joining the ICAO PKD will be the pre-requisite to meeting the ICAO standards.

After meeting the Deputy Minister, the OSCE delegation also met with representatives of the Civil Aviation Agency of Montenegro and discussed how the agency could support the government in joining the ICAO PKD.

The country visit was a follow-up activity to the first OSCE Regional Workshop for South-East Europe on ICAO PKD, which was organized in Montenegro in November last year. At the workshop Montenegro presented an overview of its e-passport system and together with recommendations from experts drafted a road map on how to join the ICAO PKD.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission followed up on reports of an injured man in Donetskyi.
• The Mission spotted refurbishment of military positions inside the Petrivske disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential civilian infrastructure in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued in all three disengagement areas and elsewhere, including again ata checkpoint near Popasna.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewerceasefire violations, including about 180 explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (about 470 explosions). The majority of ceasefireviolations, including the majority of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-east of Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and at south-westerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded about 280 ceasefire violations, including about 260 explosions. During the previous reporting period, the SMM did not record any ceasefire violations in the region. The majority of ceasefireviolations were recorded at westerly directions of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, non-government-controlled, 50km west of Luhansk) including about 150 explosions of artillery rounds, 40 of which assessed as outgoing.

Man injured reportedly as a result of shelling in Donetskyi

At a hospital in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), medical staff told the Mission that a man (in his forties) had been admitted to the hospital on 18 February with shrapnel wounds to his right foot and ankle. The man told the SMM he had been injured during shelling while he had been at his house in Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk).

Fresh impact crater

In Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw a fresh crater in a field 130m south-east of a functioning school and 85m east of the closest civilian house. It assessed the crater as caused by an 82mm mortar round fired from a south-westerly direction. 

Disengagement areas[2]

On 27 February, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted new wooden poles and tarpaulin sheeting on the roofs of two bunkers assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 550m south of the area’s northern edge and about 1.3km west of its eastern edge. On 24 February, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a military truck inside the area, about 700m east of its western edge and about 600m south of its northern edge.[3]

On the evening of 28 February, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 1-1.5km south-east (assessed as outside the disengagement area). 

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines 

Government-controlled areas

1 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• three surface-to-air missile systems (9K35, Strela-10) near Pionerske (14km east of Mariupol).

Non-government-controlled areas

24 February

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of four tanks (types undetermined) and a probable self-propelled howitzer (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

1 March

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BTR-3E) in Pionerske.

The SMM saw:

• two IFVs (BMP-2) near Yasnobrodivka (26km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

27 February 

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted: 

• two IFVs (BMP-1) and a probable armoured combat vehicle near Styla (34km south of Donetsk).

28 February

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (BMP-1) near Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk) and
• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (MT-LB) near Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

1 March

The SMM saw:

• an APC (MT-LB) with a mounted anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) nearMius (65km south-west of Luhansk)

Presence of unexploded ordnance

About 600m west of Verkhnoshyrokivske(formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw for the first time two pieces of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as 152mm artillery rounds,with the nose fuses pointing upwards,lying on the northern side of the road, about 4m of its edge.

About 2.6km north-east of the Donetsk central railway station (non-government-controlled, 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), on Kyivskyi Avenue, the SMM observed for the first time two parts of an UXO (a grey round tube which was broken in two pieces), assessed as a multiple launch rocket system (Grad) (type undetermined) rocket embedded in the asphalt. The UXO was located around 110m from the closest civilian house.

SMM facilitation of repair works to civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to water pipelines at the Petrivske water pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works topower transmission lines in Sakhanka(non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), after the electricity poles had fallen down further breaking the electricity cables. The SMM observed that power supply in Sakhanka had been restored the same day. 

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that theJoint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report of 25 February 2019).The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access: 

• At a checkpoint in the eastern outskirts of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces soldier again did not allow the SMM to proceed south-west on road T-0504, citing orders from his commander.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to the three disengagement areas, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. 
• At a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the JCCC told the SMM that there had been no demining in the area.

Other impediments:

• In Horlivka(non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the head doctor of the hospital refused to provide information to the SMM without prior authorization from senior members of the armed formations.

 

[1]For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Krasnohorivkaandat Oktiabr mine were not operational.

[2]Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[3]Due to the presence of mines, including on a road between Bohdanivka and Petrivske, the SMM’s access to its camera in Petrivske remains limited, and thus the SMM has not been able to access observations from the camera since 22 June 2018.

[4]The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

412904 Communication and Media Relations Section

Supporting the economic empowerment of women in vulnerable situations in Armenia was the topic of discussion at an OSCE meeting held on 1 March 2019 in Yerevan. The event was part of the Organization’s overall efforts to promote social cohesion, stability and security by tackling socio-economic inequalities.

Representatives of national and local authorities and international and civil society organizations debated ongoing and future initiatives to promote gender equality in the economic sphere in the country. The goal was to explore synergies and maximize the impact of the OSCE project “Economic empowerment of women in the Syunik region and other regions of Armenia”, which will be implemented over the next two years. The project is aimed at improving the employability and income-generation capacities of women in vulnerable situations.

Through a combination of capacity-building activities targeting the network of Women’s Resource Centres in Armenia and direct assistance measures benefitting women in vulnerable situations, the project helps to improve women’s access to psycho-social, technical and financial services provided by civil society organizations and public social services at the local and national levels.

“Developing women’s human capital is critical to rebalancing inequalities,” said Ermelinda Meksi, Deputy Co-ordinator of the Office of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. “Consolidated economic research demonstrates that women reinvest close to 90 per cent of their incomes into their families and communities. Investing in women means investing in everybody else.”

“At the global level, women continue to experience significant gaps in accessing the labour market, income-generating opportunities, education, and innovation,” said Meksi. “Armenia is no exception and we wish to join forces with a wide variety of actors who play a role in fostering positive change for women in this country.”

Based on the lessons learned during the project’s implementation, the OSCE in co-operation with relevant stakeholders will upon its completion develop a set of guidelines for the economic empowerment of women in vulnerable situations in Armenia, to be used as an advocacy tool by the Women’s Resource Centres.

The project is financially supported by Finland, Italy, Norway and United States.

Edita Buçaj

A 4-module specialized training program organized by the OSCE Mission in Kosovo for 49 officers of the Police Inspectorate of Kosovo (PIK) on combating corruption and increasing police integrity concluded today in Prishtinë/Priština.

The modules, held over the last two months, covered: Criminal Investigation of Financial Irregularities and Corruption in the police (14 -18 January); Handling and Protecting Informants and Whistle-blowers (28 January - 1 February); Risk Analysis and Risk Assessment of Corruption in the police (11 - 15 February); and Integrity Testing (25 February – 1 March).

“This program was designed to advance the investigative capacities of the PIK to effectively perform its role of police oversight,” said Ake Roghe, Director of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo Department of Security and Public Safety.

“Improving the skills of PIK officers and successfully holding police officers accountable, will increase the general public’s trust in a fair and impartial investigation of allegations of wrongdoings by police officers,” he added.

PIK officers were trained by professional trainers from Italy, the United Kingdom and Canada. They deepened their knowledge of conducting criminal investigations into allegations of misconduct involving members of the police; methods used to effectively conduct financial investigations in accordance with the best international standards; handling and protecting informants and whistle-blowers; conducting risk analysis and assessments; and explored the best practices in mechanisms and related methods for integrity testing, and how those mechanisms contribute to ensuring that the best ethical standards are implemented within the Kosovo Police.

The training program was supported by the Italian Delegation to the OSCE in Vienna.