European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Rafał Mańko,

© BigNazik / Fotolia

Member States share an obligation with the EU to protect the Union’s financial interests and to counter fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting them under Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), on which the EU anti-fraud programme is based. According to a 2016 Eurobarometer survey, 75 % of EU citizens would like the EU to intervene more in the fight against tax fraud, making it one of the areas with the strongest support for greater EU involvement. At the same time, two thirds of EU citizens evaluate the current EU activity in the fight against fraud as insufficient. This Briefing focuses on two EU programmes within the remit of the fight against fraud: Pericles 2020 and Hercule III, as well as the anti-fraud information system (AFIS) platform (a further two crucial programmes in this area, Customs 2020 and Fiscalis 2020, are the subject of a separate briefing in this series).

Pericles 2020 is a multiannual programme to promote action on the protection and safeguarding of the euro against counterfeiting and related fraud. Pericles 2020’s added value is that it actively encourages an increase in transnational cooperation to protect the euro inside and outside the Union and with the Union’s trading partners. Pericles 2020 also has an international dimension, to address the situation in those Member States or third countries that have the highest rates of euro counterfeiting. The general objective of Pericles 2020, defined in Article 3 of Regulation 331/2014, is to prevent and combat counterfeiting and related fraud, thus enhancing the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and securing the sustainability of public finances. The specific objective of the programme is to protect euro banknotes and coins against counterfeiting and related fraud by supporting and supplementing the measures undertaken by the Member States and assisting the competent national and Union authorities in their efforts to develop close and regular cooperation and an exchange of best practice, where appropriate including third countries and international organisations. In 2018, the Pericles 2020 programme funded a number of actions, for a total of €993 388.74, including providing training and specialised anti-counterfeiting equipment.

The Hercule III programme aims at supporting the combat against irregularities, fraud and corruption that affect the EU budget. The general objective is to protect the financial interests of the Union, enhancing the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and ensuring the protection of taxpayers’ money. More specifically, the programme seeks to prevent and combat fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union. The latest available detailed information on spending under the Hercule III programme is for 2017. In that year, the programme financed, inter alia, grants concerning cigarettes and investigation support, and the procurement of IT databases and tools, tobacco analysis, technical equipment, and grants for anti-fraud, forensics and legal training.

The EU anti-fraud information system (AFIS) is simply a collection of applications that facilitate the exchange of anti-fraud information between OLAF and competent administrations in the framework of the Mutual Assistance Regulation (515/97). These applications include: AFIS Mailing (structured & unstructured communications); Customs Information System (CIS); FIDE System; Mutual Information System with the Russian Federation (MIS); virtual-OCU supporting Joint Surveillance Operations, and WCO-CigInfo system for the exchange of data relating to cigarette seizures between the Member States and the World Customs Organization (via OLAF). The AFIS platform also provides the irregularity management system (IMS) – a secure electronic tool for the reporting, management and analysis of irregularities, including fraud, that affect the financial interests of the EU. Competent national authorities use the IMS to report irregularities relating to EU funds in agriculture, structural and cohesion policy, fisheries, asylum-related funds, and the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, as well as in pre-accession assistance.

On 30 May 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing an EU anti-fraud programme under the new 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal entails grouping the Hercule III programme with the anti-fraud information system (AFIS) and irregularity management system (IMS) operational activities (the latter is currently financed through AFIS). Under the proposed new programme, the operational provisions of AFIS and IMS would remain under their respective legal instruments, with only the financing provisions of AFIS transferred to the new EU anti-fraud programme regulation. This new financing arrangement for AFIS would cover all actions currently financed under AFIS, including IMS. IMS would become a stand-alone action to be financed under the new regulation, thereby uncoupling it from AFIS, as is currently the case.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Fight against fraud: Pericles 2020, Hercule III and AFIS‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Denise Chircop,

© ocon10 / Fotolia

The proportion of young people (15-29 years old) in the general EU population is declining. On the whole, young people have a higher level of education than older adults, and youth unemployment rates have begun to decrease. Nevertheless, young people are still more exposed to poverty and social exclusion than other sections of the population. They are less prone to put their health at risk than previous generations. For instance, fewer young people smoke, get drunk, or become involved in a road accident than previously, but young people are still over-represented among those who are injured in road accidents. Obesity due to bad eating habits and lack of physical exercise is still an issue. Young people are also less likely to vote, or stand for election than older adults, but in recent years there has been a slight increase in interest in politics, political action and volunteering. Almost 80 % of young Europeans identify themselves as European citizens. In a Eurobarometer survey published in 2018 they placed education, skills and the environment at the top of a list of priorities for the EU.

The European Union is engaged in helping Member States address young people’s needs and aspirations through a youth strategy which covers areas such as employment, entrepreneurship, social inclusion, participation, education, training, health, wellbeing, voluntary activities, the global dimension, creativity and culture. The strategy is backed by a number of funding programmes that are specifically focused on young people, most notably the Youth Employment Initiative, Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps. It also draws from funds directed at other specific policy areas. EU action in the area of youth empowerment is best known for the mobility opportunities it has created, in particular through Erasmus. Future challenges include reaching a wider spectrum of young people, especially those from disadvantaged and hard-to-reach groups, making the results of the consultative process, known as structured dialogue, more tangible, and improving synergies between policy areas for greater effectiveness.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Youth empowerment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon,

© A.Hartung / Fotolia

European Union (EU) action beyond its borders often requires a combination of approaches. The EU Treaties differentiate between common foreign and security policy (CFSP), common security and defence policy (CSDP), external action, and the external dimension of internal policies, but in the field, issues are so intertwined that more often than not a single tool is not sufficient. For example, population displacement triggered by a conflict over natural resources has to be addressed by humanitarian aid, itself secured by a CSDP mission, and its effects mitigated by adequate migration and development policies, while peace talks are conducted. Coordination between all stakeholders is challenging but vital, not only as a response but also for prevention.

In order to address new challenges such as climate change, rising insecurity or new migration patterns, the EU has put forward concrete solutions to shape synergy between the actors, in order to use shared expertise more effectively, and to find new sources of funding. The new foreign policy framework (EU global strategy) is designed to map the tools and resources best designed to help society as a whole, in the EU and partner countries, to withstand natural and manmade shocks more effectively. This means making connections between actors and between traditionally separate policy areas. Budgetary constraints and the will to depart from a donor/recipient relationship have also resulted in innovative financing tools, using EU funds to leverage private investments.

Two years since its launch, the global strategy has proved to be a coherent vision. Nevertheless, sturdy, comprehensive external action requires coordination at all levels. In the years to come, global instability is expected to rise; the challenge for the EU will be to ensure security while upholding the core values of the Treaties – human rights, democracy and the fight against poverty – as its primary objectives on the global stage.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Foreign policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp, Gianluca Sgueo and Sofija Voronova,

© Sean K / Fotolia

Faced with a growing international terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an ever more ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Even though primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools as well as financial support to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond its own borders.

EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years and is set to grow in the future, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security, such as Europol and eu-LISA. Financing for cooperation with third countries has also increased, including through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted since 2014 range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms. To evaluate the efficiency of the existing tools and identify gaps and possible ways forward, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR), which delivered its report in November 2018. TERR made extensive recommendations for immediate or longer term actions aiming to prevent terrorism, combat its root causes, protect EU citizens and assist victims in the best possible way.

In line with these recommendations, future EU counter-terrorism action will most probably focus on addressing existing and new threats, countering radicalisation – including by preventing the spread of terrorist propaganda online – and enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure. Foreseeable developments also include increased information sharing, with planned interoperability between EU security- and border-related databases, as well as investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes at EU level, through the proposed extension of the mandate of the recently established European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: The fight against terrorism‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© magele-picture / Fotolia

An investment gap in the European Union (EU) persisting several years after the financial and economic crisis is one of the various challenges confronting the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2014 to 2020 since its beginning. The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) was created in 2015 to provide the EU budget’s contribution to addressing this challenge, as part of the broader investment plan for Europe.

Following its extension and reinforcement in 2017, EFSI currently aims to trigger additional investment worth €500 billion in sectors of the EU’s economy that suffer from market failures and sub-optimal investment situations by 2020. The concept of additionality is closely linked to the fund. This means that EFSI-backed operations should be viable financing and investment activities that could not have taken place, or not to the same extent, without EFSI.

EFSI focuses on various crucial sectors that can provide a significant contribution to job creation and sustainable growth in the EU, such as strategic infrastructure, education, research, development and innovation, renewable energy, and resource efficiency. Another major objective is to improve access to finance for European companies, with special attention paid to smaller businesses.

The functioning of EFSI relies on a strategic partnership with the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, which can approve and finance investment operations with a higher-risk profile than its usual portfolio, thanks to a €26 billion guarantee provided by the EU budget under EFSI. In addition, the contribution from the EIB’s own resources to EFSI is worth €7.5 billion.

When putting the proposals forward for the investment plan for Europe, the European Commission estimated that each euro of public resources allocated to EFSI (i.e. EU guarantee obligations and the contribution from the EIB’s own resources) should generate, on average, €15 of total investment, by triggering additional financing from other private and/or public sources (the ‘multiplier effect’).

The EU guarantee obligations enable the EIB Group to deploy a wide range of financial instruments supported by EFSI, such as equity-, debt- and guarantee-type products. Relevant activities include the use of already existing financial instruments supported by the EU budget, at a higher and faster rate. Targeting the diverse needs of sectors, countries and individual projects is possible thanks to the variety of options offered.

The various EFSI-backed financial products are available under two investment windows that reflect EFSI’s two overarching objectives. The EIB implements the infrastructure and investment window (IIW) that stimulates strategic investment in various sectors, while the European Investment Fund (EIF) is in charge of the SME window (SMEW) to improve access to finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-cap companies.

As of 5 February 2019, approved EFSI financing amounted to €71.4 billion (of which 75 % through the EIB and 25 % through the EIF), and was projected to trigger a total investment of some €380 billion. Almost three quarters of the investment relates to operations in three of the sectors supported by EFSI: smaller companies (32 %); research, development and innovation (23 %); and energy (18 %).

Examples of EFSI-backed financing include: a €20 million loan to the French small firm Amoéba, which, thanks to the discovery of a natural microorganism, has developed an alternative for industrial water treatment that does not use chlorine and chemical biocides; and €40 million in financing for the development of a wind park in Bruck an der Leitha (Austria) to produce renewable energy for 27 000 households.

EFSI has been closely monitored since its outset, which confirms the interest it has attracted as a tool that can contribute to reducing the investment gap in the EU. Various assessments, including independent evaluations and a special report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), have been produced to date.

The various evaluations agree that EFSI has successfully raised finance to support substantial additional investment in many policy sectors across the EU. Areas for action, highlighted for example in ECA recommendations, include: encouraging complementarity between EU financial instruments and EU budgetary guarantees; improving the assessment of additionality and the estimate of the investment mobilised; and increasing the geographical spread of EFSI supported investment.

Taking account of the various assessments, the European Commission concluded that EFSI has been successful in triggering significant additional investment in the EU and that its function remains relevant in the post-2020 programming period. The Commission has therefore put forward a proposal for a 2021-2027 InvestEU programme, a single investment scheme for internal Union policies that should build on EFSI and streamline the use of financial instruments supported by the EU budget. The proposed guarantee obligations for the new InvestEU Fund, part of the overall programme, amount to €38 billion with an investment target of more than €650 billion over seven years.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger,

© bluedesign / Fotolia

With the European Parliament elections set for May 2019, the 21st EU-China Summit has been advanced, to be held in Brussels on 9 April 2019, only nine months after the previous one. The 2018 summit’s joint statement captured a broad range of deliverables that had been achieved over a three-year period, since the EU and China had failed to agree on joint statements in 2016 and 2017. Considering that not even the short-term commitments on the trade and investment agenda from 2018 have been met, that the context of US-China great power competition looms large and that the EU has adopted more assertive language in its recently issued EU-China strategic outlook, it remains to be seen whether meaningful outcomes will be reached at this year’s summit.

Major issues likely to impact the 21st EU-China Summit

The EU-China Summit 2019 will be held against the backdrop of significant uncertainty about the outcome of the US-China trade war that has taken its toll on the Chinese economy. The exact extent of the drop in Chinese GDP growth is unclear, since Chinese official data are rather a reflection of the government’s political targets than of the real economic situation, and few Chinese academics discuss their diverging calculations in public. The Chinese government has responded to the trade frictions with the US, inter alia, by shifting away from policies prioritising deleveraging back to stimulus policies, including tax cuts and infrastructure spending, and by ordering references to its ‘Made in China 2025‘ strategy to be removed from public discourse, while doubling down on achieving its objectives under new labels. The strategy seeks to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency, and ultimately a dominant position for Chinese companies in 10 advanced technologies at home and abroad, by outcompeting firms of advanced economies. As the trade war is still a major risk and a priority for China, it is likely to continue to drag its feet in talks with the EU in areas in which it wishes to remain flexible for a trade deal with the US. A case in point is an EU-China agreement on geographical indications (GIs), talks on which should already have been finalised by October 2018. The summit will also take place at a time when China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) faces a backlash from new governments in Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone, and allegations of Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy‘ continue unabated. It will also be held at a time when the EU is rolling out its 2018 strategy on connecting Europe and Asia, focused on economic, environmental, fiscal and social sustainability, open procurement, transparency and a level playing field. Italy and Luxemburg have, however, just formally signed up to the BRI, challenging EU unity on the issue. It remains to be seen whether this complicated context will be conducive for the EU and China to make headway towards concrete deliverables under the EU-China Connectivity Platform, e.g. on the implementation of already identified pilot projects. The EU-China Summit 2019 moreover coincides with a controversial and strongly politicised debate in the West about the security, economic, and geopolitical implications of (not) involving Chinese telecom equipment vendors in the EU’s 5G networks (see EPRS ‘at a glance‘ note).

An EU policy shift to a more realistic, assertive and multi-faceted approach to China

In a fairly unusual move ahead of the forthcoming EU-China summit, on 12 March 2019, shortly before the EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue of 18 March, the EU published a ‘strategic outlook‘ for EU-China relations, to be debated at that week’s European Council meeting. The paper refers to a shift in the balance of challenges and opportunities the EU faces in its ties with China; it moves away from portraying China as a strategic partner towards an issue-based, differentiated framing of China as a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. It spells out three goals: to ‘deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at global level’, based on clearly defined interests and principles; to ‘seek more balanced and reciprocal economic relations’; and to ‘adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base’. It sets out 10 actions, and stresses that Member States need to apply a uniform approach to China to achieve these goals.

Dealing with China’s selective engagement in favour of multilateralism

The EU and China are cooperating successfully in some multilateral formats, such as at the 24th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Katowice in late 2018, when they pushed for stringent and uniform reporting rules to implement the Paris Agreement. However, China continues to pursue distinct policies in its bilateral ties, such as funding new coal-fired plants (for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) as part of its BRI projects. By doing so, it clashes with the EU’s strategy for the Western Balkans. Other opportunities for EU engagement with China abound on global and regional issues, such as ocean governance, sustainable finance, Afghanistan, and Iran. However, China’s engagement in favour of multilateralism is at times selective, and based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order, as demonstrated by its refusal to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 binding ruling on maritime features in the South China Sea. WTO reform will be a litmus test for China’s preparedness to support the revision of vital aspects of the WTO’s rulebook – such as those on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and the developing country status – which are inextricably related to its unique economic model.

Glacial progress in levelling the trade and investment playing field with China

The EU is keen to address the long-standing reciprocity gap in EU-China economic relations. According to provisional EU figures for 2018, the deficit (€185 billion) in EU-China total trade in goods (€605 billion) has continued to grow. Despite selective removals of market access barriers, such as ownership caps, China’s overall investment restrictiveness, notably in services, is still very high. The yet to be decided implementing details of the new foreign investment law, which features a negative list approach, pre-establishment national treatment provisions and a prohibition of forced technology transfer, will reveal how meaningful the law is in practice. Progress in the EU-China talks on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI, the EU’s main investment policy tool to level the playing field with China) has, despite 20 negotiating rounds since 2014, been glacial. It remains to be seen whether the recent adoption of the EU framework for foreign direct investment (FDI) screening and the tightening of US FDI screening and export controls will spur China’s interest in concluding the CAI by 2020, as envisaged by the EU. According to transaction-based data, in 2018 Chinese FDI flows in the EU declined considerably, but less than those in the US.

Revising competition and public procurement rules to level the playing field?

There is growing awareness in the EU of the need for a common multi-pronged policy response to the systemic competition between the EU’s market-based and China’s state-capitalist economic models. The latter pursues industrial policies heavily reliant on state-sponsored national champions that seek to acquire global leadership in advanced technologies, while being shielded from foreign competition at home. Huawei has benefited from open overseas markets to expand its global footprint, but China has the most restrictive environment for digital trade. As a review of current EU instruments is set to identify new policy responses to the distortive effects of state-subsidised foreign companies operating in the internal market, business has, inter alia, proposed a new instrument to address state-subsidised takeovers of EU companies by foreign investors as a policy option. A French-German initiative to create European champions as part of proposals for a new EU industrial policy has suffered a setback, after the proposed merger between the rail divisions of Siemens and Alstom was blocked at EU level, drawing criticism and fuelling a debate on EU industrial policy. Unblocking the revised proposal for an international procurement instrument, gridlocked in the Council, is a policy option to open third countries’ public procurement markets, including the Chinese one.

In its resolution on the state of EU-China relations, the EP called for enhanced EU engagement with China on global challenges and in support of multilateralism, building on successful cooperation on peacekeeping and anti-piracy. It stresses that China-led initiatives require a unified EU response and that the imbalance in EU-China economic ties needs to be tackled. It comments critically on the deteriorating human rights situation in China, notably in the autonomous provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang; on political and legal issues in mainland China and Hong Kong; on difficult cross-strait relations; and on China’s foreign influence operations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Towards a new EU policy approach to China: 21st EU-China Summit – April 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read also: EU-China relations topical digest: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/TD_China-EU_relations.pdf

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© David / Fotolia

On 14 November 2018, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) negotiators announced their approval of the legal agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. At a special European Council meeting on 25 November 2018, EU leaders endorsed the draft withdrawal agreement, as well as the text of a non-binding political declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship. While the process of approving the withdrawal deal (the agreement and the political declaration) began rapidly in both the UK and the EU, it immediately met with significant difficulties in the UK. In particular, the House of Commons’ rejection of the withdrawal deal in the ‘meaningful vote’ of 15 January 2019, led to renewed UK attempts at renegotiation. Although the EU and the UK eventually agreed additional guarantees with respect to the Ireland/Northern Ireland backstop, the withdrawal deal was again voted down on 12 March 2019.

Faced with the prospect of a ‘no deal exit’ on 29 March 2019, the initial Brexit date, the UK government, as instructed by the House of Commons, eventually requested an extension to the Article 50 negotiating period. On 22 March, the European Council extended the UK’s EU Membership until 22 May 2019, on the condition that the UK parliament approved the withdrawal agreement by 29 March. As the House of Commons rejected the withdrawal agreement for a third time, the new Brexit date was instead set, under that European Council decision, at 12 April 2019.

With a ‘no deal’ Brexit becoming a highly likely scenario, both sides stepped up their contingency planning. However, other outcomes remain possible, in particular a further Article 50 extension, given the UK Prime Minister’s request of 5 April. The EU-27 are set to decide on this within the European Council on 10 April 2019, most likely on the basis of conditions set for the UK. While a parallel process for establishing a majority for an alternative solution to the negotiated deal is under way in Westminster, its outcome remains uncertain. Finally, although rejected by the government, the UK still has the option to unilaterally revoke its notification to withdraw from the EU, or to organise another referendum on the issue (the latter dependent on an extension).

Please see also the parallel Briefing, Brexit: Understanding the withdrawal agreement and political declaration, of March 2019. And visit the European Parliament homepage on Brexit negotiations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ratifying the EU-UK withdrawal deal: State of play and possible scenarios‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Brexit timeline

Written by Tania Latici,

Against a backdrop of evolving geopolitical configurations and security threats, anniversaries serve as a useful occasion for reflection, allowing us to draw lessons from the past and informing strategies for the future. In this context, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in collaboration with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, hosted a panel discussion on ‘NATO at 70 and CSDP at 20: The future of European security and defence’ on 1 April 2019. The extremely well-attended event took stock of what has been achieved so far in European and transatlantic defence, discussing the state of play of the different EU defence integration initiatives, EU-NATO cooperation and transatlantic relations. A forward-looking discussion about the future of European defence followed the panel debate.

Clare Moody (S&D, UK), Parliament’s Vice-Chair of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence opened the debate, giving a comprehensive overview of the security challenges facing the EU, not least cyber and hybrid threats. Her speech also touched upon the importance of EU-NATO relations and on the complementarity between the two, noting that both organisations share the same fundamental goal, of ensuring the security of European citizens. Clare Moody reminded the audience of the EU’s immense soft power role and its added value for EU external action. However, she also highlighted that, in order for the EU to be credible in its action with external partners, it must act as one, in true solidarity. Lastly, she emphasised the overarching purpose of a robust and coherent defence policy by saying that ‘when we talk about defence, we are intrinsically talking about peace’.

In her role as moderator, Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst in the EPRS External Policies Unit, launched the panel debate by setting the context of the two defence anniversaries of this year: NATO turning 70 and CSDP turning 20. Representing the European External Action Service, Arnout Molenaar (Senior Defence Advisor), noted that the crises of recent years have propelled security and defence to the top of the EU’s agenda, and now represent a key pillar of EU action. In the current multipolar power distribution, the EU must act as a union and has to start to think European. After putting all the structures in place, he noted, the EU must now deliver on its promises and implement initiatives such as permanent structured cooperation and the European Defence Fund, notwithstanding its cooperation with NATO.

Introducing a NATO perspective to the debate, Jamie Shea offered the audience a brief history of NATO. Noting that while in previous years the Alliance had the luxury of focusing on one challenge at the time, He underlined that it now has to take a 360 degree approach and tackle three challenges simultaneously: in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, , and on homeland security – including hybrid threats. For each of these challenges, NATO requires partners – not least the EU. While recognising the progress achieved by the EU in the defence realm, he also noted the importance of burden-sharing and of communicating the EU’s purpose and actions to its transatlantic partner. Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly added that the Alliance’s endurance relies on its ability to adapt to the challenges of the international security environment in the post-Cold War environment. He continued by saying that, rather than defining the Alliance by what it is against, NATO should instead be defined by what it stands for and seeks to protect and defend. The Alliance’s future survivability, he continued, will therefore be impacted by its ability to remain committed to the defence of its core values – democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Looking to the other side of the Atlantic, he argued that despite President Trump’s past criticism of NATO, popular and bipartisan support for NATO is very high in the United States. Although this criticism has had a clear impact on Europeans’ perceptions of US commitment to their security, evidence shows that the United States are as engaged as ever on the ground. Ethan Corbin concluded his remarks by outlining the impending future debate about NATO’s nuclear posture and the coming debate on the Alliance’s potential future actions in a post-INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Europe. Recalling the deterrence and dialogue initiative of the first INF crisis, he noted that any enduring solution would have to involve a return to mutually reassuring arms control agreements.

Moving over from the EU and NATO perspectives to a more Member State focused observation, the Head of the Brussels office of the Antall József Knowledge Centre, Ildikó Szenci reminded the audience of the legacy of the Iron Curtain in central and eastern Europe, which fell 30 years ago in November this year. Against this backdrop, she gave the example of Hungary, who supports the EU’s defence initiatives but sees NATO as the sole responsible body for collective defence. Nonetheless, given the different threat perceptions among EU Members, the EU and NATO each bring unique added value to the protection of Europe.

During the questions and answers session that followed the debate, the audience asked the speakers for their views on citizens’ perceptions of NATO and defence, about the political concept of a ‘European army’ and whether there is any substance to it, on how the United States sees the EU’s action on defence, the role of the European Parliament in defence matters and about post-Brexit EU-UK defence cooperation. The panellists were unanimous in expressing the need for Europeans’ to start implementing their commitments in the realm of defence. They also emphasised that the EU and the UK share the same threats to their security and thus it is vital to remain in close cooperation. Lastly, fact-based analyses such as the EPRS Public Expectations series also demonstrate citizens’ demand for institutions to do more in defence and security matters.

The second and final part of the event focused on the outlook for European defence, with Suzana Anghel, Policy Analyst in the EPRS European Council Oversight Unit, posing challenging questions to her co-panellist, Sven Biscop, Director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont Institute. Her questions related to the direction in which Europe is heading on defence, to the prospects of EU Member States achieving consensus in future defence actions and to Europe’s soft power, questioning whether there is an impetus to go beyond the EU’s traditional civilian perspective. Starting by describing the use of defence as a foreign policy instrument, Sven Biscop made the case for Europe to become a stronger actor, strong enough to engage other great powers on its own terms. He also emphasised the need for Europe to find its own role and not allow this debate to become polarised due to recent USA-China tensions. Lastly, he also noted that the EU and NATO do share a common purpose and are both founded on the principles of democracy.

Many strategic questions and challenges lie ahead for the EU and NATO in this time of uncertain security realities, but what is certain is that the organisations’ role of maintaining peace on the continent is as important now as ever before.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Eamonn Noonan,

Europe can no longer take prosperity, stability, or even democracy for granted. Fundamental changes in technology, in relations between and within continents, and not least in climate, demand vigorous responses. Challenges and Choices for Europe, a new report by the EU’s European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), looks closely at the tasks that lie ahead.

The key European institutions, including the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, jointly examine global trends through an informal network, ESPAS. They have now published a major report offering a forensic and fast-moving tour of the future. It does not minimise the challenges ahead – such as the disastrous consequences of a rise of 1.5 degrees in global temperatures. Yet the report is neither despairing nor defeatist.

A three-cornered comparison with the US and China gives a bearing on Europe’s prospects. By economic size, the EU ranks alongside them as part of a G3. Will this still be the case in 2030? If Europe is left behind in the race for breakthrough technologies, many vulnerabilities will arise. Europe will also need to adapt to having a smaller and older population than other continents. At the same time, a new constellation of defence and security threats is emerging; what capacities and capabilities are necessary?

An embedded culture of democracy, underpinned by the rule of law and by codified individual rights, has driven the rise of Europe. Remarkably, these are now contested, even within. As the ESPAS report points out, democratic renewal and stronger social cohesion promise better economic outcomes and greater resilience to external threats.

Europe has advantages – and one of the greatest is the resourcefulness of its people. Talent is distributed evenly – but opportunity is not. More than most, Europe works to overcome this handicap by ensuring that education is for all, not just a privileged few. The ESPAS report stresses the need to go further, to reach a level of education and training suited to the 21st century.

Europe is also remarkable for its diversity of languages, cultures and beliefs. At a time when some seek to demonise diversity, we need to see it as a powerful resource, as Europe rethinks and redesigns its global role.

The ESPAS report was written by Florence Gaub of the EU Institute of Strategic Studies, with input from the EPRS Global Trends Unit and other parts of the ESPAS network.

Read the complete report Global trends to 2030: Challenges and choices for Europe.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© piyaset / Fotolia

The United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, has urged governments worldwide on March 28 to come to the UN summit on climate in September 2019 with concrete plans to boost action against global warming. The call followed the publication and the annual report on climate change by the World Meteorological Organisation, which warned about dire consequences of the continued rise of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In the same month, hundreds of thousands of students and pupils in 120 countries have tried to draw politicians’ attention to climate change by walking out of classes to stage street protests.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on climate talks and wider issues relating to climate change. Earlier publications on the issue can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ published in November 2018.

Managing climate risk for a safer future: A new resilience agenda for Europe
E3G, April 2019

Raising and strengthening EU climate ambition: Priorities and options for the next five years
IDDRI, SciencesPo, March 2019

Can Europe create strong energy and climate coalitions?
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2019

Nach dem Klimagipfel in Kattowitz: Wichtige Elemente der EU-Klimaagenda 2019
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

What can the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C tell us about a CCS and CCU agenda for Europe?
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2019

European energy transition 2030: The big picture
Ecologic Institute, March 2019

The geopolitical implications of the global energy transition
Bruegel, March 2019

Sustainability and internationalism: Driving development in the 21st century
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, March 2019

The case for green realism
Bruegel, March 2019

Legislating for a low carbon and climate resilient transition: Learning from international experiences
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2019

A pathway design framework for national low greenhouse gas emission development strategies
IDDRI, March 2019

Climate change and human rights: Can the courts fix it?
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, March 2019

Carbon pricing options for international maritime emissions
New Climate Institute, March 2019

Fighting climate change with disclosure? The real effects of mandatory greenhouse gas emission disclosure
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, February 2019

Reducing climate risk in the post-2020 EU budget
EG3, February 2019

How does climate change affect optimal allocation of variable renewable energy?
Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln, February 2019

Defining green bonds: The danger of neglecting the issuer side
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, February 2019

Fuel to the fire: How geoengineering threatens to entrench fossil fuels and accelerate the climate crisis
Center for International Environmental Law, February 2019

Energie-climat en Europe: pour une excellence écologique
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, February 2019

Climate security: Making it doable
Clingendael, February 2019

This is a crisis: facing up to the age of environmental breakdown
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2019

Progress on implementing the Hague declaration on climate and security
Clingendael, February 2019

Vers une société post-carbone
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, February 2019

Getting a grip on the climate challenge to build the future of Europe
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2019

Realizing the promise of Paris: Roadmap to a safer climate
New Climate Institute, January 2019

Agroécologie paysanne: La Via Campesina en action: des solutions pour le climat
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, January 2019

Clean energy standards
Resources for the Future, January 2019

CAP 2021-27: Using the eco-scheme to maximise environmental and climate benefits
Institute for European Environmental Policy, January 2019

Sinking to zero: The role of carbon capture and negative emissions in EU climate policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

Green bonds: Current development and their future
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Triaging climate change
Rand Corporation, January 2019

Intertemporal emissions trading and market design: An application to the EU ETS
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, January 2019

A just transition of European coal regions
E3G, January 2019

Steering the climate system: An extended comment
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, January 2019

The repatriation of competences in climate and energy policy after Brexit: implications for devolution and multi-level government
UK in a Changing Europe, January 2019

The regional dimension of climate change: Making the case for a just and innovative transition
Friends of Europe, December 2018

De la COP 21 à la COP24: Bilan d’étape
OCP Policy Center, December 2018

The role of sub-state and non-state actors in international climate processes: financial institutions
Chatham House, December 2018

Despite technical progress, COP24 struggles to build political momentum
IDDRI, December 2018

Pigou pushes preferences: Decarbonisation and endogenous values
Oxford Martin School, Grantham Research Institute, Centre for Climate Change Economic and Policy, December 2018

Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, December 2018

Are the G20 economies making enough progress to meet their NDC targets?
Energy Policy, March 2019

Climate change and the just transition: a guide for investor action
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, December 2018

How poverty is causing deforestation across Africa
Chatham House, December 2018

Making finance consistent with climate goals: Insights for operationalising article 2.1c of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement
ODI, World Resources Institute, Rocky Mountain Institute, E3G, December 2018

Written by Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition),

© Jonathan Stutz / Fotolia

The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament is considering the 654 amendments, tabled in February 2019, to the European Commission’s September 2018 proposal to recast the Return Directive. The Directive is the main piece of EU legislation governing the procedures and criteria to be applied by Member States when returning irregularly staying third-country nationals, and a cornerstone of the EU return policy. Taking into account the decrease in the EU return rate (45.8 % in 2016 and 36.6 % in 2017), and following European Council and Council calls to review the 2008 legal text to enhance the effectiveness of the EU return policy, the Commission has proposed a targeted recast of the directive aiming to ‘reduce the length of return procedures, secure a better link between asylum and return procedures and ensure a more effective use of measures to prevent absconding’.

Versions

• April 2019: ‘Recasting the Return Directive‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive (EU) 2016/2341 Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2018) 634 final of 12.9.2018 Rapporteur: Judith Sargentini (Greens/EFA, The Netherlands) 2018/0329(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (EPP, Sweden) Sylvie Guillaume (S&D, France) Jussi Halla-aho (ECR, Finland) Sophia in ‘t Veld (ALDE, The Netherlands) Barbara Spinelli (GUE/NGL, Italy) Laura Ferrara (EFDD, Italy) Giancarlo Scottà (ENF, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the April I plenary session included debates on the Future of Europe with Swedish Prime Minister, Stefan Löfven, and on UK withdrawal from the EU. Important debates also took place on several legislative proposals, and Members voted on proposals including the mobility package files debated during the March II plenary session on rules for posted road transport workers and on working conditions for drivers. Parliament also adopted first-reading positions on three further proposed funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period.

Common rules for the internal market for natural gas

Parliament debated and adopted a text agreed in trilogue on applying internal market rules to gas pipelines entering the EU from countries outside the EU. Tighter rules will ensure that, while the EU Member State in which a pipeline arrives is responsible for applying EU law, the Commission must authorise negotiations on such projects, be kept informed of progress, and must authorise the signature of any such agreement.

Multiannual plan for western Mediterranean fisheries

Parliament approved (461 to 62, 101 abstentions) the multiannual plan for the fisheries exploiting demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean to protect stocks from over-exploitation.

EU citizens’ identity and residence documents

Members approved a proposal to curb the fraudulent use of EU citizens’ identity and residence documents. The strengthened proposal should make it harder for criminals and terrorists to use EU identity papers, through clear rules on validity, recognition by Member States, and authorisation to handle biometric data.

Road infrastructure and safety management

Members held a debate and voted on the agreed text of a directive on road infrastructure safety management, addressing shortcomings in the existing legislation to reduce both road fatalities and serious injuries by improving road infrastructure safety performance. It proposes key changes to strengthen safety management procedures and extends the scope beyond the trans-European transport network (TEN-T).

Pan-European personal pension product

Members debated and adopted a provisional agreement on the proposal to create a pan-European personal pension product (PEPP) – a new framework for voluntary pension contributions aiming to tackle the shortfall in pension provision in our ageing society. PEPPs are expected to offer greater choice in savings plans, including a switching service and a default option with a guaranteed return.

Work-life balance for parents and carers

Parliament adopted (490 to 82, 48 abstentions) the text of a new directive on work-life balance for parents and carers which proposes to redress the gender balance in the workplace. Introducing a right to two weeks paternity leave, while maintaining current maternity leave arrangements, the work-life balance package should give parents and carers more flexibility to care for their family by affording greater choice in who takes a break.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

No decisions to enter into negotiations were announced.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, April I 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Szczepański,

© typomaniac / Fotolia

All EU Member States are party to the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The purpose of the Community is to create the necessary conditions for the development of a powerful European nuclear industry. To achieve this goal, the Community promotes research and establishes safety standards, among other things. Consecutive Euratom research and training programmes are established by Council regulations and are based on Article 7 of the Euratom Treaty, which stipulates that programmes shall be drawn up for a period of not more than five years.

The total budget of the Euratom programme for the 2014-2018 period, amounted to €1 603.3 million and was allocated to three programmes:

1. indirect measures in fusion energy research and development (€728.2 million);
2. indirect measures for nuclear fission, safety and radiation protection (€315.5 million);
3. direct measures in the field of nuclear safety, nuclear waste management, safeguards and security, mainly carried out by the Commission’s Joint Research Centre (€559.6 million).

In October 2018, the Council extended the Euratom programme to the 2019-2020 period, to synchronise its duration with the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF). While the objectives of the programme remain unchanged, there is now increased focus on nuclear safety and security aspects that are dealt with by the JRC. The €770.2 million financial envelope for the implementation of the 2019-2020 programme is allocated among the three above-mentioned strands, with respectively €349.8 million for indirect measures in the field of nuclear fusion research, €151.6 million for indirect measures for nuclear fission, and €268.8 million for direct measures in the field of nuclear safety. Switzerland and Ukraine partcipate as associated members of the programme.

An interim evaluation covering the first half of the 2014-2018 periode indicates good progress in reaching the programme’s objectives. It underlines its EU-added value, relevance and efficiency, and suggests improvements, considering for example the need for greater visibility and availability of the results for stakeholders. Taking into account the experiences gained from running the current programme, the EU is now considering a Commission proposal for the new edition, covering the 2021-2025 period, which offers a modest increase in the financial envelope (+4.4 %), and more streamlined objectives.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Euratom research and training programme‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Aggregated budget of the Euratom programme (€ million)

Written by Martin Svášek,

© anawat_s / Fotolia

The European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD) is one of the EU financial instruments that promote a proactive development aid policy. It covers three areas of activity (‘pillars’): financing, providing technical assistance for the development of bankable projects, and helping to improve the business environment in partner countries through dialogue.

The EFSD promotes investment in EU partner countries, especially fragile ones, by making financing capacity in the form of grants, guarantees and other financial instruments available to eligible counterparts. It furthermore seeks to increase access to financing, primarily in Africa and the European neighbourhood countries. EFSD investment seeks to address specific socio-economic root causes of migration, foster the sustainable reintegration of migrants returning to their countries of origin, and strengthen transit and host communities.

Another aim of the EFSD is to contribute to the achievement of the UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda and to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. The fund’s strong environmental focus requires that 28 % of its financing be invested in measures related to climate action, renewable energy and resource efficiency.

Structure of the EFSD

The EFSD includes two regional investment mechanisms – the African Investment Platform and the Neighbourhood Investment Platform. These were established on the basis of two previously existing blending facilities (which combine EU grants with loans or equity from public and private financiers): the Africa Investment Facility (AfIF) and the Neighbourhood Investment Facility (NIF), whose funds together amounted to €2.6 billion. Under the present arrangement, blending operations are combined with EFSD guarantee operations, which are based, in their turn, on the existence of the EFSD Guarantee Fund. The EFSD Guarantee Fund amounts to €750 million (€350 million from the general budget of the EU and €400 million from the 11th European Development Fund).

The EFSD Guarantee Fund provides liquidity to compensate, if necessary, losses covered under guarantee agreements. It is envisaged that, by 2020, the EFSD guarantee will reach a total volume of up to €1.5 billion and will leverage additional financing by allowing risk-sharing with private investors, international financial institutions and development banks. Depending on the total volume of the EFSD guarantee, it might leverage from an expected €44 billion, up to the double of this amount whenever eligible partners, such as EU Member States, European Free Trade Association states, or others, make important additional contributions.

First results

According to the Commission’s (first) 2017 EFSD operational report, in 2017 the EU agreed to invest nearly €1.3 billion in 52 blending projects in Africa and the European Neighbourhood under the EIP. The EU contribution is expected to trigger around €10.6 billion in public and private investment (24.1 % of the €44 billon target for 2020) after the EFSD’s first year of operation.

The report highlighted that around €400 million of EU investments under the EFSD had gone to Neighbourhood Investment Platform countries (22 projects) and almost €900 million to Africa Investment Platform countries (30 projects). The EFSD leveraged investments worth €5 billion and €5.6 billion respectively. The report reflecting the results for 2018 should be published soon.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: European Fund for Sustainable Development‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel, with Jens Van Steerteghem and Richelle Boone,

© mycteria / Fololia

Should we be prepared to change the population composition of a species in order to wipe out a disease that is a terrible burden to mankind? During a well-attended working breakfast organised by the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) on 19 March 2019, experts and citizens delved into the case study of eradicating malaria by applying gene-drive technology. This genetic tool could enable us to suppress mosquito populations that transmit malaria by reducing the number of females. This would be done by introducing in some mosquitos a genetic mechanism that easily spreads – ‘drives’ – through the whole population over generations.

The purpose of the event was to gain insight into the science and ethics of gene-drive technology, and of genome-editing technologies in general. The meeting was chaired by Kay Swinburne, (ECR, UK) a STOA Panel member, who underlined the importance of invigorating public debate on such technologies in her opening statement. With more than 200 million cases of malaria each year worldwide, of which over 400 000 are fatal, no one doubts the importance of fighting this disease. This, as Kay Swinburne explained, makes the case less controversial than, for instance, human genome editing, and therefore it provides a good opportunity to focus on understanding the benefits of genetic technology. Such an understanding, combined with knowledge of the risks and concerns, and with awareness of different stakeholder perspectives, should help policy-makers anticipate the application of genome-editing technologies. With three expert presentations and a debate, this event provided input on all these fronts.

First, Jens Van Steerteghem, of KU Leuven, and a former STOA trainee, gave the audience a technical overview of gene-drive technology in the context of eradicating malaria. His presentation was based on a scientific briefing that was used in a preliminary foresight analysis project on gene drive and malaria. This project aimed to map the potential societal impact of gene-drive technology and exposed the need for a general risk assessment framework for biotechnological applications. Jens Steerteghem explained how the number of female mosquitos would be suppressed if the gene-drive method were applied: by introducing in males a gene on the Y chromosome that cuts their X chromosome, so that they only pass Y chromosomes to their offspring. This offspring are consequently exclusively male, and additionally carry the new gene on their Y chromosome.

Delphine Thizy, Stakeholder Engagement Manager with the non-profit research organisation Target Malaria delivered the second presentation. This organisation is developing the gene-drive technology method to reduce malaria. Delphine Thizy described the current state of the research at her organisation, commenting that only in September 2018, their team published a paper on a successful eradication experiment on a mosquito population in a containment cage. She also addressed some of the misconceptions and concerns she hears when explaining Target Malaria’s plans. These worries are expressed both by citizens in Western countries but also, and more importantly, from stakeholders in countries in sub-Saharan Africa that suffer from malaria. People question, for example, if the targeted mosquito species are crucial pollinators, or if the reduction of mosquitos would disturb food chains. For both cases, she indicated that there is no need to worry: the targeted mosquitoes are not known to be pollinators and just three mosquito species would be targeted out of 830 species in Africa alone.

Next, Sybille van den Hove, Executive Director of the Bridging Sustainability Consultancy Company, informed and advised attendees on the precautionary principle. She first explained that there are many different definitions and interpretations for this principle. She prefers the European Environment Agency description: ‘The precautionary principle provides justification for public policy and other actions in situations of scientific complexity, uncertainty and ignorance, where there may be a need to act in order to avoid, or reduce, potentially serious or irreversible threats to health and/or the environment, […]’. Since one of these situations is the case of eradicating malaria with gene-drive technology, Sybille van den Hove explained that precaution should be a key principle in legislating on the issue. She listed many pieces of advice for policy-makers desiring to apply the precautionary principle, such as designing policy processes so as to allow for revision, thus making it easy to adapt to new knowledge; being open-minded; acknowledging the possibility of surprises; and being able to discard ‘bad good ideas’. Another recommendation was to be reflective, both by measuring an innovation against one’s societal visions and by being aware of broader philosophical discussions connected to certain topics.

During the debate following the three presentations, participants raised several interesting points. One called for attention to the possibility of malaria-transmitting mosquitoes again becoming prevalent in Europe as a result of climate change, a concern Delphine Thizy attenuated. It was also pointed out that tiger mosquitoes in Italy could be future targets of gene-drive, as they are carriers of diseases such as zika, dengue and chikungunya. Another attendee commented that better education and a global governance infrastructure would be necessary to successfully deal with new complex technologies. A fourth participant emphasised the need for a strictly philosophical discussion on genome editing, in addition to the debate on possible consequences. He argued that the moral question about using technology to instrumentally design an animal species for human purposes is what is fundamentally at stake. In the past, political views on biotechnologies were most often divided at this level of the debate.

Wrapping up the event, Kay Swinburne concluded that the dialogue between experts, policy-makers and the public should be continued. She also emphasised that she is happy that the EU’s strong regulatory framework prevents technologies such as gene-drive from being introduced for the sake of profit alone. She praised the fact that such implementations only take place after a serious debate that covers all aspects: from the ethical to the economic, and from the societal to the environmental. Because of this, she explained, for her and for many other policy-makers, support for innovation should not be understood as support for individual profits, but as support for the many benefits that could result.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Union, EP

The first item on Parliament’s agenda in April is – unsurprisingly given the paralysis in the United Kingdom regarding which direction to take on Brexit – Council and Commission statements on the United Kingdom withdrawal from the EU. The agreement, endorsed at EU leaders’ level back in November, would ensure an orderly UK withdrawal from the EU at the end of the Article 50 extension period. Alongside that agreement, the political declaration sets out the main parameters of the future EU-UK relationship, but this is no closer to finding approval in the UK Parliament. The statements on Brexit are followed on Wednesday afternoon with the penultimate debate in the series on the Future of Europe, this time with the Prime Minister of Sweden, Stefan Löfven.

On Wednesday evening, Parliament will debate a text agreed in trilogue on applying internal market rules to gas pipelines entering the EU from countries outside the EU. With ongoing controversy over the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the tightened rules will ensure that, while the EU Member State on which such a pipeline arrives is responsible for the application of EU law, the Commission will have to authorise negotiations on such projects, must be kept informed of their progress and must authorise the signature of any such agreement.

Parliament will then decide whether to grant approval to a Multiannual plan for the fisheries exploiting demersal stocks in the western Mediterranean Sea, which aims to protect vulnerable stocks of fish and crustaceans living on the sea bottom from over-exploitation. The plan involves Italy, Spain and France cooperating to ensure that their fishing fleets’ activities are sustainable.

Later on Wednesday evening, Members will also vote on a proposal to curb the fraudulent use of EU citizens’ identity and residence documents, of which there are many different types in circulation. Parliament’s Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee wishes to strengthen the proposal so that all Member States recognise EU national identity cards, that there are clear rules on validity, and that only authorised staff may handle the biometric identifiers involved. The changes should make it harder for criminals and terrorists to use EU identity papers.

Following Council and Commission statements on EU-China trade relations, a joint debate will be held on Wednesday night on customs in the EU. The final file on the agenda on Wednesday is that of road infrastructure safety management, where proposals to improve safety have been made with the aim of reducing fatalities and serious injury on EU roads. Parliament will decide whether to formally adopt the text agreed with Council. On Thursday lunchtime, Members are expected to return to the transport-related files debated during the last plenary session, to vote on the proposals on rules for posted workers in the road transport sector and on working conditions for drivers.

On Thursday morning, Members will debate two files with a direct effect on EU citizens’ lives. The first is a provisional agreement on the proposal to create a pan-European personal pension product (PEPP) – a new framework for voluntary pension contributions aiming to tackle the shortfall in pension provision in our ageing society. The PEPPs are expected to offer greater choice in savings plans, including a switching service and a default option with a guaranteed return of at least the sums contributed. The file is also the subject of a vote on the tax treatment of pension products, scheduled for Thursday afternoon. The second proposal, on work-life balance for parents and carers is a proposal to redress the gender balance in the workplace. Introducing a right to two weeks paternity leave, while maintaining current maternity leave arrangements, the work-life balance package aims at permitting parents and carers the flexibility to care for their family by affording greater choice in who takes a break

The data economy is a top EU priority under the digital single market. On Thursday lunchtime, Members will vote on an agreement to improve access to valuable existing public sector information, such as land registries and statistics that can be used to help grow the economy, or develop artificial intelligence, and help administrations themselves to face the challenges of modern society. The four main changes proposed include making the data available in real time, making re-use of documents free of charge or at limited cost, preventing exclusive arrangements that favour commercial companies, and increasing the supply of high-value public data.

Introduction

Written by Silvia Polidori.

Over the last decade, public discourse has been moved, to a great extent, into virtual spaces. In the empire of social media, influencers and service providers employing algorithms have overtaken up the important role of shaping public opinion previously the domain of the classical (printed and electronic) media. In the current crisis of representative democracy, marked by the perception of a growing distance between the elite and the public, promoting public participation in the European policy-making process is more at stake than ever. Using social media as a new type of stakeholder dialogue and awareness-raising tool is crucial not only for fighting against disinformation, but also for achieving effective communication in support of evidence-based decision-making.

It is essential therefore to explore and understand the way viral content and influencers’ techniques work, and to bring scientists, policy-makers and media experts together for an in-depth discussion of the topic. In view of the forthcoming European elections, it is important to investigate how activism and key messages work online, how they motivate and attract people, and to assess their political impact. This is particularly important in the current European social and political context.

European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) Workshop

3 April 2019, European Parliament, Brussels

9.30-12.00 – Room P3C050

The workshop

A workshop organised by the European Parliament’s European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) will focus on the role of ‘influencers’ in using modern technologies to increase the number of their ‘followers’. It will look at how technologies can carry and amplify messages, becoming ‘viral’, and the type of communication used. The event will also explore the ‘eco-chamber effect’ in communication within modern societies.

Besides the technological aspects, the workshop will also employ social science considerations to deal with the psychological aspects of ‘viral media communication’ and its social impact, with particular attention paid to political influence, e.g. the ‘yellow-vest’ movement. The idea is to explore whether we can use a social media communication methodology, going beyond keywords and sentiment, and looking at the full social discourse, to understand the broad themes that attract and motivate people to join the conversation and gain insight into their behaviour.

The workshop will feature discussion between various experts in the fields of communication technologies and social sciences on the ‘science of virality’. It will also include communication practitioners involved in past electoral campaigns and social media representatives in a session on the ‘practice of virality’. The event will be moderated by a senior online communication expert.

Besides the workshop, the ESMH will also perform and compile interviews of the speakers as part of an ‘event report’ to be published on its website.

The event will take place on 3 April 2019, just fifty days before the next European elections. It therefore provides a very useful occasion to reflect, exchange and debate on the topic among Members of the Parliament and the other participants, especially on how the European message can be conveyed more effectively. In fact, ‘influencers’ and ‘viral content’ can also pose a threat, a challenge, as well as an opportunity to pass positive messages. The ESMH, in its role of a promoter of sound science communication, is ideally positioned to inform the Members of the Parliament and other related and interested actors about the topic.

The subject is also relevant in the framework of the current discussions on the role of new media in relation to big data, analytics and artificial intelligence (AI), such as those that took place in the context of the European Parliament resolution of 12 February 2019 on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics. It also bears on a number of recently published or ongoing STOA studies, especially those on algorithmic transparency and accountability, polarisation and the use of technology in political campaigns, and regulating disinformation with AI.

Follow the workshop online and join the debate via Twitter: #ViralityESMH

To keep up to date with this workshop and other STOA activities, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso and Wouter van Ballegooij (*),

The European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) hosted a discussion on ‘Migration and Borders: Roadmap for the future of Europe’, including a keynote address from Claude Moraes (S&D, United Kingdom, Chair of Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)) on 19 March 2019.

Following a welcome by EPRS Director General, Anthony Teasdale, Claude Moraes identified migration as the critical issue for the upcoming elections and for the work of the soon-to-be-elected new European Parliament. In his speech, he called for a comprehensive European approach to asylum and migration, including stronger legal migration possibilities, but also stressed the difficulties that the European Parliament has faced in finding a common ground on this topic with the Council.

The lack of progress made on the ‘asylum package’, as well as on the reform of the EU blue card, is a particular issue for Claude Moraes; even a simple revision of this instrument, limited to high skilled migrants, was blocked by the Council because of Member States’ opposition to any measure featuring the word ‘migration’. This opposition stems from the negative connotations surrounding migration based on fear of migrants as a threat to national identity. Moraes highlighted that, to the contrary, the analyses presented in the Parliament’s studies on the cost of non-Europe in the area of asylum and legal migration shed light on the opportunities offered by further European integration and attracting labour migrants.

Claude Moraes (S&D, United Kingdom, Chair of Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)

Concerning the long-term budgetary aspects of migration, Moraes noted that the proposal for the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2021-2027 included greater EU spending on this issue. However, he deplored the preference given to border management over support to asylum systems, legal migration and long-term integration policies. In its first-reading positions on the Asylum and Migration Fund, Internal Security Fund and Integrated Border Management Fund, Parliament had insisted on a balanced allocation of resources between these objectives to address the unwarranted focus on returns and security-related measures. Parliament has also ensured that the money will primarily be spent within the EU and not abroad, to help frontline Member States who deal with the majority of new arrivals into Europe.

During the Q&A session following the discussion, Claude Moraes was asked whether he was pessimistic about future developments in the migration domain and where one should draw the line in the debate between valid concerns and positions fed by racism and xenophobia. He responded by stating the need for a change in the narrative on migration, towards one highlighting its opportunities, while tackling the identity concerns, racism and xenophobia head-on.

The debate continued with a roundtable discussion moderated by Fabia Jones, which was based on the presentation of three studies analysing budgetary, legal and economic aspects of EU policies on migration and borders. Alessandro D’Alfonso presented his study on external border control and asylum management as EU common goods: A budgetary perspective, recently published by the European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies. He explained that the removal of internal border controls across most of the EU has triggered the emergence of various EU common goods in the fields of borders, asylum and migration. The EU budget has an important role to play in the effective provision of such common goods, based on the Treaty of Lisbon, which sets the guiding principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility for these policy areas, including the financial implications, between the Member States. The presentation highlighted the institutional and budgetary challenges that led to a limited pooling of financial resources prior to the refugee crisis. Up to 2015, common expenditure on external borders, asylum and migration within the EU accounted for well below 1 % of the EU budget. The EU was obliged to resort to the flexibility tools of the MFF for the financing of measures designed to help tackle the refugee crisis inside the Union. Focusing on the proposals for the post-2020 MFF, Alessandro D’Alfonso highlighted elements that could increase the contribution of the EU budget to the application of the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, such as higher resources, more flexibility and allocation parameters that take into account evolving needs.

The next speaker, Wouter van Ballegooij, focused on the cost of non-Europe in the area of migration and borders, based on a number of his publications stemming from a project requested by the LIBE Committee, notably in the area of asylum and legal migration. The main gaps in EU action and cooperation in the area of migration and borders relate to the lack of enforcement of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights and secondary EU legislation already adopted, and a lack of legal pathways for asylum seekers and certain labour migrants to enter the EU. This lack of enforcement contributes to the ongoing tragedy of loss of lives in the Mediterranean, among other fundamental rights violations. It also leads to inefficiencies in EU and national spending and lost tax revenue. A cost of non-Europe report on organised crime and corruption drawn up by EPRS estimated the cost of corruption to the European economy in terms of GDP as between €218 billion and €282 billion annually. The cost of remaining with the status quo in the area of asylum is estimated at approximately €48.3 billion annually (of which the estimated cost of lives lost is around €12 billion). Income losses for third-country nationals already within the EU at individual level, and lost tax revenue at societal (aggregate EU) level due to discrimination, are estimated at €29 billion annually. Furthermore, shortages in the EU labour market and the effects of demographic change are not addressed. In addition, the potential to boost innovation and growth remains untapped. Beyond the introduction of an EU pact for monitoring and enforcement of democracy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, options for further EU action and cooperation in the spirit of solidarity and the fair sharing of responsibility are the introduction of an EU humanitarian visa scheme, and an immigration code covering all third-country nationals.

The final speaker, Lina Vosyliute, presented a study prepared for the Parliament on ‘The cost of non-Europe in the area of legal migration’, feeding into the relevant Cost of non-Europe report (see Annex I). Lina Vosyliute described the current state of play as a circle of ‘minimum harmonisation’ approach, since the EU Member States retain a certain leeway as to how to implement EU legislation governing migration. This results in a high degree of fragmentation and complexity in the EU, and a low use of EU schemes (e.g. the EU blue card for high-skilled workers), as national migration schemes are preferred by some countries, which in turn leads to the EU wide scheme having low perceived impact. Moreover, third-country nationals face a number of obstacles related to differential treatment of the different migratory groups as regards equal treatment, entry and re-entry conditions, work authorisation etc. These problems also result in income loss at individual level and lost tax revenue at the aggregate EU level. Vosyliute recommends the policy option of a legally binding immigration code as proposed by the European Commission in 2001 in line with international labour and human rights standards as a solution. However, while this would have key benefits and low cost, it is politically difficult to implement.

(*) With special thanks to Sophia Stutzmann, trainee with the EPRS Budgetary Policies Unit, for preparing a draft report of this event.

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Written by Silvia Polidori,

An ecological and social approach to converting old-style industries in urban areas may well contribute to a new eco and social friendly development path for the European Union. This prospect was a prominent conclusion of the workshop on ‘Reconversion of industrial areas in the framework of regional policy‘, organised by the Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) on 26 February 2019 at the European Parliament (EP), and proposed by Rosa D’Amato (EFDD, Italy), member of the EP Committee on Regional Development (REGI). Fifteen experts from twelve EU Member States, including five Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), representatives of other European institutions, universities and local authorities, attended to discuss the topic from various angles, highlighting the challenges and proposing solutions based on policy strategies, legislative proposals and specific case studies.

As explained in his welcome to the audience, Ramón Luis Valcárcel Siso (EPP, Spain), EP Vice-President responsible for STOA, highlighted that the impact of new technologies and the circular economy links to wider aspects of European development. In the 1950s, the coal and steel industry became the symbol of cooperation among those European countries that decided to pool their coal and steel resources. This served to guarantee peace among European peoples, and those industries represented a step towards European integration. Today, he argued, we need to change perspective and move on to a new phase of European development, based on industrial conversion towards more sustainable models. The main challenges in triggering industrial conversion are related to developing the architecture of old industrial areas in or close to towns into innovative and ecological zones, offering investment opportunities for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), involving the local population in the decisions affecting their towns, and managing the risks of demographic and employment losses during the process.

Gerald Muscat, Head of the Urban Development Division in the Projects Directorate of the EIB explained that the European Investment Bank (EIB) proposes dedicated partnerships in industrial conversion investment. These involve cities and regions, urban development agencies, urban remediation and regeneration funds, real estate developers and national promotional/municipal banks.

The European Commission also proposes a strategy for supporting industrial reconversion. Embedded in the ‘proposal for a regulation on the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Cohesion Fund (CF)’, published on 29 May 2018. As Sander Happaerts, Policy analyst in the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission, mentioned, the new EU cohesion policy (2021-2027) is expected to focus on five policy objectives, including a Europe closer to citizens, with the support of locally-led development strategies and sustainable urban development. Industrial modernisation is one of the key investment priorities. There is also a shift towards investments that promote a low-carbon, circular economy, and help in the fight against climate change.

Bronis Ropė (Greens/EFA, Lithuania), member of the REGI Committee, emphasised the positive inputs provided by the report on the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund adopted by his committee on 14 February 2019 in the form of amendments to the Commission’s proposal. The REGI Committee confirmed its support for sustainable urban development and smart specialisation, and for a transition to ‘industry 4.0’. In the optimistic view of Gilles Pargneaux (S&D, France), Member of the EP Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI), Europe will win the challenge of industrial conversion, acknowledging that ‘it won’t be easy, but it will succeed’.

This positive approach is supported by specific cases of urban areas with an industrial past, already transformed into attractive locations for their inhabitants and for tourists. Bilbao, for example, has overcome a difficult past, dominated by natural and social turbulence, establishing itself as a liveable and inclusive city. Lille and its Haut-de-France Region well represent the third industrial revolution, privileging environmentally-friendly policies, based on a systemic approach. The Ruhr region, a symbol of the end of coal mining, and its Industrial Heritage Route with the Zollverein Word Heritage site is a tourist attraction reminiscent of, but far from, the heavy-industry historical age. The city of Gdansk, with its various districts, is also a good example of industrial reconversion, revitalising and reorganising social life through development of suitable infrastructures. L’Aquila, capital of the Abruzzo region in Italy, is undergoing a digital transformation, becoming one of the fifteen European Digital Cities and one of the five Italian cities with 5G. After the destruction of the 2009 earthquake, L’Aquila can be described as a living laboratory. The river city of Gothenburg also proposes a citizen-friendly vision for reconstruction of the harbour and industrial area on the riverbanks.

As Rosa D’Amato stressed in her concluding remarks, industrial conversion is already a reality all around Europe, but we need to go further. Paul Rübig (EPP, Austria), STOA First Vice-Chair, believes that the use of technologies can facilitate this transition, but policy-makers need to listen to the people, to ensure the process is smooth and successful. All in all, a lot is at stake for the next generation and for a sustainable society.

* All presentations of the workshop are available on the STOA website.

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Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the March II plenary session included debates on the conclusions of the 21-22 March 2019 European Council meeting and on recent developments on the Dieselgate scandal. Parliament also debated the situation in Algeria and the illegal occupation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. Important debates also took place on various legislative proposals, including on interoperability between EU information systems. Members voted on a number of legislative proposals (see below), such as discontinuing seasonal changes of time. Parliament also voted on the report on the TAX3 committee’s findings and on 53 reports on the 2017 discharge procedure. Finally, Parliament adopted first-reading positions on nine further proposed funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period.

Report on financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance (TAX3)

Members debated the report from Parliament’s TAX3 Special Committee on the progress made and the work still to do to tackle financial crimes, tax evasion and tax avoidance. In response to scandals highlighting the extent of the issue, the committee proposes greater scrutiny over Member States’ tax systems, including eliminating loopholes and greater recourse at national level against money-laundering activities.

Internal market for electricity

Members debated and approved compromise agreements on four proposals for new rules regarding the internal market for electricity. The proposed changes to the rules would give consumers stronger rights when dealing with electricity suppliers, and provide extra protection for vulnerable consumers.

Representative actions for the protection of collective interests of consumers

Parliament adopted, by a large majority, proposals to harmonise the EU rules on representative actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers. Although the proposed rules do not provide for the type of class action seen in the USA, they seek to make it easier for groups of consumers whose rights are violated to launch a collective action for redress, and to obtain compensation if successful. Only qualified representative entities would be authorised to mount such actions (rather than lawyers), and are required to disclose publicly how they are financed, organised and managed.

Copyright in the digital single market

Ending two years of negotiation, Members adopted a compromise agreement on copyright in the digital single market. This contentious file deals with the opportunities and drawbacks of creating, producing, distributing and exploiting content online, and the balance to be struck between remunerating creators and publishers, and protecting consumers. The file now goes back to Council for final adoption.

Mediterranean fisheries management measures

Members voted to formally adopt an agreement on a Commission proposal to transpose recommendations from the General Fisheries Commission for the Mediterranean into EU law. The measures, supported in a Fisheries Committee report, aim to encourage fish stock recovery and protect vulnerable habitats in the Adriatic, Alboran and Black Seas.

Road transport: Social and market rules

Members debated three sensitive files relating to overhauling current legislation on road transport. There was no vote on these files and once again, they were referred back to the Transport Committee for consideration. So far, the committee could only reach agreement on the cabotage file, which seeks to clarify the rules for international haulage operations, particularly on minimum turnaround times. Nevertheless, political groups tabled amendments to the proposals on social and market rules that seek to level the playing field between posted and local drivers and improve working conditions. Following a further round of voting in committee, the proposals are due to return for a plenary vote in the April I session.

Protecting workers against carcinogens and mutagens: Third proposal

Parliament voted by a large majority to formally adopt the latest in a series of proposals to amend the Carcinogens and Mutagens Directive to protect workers against exposure to a further number of cancer- or mutation-causing chemical agents. The five priority chemical agents include formaldehyde, cadmium and arsenic, and the measures seek to provide clarity in the workplace for workers and employers.

Reducing marine litter from plastics

Members debated and voted, by an overwhelming majority, on legislative proposals on reducing the impact of plastic products on the environment, particularly plastic marine litter. An agreement reached with Council extends bans on products beyond cutlery, plates, and straws to include oxo-degradable plastics and expanded polystyrene packaging. The proposals also set out annual collection rates for recycling plastic fishing gear, among other measures, which could ultimately become binding.

CE marked fertilising products

Members debated and approved an agreed text on CE-marked fertilising products. While inorganic fertilisers increase crop yields, they can also contain harmful chemicals, such as cadmium. The agreement proposes gradual reduction of the heavy metal content in fertilisers and extending legislation to cover organic or recycled waste alternatives.

Central counterparty recovery and resolution

Central counterparties provide guarantees on financial performance. In the light of the financial crisis, Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs wishes to ensure that this important role is fully supported with effective recovery plans. Members adopted a position on the Commission proposals that central counterparty recovery and resolution include comprehensive stress-testing to avoid that central counterparties themselves become a systemic risk.

Framework to facilitate sustainable investment

Members debated and adopted a report on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment. A joint report from Parliament’s Economic Affairs and Environment Committees underlines that gradual harmonisation of what ‘environmentally sustainable’ actually means will help EU investors to ensure that their investments take account of their environmental impact.

Discharge 2017

With a view to reassuring EU citizens that taxpayers’ money is properly managed, all EU institutions are required to present their ‘accounts’ for scrutiny on an annual basis. Parliament then makes its ‘discharge’ decisions based on Budgetary Control (CONT) Committee reports on the European Court of Auditors’ annual assessment and the Council’s recommendations. Members conducted a joint debate and voted on 53 reports recommending whether or not to agree to discharge the 2017 budget for the European Commission and all executive agencies, as well as EU joint undertakings (public-private partnerships) and decentralised agencies and the other EU institutions. This year, CONT proposed granting discharge to the Commission and to all six executive agencies, as well as to all eight joint undertakings – subject to some improvements in financial management. The committee recommended granting discharge to all but one of the 32 agencies – the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) – in the light of irregularities uncovered by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF), for which discharge and closure of accounts was postponed.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

No decisions to enter into negotiations were announced.