OSCE

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission saw damage to a farm near Novoluhanske.
• On 23 August, it saw members of the armed formations taking down a wall at their former forward position and personnel from the State Emergency Services of Ukraine cutting trees and branches inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote-5/Mykhailivka.
• The SMM spotted weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Raihorodka and non-government-controlled Ternove.
• It saw new anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia.
• An SMM long-range UAV spotted a cargo train heading south-west as well as a cargo train probably loaded with coal in Kumshatske.
• The long-range UAV spotted vehicles and people in a field west of the border with the Russian Federation in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including in non-government-controlled areas at a checkpoint near Verkhnoshyrokivske, in Sosnivske and Naberezhne, and at a border crossing point near Izvaryne.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (46), compared with the previous reporting period (69 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations, however, no explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (15 explosions). All ceasefire violations were recorded at westerly directions of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Damage to a farm near Novoluhanske

The SMM saw damage to two buildings at the Bakhmut Agrarian Union's pig farm near Novoluhanske (government-controlled, 53km north-east of Donetsk). At the administration building, the Mission saw a hole in an east-north-east-facing ground floor window but could not assess the cause of damage. At a pig barn about 150m south-east of the administration building, the SMM saw about 15-20 holes in a south-facing outer wall, a hole in a south-facing window, assessed as fresh, and a hole in another south-facing window along with a corresponding hole on a south-facing wall inside of the barn, both assessed as caused by small-arms fire. An employee at the farm (a woman in her forties) told the SMM that she had been in the barn with other employees on the morning of 18 August when she had heard shooting and took shelter in a corridor. Shortly thereafter, she said she heard a bullet impact the window (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 27 June 2019).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw at least 21 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as four vehicles (including a white armoured vehicle), entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk). On the same day, inside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw eight Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel, six members of the SES cutting trees and branches in fields west of the road and north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), as well as a bulldozer, a dump truck, and a crane parked near the former forward position of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The SMM also saw that a shuttle bus and golf cart continued to operate between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back. On two occasions, at the EECP north of the bridge, the SMM saw 500-800 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas and 150-400 queuing to enter. Throughout the day, at the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of pedestrians.

At the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw four members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them, as well as five members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from a wall of the position to a location about 10m south. [2] On the same day, near the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw six contractors constructing a shelter of a humanitarian organization.       

On 24 August (outside of the reporting period), the SMM saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel removing sand-filled tyres from the walls and roof of their former forward position north of the broken section of bridge. The SMM also saw Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel using a crane to remove nine large concrete slabs from an area south of the former forward position. At the same time, the SMM saw members of the armed formations removing sand-filled tyres from the walls of their former forward position immediately south of the broken section of bridge.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned in the central part of Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-west of Luhansk), while conducting a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight over the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 24 shots and five burst of small-arms fire about 1-2km west (unable to assess as inside or outside of the disengagement area), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2km west. Shortly thereafter, while returning the UAV, the SMM heard three additional shots of small-arms fire about 1-1.5km north-north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery), assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1.3km north-north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and heard an additional two shots of small-arms fire at a distance of about 1.5km north-west (assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery) before it left the area.*

While positioned about 2km north of the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard four shots of small arms fire at a distance of about 1km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. On the same day, the SMM accessed its camera site in Petrivske for the second time since June 2018 and conducted maintenance.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled

21 August

An SMM UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound near Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted two multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 22 August 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted a self-propelled anti-aircraft system (2K22 Tunguska) in a military compound on the eastern edge of Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted nineteen tanks (eight T-64 and 11 undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

23 August

The SMM noted that six MLRS (BM-21), six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 11 towed mortars (PM-38, 120mm), and a mortar (2B11 Sani, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites

At a permanent storage site in a government-controlled area of Donetsk

23 August

The SMM noted that 93 tanks (26 T-64, 36 T-64-B, 30 T-72, and a T-80), seven towed howitzers (D-44, 85mm), nine towed mortars (six 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm and three PM-38) and four mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) near a school building in Raihorodka and
• five APCs (BTR-70) and an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM) near Heivka (27km north-west of Luhansk).

22 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and an armoured combat vehicle (type undetermined) near residential houses in Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk);
• an IFV (BMP variant) near Novotoshkivske; and
• four IFVs (a BMP-2 and three BMP variants) near Orikhove (57km west of Luhansk).

23 August

The SMM saw:

• three APCs (a BTR-80, a BTR variant and a type undetermined) in Stanytsia Luhanska and
• an APC (BTR-70) and a heavy-machine-gun (DShK, 12.7mm) north-east of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

On 23 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission again saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches.

Anti-tank mines south of the bridge in Shchastia

The SMM saw 12 new anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in the western lane of the road H-21 south of the bridge near Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), as well as 15 previously observed anti-tank mines laid across the entire road further south.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Trains near Kumshatske

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable fuel cargo train (with 20 wagons) moving south through the train station in Kumshatske (non-government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) towards Sofiivka (non-government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk), as well as a stationary train (with at least 50 wagons), assessed as probably carrying coal, at the same train station.

Vehicles spotted in a non-government-controlled area near Manych

On the night of 22 August, an SMM long-range UAV spotted a probable cargo truck and two cars stationary in a field, about 3.5km north-east of Manych (non-government-controlled, 76km east of Donetsk), in an area adjacent to the border with the Russian Federation where there are no official border crossing points, as well as a cargo truck stationary at a junction about 2.5km south-west of Manych. About ten minutes later, in the same area, it spotted another truck driving west on a dirt road about 400m west of the border. After about 30 minutes, the UAV spotted around six people walking west in a field between the border and the aforementioned truck and two cars. About five minutes later, it spotted two cars (probably the aforementioned ones) driving west towards Manych, as well as an additional third car, also moving west towards Manych.

Border areas outside government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 22 cars (four with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as ten with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw 24 cars (five with Ukrainian and 14 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as five with “DPR” plates), two covered cargo trucks with Ukrainian licence plates, one bus with “DPR” plates, and two pedestrians (women in their thirties and fifties) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Verkhnoharasymivka (57km south-east of Luhansk) for about 25 minutes, the SMM saw two pedestrians (males) entering Ukraine and 13 pedestrians (eight females and five males) exiting Ukraine.

While at a border crossing point near Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), the SMM saw one car with Russian Federation licence plates, two covered cargo trucks (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “LPR” plates), one bus with Ukrainian licence plates, and 25 pedestrians entering Ukraine. The SMM also saw seven cars (three with Ukrainian, three with Russian Federation, and one with German licence plates), five covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates as well as two with “LPR” and one with “DPR” plates), and 11 pedestrians (mixed ages and genders) exiting Ukraine. After about five minutes, a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.*

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see below. The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, once citing an “ongoing operation in the area” and once citing the SMM’s refusal to show its patrol plan.
• At the eastern entrance to Sosnivske (non-government-controlled, 78km south of Donetsk), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM access to the village, citing orders from superiors.
• While at a shop in Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations approached the SMM and asked to see its patrol plan, then told the Mission to leave the village, citing orders from superiors.
• At a border crossing point near Izvaryne (non-government-controlled, 52km south-east of Luhansk), a member of the armed formations told the SMM to leave the area.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM was allowed to proceed only after 18 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 22-23 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Petrivka (government-controlled, 43km north of Donetsk) and Yurivka (government-controlled, 35km north of Donetsk) and between Bulavyne (non-government-controlled, 54km north-east of Donetsk) and Nelipivka (government-controlled, 40km north-east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Yurivka and Bulavyne.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that two storage sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and fewer in Luhansk region.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near non-government-controlled Bile.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (69), compared with the previous reporting period (50 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas east and south-east of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and at south-easterly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (15), compared with the previous reporting period (26). All ceasefire violations, were explosions and were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw 37 personnel of the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine, as well as five vehicles (including white armoured vehicle), three trucks, a crane and a bulldozer entering the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) and heard chainsaw being operated around 50m west of the road, north of the broken section of the bridge. During the same day, the Mission saw up to 24 SES personnel and seven vehicles (including white armoured vehicle and a crane), parked near the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 21 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw a remnant of an object stuck on a tree on the southern bank of the river, around 15m south-east of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk), assessed as an exploded remnant of OG-9 projectile. On 22 August, the Mission saw that the tree had fallen down.

Inside the disengagement area, around the area south of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw two deminers from non-government-controlled areas cutting vegetation, as well as members of the armed formations wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it.[2]

The SMM saw that the shuttle bus and a golf cart continued operating between the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the broken section of the bridge and back.

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned inside the disengagement near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed calm situations.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

The SMM saw four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) in a compound in Syrotyne (71km north-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• at least five tanks (T-80) south of Krasna Hora (76km north of Donetsk); and
• at least six tanks (T-64) and six surface-to-air missile systems (three 9K35 Strela-10 and three 9K33) near Pidhorodne (73km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

22 August

The SMM saw nine self-propelled howitzers (2S1) in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).

Weapons permanent storage sites[4]

At a permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 August

The SMM could not verify seven tanks (T-72) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.

At a heavy weapons permanent storage site in a non-government-controlled area of Luhansk region

22 August

The SMM could not verify seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) as their serial numbers were covered with paint.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

21 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• at least three armoured combat vehicles (ACV) (type undetermined) near Popasna;
• an infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) and three ACVs (type undetermined) near Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk); and
• two IFVs (probable BMP variant) near Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk).

22 August

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk); and
• an APC near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas 

20 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• three ACVs (type undetermined) in a training area near Novoselivka (37km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an ACV (type undetermined) in a training area near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armaments and military equipment is proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an ACV north of Sentianivka (formerly Frunze, 44km west of Luhansk).

21 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (probable BRDM-2) in a compound in Pervomaisk (58km west of Luhansk).

New trenches near Zernove, Molodizhne and Petrivske

On 20 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of a new trench running north-east to south-east for about 100m, as well as an extension to an existing trench running for about 20m south-west to north-east in a training area south of Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 5 August 2019).

On 21 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a 30m-long trench running north-west into a field from a treeline with a mortar firing position about 500m north-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 5 May 2019).

On 22 August, near a checkpoint of the armed formations on road C-051532 between Styla (non-government-controlled, 34km south of Donetsk) and Petrivske, the Mission saw four members of the armed formations digging inside deep trenches, partially covered with logs, as well as unoccupied camouflage-netted firing position located around 20m north of the trenches.

Situation at checkpoints along the contact line

At a checkpoint on highway H-15 near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM again saw at least 280 cars, 22 buses and over 300 pedestrians queueing to travel towards government-controlled areas and at least 30 cars and around 25 pedestrians in the opposite direction.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage, citing “ongoing engineer works along the road”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The Mission continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The SMM saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints in non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (50), compared with the previous reporting period (about 100 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including almost all explosions, were recorded at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the Mission recorded more ceasefire violations with a similar number of explosions (26), compared with the previous reporting period (about 30). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-east and south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area, about 250m north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine, one of them carrying a metal detector, clearing and cutting vegetation on the western and eastern sides of the road.

The Mission also saw nine deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing and burning vegetation east of the broken section of the bridge, as well as a senior member of the armed formations, and a member of the armed formations wearing an armband with “JCCC” written on it, next to the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 20 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted two armoured combat vehicles (ACV) on the southern edge of Katerynivka (government-controlled, 64km west of Luhansk), inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

20 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and six anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk);
• five multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk); and
• 22 MLRS (BM-21) near Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyi Luch, 56km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see the SMM Daily Report 30 July 2019).

21 August

The SMM saw six MLRS (BM-21) in the training area near Ternove (see above).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Non-government-controlled areas

20 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• 14 tanks (eight T-64 and six undetermined variants) in the training area near Ternove (see above);
• 12 towed howitzers (four 2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm, four 2A65 Msta-B, 152mm and four 2A36 or 2A65), a self-propelled howitzer (2S1) and three tanks (T-72) near Khrustalnyi; and
• 12 tanks (probable T-64) in a training area near Shymshynivka (see above).

21 August

The SMM saw three tanks (type undetermined) in the training area near Ternove (see above).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

20 August

The SMM noted that seven tanks (T-80B) and five self-propelled howitzers (2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm) were present and a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) was present for the first time. The Mission also noted that 58 tanks (52 T-64 and six T-72), 22 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) and 11 self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) remained missing.

Weapons storage sites

At a permanent storage site in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

20 August

The SMM noted that 17 mortars (11 2B9 Vasilek, 82mm, three 2B11 Sani, 120mm and three BM-37, 82mm) and 31 tanks (T-64) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted:

• a probable infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) (BMP variant) near residential houses in Novoselivka (31km north-east of Donetsk);
• an IFV (BMP-1) near Druzhba (45km north-east of Donetsk); and
• an ACV (type undetermined) on the southern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina (59km north-west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

20 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a fortified position made of logs and steel under construction next to an existing trench in a field about 1.7km north-east of Stepanivka (62km west of Luhansk) (not seen in imagery from 19 July 2019).

Mines near Novoselivka, unexploded ordnance near Shyrokyne

On 20 August, an SMM mid-range UAV spotted at least 60 anti-tank mines in a field about 3.5km north-east of Novoselivka, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 April 2019).

On 21 August, the Mission saw for the first time an object, assessed as a 14.5mm armour-piercing incendiary tracer, lying on soft ground on the side of road M-14 about 1km west Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol).

The SMM saw that the 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the asphalt surface on a road leading to the power substation in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) observed for the first time on 19 August 2019 had been removed.

Demining activities near Hranitne

In a field north of road T-0512, about 5.5km south-west of Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), the SMM saw about 20 people wearing clothing with the logo of an international organization conducting demining activities (for previous observations from the area, see SMM Daily Report 8 August).

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to enable maintenance works to a gas pipeline in Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol).

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

While at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 13 cars (five with Ukrainian and three with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), two buses (one with Russian Federation licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 14 pedestrians (ten women and four men) entering Ukraine. During the same time, the Mission saw 18 cars (three with Ukrainian and eight with Russian Federation licence plates, and seven with “DPR” plates), four covered-cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and one with Russian Federation licence plates), three buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and seven pedestrians (four women and three men) exiting Ukraine.

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

 

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), on two occasions, a member of the armed formations again asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan and “security and safety instructions”. When the Mission refused to present its patrol plan, its passage was denied.
• At a checkpoint in the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), two members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage, citing “lack of orders from superiors”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, a member of the armed formations only allowed the SMM passage after a delay of about 30 minutes.

Other impediments:

• On the evening and night of 20-21 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying between Stepanivka (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Dyliivka (government-controlled, 49km north of Donetsk); between Yuzhna-Lomuvatka (non-government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) and Samsonivka (non-government-controlled, 31km south-east of Luhansk); and between Khmelnytskyi (non-government-controlled, 69km south of Luhansk) and Snizhne (non-government-controlled, 72km east of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Dyliivka and Yuzhna-Lomuvatka.[6]
• An SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Hranitne (government-controlled, 60km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM observed weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within the radius of several kilometres of the UAVs’ positions.

428501 Željka Šulc

The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the European Union Force in BiH (EUFOR) jointly organized a training workshop for Armed Forces of BiH on the management of weapons and ammunition storage from 20 to 22 August 2019. The event took place at the Laboratory for the Chemical and Thermal Analysis of Ammunition, which is situated in the Technical Workshop for Repair and Destruction of Ammunition (TROM) in Doboj, Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The workshop focused on how to monitor, survey, review, reassess and, if necessary, revise the chemical and administrative processes for analysing samples of ammunition to be able to determine the level of its stability.

Military experts from the AFBiH worked on how to improve the current recording, reporting and chemical analysis procedures at the laboratory to achieve the maximal possible reliability, efficiency, and accuracy in terms of ammunition and explosive life-cycle management.

“Improving the safety of ammunition storage through modern equipment and laboratory, as well through targeted trainings for Armed Forces, greatly contributes to safety of AF personnel, as well as to overall safety. The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to support efforts aimed to improve infrastructure security and reduce security risks at ammunition storage sites and facilities.” said Bruce G. Berton, Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH.

Namir Halilović, First Lieutenant, Head of the Section for Examining Propellant Ammunition Fuels at TROM, said: "Co-operation with the team of chemical experts in powder stability management from Switzerland started successfully last year. The co-operation has included training seminars, exchange of best practices, sharing know-how and experience. It has also made possible the opening of the Laboratory for the Armed Forces of BiH.”  He added that the workshop was another step forward in improving the safekeeping of ammunition and ammunition storage sites and increasing the safety of the civilian population of BiH.

The OSCE Mission to BiH will continue to provide assistance in ensuring the sustainability of the Laboratory through training and equipment. The Mission will also continue the partnership with the BiH Ministry of Defence and AFBiH to support their efforts in implementing important strategic documents and plans.

428423 Kunduz Rysbek

The 11th annual OSCE regional workshop Explosive Hazards Reduction and Response: Countering Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IEDs) concluded in Issyk-Kul, Kyrgyzstan on 23 August. The five-day event brought together over thirty international experts to discuss recent developments in national, regional, and global C-IEDs strategies. It was organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Bishkek and the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe in close co-operation with the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan.

Through a combination of group work, presentations and practical exercises, experts from Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan, as well as the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), James Madison University and the International Trust Fund for Enhancing Human Security (ITF) shared their experience in tackling threats originating from improvised explosive devices. Participants noted that the unlawful use of IEDs and their proliferation has become a catalyst of attacks, conflicts and wars around the globe because of poor ammunition stockpile management, penetrable borders, and corruption. Thus, it is crucially important to focus on strengthening arms control, advancing ammunition management, and exchanging information between the co-operating states.

“The Government of the Kyrgyz Republic places high importance on co-operation with the OSCE and appreciates the OSCE’s support in providing workshops on reducing explosive hazards. The workshop serves as a stimulus for development of scientific and technical solutions in reduction and deactivation of IED,” noted Zyiabek Kamchybekov, Head of the Engineering Directorate of the General Staff of Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan.

Johan Dahl, Acting Head of the Politico-Military Dimension of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, said: “Addressing explosive hazards is a communal effort where government and all stakeholders must work closely together to achieve common awareness and preparedness.”

The workshop included a practical showcase of IED demolition demonstrated by the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Kyrgyzstan and the International Trust Fund for Enhancing Human Security.

MINSK, 21 August 2019 – The Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Martin Sajdik, made the following statement to the press after the meeting of the TCG ‎and its working groups in Minsk on 21 August 2019:

“The ceasefire that had been agreed by the TCG and entered into force on 21 July 2019, continues to yield results. Compared to other recommitments to ceasefire, this one has been the most effective.

Today, thirty days after its start, the average figure of ceasefire violations continues to be significantly lower compared to this indicator before the ceasefire took effect.

Also, according to the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission, since the beginning of the ceasefire, no civilian casualties due to shelling have been recorded, although, unfortunately, one person was injured. This clearly proves the importance of the ceasefire agreements by the TCG.

Once again, I urge all the sides to continue to fully comply with these obligations, especially with a view to the beginning of the school year.

The main topic of today’s discussion in the TCG was the repair works of the bridge at Stanytsa Luhanska. The TCG participants agreed on the necessary further steps in this regard. In particular, already tomorrow the sides shall exchange written messages via myself about the completion of mine clearance and readiness to begin repair works, including the dismantling of fortifications. By the way, I have just received such messages from the Ukrainian side.  

In addition to the issues of ceasefire and the situation in Stanytsia Luhanska, the Security Working Group also discussed the topic of renewal of the disengagement of forces and hardware in Zolote and Petrivske.

The Economic Working Group, among other topics, continued to deal with water supply issues in certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions (CADR and CALR), in particular, with the financial situation and preparations for the international audit of the ‘Voda Donbasa’ company.

The Humanitarian Working Group continued to discuss the questions related to an exchange of detainees.

The Political Working Group, as at the previous meeting, continued to discuss the traditional topics on its agenda related to the implementation of the ‘Steinmeier formula’, amnesty and local elections in CADR and CALR”.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and a similar number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region.
• A man was injured by a mine explosion near government-controlled Illienko in Luhansk region.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle near Luhansk city.
• The SMM continued to monitor the situation in the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.
• It saw a fortified position and trenches of the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (about 100), compared with the previous reporting period (about 130 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south-west, west and north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), where the majority of explosions were recorded.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including however more explosions (about 30), compared with the previous reporting period (one explosion). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-north-west of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, assessed as aimed at the SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), as well as in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and west-south-west of Orikhove (government-controlled, 57km north-west of Luhansk), all of which were explosions.

Man injured by a mine explosion near Illienko

On 1 August, medical staff at a hospital in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk) told the SMM that a man (35 years old) had been admitted on 3 July with injuries caused by a mine explosion. On 7 August, the man told the SMM over the phone that he had sustained injuries after his tractor drove over a mine on 3 July in a forested area near Illienko (government-controlled, 27km east of Luhansk). On 19 August, a police representative told the SMM that a man had been injured after his tractor had hit a mine in a forested area near Illienko and that police had opened a criminal investigation for the incident.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAV near Luhansk city

Positioned on the north-eastern edge of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard ten shots of small-arms fire about 1km west-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 1km west-north-west. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area. *

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Positioned at the checkpoint of the armed formations inside the disengagement area, the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed distance of 500m east of the checkpoint, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

The SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine entering the disengagement area through the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska. Inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw eight deminers about 50m west of the asphalt road cutting branches and trees. The SMM saw members of the civil-military administration of Stanytsia Luhanska and four police officers accompanied by an Ukrainian Armed Forces officer of the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) walk to the broken section of the bridge and back towards the EECP.

Inside of the disengagement area, south of the broken section of the bridge, the Mission saw four deminers from the non-government-controlled area walk to the broken section of the bridge and up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. [2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 20 August, while positioned in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion at an assessed range of 1-2km north-west, which it was unable to assess as inside or outside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk). While positioned in Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk), in Orikhove and in Holubivka (formerly Kirovsk, non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions, all assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Inside of the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM again saw a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the ground on the eastern edge of the T-1316 road between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations. It again saw 12 anti-tank mines laid across the same road about 1km south of the area’s northern edge near positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 350m north of the checkpoint of the armed formations, the SMM again saw a spool wire stretched across the same road.

On 18 August, inside the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed trench modification by filling in a branch of a 30m long trench near the forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, about 280m south of its northern edge and about 650m east of its western edge (not visible in the imagery from 6 August 2019). Outside the disengagement area, the same aerial imagery revealed a 15m long extension of a previously reported trench, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. The imagery also revealed the presence of a tank outside the disengagement area’s eastern edge (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019).

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

19 August

An SMM mini UAV spotted:

• five tanks (T-72) and two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area south of Zernove (70km south of Donetsk), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014 (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 August 2019); and
• four tanks (three T-72 and one undetermined type) and six self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Boikivske (formerly Telmanove, 67km south-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

19 August

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound near Kremenivka (27km north-west of Mariupol).

20 August

The SMM saw two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) towed by military trucks and three self-propelled howitzers (2S1) near Kalynove (formerly Kalinine, 65km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

19 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three probable mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm) in a training area south of Zernove (see above), in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At a heavy weapons holding area in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

20 August

The SMM noted that 23 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) and a self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

20 August

The SMM saw an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska and an APC (BTR-70) in Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

19 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted seven infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (five BMP-1 and two BMP-2) near Boikivske (see above).

20 August

The SMM saw an IFV (BMP-1) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BTS-4A) near Panteleimonivka (26km north-east of Donetsk).

Non-SMM UAV seen inside Zolote disengagement area

The SMM saw a UAV flying 30-50m above its position inside the disengagement area near Zolote.

Fortified position and trenches of the armed formations near Novooleksandrivka

The SMM saw two armed members of the armed formations digging trenches around a newly fortified bunker made of logs and sand bags with a gun port on the front pointed in the direction of Novooleksandrivka (government-controlled, 65km west of Luhansk) between the road T-0504 and a wooded area, about 70m east of the T-junction leading south to Novooleksandrivka and about 600m west-north-west of a checkpoint of the armed formations. The SMM also saw a camouflage shield made of small trees and branches on the shoulder of the road T-0504 about 5m west-north-west of the aforesaid bunker (for previous observations in the area see SMM Daily Report 1 July 2019).

Unexploded ordnance near Popasna and Uzhivka

On the road T-0504, near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces east of Popasna, the SMM again saw a round of a rocket-propelled grenade laying in the centre of the road and a tailfin from a 120mm anti-tank guided missile laying on the south shoulder of the road.

In Uzhivka (formerly Leninske, non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw that a previously observed tailfin of a 120mm mortar bomb protruding from the asphalt on the edge of the road was still present.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk) and to power lines near Yasne (non-government-controlled, 30km south-west of Donetsk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, (16km north-west of Luhansk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Border areas outside of government control

While at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 32 cars (four with Ukrainian and twelve with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 16 with “DPR” plates), five covered cargo trucks (three with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates), two buses (one with Ukrainian licence plates and one with “DPR” plates) and 24 pedestrians (17 women, 7 men, 20-60 years old) entering Ukraine. It also saw seven cars (two with Ukrainian and four with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as one with “DPR” plates), seven covered cargo trucks (two with Ukrainian licence plates and five with “DPR” plates) and 15 pedestrians (eight women and seven men, 20-50 years old) exiting Ukraine.

While at a pedestrian border crossing point near Ulianivske (61km south-east of Donetsk) for about 20 minutes, the SMM saw no pedestrians entering or exiting Ukraine.

SMM monitored the security situation in south-east Kherson region

On 18 and 19 August, the Mission continued to monitor the security situation along the Sea of Azov coast in Kherson region and at the crossing point between Chonhar (163km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea and observed a calm situation.

The Mission continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• A member of the Ukrainian Armed Forces denied the SMM access to a heavy weapons holding area in a government-controlled area of Donetsk region. 

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Delay:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations asked the SMM to provide its patrol plan, citing “new rules”; when the SMM refused to do so its passage was denied; the SMM was however allowed to proceed after 40 minutes of waiting.
• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations first denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “demining activities”; its passage was however allowed after about 20 minutes of waiting.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the north-eastern edge of non-government-controlled Luhansk city, the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which it landed safely (see above).

• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying in of Lebedynske (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.[6]

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[6] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

WARSAW, 22 August 2019 – Amid increasingly violent outbreaks of religious intolerance, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) welcomes the first-ever United Nations International Day Commemorating the Victims of Acts of Violence Based on Religion today, and calls on governments to promote the interfaith dialogue and education needed to combat hatred and violence.

“The hate crimes and intolerance we are seeing against people with a particular religion or belief rarely take place in isolation, but go hand in hand with other human rights violations,” said ODIHR Director Ingibjörg Sólrún Gísladóttir. “The negative effect of such violence and discrimination should not be underestimated, on the communities concerned but also on the security situation in the OSCE region overall.”

In order to counteract hate crime and discrimination, governments are encouraged to adopt a comprehensive approach that helps to build a culture of mutual respect and understanding  through interfaith and interreligious dialogue and partnerships, and education programmes that promote equality and respect for human rights. At the same time, they have to develop a strong support system to assist victims. The efforts of civil society, including religious or belief communities and other community organizations, are vital in this area, making the freedom to carry out their activities and access to funding particularly important. 

ODIHR is making every effort to assist countries across the OSCE in living up to their commitments on freedom of religion or belief as well as tolerance and non-discrimination. It works with a wide range of stakeholders to ensure that no group is singled out for protection at the expense of another. More information about ODIHR’s work in this area is available here.

428366 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

A three-day national tabletop exercise on the topic of countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes started in Dushanbe on 21 August 2019. The event is organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe, in co-operation with the Action against Terrorism Unit of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department.

The exercise centers on a fictional and interactive scenario developed by the Action against Terrorism Unit that serves as a realistic and strategic-level case study based on real-world events and emerging security threats relevant to Central Asia. More than 45 representatives from across national institutions, the national judiciary, civil society, the ICT industry, the media and law enforcement are participating in the event.

The focus of the interactive meeting is on developing and enhancing national capacities to counter terrorist content online by focusing on international co-operation and sharing current initiatives, projects and best practices among participants coming from both the private and public sectors. 

“Collaboration between government and civil society in preventing and countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes is absolutely crucial,” said Filippo Crivellaro, Acting Head of the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe. “Non-governmental organizations, the media, local communities and every individual as a concerned citizen can play an important role in preventing and countering terrorists’ exploitation of the Internet and ICT.”

Ilhomiddin Atoev, Deputy Head of Tajikistan’s State Service on Communications, said: “The evolution of modern technologies and their accessibility provides terrorists and violent extremists with new opportunities to plan and execute their attacks. If we do not take any measures to counter terrorists in the virtual world, we will put our security and lives at risk in the real world.” 

Komron Hidoyatzoda, Deputy Head of the Department for Regional Security Issues of the Center for Strategic Studies under the jurisdiction of the President of Tajikistan, said: “We are confident that this table-top exercise will lay the ground for developing practical measures and recommendations in analysing and solving the problem.”

The exercise will include a number of presentations from international experts from UNODC, Europol’s Internet Referral Unit, the UNCED-led Tech Against Terrorism initiative, the Civil Initiative on Internet Policy, as well as advisers from the Office of the OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media and the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights.

The tabletop exercise will lead to the creation of a document containing actionable policy responses and recommendations. The document will provide national policymakers with concrete tools and competences to improve their efforts in addressing the threats posed by the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes. These recommendations will be carefully tailored to best fit the local context and also help policymakers formulate pertinent, human-rights compliant and gender mainstreamed policies and frameworks for preventing and countering terrorists’ exploitation of the Internet and ICT. 

This is the second national tabletop exercise on countering the use of the Internet for terrorist purposes organized in the OSCE area, with the first one held in Tashkent in January 2019. The Action against Terrorism Unit plans to conduct similar events in Central Asia and South-Eastern Europe in 2019 and 2020.

428381 Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights

Following the presidential election in North Macedonia on 21 April and 5 May 2019, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) has published its final report. The election was overall well-administered, despite some technical challenges. Voters were able to make an informed choice between competing political alternatives, with fundamental freedoms of assembly and expression respected in the campaign. Some regulatory gaps in the legal framework were partially addressed through cross-party political agreements, but a previously launched electoral legislation reform is still awaiting finalization.

Key recommendations include:

• Further reviewing electoral legislation, including campaign and media rules, to ensure equal opportunities for candidates, and reviewing the need for the turnout threshold, to minimize the risk of failed elections;

• Adopting legal provisions which clearly establish the composition and length of mandate of a permanent State Election Commission (SEC), and employ essential personnel of the SEC secretariat on a permanent basis;

• Continuing updating and harmonizing all pertinent state registers and databases to provide an accurate basis for the voter register;

• Continuing efforts to counter any form of pressure on public-sector employees, including clear public statements and written instructions by senior state officials that such pressure will not be tolerated and that no citizen should fear any negative consequences as a result of supporting or not supporting any candidate or party;

• Mandating the State Audit Office (SAO) to review interim reports and to promptly publish its findings, and clarifying rules on campaign finance reporting; granting investigatory powers to the SAO to review compliance with campaign finance rules, and supplying the SAO with adequate resources and technical expertise to fulfil these tasks;

• Reviewing the legal framework to eliminate undue restrictions on the right to lodge electoral complaints and appeals, and to provide for effective legal remedies; decisions and actions of the election administration should be reasoned and subject to timely and effective judicial review.

ODIHR deployed an Election Observation Mission (EOM) on 10 March 2019 to observe the presidential election. All 57 participating States across the OSCE region have formally committed to following up promptly on ODIHR’s election assessments and recommendations.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public.

Summary

• Compared with the previous 24 hours, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations both in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man was injured due to gunfire in Zaitseve.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles near Pervomaisk and Smile.
• The SMM continued to monitor the situation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines near government-controlled Yasnobrodivka and non-government-controlled Ternove.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to a phenol sludge reservoir.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (about 130), compared with the previous 24 hours (about 60 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at easterly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk), where the majority of explosions was recorded.  

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including one explosion, compared with the previous 24 hours (no explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas north-north-west of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk) and in areas north-north-west of Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk). On both occasions, the ceasefire violations were assessed as aimed at the SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

A man injured due to gunfire in Zaitseve

On 19 August, outside a hospital in Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw a 56-year-old man with bandaged wounds on both knees and left arm. The man told the SMM that he had been in the garden of his house at 212 Rybalka Street in a non-government-controlled part of Zaitseve (50km north-east of Donetsk), at around 18:30 on 15 August, when he heard gunfire and hid behind the water well where he was then injured by bullet ricochets in his arm and legs. A woman (in her fifties), introducing herself as his spouse, told the SMM that she had been in the house when the shooting started and had seen her husband running towards the house, after he was hit. Previously, on 16 August, medical staff at the hospital in Horlivka had confirmed admitting a man from Zaitseve. The SMM could not visit the house on Rybalka Street due to security restrictions.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAVs near Pervomaisk and Smile

Positioned on the western edge of Pervomaisk, while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard 22 shots of small-arms fire about 700m north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 750m north-north-west.

Positioned on the north-western edge of Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard at least 13 shots of small-arms fire about 3.6km north-north-west, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3.9km north-north-west. In both cases, the SMM safely landed the UAVs and left the areas.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

The SMM saw at least 14 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine entering the disengagement area through the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk). Inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw three deminers on the western side of the asphalt road, about 50m north of the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, and eight deminers cutting branches about 25m west of the said road. The SMM saw red and white poles protruding the ground, marking the location of an anti-tank mine, about 100m west of the former forward positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Inside of the disengagement area, south of the broken section of the bridge, the Mission saw up to five members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them. [2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 16 August, inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), an SMM mini-UAV spotted four members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces present near their most forward positions on road T-1316 south of the railway tracks. The same UAV also spotted two members of the armed formations present near their most forward positions in a treeline about 240m south-south-west from the said positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and about 70m east of the aforementioned road.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

19 August

The SMM saw a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near Yasnobrodivka (25km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight self-propelled howitzers (2S1, Gvozdika, 122mm) and three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations in the area, see SMM Daily Report 16 August 2019).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

17 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10) in a compound in the southern outskirts of Manhush (111km south of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 29 tanks (13 T-64 and 16 T-72) and two self-propelled mortars (2S9 Nona-S, 120mm) in a training area near Ternove (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

17 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (a BMP-2 and a BMP variant) near Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk); and
• six IFVs (five probable BMP-1 and a probable BMP-2) in a compound in Novoselivka Druha (69km south of Donetsk).

19 August

The SMM saw:

• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2, 23mm) in Makarove (19km north-east of Luhansk);
• an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23-2) and an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-70) in Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north of Luhansk); and
• an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM) loaded on a trailer in a residential area of Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

17 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted 12 IFVs (BMP-1), an APC (BTR-70) and a combat engineering vehicle (IMR-2) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

19 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted eight probable IFVs (BMP variant) near Pryshyb (34km north-west of Luhansk).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

On a road leading to the power substation in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a 120mm mortar tailfin embedded in the asphalt surface (not seen the last time the SMM was on that road on 12 August).

Trenches and mines on a road between Svitlodarsk and Debaltseve

The SMM saw a 7m-long trench cutting the asphalt surface of road M-03 between Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk) and Debaltseve (non-government-controlled, 58km north-east of Donetsk). About 300m further on the same road, the Mission saw another 6m-long trench also cutting the asphalt surface of the road (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 23 December 2018). Around 60m south-east of the second trench, the SMM again saw a line of 11 anti-tank mines positioned across the same road.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk). The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denial of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage to non-government-controlled areas.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the western edge of Pervomaisk (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which landed safely (see above).
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the north-western edge of Smile (non-government-controlled, 31km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM heard small-arms fire assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which landed safely (see above).

• On the night of 17-18 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over Kostiantynivka (government-controlled, 60km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying between Netailove (government-controlled, 22km north-west of Donetsk) and Slavne (government-controlled, 26km south-west of Donetsk) and between Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol) and Opytne (government-controlled, 12km north-west of Donetsk).[5]
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying in Zernove (non-government-controlled, 70km south of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.6
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over Ukrainske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.6

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. During the reporting period, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

This report is for the media and the general public.

SUMMARY

Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall number of border crossings by persons increased at both BCPs compared to the previous week.

OPERATIONAL REMARKS

The OM is currently operating with 22 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a staff member and the Chief of Fund Administration based in Vienna.

OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS

Persons crossing the border                                                                                                                                                                                          

The profile of persons crossing the border can be categorized as follows:

1. Adults travelling on foot or by car with little or no luggage;
2. Persons in military-style outfits;
3. Families (often including elderly persons and/or children) travelling on foot or by car with a significant amount of luggage.

The average number of entries/exits increased from 13,435 to 13,793 per day at both BCPs compared to last week[1].

During the reporting period, the majority of border crossings were to Ukraine, with an average net flow of two per day for both BCPs.

The Donetsk BCP continued to experience much more traffic than the Gukovo BCP.

Persons in military-style outfits

During the reporting period, the number of persons in military-style outfits crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs was 11 this week compared to 17 last week: four of them crossed into the Russian Federation, and seven into Ukraine (18 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP). They continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed on foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border, especially since some of the private vehicles had tinted windows, and buses and minivans had drawn curtains.

Families with a significant amount of luggage

The OTs continued to report on families, sometimes with elderly persons and/or children, crossing the border at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage, or travelling in heavily loaded cars. During this reporting week, nine families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation and seven were observed crossing into Ukraine, compared to the previous reporting period when 14 families were observed crossing to the Russian Federation and four to Ukraine.

Bus connections                                         

Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (mostly from/to the Luhansk region) and the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses did not state their route; instead they had a sign on the windshield stating “irregular”.

During the reporting period, the OTs observed an increase in the overall number of buses crossing the border at both BCPs (483 compared to 465 observed during the previous week). There were 250 buses bound for the Russian Federation and 233 bound for Ukraine.

On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses, while some buses did not display their route at all. The majority of long-distance buses commuting between the Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region and “LPR” plates.

Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted:  Luhansk-Yalta, Luhansk-Odessa and Sevastopol.

Trucks

During the reporting period, the OTs observed 981 trucks (compared to 1,007 during the previous reporting week) crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs (545 at the Gukovo BCP and 436 at the Donetsk BCP); 565 of these trucks crossed to the Russian Federation and 416 crossed to Ukraine. Most of the trucks observed by the OTs had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, on a daily basis, the OTs also noted trucks registered in Belarus and the Russian Federation and with “LPR” plates. During the reporting week, the Gukovo BCP continued to experience more cargo traffic than Donetsk (in particular due to a significant number of cargo trucks crossing from Ukraine to the Russian Federation).

The OTs also continued to observe tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. During the reporting week, the number of tanker trucks increased to 65 (compared to 45 during the previous reporting period). These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in either Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks had hazard signs, indicating that they were transporting propane or a mix of propane and butane.

All trucks underwent systematic inspection by Russian Federation officials, which could include an X-ray check. Due to the unfavourable observation position at the Gukovo BCP, the OTs continued to be unable to observe any X-ray checks.

Compared to the previous week, the total number of X-ray checks at the Donetsk BCP decreased from 105 to 98, 85 trucks (87 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 13 trucks (13 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.

Minivans

The OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2] crossing the border in both directions at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly with Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region; however, the OTs also frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation. Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans increased from 140 to 161 vehicles; 92 crossed into the Russian Federation and another 69 into Ukraine.

Trains

The OTs continued to pick up the sound of trains on the railway tracks located approximately 150m south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on 32 occasions; the OTs assessed that 19 trains were travelling to the Russian Federation and 13 to Ukraine (more details are provided in the sections “trends and figures at a glance” below).

The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine was regularly informed about the trains bound for Ukraine.

Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees located between the train tracks and the BCP.

Other observations

The majority of vehicles crossing the border had Ukrainian licence plates issued in the Luhansk region, or Russian Federation licence plates. A significant number of vehicles with “LPR” plates were also observed crossing the border in both directions on a daily basis. The OTs also observed cars with licence plates from Belarus, Georgia, Germany, Lithuania, and Poland.

On 13 August, the OT’s observed two ambulances at the both BCPs. At 21:11, an ambulance with two crew members entered the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation and parked next to the main building. An elderly female received medical care. At 21:35, the ambulance left the BCP towards the Russian Federation. The same day, at 22:09 an ambulance with the inscription “Urgent medical help - 112” (in Russian) and bearing Russian Federation licence plates, arrived at the Gukovo BCP and parked behind the main building. Two paramedics left the vehicle and returned after a short while. At 22:50, the ambulance crossed back into the Russian Federation.

On 13 August at 18:30, the OT at the BCP Donetsk observed a police vehicle arriving from the Russian Federation. The vehicle parked in front of the checkpoint and two police officers entered the main building. The vehicle stayed ten minutes within the BCP area and at 18:40 returned towards the Russian Federation.

On 14 August at 06:00, the OT observed a funeral minivan (with three passengers inside) with Ukrainian licence plates, bearing the inscription “Funeral Services” (in Russian), entering the Donetsk BCP from the Russian Federation. The vehicle underwent customs procedures and crossed the border towards Ukraine.

For trends and figures at a glance covering the period from 16 July to 20 August 2019, please see the attachment here.    

[1] Based on data received from the Regional Representation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

 

[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving licence C1).                              

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region, compared with the previous 24 hours.
• The SMM continued to monitor the situation inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area.
• The Mission recorded ceasefire violations inside of the Zolote and Petrivske disengagement areas.
• It saw self-propelled howitzers in violation of withdrawal lines near Mariupol.
• The SMM saw unexploded ordnance near Popasna, Novohryhorivka, Verkhnoshyrokivske, and Shyrokyne.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate the operation of essential civilian infrastructure at the Donetsk Filtration Station and the pumping station near Vasylivka.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near Kreminets where members of the armed formations behaved aggressively towards the Mission.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including, however, more explosions (about 150), compared with the previous reporting period (52 explosions). The majority of the ceasefire violations, including most of the explosions, were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), north-north-west of Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk) and at southerly directions of Svitlodarsk (government-controlled, 57km north-east of Donetsk).

Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded a similar number of ceasefire violations, including, however, fewer explosions (about 60), compared with the previous 24 hours. The majority of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk and south-south-west of Svitlodarsk.

In Luhansk region, between the evenings of 16 and 17 August, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (four), compared with the previous reporting period (35 explosions). All of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas west-south-west of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), north-west of Nyzhnoteple (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk), and south-south-east of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk).

Between the evenings of 17 and 18 August, the Mission recorded fewer ceasefire violations, and no explosions, compared with the previous 24 hours. All of the ceasefire violations were recorded east-north-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 17 August, outside of the disengagement area, the SMM saw at least 15 deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine near the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk).

On both 17 and 18 August, inside of the disengagement area, the Mission saw between three and five members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them between the former forward position of the armed formations south of the broken section of the bridge and the checkpoint of the armed formations. [2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the night of 16 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded one projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

During the day on 17 August, positioned in Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard 15 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, at an assessed range of 4-6km west-south-west, assessed as outside the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 18 August, positioned on the eastern edge of Popasna, the SMM heard 12 shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east-north-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area near Zolote but within its 5km periphery.

On 17 August, positioned north of Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM heard nine undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 3-5km south, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery. During the day on 18 August, positioned at the same location, the SMM heard one undetermined explosion at a distance of about 5km south-west, assessed as inside of the disengagement area. Shortly thereafter, while at the same location, the SMM heard a shot of small-arms fire at a distance of about 1km south-east, assessed as outside of the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

17 August

The SMM saw two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) on a road about 1km north-west of Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

17 August

The SMM noted that two towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and seven self-propelled howitzers (2S1) continued to be missing.

Weapons storage sites

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

17 August

The SMM noted that 18 tanks (ten T-64 and eight T-72) continued to be missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[5]

Government-controlled areas

16 August

An SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) spotted:

• three infantry fighting vehicles (IFV) (BMP-1) on the eastern outskirts of Popasna and
• three IFVs (BMP-1), an armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRM-1K) and an armoured recovery vehicle (BREM-2) in a compound about 100m from residential houses in Oleksandropillia (71km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

18 August

The SMM saw an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23, 23mm) in Brianka (46km south-west of Luhansk).

On 16 August, in a treeline beside a field between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the armed formations about 3km south-south-west of Naberezhne (non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), an SMM mid-range UAV spotted for the first time a new 110m-long trench running north-south (not seen in imagery from 21 April 2019).

Unexploded ordnance (UXO) near Novohryhorivka, Popasna, Verkhnoshyrokivske and Shyrokyne

On 16 August, in a field about 10m north of a road running west from Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) towards Pyshchevyk, which is commonly used by the SMM, the Mission saw a piece of an unexploded 82mm mortar round lying on the ground. About 150m east of the mortar round, the SMM also saw an anti-tank mine (TM-62) laid in the field for the first time. About 50-400m west of the mine, the SMM saw three unexploded rocket-propelled grenades (RPG-7) in fields 2-5m north and south of the road. Additionally, about 1.5km west of the previously-mentioned mine, the SMM saw four pieces of unexploded armour-piercing incendiary projectiles in a field about 5m north of the road, assessed as recent. On the same day, the SMM again saw a piece of UXO assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade about 10m north of the road from Verkhnoshyrokivske to Pyshchevyk.

On the same day, at the intersection of two roads in Novohryhorivka (non-government-controlled, 61km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw for the first time an unexploded artillery round, assessed as not recent, embedded in the middle of the road about 20m west of residential houses.

On 17 August, on road T-0504, which is regularly used by the SMM, near a checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces south-east of Popasna, the SMM saw for the first time a round of a rocket-propelled grenade laying in the centre of the road and a tailfin from a 120mm anti-tank guided missile laying on the soft shoulder of the road, both assessed as recent. On 18 August, about 200m east-south-east of the previously-mentioned anti-tank guided missile, the SMM saw the unexploded remnant of an anti-tank guided missile launcher (9K111 Fagot, 122mm) rocket lying on the southern shoulder of the same road, assessed as recent.

On 17 August, on the road E-58 about 3km north-west of Shyrokyne (government-controlled, 20km east of Mariupol), the SMM saw an undetonated 23mm incendiary round, assessed as not recent, laying on the ground about 1m south of the road.

Demining activities near Maiorsk

On 17 August, the SMM saw six members of an international demining organization conducting demining activities in a field on the north-western side of road T-0513 about 4km north of the EECP near Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk).

Border areas not under government control

On 17 August, while at a border crossing point near Marynivka (78km east of Donetsk) for 45 minutes, the SMM saw 11 cars (four with Russian Federation licence plates and seven with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 71 cars (17 with Ukrainian and 36 with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 18 with “DPR” plates) and one bus with “DPR” plates exiting Ukraine.

SMM facilitation of the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

On 17 and 18 August, the Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The Mission continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On 17 August, at a checkpoint of the armed formations near Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), three armed members of the armed formations behaved aggressively towards the SMM by shouting and displaying their weapons and denied the SMM passage through the checkpoint. They told the SMM to address their questions to senior members of the armed formations.
• On 17 August, at a checkpoint about 600m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol) and southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol), citing demining activities in the area.
• On 17 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to non-government-controlled areas.
• On 18 August, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske, on two occasions, two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage to non-government-controlled areas, once citing “orders from authorities due to security considerations” and once citing “engineering operations in the area.”
• On 18 August, at a checkpoint north of the bridge in Shchastia (government-controlled, 20km north of Luhansk), Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel denied the SMM access to the bridge.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. Between the evenings of 16-18 August, the SMM cameras in Berezove and Kriakivka were not operational.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that three such sites continued to be abandoned.

[5] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

COPENHAGEN, 19 August 2019 – Marking World Humanitarian Day, which this year is dedicated to honoring the work of women, the leaders of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly’s Committee on Democracy, Human Rights and Humanitarian Questions today highlighted women’s contributions to promoting human rights in the OSCE area.

Committee Chair Kyriakos Hadjiyianni (Cyprus) stressed that the defence of women’s rights must be prioritized in the foreign policies of OSCE participating States, noting positive examples in countries including Canada, France and Switzerland, which have linked humanitarian aid to gender equality, implemented new measures to fight sexual violence and sexual harassment, and promoted gender-based foreign policies.

“Following struggles of activists for women’s rights, some OSCE countries have made important progress in advancing gender equality, both within their own societies and by prioritizing women’s issues in their foreign policies,” said Hadjiyianni. “Today, I want to salute these women leaders and honor their work by calling for additional progress to be made toward gender equality and stronger humanitarian responses to the challenges facing our region.”

He also highlighted violence against women, particularly in conflict zones, as a problem that must be addressed. “In wars and military occupations, women are often exploited. The abuse and rape of women by armies and paramilitary organizations cause fear and panic in order to achieve military and political victories or other purposes. We strongly condemn these practices and urge OSCE participating States to effectively combat such horrific acts,” he said.

Committee Vice-Chair Michael Georg Link (Germany) focused on the work done by women to abolish the death penalty, including in the two OSCE participating States that still carry out executions – Belarus and the United States.

“On World Humanitarian Day, I call for a renewed commitment towards abolishing the death penalty, which has been shown to be both ineffective as a deterrent and a violation of human rights,” Link said. “I regret that after decades of progress rolling back the use of capital punishment in the United States, the current administration is reportedly moving ahead with plans to resume executions after a 16-year moratorium at the federal level.”

He urged the U.S. to reconsider this move, pointing to the many calls by the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly for the abolition of the death penalty in the OSCE area. (See, inter alia, the Resolution on Abolition of the Death Penalty adopted at the 2017 Annual Session in Minsk.)

Committee Rapporteur Susana Amador (Portugal) said: “Today’s World Humanitarian Day is an opportunity to celebrate the work of women as humanitarian leaders, voices of conscience, facilitators of dialogue and peace, and agents of change. Whether the issue is prevention of conflicts, migration, the rights of children or the humanitarian situation in conflict zones such as eastern Ukraine, women are working on front lines in their own communities and are often risking their own lives to help others. Today we salute these unsung heroes.”

428132 Munira Shoinbekova, OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe

Twenty young people from Tajikistan, 14 women and six men, nominated by registered political parties in Tajikistan, participated in the summer school “Youth for Gender Equality" from 12 to 17 August 2019 in the OSCE Academy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.

The course was delivered by an experienced gender trainer from Kyrgyzstan, who   presented   the international normative frameworks adopted by Tajikistan on protecting and advancing women's rights, as well as skills on conducting a gender analysis and gender budgeting.

The summer school included meetings with active youth organizations working on the promotion of women's rights in Kyrgyzstan and Central Asia.  In addition, OSCE Academy professors delivered lectures on political theory and democratization. 

During the "Coffee with Leaders" session, Avazkan Ormonova, Member of the Kyrgyz Parliament and Chairwoman of the budget group noted:  "Youth and women must be equal partners in promoting women’s rights.  We need to be united at all levels of politics, including local, national and regional.”

The event was jointly organized by the OSCE Programme Office in Dushanbe and OSCE Academy in Bishkek.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and more in Luhansk region.
• The SMM continued observing demining activities inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure, including repairs to gas pipelines, power lines, and the drilling of the water wells.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]  

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however, more explosions (52), compared with the previous reporting period (about 40 explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and in areas south of Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk). The ceasefire violations registered at the latter area were assessed as part of a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone.

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (35), compared with the previous reporting period (nine explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east and south of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk).

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

In the evening of 15 August, while on the eastern edge of Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard two shots of small-arms fire, assessed as outside the disengagement area, but within its 5km periphery.On 16 August, inside the disengagement area, the SMM saw up to seven deminers of the State Emergency Service (SES) of Ukraine conducting demining activities on the eastern side of the road north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk).

The SMM saw up to 16 deminers from non-government-controlled areas, cutting trees and clearing vegetation on the eastern side of the road south of the broken section of the bridge, with some carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. Inside the disengagement area, the Mission saw a member of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them.[2]

In the morning of 16 August, at the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, the SMM observed about 700 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and about 400 people queuing to exit government-controlled areas. The Mission saw that the EECP closed at 17:30 leaving about 60 people in the queue to exit. A representative of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine (SBGSU) informed the pedestrians that according to the SBGSU website, the EECP closes at 17:30. At 18:15, the SMM saw that the people had left the vicinity of the EECP. At the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the bridge, the SMM saw a steady flow of people traveling in both directions throughout the day. 

Other disengagement areas[3]

On 15 August, an SMM mid-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) again spotted at least 30 anti-tank mines laid in three rows in a field inside the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), about 90m south of its northern edge and about 70m east of road T-1316, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. During the same day, inside the disengagement area near Zolote, the SMM saw two soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces in two trenches. On 16 August, positioned at the northern edge of the disengagement area, the SMM heard two undetermined explosions at an assessed range of 2-3km south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area.

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Government-controlled areas

16 August

The SMM saw two towed howitzers (2A36 Giatsint-B, 152mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near Lysychansk (75km north of Luhansk).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[4]

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

16 August

The SMM noted that 21 tanks (16 T-72 and five T-64), 23 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), six towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm), 12 mortars (M120-15 Molot, 120mm), 21 mortars (2B11 Sani, 120mm), a mortar (BM-37, 82mm) and three anti-tank guns (MT-12) remained missing.

At heavy weapons holding areas in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

16 August

The SMM noted that 13 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) were present and 50 towed howitzers (2A36) and 15 self-propelled howitzers (2S1) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites[5]

At permanent storage sites in government-controlled areas of Luhansk region

16 August

The SMM noted that 51 tanks (T-64) and six mortars (M120-15) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

16 August

The SMM saw:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR-60) in Stanytsia Luhanska; and
• an APC (BTR-70) near Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk, 43km north of Donetsk);

The SMM saw a non-SMM UAV landing 300m south-west of the SMM’s position on the eastern edge of Popasna.

Non-government-controlled areas

15 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted five armoured combat vehicles near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted three infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-1) under camouflage netting near Lobacheve (13km east of Luhansk).

16 August

The SMM saw an (APC) (MT-LB) on the northern outskirts of Kadiivka (formerly Stakhanov, 50km west of Luhansk).

Demining activities on the road between Popasna and Molodizhne and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Khreshchatytske

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate demining activities on the road between the checkpoint of the Ukrainian Armed Forces on the eastern edge of Popasna and a checkpoint of the armed formations south-west of Molodizhne (non-government-controlled, 63km north-west of Luhansk). For about two hours, five deminers from non-government-controlled areas conducted demining activities. At two different locations near the said road, the SMM heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonation of explosive devices.

In Khreshchatytske (formerly Krasnoarmiiske, non-government-controlled, 33km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM saw two pieces of UXO in the ground near the Pervomaiska Street where on 16 July the SMM observed damage from artillery rounds to residential buildings (for previous observations, see SMM Daily 16 July 2019).

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to gas pipelines and to power lines near Holmivskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km north-east of Donetsk), the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk) and to the phenol sludge reservoir near Zalizne (formerly Artemove, government-controlled, 42km north-east of Donetsk).

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two separate occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), a member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage citing “an ongoing anti-terrorist operation in the area”.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On the night of 15-16 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Bila Hora (government-controlled, 54km north of Donetsk) and Horlivka (non-government-controlled, 39km north-east of Donetsk).[7]
• An SMM mini-UAV and an SMM mid-range UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.8

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Berezove were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[5] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[6]           The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs’ position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• A man from Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district was injured from shrapnel in April.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near government-controlled Zolote-4/Rodina.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled Zernove.
• The SMM saw a new trench near the Donetsk Filtration Station.
• The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Zaichenko and Verkhnoshyrokivske.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, however a similar number of explosions (about 40), compared with the previous reporting period. Almost half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) (assessed as part of a live-fire exercise inside the security zone, in violation of the decision of the Trilateral Contact Group of 3 March 2016 that prohibits the conduct of live-fire training in the security zone).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including nine explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (three explosions). The majority of ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south-east of Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk) and east of Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk).

Man injured from shrapnel from incident in April

In the Trudivski area of Donetsk city’s Petrovskyi district (non-government-controlled, 15km south-west of Donetsk city centre), on 15 August, the SMM saw a man (56 years old) with fresh scars, two on his right arm and another on his left elbow. The man said that he was injured on 6 April when a projectile had landed in his garden at 30 Maksymilianivska Street. The wife of the man told the SMM over the phone that she had been in the other side of the garden at that time and had found her husband with the abovementioned injuries. The SMM was unable to access the man’s house due to security considerations. On 7 April, at a hospital in the Petrovskyi district, medical staff told the SMM that a man (56 years old) from the Trudivski area had been admitted on 6 April with shrapnel-related injuries incurred that day in that area.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) near Zolote-4/Rodina

While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was flying about 2km east of the patrol. The Mission safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

Inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), the SMM saw vehicles, including a crane and a truck, belonging to the State Emergency Services (SES) of Ukraine parked north of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk).

Around 60m east of the broken section of the bridge, the SMM saw ten members of the armed formations burning tree branches and clearing vegetation, with some carrying metal detectors and prodding sticks. It also saw up to seven members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

In the early morning hours of 15 August, the SMM camera in Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) recorded a projectile in flight at an assessed range of 2-4km east-south-east (the SMM could not assess if inside or outside the Zolote disengagement area). On the same day, positioned on the northern edge of Zolote-4/Rodina, the SMM heard eight shots of small-arms fire at an assessed range of 1-1.5km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area and aimed at the UAV (see above).

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk), the SMM observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal lines

Non-government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) in a training area south of Zernove (70km south of Donetsk) in a zone within which deployment of heavy armament and military equipment is further proscribed according to Point 5 of the Memorandum of 19 September 2014.

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted five tanks (T-80) under a camouflage net near Paraskoviivka (75km north of Donetsk), about 1km from where small-arms fire was directed at an SMM mini-UAV (see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019).  

Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 23 tanks in a training area near Ternove (57km east of Donetsk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 24 July 2019) and
• 22 tanks and 24 pieces of towed artillery in a training area near Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 13 August 2019).

Other weapons observed[4]

On 11 August, aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of three towed howitzers or mortars (types undetermined) in a training area near Ternove (see above) (not seen in imagery from 28 July 2019).

Weapons that the SMM could not verify as withdrawn[5]

At heavy weapons holding areas in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 August

The SMM noted that 13 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) remained missing.

Weapons permanent storage sites[6]

At permanent storage sites in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region

14 August

The SMM noted that 23 tanks (14 T-72 and nine T-64), 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and nine mortars (2B14 Podnos, 82mm) remained missing.

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[7]

Government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted two armoured personnel carriers (APCs) (BTR variant) north-east of Zolote-4/Rodina.

An SMM long-range UAV spotted:

• two infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs) (BMP variant) near Troitske (69km west of Luhansk) and
• three probable IFVs (BMP variant) near Novhorodske (35km north of Donetsk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• four IFVs (three BMP-2 and a BMP-1) and an APC (BTR-70) in a compound in Chermalyk (31km north-east of Mariupol) and an IFV (BMP-1) under a camouflage net north of Chermalyk; and
• a new trench about 10m in length running from east to west from a bunker into a wooded area, with two members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces inside of it, on the western side of road H20, about 200m west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk) (not seen in imagery from 31 May 2019) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 15 August 2019).

15 August

The SMM saw:

• an IFV (BTR-4) near Novobakhmutivka (28km north of Donetsk) and
• an APC (BTR-70) in a concrete shelter north of the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska.

Non-government-controlled areas

14 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted three APCs (two MT-LB and a BTR variant) under a camouflage net on the south-eastern edge of Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

Border areas not under government control

On 14 August, while at a border crossing point near Uspenka (73km south-east of Donetsk) for about an hour, the SMM saw 16 cars (nine with Ukrainian and two with Russian Federation licence plates and five with “DPR” plates), 12 covered cargo trucks (ten with Ukrainian licence plates and two with “DPR” plates) and two buses with Ukrainian licence plates entering Ukraine. During the same time, the SMM saw 32 cars (five with Ukrainian and 11 with Russian Federation licence plates and 16 with “DPR” plates) and 31 covered cargo trucks (13 with Ukrainian, three with Belarusian and one with Russian Federation licence plates, as well as 13 with “DPR” and one with “LPR” plates) exiting Ukraine.  

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to a water pipeline between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna and the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk). The SMM facilitated the movement of Vodafone employees from non-government- to government-controlled areas through the checkpoint of the armed formations near Horlivka.  

The SMM also continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS and to monitor the security situation in the area of the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Calm situation at the crossing points between Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Crimea

On 14 August, the Mission observed a calm situation at the crossing points between Kalanchak (67km south-east of Kherson), Chaplynka (77km south-east of Kherson) and Crimea.

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint about 800m north of Zaichenko (non-government-controlled, 26km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage southwards to Sakhanka (non-government-controlled, 24km north-east of Mariupol) and westwards to Pikuzy (formerly Kominternove, non-government-controlled, 23km north-east of Mariupol), citing “ongoing demining activities in the area”.

Delays:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), three members of the armed formations again delayed the SMM passage citing “orders from superiors not to let the SMM into non-government-controlled areas”, allowing it to proceed only after 40 minutes of waiting at the checkpoint.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Zolote-4/Rodina (government-controlled, 59km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard small-arms fire about 1-1.5km east, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• On the night of 14-15 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over Ivanopillia (government-controlled, 51km north of Donetsk), Bezimenne (non-government-controlled, 30km east of Mariupol) and Siedovo-Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 89km south of Donetsk). The same UAV also experienced dual GPS signal interference, assessed as caused by jamming, while flying over Petrivske (non-government-controlled, 41km south of Donetsk).[8]
• On 15 August, an SMM mini-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as probable jamming, while flying over the Petrovskyi district of Donetsk city. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.9

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Berezove were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[5] The SMM visited areas previously holding weapons that could not be verified as withdrawn, as their storage did not comply with the criteria set out in the 16 October 2015 notification from the SMM to the signatories of the Package of Measures on effective monitoring and verification of the withdrawal of heavy weapons. The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[6] The SMM noted that one such site continued to be abandoned.

[7] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[8] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
• The Mission again saw small-arms fire damage to a school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka. It also saw damage from gunfire at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at an SMM mini unmanned aerial vehicle near government-controlled Paraskoviivka.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines in non-government-controlled areas, including multiple launch rocket systems.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs to and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the Mission’s access continued, including at a checkpoint near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske and at a heavy weapons holding area in non-government-controlled areas of Donetsk region.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, including fewer explosions (38), compared with the previous reporting period (87 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations, including almost half of the explosions, were recorded in areas south-south-east and south of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol), at southerly directions of Avdiivka (government-controlled, 17km north of Donetsk) and Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk) and in areas north-east of Pervomaiske (government-controlled, 17km north-west of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, all explosions (three), compared with the previous reporting period (two explosions).

Damage from gunfire to a functioning school in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka

The SMM again observed damage from gunfire to the three-storey brick building of a functioning school on Myru Street in Zolote-5/Mykhailivka (non-government-controlled, 58km west of Luhansk). The Mission saw two holes in two first-floor window panes on the north-east-facing wall of the building. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by small-arms fire. Two members of school staff told the SMM that they had first seen the damage in the morning on 13 August when they arrived at work.

Damage from gunfire to booth at the entry-exit checkpoint in Maiorsk

At the entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) in Maiorsk (government-controlled, 45km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM saw three holes on the south-facing metal wall of one of the booths located at the south-eastern edge of the EECP. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by 5.47mm or 7.62mm bullets. Officers of the State Border Guard Services of Ukraine at the EECP told the Mission that the damage had occurred three days prior at night.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAV near Paraskoviivka

While conducting a mini unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flight near Paraskoviivka (government-controlled, 75km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire at an assessed distance of about 1km south-east of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which was also flying about 1km south-east of the patrol. The Mission safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 14 August, the SMM saw four vehicles belonging to the State Emergency Services of Ukraine parked about 100m north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north of Luhansk), as well as vegetation burning east of the broken section of the bridge. It also saw six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

Other disengagement areas[3]

Positioned close to the disengagement area near Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk), the Mission observed a calm situation.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal linesNon-government-controlled areas

12 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted four towed howitzers (D-30 Lyagushka, 122mm) and two self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm) near Bile (22km west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 21 July 2019).

 

13 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) near the railway station in Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk).

14 August

The Mission saw four multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) near Novoamvrosiivske (56km east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

14 August

The SMM saw two surface-to-air missile systems (9K33 Osa) near Valerianivka (51km south-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of:

• 22 tanks in a training area near Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 13 August 2019) and
• five tanks in a training area near Shymshynivka (27km south-west of Luhansk) (for previous observations see SMM Daily Report 10 August 2019).

14 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted seven tanks (type undetermined) entering a training area near Kruhlyk (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[4]

Government-controlled areas

13 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted:

• an armoured personnel carrier (APC) (BTR variant) near Pyshchevyk;
• a 140m-long extension of a trench about 3km south-east of Pyshchevyk (not seen in imagery from 4 June 2019), as well as an ongoing construction of a mortar pit about 2km north from the trench extension;
• two infantry fighting vehicles (one BTR-3E and one BMP variant) near Stanytsia Luhanska; and
• an APC (MT-LB) west of the bridge near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk).

14 August

The SMM saw:

• an APC (BTR-70) inside a concrete shelter, under a camouflage net, outside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (for previous observation, see SMM Daily Report 5 August 2019) and
• a new military position with five Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel reinforcing it located on road H20 about 200m west of the Donetsk Filtration Station (DFS) (15km north of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

13 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted two APCs (MT-LB) near the railway station in Debaltseve.

14 August

The SMM saw a reinforcement of an existing trench on the northern side of M-04 road near the interchange with road H-20, about 800 west of the edge of Yasynuvata.

Mines seen near Shchastia and Vesela Hora; unexploded ordnance seen near Raivka and Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 13 and 14 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 36 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid in three rows across road H-21 south of the bridge in Shchastia, assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

On 14 August, an SMM mini-UAV again spotted 27 anti-tank mines (TM-62) laid out in four rows across road H-21, east and north-east of Vesela Hora (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Luhansk), assessed as belonging to the armed formations.

On 13 August, the Mission saw for the first time a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), assessed as a rocket-propelled grenade and recent, about 10m north of the road from Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol) to Pyshchevyk, about 2km west of Verkhnoshyrokivske.

On 14 August on the side of a local road on the northern outskirts of Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM saw a piece of UXO, assessed as a projectile from an MLRS rocket and not recent.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The Mission monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna (government-controlled, 69km west of Luhansk), to power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and to power lines in the area of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk), as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the DFS.

The SMM continued monitoring in Kherson, Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, UXO and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily Report 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• On two occasions, at a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), members of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage citing “an ongoing operation in the area” on the first occasion and “orders from superiors” on the second.

Delays:

• A member of the armed formations delayed the SMM’s entry into a heavy weapons holding area in a non-government-controlled area of Donetsk region by about 40 minutes.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO. For instance, on 14 August a Ukrainian Armed Forces officer on two occasions denied the SMM passage across the bridge in Shchastia.

Other impediments:

• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Paraskoviivka (government-controlled, 75km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 20 bursts of small-arms fire about 1km south-east of the patrol, assessed as aimed at the mini-UAV, which it landed safely.
• On the night of 13-14 August, an SMM long range-UAV lost its GPS signal due to signal interference, assessed as caused by probable jamming, while flying over government- and non-government-controlled areas of north and east Donetsk region and central Luhansk region.[5]
• On four occasions, SMM mini-UAVs experienced signal interference while flying near Chermalyk (government-controlled, 31km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Kruta Balka (non-government-controlled, 16km north of Donetsk), assessed as caused by probable jamming.

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM cameras in Kriakivka and Berezove were not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAVs positions.

SDGs SDGs:  16 - Peace, justice and strong institutions

This report is for the media and the general public. 

Summary

• Compared with the previous reporting period, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region and fewer in Luhansk region.
• Residential houses were damaged by mortar fire in Verkhnoshyrokivske.
• Small-arms fire was assessed as directed at SMM mini-unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) near government-controlled Hnutove and Talakivka and non-government-controlled Obozne; near Obozne, the SMM mini-UAV was lost.
• The SMM observed that demining works continued inside the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area; it saw, for the first time, a golf cart transporting people from the entry-exit checkpoint near Stanytsia Luhanska to the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It also recorded ceasefire violations inside the Zolote disengagement area.
• The Mission saw weapons in violation of withdrawal lines on both sides of the contact line, including multiple launch rocket systems near non-government-controlled Sadovyi.
• The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to facilitate repairs of and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure.
• Restrictions of the SMM’s access continued, including at checkpoints near non-government-controlled Verkhnoshyrokivske, Ukrainske and Kreminets. SMM UAVs were subjected to signal interference.*

Ceasefire violations[1]

In Donetsk region, the SMM recorded more ceasefire violations, including more explosions (87), compared with the previous reporting period (65 explosions). More than half of the ceasefire violations were recorded in areas south and south-south-east of Pyshchevyk (government-controlled, 25km north-east of Mariupol) and at southerly and westerly directions of Yasynuvata (non-government-controlled, 16km north-east of Donetsk).

In Luhansk region, the SMM recorded fewer ceasefire violations, however two explosions, compared with the previous reporting period (no explosions). Almost all ceasefire violations were recorded at southerly and easterly directions of Zolote (government-controlled, 60km west of Luhansk) (see below).

Five residential houses were damaged by mortar fire in Verkhnoshyrokivske

On 12 August, an SMM mini-UAV spotted three fresh craters on Zoriana Street on the northern edge of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as fresh and caused by mortar rounds (calibre undetermined), and at least 18 craters in a field about 100m north-west of the aforementioned craters, assessed as fresh and caused by 120mm mortar rounds, all about 30m north of residential houses. It also observed two residential houses, about 100 and 200m south-east and south-west of the aforementioned craters, respectively, each with a hole (about 1m in diameter) in the east-facing side of their roofs and other damage, including missing roof panels from the first house and six shattered windows, as well as pieces of window frames, lying on the ground around the second house. The SMM mini-UAV observed two probable underground bunkers and five trenches connecting mortar pits about 20m south of the aforementioned craters, assessed as belonging to the armed formations. It also observed ammunition crates between two nearby houses.

On 13 August, in Verkhnoshyrokivske, led by members of the armed formations, the SMM followed up on reports regarding damages to single-storey residential houses (see above).

At 4 Zoriana Street, the SMM observed a hole (2m in diameter) in the roof of an inhabited residential house and a corresponding hole in the ceiling of a room, as well as the tailfin of a mortar round stuck in the south-facing wall of the same room. The SMM assessed the damage to be fresh and the tailfin to belong to an undetonated 82mm mortar round fired from a north-westerly direction. At the same address, residents (two women in their forties and sixties, and a man in his twenties) told the SMM that they, as well as another man in his twenties, were inside the house when it was hit, but that nobody had suffered any injuries. About 50m north of the house, the Mission also observed a hole (3m in diameter) and broken tiles on the roof of a storage shed, assessed as fresh and caused by an 82mm mortar round from a north-westerly direction.

At 10 Zoriana Street, about 100m east of the aforementioned house, the SMM observed two craters, one in a yard, about 20m south of an inhabited residential house and the other in the asphalt road, about 30m south of the house. The SMM assessed the two craters to be fresh and caused by 120mm mortar rounds from a north-westerly direction.

At 11 Zoriana Street, about 30m north of the house at 10 Zoriana Street, the Mission saw that almost all roof tiles of an inhabited residential house were missing, and that a south-facing window was shattered. It also observed that the tiles and beams of the roof of a summer kitchen, 10m east of the residential house, were missing. The SMM assessed the damage to be fresh and caused by impacts of 120mm mortar rounds from a north-westerly direction. The SMM also saw four craters (1.5m in diameter), one about 2m south-east and three in a field about 30m north-east of the house. The SMM assessed the craters as fresh and likely caused by 120mm mortar rounds from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the house (a woman in her sixties) told the SMM that a mortar round had hit her house in the morning of 12 August while she and her grandson had been in the shelter of a neighbour’s house.

The SMM observed five craters in the asphalt road, as well as in soft ground, about 70m south-east of the aforementioned residential house, with the closest being 10m south of a residential house. It assessed them all as fresh and caused by 120m mortar rounds from a north-westerly direction. Nearby, it observed four electricity lines hanging off an electricity pole, assessed as having been caused by shrapnel from the aforementioned mortar rounds.

At 13 Zoriana Street, about 200m south-east of the aforementioned residential house, the Mission observed that the tiles and beams of a roof of an inhabited residential house were missing, that all its nine windows were shattered and that there were cracks in the north-, south-, and west-facing walls of the house. The SMM also observed household items scattered around the house, assessed as caused by a blast. It assessed the damage as fresh and caused by a direct hit of a mortar round from a north-westerly direction. The owner of the house (a woman in her seventies) told the Mission that she lives alone and had been at home in her yard when it had been hit in the morning of 12 August.

At 17 Zoriana Street, about 70m north-west of the aforementioned house, the SMM observed a crater in soft ground about 10m south of an inhabited residential house, assessed as fresh and caused by a 120mm mortar round from a north-westerly direction. Also, the Mission observed multiple shrapnel holes to the gate and fence located 4m south-east of the house. The owners of the house (a man in his fifties and a woman in her twenties) told the SMM that their house had been impacted in the morning of 12 August, when the woman had been in the yard.

The SMM observed that several houses on Zoriana Street were occupied by members of the armed formations.

Small-arms fire assessed as directed at SMM mini-UAVs near Hnutove and Talakivka

Positioned about 2km north of Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km north-east of Mariupol), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard at least 12 bursts and uncountable shots of small-arms fire about 3.4km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3.4km east of its position (between positions of the Ukrainian Armed Forces and positions of the armed formations). The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

Positioned on the eastern edge of Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), while conducting a mini-UAV flight, the SMM heard seven bursts and uncountable shots of small-arms fire about 2km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 2km east of its position. The SMM safely landed the UAV and left the area.*

SMM mini-UAV lost near Obozne after small-arms fire assessed as directed at UAV

While conducting a mini-UAV flight on the northern edge of Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard three bursts of small-arms fire about 3km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which was flying about 3km north of its position. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it.*

Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area

On 12 August, at 18:43 and 18:47, the Mission heard two explosions, assessed as controlled detonations of explosive devices, south of the broken section of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (15km north-east of Luhansk). These explosions occurred after the Ukrainian Armed Forces entry-exit checkpoint (EECP) outside the disengagement area and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (inside the disengagement area) had been closed (at 18:00).

During the day on 13 August, inside the disengagement area near Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM observed ten deminers of the State Emergency Service of Ukraine clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities east of the road, about 50-100m north of the northern wooden ramp of the broken section of the bridge.

The Mission also saw six deminers from non-government-controlled areas clearing vegetation and conducting demining activities on both sides of the broken section of the bridge. It observed that, between the Prince Ihor Monument, about 250m south-east of the south-eastern edge of the Stanytsia Luhanska disengagement area, and the checkpoint of the armed formations south of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the soft shoulders on a 700m stretch of road had been cleared of vegetation and that about ten mine hazard signs had been placed on either side of the road. The SMM also observed, for the first time, six mine hazard signs along an unpaved road leading from the aforementioned monument to summer houses about 600m north-west of the monument, inside the disengagement area.

The SMM saw at least six members of the armed formations wearing armbands with “JCCC” written on them south of the bridge.[2]

The SMM saw that the shuttle bus continued operating between the Ukrainian Armed Forces EECP and the broken section of the bridge. It also observed a golf cart transporting eight people at a time from a location south of the EECP to the broken section of the bridge and back. A representative of an international organisation told the SMM that starting from 16 August the cart would be operated by a local organisation and transport people over the age of 75, mothers with children under the age of three, as well as people with disabilities.

Other disengagement areas[3]

On the evening and night of 12-13 August, the SMM camera in Zolote recorded five projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 1.5-4.5km south-east and south-south-east, assessed as inside the disengagement area. On the same evening, it also recorded two projectiles in flight at an assessed range of 2.5-4km east-south-east (unable to assess whether inside or outside the disengagement area) and two projectiles at an assessed range of 2-4km east, assessed as outside the disengagement area but within its 5km periphery.

Withdrawal of weapons

The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons in implementation of the Memorandum and the Package of Measures and its Addendum.

In violation of withdrawal linesGovernment-controlled areas

12 August

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a mortar (2B11, Sani, 120mm) in Hnutove.

Non-government-controlled areas

12 August

An SMM long-range UAV again spotted eight multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21, Grad, 122mm) near Sadovyi (57km south-west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted a tank (T-64) in a residential area on the eastern edge of Novohryhorivka (61km north-east of Donetsk).

Beyond withdrawal lines but outside of designated storage sites

Government-controlled areas

12 August

The SMM saw a tank (T-72) in Kramatorsk (83km north of Donetsk).

13 August

An SMM mid-range UAV spotted a surface-to-air missile system (9K33 Osa) near Novopokrovske (29km north-west of Donetsk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 tanks and four surface-to-air missile systems (types undetermined) in a training area near Buhaivka (37km south-west of Luhansk) (in the same area, aerial imagery revealed also the presence of 63 armoured combat vehicles (ACV).[4] (For previous observations, see SMM Daily Report 9 August 2019.)

Other weapons observed[5]Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of 18 self-propelled howitzers or mortars and 29 towed howitzers or mortars in a training area near Buhaivka (see above).

Indications of military and military-type presence in the security zone[6]

Government-controlled areas

12 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Zolote-4/Rodina (59km west of Luhansk).

An SMM mini-UAV spotted an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-1) in Sukha Balka (36km north of Donetsk).

13 August

The SMM observed an armoured personnel carrier (MT-LB) in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk).

Non-government-controlled areas

11 August

Aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two ACVs (types undetermined) in Bezimenne (30km east of Mariupol).

12 August

An SMM long-range UAV spotted an ACV (type undetermined) near Kruhlyk (65km south-west of Luhansk).

Trench extensions near Vodiane

On 11 August aerial imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence of two trench extensions (30m and 100m in length, not seen in imagery from 30 July 2019), east and south-east of Vodiane (government-controlled, 19km north-east of Mariupol), assessed as belonging to the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

SMM facilitation of repairs and the operation of essential civilian infrastructure

The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs of water pipelines between Zolote-3/Stakhanovets (government-controlled, 61km west of Luhansk) and Popasna, of power lines servicing the Petrivske pumping station near Artema (government-controlled, 26km north of Luhansk) and of power lines in the area of Holubivske (non-government-controlled, 51km west of Luhansk) and Donetskyi (non-government-controlled, 49km west of Luhansk); as well as to enable the drilling of wells near Raivka (non-government-controlled, 16km north-west of Luhansk).

The SMM also facilitated and monitored the transfer of the body of a deceased Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel from non-government- to government-controlled areas in Luhansk region.

The Mission continued to facilitate the operation of the Donetsk Filtration Station (15km north of Donetsk) and monitor the security situation around the pumping station near Vasylivka (non-government-controlled, 20km north of Donetsk).

Security situation along the Black and Azov Sea costs

On 11 and 12 August, the SMM observed a calm situation along the Black and Azov Sea coasts between Prymorske (190km south-east of Kherson) and Ochakiv (79km west of Kherson).

The SMM continued monitoring in Odessa, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Dnipro, Chernivtsi and Kyiv.

*Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate

The SMM’s monitoring and freedom of movement are restricted by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines, unexploded ordnance (UXO) and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations. They have also agreed that the JCCC should contribute to such response and co-ordinate mine clearance. Nonetheless, the armed formations in parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions frequently deny the SMM access to areas adjacent to Ukraine’s border outside control of the Government (for example, see SMM Daily 1 August 2019). The SMM’s operations in Donetsk and Luhansk regions remain restricted following the fatal incident of 23 April 2017 near Pryshyb; these restrictions continued to limit the Mission’s observations.

Denials of access:

• At a checkpoint west of Verkhnoshyrokivske (formerly Oktiabr, non-government-controlled, 29km north-east of Mariupol), an armed member of the armed formations again denied the SMM passage citing “demining activities”.
• At the western edge of Ukrainske (non-government-controlled, 36km north-east of Mariupol), two armed members of the armed formations denied the SMM passage into the village, citing a need for the SMM “to obtain prior permission from senior members of the armed formations”.

Delays:

• At a checkpoint on the southern edge of Kreminets (non-government-controlled, 16km south-west of Donetsk), three members of the armed formations only allowed the SMM passage after a delay of about 20 minutes, due to their request to see the SMM’s car registration documents. The SMM did not show its registration documents.

Regular restrictions related to disengagement areas and mines/UXO:

• The sides continued to deny the SMM full access to disengagement areas near Zolote and Petrivske, as well as the ability to travel certain roads previously identified as important for effective monitoring by the Mission and for civilians’ movement, through failure to conduct comprehensive clearance of mines and UXO.

Other impediments:

• On two occasions, an SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying near Donetsk city, assessed as caused by probable jamming. [7]
• An SMM mini-UAV experienced signal interference while flying over areas near Hnutove (government-controlled, 20km NE of Mariupol), assessed as caused by probable jamming.
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Hnutove, the SMM heard small-arms fire about 3.4km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above). 
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Talakivka (government-controlled, 17km north-east of Mariupol), the SMM heard small-arms fire about 2km east, assessed as aimed at the UAV, which it landed safely (see above).
• While conducting a mini-UAV flight near Obozne (non-government-controlled, 18km north of Luhansk), the SMM heard three bursts of small-arms fire about 3km north, assessed as aimed at the UAV. The SMM lost control of the UAV and was unable to recover it (see above).

[1] For a complete breakdown of ceasefire violations, please see the annexed table. The SMM camera in Kriakivka was not operational during the reporting period.

* Please see the section at the end of this report entitled “Restrictions of the SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to fulfilment of its mandate”.

[2] The Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) was established in September 2014 by Ukraine and the Russian Federation. Each posted a representative to jointly head the Centre and a staff of officers from the Ukrainian and Russian Federation Armed Forces to be co-located in defined sectors of Luhansk and Donetsk regions. In December 2017, Russian Federation Armed Forces officers withdrew from the JCCC and departed Ukraine.

[3] Disengagement is foreseen in the Framework Decision of the Trilateral Contact Group relating to disengagement of forces and hardware of 21 September 2016.

[4] ACVs mentioned in this section are not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[5] The SMM was unable to assess whether these weapons were in violation of withdrawal lines in the absence of information on their calibre.

[6] The hardware mentioned in this section is not proscribed by the provisions of the Minsk agreements on the withdrawal of weapons.

[7] The interference could have originated from anywhere within a radius of kilometres from the UAV’s position.

VIENNA, 14 August 2019 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Harlem Désir, expressed his concern today over the closure of the TV channel Aprel in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and called for respect for diversity in the media.

On 9 August, the TV channel Aprel was shut down after security forces sealed off the office’s headquarters in Bishkek, as part of a security operation.

“I am concerned by the seizure of assets of the TV channel Aprel and the suspension of its operations,” the Representative said. “While I am fully aware of the exceptional circumstances under which this decision was taken, I call on the relevant authorities to review this decision. Freedom of the media and media diversity should be preserved even in difficult situations.”

The Representative also said that the safety of journalists who cover political events must be respected by all actors, after media worker Aida Djumashova was wounded during the events in Koi-Tash on 7 August and reporters with Vesti.kg, Aprel and Kloop.kg were attacked by protesters in Bishkek on 8 August.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.