European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Martin Russell,

© krutenyuk / Fotolia

Among the Western Balkan countries aspiring to EU membership, Serbia is seen as a frontrunner in terms of its democratic institutions, level of economic development and overall readiness for accession. However, in November 2018 opposition politician, Borko Stefanović, was beaten up by thugs, triggering a wave of protests that has spread across the country. Week after week, thousands have taken to the streets, accusing Serbian president, Aleksandar Vučić, and his Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) of authoritarian rule, attacks on independent media, electoral fraud and corruption.

Although the protests only started recently, they highlight worrying longer-term trends. Press freedom has been in decline for several years, particularly since Vučić became prime minister in 2014. A large part of the media is now controlled either directly by the state or by pro-SNS figures. Independent journalists face threats and even violence, and perpetrators are rarely convicted.

In the National Assembly, the governing coalition uses its parliamentary majority to systematically block meaningful discussions of legislative proposals. In protest, the opposition started a boycott of plenary debates in February 2019.

The tone of verbal attacks by SNS politicians and their allies on independent media, the political opposition and civil society is often virulent. Criticising government policy is framed as betrayal of Serbian interests. The aim seems to be to marginalise critical voices while concentrating power in the hands of the SNS-led government. Elected to the mainly ceremonial role of president in 2017, Vučić nevertheless remains the dominant figure.

If Serbia’s drift towards authoritarianism continues, it could become a major obstacle to EU accession, for which 2025 has been mentioned as a possible date.

Read the complete Briefing: ‘Serbia at risk of authoritarianism?‘ on the Think Tank website of the European Parliament.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

©Rashad Ashur/Shutterstock

The expected benefits of algorithmic decision systems (ADS) may be offset by the variety of risks they present for individuals (discrimination, unfair practices, loss of autonomy), the economy (unfair practices, limited access to markets), and society as a whole (manipulation, threat to democracy). A significant factor in the adoption of algorithmic systems for decision-making is their capacity to process large amounts of data sets, which are paired with machine learning methods to infer statistical models directly from the data. The same properties of scale, complexity and autonomous model inference, however, are linked to increasing concerns that many of these systems are opaque to the people affected by their use and lack clear explanations for the decisions they make. This lack of transparency risks undermining meaningful scrutiny and accountability, which is a significant concern when these systems are applied as part of decision-making processes that can have a considerable impact on people’s human rights (e.g. critical safety decisions in autonomous vehicles, or allocation of health and social service resources).

As a result, there is growing concern that, unless appropriate governance frameworks are put in place, the opacity of algorithmic systems could lead to situations where individuals are negatively impacted because ‘the computer says NO’, with no recourse to meaningful explanation, a correction mechanism, or recourse to compensation mechanisms. It is therefore necessary to establish clear governance frameworks for algorithmic transparency and accountability, to ensure that the risks and benefits are equitably distributed in a way that does not unduly burden or benefit particular sectors of society.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published two studies on algorithmic accountability and transparency, both requested by STOA Chair, Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece). The first study, ‘Understanding algorithmic decision-making: Opportunities and challenges‘, was carried out by the French National Research Institute for the Digital Sciences (Institut national de recherche en informatique et en automatique – Inria), and managed by STOA. It focuses on the technical aspects of ADS, and reviews the opportunities and risks related to their use. Beyond providing an up-to-date and systematic review of the situation, the study sketches policy options for reducing the ethical, political, legal, social and technical challenges and risks related to ADS.

The authors argue that transparency should not be seen as the ultimate solution for users or people affected by the decisions made by an ADS, since source code is illegible to non-experts. ‘Explainability’ is shown to have different meanings and the needs vary considerably according to the audience. It is also important to note that the requirements for explainability vary from one ADS to another, according to the potential impact of the decisions made and whether the decision-making process is fully automated. Although transparency and explainability are essential for reducing the risks related to ADS, the study argues that accountability is the most important requirement as far as the protection of individuals is concerned. In fact, transparency and explainability may allow for the discovery of deficiencies, but do not provide absolute guarantees regarding the reliability, security or fairness of an ADS.

Accountability can be achieved via complementary means, such as algorithmic impact assessments, auditing and certification. The main virtue of accountability is to put the onus on the providers or operators of the ADS to demonstrate that they meet the expected requirements. Accountability cannot provide an absolute guarantee either, but, if certification is rigorous and audits are conducted on a regular basis, potential issues can be discovered and corrective measures taken. In this perspective, the study suggests that oversight agencies and supervisory authorities should play a central role and it is critical that they have all the means they need to carry out their tasks at their disposal, notably the right to access and analyse the details of the ADS, including their source code and, if necessary, the training data.

The second study, ‘A governance framework for algorithmic accountability and transparency’, was carried out by the University of Nottingham, and managed by STOA. The study uses a series of real-life case studies to illustrate how a lack of fairness can arise, before exploring the consequences that such a lack of fairness can have, as well as the complexities inherent to trying to achieve fairness in any given societal context. The study describes ways in which lack of fairness in the outcomes of algorithmic systems might result from developmental decision-making and design features embedded at different points in the lifecycle of an algorithmic decision-making model. A connection is made between the problem of fairness and the tools of transparency and accountability, while highlighting the value of responsible research and innovation (RRI) approaches to pursuing fairness in algorithmic systems. Central to RRI is enabling an inclusive, reflexive and accountable innovation process through the involvement of relevant stakeholders throughout the entirety of the innovation life cycle. In relation to the development of algorithms, this would likely involve a contextualised consideration of an algorithm to determine the most relevant stakeholders, including the establishment of mechanisms such as stakeholder workshops and focus groups.

The study develops policy options for the governance of algorithmic transparency and accountability, based on an analysis of the social, technical and regulatory challenges posed by algorithmic systems. It begins from a high-level perspective on fundamental approaches to technology governance, then provides a detailed consideration of various categories of governance options, and finally reviews specific proposals for governance of algorithmic systems discussed in the existing literature. Based on an extensive review and analysis of existing proposals for the governance of algorithmic systems, the authors propose a set of four policy options, each of which addresses a different aspect of algorithmic transparency and accountability: (i) awareness raising: education, watchdogs and whistle-blowers; (ii) accountability in public-sector use of algorithmic decision-making; (iii) regulatory oversight and legal liability; and (iv) global coordination of algorithmic governance.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via STOA@europarl.europa.eu.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

©Jirsak/Shutterstock

The spread of false information is not merely a reputational threat for news providers in general, but is a risk factor for democratic order. People are increasingly concerned about the influence of fake news on elections in the USA and Europe.

The recent surge of advances in artificial intelligence (AI) has opened up new opportunities in a wide range of different fields, including developments that suggest that the technology can be leveraged to tackle the ‘fake news’ problem. Given the limited capacity of manual fact-checking, automated content recognition (ACR) technologies have been promoted as a solution to identifying disinformation, fake news and other threats. Across the European Union, Member States, public bodies and private entities are combining technology and human expertise to tackle fake news. As they are based on algorithms, however, these technological initiatives may affect freedom of expression and media pluralism, and strengthen centralised control of what can be published online, given that the notion of ‘fake news’ is too vague to prevent a subjective and arbitrary interpretation.

The European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) recently published two studies on disinformation and artificial intelligence. The first study, under the title ‘Automated tackling of disinformation’, was carried out by EU DisinfoLab and managed by STOA. The study, requested by STOA panel member María Teresa Giménez Barbat (ALDE, Spain), maps and analyses current and future threats from online disinformation, alongside currently adopted socio-technical and legal approaches to countering these threats. The study also discusses the challenges of evaluating the effectiveness and practical adoption of these approaches. Drawing on and complementing existing literature, the study summarises and analyses the findings of scientific studies and policy reports in relation to detecting, containing and countering online disinformation and propaganda campaigns. It traces recent developments and trends, identifies significant new or emerging challenges, and addresses the potential policy implications of current socio-technical solutions for the EU.

This study first defines the technological, legal, societal and ethical dimensions of the disinformation phenomenon, and argues strongly in favour of adopting the terms ‘misinformation’, ‘disinformation’ and ‘malinformation’, instead of the ill-defined ‘fake news’. Next, it discusses how social platforms, search engines, online advertising and computer algorithms enable and facilitate the creation and spread of online disinformation. It also presents the current understanding as to why people believe false narratives, what motivates people to share them, and how they impact offline behaviour (e.g. voting). Drawing on existing literature, the study also summarises state-of-the-art technological approaches to fighting online misinformation. A brief overview of self-regulation, co-regulation and classic regulatory responses, as currently adopted by social platforms and EU Member States, complements the study. In addition, the study summarises civil-society and other citizen-oriented approaches (e.g. media literacy). The authors have also compiled a roadmap of initiatives from key stakeholders in Europe and beyond, spanning the technological, legal and social dimensions. Three in-depth case studies on the utility of automated technology in detecting, analysing and containing online disinformation complement their analyses. The study concludes with the provision of policy options and makes reference to the stakeholders best placed to act upon these at national and European level. The options include support for research and innovation on technological responses; improving the transparency and accountability of platforms and political actors over content shared online; strengthening media and improving journalism standards; and supporting a multi-stakeholder approach, including involving civil society.

The second study, entitled ‘Regulating disinformation with artificial intelligence’ was carried out by Vesalius College, Brussels, and managed by STOA. The study, requested by Isabela Adinolfi (EFDD, Italy) and Stelios Kouloglou (GUE, Greece), looks at the consequences of the use of AI and ACR systems in the fight against disinformation for freedom of speech, pluralism and democracy, reviews some of the key ideas from the field and highlights their relevance to European policy. The study examines the trade-offs involved in using automated technology to limit the spread of disinformation online and presents (self-regulatory to legislative) options for regulating ACR technologies in this context. The opportunities for the European Union as a whole to take the lead in setting the framework for designing these technologies in a way that enhances accountability and transparency, and respects free speech, are a particular focus.

The authors emphasise that disinformation is best tackled through media pluralism and literacy initiatives, as these allow diversity of expression and choice, whereas source transparency indicators are preferable over (de)prioritisation of disinformation. They advise against regulatory action that would encourage increased use of AI for content moderation purposes, without strong human review and appeal processes. The study argues that introduction, as soon as feasible, of independent appeal and audit procedures is necessary when platforms moderate content and accounts. There is scope for standardising notice and appeal procedures and reporting, and creating a self- or co-regulatory multi-stakeholder body, such as a ‘social media council’, as suggested by the UN Special Rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Council. As the Special Rapporteur, in the first-ever UN report that examines the regulation of user-general online content, recommends: this multi-stakeholder body could, on the one hand, have competence to deal with industry-wide appeals; and, on the other, work towards a better understanding and minimisation of the effects of AI on freedom of expression and media pluralism. The study concludes that, given the lack of independent evidence or detailed research in this policy area, greater transparency in the variety of AI and disinformation-reduction techniques used by online platforms and content providers must be introduced.

Your opinion counts for us. To let us know what you think, get in touch via stoa@europarl.europa.eu

Written by Tania Latici,

© donfiore / Fotolia

Despite the recent turmoil in Britain’s defence establishment, it is in both the European Union and the United Kingdom’s interest to continue to have a deeply interlinked defence partnership.

The 2018 British National Security Capability Review states ‘Europe’s security is our security’. The expected departure of the United Kingdom from the European Union will not alter geography, and the UK will remain a European country. The UK and the countries of the EU share the same strategic environment and, by default, the same threats to their peace and security. Historically, pragmatically and geographically, they remain deeply linked from a security and defence perspective, and there is political consensus on the need to nurture this linkage. Official documents from the British government also confirm this: the UK is exiting the EU, not Europe.

In legal terms, after leaving the EU, the UK will become a third country to the EU and cooperation will continue on that basis. While the EU’s common security and defence policy has an established precedent in cooperating closely with third countries on missions and operations, albeit without providing them with decision-making roles, the EU’s new defence integration initiatives are currently exploring third party cooperation. As the UK played a founding role in developing the EU’s security and defence policy, it is naturally deeply interconnected with the other EU Member States in this area. As one of the EU’s biggest military powers, the UK brings a particularly valuable contribution and know-how to the field.

Both parties have made commitments to ensure as close as possible a partnership in foreign policy, security and defence matters. Can cooperation in the area of security and defence result in a positive post-Brexit tale?

Read the complete Briefing: ‘What role in European defence for a post-Brexit United Kingdom?‘ on the European Parliament Think Tank website.

© European Union 2019 – Source: EP – Daina Le Lardic.

As the only European Union institution elected directly, the European Parliament is at the heart of representative democracy, the foundation upon which the EU is built. Since its creation, the Parliament’s power and influence have evolved significantly, transforming it into a full-fledged legislative body and forum of discussion and engagement, whose influence is felt in virtually all areas of EU activity.

First of all, the Parliament does what most parliaments do – it adopts legislation, mostly together with the representatives of the national governments of the Member States (the Council). The number of areas in which the Parliament co-legislates with the Council has expanded greatly over time, and now includes policies concerning the EU internal market, environment, consumer protection, food safety, justice and home affairs, cohesion policy, transport, energy and many others. Law-making is also about international action. When the EU enters into an international agreement with a third country, for example, the Parliament must give its consent.

Next, the Parliament has power over the EU budget. This power is also shared with the Council, and its extent varies according to the different aspects of the EU financial system. Its role is less developed when deciding about the revenue side of the budget (own resources system), stronger in shaping the EU’s long-term spending priorities included in the multiannual financial framework, and stronger still in the context of the procedure for approving the implementation of the budget, known as the discharge procedure. The Parliament decides on the EU’s annual budget on equal terms with the Council.

a mapping of EP powers

Another important set of EP prerogatives concerns the scrutiny and control of the executive, namely the European Commission. The latter regularly reports to and informs the Parliament of its activities and responds to parliamentary questions. Moreover, the Parliament plays a crucial role in the appointment and dismissal process of the Commission. The most recent prominent illustration in this regard is the Spitzenkandidaten process, which led to the election of Jean-Claude Juncker as Commission President in 2014. The Parliament remains firmly committed to repeating and consolidating the process in 2019, and many European political parties have selected their lead candidates for the position of the next Commission President. After the election of the Commission President, and following parliamentary hearings with individual Commissioners-designate, the college of Commissioners as a whole must be approved by the Parliament before it can take office. The next Commission investiture process, which will take place not long after the 2019 European elections, will offer a major opportunity for the Parliament to shape the agenda of the Commission over the coming five years (2019-24). Besides its role in the Commission’s appointment, the Parliament may also force the resignation of the Commission (by a motion of censure), which is one of its oldest prerogatives.

In addition to adopting laws and overseeing the executive, the Parliament also has powers relating to the very nature of the EU and its institutional/constitutional foundations. Parliament’s consent is required before any new country joins the EU, and its consent to the withdrawal treaty is required before a country can leave the EU. The Parliament may initiate a Treaty revision process and must give its consent before it is decided that an EU Member State is breaching (or is about to breach) the values of the EU.

Finally, besides its formal legislative and scrutiny powers, the Parliament functions as a forum for debate and engagement, putting matters on the political agenda, debating and raising awareness. For example, since January 2018, the Parliament has hosted a number of national leaders invited to debate and share their visions on the ‘Future of Europe’.

Read the complete In-depth Analysis on ‘The power of the European Parliament‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Giulio Sabbati (EPRS) and Caterina Francesca Guidi (Globalstat, EUI),

European societies face a variety of political, economic, social and cultural challenges. The multiple crises that challenge Europe, from within and without, have recently put considerable stress on the solidarity between nations, one of the fundamental pillars of European integration. In the final approach to the 2019 European elections, the main objective of the ‘Living in the EU’ series is to highlight the relevance of solidarity within and across European societies, shedding light on the multifaceted state of wellbeing in EU Member States, and adding a global perspective whenever meaningful.

In any multilevel system of interconnected relations that builds on shared interests and security, such as that of the European Union, solidarity between nations supports the endurance of states and their stability thanks to negotiation, balancing, integration, and redistribution. Solidarity between EU Member States, alongside the desire for lasting peace between nations, was one of the driving forces, values and principles of the EU’s founding fathers. However, internal and external pressures are eroding the original idea of European integration, endangering solidarity in Europe, both as a constitutional value and as an administrative principle. Adding to the challenges of economic and social crises, populism and contestation in politics are attacking democracy, in several EU Member States, from within.

Against this backdrop, the democratic functioning of the European Union and its Member States, as well as their capacity to respond to the aspirations and needs of future generations are of central interest to the 2019 European election campaign. The new GlobalStat-EPRS series on ‘Living in the EU’ aims to inform citizens and policy-makers in the run-up to the 2019 elections of the central features that shape life in the EU. The series presents statistical data based on EPRS and GlobalStat research on six main themes:

Climate change and energy:

Economic prosperity and environmental protection are interdependent. Monitoring how Member States perform in terms of emissions and energy supply represents a key element in deciding upon action to prevent climate change.

  European Elections and Democracy:

Many Europeans show an increasing attachment to the EU and to its democracy. Could this herald a turnaround in the hitherto declining electoral turnout in Europe?

  Demography:

The EU population is ageing dramatically. While population growth is slowing, increasing old-age dependency ratios and east-west movement have serious implications for the economy, labour market, healthcare and pensions.

Asylum and Migration:

Migration from third countries plays an important role in shaping demography in the EU, but whether this can mitigate demographic challenges remains an open question.

  Economy:

The EU coordinates economic policy with its Member States annually. Trade, taxes, social contributions and consumption-related household expenditure combine to provide a picture of citizens’ wellbeing.

Education and Health:

Health and education are the responsibility of EU Member States, with the EU providing complementary support, particularly on cross-border issues. These indicators therefore demonstrate a range of national differences, with consequences for citizens.

 

The European Parliamentary Research Service has prepared these publications, in cooperation with Globalstat and the European University Institute in Florence, Italy, in preparation for the ninth edition of ‘The State of the Union’ address on 2-4 May 2019. Top leaders and thinkers will gather in Florence, just weeks before the pivotal European elections, to debate and reflect on the democratic functioning of the European Union, its Member States, and their capacity to respond to the aspirations and needs of future generations, with special emphasis on 21st-Century democracy in Europe.

Written by Joanna Apap,

LAFFAN, Brigid

On 4 April, EPRS hosted, in Parliament’s Library Reading Room, the Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 2019 Lecture – ‘How the EU27 came to be’, this year delivered by Professor Dr Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies at the European University Institute in Florence.

Following a warm welcome from EPRS Director General Anthony Teasdale, Dr Emanuele Massetti, Co-Editor of the JCMS Annual Review and moderator of the event, explained that the Annual Review is a key component of the Journal of Common Market Studies (JCMS). It shares the JCMS’ overall aim of publishing high quality, innovative and accessible articles that advance debates in European and comparative regionalism studies. Within this common endeavour, the specific role of the Annual Review is to provide rigorous analyses of the most important events and/or trends that emerge year by year in the context of the European Union, including an Annual Lecture delivered by a leading scholar or practitioner.

The Annual Review covers the key developments in the European Union, its Member States, and acceding and/or applicant countries in the previous year, including important developments in the domestic or external arena that shape the political debates in Europe. In line with the ethos and inspiring principles of the JCMS, the Annual Review is a multidisciplinary outlet, open to all methodological and theoretical approaches.

In her lecture, Professor Brigid Laffan explained how the ‘Brexit shock’ came at a time when the EU had endured a series of crises that had seemed too much for the weakened Union to bear. The evening of 23 June 2016, as Professor Laffan highlighted, was a momentous one in the history of European integration. The electorate of a Member State, the United Kingdom (UK), made the decision to leave the EU by voting 52 % ‘leave’ to 48 % ‘remain’. The Brexit shock came at a time when the EU had endured both the acute crisis in the euro area and the 2015 refugee crisis, and the immediate reaction from the media was that this third crisis might lead to the disintegration of the EU, representing a ‘final straw’ for the weakened Union. To the contrary, however, the EU responded to the Brexit shock with resolve and a determination to protect the polity.

The EU’s immediate responses featured:

• Speedy EU collective framing on 24 June 2016:
  • President of the European Commission,
  • Presidents of the EU institutions,
  • Informal European Council at 27 on 29 June 2016.
• Survival of the Union: ‘We will stand strong and uphold the EU’s core values of promoting peace and the wellbeing of its peoples. The Union of 27 Member States will continue’.
• Unity: President of the European Council, Donald Tusk declared that ‘Today, on behalf of the 27 leaders, I can say that we are determined to keep our unity as twenty seven’.
• Process and orderly withdrawal under Article 50,
• United Kingdom as an embryonic ‘other’: the EU would negotiate the future relationship with the UK as a third country, and negotiations had to involve a balance of rights and obligations.

Professor Laffan explored what the EU response revealed about the Union, what membership means and the crucial difference between differentiation within the Union and as an external partner. Her aim was to understand and explain the Union response. Professor Laffan argued that Brexit is very revealing of the DNA of the European Union and the Union’s resolve to use its full capacity. In addition, Professor Laffan examined what Brexit helped reveal, through the EU’s response, about the Union, and the EU27’s actions since 2016 to reinforce its own inherent resilience.

Brexit revealed that the EU has become much more polity-like, unafraid of deploying power through the challenges of the multiple crises it faces. According to Professor Laffan, the EU showed a formidable capacity and is capable of deploying it collectively and strategically, particularly when its interinstitutional and Brussels/capitals networks work well – this enhances capacity. Finally, yet importantly, methods do matter. Unity after 2016 was not accidental – it was hard-won.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Eamonn Noonan, with Atte Ojanen,

EPRS round table – Study visit

April 2019 marked the launch of the new European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS) report: ‘Global Trends to 2030: Challenges and Choices for Europe’. The report is a result of a multi-year joint effort by key European institutions. The collaborative nature of the ESPAS process was also reflected in the launch event, which featured variety of stakeholders as speakers.

Lead author of the report, Florence Gaub, from EUISS, highlighted the report’s structure, focusing on ‘mega-trends’, ‘catalysts’ and ‘game-changers’. ‘Mega-trends’ refer to decade-long trends, which are extremely hard to alter, such as climate change and increasing connectivity. ‘Catalysts’ on the other hand are short-term trends that are more easily influenced. These include trends like technological progress, increasing trade and migration. Finally, informed by mega-trends and catalysts, ‘game-changers’ are the key decisions that will shape our common future. The most pressing game-changers include responses to climate change and the populist threat to democracies.

ESPAS Chair, Ann Mettler, from EPSC, depicted the report as a call to action. Despite the somber challenges, we are still in a position to take action and shape the future for the better. Importantly, the ESPAS process has fostered the role of foresight and preparedness throughout European decision-making. Trends such as the decline of democracy, a global power shift towards China, and growth in connectivity, are now more widely acknowledged. The report helps frame the discussion concerning global challenges, which is crucial given the next institutional cycle. Not only can we shape our own future, but the European Union is also a normative superpower, standing for human rights, democracy and equality in an increasingly uncertain world.

The report lays the groundwork for a serious debate about the future, as expressed by Jim Cloos, Deputy Director-General for General and Institutional Policy at the General Secretariat of the EU Council of Ministers. It forces us to discuss Europe itself and its role in the world, rather than being trapped in a discourse on internal politics. Foresight is not a matter of predicting the future, but rather about framing issues, building a shared narrative and understanding. One cannot tackle the most challenging issues of the future without first agreeing what the problems themselves are. It is central therefore that the ESPAS report is not only circulated within the foresight community, but also finds its way into the hands of heads of states.

In spite of the grave challenges, one can also find a positive and motivating tone in the report. As Christian Leffler of EEAS noted, the EU is well positioned to respond to these challenges and provide stability for the world. Many of the problems are recognised in the institutions and policies of the Union, especially when compared to other global actors. While preparation and adaptation are still needed, the structural framework for effective response is in place. This is important given the contested and fragmented global context. The rules-based international order and multilateralism are giving way to competitive multi-plurality. The response lies in the EU’s strategic autonomy, ensuring the Union’s capacity to choose its own path.

The launch event also generated lively discussion. The severity of climate change, ‘de-growth’, the potential of Africa, the future of trade, and gender-balance figured in the questions from the audience. The questions highlighted the essence of foresight – reconciliation and balancing conflicting views. Ultimately, foresight is not a mere intellectual exercise, as these challenges are already affecting us profoundly. The launch day of this second ESPAS report marked the beginning of a new discussion, which aims to strengthen the culture of preparedness and anticipation throughout Europe.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the April II plenary session (the last of the current legislature) included debates on the conclusions of the April 2019 European Council meeting on the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union, and the final debate in the series on the future of Europe with the Prime Minister of Latvia, Kisjanis Karins. Important debates also took place on the rule of law in Romania; failure to adopt an EU digital services tax; protecting the European elections against international cybersecurity threats; and on the possible extradition of Julian Assange. Members debated a number of external relations situations: in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe after cyclone Idai; in Libya; in Sudan; and US recognition of the Golan Heights as Israeli territory. The legislative proposals adopted included those on collective investment funds, banking reform, prudential requirements, covered bonds, CO2 emission standards for heavy-duty vehicles, and promoting clean, energy-efficient vehicles. Members voted on a number of legislative proposals (see below), including a partial agreement on the Horizon Europe programme.

Protection of whistle-blowers

By a large majority, Members adopted the agreement reached with the Council on the long-awaited proposal for an EU directive giving whistle-blowers greater protection when they report on breaches of EU law (such as money laundering, or contravening environmental or food safety regulations).

Collective investment funds

Members debated and voted on proposals on collective investment funds, which pool investment capital in collective securities portfolios. While the EU provides passporting to ensure a wide range of cross-border distribution of investment funds, the EU market remains both small and national. The proposals align national rules and harmonise verification, creating economies of scale and opening up the market.

Prudential requirements and supervision of investment firms

Parliament voted to agree to an update of the current complex and inefficient EU regulatory framework for prudential supervision and requirements of investment firms, which facilitates savings and investment in EU capital markets, to take account of the size and nature of investment firms and the risks involved.

Transparent and predictable working conditions

Members debated and approved an interinstitutional agreement on proposals to reform labour market rules, ensuring transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU, to end the unfair employment practices that have affected EU citizens in the wake of the financial crisis.

Horizon Europe

An EU success story – the key role played by the Horizon 2020 programme in the first ever observation of a black hole – underlines the importance of EU research funding. Members debated and approved a partial agreement to establish and implement Horizon 2020’s replacement, the Horizon Europe programme, which could generate 100 000 new jobs, and could see 35 % of its budget allocated to climate objectives.

Market surveillance and compliance of products

Members debated and voted to adopt proposals encouraging fair competition between businesses and protecting consumer health and safety, through the market surveillance and compliance of products, with greater coordination of rules on surveillance of harmonised industrial products in the single market.

Fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation platforms

After debating proposals for a regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services, Members voted to adopt an agreement on the proposals, which seek fairer contractual relations between online giants (such as Amazon and Google) and other online businesses (such as hotels or restaurants).

Food chain risk assessment transparency

In a direct response to citizens’ demands for improved public access to the scientific studies carried out on sensitive products and substances, notably regarding a ban on glyphosate, Members debated and adopted an agreement reached during interinstitutional negotiations on a regulation concerning the transparency and sustainability of risk assessment in the food chain.

Supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products

Due to the lengthy testing and trials necessary to obtain EU market approval, pharmaceuticals firms can extend the patent protection on their products through a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) for medicinal products. Members debated and adopted a compromise on proposals to improve the intellectual property rights regime for the industry, which suffers from competitive disadvantage in export markets.

Coordination of social security systems

Parliament decided not to close the first reading procedure on a regulation on social security system coordination, but to leave it to the next Parliament. The European Commission proposal seeks to: ensure benefits do not overlap; secure equal treatment; allow for aggregation of insurance, work or residence periods; and ensure benefits from one country can still be received if the citizen moves to another country.

European Border and Coast Guard

Members debated and approved a provisional agreement to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard, including measures to engage 5 000 EU border guards (from January 2021), with a further 5 000 operational staff by 2027. The changes aim to ensure uniform border management standards throughout the EU, and to provide more support for national authorities involved in managing migration and the fight against cross-border crime at the EU’s external borders.

EU Visa Code

Parliament debated and approved an agreement on the revision of the EU Visa Code, which would increase the visa fee to €80, simplify the procedures for requesting visas and harmonise multiple-entry visa rules. The proposals also seek non-EU country cooperation in re-admitting their illegally staying nationals.

Adapting legal acts to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU

Members approved a revision that would adapt legal acts to the Treaty of Lisbon. The proposal aligns ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny‘ (RPS) measures, from 64 basic acts, with the delegated acts procedure, where European Parliament and the Council have the right of veto and may revoke the delegation. However, agreement on a further 104 acts, and on acts in the justice policy field, will have to wait until the new legislative term.

Digital tools and processes in company law

Members debated and approved an agreement on measures to improve the use of digital tools and processes in company law, which should make it easier to set up and register a business in the EU, including greater use of online submission for official company documentation.

Covered bonds

Finally, Members debated and approved a compromise on proposals on covered bonds – debt securities issued by credit institutions, secured by a pool of mortgage loans or public sector debt. Covered bonds provide vital long-term finance for many EU Member States, channelling funds to the property market and the public sector. However, both use and regulation of these bonds varies greatly between EU countries, and a common definition is lacking.

Written by Mihalis Kritikos,

Asking ‘Is artificial intelligence a human rights issue?’, the workshop co-organised by STOA with the European Parliament’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) on 20 March 2019, gathered academic experts, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), practitioners and representatives of international organisations to share their perspectives on exactly how artificial intelligence (AI) affects the protection and enjoyment of human rights. Despite the speakers’ diverse experiences, there was a consensus that AI poses a wide range of new risks for human rights that need to be addressed immediately. The panellists also agreed that there are no established methodologies yet to track the effects on human rights and to assess the potential for discrimination in the use of machine learning.

The workshop opened with a welcome address from STOA Chair Eva Kaili (S&D, Greece), who highlighted that the workshop followed up on the recently adopted European Parliament resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics, and that its conclusions should feed into efforts to shape a socio-ethical framework for a human-centric approach to AI. She also emphasised the need to assess the capacity of the current universal human rights and EU ethical frameworks, to confront emerging governance challenges when it comes to the deployment and application of AI, and argued that Europe has the opportunity to shape the direction of AI, at least from a socio-ethical perspective.

Following the Chair’s remarks, the first panel kicked-off with Ekkehard Ernst, Chief Macroeconomist at the International Labour Organization analysing the four AI inequality challenges. He argued that AI intellectual property rights should be addressed as a way to decrease the unsustainable concentration of data and AI development in the hands of a few mega-corporations. Representing the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA), Joanna Goodey, Head of the Research and Data Unit, presented the work of FRA in this field, highlighting that the protection of human dignity should be prioritised and arguing that use of AI in the area of law enforcement can lead to discrimination. Dimitris Panopoulos, Co-founder of Suite5 Data Intelligence Solutions, presented the initial findings of the EU-funded project ChildRescue – Collective Awareness Platform for Missing Children Investigation and Rescue, emphasising that AI can also be used to protect the human rights of vulnerable population groups such as children.

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The second panel, which was moderated by Marietje Schaake (ALDE, the Netherlands) focused on the impacts of AI on human rights through the presentation of real life case-studies. The first panellist, Silkie Carlo, Chief Executive of Big Brother Watch, shared her experience of working on real case studies in the United Kingdom that undermine the protection of the rights to privacy, freedom of expression and non-discrimination. She highlighted that flaws in biometric facial recognition used by the Police in the UK can lead to misleading judgments, especially for minorities and women, and recommended that decisions that engage individuals’ human rights must never be purely automated. Lorena Jaume-Palasi, founder of the Ethical Tech Society a non-profit organisation analysing and evaluating processes of automation and digitisation regarding their social relevance, noted that it is not the technology itself, but its use that matters and argued for the need for more reflective oversight structures. In her presentation, she called for a paradigm shift in our approach towards information platforms’ terms of operation and in the principles and values that determine the access to platforms and the degree of their commercial character.

Lofred Madzou, Project Lead, AI & Machine Learning at the World Economic Forum, presented the work of the Center for the Fourth Industrial Revolution and analysed the policy concerns associated with AI, such as the erosion of privacy, algorithmic bias and the abuse of surveillance that could, in his opinion, ‘affect our rights to stand up and protest if AI remains unregulated’. Marietje Schaake noted that algorithmic oversight for AI is urgently needed and that it is essential to ensure that the process of embedding ethical principles and values in AI-based decision-making systems is transparent and inclusive.

The third panel focused on the possible measures and remedies for safeguarding the protection of human rights in the context of AI. The panel was moderated by Michał BONI (EPP, Poland), who noted that Member States are gradually adopting their national AI strategies, but that this could lead to regulatory fragmentation. He therefore argued for the need for ethical certainty and stability for AI. Professor Aimee van Wynsberghe of TU Delft and Member of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, presented the preliminary results of the ongoing STOA study on a new ethical framework for AI. She noted that context and practice matter in our ethical analysis of AI, and recommended the introduction of data hygiene certification, ethics impact assessment and accountability reports. Fanny Hidvegi of Access Now and Member of the High-Level Expert Group on AI, presented a case study examining the use of AI-powered facial recognition tools for law enforcement purposes and recommended the adoption of strict standards for government use of AI. She emphasised that the design, development and deployment of AI and any AI-assisted technologies must be individual-centric and respect human rights. Can Yeginsu a Barrister with 4 New Square Chambers, noted that we do not yet have the potential to leave AI without any human intervention, and may need to ensure individual access to justice and even consider the establishment of an AI ombudsman to handle individual complaints associated with the use/misuse of AI.

Following the panel presentations, the audience raised several interesting questions, in particular regarding how to establish connections between AI, consent, surveillance and human rights, as well as whether the various EU-level ongoing or planned policy initiatives (such as the ethics guidelines for trustworthy artificial intelligence produced by the European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on AI, the Commission communication on artificial intelligence for Europe, and the European Parliament resolution on a comprehensive European industrial policy on artificial intelligence and robotics), are sufficient to safeguard a human rights lens in the governance of AI. In response, the panellists advocated an ethics-by-design approach that will facilitate the embedding of values such as transparency and explainability in AI development. They also noted that legally binding norms are needed in the field of AI-based decision-making processes, rather than soft-law instruments, and that EU legislators should consider the possibility of integrating a requirement for systematic human rights impact assessments, or even developing new legal mechanisms for redress/remedy for human rights violations resulting from AI.

If you missed out this time, you can access the presentations and watch the webstream of the workshop via the STOA events page.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© millenius / Fotolia

Having been a part of the European Community since 1973 through Denmark’s membership, Greenland withdrew from the European Community in 1985 after the island secured home rule from Denmark. Since then, Greenland has been associated with the European Union as an Overseas Country and Territory (OCT). The purpose of this association is ‘to promote the economic and social development of the countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Union as a whole’.

Various documents cover Greenland’s relations with the EU, including the 2014-2020 EU-Greenland Partnership Agreement that aims to contribute to the diversification of Greenland’s economy. The explicit political ambition is to ensure policy dialogue on global issues of common interest. The main areas of cooperation include education and training, energy, climate, environment and biodiversity, natural resources, maritime transport and research and innovation, in addition to Arctic issues.

As part of the partnership, and taking Greenland’s needs into account, the focal point of EU-Greenland financial cooperation is education and training, with a special emphasis on boosting the pre-school and elementary school system, as well as on providing support for vocational education and post-elementary education.

The EU allocates an indicative amount of €217.8 million (current prices) for financial cooperation with Greenland for the 2014-2020 period. The overarching aim of this financial cooperation is to contribute to an inclusive and coherent education system, while specific objectives focus on reducing inequality, improving the quality of the education system, and making it more efficient.

The EU budget channels financial cooperation with Greenland, contrary to the case for all other OCTs, which receive support from the European Development Fund. As regards the aid modality, the European Commission grants budget support for the implementation of the Greenland education programme, which is led by Greenland’s Ministry of Education, Church, Culture and Gender Equality, in cooperation with other ministries and stakeholders.

The evaluation of the 2014 Greenland Decision, which lays down rules for the EU-Greenland Partnership, fed into the mid-term review of the EU’s 2014-2020 external financing instruments (2017). This deemed the choice of education as the focal sector to be relevant to beneficiaries’ needs in Greenland: there is a broad consensus in Greenland that education is ‘the most relevant growth parameter’. The evaluation stressed that the fact that the education sector had been chosen by the Greenland government ensured strong support and ownership.

According to the evaluation, attempts to expand the official policy dialogue to include areas of mutual interest other than education had not yet been achieved. The document added that, while it was still too early to see a significant impact in terms of diversifying Greenland’s economy, the instrument had triggered positive dynamics and contributed to sustainable development by improving educational attainment.

On the basis of the assessment of current external financing instruments, the European Commission has proposed to streamline funding for OCTs and channel it entirely through the EU budget for the post-2020 programming period, with special arrangements for Greenland. The proposed resources for the years 2021 to 2027 amount to €500 million for all OCTs, including Greenland.

Read this briefing on ‘EU cooperation with Greenland‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marie Lecerf,

© Svyatoslav Lypynskyy / Fotolia

In 2014, around 122 million people were ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) in the 28 EU Member States– a quarter of the population. This means they were in at least one of the following situations: at risk of monetary poverty (17.2 % of the total population); living in households with very low work intensity (11.1 %); or severely materially deprived (9.0 %).

Since the onset of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, fighting poverty and social exclusion is a key priority for the European Union. One of the aims of the Europe 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ by at least 20 million by the end of the decade. Consequently, on 24 October 2012, the European Commission announced a proposal to set up a new Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) for the 2014-2020 period, to replace the EU’s food distribution programme for the most deprived (MDP).

The fund’s general objective is to promote and enhance social inclusion and therefore ultimately contribute to the goal of eradicating poverty in the Union. It seeks to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing non-financial assistance for the most deprived in conjunction with other EU funds, such as the European Social Fund (ESF), and with Member States’ national poverty eradication and social inclusion policies.

The EU contribution to the FEAD is more than €3.8 billion (in current prices) for the 2014‑2020 period. In addition, Member States are to co-finance at least 15 % of the costs of their national operational programmes (around €674 million), bringing the total resources channelled through the fund to approximately €4.5 billion.

The principal measures undertaken under the FEAD are:

• food support (distribution of food packages and meals to people in deprived situations, school lunches for children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, collection and distribution of donated food, etc.);
• material assistance (basic hygiene items for adults and children, basic household items, clothing, sleeping bags for the homeless, school supplies, etc.);
• accompanying measures to alleviate adversity through advice and guidance (regarding basic rights, nutrition and health, available social services and access to education services, temporary shelter for the homeless, etc.);
• social inclusion activities (improving access to existing support and social services, psychological support, training in self-reliance, language courses, etc.).

FEAD assistance is delivered via partner organisations (public bodies or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), selected by Member States on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.

On 27 March 2019, the mid-term evaluation of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived was published. It presents the FEAD’s main achievements for the period up to the end of December 2017. According to the report, between 2014 and 2017, the FEAD supported more than 12 million people per year and, during this period, more than 1.3 million tonnes of food were distributed. Social inclusion measures, meanwhile reached about 66 000 people. Given the FEAD’s very limited resources compared with other EU funds, the main conclusion of the mid-term evaluation is that there are strong arguments in favour of continuing the programme.

The European Court of Auditors is, however, much more severe in its evaluation of the programme’s first results. In its Special Report No 5/2019: FEAD-Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, published on 3 April 2019, the Court assesses whether the initial set-up of the FEAD and the Member States’ operational programmes effectively target the most in need and do contribute to the Europe 2020 poverty-reduction target. The Court points out that the fund remains primarily a food aid scheme, with 80 % of its budget devoted to food support. As a result, although the FEAD offers Member States the possibility to focus on social inclusion, those measures are scarcely implemented. The Court concludes by stating that the ability of the fund to reduce poverty has yet to be demonstrated.

Read this briefing on ‘Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

Drug addiction is one of the greatest problems facing European public health authorities. Advances in drug addiction research have focused mostly on the neurobiological aspects of the disease, but now promising new technologies are enhancing our ability to understand and treat drug addiction. A wide range of health tools for drug addiction recovery is available on the internet: information and education websites; assessment and psychotherapeutic software; comprehensive self-help programmes; and social network therapeutic communities. Use of such tools on smartphones and other mobile devices is known as mobile health (mHealth). The utilisation of new technologies in drug addiction treatment and research has generated interest, curiosity and expectation, but also concerns regarding the ethical aspects of their use.

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Substance-use disorders (SUDs) are major public health concerns in the EU, with considerable interpersonal, physical and societal consequences. Around 23 million people are affected by alcohol-related disorders in Europe. One in four EU citizens over 15 years of age is a tobacco smoker. There are about 1.3 million high-risk opioid users in Europe and 2.3 million young adults (aged 15–34 years) used cocaine in the last year. Given these figures, it is not surprising that there has been significant interest in Europe in the development and implementation of technology-based interventions (TBIs) for people with SUDs.

TBIs do not attempt to replace traditional therapy. Rather, they allow for the combined use of different intervention tools, increasing the still-limited number of therapeutic methods in treating drug dependence, and reaching out to a different typology of subjects. Strategies for managing SUDs should be able to address the chronic and relapsing nature of addiction, and TBIs can provide a valuable support in addressing these challenges.

TBIs include technology-assisted behaviour therapies, education, recovery support programmes, wellness monitoring, and resources for prevention and information. These interventions can be offered via different approaches, including for instance telephone counselling and web-based video conferencing tools, self-directed desktop therapeutic tools, web-based text communication (email, chat, forums), as well as mHealth. Significant overlaps exist between the use of the aforementioned types of tools, and similar services are offered via different tools.

Overall, TBIs for SUDs appear to be effective, although their efficacy in behavioural change tends to be small, and the mechanisms through which the treatment works remain largely unknown. Nonetheless, these changes should be considered important because, from a public health perspective, even small changes become meaningful when multiplied at the population level.

Specifically, mHealth can provide support in conducting SUD research and treatment through two different pathways: (i) direct input, via self-assessments by patients; or (ii) via passive data collection, where physiological information is gathered using special sensors.

Using mobile technologies to collect self-assessments is referred to as ecological momentary assessment (EMA). EMAs help people to self-monitor behaviours at the time and in the context in which they occur. Compared to traditional measures using paper-pencil questionnaires, EMA has several benefits, such as increasing our ability to correlate instances of craving to maladaptive behaviours.

Passive data collection often relies on technologies that record patterns of movement within the patient’s environment, for example, via global positioning system (GPS) and wireless local area networks (Wi-Fi), which can be used to acquire location-based data. What is specific about these tools is the possibility to gather spatial and temporal information, i.e. where and when the behaviours of the subject occurred.

The impact of the environment in developing or sustaining SUDs has been called the ‘exposome’ of addiction. The term has already been used in other areas of medical research, such as in cancer research, where it refers to the environmental exposures throughout life as a way of understanding the environmental influence on the onset and development of tumour diseases.

In addition, physiological information from special sensors, such as those measuring blood pressure, heart rate, skin temperature or substance concentration levels in blood, can be combined with the gathered spatial and temporal data in order to get a more detailed profile of the patient and her or his behaviour, including monitoring physiological responses or precursors to craving.

Possible impacts and developments

TBIs have the potential to play an important role in enhancing the availability of SUD treatment. Given the substantial gap between the number of individuals seeking addiction treatment and the health system’s capacity to offer adequate and timely health support, TBIs appear to offer interesting opportunities for clinicians, health administrators and decision-makers to expand the availability of medical services and reduce health service barriers, such as reduced patient mobility, treatment costs or carer availability.

Moreover, based on information from smartphones and other mobile devices, it is possible to deliver, in real time, interventions during people’s daily lives. Information can be utilised by clinicians, health personnel, peers or family for detailed messages and suggestions, helping the patient to control her or his cravings. In addition to real-time monitoring of factors related to SUDs, information collected by these technologies can be used to calculate the risk for new episodes of the specific maladaptive behaviour: it has been found that relapse to substance use can be predicted using information from surveys of use and risk factors in the previous weeks. Algorithms may then be developed to identify behavioural patterns indicative of treatment progress, such as treatment response and triggers for cravings and behaviour that increases the risk of relapse.

Anticipatory policy-making

Despite encouraging progress, TBIs for SUDs need to be evaluated with caution. This field of medical science still suffers from a lack of clarity and consistency. Across the research literature there are methodological difficulties, such as a lack of common definitions, selection biases, study attrition, difficulties in mounting randomised clinical trials and uncertain conclusions drawn from the findings. Supporting TBIs for SUDs by investing in research is important for a better understanding of the potential and limits of these applications. Improving the quality of research will enable effective clinical interventions, but can also help decision-makers to better understand the potential of these technologies from a public health perspective.

Given the proliferation of technology applications, a possible policy option for fostering the implementation of TBIs in SUD treatment is to provide adequate ICT infrastructure and stimulate digital literacy among healthcare professionals. Training for health personnel will become not only necessary but also multi-disciplinary in the near future. Clinicians should develop expertise in different types of media and technological interventions, developing collaborations with experts in other fields, such as cognitive psychology, ICT and communication.

TBIs for SUDs are a component of the application of ICT in healthcare (eHealth). Several barriers hamper the wider uptake of eHealth solutions in Europe, such as limited interoperability between eHealth solutions and insufficient evidence of cost-effectiveness. A legal framework applicable to mHealth tools exists, but practical implementation brings forward questions about how specific software should be classified and thus which rules should apply. Another barrier to wider uptake of digital health applications is a lack of transparency regarding the utilisation of data collected by such applications. A privacy code of conduct for mHealth apps is currently being developed, because the issue of ambiguous data collection may render the implementation of online therapy for SUDs incompatible with health professionals’ ethical duty to protect their patients’ privacy and to guarantee patient confidentiality.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could fight drug addiction with digital technology?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Simon Schroecker,

© Argus / Fotolia

At the special European Council (Article 50) meeting on 10 April 2019, Heads of State or Government agreed to further extend the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 at the latest. This goes beyond the request made by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, for that period to be extended until 30 June 2019, but represents only half of the time period some European Council members had been seeking to offer. The compromise found, which maintains unity amongst the EU-27, is designed to reduce as much as possible the disruptive effects of the Brexit negotiations on EU affairs at the start of the new institutional cycle. With the longer extension period – and if the Withdrawal Agreement, already rejected three times by the UK Parliament, is not ratified by 22 May – the UK will be required to organise European elections. The decision adopted by the EU-27 also confirms that, during this period, the UK remains a Member State with all its rights and obligations. Under this extension, several different scenarios are all still possible: ratifying the current deal, ‘no deal’, another referendum or revoking Article 50. However, the decision preclude any changes to the Withdrawal Agreement. Progress in the ratification process in the UK will be reviewed at the European Council meeting on 20-21 June.

1. The UK request to further extend the Article 50 negotiation period

On 21 March 2019, the EU-27 Heads of State or Government had agreed to a first request by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, for an extension of the Article 50 period, deciding to postpone Brexit until 22 May 2019, provided that the Withdrawal Agreement were approved by the House of Commons by 29 March. If not approved, the extension would end on 12 April, with the UK required to indicate a way forward before that date. As the House of Commons rejected the Withdrawal Agreement for the third time, on 29 March 2019, the 22 May extension was no longer valid. On 5 April, the UK Prime Minister sent a letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in which she requested the UK’s withdrawal to be delayed until 30 June 2019. In her letter, she argued that, without this further extension, the United Kingdom would leave the European Union without a deal on 12 April 2019. She also made the case that she was now seeking a consensus across the House of Commons, and therefore, had met with the leader of the opposition with the aim of agreeing on ‘a proposal that can be put before the House of Commons which allows the United Kingdom to leave the European Union with a deal’.

2. The European Council (Article 50) meeting

On 10 April, EU-27 Heads of State or Government met to deliberate on the consequences which an extension beyond 22 May, as requested by the UK Prime Minister, would have on the forthcoming European elections and on EU decision-making. Following an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the EU-27 Heads of State or Government listened to Theresa May’s presentation of the state of play of the ratification process in the UK, and to her arguments in favour of a further extension.

Extension period

After lengthy discussions amongst the EU-27, between those seeking a longer extension period – possibly until the end of 2019 or even the end of March 2020 – and others, in particular the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, who were more critical of a long extension period, the Heads of State or Government adopted a decision to extend the Article 50 period, but not until 30 June, as requested by the UK Prime Minister. The compromise found grants the United Kingdom a six-month flexible extension of the Article 50 period, which ‘should last only as long as necessary and, in any event, no longer than 31 October 2019’. This flexibility means that the extension could be terminated at any time before 31 October, once the Withdrawal Agreement has been ratified. The UK would then leave the EU on the first day of the following month. Theresa May agreed to this flexible extension, since ‘the extension can be terminated when the Withdrawal Agreement has been ratified’. She nevertheless underlined that she believes that ‘we need to leave the EU, with a deal, as soon as possible’.

In advance of the meeting, Donald Tusk had already argued against a short extension until 30 June and for granting a ‘flexible extension, which would last only as long as necessary and no longer than one year’. The advantage of this approach would be, in his view, to avoid both an accidental ‘no-deal’ Brexit as well as repeated Brexit summits. Furthermore, it would allow the extension to terminate automatically, as soon as both sides had ratified the Withdrawal Agreement, and could also ‘allow the UK to rethink its Brexit strategy’.

The date of 31 October 2019 has most likely been chosen in order to complete the Brexit process before the entry into office of the new Commission on 1 November. The aim was thus to limit as much as possible further disruption to EU affairs at the start of the new institutional cycle – beyond the existing uncertainty arising with regard to the European elections, notably as to the effective composition of the new European Parliament.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: The President, Antonio Tajani, stressed that the key question was not the length of the extension, but whether it served a clear purpose. It should not be used for negotiations on further relations or to reopen the withdrawal agreement, but ‘must be designed to resolve the issue meaningfully’.

European Parliament elections

The European Council decision provides that, ‘if the United Kingdom is still a Member State on 23-26 May 2019, and if it has not ratified the Withdrawal Agreement by 22 May 2019, it will be under an obligation to hold the elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Union law‘. The UK Prime Minister stressed again her preference to agree on the Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons before 22 May, so that the UK would not have to participate in the European elections. The European Council’s decision specifies that ‘if it fails to live up to this obligation, the withdrawal will take place on 1 June 2019’.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: Antonio Tajani underlined the importance of any extension for the European Parliament. ‘The European elections are not a game, and they must not be made to look like one thanks to the casual attitude that some in the UK may choose to take towards them’. The President emphasised the importance of genuine participation of the United Kingdom in the European elections, as they are the basis for the efficiency and integrity of the European Parliament and the EU.

Membership rights and sincere cooperation

During the extension period, the United Kingdom will remain a Member State with full rights and obligations in accordance with Article 50 TEU. The other Member States expect ‘the United Kingdom to act in a constructive and responsible manner throughout the extension period in accordance with the duty of sincere cooperation’, and expect ‘the United Kingdom to fulfil this commitment and Treaty obligation in a manner that reflects its situation as a withdrawing Member State. To this effect, the United Kingdom shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and shall refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives, in particular when participating in the decision-making processes of the Union.’ The summit conclusions specify that, during the extension period, ‘the EU27 will continue to meet separately … to discuss matters related to the situation after the withdrawal of the UK’.

Following the meeting, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed the Commission’s satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting, and President Tusk called upon ‘our British friends not to waste the time’ given by this extension, and to seek ‘to find the best possible solution’.

3. Outlook

Even after granting this new ‘flexible extension’ all the possible scenarios, including ratifying the current deal, ‘no deal’, another referendum or revoking Article 50 are all still possible. However, the EU-27 leaders clearly indicated that the extension ‘cannot be used to start negotiations on the future relationship’. They also indicated that in case the position of the United Kingdom were to evolve, they would be prepared ‘to reconsider the Political Declaration on the future relationship in accordance with the positions and principles stated in its guidelines and statements, including as regards the territorial scope of the future relationship. President Tusk stressed that ‘until the end of this period, the UK will also have the possibility to revoke Article 50 and cancel Brexit altogether’. Recent polls show that in case of a second referendum, ‘remain’ would be more likely to win, although the margins remain close.

The European Council will review progress at its meeting on 20-21 June 2019. President Tusk clarified that this date is not a ‘cliff edge’, as the aim for this meeting would not be to have a discussion, but only to inform the EU-27 of the current situation and the state of play in the ratification process. With the extension agreed at the special meeting, the possible ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement would most probably only take place after the new European Parliament has started its activity.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: Antonio Tajani, expressed the hope that an agreement could soon be reached between the British government and the opposition, preferably including a more ambitious political declaration on future relations. Prior to the meeting, the European Parliament had already stated its support for ‘an upgrading of the political declaration, that could include participation in either the customs union or the single market, in full compliance with EU principles – indivisibility of the four freedoms, integrity of the single market and autonomy of EU decision-making.’

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the Special European Council (Article 50) meeting, 10 April 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christian Salm,

Between 23 and 26 May 2019, 350 million European Union (EU) citizens have the opportunity to vote for Members of the European Parliament. It will be the ninth time that EU citizens can vote directly for the policy- and decision-makers who will represent them in EU politics. Direct elections to the European Parliament are consequently one of the most important events in the EU political cycle. Moreover, with Brexit and other challenges to overcome before the new Parliament can be constituted, many EU observers attach a special significance to this ninth election in the history of direct European elections. Before the elections take place therfore is a good time to look back to the very first direct election to the European Parliament, held forty years ago, in 1979. A history roundtable, jointly organised by EPRS, the European University Institute (EUI) and the Association of Former Members of the European Parliament (FMA); took place on 3 April 2019 to recall this occasion, and to discuss the Parliament’s past as a new political institution in the making.

The roundtable brought together former Presidents and former Members of the European Parliament, as well asnd academics from the field of EU politics and history. EPRS Director-General, Anthony Teasdale, opened the roundtable, emphasising the importance of raising the awareness of the Parliament’s past, and its presence as a political institution that has gained substantial decision-making powers since the first direct election in 1979. In this context, he underlined the role of former Presidents and former Members as key players in maintaining Parliament’s public profile, and influencing debates on EU politics in the Member States. He also mentioned that increased historical research on the Parliament is needed to close the gaps in Parliament’s history. More studies should be carried out, along the lines of a recent EPRS research project on Parliament’s culture, role, and impact during the first two directly-elected Parliaments from 1979 to 1989. The results of this EPRS research project were presented in the first panel discussion of the history roundtable.

Researching the Parliament’s character, composition and culture in the 1980s, Birte Wassenberg (Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Strasbourg) stressed three key elements of the EP in that decade. She described, firstly, how Parliament’s inter-groups such as the Kangaroo Group, an association created in 1979 as an informal gathering of members of the European institutions from different countries and political affiliations, contributed to creating a European family. Secondly, she pointed to the effects of the Parliament’s working culture on Members, including those with an Eurosceptic view. Thirdly, she underlined the Parliament’s engagement in the fight for women’s rights, exemplified by the election of Simon Veil as President of the first directly-elected Parliament.

Exploring Parliament’s policies on the institutional reform of the European Communities in the 1980s, Wolfram Kaiser (Professor of European Studies at the University of Portsmouth) explained how the Parliament fulfilled key functions in building the present-day EU. He argued that these functions included defining a set of criteria for effective and democratic governance and developing legal concepts such as subsidiarity. Moreover, he argued that the Parliament pressured the Member States into accepting greater institutional deepening and more powers for the Parliament in the 1986 Single European Art and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

Inquiring into the Parliament’s role in the development and implementation of the single market programme (1979 to 1989), Laurent Warlouzet (Professor of Contemporary History at the Université de Boulogne) addressed various ways the Parliament affected the policy-making process behind the programme. He outlined, for example, that the Parliament exercised intellectual influence by developing and using the notion of the ‘cost of non-Europe’, a concept used to quantify the potential efficiency gains to be made for the European economy through pursuing further integration and harmonisation in various European policy fields. Furthermore, he demonstrated that the Parliament set and shaped the Community’s economic agenda, as for example in case of the ‘relaunch of Europe’ initiative, with the aim to overcome economically disadvantaged Member States’ situations in the 1980s. Finally, he pointed out how the Parliament pushed the Commission to act with regard to the implementation of the single market programme.

Moderated by the Director of the EU Archives at the EUI, Dieter Schlenker, the second panel gathered four former Parliament Presidents and one former Parliament Vice-President: Charlotte Cederschiöld (Vice-President and Chair of Conciliation 2001-2001), Enrique Barón Crespo (President 1989-1992), Klaus Hänsch (President 1994-1997), Pat Cox (President 2002-2004), and Hans-Gert Pöttering (President 2007-2009). The panel of influential actors in the EP’s history reflected on the forty years of direct elections and emphasised that, despite being complex, the EU’s decision-making systems are democratic, thanks in part to the direct elections to the European Parliament. Moreover, they underlined that, within the last four decades, the Parliament has changed and developed tremendously, becoming a legislative maker equal to the Council. They also addressed possible challenges for constituting the Parliament after the election in May 2019. Here, they particularly mentioned the possible increase of Eurosceptic representation. Asked to provide a slogan for the European elections to come, Pat Cox referred to a quote by one of the EU founding fathers, Jean Monnet: ‘Ce qui est important, ce n’est, ni d’être optimiste, ni pessimiste, mais d’être déterminé‘, adding that: ‘The Parliament is determined to succeed in the next election.’

Click to view slideshow.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for scouts.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

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Are you, or is someone you know, one of the 40 million recognised members of the scouting movement worldwide? Then you will already know that scouts in Europe and worldwide are committed to contributing to build a better world where people are self-fulfilled as individuals and play a constructive role in society.

Over 1.7 million scouts are active in Europe. The European Scout Region, co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme, numbers 41 national scout organisations, under the umbrella of the World Organisation of the Scout Movement. The World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, also co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme, reaches more than 1.2 million young girls throughout Europe. There are several other scout organisations operating at European level, including, for example the Confederation of European Scouts and the Union Internationale des Guides et Scouts d’Europe.

According to their Vision for Scouting 2023, scouting will be the world’s leading educational youth movement by 2023, enabling 100 million young people to be active citizens who create positive change in their communities and in the world, based on shared values.

The EU Youth Strategy for 2010-2018 promotes youth participation in society. Among the key points are the recognition of informal learning and of volunteer work, both of which figure large in scouting activities. Erasmus+ is the funding programme for youth in the EU budget, and brings together funding for scouting, education and exchange under the Erasmus, European Voluntary Service, Youth in Action, and Life-Long Learning programmes.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Youth empowerment [Ten issues to watch in 2018]’, 2018 https://epthinktank.eu/2018/01/10/youth-empowerment-ten-issues-to-watch-in-2018/
• EPRS publication ‘How the EU Budget is spent: Erasmus+’, 2016, https://epthinktank.eu/2016/11/23/how-the-eu-budget-is-spent-erasmus/
• EUROPEAN SCOUT REGION, Facts and Numbers https://www.scout.org/europe

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The EU budget corresponds to around 2 % of total public spending in the European Union, and its impact on the economy is debated, with many analysts deeming it relatively small in size in comparison with the wide range of policy areas in which the EU has responsibilities. However, the EU budget has features that can amplify its impact, starting with the underpinning idea that pooling resources at EU level can be more efficient and effective in a number of policy areas than individual expenditure by Member States.

For those interested in knowing more about the EU budget, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has produced a series of publications on ‘How the EU budget is spent’. The aim is to give a concise overview of the key features of major EU spending programmes and funds for the 2014-2020 period, including: the role of the EU in the policy area, objectives, budgetary figures, eligible measures, funded projects and assessment of results.

The titles in the series show the variety of activities currently funded from the EU budget, giving a taste of the role that these measures play for citizens, business and public authorities across the EU and beyond. The series was launched in 2015 with a publication on the LIFE programme, which supports projects addressing environment- and climate-related issues. In 2019, seven new titles have been published, and these include analysis of instruments such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and the European Fund for Strategic Development (EFSD) that were agreed after the start of the 2014-2020 period, to address specific challenges.

Ahead of the European Parliament’s last plenary session of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, all the publications in the series are now collected in this compendium to provide a handy overview of current EU funding instruments. While the series is not exhaustive, it covers instruments accounting for most of the expenditure side of the EU budget in the 2014-2020 period. The funds and programmes are presented according to the current structure of the EU’s multi-year financial planning – the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2014 to 2020 – and the order of the programmes in official budgetary documents produced by the European Commission.

In addition, an annex sets out and updates the budgetary figures, for all the programmes and funds covered in the compendium, for the entire 2014-2020 period. The allocations set in the original legal bases have evolved – slightly or significantly. Depending on the budgetary instruments, these changes have come for different reasons. For example, while technical adjustments and updates of Member States’ cohesion policy envelopes are built into the MFF, the unexpected migration and refugee crisis of 2015-2016 has led to the reinforcement of the resources allocated to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) through the use of the flexibility provisions of the framework.

Against the background of the ongoing negotiations for the post-2020 MFF and the vibrant debate on the future of EU finances, this compendium offers a simple tool to understand better the starting point of those discussions.

Read the compendium on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Spending programmes under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people interested in artificial intelligence.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© Gorodenkoff / Fotolia

Unless you are a robot yourself, you are probably either fascinated or appalled by the prospects of artificial intelligence (AI). No longer limited to science-fiction, artificial intelligence is already a fact in our daily life, through speech recognition, driverless cars, medical diagnosis, etc. AI takes away some tasks from us. This might be for the better, when machines perform routine work and helps us concentrate on more interesting tasks, or appreciate extra leisure time. However, this might also be for the worse, as automation may lead to replacing humans at work. Changes to the way we manage our time, and perhaps earn less money, have to be considered carefully. Moreover, trusting ‘things’ with the power to decide on our behalf – on the road or at the hospital – implies a thorough revision of our ethical and legal frameworks.

A wide range of activities have to be ready for the shift to AI. We need a collective strategy to tackle changes in the education system, job market, health services, and road safety rules. The EU approach addresses all three dimensions of the artificial intelligence revolution. The EU and Member States are committed to: boost public and private investment to harness research and development; support the adaptation of education and training systems; and reflect on future ethics and legal guidelines. The 2018 General Data Protection Regulation has already cleared the way for a more transparent use of our data by automated systems and their developers. Let’s continue to be smarter than artificial intelligence!

Further information

• European Commission, website on artificial intelligence, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/artificial-intelligence
• European Commission, factsheet ‘Artificial intelligence for Europe’, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/factsheet-artificial-intelligence-europe
• EPRS blog, STOA workshop ‘Should we fear the future? Is it rational to be optimistic about artificial intelligence?’, 2017, https://epthinktank.eu/2017/10/30/is-it-rational-to-be-optimistic-about-artificial-intelligence/

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Parliament / P.Naj-Oleari

Unsurprisingly, the agenda for this final plenary session of Parliament’s 2014-2019 term will deal with a range of issues that are emblematic of the major themes that have marked this eighth legislature.

EU policy on migration was always high on this Parliament’s agenda, and two files scheduled for debate on Wednesday afternoon deal with issues linked to future migration policy. Parliament is expected to take a position on the provisional agreement to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard, including measures to engage 5 000 EU border guards (from January 2021), with a further 5 000 operational staff in operation by 2027, including a ‘rapid response’ team. The changes aim to ensure the same high border-management standards throughout the EU, and to provide more support for national authorities involved in managing migration and the fight against cross-border crime at the EU’s external borders. Members will then turn to consider the revision of the EU Visa Code, which would increase the visa fee to €80; simplify the procedures for requesting visas and harmonise multiple-entry visa rules. The proposals also seek to ensure that non-EU countries cooperate in readmitting their illegally staying nationals.

The financial crisis and the challenges of the shift to digital processes have affected EU citizens and businesses alike. Digitalisation and an ageing population have brought about major changes in the EU labour market in recent decades, leading to unfair employment practices such as ‘zero hours’ contracts. On Tuesday morning, Members will debate proposals to reform labour market rules, to ensure transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU. Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee wants to ensure that employers provide timely information for their employees, respect probationary periods and set out working conditions for those who work non-standard schedules. A proposal for a regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services returns to the agenda on Tuesday afternoon, seeking fairer contractual relations between online giants (such as Amazon and Google) and other online businesses (such as hotels or restaurants). Encouraging fair competition between businesses, as well as protecting consumers’ health and safety, is behind proposals on the market surveillance and compliance of products, which Members will debate on Tuesday afternoon. The proposals seek greater coordination of rules on market surveillance of harmonised industrial products, which represent 69 % of the overall value of industrial products in the internal market. On Wednesday night, Members will debate an agreement on measures to improve the use of digital tools and processes in company law. Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee wants to see stronger measures throughout the EU to make it easier to set up and register a business, including greater use of online submission for official company documentation.

The pharmaceuticals sector is an important source of jobs and growth in the EU. On Tuesday evening, Members will consider a compromise on proposals to improve the intellectual property rights regime for the industry, which suffers from competitive disadvantage in export markets. Due to the lengthy testing and trials necessary to obtain EU market approval, pharmaceuticals firms can extend the patent protection on their products through a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) for medicinal products. The proposal would allow EU-based companies who do not hold the rights within the EU to manufacture generic or biosimilar versions of medicines still under SPC protection inside the EU, providing this is done exclusively for export to a non-EU market, or for stockpiling in anticipation of the patent protection’s expiry. The new rules could lead to €1 billion annual net additional export sales, create new jobs, and allow better access to quality and affordable medicine.

Over the current legislature, controversy has also erupted on more than one occasion on environmental issues, not least over the way in which products and substances are authorised (and renewed) for use in the EU. Members will vote to adopt Parliament’s position on an agreement concerning the transparency and sustainability of risk assessment in the food chain on Tuesday afternoon, which are a direct follow-up to citizens’ demands, notably regarding a ban on glyphosate. The current proposals would improve public access to the scientific studies carried out on sensitive products and substances. Against the background of emissions scandals and warnings about the deteriorating climate change situation during this legislature, the review of the Clean Vehicles Directive has shown poor results to date. Members will debate a proposal on Wednesday night that should tighten up definitions of clean road transport vehicles and set stronger emissions thresholds. Immediately afterwards, Parliament debates an agreed text setting CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles, such as buses, trucks and trailers, at 15 % lower than current standards. Such issues often come to light thanks to whistle-blowers. On Monday evening, Members will debate EU proposals to give whistle-blowers greater protection when they report on breaches of EU law (such as money laundering, or contravening environmental or food safety regulations), where the situation varies greatly between EU countries. However, the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee insists the measures should be stronger, including that journalists and non-governmental organisations can enjoy anonymity and legal protection when reporting on whistle-blowing.

An EU success story – the key role played by the Horizon 2020 programme in the first ever observation of a black hole – underlines the importance of EU research funding. The EU is proposing to replace this successful programme when it ends in December 2020 with the Horizon Europe package. In a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon, Members will consider a report on proposals to establish and implement the Horizon Europe programme that encourages an even more ambitious programme, not least because it could generate some 100 000 new jobs, as well as to allocate 35 % of the Horizon Europe budget to climate objectives.

Members will also discuss a number of finance-related issues, with a joint debate on banking reform and financial supervision, and several other financial issues. Among these, Members will debate collective investment funds – which pool investor capital for investment in collective securities portfolios – in a joint debate on Monday afternoon. While the EU provides passporting possibilities to ensure a wide range of cross-border distribution of investment funds, at present, little advantage is taken of these opportunities in a market that remains relatively small and predominantly national. The proposals under consideration would align national requirements and harmonise verification, creating economies of scale, reducing investors’ fees and opening up the market. In addition, the current prudential supervision and requirements of investment firms, which facilitate savings and investment throughout the EU’s capital markets, is too complex and inefficient. Members will also debate proposals on Monday night to update the EU regulatory framework for investment firms, taking account of the size and nature of investment firms and the risks involved. In a joint debate on Wednesday night, Members will discuss a compromise on proposals on covered bonds – debt securities issued by credit institutions, secured by a pool of mortgage loans or public sector debt. Covered bonds provide vital long-term finance for many EU Member States, channelling funds to the property market and the public sector. However, both use and regulation of these bonds varies greatly between EU countries, and a common definition is lacking.

Having been postponed again, to 31 October 2019, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the state of play of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia, Krišjānis Kariņš will attend plenary on Wednesday morning, for the last debate in the series on the future of Europe.

Turning to the details of how EU laws are decided on Wednesday evening, Members will debate proposals on a revision that would adapt legal acts to the Treaty of Lisbon. The proposal aligns ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny‘ (RPS) measures, from 64 basic acts, with the delegated acts procedure, where European Parliament and the Council have the right of veto and may revoke the delegation. However, agreement on a further 104 acts, and on acts in the justice policy field, will have to wait until the new legislative term.

Finally, the European elections for the ninth European Parliament are approaching fast. Members will hear a Commission statement on Tuesday afternoon on protecting the integrity of the European elections, particularly considering international threats to cybersecurity.

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: Covered bonds: Issue and supervision, exposures (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Adapting legal acts to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Revision of the Visa Code (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Digital tools and processes in company law (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Establishing and implementing Horizon Europe (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Protection of whistle-blowers (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Food chain risk assessment transparency (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) European Border and Coast Guard (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL)

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© boldg / Fotolia

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) celebrates its 70th anniversary in April 2019, proud of its survival, durability and historic role in ensuring peace, notably during the Cold War. However, analysts and politicians stress that the military alliance must work hard to keep pace with a changing environment and new challenges of the 21st century, both geo-strategic and technological. Another major test is an uncertain commitment to NATO of Donald Trump, the current President of the United States.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on NATO and European defence by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on European defence, focused on a planned U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in February 2019.

NATO at 70: From triumph to tumult?
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

NATO at 70: Twilight years or a new dawn?
Centre for European Reform, April 2019

NATO just turned 70, and it’s showing its age
Carnegie Europe, April 2019

NATO at 70: Shaping the future for the next 70 years
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019

NATO at 70: Celebration and introspection
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Don’t count on NATO to save liberal values
Chatham House, April 2019

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

NATO at seventy: Filling NATO’s critical defense-capability gaps
Atlantic Council, April 2019

NATO at 70: A strategic partnership for the 21st century
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

After Crimea: Does NATO have the means to defend Europe?
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Beyond collective defense: How NATO can lead on 21st century challenges
Atlantic Council, April 2019

Europe whole and free: Why NATO’s open door must remain open
Brookings Institution, April 2019

To preserve NATO, Britain must help reinvent it
Chatham House, April 2019

3 ways Europe is looking at a fraying NATO
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

As NATO turns 70, the European security debate comes full circle
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Europe in a multipolar missile world: Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty
Egmont, April 2019

Love me today, love me tomorrow? Millennials and NATO
Brookings Institution, April 2019

Brexit makes NATO even more important for the Atlantic
Chatham House, April 2019

L’état de la relation entre la Turquie et l’OTAN : Un engagement fragilisé
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2019

European strategic autonomy: Actors, issues, conflicts of interests
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

Time for NATO to talk about China
Carnegie Europe, March 2019

Why and how NATO should adapt to a new Mediterranean security environment
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

NATO’s pointless burden-sharing debates: The need to replace a mathematically ridiculous 2% of GDP
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Joining forces: The way towards the European Defence Union
European Political Strategy Centre, February 2019

Towards a more stable NATO-Russia relationship
Russian International Affairs Council, European Leadership Network, February 2019

State of disunion: Europe, NATO, and disintegrating arms control
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

‘Fort Trump’ or bust?: Poland and the future of European defence
Friends of Europe, January 2019

Is NATO deterrence a paper tiger?
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

Der Balkan als integraler Teil einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur? Sicherheit, Rolle der NATO und der Auslandseinsätze des österreichischen Bundesheeres
Austrian Institute for International Affairs, January 2019

The future of NATO: Fog over the Atlantic?
Clingendael, December 2018

Reducing the risks of conventional deterrence in Europe: Arms control in the NATO-Russia contact zones
OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, December 2018

Offense as the new defense: New life for NATO’s cyber policy
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

Why the United States needs a cohesive NATO
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

Rising tensions between the West and Russia: what role for arms control?
Cligendael, December 2018

NATO needs a European level of ambition
Rand Corporation, December 2018

Rising tensions between the West and Russia: What role for arms control?
Clingendael, December 2018

NATO priorities after the Brussels summit
Atlantic Council, November 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2018

Spending to defend: NATO and the EU’s new budget
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

EU-NATO relations: A long-term perspective
Egmont, November 2018

Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

NATO’s return to the North Atlantic: Implications for the defense of Northern Europe
Finnish Institute of International Relations, November 2018

NATO‘s northeast quartet: Prospects and opportunities for Baltic-Polish defence cooperation
International Centre for Defence and Security, November 2018

The erosion of strategic stability and the future of arms control in Europe
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018

The challenges of NATO nuclear policy: Alliance management under the Trump administration
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2018

Pointing to the emerging Soviet dead ends:-NATO analysis of the Soviet economy, 1971-1982
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 2018

NATO in the Trump era: Surviving the crisis
Clingendael, September 2018

NATO after the Brussels summit: Bruised or emboldened?
German Marshall Fund, September 2018

Hard lessons from Brussels: The key challenges facing NATO
Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, September 2018

Russia and the Baltics: A testing ground for NATO–EU defence cooperation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

Debating security plus: Conflict, competition and cooperation in an interconnected world
Friends of Europe, September 2018

Germany and European defence cooperation: A post-Atlantic turn?
Finnish Institute of International Cooperation, September 2018

NATO’s deterrence problem: An analog strategy for a digital age
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2018

Rediscovering geography in NATO defence planning
Egmont, August 2018

Read this briefing on ‘NATO at 70‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.