European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for astronomers.

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European astronomers have always been leaders in exploring the final frontier. The EU helps to continue this tradition, regardless of whether astronomers are amateur or professional. In 2017, for example, a Belgian astronomer made international headlines with the discovery of seven Earth-like planets orbiting another star (Trappist-1 system), and a French astronomer discovered the existence of a ring around a dwarf planet in our own solar system (Haumea). Both discoveries were made possible through EU financial support.

© AZP Worldwide / Fotolia

The EU helps to fire up the next generation of astronomers through its financial support to the ‘EU-Universe Awareness project’. This initiative uses astronomy to inspire and encourage a lifelong interest in science among young children (aged 4 to 10). The EU’s support was used to develop the project in five EU countries from 2011 to 2013, and it has since grown into an international network of 16 EU countries.

The EU also pays for the development of world-class research infrastructure to ensure that professional astronomers can continue to conduct cutting-edge research. One example is EU funding of the ‘ASTERICS project’, supporting future collaboration between four new large telescopes. At the same time, the EU provides grants to ambitious astronomers, to encourage further important discoveries.

Every astronomer, whether working from an observatory or from their backyard, can enjoy the remarkable results of EU-funded projects, and hopefully future generations will be inspired to boldly go where no one has gone before!

Further information

• European Commission’s Directorate General for Research and Innovation, https://ec.europa.eu/info/research-and-innovation_en
• European Commission’s Community Research and Development Information Service, https://cordis.europa.eu/home_en.html
• Website of Universe Awareness, http://www.unawe.org/

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for watersports enthusiasts.

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European rivers, lakes and seas offer plenty of opportunities to practise watersports. Swimming is by far the most popular activity, but you can also dive, surf or sail, or paddle in a canoe or on a stand-up board.

None of these activities would be enjoyable without clean water. Thanks to EU rules, the vast majority of sites in the EU boast good or excellent bathing water quality.

© KarlGroße / Fotolia

Diving and boating also provide a unique opportunity to enjoy nature and observe marine wildlife such as birds and fish. To preserve this natural heritage, the EU has established the ‘Natura 2000’ network of protected areas that allow for the coexistence of wildlife with human activities.

To have an enjoyable and safe watersports experience, you need the right equipment, from swimwear to boats and paddles. Thanks to the EU internal market, you have a wide choice, as a product available in one EU country can be sold in all the others as well. Furthermore, under EU law, defective products must be repaired or replaced within a legal guarantee period of two years, without cost to the consumer.

When you venture out in a boat or with diving gear, your life and safety depends on the equipment. EU rules require watercraft and personal protective equipment sold in the EU to bear the CE label which shows that they conform to safety standards. For the safe and effective use of watersports equipment, such as life vests, it is essential that you understand the instructions. That is why EU rules require the manual to be available in the language of the country where you buy the equipment.

Further information

• European Commission website on bathing water quality, europa.eu/environment/water/water-bathing/
• European Commission website on Natura 2000, europa.eu/environment/nature/natura2000/
• European Commission website on CE marking, https://ec.europa.eu/growth/single-market/ce-marking_en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for refugees.

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People who flee war and persecution in their own country have a right to apply for protection in another country as refugees. International refugee law obliges countries to provide access to protection and adequate reception conditions that respect applicants’ human rights.

© Andrey Popov / Fotolia

EU law upholds these principles and aims to ensure that all EU countries not only offer protection, but also have the same understanding as to who qualifies as a refugee. While the final decision to accord protection is taken at national level, EU law has shaped national provisions and added guarantees that a similar level of protection is available to refugees across the EU.

To help countries outside the EU that currently host large numbers of refugees, such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan, the EU has also established a system for all EU countries to receive refugees directly from those countries. This is largely based on EU cooperation with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), which helps to resettle refugees directly from refugee camps.

The EU also contributes through funding, both in and outside the EU. Within the EU, €7.4 billion funding is planned for 2015-2017. The EU also offers development and humanitarian aid to countries outside the EU, to help them strengthen their societies in the face of difficult times, and to support refugee reception and integration.

Further information

• European Commission, European agenda on migration, COM(2015) 240 final
• European Commission, Delivery of the European Agenda on Migration, COM(2017) 558 final
• European Commission, Lives in Dignity: from Aid-dependence to Self-reliance. Forced Displacement and Development, COM(2016) 234 final
• European Commission factsheet, The EU and the refugee crisis, July 2016

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people travelling with cash.

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If you are travelling to or from the EU by air, road, rail or sea with €10 000 or more in cash you must declare it to the customs authorities. This obligation is not designed to make your life difficult but to prevent money laundering, the financing of terrorism and other financial crimes. If you are travelling in a group, the €10 000 limit applies to each person individually.

© Syda Productions / Fotolia

Cash includes not only banknotes and coins in circulation all over the world but also cheques, promissory notes, money orders and traveller’s cheques. It does not include currency out of circulation, antique coins, bullion coins and casino chips. Gold, precious metals and precious stones are not considered cash yet, but they will be soon.

The Cash Control Regulation, which is currently being revised, states that people who do not declare their cash may have it confiscated and receive a substantial fine. Customs authorities can carry out individual checks and checks on baggage and vehicles. All this may inconvenience law-abiding citizens, but it is done to prevent crime. You must fill in an EU Cash Declaration Form on entering and leaving the EU, in the official language of the country concerned. There are some non-EU language versions to help you understand the form if you are not from the EU.

Your personal information will be available to the intelligence agencies that monitor financial transactions, but it will be kept confidential to protect your security when carrying cash. Be aware that individual EU countries may have their own cash control rules and limits for travelling within the EU.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Controls of cash movements’, 2016, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/593780/EPRS_BRI%282016%29593780_EN.pdf
• European Commission, website ‘Cash Controls’, https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/individuals/cash-controls_en
• The Cash Control Regulation (Regulation (EC) No 1889/2005)
  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2005:309:0009:0012:EN:PDF

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for cross-border creditors.

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Around 50 % of all consumers shop online, and the number of cross-border transactions in the internal market is growing steadily. However, the individual value of such transactions remains relatively small, with almost half coming under €100. Because the amounts involved are small, not all contracts are properly performed, which sometimes leads to cross-border disputes, most of which do not end up in court. According to estimates, there could be as many as 0.5 million cross-border consumer cases of a value below €2 000 and some 130 000 such cases between businesses per year in the EU. The annual number of consumer claims for amounts between €2 000 and €10 000 is estimated at 84 000, and claims between businesses at 208 700.

© leszekglasner / Fotolia

To assist cross-border creditors who need to take a debtor in a different country to court over a small sum of money, the EU created the European small claims procedure in 2008. This simple, fast procedure is available only for small monetary claims in cross-border cases. Using ready-available standard forms, in all EU languages, its basic elements are identical throughout the EU.

Reform of the procedure in 2015 means creditors can now make cross-border claims up to €5 000. Court fees were reduced, and digital technology is increasingly used to take evidence, further reducing costs and making the proceeding easier.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Reform of the European Small Claims Procedure’, 2015, link1.euhttp://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/EPRS-Briefing-565871-Reform-European-Small-Claims-Procedure-rev-FINAL.pdf
• European e-Justice Portal, https://e-justice.europa.eu/content_small_claims_forms-177-en.do?clang=en

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people living in remote areas.

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If you live in a remote region, you will be aware of the unique challenges that arise from being a long way from urban areas, or possibly from certain geographical or demographic conditions. Despite their differences, islands, mountainous areas and sparsely populated regions are remote areas that share common challenges, including poorer access to a range of job opportunities and to basic services in areas such as transport, education and healthcare. In general, remote regions also experience lower economic growth than the rest of the European Union.

© marios_b / Fotolia

The EU plays an active role in helping remote regions to address these challenges and to exploit their development potential. EU-funded projects, for example, helped people living in a remote village in Sweden organise their own public transport by setting up a village bus and isolated people living in a sparsely populated Alpine region on the French-Italian border set up a homecare service system. Certain remote areas, referred to as ‘outermost regions’, benefit from specific EU measures, for instance, to support local agricultural production. The EU’s priorities include developing broadband coverage and enhancing the use of digital technologies in these regions, as this improves access to the job market and services. One example is an EU-funded telemedicine project aimed at providing medical services at a distance in remote parts of Saxony. In the case of mountainous areas, priorities include measures to fight environmental degradation and to promote energy efficiency and sustainable tourism.

Further information

• EPRS publication on ‘Islands of the EU: Taking account of their specific needs in EU policy’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/573960/EPRS_BRI(2016)573960_EN.pdf
• EPRS publication on ‘Sparsely populated and under-populated areas’, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/586632/EPRS_BRI(2016)586632_EN.pdf
• European Commission’s Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy, http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/regional_policy/index_en.htmhttp://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=1137

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

2018, the last full year of the current European Parliament’s current term brought tougher challenges and choices for the European Union than the previous year, when, in the words of European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, the ‘wind was back in European sails’, along with the economic recovery. Still, the passing year was better than the annus horriblis of 2016, when the EU faced a number of existential threats.

The 2018 agenda was dominated by US President Trump’s decisions, which raised the spectre of a trade war, Brexit negotiations, the unabated rise of populism and anti-establishment movements, unsolved migration issues, problems with the rule of law in some EU countries, Russia’s assertive foreign policy moves and a gradual slowing of economic growth in Europe. Those events and processes featured in the debate on ‘What mattered in 2018 and why: What think tanks are thinking’, organised by the European Parliamentary Research Service in the Library Reading Room on 18 December. These tough issues and other developments form the backdrop for the European elections in 2019.

Speakers from major international think tanks who took part in the debate concluded that most of the challenges discussed have not yet been overcome and some might not even be resolvable for the time being. For example, the long-term stability of and sustainable growth in the European Monetary Union and a wider EU requires far-reaching reforms, involving considerable centralisation, and yet there is no political nor democratic appetite for that, said Maria Demertzis, deputy Director at Bruegel, an influential economic think tank. This is why, despite an ambitious reform agenda advocated by French President Emmanuel Macron, progress in reforming the EMU was limited in 2018. There is also no ideal solution to the migration problem, which has haunted the EU ever since hundreds of thousands of migrants escaping war and poverty in Africa and Asia made it to European shores in 2015 and 2016, noted Camino Mortera-Martinez, a senior research fellow at the Centre for the European Reform, a London-based think tank, which now has an office in Brussels. The refusal of several EU Member States to back the UN-sponsored Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, exposed deep divisions over the issue in the Union, as well as difficulties in formulating a common foreign policy in general.

Mortera-Martinez and others, including Dušan Reljić, head of the Brussels office of the powerful German think tank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, noted that the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the EU, now set for 29 March 2019, will wreak economic and political havoc, especially in the UK, where the political atmosphere is completely poisoned by the Brexit debate. Among the several possible scenarios, the least damaging in the short-term would be the approval of the agreed departure agreement in a crucial vote in January. It is also possible that the government falls, that there is what is known as a ‘hard Brexit’, or that a new referendum is held.

Wojciech Białożyt, Managing Director of the Warsaw-based WiseEuropa think tank, said central and eastern European countries, such as Hungary and Poland, were acting against their own long-term interest when they implemented judicial and other reforms that many EU politicians believe violate the bloc’s rule of law principle. While the Hungarian government has a constitutional majority to pursue the controversial changes, the Polish one however does not, thereby breaking its own constitution. Białożyt expressed hope that some new members from central and eastern Europe would stop attempts to weaken local institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, or the EU might face difficult choices as to what action to take.

All speakers agreed US President Donald Trump’s volatile policies posed the biggest threat to the global economy and rules-based, multilateral system. A full-blown trade war could throw the world into recession. Suggestions how the EU should react to Trump varied. Bruegel’s Demertzis argued that Europe should be ‘reactive’, so as not to exacerbate the situation. Others believed that the abdication of the US from its traditional role of benign protector of the global order offers opportunities for the EU to forge new trade ties and boost its defence cooperation and capability.

The EPRS conference was held under the ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking‘ brand, which is also the title of a weekly publication that gathers links to recent think tank publications on a given topic.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Fotolia

The meetings of EU Heads of State or Government that took place on 13-14 December 2018 dealt with a more extensive agenda than originally planned. The European Council set a timeline for the negotiations on the MFF, assessed the implementation of its comprehensive approach to migration, and announced that an in-depth discussion on the Single Market would be held next spring. On external relations, it discussed the February 2019 summit with the League of Arab States, expressed its concern regarding the escalation in the Azov Sea, welcomed progress in the field of security and defence, and addressed the issue of disinformation. Additionally, EU Heads of State or Government issued conclusions on climate change and the fight against racism and xenophobia, as well as on citizens’ dialogues and citizens’ consultations.

Due to developments in the UK, EU Heads of State or Government also needed to discuss Brexit. While the European Council (Article 50) provided assurances on the ‘backstop’, it reiterated that the Withdrawal Agreement ‘is not open for renegotiation’. At the Euro Summit, leaders endorsed the reform of economic and monetary union (EMU) by strengthening the role of the European Stability Mechanism and envisaging the possibility of establishing a euro-area budget.

1. European Council commitments: Implementation and new deadlines

Sebastian Kurz, Austrian Chancellor and President-in-Office of the Council, provided an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions, as well as on the progress in MFF deliberations

Table 1: New European Council commitments and requests with a specific time schedule

Policy area Action Actor Schedule MFF Develop an orientation for the next stage of the negotiations, with a view to achieving an agreement Incoming Presidency Autumn 2019 Single Market Agree on as many of the pending proposals relevant to the Single Market as possible Co-legislators Before
18 April 2019 Single Market Hold an in-depth discussion on the future development of the Single Market European Council Spring 2019 Climate Change Provide guidance on the overall direction and political priorities in this field European Council First half of 2019 Disinformation Continue work on this issue and report back to the European Council Council March 2019 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

In the event, among the points originally foreseen for the MFF discussion, the European Council conclusions only address the issues of the timetable for negotiations, leaving out the definition of political priorities for the 2021-2027 MFF and the question of the overall level of expenditure for that period. Currently, the aim is for the European Council to reach an agreement in autumn 2019. This wording leaves room for interpretation: were there to be no agreement at the October 2019 European Council, the 12-13 December 2019 meeting could still provide a possible alternative date.

If the European Council only reaches a political agreement at the end of 2019, and if the timetable of the negotiating process for the 2014-2020 MFF were to be repeated, the Parliament and Council would not be expected to reach an agreement before the summer of 2020 at the earliest. Accordingly, the new European Parliament would be responsible for concluding the negotiations for the next MFF. Moreover, the European Council’s agreement on the MFF might come only under the next President of the European Council, since Donald Tusk’s second and final mandate ends on 30 November 2019. This could pose an additional challenge for the negotiations, in the event of delays and last-minute bargaining between Member States, as was the case during the last MFF negotiations (see EPRS Briefing).

Main messages of the EP President: The President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, reiterated the Parliament’s priorities for the next MFF, including the need for greater flexibility in the future EU budget and the need for sufficient progress on the Union’s own resources system, which is an essential precondition for obtaining the Parliament’s consent. He criticised the ‘negotiating box’ as presented by the Austrian Presidency, which ‘includes important parts of the legislative proposals for sectoral programmes’, and has therefore been ‘excluded from the negotiations with the Parliament and agreed only between Member States’. He also expressed his regret that it will not be possible to reach an agreement before the European elections.

Single market

EU leaders decided to hold an in-depth discussion on future developments in the single market and European digital policy in spring 2019, looking ahead to the next ‘strategic agenda’. Among the challenges to be addressed, they mentioned services, data economy and artificial intelligence.

Migration

In its conclusions, the European Council pointed out that the ‘number of detected illegal border crossings has been brought down to pre-crisis levels’. It nevertheless reiterated the need to remain vigilant on all existing and emerging migration routes. EU Heads of State or Government invited the co-legislators to rapidly conclude the negotiations on the Asylum Agency and the European Border and Coast Guard (EBCG). While welcoming the agreement reached in Council on enhancing the EBCG’s mandate in the area of return and cooperation with third countries, the European Council also called for ‘further efforts to conclude negotiations on the Return Directive and on all parts of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS)’. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed his dissatisfaction with the outcome of the discussion, as the European Council did not come to a political agreement on the five (of seven) legislative proposals on the reform of the Common European Asylum System already close to agreement in Council.

Main messages of the EP President: President Tajani stated that the Parliament is only prepared to adopt the five proposals from the package on reform of the CEAS if the Council approves a negotiating mandate for the remaining two. Furthermore, the Parliament is very disappointed by the negotiating mandate adopted by Council on the EBCG, as it ‘lacks ambition’ and only addresses some of the elements proposed by the Commission.

Other items External relations

The Heads of State or Government discussed the preparation of the summit with the League of Arab States, to be held in Egypt in February 2019. The President of Romania, Klaus Iohannis, expressed the incoming Romanian Presidency’s commitment to a results-oriented summit. The agenda could include trade, investment, countering illegal migration and the fight against terrorism.

The European Council expressed its concern over the situation in the Azov Sea and requested the release of all detained Ukrainian seamen, the return of the seized vessels and free passage of all ships through the Kerch Strait. It reaffirmed its support to the territorial integrity of Ukraine, and reconfirmed the EU’s policy of non-recognition of the illegal annexation of Crimea. The President of France, Emmanuel Macron, and the Chancellor of Germany, Angela Merkel, informed their colleagues about the lack of progress in implementing the Minsk Agreements. President Tusk announced agreement on renewing the sanctions on Russia following its illegal annexation of Crimea.

The EU leaders also discussed, without adopting conclusions, the situation in the Western Balkans.

Main messages from the EP President: President Tajani recalled that the European Parliament’s 2018 Sakharov Prize was awarded to Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian filmmaker and opponent of the illegal annexation of Crimea, detained by Russia since 2014. The Parliament had adopted several resolutions condemning the illegal detention of Ukrainian citizens by Russia, whilst the European Council had deplored this situation in March 2016.

Climate change

The European Council considered the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP24) held in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018, and referred to the November 2018 ‘strategic vision of the European Commission for achieving a climate-neutral economy by 2050’.

Security and defence

The European Council took stock of progress made since June 2018 on security and defence cooperation, notably on Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), the European Defence Fund, and EU-NATO cooperation. It also endorsed the Civilian CSDP Compact adopted by the Council in November 2018 with the aim of strengthening and streamlining civilian crisis management.

Disinformation

The European Council discussed disinformation for the third time in 2018. It considered it as a form of hybrid warfare, stressing its challenge to democracy and free elections in Europe. President Tusk spoke of a ‘deliberate, large-scale and systemic’ threat which EU leaders are ‘determined to counter’. The latter called for the implementation of the Joint Action Plan on disinformation presented on 5 December 2018, following a request from the European Council.

Fight against racism and xenophobia

The European Council condemned all forms of antisemitism, racism and xenophobia. Chancellor Kurz expressed his satisfaction that the Heads of State or Government all welcomed the adoption on 6 December 2018 of the Council declaration on the fight against antisemitism

Citizens’ Dialogues and Citizens’ Consultations, and preparations for the Strategic Agenda

The European Council welcomed the Citizens’ Dialogues and Citizens’ Consultations as ‘an unprecedented opportunity to engage with European citizens; these could serve as an inspiration for further consultations and dialogues’. Moreover, EU leaders indicated that they will discuss the priorities for the next institutional cycle (2019-2024) at their informal meeting in Sibiu on 9 May 2019, with a view to agreeing on the next Strategic Agenda in June 2019.

3. Euro Summit

EU leaders endorsed the agreement on reform of economic and monetary union (EMU) reached at the Eurogroup meeting of 3 December: (i) the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will provide a backstop to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF), if sufficient progress in risk reduction is made by 2020; (ii) the ESM will be able, under strict conditionality, to provide precautionary loans to Member States and be more closely involved in the surveillance of countries’ finances. The Euro Summit asked the Eurogroup to come up with necessary amendments to the ESM Treaty by June 2019.

Building on the Eurogroup compromise, EU leaders gave finance ministers a mandate to work on the design of a euro-area budget, which would focus on convergence and competitiveness. The size of the new budgetary instrument will be decided in the context of the MFF. However, they did not mention a crucial missing piece in the Banking Union framework: the European deposit insurance scheme (EDIS). They also declined to envisage the euro-area budget having a stabilisation function.

4. Special European Council (Article 50) meeting

Contrary to original plans, EU-27 Heads of State or Government also met in the European Council (Article 50) format on 13 December. Donald Tusk called the meeting following the postponement of the vote on the withdrawal agreement in the UK House of Commons, initially planned for 11 December. The British Prime Minister, Theresa May, wanted to discuss with EU leaders ‘the clear concerns that the House has expressed’. Prior to the meeting, President Tusk indicated that EU leaders would ‘not renegotiate the deal, including the backstop, but are ready to discuss how to facilitate UK ratification’.

After listening to Mrs May’s assessment of the ratification process, EU-27 Heads of State or Government adopted conclusions which state clearly that the Withdrawal Agreement ‘is not open for renegotiation’. However, they provided an assurance that the backstop was purely intended to be ‘an insurance policy to prevent a hard border on the island of Ireland and ensure the integrity of the Single Market’. The EU-27 stressed that the aim was to work speedily on a subsequent agreement that would, by 31 December 2020, establish alternative arrangements, so that the backstop would not need to be triggered. It is also specified that ‘if the backstop were nevertheless to be triggered, it would apply temporarily, unless and until it is superseded by a subsequent agreement that ensures that a hard border is avoided’. The European Council also called for work on preparedness at all levels for the consequences of the UK’s withdrawal to be intensified, taking into account all possible outcomes. Following the announcement of President Juncker, the Commission published a further series of legislative proposals to cope with a ‘no-deal’ scenario on 19 December.

Main messages of the EP President: The backstop is the guarantee that there will not be a hard border on the island of Ireland. For the Parliament, this is not negotiable. While the Parliament is prepared to clarify the terms of future relations, the withdrawal agreement could not be reopened.

 

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© christianchan / Fotolia

After 2017 brought optimism for the European Union, 2018 has proved a year of tougher challenges and choices. It was a time of slower growth, with the spectre of a global trade war. Turbulent negotiations on Brexit brought an agreement, but the chances of its approval by the UK House of Commons look unpromising. It was a year of uncertainty for transatlantic ties and for US global leadership. Tensions re-emerged over migration. Progress in overhauling the euro-area was limited. The simmering Russia-Ukrainian conflict erupted again. These and other developments form the backdrop for the European elections in 2019.

This note offers links to recent selected commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on the state of the EU in 2018 and its outlook in several important areas.

Brexit

The proposed UK-EU Brexit deal: An explainer
Open Europe, December 2018

Le Brexit dans tous ses états
Institut français des relations internationales, December 2018

Brexit brief: Special edition
Institute of International and European Affairs, November 2018

New research shows economic and fiscal consequences of the Brexit deal
The UK in a Changing Europe, November 2018

The November Draft Withdrawal Agreement
Institute for Government, November 2018

The Brexit deal and the UK-EU security relationship
DCU Brexit Institute, November 2018

What happens if Parliament rejects May’s Brexit deal?
Centre for European Reform, November 2018

What impact would a No Deal Brexit have on European Parliament elections?
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

LSE blog: Brexit
London School of Economics, November 2018

Brexit: Next steps in UK’s withdrawal from the EU
House of Commons Library, 2018

More think tank papers on Brexit
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

Trump and trade

Trump, Xi reach trade war truce… for now
Atlantic Council, December 2018

The Trump-Xi meeting at G-20: Kicking the can down the road
Rand Corporation, December 2018

What the 2018 (and 2020) elections mean for U.S. trade policy
European Centre for International Political Economy, December 2018

What might a Trump withdrawal from the World Trade Organization mean for US tariffs?
Peterson Institute of International Economics, November 2018

Consequences of U.S. trade policy on EU-U.S. trade relations and the global trading system
German Marshall Fund, November 2018

Disciplining China’s trade practices at the WTO: How WTO complaints can help make China more market-oriented
Cato Institute, November 2018

The EU response to US trade tariffs
Bruegel, October 2018

Crisis in the WTO: Restoring the dispute settlement function
Centre for International Government Innovation, October 2018

How the United States should confront China without threatening the global trading system
Peterson Institute of International Economics, August 2018

Power in the international trading system: Trump Administration risks destroying world trade order
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, July 2018

More papers on Trump’s presidency, trade and international policies
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

Foreign policy, defence

New realities in foreign affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st century
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, December 2018

American climate leadership without American government
Brookings Institution, December 2018

Strategic autonomy: Towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

Western countries must rethink how to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine
Chatham House, December 2018

The EU and NATO: A partnership with a glass ceiling
Istituto Affari Internazionali, December 2018

From the Azov Sea to Washington DC: How Russophobia became Russia’s leading export
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

Fighting terrorism and radicalisation in Europe’s neighbourhood: How to scale up EU efforts
European Policy Centre, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2018

NATO in the Trump era: Surviving the crisis
Clingendael, September 2018

The Trump administration’s National Security Strategy
Real Instituto Elcano, July 2018

More think tank papers on global trends
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

More think tanks papers on climate
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

More think tank papers on China
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

More think tank papers on Russia
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, September 2018

More think tank papers on NATO
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, July 2018

EMU reform, economy, institutions

Euro area reform: An anatomy of the debate
Centre for Economic Policy Research, Bruegel, November 2018

The European Parliament after the elections
Clingendael, November 2018

European fiscal rules require a major overhaul
Bruegel, October 2018

Reform of the international monetary system and new global economic governance: How the EU may contribute
Egmont, October 2018

The Italian budget: A case of contractionary fiscal expansion?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2018

European Parliament elections 2019: The litmus test for the Spitzenkandidaten process
Centre for European Reform, December 2018

ESM reform: No need to reinvent the wheel
Jacques Delors Institut, Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2018

Competing visions of Europe are threatening to tear the Union apart
Chatham House, August 2018

Europe’s surprising economic success story
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2018

The future of the Economic and Monetary Union
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, Clingendael, June 2018

More think tanks papers on EMU reform
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, November 2018

More think tanks papers on the State of the Union
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, November 2018

Migration

The Global Compact for Migration and the EU: Global effects of a regional backlash
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

À propos du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2018

EU migration policies in the Sahel-stagnation in a mode of crisis
Clingendael, December 2018

Three years into the refugee displacement crisis
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

For a European policy on asylum, migration and mobility
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

EU migration policy bears no relation to reality
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

In search of a new equilibrium: Immigration policymaking in the newest era of nativist populism
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

It’s not a refugee crisis: It’s a crisis of shrinking humanity and inequality
Friends of Europe, November 2018

Reforming Europe’s refugee policies: Austrian-Danish plan will not work
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2018

State of play in the debate on migration management in Europe
Clingendael, October 2018

More think tanks papers on migration
What think tanks are thinking, EPRS, December 2018

Read this briefing on ‘2018: Challenges and choices‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Visit the European Parliament page on ‘Migration in Europe‘.

Written by Joanna Apap and Ionel Zamfir,

© nito / Fotolia

These figures are expected to grow for a number of reasons, including population growth, conflicts,increasing connectivity, trade, rising inequality, demographic imbalances and climate change. Migration provides immense opportunity and benefits – for the migrants, host communities and communities of origin. However, when poorly regulated it can create significant challenges. These challenges include overwhelming social infrastructures with the unexpected arrival of large numbers of people and the deaths of migrants undertaking dangerous journeys.

Today, over 258 million persons around the world live outside their country of birth. In 2017, high-income countries hosted 64 %, or nearly 165 million, of the total number of international migrants worldwide. Moreover, most of the growth in the global population of international migrants is due to movements toward high-income countries, which host 64 million of the 85 million migrants added since 2000.

The large-scale migratory flows affecting several regions in the world in the last several years have brought the plight of persons who are forced to flee their homes due to war, insecurity or persecution more forcefully than ever to the world’s attention. They have also exposed how ill-prepared the international community has been to deal with this challenge and how disproportionate the distribution of the burden of caring for such people has been among countries.

The number of international migrants includes 26 million refugees or asylum seekers, or about 10 % of the total number of migrants in the world. At the end of 2017, almost 20 million were recognised as refugees under the UNHCR mandate – a figure the UN agency considers a record.

Although a majority of the world’s international migrants live in high-income countries, low- and middle-income countries host nearly 22 million, or 84 %, of all refugees and asylum seekers. While critical voices have pointed to the lack of political will in developed countries as an explanation for this state of affairs, the causes are more complex and nuanced. Most often, refugees tend to move to neighbouring countries for practical reasons.

Moreover, there are huge discrepancies not only in the number of refugees hosted in the world across regions and countries, but also in the quality of protection offered. Many of the countries that host refugees, particularly developing countries in Africa and Asia, have either not ratified the Geneva Convention or do not comply with all their obligations. They hold refugees in camps, do not grant them the right to move freely and to work and rely largely on international solidarity to fulfil their basic needs. They do not provide a path to integration and naturalisation, generating protracted refugee situations. This encourages secondary movements of refugees, who try to reach countries offering more adequate protection and integration prospects, such as in Europe. These imbalances among countries and regions have clearly exposed the need for fairer burden sharing and more solidarity across countries.

To meet these growing challenges, the international community has adopted two distinct legally non-binding compacts on refugees and migration, respectively. The latter has received a lot of public attention and been the focus of much political controversy, while the first has been quietly adopted. As some commentators have failed to adequately distinguish between the two,it is important to highlight their distinct scope and role. Refugees are persons fleeing persecution in their home countries, as defined in the Geneva Refugee Convention. Persons who may face torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment if returned to their countries of origin and thus deserve international protection are treated similarly to refugees under international law. For migrants, on the other hand, there is no international legal definition. The countries that have ratified the Geneva Convention – and this is the case for all EU countries – have clearly defined legal obligations with respect to refugees. This is not the case with migrants, although states are bound to respect general international human rights obligations towards any person on their territory, including migrants – such as the prohibition of arbitrary detention.

The drafting process was initiated in September 2016, when all 193 UN member states adopted the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, paving the way for two non-binding international compacts on refugees, and migration. Two global compacts were prepared and negotiated during two years, a Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and a Global Compact on Refugees. The Global Compact on Migration was prepared by the International Organization on Migration (IOM) through broad consultations with UN member states and stakeholders. This was endorsed by oral acclamation in Marrakech by164 UN member states after two years of negotiations. The compact on refugees was, on the other hand, drafted by the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), which also underwent a similar rigorous consultations process. The Global Compact on Refugees was endorsed by the UN General Assembly on 17 December 2018.Conversely, the EU was both supportive and involved in the UN-launched process for the preparation of both global compacts.

The Global Compact on Migration, comprising of 23 objectives for better managing migration at local, national, regional and global levels, is the first ever UN global agreement on a common approach to international migration in all its dimensions. The global compact is non-legally binding. It is grounded in values of state sovereignty, responsibility-sharing, non-discrimination, and human rights, and recognises that a cooperative approach is needed to optimise the overall benefits of migration, while addressing its risks and challenges for individuals and communities in countries of origin, transit and destination. It will therefore be up to the Member States to implement it in full respect of their sovereignty. The EU has shared competence with Member States with regards to migration, and migration policy is a matter of domestic law.

Addressing issues such as a fairer distribution of refugees(e.g. through broader voluntary participation in UNHCR led-resettlement),better integration of refugees in their host society as well as supporting appropriate conditions for return to their home countries, are among the main objectives of the Global Compact on Refugees. The Global Compact on Refugees also encourages the involvement not only of state actors but also of other stakeholders, such as local authorities and private entities in responding to refugee crises. However, with regard to refugees, the Compact does not include any new commitments compared to the Geneva Conventions, but only practical solutions about how to implement these. The Compact explicitly states that it is non-binding. It also envisages involving refugees themselves and host communities in designing the appropriate policy responses. The Global Compact on Refugees proposes a global refugee forum at ministerial level, which, according to the third draft,will convene every four years from 2019. It will provide participating states with the opportunity to make pledges in various forms, such as providing financial, material and technical assistance to host countries; and providing resettlement places and complementary pathways for admission. The Refugees Compact includes a programme of action, which outlines a threefold set of solutions to end refugee crises, based on voluntary repatriation when conditions allow,integration into the host society and resettlement to third countries.

EU Member States, however, are bound by the EU Treaties to respect human rights and uphold the values of the Union as well as respect UN norms (Articles 2 and 3 TEU). The European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights will always have a role should a Member State fail to fulfil its obligations with respect to the EU treaties and,respectively, its human rights obligations. The UN universal periodic review is a further mechanism of oversight as to how well UN member states respect UN norms and values.

To read more on these two compacts, see our forthcoming EPRS briefings:

• A global compact on migration: Placing human rights at the heart of migration management by Joanna Apap
• A global compact : Strengthening international cooperation to ease the plight of refugees in the world by Ionel Zamfir

Written by Alina Dobreva,

© Silkstock / Fotolia

The Guarantee Fund for External Actions (GFEA) backs loans and loan guarantees granted to non-EU countries, or to finance projects in non-EU countries. It was established back in 1994 with the objective to help protect the EU budget against the risks associated with such loans. Although it had undergone amendments over the years, the Fund maintains its core purpose and managing it, the European Investment Bank (EIB) provides support to the EU’s external policies.

Currently, the main objective of the particular actions backed by the GFEA is to support the increase of growth and jobs, and to improve the business environment in developing countries by strengthening the involvement of the private sector. The GFEA resources are used to repay the EU’s creditors in the event of a default on a loan granted or guaranteed by the Union or for which the Union has provided a guarantee. The lending and guarantee operations are carried out for the benefit of a third country or for the purpose of financing projects in third countries.

The GFEA also contributes to the European External Investment Plan, which addresses the root causes of migration, the ongoing refugee crisis and security-related issues.

The main purpose of the EU budget guarantee is to act as a liquidity cushion covering default or late payments for projects in non-Member States. Once the beneficiaries of a loan to third countries fail to service its loans to the bank, the EIB calls on the GFEA to cover the default within three months of the call. The size of the contributions transferred to the GFEA is determined annually, depending on the budget that is adopted. The contributions for 2018 amount to €137.8 million, down by about €102.7 million compared to the2017 budget. Despite some criticism on the lack of sufficient geographical focus, focus on climate change and general sub-optimal use of the GFEA, it is an instrument that is appreciated by the stakeholders. Evaluations also recognise the flexibility of the ELM with regards to the Union’s external policy agenda, mentioning its adequate response to geopolitical and economic challenges as in the case of Syria, Ukraine (the Ukrainian crisis), Egypt and Morocco (the ‘Arab spring’) and Jordan (the refugee crisis).

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Guarantee Fund for External Actions‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2018 – Source : EP

The December plenary session was marked by the terrorist attack that took place in Strasbourg on 11 December. Members had that very day debated the report of Parliament’s Special Committee on Terrorism, concluding its year’s work. The December plenary session also featured debates on the preparations for the same week’s European Council and Euro Summit meetings, as well as on the future of Europe, with Nicos Anastasiades, President of Cyprus. Parliament awarded the 2018 Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought to the imprisoned Ukrainian filmmaker, Oleg Sentsov, and adopted a report on the implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. Parliament adopted the EU’s 2019 budget, and held debates and voted on proposals on a digital services tax; risk assessment in the food chain; risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work; revision of the statutes of three EU agencies; as well as an own initiative legislative report on expedited settlement of commercial disputes. Finally, Parliament adopted positions on seven of the three dozen proposed funding programmes for the 2021-2027 period, enabling negotiations with the Council to be launched.

Award of the Sakharov Prize

This plenary session marks the 30th anniversary of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought, which this year goes to imprisoned Ukrainian filmmaker, Oleg Sentsov. Awarded annually for a specific achievement in human rights, the 2018 Sakharov Prize is recognition of Sentsov’s courageous contribution to the ‘Euromaidan’ resistance against Russian aggression in Ukraine, and as a representative of political prisoners worldwide.

EU-Japan Partnership Agreement

Parliament gave its consent, with a comfortable majority, to the conclusion of the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement and the Strategic Partnership Agreement, following a joint debate. The Strategic Partnership Agreement provides the legal framework for future EU-Japan relations, increasing the possibilities for cooperation between the two partners in areas such as combating climate change and cybercrime. Importantly for EU businesses, the Economic Partnership Agreement, the largest-ever bilateral free trade deal, will provide customs-free access to the Japanese markets for EU companies.

Digital services tax

During a joint debate on a proposed digital services tax, Members discussed and adopted reports on two proposals: for an interim digital services tax on revenues from certain digital services, and for corporate taxation of a significant digital presence. The first proposal would broaden the Member States’ tax bases, by making revenue from digital content services taxable in the short term. The second, for a permanent system, would define the circumstances under which a digital company’s ‘significant digital presence’ in a country would make it liable to pay tax. The final rules, however, require unanimity in the Council.

EU agencies: Cedefop, EU-OSHA and Eurofound

Members adopted interinstitutional agreements on proposals to revise the statutes of three decentralised EU agencies that support the EU’s wider employment-related objectives. Reports from the Committee on Employment and Social Affairs confirm the need to define the agencies’ tasks to avoid any overlap. A new governance structure proposed for each agency should include independent representation on behalf of the Parliament on their management boards dealing with strategic and budgetary priorities.

Protection from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work

Members adopted, by a very large majority, the interinstitutional agreement on the second revision of the Directive on the protection from the risks related to exposure to carcinogens or mutagens at work. The agreement sets a limit value for diesel vapour of 0.05 mg/m³, with a transition period of two years. The change to legal exposure limits to certain chemical agents will benefit an estimated 15.6 million EU workers.

Transparency and sustainability of EU risk assessment in the food chain

Members debated and adopted, by a comfortable majority, a report on risk assessment in the food chain, which supports the Commission proposal to revise the General Food Law to widen public access to commercial studies used by the European Food Safety Authority. Parliament also agreed to the ENVI committee opening trilogue negotiations on the proposal

EU-Ukraine Association Agreement

Against the background of continuing Russian aggression in the region, Members debated and adopted a report on progress on implementation of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. While the report acknowledges the progress the country has made on implementation in very difficult circumstances, it nevertheless expresses dissatisfaction with the continued level of corruption and politicisation in the country’s institutions. Parliament also calls on the EU and its Member States to adopt targeted sanctions if Russia does not release captives seized in the Kerch Strait, or in the event of further military escalation.

EU Budget 2019

When budgetary conciliation on the first draft budget for 2019 failed to find agreement, the Commission put forward a new draft budget. Based on this second draft and subsequent negotiations, the European Parliament and Council agreed the general budget for the European Union for 2019 (with Parliament adopting the agreed text by 451 votes in favour, 142 against, with 78 abstentions), which sets out €165 795.6 million in commitments and €148 198.9 million in payment appropriations. Compared to the 2018 budget, this represents an increase of 3.2 % in commitments and 2.4 % in payments. Parliament also approved: draft amending budget No 6/2018, and two instances of mobilisation of the Flexibility instrument, to address the ongoing challenges of migration, refugee inflows and security threats, and to provide for the payment of advances in the 2019 budget.

Findings and recommendations of the Special Committee on Terrorism

Parliament debated and adopted the final report of the Special Committee on Terrorism on the fight against terrorism in the EU. The report highlights that, while each Member State is responsible for its own national security, cooperation is vital to effective counter-terrorism and intelligence. The committee also underlined that an effective fight against terrorism requires, among other things: an appropriate data retention regime; an EU centre of excellence for preventing radicalisation; swift removal of terrorist content posted online; external borders that are well secured through interoperable databases and biometric checks; checks on financial flows; better tracking of suspects; and tighter control of explosives and firearms.

Expedited settlement of commercial disputes

Members considered, and adopted by a large majority, a report requesting that the European Commission make a proposal on expedited settlement of cross-border commercial disputes. The report proposes the introduction of a European expedited civil procedure to solve cross-border business disputes, to cut costs and accelerate the process of adjudication to 6-12 months by instigating tight deadlines and ending lengthy appeals on procedural grounds.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Thirteen parliamentary committee decisions (from ECON, REGI, ITRE, LIBE, JURI, IMCO, AFCO) to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed. Only one vote was held, on an Economic & Monetary Affairs Committee report on minimum loss coverage for non-performing exposures, where the committee’s decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations was approved. Parliament also confirmed two Employment & Social Affairs Committee decisions, on a European Labour Authority and on the coordination of social security systems, following requests made during the November II plenary session.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Strasbourg, December 2018‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Hepta / Fotolia

On 10 December 2018, at a conference in the Moroccan city of Marrakech, more than 160 United Nations members adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. This is the first multilateral framework providing a global response to migration, and comes at a time of mounting public concern about the issue, in particular in the EU and US. Even though the agreement is non-binding and serves more as a set of best practices for the international community to improve global cooperation on migration, nearly 30 countries, including the US and a number of EU Member States, have decided to oppose it. 

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on migration by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on the same topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in October 2018.

The Global Compact for Migration and the EU: Globaleffects of a regional backlash
Istitutoper gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, December 2018

À propos du Pacte mondial pour des migrations sûres, ordonnées et régulières
Institut des relations internationales et stratégiques, October 2018

EU migration policies in the Sahel-stagnation in a mode of crisis
Clingendael, December 2018

Three years into the refugee displacement crisis
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

The costs of fuelling humanitarian aid
hatham House, December 2018

Is Italian agriculture a ‘pull factor’ for irregular migration, and, if so, why?
Open Society Institute, December 2018

For a European policy on asylum, migration and mobility
Institut Jacques Delors, November 2018

EU migration policy bears no relation to reality
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

Some EU governments leaving the UN Global Compact on Migration: A contradiction in terms?
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

Migration in the EU-ACP Partnership after 2020: Implementing the UN Global Compact
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, November 2018

UN migration agreement leads to splits in the European Union
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Migration dynamics in play in Morocco: Trafficking and political relationships and their implications at the regional level
Istituto Affari Internazionali, November 2018

Real people, true stories: Refugees for more inclusive societies
Friends of Europe, November 2018

The future of migration policy in a volatile political landscape
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

Welcome! And the Global Compact’s ‘continental pull-out’
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2018

Competing priorities at the EU’s external border
European Policy Centre, November 2018

Testing the water: How water scarcity could destabilise the Middle East and North Africa
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

In search of a new equilibrium: Immigration policymaking in the newest era of nativist populism
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

It’s not a refugee crisis: It’s a crisis of shrinking humanity and inequality
Friends of Europe, November 2018

Transformative technology for migrant workers: Opportunities, challenges, and risks
Open Society Institute, November 2018

Who secures the U.S. border?
Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

When facts don’t matter: How to communicate more effectively about immigration’s costs and benefits
Migration Policy Institute, November 2018

Cities and migration in Europe: All integration is local
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, November 2018

Changing patterns of migration from Pakistan to Germany
Bertelsmann Stiftung, November 2018

Reforming Europe’s refugee policies: Austrian-Danish plan will not work
Centre for European Policy Studies, October 2018

Creating legal pathways to reduce irregular migration? What we can learn from Germany’s ‘Western Balkan Regulation’
German Marshall Fund, October 2018

State of play in the debate on migration management in Europe
Clingendael, October 2018

States are challenging new policy that denies asylum to survivors of domestic violence
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

Notes for understanding African migration
Atlantic Council,October 2018

Not always on a boat to Europe: Movements of Africans within and beyond the continent
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, October 2018

Trump’s cuts to central America aid will lead to more caravans
Council on Foreign Relations, October 2018

Balancing acts: Policy frameworks for migrant return and reintegration
Migration Policy Institute, October 2018

Turkey’s migration policy revisited: (Dis)Continuities and peculiarities
Istituto Affari Internazionali, October 2018

The future of Schengen
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, October 2018

The European Council and migration: Any progress?
Fundacion Real Instituto Elcano, October 2018

Applying behavioral insights to support immigrantintegration and social cohesion
Migration Policy Institute, October 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Migration‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Lucienne Attard (The Directorate-General for the Presidency),

Official logo Romanian Presidency © romania2019.eu

Romania will hold the EU Council Presidency from January to July 2019. Its Presidency comes at the end of the European Parliament’s current legislative term, with European elections taking place on 23-26 May 2019. This is the first time that Romania holds the EU Council Presidency since joining the European Union on 1 January 2007.
Romania has a bicameral legislature. The Parliament consists of the Senate (the upper house) having 137 seats and the Chamber of Deputies (the lower house) with 332 seats. The members of both houses are elected by direct, popular vote on the basis of proportional representation to serve four-year terms. The executive branch of the Government is directly or indirectly dependent on the support of the parliament, often expressed through a vote of confidence.

The Social Democratic Party (PSD) heads the current governmental alliance with the centre-right Liberal-Democrat Alliance (ALDE). Romania is a semi-presidential republic, with Klaus Iohannis as President in office since November 2014, and the current Prime Minister, Viorica Dancila (PSD), in office since January 2018.

Political priorities of the Romanian Presidency

This note looks at the Romanian Presidency priorities, with those dossiers which figure in the Joint Declaration agreed by the three institutions as priorities up to May 2019 marked with an asterisk (*).

Romania will focus on the over-arching principle of cohesion as a common European value, and as an expression of the unity between EU Member States and regions. To this end, it has announced that its Presidency programme will focus on four main pillars:

• ensuring fair and sustainable development through an increased level of convergence, cohesion, innovation, digitalisation and connectivity;
• maintaining a safe Europe;
• strengthening the EU’s global role; and
• a Europe of shared values.

Read the full briefing here: Priority Dossiers under the Romanian EU Council Presidency.

The Directorate-General for the Presidency (DG Presidency) plays a key role throughout each parliamentary procedure, from its launch until its conclusion through the adoption of an EP resolution or legislative act, in particular in ensuring the smooth running of the plenary sessions. The staff of the DG play a key coordination role across the different services of the Parliament, and support Members in a wide range of activities. The Interinstitutional Relations Unit within DG Presidency, amongst other tasks, prepares a broad range documents concerned with strategic programming, such as on activities of the Commission and the Council.

Written by Nera Kuljanic,

Satellite navigation (satnav) helps us locate ourselves based on signals provided by a constellation of satellites. Probably the best-known satnav is the American GPS, but China (BeiDou) and Russia (GLONASS) have also developed their own global navigation satellite systems (GNSS). All these systems are under military control.

© Shutterstock / Designua

Since the early 1990s, the EU has been exploring the potential of developing its own satnav. Setting up the foundation of the Galileo programme in 1999 achieved this ambition. After years of drawbacks, delays and increased costs, Galileo started providing what are known as ‘initial services’ in December 2016, and is set to become fully operational for 2021.

Satnav and other services enabled by GNSS, like Galileo, have found their way into a large number of applications in our daily life, in areas such as aviation; Location Based Services (LBS); timing and synchronisation (e.g., for mobile phone networks); surveying; road, rail, and maritime transport; agriculture; and public authority and military operations. For land surveys and civil protection, particular advantages stem from combining Galileo and Copernicus, the EU’s earth observation programme. Besides the benefits to European citizens and public authorities, Galileo enables innovation, contributing to the creation of new products and services, creating jobs and allowing Europe to own a greater share of the €175 billion global GNSS market.

Overall, compared to other GNSS, Galileo offers several unique features and provides other benefits to the EU, as well as globally:

• Developed as a civil system under the civil governance of the EU, Galileo allows Europe to remain autonomous, compared to relying on foreign-owned satnav, whose signals could be shut down or degraded for civil and/or foreign use (for example during conflicts). Civil governance also allows an open communication policy on system design specifications, which enables development of additional applications and technologies, and facilitates their certification.
• Interoperability between different GNSS is particularly important to avoid costly adaptations to single-satellite navigation systems. Galileo provides access to more satellites and frequencies, resulting in better user service, especially in challenging urban scenarios.
• Galileo will also provide the signal authentication feature for open, free-of-charge signals available to civilians. Signal authentication is a technical mechanism that verifies that the signals received actually originate from the source stated, which is particularly important for security sensitive applications. Galileo will also provide improved accuracy and coverage, with a unique return link capability for search and rescue (SAR) operations.
• Galileo is also the European contribution to the worldwide SAR service Cospas-Sarsat. Galileo helps increase the coverage and the localisation accuracy of the entire system, and adds a unique feature: a notification for the person in distress that their call has been detected and that help is on its way.

On the other hand, Galileo also faces a number of challenges. On the technical side, for example, the susceptibility of GNSS to radio frequency interference is a major threat for all domains. Furthermore, even though the open communication policy is much appreciated, some experts would prefer certain detailed technical information needed for their domain to be more readily available, particularly for safety-critical applications, which would also facilitate certification. From the organisational point of view, Galileo still suffers from its overly optimistic early schedules and past promises. Reliable schedules are crucial for private business investment in Galileo-related technologies. Finally, with the parallel modernisation of GPS, Galileo has missed the opportunity to be the first operational system with modern features for civil users and is today mostly considered an additional source of measurements to be used in conjunction with other GNSS. Nevertheless, Galileo remains the first and only GNSS under civilian control, and represents a strategic advantage for the EU.

The above points are the main conclusions of the recently published STOA study on the Galileo satellite navigation system. Requested by STOA Second Vice-Chair, Evžen Tošenovský (ECR, CZ), the study was carried out by experts from the Institute of Flight Guidance of the Technical University Braunschweig, Germany, under STOA management. A list of sources complements the study, which draws on information and feedback collected during 13 interviews with various experts in the field of GNSS. Based on the key advantages provided by Galileo and some of the challenges identified, the study offers a set of policy options to maximise the impact of the European satnav system both in the near future and in the long term.

If you read the study, please get in touch via email to let us know what you think. Your opinion counts for us.

Written by Enrico D’Ambrogio,

© mattiaath / Fotolia

The EU and Japan share the same basic values, including on democracy, market economy, human rights, human dignity, freedom, equality, and the rule of law. Against a background of increasingly assertive neighbours, they are also putting emphasis on security issues. The EU has adopted a Global Strategy placing security and defence as a key strategic priority, and conclusions on ‘enhanced EU security cooperation in and with Asia’. Japan has reformed its security policy, aiming at becoming a ‘proactive contributor for peace’. In order to enhance their relations, in July 2018 the EU and Japan signed a binding Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA), along with an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), negotiated in parallel.

The SPA represents a framework strengthening the overall partnership, by promoting political and sectoral cooperation and joint actions in more than 40 areas of common interest. Once adopted, the EU-Japan strategic partnership will become more operational. The agreement will facilitate joint EU-Japan efforts to promote shared values such as human rights and rule of law, a rules-based international system, and peace and stability across the world. It will allow EU-Japan security cooperation to reach its full potential.

Strategic Partnership Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Japan, of the other part Committee responsible: Foreign Affairs (AFET) Rapporteurs:

2018/0122 (NLE) Alojz Peterle (EPP, Slovenia)

 

 

Read the complete briefing on ‘The EU-Japan Strategic Partnership Agreement (SPA) – A framework to promote shared values‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Japan, its neighbours and territorial disputes

 

Written by Naja Bentzen and Ionel Zamfir,

© andrys lukowski / Fotolia

Thirty years since it was first awarded, the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought retains all its symbolic meaning, as human rights continue to be embattled in many parts of the world. The courage of those who stand up for them therefore deserves to be widely recognised. By awarding the 2018 Prize to the Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov – who is currently an inmate in a penal colony in Siberia – Parliament aims to increase the pressure on Russia to release Sentsov. At the same time, the award also draws attention to the struggle of all Ukrainian political prisoners currently behind bars in Russia and the annexed Crimean peninsula.

Background Significance of the prize

The Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought is awarded each year by the European Parliament to individuals or organisations for their outstanding achievements in upholding human rights and fundamental freedoms. Created through a Parliamentary resolution of 13 December 1985, the prize bears the name of prominent Soviet-era dissident, Andrei Sakharov, joint inventor of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize-winner and campaigner for human rights and nuclear disarmament in the Soviet Union. The prize was named after him in recognition of his courageous defence of human rights, among which the freedom of thought and expression, to the detriment of his professional career and personal freedom. The prize was awarded for the first time in 1988 jointly to Nelson Mandela and (posthumously) to Soviet dissident Anatoli Marchenko. Both Mandela and Marchenko embodied the bravery of the individual who stands up to the discretionary power of an oppressive regime and paying for it with their personal freedom. Mandela’s story is widely known. Marchenko was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He died in 1986 after a three-month-long hunger strike for the release of all Soviet dissidents. The public outcry caused by his death pushed Mikhail Gorbachev to authorise the release of political prisoners from Soviet jails. His courageous action prefigures the similarly brave standing of the 2018 laureate (see below).

The prize is awarded for a specific achievement in one of the following fields: defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly the right to free expression; safeguarding the rights of minorities; respect for international law; development of democracy and implementation of the rule of law.

Selection procedure

Nominations can be made by political groups or by at least 40 Members of the European Parliament, and are submitted during a joint meeting of the European Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) Committees. This year, on 9 October 2018, the two committees shortlisted the following three finalists from among the eight nominees: Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian film-director, convicted in Russia to 20 years in prison for his opposition to the annexation of Crimea (proposed by the EPP), NGOs protecting human rights and saving migrant lives across the Mediterranean Sea (proposed by S&D and the Greens/EFA), and Nasser Zefzafi, the leader of a mass protest movement in the Rif region of Morocco, sentenced to 20 years in prison (proposed by GUE/NGL). The Conference of Presidents, composed of President Antonio Tajani and the leaders of the political groups, chose Oleg Sentsov, the Ukraine filmmaker detained in Russia, as this year’s laureate. The prize, consisting of a certificate and €50 000, will be presented at a ceremony in the European Parliament during the plenary session in Strasbourg on 12 December 2018. All three finalists are invited to the award ceremony. This year’s laureate will be represented by a relative and by his lawyer. Other laureates in the history of the prize have also been prevented from attending because of detention, most recently Raif Badawi in 2015. Sentsov is the first laureate from eastern Europe since 2009, when the Russian human rights centre, Memorial, received the prize.

Oleg Sentsov: Ukrainian filmmaker and symbol for political prisoners

Born on 13 July 1976 in Simferopol (Crimea), Oleg Sentsov studied marketing at Kyiv State Economics University. He did not particularly enjoy these studies, which he said ‘disillusioned’ him. After managing a computer club in Simferopol and playing online video games professionally for years – eventually becoming the champion of Ukraine – Sentsov became the leader of the Crimean gaming movement. This experience from the gaming world served as inspiration for his first feature film Gamer, which was released in 2011 and later screened at a number of international film festivals.

Euromaidan as a turning point for Ukraine — and for Sentsov

Sentsov’s work on his film Rhino, about children of the 1990s, was interrupted in 2013, when he joined the Revolution of Dignity (‘Euromaidan’) that broke out in Ukraine after pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovich decided to suspend talks on an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In February 2014, the protests paved the way for a new pro-European government and the ousting of Yanukovich. When Moscow responded by illegally annexing Crimea and launching a hybrid war against Ukraine, Sentsov helped bring food to Ukrainian soldiers and organised rallies for a united Ukraine in Simferopol. Sentsov was arrested by the Russian Federal Security Service in Crimea in May 2014, and deported to Russia. In what Amnesty International called a ‘cynical show trial’, a Russian military court in August 2015 convicted Sentsov to 20 years imprisonment for plotting terrorist acts. Sentsov denies the charges, which he and human rights groups call politically motivated. Sentsov said he was beaten for 24 hours in an attempt to force him to confess. Russian authorities have refused to investigate the allegations of torture.

Increasing concerns over Sentsov’s health after hunger strike

In May 2018, Sentsov began a hunger strike, demanding the release of all Ukrainians held on political grounds in Russia and annexed Crimea. Amid growing concern over Sentsov’s health, Ukraine’s Mission to the United Nations (UN) in June delivered an official letter on behalf of 38 countries to the UN Secretary-General. Sentsov ended the 145-day hunger strike on 6 October 2018. In a handwritten statement he explained that he had no choice but to halt the hunger strike to avoid being force-fed by Russian authorities due to the critical state of his health. Kyiv’s calls to swap Sentsov and Ukrainian journalist Roman Suschenko, arrested in Moscow in 2016 on espionage charges, for Russian prisoners, have so far been rejected by Moscow.

International support, including from the EU and the European Parliament

In addition to Ukraine, the European Union, the United States, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights groups, filmmakers’ and writers’ associations and even Russian film-director Nikita Mikhalkov, who has close links to Russian President Vladimir Putin, have requested Sentsov’s release. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy / Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini, has repeatedly underlined that Sentsov’s detention breaches international law, and urged Russia to return Sentsov and fellow activist Oleksandr Kolchenko to Ukraine. In a June 2018 resolution, Parliament requested the immediate release of Sentsov and the 70 other Ukrainian citizens illegally detained in Russia and Crimea. After Sentsov ended his hunger strike, the European External Action Service condemned Russian authorities’ refusal to provide Sentsov appropriate medical treatment. Announcing the Sakharov Prize laureate in Strasbourg on 25 October 2018, European Parliament President Antonio Tajani stated that Sentsov’s ‘courage and determination’ has made him ‘a symbol of the struggle for the release of political prisoners held in Russia and around the world’. With the award of the Sakharov Prize, Parliament is ‘expressing its solidarity with him and his cause’, Tajani said: ‘We ask that he be released immediately’.

Responses to the 2018 Sakharov Prize

While Russia’s Foreign Ministry criticised Parliament’s decision as ‘absolutely politicised’, others hailed it. PEN America called it ‘a powerful statement in defence of writers, artists, political prisoners, and all those … actively fighting for free thought and free expression in a time of creeping – and not so creeping – authoritarianism around the world’. Human Rights Watch said the award would help increase the pressure on Moscow to release Sentsov. European Council President Donald Tusk renewed his call on Moscow to ‘free Sentsov and all other political prisoners following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea’. Ukrainian Prime Minister Volodymyr Groysman expressed gratitude to Parliament for the award, which he called ‘a strong message highlighting the necessity of democracy protection in the world’.

Read this At a glance note on ‘The 2018 Sakharov Prize‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Joanna Apap,

© igor / Fotolia

The promotion and protection of human rights is a core and founding value of the EU and is at the heart of multilateralism – a central pillar of both the European Union and the United Nations system.

The international community observes 10 December annually, since 1948, as Human Rights Day – the day the United Nations General Assembly adopted, in 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This year, the celebrations will be even more significant, as 2018 marks the 70th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 25th anniversary of the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, and the 20th anniversary of the UN Human Rights Defenders Declaration. It is also the 30th anniversary of the European Parliament’s Sakharov prize. Awarded since 1988, the annual Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought is one of the ways that the European Parliament (EP) supports human rights.

The Sakharov prize is awarded to individuals who have made an exceptional contribution to the fight for human rights across the globe, drawing attention to human rights violations as well as supporting the laureates and their cause. Oleg Sentsov (1976-), this year’s Sakharov prize laureate is a Ukrainian film director, who was detained on 10 May 2014 at Simferopol, Crimea, and sentenced to 20 years in prison on charges of plotting terrorist acts against Russian ‘de facto’ rule in Crimea. Amnesty International described the court process as ‘an unfair trial before a military court’. Sentsov was sentenced because he opposed the illegal and forced annexation of part of his country by its belligerent neighbour, in a blatant violation of international law, and Russian international and bilateral commitments. His conviction has become a powerful symbol of the fate of the approximately 70 Ukrainian citizens illegally arrested and convicted to long prison sentences by the Russian occupying forces in the Crimean peninsula following its annexation

As part of its actions in support of human rights, the European Parliament debates and adopts an annual report on human rights and democracy in the world. Human rights and the promotion of democracy worldwide are top priorities for the EP, and fall under the remit of its Committee on Foreign Affairs (AFET), together with its sub-committee on Human Rights (DROI). AFET’s own-initiative report on the 2017 annual report on human rights and democracy in the world and the European Union’s policy on the matter (rapporteur: Petras Auštrevičius, ALDE, Lithuania) was adopted by the Committee on 12 November 2018, and is due to be debated and voted in plenary session on 11 and 12 December respectively. The report includes the opinion of the Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). In 2017, human rights were very much at the heart of the European Union’s external action. However, 2017 also saw a continued backlash, worldwide, against civil society, particularly journalists, a rise in misinformation and growing populism. The AFET reports calls for the continuous mainstreaming of human rights throughout the EU’s work both internally and externally. To improve the EU’s response to human rights challenges in third countries and in its neighbourhood, the report emphasises such areas as development, migration, security, counter-terrorism, women’s rights, combatting all forms of discrimination, enlargement and trade, as these require further political commitment and additional efforts to empower local actors, including the reinforcement of civil society and the protection of human rights defenders.

Further to its previous resolutions on annual reports on human rights and also its recent resolutions (amongst others): Addressing refugee and migrant movements: the role of EU external action (5 April 2017); Addressing shrinking civil society space in developing countries (3 October 2017); Progress on UN Global compacts for safe, orderly and regular migration and on refugees (18 April 2018); Media pluralism and media freedom in the European Union (3 May 2018); Parliament remains committed to improving its own procedures, processes and structures on human rights, to ensure that human rights and democracy are at the core of its actions and policies.

See below for the European Parliamentary Research Service‘s most recent publications on human rights, which provide background information and analysis on the core principles in this area:

• Apap J., Adorna Diaz D., Urbina Trevino D., A global compact on migration: Placing human rights at the heart of migration management, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, December 2017.
• Apap J., Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2017 (please add link), European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, December 2018.
• Apap J., Indivisibility of Human Rights: Unifying the two Covenants on Human Rights?, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, November 2018.
• Apap J., One step forward and two steps back for human rights in the world, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, March 2018.
• Apap J., The concept of ‘climate refugee’: Towards a possible definition, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, May 2018.
• Apap J., United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, March 2018.
• Bentzen N., Zamfir I., Award of the Sakharov Prize, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, December 2018.
• Ioannides I.,The Trade Pillar in the EU-Central America Association Agreement, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, October 2018.
• Perchoc P., Freedom of conscience around the world, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, April 2018.
• Prpic M., Shreeves R., Zamfir I., EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Human Rights, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, November 2018.
• Salm C., Major sporting events versus human rights: Parliament’s position on the 1978 FIFA World Cup in Argentina and the 1980 Moscow Olympics, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, June 2018.
• Zamfir I., EU policies – Delivering for citizens: EU support for democracy and peace in the world, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, October 2018.
• Zamfir I., EU support for human rights defenders around the world, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, November 2018
• Zamfir I., Human rights in EU trade policy: Unilateral measures applied by the EU, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, May 2018.
• Zamfir I., International Criminal Court: Achievements and challenges 20 years after the adoption of the Rome Statute, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, July 2018.
• Zamfir I., Sakharov Prize: Voices of humanity, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, May 2018.
• Zamfir I., The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and its relevance for the European Union, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, November 2018.
• Zamfir I., Towards a binding international treaty on business and human rights, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, October 2018.
• Zamfir I., Towards a global compact on refugees: Strengthening international cooperation to ease the plight of refugees in the world, European Parliamentary Research Service, European Parliament, June 2018.

Written by Lieve Van Woensel with Jens Van Steerteghem,

‘Gene drive’ is best known for its capacity to suppress malaria by eradicating mosquito populations. However, its applications reach even further, including through its potential to eliminate other insect-transmitted diseases, erase herbicide and pesticide resistance in weeds and pests, and remove invasive species from ecosystems. It is worth looking into these potential benefits, while also weighing the significant risks involved in gene drive use.

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A gene drive is a technique for manipulating ecosystems by introducing self-propagating custom genes among a population of sexually reproducing organisms, using the CRISPR-Cas9 gene-editing technology. This recent revolutionary technology grants scientists nearly endless possibilities for manipulating genes and genomes with high efficiency and ease, and at a low cost. The specific CRISPR-Cas9 set-up used can subvert normal inheritance rules in order to bias a custom gene so that it is inherited at a frequency higher than the normal 50 % (sometimes up to 100 %) – an effect produced by other genetic mechanisms in nature as well. Researchers can then insert this set-up into the genome of a number of initiator organisms and release them into the wild, causing the custom gene to spread and perform its function throughout a growing fraction of the population. This gene may induce a variety of effects on the targeted organism, such as fatal development problems, change of sex, sterility, increased resistance to parasites, decreased resistance to pesticides or herbicides, etc. Instead of introducing a custom gene, the drive may also alter the organism by disrupting a natural gene, such as one that performs a critical development role.

While the idea of gene drives has been around since 2003, they only became practicable in 2013 with the advent of CRISPR-Cas9. Gene drives have proven to be successful in lab tests on mosquitoes and fruit flies, but less so on mice, showing room for improvement. So far, no gene drives have been released into wild populations. Current research focuses on combating malaria by reducing mosquito populations or their ability to transfer the malaria parasite, and on eradicating rodents that cause major damage to the endemic flora and fauna on the islands they invade.

Since the above-mentioned technology modifies the germline of the species, i.e. the genetic material that passes onto the next generation, this practice raises a host of ethical considerations. Are we willing to take on the risk of introducing irreversible and unintended changes in the genome of a species, or even of unleashing an environmental catastrophe through carelessness? Is assuming such a risk justified by the fact that in so doing we could eradicate insect-transmitted diseases and thereby prevent 700 000 deaths per year? Or by the fact that we could manipulate ecosystems to better withstand invasive species – eradicating them in a humane way – and thereby increase productivity of farmland? Many feel that using gene drive technology to eradicate species or populations of organisms is wrong, but others argue that it can help us prevent the extinction of others. In any case, an open, well-informed debate including all stakeholders is crucial before deciding on regulation and implementation.

Potential impacts and developments

Potential gene drive applications include reducing or eradicating insect-transmitted diseases such as malaria, dengue, Zika, Lyme, schistosomiasis and others; removing herbicide resistance in weeds or pesticide resistance in insects; inserting pesticide or parasite resistance in vulnerable populations (think of bees suffering from Varroa mites and pesticide use, and the decline of amphibia due to Chytrid fungus); inserting vulnerabilities to harmless molecules in pests, making (local) eradication easier; and suppressing populations of invasive species, weeds and pests (e.g. fruit flies, aphids). However, these potential benefits are not free of hazards. Ecologists are very unsure about the potential impact of suppressing or eradicating populations of organisms on ecosystems. The gene drive may spread globally and cause unwanted extinctions; accidental releases from research labs are likely; failure of the drive to eradicate a population may leave genetic residues such as a skewed sex ratio; and the still significant off-target effects of CRISPR-Cas9 may cause unwanted mutations. Furthermore, harmful mutations could occur in the gene drive itself that would ride along and spread, and possible non-target effects may cause the gene drive to spread horizontally to other species. Lastly, drives might be used as a biological weapon or in bioterrorism.

As an answer to these risks, scientists are developing safeguards and preventive measures in the form of temporally and locally limited gene drives (known as daisy drives); reversal drives that use a second gene drive to reverse effects of a first drive; and immunising drives that spread through a population of organisms and immunise them against other drives. Future research may also produce drives that respond to certain environmental stimuli that are triggered, for example, when the targeted pest eats certain crops. In addition, nature has its own defences in the form of evolution. Resistance to drives will often already be present in wild populations or will occur after some time, by rapidly spreading through populations and stopping the drive systems. With this in mind, gene drives may be better suited as an additional tool alongside traditional approaches to fighting diseases and conservation, with new drives designed whenever resistance is acquired. There are ways to increase the potency of a drive so as to make resistance unlikely to evolve in the first place, but this may bring along consequences we are not willing to face.

So what are the potential positive impacts for the EU? There are currently 49 invasive alien species of Union concern causing damage worth billions of euros to the EU economy. Suppressing or eradicating these species from EU soil would improve ecosystem services crucial to many sectors. Drives may also reduce our reliance on herbicides and pesticides in agriculture, by removing tolerance in weeds and pests. Among the diseases within the EU that are targetable by gene drives, Lyme disease occupies a prominent place, given that more than 360 000 cases of persons suffering from it have been reported over the past two decades. When it comes to negative impacts for the EU, hostile nations could use gene drives as a biological weapon to target keystone species in order to damage European ecosystems (e.g. pollinators such as bees). As gene drives are so inexpensive and relatively easy to engineer, bioterrorism is also an issue the EU should consider. As a side note, no major risks are attached to gene drives being released in crops and livestock or humans, since these are slow to spread and easy to monitor due to the long reproduction cycles.

Anticipatory policy-making

There are concerns that the privatisation of gene drive technology without strict regulation could lead to an ecological cacophony of drives targeting whatever insects or plants industry labels as ‘pests’. Agribusiness incentives tend to focus on the short term and are of a profit-driven nature. Mainstreaming the use of gene drives will therefore likely happen through the prevalence of economic interests over those of local communities, which will have to face the potential harms or side effects. In this context, one of the inventors of the CRISPR-based gene drive calls for the exclusive non-profit exploitation of the technology.

Gene drives fall under EU GMO legislation, which includes Regulation (EC) 1946/2003. The latter translates the UN Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity into EU law, and details procedures for handling transboundary movements of GMOs. In November 2018, the convention refrained from establishing a moratorium on gene drive, instead building stronger precautions in terms of research. Risk assessment/management and the consent of involved communities are now central to regulation.

As regulation will always lag behind technological developments, researchers’ responsibility is important, making sure there are possibilities for cooperation among them, rather than incentives to conceal results and information for fear of being ‘scooped’ and of missing the chance to see one’s work published.

Read this At a glance on ‘What if we genetically engineered an entire species?‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg,

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On 13 and 14 December, EU Heads of State or Government will hold their last meeting of 2018. Their discussions will mainly focus on the 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), the single market and migration. EU leaders will hold their first substantial exchange of views on the 2021-2027 MFF, debating its political priorities, the overall level of expenditure and the timetable for the MFF negotiations. On migration and the single market, the European Council will review the implementation and state of play of its previous orientations. Other items to be addressed include the challenge of disinformation, the fight against racism and xenophobia, climate change and external relations, in particular preparation of the EU-Arab summit on 24-25 February 2019. Leaders will also be informed on preparations for the 2019-2024 Strategic Agenda. The Euro Summit is expected to discuss the reform of Economic and Monetary Union, as well as the taxation of digital companies.

1. Implementation: Follow-up on previous European Council commitments

At the start of the meeting, following European Parliament President, Antonio Tajani’s address, the Austrian Chancellor and President-in-Office of the Council of Ministers, Sebastian Kurz, will provide an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions. In terms of previous European Council commitments, the most relevant for this meeting is the call for an EU action plan for a coordinated EU response to the challenge of disinformation.

2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF)

For the first time since the publication of the Commission’s proposal on 2 May 2018, the European Council will discuss the 2021-2027 MFF. EU leaders had already addressed the issue at their informal meeting of 23 February 2018. At their formal meeting in June 2018, they had invited ‘the European Parliament and the Council to examine the proposals in a comprehensive manner and as soon as possible’. Following an update from the Austrian Presidency on the state of play, discussions are expected to focus on three areas:

1) Political priorities for the 2021-2027 MFF

At their informal meeting on 23 February 2018, EU-27 Heads of State or Government already agreed that ‘the EU will spend more on stemming illegal migration, on defence and security, as well as on the Erasmus+ programme’. Therefore one can expect discussions to focus on other possible priorities for the MFF, such as cohesion policy and agriculture policy. On 29 November 2018, the ‘friends of cohesion group’ (i.e. Member States which had, during the previous MFF negotiations, advocated the importance of adequate funding for cohesion policy) adopted a declaration on the 2021–2027 MFF, which calls for sufficient resources for the cohesion and common agricultural policies, with financing for both areas at the 2014-2020 MFF level.

2) Overall level of expenditure for the 2021-2027 MFF

While tensions between EU Heads of State or Government regarding the overall level of expenditure for the 2021-2027 MFF are expected to be lower than during previous negotiations, this will nevertheless be the most contested aspect of the MFF discussion. Those Member States which stress the importance of cohesion and agricultural policy also plead for an ambitious long-term 2021-2027 budget, providing ‘the European Union with sufficient resources’. By contrast, many of the Member States wanting to concentrate on more ‘modern’ policy areas, are also net contributors (i.e. Member States who contribute more to the EU budget than the amount of EU funding they receive), often referred to as ‘friends of better spending’. They favour a reduction in, or at least no expansion of, the total amount of the EU budget. A prime example is the view of the Dutch Prime Minister, Mark Rutte, that ‘a smaller EU as a result of Brexit should also mean a smaller budget’.

While the European Commission proposed a commitments ceiling for the 2021-2027 MFF at 1.11 % of gross national income (GNI) , the European Parliament reiterated, in its resolution of 14 November 2018, that ‘the level [of commitments…] should be set at €1 324.1 billion in 2018 prices, representing 1.3 % of the EU-27 GNI.’

3) Timetable foreseen for the MFF negotiations

The EU Heads of State or Government are expected to sketch out their expectations on the timeline for the MFF negotiations. The General Affairs Council meeting of 12 November 2018 revealed a variety of views on this point. Some Member States called for rapid agreement on the post-2020 MFF, even hoping for the European Council to set a deadline, while others argued against any artificial timetables, stressing that content must take precedence over speed. The European Council is expected to welcome the preparatory work done by the Austrian Presidency and to invite the incoming Romanian Presidency to continue the work and develop an orientation for the next stage of the negotiations, with a view to an agreement in the European Council in autumn 2019.

The European Commission and the European Parliament had originally expressed their preference for a more ambitious calendar, and strongly stressed the need to finalise the negotiations on the post-2020 MFF ahead of the European Parliament elections in May 2019. In its contribution to the December European Council, the Commission calls for a political agreement on the new long-term budget at the European Council meeting in October 2019.

Single market

Instead of a strategic discussion on the future orientations for the European single market (beyond 2018), as indicated in the Leaders’ agenda, the European Council is expected to take stock of progress achieved in the implementation of the EU single market strategies. Following a European Council request at its March 2018 meeting, the European Commission submitted a communication in November assessing the state of play on the single market. The report stresses the need to close the delivery gap, since 44 of the 67 single-market related proposals are still to be adopted by the co-legislators. As a further contribution to the December discussion, the report commissioned by Ireland, Finland, Denmark and the Czech Republic could be mentioned; it argues for more ambitious measures to remove obstacles to the cross-border provision of services in the EU.

The European Council is expected to underline the key role of the single market in boosting inclusive growth and creating jobs in the EU, whilst reiterating its call for adoption of pending proposals by the end of the current legislature, as well as for the implementation of measures at all levels of government.

Migration

The European Council will return to the implementation of its comprehensive approach to migration. Following up on its conclusions of 28 June 2018, the meeting will most likely address both the external and internal dimensions of migration policy, review the effectiveness of the return policy and the protection of the EU’s external borders, and elaborate on the support given to partner states. Regarding the internal dimension of migration, Heads of State or Government are expected to refer to the Commission’s communication of 4 December 2018, ‘Managing migration in all its aspects’, which invites the European Parliament and the Council to ‘adopt before the European elections the five legislative proposals [out of seven] on the reform of the Common European Asylum System on which agreement is within close reach’, thereby breaking up the overall package. Regarding the remaining two, the Commission calls on the Council to ‘adopt its negotiating position on the Asylum Procedure Regulation by the end of the year and to find a way forward on the Dublin Regulation by identifying the core elements of a solidarity and responsibility mechanism so that the reform can be completed in co-decision with the European Parliament as soon as possible’.

Other items Disinformation

The European Council has already discussed disinformation twice in 2018, at its June and October meetings. It stressed the importance of a coordinated response between external and internal actions aimed at countering disinformation and ensuring online transparency. It has requested that by December 2018, the EU institutions assess the implementation of the Code of Practice on disinformation and produce a Joint Action Plan facilitating a coordinated response to countering the phenomenon. EU leaders are expected to take stock of progress made and adopt new strategic guidelines.

External relations

Following up on their October 2018 meeting, EU leaders will discuss progress made in preparing their summit with the League of Arab States, to be held in Egypt in February 2019. As announced by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, at the informal European Council meeting held in Salzburg in September 2018, the summit will focus on the external dimension of migration.

President Tusk recently called on the international community to explore solutions to end the crises in Syria, Yemen and Ukraine. The European Council might discuss some of these crises, in particular, the uncertain situation in the Azov Sea. EU leaders could ‘greenlight’ the renewal of economic sanctions on Russia, imposed following the illegal annexation of Crimea.

Climate change

The Heads of State or Government will most probably take note of the 28 November 2018 European Commission ‘strategic vision for achieving a climate neutral economy by 2050’. To meet this objective, the EU Member States would have to overcome persistent ‘divisions’ between those in favour of (for example, the Netherlands, Sweden and Denmark), and those hesitant about, setting more ambitious greenhouse gas emissions targets. The outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference (COP24) taking place in Katowice, Poland, in December 2018, may also be touched upon.

Citizens’ Dialogues and Consultations and preparations for the Strategic Agenda

The European Council will be informed on preparations for the next Strategic Agenda, including the outcome of Citizens’ Dialogues and Consultations.

Fight against racism and xenophobia

The European Council will condemn any form of racism and xenophobia, and welcome the adoption of the recent Council declaration on the fight against anti-semitism, which invites Member States to endorse the working definition of anti-semitism employed by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA).

3. Euro Summit

On 14 December, EU leaders will meet for a Euro Summit in an inclusive format (19 euro-area members, as well as those Member States which have ratified the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, plus the Czech Republic). President Tusk, in his letter to EU leaders of 21 September 2017, called for a first set of concrete decisions on EMU reform to be taken in June 2018. Given the modest progress registered, however, the June Euro Summit invited the Eurogroup and co‑legislators to continue their work, with a view to further discussion in December 2018.

The Eurogroup meeting on 3 December agreed on a framework to strengthen the euro. This sets out, i) the conditions under which the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) will be able to provide precautionary loans to countries facing adverse economic shocks; ii) that the ESM will serve as a backstop of last resort to the Single Resolution Fund; and iii) that the possibility of establishing a euro-area budget will be further explored. Thus, reform of the ESM and the establishment of a euro-area budget will be high on the agenda of the December Euro-Summit.

In the Meseberg Declaration of June 2018, France and Germany called for a stronger ESM role in crisis prevention and the monitoring of Member States receiving financial assistance. The main point of contention is about who, and under what conditions, will pay in case of financial problems in other countries. Some governments insist on a more significant reduction of non-performing loans (NPLs) burdening banks in the euro area before the ESM backstop to the SRF can be made operational. France and Germany also supported the establishment of a euro-area budget. A group of fiscally conservative countries led by the Netherlands, the ‘new Hanseatic League’, questions its necessity altogether, stressing that Member States should cut debt and deficits immediately, instead of relying on a euro-area budget. While supporting a stronger role for the ESM, this group insists that it should stay an intergovernmental institution accountable to its shareholders.

The Euro Summit is also expected to discuss proposals for taxing revenues of big digital companies. While most Member States support such digital taxation, a minority insists it could lead to double taxation and retaliation from the US.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council and Euro Summit, 13-14 December 2018‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.