European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marie Lecerf,

© Svyatoslav Lypynskyy / Fotolia

In 2014, around 122 million people were ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ (AROPE) in the 28 EU Member States– a quarter of the population. This means they were in at least one of the following situations: at risk of monetary poverty (17.2 % of the total population); living in households with very low work intensity (11.1 %); or severely materially deprived (9.0 %).

Since the onset of the 2008 financial and economic crisis, fighting poverty and social exclusion is a key priority for the European Union. One of the aims of the Europe 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people ‘at risk of poverty or social exclusion’ by at least 20 million by the end of the decade. Consequently, on 24 October 2012, the European Commission announced a proposal to set up a new Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) for the 2014-2020 period, to replace the EU’s food distribution programme for the most deprived (MDP).

The fund’s general objective is to promote and enhance social inclusion and therefore ultimately contribute to the goal of eradicating poverty in the Union. It seeks to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing non-financial assistance for the most deprived in conjunction with other EU funds, such as the European Social Fund (ESF), and with Member States’ national poverty eradication and social inclusion policies.

The EU contribution to the FEAD is more than €3.8 billion (in current prices) for the 2014‑2020 period. In addition, Member States are to co-finance at least 15 % of the costs of their national operational programmes (around €674 million), bringing the total resources channelled through the fund to approximately €4.5 billion.

The principal measures undertaken under the FEAD are:

• food support (distribution of food packages and meals to people in deprived situations, school lunches for children at risk of poverty or social exclusion, collection and distribution of donated food, etc.);
• material assistance (basic hygiene items for adults and children, basic household items, clothing, sleeping bags for the homeless, school supplies, etc.);
• accompanying measures to alleviate adversity through advice and guidance (regarding basic rights, nutrition and health, available social services and access to education services, temporary shelter for the homeless, etc.);
• social inclusion activities (improving access to existing support and social services, psychological support, training in self-reliance, language courses, etc.).

FEAD assistance is delivered via partner organisations (public bodies or non-governmental organisations (NGOs)), selected by Member States on the basis of objective and transparent criteria.

On 27 March 2019, the mid-term evaluation of the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived was published. It presents the FEAD’s main achievements for the period up to the end of December 2017. According to the report, between 2014 and 2017, the FEAD supported more than 12 million people per year and, during this period, more than 1.3 million tonnes of food were distributed. Social inclusion measures, meanwhile reached about 66 000 people. Given the FEAD’s very limited resources compared with other EU funds, the main conclusion of the mid-term evaluation is that there are strong arguments in favour of continuing the programme.

The European Court of Auditors is, however, much more severe in its evaluation of the programme’s first results. In its Special Report No 5/2019: FEAD-Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, published on 3 April 2019, the Court assesses whether the initial set-up of the FEAD and the Member States’ operational programmes effectively target the most in need and do contribute to the Europe 2020 poverty-reduction target. The Court points out that the fund remains primarily a food aid scheme, with 80 % of its budget devoted to food support. As a result, although the FEAD offers Member States the possibility to focus on social inclusion, those measures are scarcely implemented. The Court concludes by stating that the ability of the fund to reduce poverty has yet to be demonstrated.

Read this briefing on ‘Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD)‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gianluca Quaglio,

Drug addiction is one of the greatest problems facing European public health authorities. Advances in drug addiction research have focused mostly on the neurobiological aspects of the disease, but now promising new technologies are enhancing our ability to understand and treat drug addiction. A wide range of health tools for drug addiction recovery is available on the internet: information and education websites; assessment and psychotherapeutic software; comprehensive self-help programmes; and social network therapeutic communities. Use of such tools on smartphones and other mobile devices is known as mobile health (mHealth). The utilisation of new technologies in drug addiction treatment and research has generated interest, curiosity and expectation, but also concerns regarding the ethical aspects of their use.

© iconimage / Fotolia

Substance-use disorders (SUDs) are major public health concerns in the EU, with considerable interpersonal, physical and societal consequences. Around 23 million people are affected by alcohol-related disorders in Europe. One in four EU citizens over 15 years of age is a tobacco smoker. There are about 1.3 million high-risk opioid users in Europe and 2.3 million young adults (aged 15–34 years) used cocaine in the last year. Given these figures, it is not surprising that there has been significant interest in Europe in the development and implementation of technology-based interventions (TBIs) for people with SUDs.

TBIs do not attempt to replace traditional therapy. Rather, they allow for the combined use of different intervention tools, increasing the still-limited number of therapeutic methods in treating drug dependence, and reaching out to a different typology of subjects. Strategies for managing SUDs should be able to address the chronic and relapsing nature of addiction, and TBIs can provide a valuable support in addressing these challenges.

TBIs include technology-assisted behaviour therapies, education, recovery support programmes, wellness monitoring, and resources for prevention and information. These interventions can be offered via different approaches, including for instance telephone counselling and web-based video conferencing tools, self-directed desktop therapeutic tools, web-based text communication (email, chat, forums), as well as mHealth. Significant overlaps exist between the use of the aforementioned types of tools, and similar services are offered via different tools.

Overall, TBIs for SUDs appear to be effective, although their efficacy in behavioural change tends to be small, and the mechanisms through which the treatment works remain largely unknown. Nonetheless, these changes should be considered important because, from a public health perspective, even small changes become meaningful when multiplied at the population level.

Specifically, mHealth can provide support in conducting SUD research and treatment through two different pathways: (i) direct input, via self-assessments by patients; or (ii) via passive data collection, where physiological information is gathered using special sensors.

Using mobile technologies to collect self-assessments is referred to as ecological momentary assessment (EMA). EMAs help people to self-monitor behaviours at the time and in the context in which they occur. Compared to traditional measures using paper-pencil questionnaires, EMA has several benefits, such as increasing our ability to correlate instances of craving to maladaptive behaviours.

Passive data collection often relies on technologies that record patterns of movement within the patient’s environment, for example, via global positioning system (GPS) and wireless local area networks (Wi-Fi), which can be used to acquire location-based data. What is specific about these tools is the possibility to gather spatial and temporal information, i.e. where and when the behaviours of the subject occurred.

The impact of the environment in developing or sustaining SUDs has been called the ‘exposome’ of addiction. The term has already been used in other areas of medical research, such as in cancer research, where it refers to the environmental exposures throughout life as a way of understanding the environmental influence on the onset and development of tumour diseases.

In addition, physiological information from special sensors, such as those measuring blood pressure, heart rate, skin temperature or substance concentration levels in blood, can be combined with the gathered spatial and temporal data in order to get a more detailed profile of the patient and her or his behaviour, including monitoring physiological responses or precursors to craving.

Possible impacts and developments

TBIs have the potential to play an important role in enhancing the availability of SUD treatment. Given the substantial gap between the number of individuals seeking addiction treatment and the health system’s capacity to offer adequate and timely health support, TBIs appear to offer interesting opportunities for clinicians, health administrators and decision-makers to expand the availability of medical services and reduce health service barriers, such as reduced patient mobility, treatment costs or carer availability.

Moreover, based on information from smartphones and other mobile devices, it is possible to deliver, in real time, interventions during people’s daily lives. Information can be utilised by clinicians, health personnel, peers or family for detailed messages and suggestions, helping the patient to control her or his cravings. In addition to real-time monitoring of factors related to SUDs, information collected by these technologies can be used to calculate the risk for new episodes of the specific maladaptive behaviour: it has been found that relapse to substance use can be predicted using information from surveys of use and risk factors in the previous weeks. Algorithms may then be developed to identify behavioural patterns indicative of treatment progress, such as treatment response and triggers for cravings and behaviour that increases the risk of relapse.

Anticipatory policy-making

Despite encouraging progress, TBIs for SUDs need to be evaluated with caution. This field of medical science still suffers from a lack of clarity and consistency. Across the research literature there are methodological difficulties, such as a lack of common definitions, selection biases, study attrition, difficulties in mounting randomised clinical trials and uncertain conclusions drawn from the findings. Supporting TBIs for SUDs by investing in research is important for a better understanding of the potential and limits of these applications. Improving the quality of research will enable effective clinical interventions, but can also help decision-makers to better understand the potential of these technologies from a public health perspective.

Given the proliferation of technology applications, a possible policy option for fostering the implementation of TBIs in SUD treatment is to provide adequate ICT infrastructure and stimulate digital literacy among healthcare professionals. Training for health personnel will become not only necessary but also multi-disciplinary in the near future. Clinicians should develop expertise in different types of media and technological interventions, developing collaborations with experts in other fields, such as cognitive psychology, ICT and communication.

TBIs for SUDs are a component of the application of ICT in healthcare (eHealth). Several barriers hamper the wider uptake of eHealth solutions in Europe, such as limited interoperability between eHealth solutions and insufficient evidence of cost-effectiveness. A legal framework applicable to mHealth tools exists, but practical implementation brings forward questions about how specific software should be classified and thus which rules should apply. Another barrier to wider uptake of digital health applications is a lack of transparency regarding the utilisation of data collected by such applications. A privacy code of conduct for mHealth apps is currently being developed, because the issue of ambiguous data collection may render the implementation of online therapy for SUDs incompatible with health professionals’ ethical duty to protect their patients’ privacy and to guarantee patient confidentiality.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if we could fight drug addiction with digital technology?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg with Simon Schroecker,

© Argus / Fotolia

At the special European Council (Article 50) meeting on 10 April 2019, Heads of State or Government agreed to further extend the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 at the latest. This goes beyond the request made by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, for that period to be extended until 30 June 2019, but represents only half of the time period some European Council members had been seeking to offer. The compromise found, which maintains unity amongst the EU-27, is designed to reduce as much as possible the disruptive effects of the Brexit negotiations on EU affairs at the start of the new institutional cycle. With the longer extension period – and if the Withdrawal Agreement, already rejected three times by the UK Parliament, is not ratified by 22 May – the UK will be required to organise European elections. The decision adopted by the EU-27 also confirms that, during this period, the UK remains a Member State with all its rights and obligations. Under this extension, several different scenarios are all still possible: ratifying the current deal, ‘no deal’, another referendum or revoking Article 50. However, the decision preclude any changes to the Withdrawal Agreement. Progress in the ratification process in the UK will be reviewed at the European Council meeting on 20-21 June.

1. The UK request to further extend the Article 50 negotiation period

On 21 March 2019, the EU-27 Heads of State or Government had agreed to a first request by the UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, for an extension of the Article 50 period, deciding to postpone Brexit until 22 May 2019, provided that the Withdrawal Agreement were approved by the House of Commons by 29 March. If not approved, the extension would end on 12 April, with the UK required to indicate a way forward before that date. As the House of Commons rejected the Withdrawal Agreement for the third time, on 29 March 2019, the 22 May extension was no longer valid. On 5 April, the UK Prime Minister sent a letter to the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, in which she requested the UK’s withdrawal to be delayed until 30 June 2019. In her letter, she argued that, without this further extension, the United Kingdom would leave the European Union without a deal on 12 April 2019. She also made the case that she was now seeking a consensus across the House of Commons, and therefore, had met with the leader of the opposition with the aim of agreeing on ‘a proposal that can be put before the House of Commons which allows the United Kingdom to leave the European Union with a deal’.

2. The European Council (Article 50) meeting

On 10 April, EU-27 Heads of State or Government met to deliberate on the consequences which an extension beyond 22 May, as requested by the UK Prime Minister, would have on the forthcoming European elections and on EU decision-making. Following an exchange of views with the President of the European Parliament, Antonio Tajani, the EU-27 Heads of State or Government listened to Theresa May’s presentation of the state of play of the ratification process in the UK, and to her arguments in favour of a further extension.

Extension period

After lengthy discussions amongst the EU-27, between those seeking a longer extension period – possibly until the end of 2019 or even the end of March 2020 – and others, in particular the President of France, Emmanuel Macron, who were more critical of a long extension period, the Heads of State or Government adopted a decision to extend the Article 50 period, but not until 30 June, as requested by the UK Prime Minister. The compromise found grants the United Kingdom a six-month flexible extension of the Article 50 period, which ‘should last only as long as necessary and, in any event, no longer than 31 October 2019’. This flexibility means that the extension could be terminated at any time before 31 October, once the Withdrawal Agreement has been ratified. The UK would then leave the EU on the first day of the following month. Theresa May agreed to this flexible extension, since ‘the extension can be terminated when the Withdrawal Agreement has been ratified’. She nevertheless underlined that she believes that ‘we need to leave the EU, with a deal, as soon as possible’.

In advance of the meeting, Donald Tusk had already argued against a short extension until 30 June and for granting a ‘flexible extension, which would last only as long as necessary and no longer than one year’. The advantage of this approach would be, in his view, to avoid both an accidental ‘no-deal’ Brexit as well as repeated Brexit summits. Furthermore, it would allow the extension to terminate automatically, as soon as both sides had ratified the Withdrawal Agreement, and could also ‘allow the UK to rethink its Brexit strategy’.

The date of 31 October 2019 has most likely been chosen in order to complete the Brexit process before the entry into office of the new Commission on 1 November. The aim was thus to limit as much as possible further disruption to EU affairs at the start of the new institutional cycle – beyond the existing uncertainty arising with regard to the European elections, notably as to the effective composition of the new European Parliament.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: The President, Antonio Tajani, stressed that the key question was not the length of the extension, but whether it served a clear purpose. It should not be used for negotiations on further relations or to reopen the withdrawal agreement, but ‘must be designed to resolve the issue meaningfully’.

European Parliament elections

The European Council decision provides that, ‘if the United Kingdom is still a Member State on 23-26 May 2019, and if it has not ratified the Withdrawal Agreement by 22 May 2019, it will be under an obligation to hold the elections to the European Parliament in accordance with Union law‘. The UK Prime Minister stressed again her preference to agree on the Withdrawal Agreement in the House of Commons before 22 May, so that the UK would not have to participate in the European elections. The European Council’s decision specifies that ‘if it fails to live up to this obligation, the withdrawal will take place on 1 June 2019’.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: Antonio Tajani underlined the importance of any extension for the European Parliament. ‘The European elections are not a game, and they must not be made to look like one thanks to the casual attitude that some in the UK may choose to take towards them’. The President emphasised the importance of genuine participation of the United Kingdom in the European elections, as they are the basis for the efficiency and integrity of the European Parliament and the EU.

Membership rights and sincere cooperation

During the extension period, the United Kingdom will remain a Member State with full rights and obligations in accordance with Article 50 TEU. The other Member States expect ‘the United Kingdom to act in a constructive and responsible manner throughout the extension period in accordance with the duty of sincere cooperation’, and expect ‘the United Kingdom to fulfil this commitment and Treaty obligation in a manner that reflects its situation as a withdrawing Member State. To this effect, the United Kingdom shall facilitate the achievement of the Union’s tasks and shall refrain from any measure which could jeopardise the attainment of the Union’s objectives, in particular when participating in the decision-making processes of the Union.’ The summit conclusions specify that, during the extension period, ‘the EU27 will continue to meet separately … to discuss matters related to the situation after the withdrawal of the UK’.

Following the meeting, the President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, expressed the Commission’s satisfaction with the outcome of the meeting, and President Tusk called upon ‘our British friends not to waste the time’ given by this extension, and to seek ‘to find the best possible solution’.

3. Outlook

Even after granting this new ‘flexible extension’ all the possible scenarios, including ratifying the current deal, ‘no deal’, another referendum or revoking Article 50 are all still possible. However, the EU-27 leaders clearly indicated that the extension ‘cannot be used to start negotiations on the future relationship’. They also indicated that in case the position of the United Kingdom were to evolve, they would be prepared ‘to reconsider the Political Declaration on the future relationship in accordance with the positions and principles stated in its guidelines and statements, including as regards the territorial scope of the future relationship. President Tusk stressed that ‘until the end of this period, the UK will also have the possibility to revoke Article 50 and cancel Brexit altogether’. Recent polls show that in case of a second referendum, ‘remain’ would be more likely to win, although the margins remain close.

The European Council will review progress at its meeting on 20-21 June 2019. President Tusk clarified that this date is not a ‘cliff edge’, as the aim for this meeting would not be to have a discussion, but only to inform the EU-27 of the current situation and the state of play in the ratification process. With the extension agreed at the special meeting, the possible ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement would most probably only take place after the new European Parliament has started its activity.

Main messages of the President of the European Parliament: Antonio Tajani, expressed the hope that an agreement could soon be reached between the British government and the opposition, preferably including a more ambitious political declaration on future relations. Prior to the meeting, the European Parliament had already stated its support for ‘an upgrading of the political declaration, that could include participation in either the customs union or the single market, in full compliance with EU principles – indivisibility of the four freedoms, integrity of the single market and autonomy of EU decision-making.’

Read the complete briefing on ‘Outcome of the Special European Council (Article 50) meeting, 10 April 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Christian Salm,

Between 23 and 26 May 2019, 350 million European Union (EU) citizens have the opportunity to vote for Members of the European Parliament. It will be the ninth time that EU citizens can vote directly for the policy- and decision-makers who will represent them in EU politics. Direct elections to the European Parliament are consequently one of the most important events in the EU political cycle. Moreover, with Brexit and other challenges to overcome before the new Parliament can be constituted, many EU observers attach a special significance to this ninth election in the history of direct European elections. Before the elections take place therfore is a good time to look back to the very first direct election to the European Parliament, held forty years ago, in 1979. A history roundtable, jointly organised by EPRS, the European University Institute (EUI) and the Association of Former Members of the European Parliament (FMA); took place on 3 April 2019 to recall this occasion, and to discuss the Parliament’s past as a new political institution in the making.

The roundtable brought together former Presidents and former Members of the European Parliament, as well asnd academics from the field of EU politics and history. EPRS Director-General, Anthony Teasdale, opened the roundtable, emphasising the importance of raising the awareness of the Parliament’s past, and its presence as a political institution that has gained substantial decision-making powers since the first direct election in 1979. In this context, he underlined the role of former Presidents and former Members as key players in maintaining Parliament’s public profile, and influencing debates on EU politics in the Member States. He also mentioned that increased historical research on the Parliament is needed to close the gaps in Parliament’s history. More studies should be carried out, along the lines of a recent EPRS research project on Parliament’s culture, role, and impact during the first two directly-elected Parliaments from 1979 to 1989. The results of this EPRS research project were presented in the first panel discussion of the history roundtable.

Researching the Parliament’s character, composition and culture in the 1980s, Birte Wassenberg (Professor of Contemporary History at the University of Strasbourg) stressed three key elements of the EP in that decade. She described, firstly, how Parliament’s inter-groups such as the Kangaroo Group, an association created in 1979 as an informal gathering of members of the European institutions from different countries and political affiliations, contributed to creating a European family. Secondly, she pointed to the effects of the Parliament’s working culture on Members, including those with an Eurosceptic view. Thirdly, she underlined the Parliament’s engagement in the fight for women’s rights, exemplified by the election of Simon Veil as President of the first directly-elected Parliament.

Exploring Parliament’s policies on the institutional reform of the European Communities in the 1980s, Wolfram Kaiser (Professor of European Studies at the University of Portsmouth) explained how the Parliament fulfilled key functions in building the present-day EU. He argued that these functions included defining a set of criteria for effective and democratic governance and developing legal concepts such as subsidiarity. Moreover, he argued that the Parliament pressured the Member States into accepting greater institutional deepening and more powers for the Parliament in the 1986 Single European Art and the 1992 Maastricht Treaty.

Inquiring into the Parliament’s role in the development and implementation of the single market programme (1979 to 1989), Laurent Warlouzet (Professor of Contemporary History at the Université de Boulogne) addressed various ways the Parliament affected the policy-making process behind the programme. He outlined, for example, that the Parliament exercised intellectual influence by developing and using the notion of the ‘cost of non-Europe’, a concept used to quantify the potential efficiency gains to be made for the European economy through pursuing further integration and harmonisation in various European policy fields. Furthermore, he demonstrated that the Parliament set and shaped the Community’s economic agenda, as for example in case of the ‘relaunch of Europe’ initiative, with the aim to overcome economically disadvantaged Member States’ situations in the 1980s. Finally, he pointed out how the Parliament pushed the Commission to act with regard to the implementation of the single market programme.

Moderated by the Director of the EU Archives at the EUI, Dieter Schlenker, the second panel gathered four former Parliament Presidents and one former Parliament Vice-President: Charlotte Cederschiöld (Vice-President and Chair of Conciliation 2001-2001), Enrique Barón Crespo (President 1989-1992), Klaus Hänsch (President 1994-1997), Pat Cox (President 2002-2004), and Hans-Gert Pöttering (President 2007-2009). The panel of influential actors in the EP’s history reflected on the forty years of direct elections and emphasised that, despite being complex, the EU’s decision-making systems are democratic, thanks in part to the direct elections to the European Parliament. Moreover, they underlined that, within the last four decades, the Parliament has changed and developed tremendously, becoming a legislative maker equal to the Council. They also addressed possible challenges for constituting the Parliament after the election in May 2019. Here, they particularly mentioned the possible increase of Eurosceptic representation. Asked to provide a slogan for the European elections to come, Pat Cox referred to a quote by one of the EU founding fathers, Jean Monnet: ‘Ce qui est important, ce n’est, ni d’être optimiste, ni pessimiste, mais d’être déterminé‘, adding that: ‘The Parliament is determined to succeed in the next election.’

Click to view slideshow.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for scouts.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© James Steidl / Fotolia

Are you, or is someone you know, one of the 40 million recognised members of the scouting movement worldwide? Then you will already know that scouts in Europe and worldwide are committed to contributing to build a better world where people are self-fulfilled as individuals and play a constructive role in society.

Over 1.7 million scouts are active in Europe. The European Scout Region, co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme, numbers 41 national scout organisations, under the umbrella of the World Organisation of the Scout Movement. The World Association of Girl Guides and Girl Scouts, also co-funded by the Erasmus+ programme, reaches more than 1.2 million young girls throughout Europe. There are several other scout organisations operating at European level, including, for example the Confederation of European Scouts and the Union Internationale des Guides et Scouts d’Europe.

According to their Vision for Scouting 2023, scouting will be the world’s leading educational youth movement by 2023, enabling 100 million young people to be active citizens who create positive change in their communities and in the world, based on shared values.

The EU Youth Strategy for 2010-2018 promotes youth participation in society. Among the key points are the recognition of informal learning and of volunteer work, both of which figure large in scouting activities. Erasmus+ is the funding programme for youth in the EU budget, and brings together funding for scouting, education and exchange under the Erasmus, European Voluntary Service, Youth in Action, and Life-Long Learning programmes.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘Youth empowerment [Ten issues to watch in 2018]’, 2018 https://epthinktank.eu/2018/01/10/youth-empowerment-ten-issues-to-watch-in-2018/
• EPRS publication ‘How the EU Budget is spent: Erasmus+’, 2016, https://epthinktank.eu/2016/11/23/how-the-eu-budget-is-spent-erasmus/
• EUROPEAN SCOUT REGION, Facts and Numbers https://www.scout.org/europe

© Zerbor / Fotolia

The EU budget corresponds to around 2 % of total public spending in the European Union, and its impact on the economy is debated, with many analysts deeming it relatively small in size in comparison with the wide range of policy areas in which the EU has responsibilities. However, the EU budget has features that can amplify its impact, starting with the underpinning idea that pooling resources at EU level can be more efficient and effective in a number of policy areas than individual expenditure by Member States.

For those interested in knowing more about the EU budget, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) has produced a series of publications on ‘How the EU budget is spent’. The aim is to give a concise overview of the key features of major EU spending programmes and funds for the 2014-2020 period, including: the role of the EU in the policy area, objectives, budgetary figures, eligible measures, funded projects and assessment of results.

The titles in the series show the variety of activities currently funded from the EU budget, giving a taste of the role that these measures play for citizens, business and public authorities across the EU and beyond. The series was launched in 2015 with a publication on the LIFE programme, which supports projects addressing environment- and climate-related issues. In 2019, seven new titles have been published, and these include analysis of instruments such as the European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) and the European Fund for Strategic Development (EFSD) that were agreed after the start of the 2014-2020 period, to address specific challenges.

Ahead of the European Parliament’s last plenary session of the 2014-2019 parliamentary term, all the publications in the series are now collected in this compendium to provide a handy overview of current EU funding instruments. While the series is not exhaustive, it covers instruments accounting for most of the expenditure side of the EU budget in the 2014-2020 period. The funds and programmes are presented according to the current structure of the EU’s multi-year financial planning – the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for the years 2014 to 2020 – and the order of the programmes in official budgetary documents produced by the European Commission.

In addition, an annex sets out and updates the budgetary figures, for all the programmes and funds covered in the compendium, for the entire 2014-2020 period. The allocations set in the original legal bases have evolved – slightly or significantly. Depending on the budgetary instruments, these changes have come for different reasons. For example, while technical adjustments and updates of Member States’ cohesion policy envelopes are built into the MFF, the unexpected migration and refugee crisis of 2015-2016 has led to the reinforcement of the resources allocated to the Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) through the use of the flexibility provisions of the framework.

Against the background of the ongoing negotiations for the post-2020 MFF and the vibrant debate on the future of EU finances, this compendium offers a simple tool to understand better the starting point of those discussions.

Read the compendium on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Spending programmes under the 2014-2020 Multiannual Financial Framework‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for people interested in artificial intelligence.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© Gorodenkoff / Fotolia

Unless you are a robot yourself, you are probably either fascinated or appalled by the prospects of artificial intelligence (AI). No longer limited to science-fiction, artificial intelligence is already a fact in our daily life, through speech recognition, driverless cars, medical diagnosis, etc. AI takes away some tasks from us. This might be for the better, when machines perform routine work and helps us concentrate on more interesting tasks, or appreciate extra leisure time. However, this might also be for the worse, as automation may lead to replacing humans at work. Changes to the way we manage our time, and perhaps earn less money, have to be considered carefully. Moreover, trusting ‘things’ with the power to decide on our behalf – on the road or at the hospital – implies a thorough revision of our ethical and legal frameworks.

A wide range of activities have to be ready for the shift to AI. We need a collective strategy to tackle changes in the education system, job market, health services, and road safety rules. The EU approach addresses all three dimensions of the artificial intelligence revolution. The EU and Member States are committed to: boost public and private investment to harness research and development; support the adaptation of education and training systems; and reflect on future ethics and legal guidelines. The 2018 General Data Protection Regulation has already cleared the way for a more transparent use of our data by automated systems and their developers. Let’s continue to be smarter than artificial intelligence!

Further information

• European Commission, website on artificial intelligence, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/artificial-intelligence
• European Commission, factsheet ‘Artificial intelligence for Europe’, https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/factsheet-artificial-intelligence-europe
• EPRS blog, STOA workshop ‘Should we fear the future? Is it rational to be optimistic about artificial intelligence?’, 2017, https://epthinktank.eu/2017/10/30/is-it-rational-to-be-optimistic-about-artificial-intelligence/

Written by Clare Ferguson,

© European Parliament / P.Naj-Oleari

Unsurprisingly, the agenda for this final plenary session of Parliament’s 2014-2019 term will deal with a range of issues that are emblematic of the major themes that have marked this eighth legislature.

EU policy on migration was always high on this Parliament’s agenda, and two files scheduled for debate on Wednesday afternoon deal with issues linked to future migration policy. Parliament is expected to take a position on the provisional agreement to strengthen the European Border and Coast Guard, including measures to engage 5 000 EU border guards (from January 2021), with a further 5 000 operational staff in operation by 2027, including a ‘rapid response’ team. The changes aim to ensure the same high border-management standards throughout the EU, and to provide more support for national authorities involved in managing migration and the fight against cross-border crime at the EU’s external borders. Members will then turn to consider the revision of the EU Visa Code, which would increase the visa fee to €80; simplify the procedures for requesting visas and harmonise multiple-entry visa rules. The proposals also seek to ensure that non-EU countries cooperate in readmitting their illegally staying nationals.

The financial crisis and the challenges of the shift to digital processes have affected EU citizens and businesses alike. Digitalisation and an ageing population have brought about major changes in the EU labour market in recent decades, leading to unfair employment practices such as ‘zero hours’ contracts. On Tuesday morning, Members will debate proposals to reform labour market rules, to ensure transparent and predictable working conditions in the EU. Parliament’s Employment and Social Affairs Committee wants to ensure that employers provide timely information for their employees, respect probationary periods and set out working conditions for those who work non-standard schedules. A proposal for a regulation on promoting fairness and transparency for business users of online intermediation services returns to the agenda on Tuesday afternoon, seeking fairer contractual relations between online giants (such as Amazon and Google) and other online businesses (such as hotels or restaurants). Encouraging fair competition between businesses, as well as protecting consumers’ health and safety, is behind proposals on the market surveillance and compliance of products, which Members will debate on Tuesday afternoon. The proposals seek greater coordination of rules on market surveillance of harmonised industrial products, which represent 69 % of the overall value of industrial products in the internal market. On Wednesday night, Members will debate an agreement on measures to improve the use of digital tools and processes in company law. Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee wants to see stronger measures throughout the EU to make it easier to set up and register a business, including greater use of online submission for official company documentation.

The pharmaceuticals sector is an important source of jobs and growth in the EU. On Tuesday evening, Members will consider a compromise on proposals to improve the intellectual property rights regime for the industry, which suffers from competitive disadvantage in export markets. Due to the lengthy testing and trials necessary to obtain EU market approval, pharmaceuticals firms can extend the patent protection on their products through a supplementary protection certificate (SPC) for medicinal products. The proposal would allow EU-based companies who do not hold the rights within the EU to manufacture generic or biosimilar versions of medicines still under SPC protection inside the EU, providing this is done exclusively for export to a non-EU market, or for stockpiling in anticipation of the patent protection’s expiry. The new rules could lead to €1 billion annual net additional export sales, create new jobs, and allow better access to quality and affordable medicine.

Over the current legislature, controversy has also erupted on more than one occasion on environmental issues, not least over the way in which products and substances are authorised (and renewed) for use in the EU. Members will vote to adopt Parliament’s position on an agreement concerning the transparency and sustainability of risk assessment in the food chain on Tuesday afternoon, which are a direct follow-up to citizens’ demands, notably regarding a ban on glyphosate. The current proposals would improve public access to the scientific studies carried out on sensitive products and substances. Against the background of emissions scandals and warnings about the deteriorating climate change situation during this legislature, the review of the Clean Vehicles Directive has shown poor results to date. Members will debate a proposal on Wednesday night that should tighten up definitions of clean road transport vehicles and set stronger emissions thresholds. Immediately afterwards, Parliament debates an agreed text setting CO2 emission performance standards for new heavy-duty vehicles, such as buses, trucks and trailers, at 15 % lower than current standards. Such issues often come to light thanks to whistle-blowers. On Monday evening, Members will debate EU proposals to give whistle-blowers greater protection when they report on breaches of EU law (such as money laundering, or contravening environmental or food safety regulations), where the situation varies greatly between EU countries. However, the Parliament’s Legal Affairs Committee insists the measures should be stronger, including that journalists and non-governmental organisations can enjoy anonymity and legal protection when reporting on whistle-blowing.

An EU success story – the key role played by the Horizon 2020 programme in the first ever observation of a black hole – underlines the importance of EU research funding. The EU is proposing to replace this successful programme when it ends in December 2020 with the Horizon Europe package. In a joint debate on Tuesday afternoon, Members will consider a report on proposals to establish and implement the Horizon Europe programme that encourages an even more ambitious programme, not least because it could generate some 100 000 new jobs, as well as to allocate 35 % of the Horizon Europe budget to climate objectives.

Members will also discuss a number of finance-related issues, with a joint debate on banking reform and financial supervision, and several other financial issues. Among these, Members will debate collective investment funds – which pool investor capital for investment in collective securities portfolios – in a joint debate on Monday afternoon. While the EU provides passporting possibilities to ensure a wide range of cross-border distribution of investment funds, at present, little advantage is taken of these opportunities in a market that remains relatively small and predominantly national. The proposals under consideration would align national requirements and harmonise verification, creating economies of scale, reducing investors’ fees and opening up the market. In addition, the current prudential supervision and requirements of investment firms, which facilitate savings and investment throughout the EU’s capital markets, is too complex and inefficient. Members will also debate proposals on Monday night to update the EU regulatory framework for investment firms, taking account of the size and nature of investment firms and the risks involved. In a joint debate on Wednesday night, Members will discuss a compromise on proposals on covered bonds – debt securities issued by credit institutions, secured by a pool of mortgage loans or public sector debt. Covered bonds provide vital long-term finance for many EU Member States, channelling funds to the property market and the public sector. However, both use and regulation of these bonds varies greatly between EU countries, and a common definition is lacking.

Having been postponed again, to 31 October 2019, Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the state of play of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Latvia, Krišjānis Kariņš will attend plenary on Wednesday morning, for the last debate in the series on the future of Europe.

Turning to the details of how EU laws are decided on Wednesday evening, Members will debate proposals on a revision that would adapt legal acts to the Treaty of Lisbon. The proposal aligns ‘regulatory procedure with scrutiny‘ (RPS) measures, from 64 basic acts, with the delegated acts procedure, where European Parliament and the Council have the right of veto and may revoke the delegation. However, agreement on a further 104 acts, and on acts in the justice policy field, will have to wait until the new legislative term.

Finally, the European elections for the ninth European Parliament are approaching fast. Members will hear a Commission statement on Tuesday afternoon on protecting the integrity of the European elections, particularly considering international threats to cybersecurity.

A list of all material prepared for this Plenary Session: Covered bonds: Issue and supervision, exposures (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Adapting legal acts to Articles 290 and 291 TFEU (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Revision of the Visa Code (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Digital tools and processes in company law (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Establishing and implementing Horizon Europe (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Protection of whistle-blowers (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) Food chain risk assessment transparency (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL) European Border and Coast Guard (available in DE – EN – ES – FR – IT – PL)

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© boldg / Fotolia

The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) celebrates its 70th anniversary in April 2019, proud of its survival, durability and historic role in ensuring peace, notably during the Cold War. However, analysts and politicians stress that the military alliance must work hard to keep pace with a changing environment and new challenges of the 21st century, both geo-strategic and technological. Another major test is an uncertain commitment to NATO of Donald Trump, the current President of the United States.

This note offers links to commentaries and studies on NATO and European defence by major international think tanks. Earlier papers on European defence, focused on a planned U.S. withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in February 2019.

NATO at 70: From triumph to tumult?
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

NATO at 70: Twilight years or a new dawn?
Centre for European Reform, April 2019

NATO just turned 70, and it’s showing its age
Carnegie Europe, April 2019

NATO at 70: Shaping the future for the next 70 years
Center for Strategic and International Studies, April 2019

NATO at 70: Celebration and introspection
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Don’t count on NATO to save liberal values
Chatham House, April 2019

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

NATO at seventy: Filling NATO’s critical defense-capability gaps
Atlantic Council, April 2019

NATO at 70: A strategic partnership for the 21st century
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

After Crimea: Does NATO have the means to defend Europe?
European Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Beyond collective defense: How NATO can lead on 21st century challenges
Atlantic Council, April 2019

Europe whole and free: Why NATO’s open door must remain open
Brookings Institution, April 2019

To preserve NATO, Britain must help reinvent it
Chatham House, April 2019

3 ways Europe is looking at a fraying NATO
German Marshall Fund, April 2019

As NATO turns 70, the European security debate comes full circle
Council on Foreign Relations, April 2019

Europe in a multipolar missile world: Why the EU and NATO should not try to salvage the INF Treaty
Egmont, April 2019

Love me today, love me tomorrow? Millennials and NATO
Brookings Institution, April 2019

Brexit makes NATO even more important for the Atlantic
Chatham House, April 2019

L’état de la relation entre la Turquie et l’OTAN : Un engagement fragilisé
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et la sécurité, March 2019

European strategic autonomy: Actors, issues, conflicts of interests
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

Time for NATO to talk about China
Carnegie Europe, March 2019

Why and how NATO should adapt to a new Mediterranean security environment
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

NATO’s pointless burden-sharing debates: The need to replace a mathematically ridiculous 2% of GDP
Center for Strategic and International Studies, February 2019

Joining forces: The way towards the European Defence Union
European Political Strategy Centre, February 2019

Towards a more stable NATO-Russia relationship
Russian International Affairs Council, European Leadership Network, February 2019

State of disunion: Europe, NATO, and disintegrating arms control
European Council on Foreign Relations, February 2019

‘Fort Trump’ or bust?: Poland and the future of European defence
Friends of Europe, January 2019

Is NATO deterrence a paper tiger?
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

Der Balkan als integraler Teil einer gemeinsamen europäischen Sicherheitsarchitektur? Sicherheit, Rolle der NATO und der Auslandseinsätze des österreichischen Bundesheeres
Austrian Institute for International Affairs, January 2019

The future of NATO: Fog over the Atlantic?
Clingendael, December 2018

Reducing the risks of conventional deterrence in Europe: Arms control in the NATO-Russia contact zones
OSCE Network of Think Tanks and Academic Institutions, December 2018

Offense as the new defense: New life for NATO’s cyber policy
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

Why the United States needs a cohesive NATO
German Marshall Fund, December 2018

Rising tensions between the West and Russia: what role for arms control?
Cligendael, December 2018

NATO needs a European level of ambition
Rand Corporation, December 2018

Rising tensions between the West and Russia: What role for arms control?
Clingendael, December 2018

NATO priorities after the Brussels summit
Atlantic Council, November 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2018

Spending to defend: NATO and the EU’s new budget
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

EU-NATO relations: A long-term perspective
Egmont, November 2018

Strategic autonomy: towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2018

NATO’s return to the North Atlantic: Implications for the defense of Northern Europe
Finnish Institute of International Relations, November 2018

NATO‘s northeast quartet: Prospects and opportunities for Baltic-Polish defence cooperation
International Centre for Defence and Security, November 2018

The erosion of strategic stability and the future of arms control in Europe
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018

The challenges of NATO nuclear policy: Alliance management under the Trump administration
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, October 2018

Pointing to the emerging Soviet dead ends:-NATO analysis of the Soviet economy, 1971-1982
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, October 2018

NATO in the Trump era: Surviving the crisis
Clingendael, September 2018

NATO after the Brussels summit: Bruised or emboldened?
German Marshall Fund, September 2018

Hard lessons from Brussels: The key challenges facing NATO
Institute for Foreign Affairs and Trade, September 2018

Russia and the Baltics: A testing ground for NATO–EU defence cooperation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

Debating security plus: Conflict, competition and cooperation in an interconnected world
Friends of Europe, September 2018

Germany and European defence cooperation: A post-Atlantic turn?
Finnish Institute of International Cooperation, September 2018

NATO’s deterrence problem: An analog strategy for a digital age
Council on Foreign Relations, August 2018

Rediscovering geography in NATO defence planning
Egmont, August 2018

Read this briefing on ‘NATO at 70‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafał Mańko,

© BigNazik / Fotolia

Member States share an obligation with the EU to protect the Union’s financial interests and to counter fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting them under Article 325 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), on which the EU anti-fraud programme is based. According to a 2016 Eurobarometer survey, 75 % of EU citizens would like the EU to intervene more in the fight against tax fraud, making it one of the areas with the strongest support for greater EU involvement. At the same time, two thirds of EU citizens evaluate the current EU activity in the fight against fraud as insufficient. This Briefing focuses on two EU programmes within the remit of the fight against fraud: Pericles 2020 and Hercule III, as well as the anti-fraud information system (AFIS) platform (a further two crucial programmes in this area, Customs 2020 and Fiscalis 2020, are the subject of a separate briefing in this series).

Pericles 2020 is a multiannual programme to promote action on the protection and safeguarding of the euro against counterfeiting and related fraud. Pericles 2020’s added value is that it actively encourages an increase in transnational cooperation to protect the euro inside and outside the Union and with the Union’s trading partners. Pericles 2020 also has an international dimension, to address the situation in those Member States or third countries that have the highest rates of euro counterfeiting. The general objective of Pericles 2020, defined in Article 3 of Regulation 331/2014, is to prevent and combat counterfeiting and related fraud, thus enhancing the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and securing the sustainability of public finances. The specific objective of the programme is to protect euro banknotes and coins against counterfeiting and related fraud by supporting and supplementing the measures undertaken by the Member States and assisting the competent national and Union authorities in their efforts to develop close and regular cooperation and an exchange of best practice, where appropriate including third countries and international organisations. In 2018, the Pericles 2020 programme funded a number of actions, for a total of €993 388.74, including providing training and specialised anti-counterfeiting equipment.

The Hercule III programme aims at supporting the combat against irregularities, fraud and corruption that affect the EU budget. The general objective is to protect the financial interests of the Union, enhancing the competitiveness of the Union’s economy and ensuring the protection of taxpayers’ money. More specifically, the programme seeks to prevent and combat fraud, corruption and any other illegal activities affecting the financial interests of the Union. The latest available detailed information on spending under the Hercule III programme is for 2017. In that year, the programme financed, inter alia, grants concerning cigarettes and investigation support, and the procurement of IT databases and tools, tobacco analysis, technical equipment, and grants for anti-fraud, forensics and legal training.

The EU anti-fraud information system (AFIS) is simply a collection of applications that facilitate the exchange of anti-fraud information between OLAF and competent administrations in the framework of the Mutual Assistance Regulation (515/97). These applications include: AFIS Mailing (structured & unstructured communications); Customs Information System (CIS); FIDE System; Mutual Information System with the Russian Federation (MIS); virtual-OCU supporting Joint Surveillance Operations, and WCO-CigInfo system for the exchange of data relating to cigarette seizures between the Member States and the World Customs Organization (via OLAF). The AFIS platform also provides the irregularity management system (IMS) – a secure electronic tool for the reporting, management and analysis of irregularities, including fraud, that affect the financial interests of the EU. Competent national authorities use the IMS to report irregularities relating to EU funds in agriculture, structural and cohesion policy, fisheries, asylum-related funds, and the Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived, as well as in pre-accession assistance.

On 30 May 2018, the European Commission published a proposal for a regulation establishing an EU anti-fraud programme under the new 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework (MFF). The proposal entails grouping the Hercule III programme with the anti-fraud information system (AFIS) and irregularity management system (IMS) operational activities (the latter is currently financed through AFIS). Under the proposed new programme, the operational provisions of AFIS and IMS would remain under their respective legal instruments, with only the financing provisions of AFIS transferred to the new EU anti-fraud programme regulation. This new financing arrangement for AFIS would cover all actions currently financed under AFIS, including IMS. IMS would become a stand-alone action to be financed under the new regulation, thereby uncoupling it from AFIS, as is currently the case.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: Fight against fraud: Pericles 2020, Hercule III and AFIS‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Denise Chircop,

© ocon10 / Fotolia

The proportion of young people (15-29 years old) in the general EU population is declining. On the whole, young people have a higher level of education than older adults, and youth unemployment rates have begun to decrease. Nevertheless, young people are still more exposed to poverty and social exclusion than other sections of the population. They are less prone to put their health at risk than previous generations. For instance, fewer young people smoke, get drunk, or become involved in a road accident than previously, but young people are still over-represented among those who are injured in road accidents. Obesity due to bad eating habits and lack of physical exercise is still an issue. Young people are also less likely to vote, or stand for election than older adults, but in recent years there has been a slight increase in interest in politics, political action and volunteering. Almost 80 % of young Europeans identify themselves as European citizens. In a Eurobarometer survey published in 2018 they placed education, skills and the environment at the top of a list of priorities for the EU.

The European Union is engaged in helping Member States address young people’s needs and aspirations through a youth strategy which covers areas such as employment, entrepreneurship, social inclusion, participation, education, training, health, wellbeing, voluntary activities, the global dimension, creativity and culture. The strategy is backed by a number of funding programmes that are specifically focused on young people, most notably the Youth Employment Initiative, Erasmus+ and the European Solidarity Corps. It also draws from funds directed at other specific policy areas. EU action in the area of youth empowerment is best known for the mobility opportunities it has created, in particular through Erasmus. Future challenges include reaching a wider spectrum of young people, especially those from disadvantaged and hard-to-reach groups, making the results of the consultative process, known as structured dialogue, more tangible, and improving synergies between policy areas for greater effectiveness.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Youth empowerment‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Eric Pichon,

© A.Hartung / Fotolia

European Union (EU) action beyond its borders often requires a combination of approaches. The EU Treaties differentiate between common foreign and security policy (CFSP), common security and defence policy (CSDP), external action, and the external dimension of internal policies, but in the field, issues are so intertwined that more often than not a single tool is not sufficient. For example, population displacement triggered by a conflict over natural resources has to be addressed by humanitarian aid, itself secured by a CSDP mission, and its effects mitigated by adequate migration and development policies, while peace talks are conducted. Coordination between all stakeholders is challenging but vital, not only as a response but also for prevention.

In order to address new challenges such as climate change, rising insecurity or new migration patterns, the EU has put forward concrete solutions to shape synergy between the actors, in order to use shared expertise more effectively, and to find new sources of funding. The new foreign policy framework (EU global strategy) is designed to map the tools and resources best designed to help society as a whole, in the EU and partner countries, to withstand natural and manmade shocks more effectively. This means making connections between actors and between traditionally separate policy areas. Budgetary constraints and the will to depart from a donor/recipient relationship have also resulted in innovative financing tools, using EU funds to leverage private investments.

Two years since its launch, the global strategy has proved to be a coherent vision. Nevertheless, sturdy, comprehensive external action requires coordination at all levels. In the years to come, global instability is expected to rise; the challenge for the EU will be to ensure security while upholding the core values of the Treaties – human rights, democracy and the fight against poverty – as its primary objectives on the global stage.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Foreign policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp, Gianluca Sgueo and Sofija Voronova,

© Sean K / Fotolia

Faced with a growing international terrorist threat, the European Union (EU) is playing an ever more ambitious role in counter-terrorism. Even though primary responsibility for combating crime and ensuring security lies with the Member States, the EU provides cooperation, coordination and (to some extent) harmonisation tools as well as financial support to address this borderless phenomenon. Moreover, the assumption that there is a connection between development and stability, as well as between internal and external security, has come to shape EU action beyond its own borders.

EU spending in the area of counter-terrorism has increased over the years and is set to grow in the future, to allow for better cooperation between national law enforcement authorities and enhanced support by the EU bodies in charge of security, such as Europol and eu-LISA. Financing for cooperation with third countries has also increased, including through the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

The many new rules and instruments that have been adopted since 2014 range from harmonising definitions of terrorist offences and sanctions, and sharing information and data, to protecting borders, countering terrorist financing, and regulating firearms. To evaluate the efficiency of the existing tools and identify gaps and possible ways forward, the European Parliament set up a Special Committee on Terrorism (TERR), which delivered its report in November 2018. TERR made extensive recommendations for immediate or longer term actions aiming to prevent terrorism, combat its root causes, protect EU citizens and assist victims in the best possible way.

In line with these recommendations, future EU counter-terrorism action will most probably focus on addressing existing and new threats, countering radicalisation – including by preventing the spread of terrorist propaganda online – and enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure. Foreseeable developments also include increased information sharing, with planned interoperability between EU security- and border-related databases, as well as investigation and prosecution of terrorist crimes at EU level, through the proposed extension of the mandate of the recently established European Public Prosecutor’s Office.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: The fight against terrorism‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© magele-picture / Fotolia

An investment gap in the European Union (EU) persisting several years after the financial and economic crisis is one of the various challenges confronting the EU’s multiannual financial framework (MFF) for the years 2014 to 2020 since its beginning. The European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI) was created in 2015 to provide the EU budget’s contribution to addressing this challenge, as part of the broader investment plan for Europe.

Following its extension and reinforcement in 2017, EFSI currently aims to trigger additional investment worth €500 billion in sectors of the EU’s economy that suffer from market failures and sub-optimal investment situations by 2020. The concept of additionality is closely linked to the fund. This means that EFSI-backed operations should be viable financing and investment activities that could not have taken place, or not to the same extent, without EFSI.

EFSI focuses on various crucial sectors that can provide a significant contribution to job creation and sustainable growth in the EU, such as strategic infrastructure, education, research, development and innovation, renewable energy, and resource efficiency. Another major objective is to improve access to finance for European companies, with special attention paid to smaller businesses.

The functioning of EFSI relies on a strategic partnership with the European Investment Bank (EIB) Group, which can approve and finance investment operations with a higher-risk profile than its usual portfolio, thanks to a €26 billion guarantee provided by the EU budget under EFSI. In addition, the contribution from the EIB’s own resources to EFSI is worth €7.5 billion.

When putting the proposals forward for the investment plan for Europe, the European Commission estimated that each euro of public resources allocated to EFSI (i.e. EU guarantee obligations and the contribution from the EIB’s own resources) should generate, on average, €15 of total investment, by triggering additional financing from other private and/or public sources (the ‘multiplier effect’).

The EU guarantee obligations enable the EIB Group to deploy a wide range of financial instruments supported by EFSI, such as equity-, debt- and guarantee-type products. Relevant activities include the use of already existing financial instruments supported by the EU budget, at a higher and faster rate. Targeting the diverse needs of sectors, countries and individual projects is possible thanks to the variety of options offered.

The various EFSI-backed financial products are available under two investment windows that reflect EFSI’s two overarching objectives. The EIB implements the infrastructure and investment window (IIW) that stimulates strategic investment in various sectors, while the European Investment Fund (EIF) is in charge of the SME window (SMEW) to improve access to finance for small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and small mid-cap companies.

As of 5 February 2019, approved EFSI financing amounted to €71.4 billion (of which 75 % through the EIB and 25 % through the EIF), and was projected to trigger a total investment of some €380 billion. Almost three quarters of the investment relates to operations in three of the sectors supported by EFSI: smaller companies (32 %); research, development and innovation (23 %); and energy (18 %).

Examples of EFSI-backed financing include: a €20 million loan to the French small firm Amoéba, which, thanks to the discovery of a natural microorganism, has developed an alternative for industrial water treatment that does not use chlorine and chemical biocides; and €40 million in financing for the development of a wind park in Bruck an der Leitha (Austria) to produce renewable energy for 27 000 households.

EFSI has been closely monitored since its outset, which confirms the interest it has attracted as a tool that can contribute to reducing the investment gap in the EU. Various assessments, including independent evaluations and a special report by the European Court of Auditors (ECA), have been produced to date.

The various evaluations agree that EFSI has successfully raised finance to support substantial additional investment in many policy sectors across the EU. Areas for action, highlighted for example in ECA recommendations, include: encouraging complementarity between EU financial instruments and EU budgetary guarantees; improving the assessment of additionality and the estimate of the investment mobilised; and increasing the geographical spread of EFSI supported investment.

Taking account of the various assessments, the European Commission concluded that EFSI has been successful in triggering significant additional investment in the EU and that its function remains relevant in the post-2020 programming period. The Commission has therefore put forward a proposal for a 2021-2027 InvestEU programme, a single investment scheme for internal Union policies that should build on EFSI and streamline the use of financial instruments supported by the EU budget. The proposed guarantee obligations for the new InvestEU Fund, part of the overall programme, amount to €38 billion with an investment target of more than €650 billion over seven years.

Read the complete briefing on ‘How the EU budget is spent: European Fund for Strategic Investments (EFSI)‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Gisela Grieger,

© bluedesign / Fotolia

With the European Parliament elections set for May 2019, the 21st EU-China Summit has been advanced, to be held in Brussels on 9 April 2019, only nine months after the previous one. The 2018 summit’s joint statement captured a broad range of deliverables that had been achieved over a three-year period, since the EU and China had failed to agree on joint statements in 2016 and 2017. Considering that not even the short-term commitments on the trade and investment agenda from 2018 have been met, that the context of US-China great power competition looms large and that the EU has adopted more assertive language in its recently issued EU-China strategic outlook, it remains to be seen whether meaningful outcomes will be reached at this year’s summit.

Major issues likely to impact the 21st EU-China Summit

The EU-China Summit 2019 will be held against the backdrop of significant uncertainty about the outcome of the US-China trade war that has taken its toll on the Chinese economy. The exact extent of the drop in Chinese GDP growth is unclear, since Chinese official data are rather a reflection of the government’s political targets than of the real economic situation, and few Chinese academics discuss their diverging calculations in public. The Chinese government has responded to the trade frictions with the US, inter alia, by shifting away from policies prioritising deleveraging back to stimulus policies, including tax cuts and infrastructure spending, and by ordering references to its ‘Made in China 2025‘ strategy to be removed from public discourse, while doubling down on achieving its objectives under new labels. The strategy seeks to achieve a high degree of self-sufficiency, and ultimately a dominant position for Chinese companies in 10 advanced technologies at home and abroad, by outcompeting firms of advanced economies. As the trade war is still a major risk and a priority for China, it is likely to continue to drag its feet in talks with the EU in areas in which it wishes to remain flexible for a trade deal with the US. A case in point is an EU-China agreement on geographical indications (GIs), talks on which should already have been finalised by October 2018. The summit will also take place at a time when China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) faces a backlash from new governments in Malaysia, the Maldives, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra Leone, and allegations of Chinese ‘debt-trap diplomacy‘ continue unabated. It will also be held at a time when the EU is rolling out its 2018 strategy on connecting Europe and Asia, focused on economic, environmental, fiscal and social sustainability, open procurement, transparency and a level playing field. Italy and Luxemburg have, however, just formally signed up to the BRI, challenging EU unity on the issue. It remains to be seen whether this complicated context will be conducive for the EU and China to make headway towards concrete deliverables under the EU-China Connectivity Platform, e.g. on the implementation of already identified pilot projects. The EU-China Summit 2019 moreover coincides with a controversial and strongly politicised debate in the West about the security, economic, and geopolitical implications of (not) involving Chinese telecom equipment vendors in the EU’s 5G networks (see EPRS ‘at a glance‘ note).

An EU policy shift to a more realistic, assertive and multi-faceted approach to China

In a fairly unusual move ahead of the forthcoming EU-China summit, on 12 March 2019, shortly before the EU-China High-Level Strategic Dialogue of 18 March, the EU published a ‘strategic outlook‘ for EU-China relations, to be debated at that week’s European Council meeting. The paper refers to a shift in the balance of challenges and opportunities the EU faces in its ties with China; it moves away from portraying China as a strategic partner towards an issue-based, differentiated framing of China as a cooperation partner, a negotiating partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival. It spells out three goals: to ‘deepen its engagement with China to promote common interests at global level’, based on clearly defined interests and principles; to ‘seek more balanced and reciprocal economic relations’; and to ‘adapt to changing economic realities and strengthen its own domestic policies and industrial base’. It sets out 10 actions, and stresses that Member States need to apply a uniform approach to China to achieve these goals.

Dealing with China’s selective engagement in favour of multilateralism

The EU and China are cooperating successfully in some multilateral formats, such as at the 24th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP24) under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Katowice in late 2018, when they pushed for stringent and uniform reporting rules to implement the Paris Agreement. However, China continues to pursue distinct policies in its bilateral ties, such as funding new coal-fired plants (for instance, in Bosnia and Herzegovina) as part of its BRI projects. By doing so, it clashes with the EU’s strategy for the Western Balkans. Other opportunities for EU engagement with China abound on global and regional issues, such as ocean governance, sustainable finance, Afghanistan, and Iran. However, China’s engagement in favour of multilateralism is at times selective, and based on a different understanding of the rules-based international order, as demonstrated by its refusal to accept the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s 2016 binding ruling on maritime features in the South China Sea. WTO reform will be a litmus test for China’s preparedness to support the revision of vital aspects of the WTO’s rulebook – such as those on industrial subsidies, state-owned enterprises, forced technology transfer, and the developing country status – which are inextricably related to its unique economic model.

Glacial progress in levelling the trade and investment playing field with China

The EU is keen to address the long-standing reciprocity gap in EU-China economic relations. According to provisional EU figures for 2018, the deficit (€185 billion) in EU-China total trade in goods (€605 billion) has continued to grow. Despite selective removals of market access barriers, such as ownership caps, China’s overall investment restrictiveness, notably in services, is still very high. The yet to be decided implementing details of the new foreign investment law, which features a negative list approach, pre-establishment national treatment provisions and a prohibition of forced technology transfer, will reveal how meaningful the law is in practice. Progress in the EU-China talks on a comprehensive agreement on investment (CAI, the EU’s main investment policy tool to level the playing field with China) has, despite 20 negotiating rounds since 2014, been glacial. It remains to be seen whether the recent adoption of the EU framework for foreign direct investment (FDI) screening and the tightening of US FDI screening and export controls will spur China’s interest in concluding the CAI by 2020, as envisaged by the EU. According to transaction-based data, in 2018 Chinese FDI flows in the EU declined considerably, but less than those in the US.

Revising competition and public procurement rules to level the playing field?

There is growing awareness in the EU of the need for a common multi-pronged policy response to the systemic competition between the EU’s market-based and China’s state-capitalist economic models. The latter pursues industrial policies heavily reliant on state-sponsored national champions that seek to acquire global leadership in advanced technologies, while being shielded from foreign competition at home. Huawei has benefited from open overseas markets to expand its global footprint, but China has the most restrictive environment for digital trade. As a review of current EU instruments is set to identify new policy responses to the distortive effects of state-subsidised foreign companies operating in the internal market, business has, inter alia, proposed a new instrument to address state-subsidised takeovers of EU companies by foreign investors as a policy option. A French-German initiative to create European champions as part of proposals for a new EU industrial policy has suffered a setback, after the proposed merger between the rail divisions of Siemens and Alstom was blocked at EU level, drawing criticism and fuelling a debate on EU industrial policy. Unblocking the revised proposal for an international procurement instrument, gridlocked in the Council, is a policy option to open third countries’ public procurement markets, including the Chinese one.

In its resolution on the state of EU-China relations, the EP called for enhanced EU engagement with China on global challenges and in support of multilateralism, building on successful cooperation on peacekeeping and anti-piracy. It stresses that China-led initiatives require a unified EU response and that the imbalance in EU-China economic ties needs to be tackled. It comments critically on the deteriorating human rights situation in China, notably in the autonomous provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang; on political and legal issues in mainland China and Hong Kong; on difficult cross-strait relations; and on China’s foreign influence operations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Towards a new EU policy approach to China: 21st EU-China Summit – April 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Read also: EU-China relations topical digest: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/EPRS/TD_China-EU_relations.pdf

Written by Carmen-Cristina Cîrlig,

© David / Fotolia

On 14 November 2018, the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom (UK) negotiators announced their approval of the legal agreement on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. At a special European Council meeting on 25 November 2018, EU leaders endorsed the draft withdrawal agreement, as well as the text of a non-binding political declaration setting out the framework for the future EU-UK relationship. While the process of approving the withdrawal deal (the agreement and the political declaration) began rapidly in both the UK and the EU, it immediately met with significant difficulties in the UK. In particular, the House of Commons’ rejection of the withdrawal deal in the ‘meaningful vote’ of 15 January 2019, led to renewed UK attempts at renegotiation. Although the EU and the UK eventually agreed additional guarantees with respect to the Ireland/Northern Ireland backstop, the withdrawal deal was again voted down on 12 March 2019.

Faced with the prospect of a ‘no deal exit’ on 29 March 2019, the initial Brexit date, the UK government, as instructed by the House of Commons, eventually requested an extension to the Article 50 negotiating period. On 22 March, the European Council extended the UK’s EU Membership until 22 May 2019, on the condition that the UK parliament approved the withdrawal agreement by 29 March. As the House of Commons rejected the withdrawal agreement for a third time, the new Brexit date was instead set, under that European Council decision, at 12 April 2019.

With a ‘no deal’ Brexit becoming a highly likely scenario, both sides stepped up their contingency planning. However, other outcomes remain possible, in particular a further Article 50 extension, given the UK Prime Minister’s request of 5 April. The EU-27 are set to decide on this within the European Council on 10 April 2019, most likely on the basis of conditions set for the UK. While a parallel process for establishing a majority for an alternative solution to the negotiated deal is under way in Westminster, its outcome remains uncertain. Finally, although rejected by the government, the UK still has the option to unilaterally revoke its notification to withdraw from the EU, or to organise another referendum on the issue (the latter dependent on an extension).

Please see also the parallel Briefing, Brexit: Understanding the withdrawal agreement and political declaration, of March 2019. And visit the European Parliament homepage on Brexit negotiations.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Ratifying the EU-UK withdrawal deal: State of play and possible scenarios‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Brexit timeline

Written by Tania Latici,

Against a backdrop of evolving geopolitical configurations and security threats, anniversaries serve as a useful occasion for reflection, allowing us to draw lessons from the past and informing strategies for the future. In this context, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in collaboration with the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, hosted a panel discussion on ‘NATO at 70 and CSDP at 20: The future of European security and defence’ on 1 April 2019. The extremely well-attended event took stock of what has been achieved so far in European and transatlantic defence, discussing the state of play of the different EU defence integration initiatives, EU-NATO cooperation and transatlantic relations. A forward-looking discussion about the future of European defence followed the panel debate.

Clare Moody (S&D, UK), Parliament’s Vice-Chair of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence opened the debate, giving a comprehensive overview of the security challenges facing the EU, not least cyber and hybrid threats. Her speech also touched upon the importance of EU-NATO relations and on the complementarity between the two, noting that both organisations share the same fundamental goal, of ensuring the security of European citizens. Clare Moody reminded the audience of the EU’s immense soft power role and its added value for EU external action. However, she also highlighted that, in order for the EU to be credible in its action with external partners, it must act as one, in true solidarity. Lastly, she emphasised the overarching purpose of a robust and coherent defence policy by saying that ‘when we talk about defence, we are intrinsically talking about peace’.

In her role as moderator, Elena Lazarou, Policy Analyst in the EPRS External Policies Unit, launched the panel debate by setting the context of the two defence anniversaries of this year: NATO turning 70 and CSDP turning 20. Representing the European External Action Service, Arnout Molenaar (Senior Defence Advisor), noted that the crises of recent years have propelled security and defence to the top of the EU’s agenda, and now represent a key pillar of EU action. In the current multipolar power distribution, the EU must act as a union and has to start to think European. After putting all the structures in place, he noted, the EU must now deliver on its promises and implement initiatives such as permanent structured cooperation and the European Defence Fund, notwithstanding its cooperation with NATO.

Introducing a NATO perspective to the debate, Jamie Shea offered the audience a brief history of NATO. Noting that while in previous years the Alliance had the luxury of focusing on one challenge at the time, He underlined that it now has to take a 360 degree approach and tackle three challenges simultaneously: in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods, , and on homeland security – including hybrid threats. For each of these challenges, NATO requires partners – not least the EU. While recognising the progress achieved by the EU in the defence realm, he also noted the importance of burden-sharing and of communicating the EU’s purpose and actions to its transatlantic partner. Ethan Corbin, Director of the Defence and Security Committee at the NATO Parliamentary Assembly added that the Alliance’s endurance relies on its ability to adapt to the challenges of the international security environment in the post-Cold War environment. He continued by saying that, rather than defining the Alliance by what it is against, NATO should instead be defined by what it stands for and seeks to protect and defend. The Alliance’s future survivability, he continued, will therefore be impacted by its ability to remain committed to the defence of its core values – democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. Looking to the other side of the Atlantic, he argued that despite President Trump’s past criticism of NATO, popular and bipartisan support for NATO is very high in the United States. Although this criticism has had a clear impact on Europeans’ perceptions of US commitment to their security, evidence shows that the United States are as engaged as ever on the ground. Ethan Corbin concluded his remarks by outlining the impending future debate about NATO’s nuclear posture and the coming debate on the Alliance’s potential future actions in a post-INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Europe. Recalling the deterrence and dialogue initiative of the first INF crisis, he noted that any enduring solution would have to involve a return to mutually reassuring arms control agreements.

Moving over from the EU and NATO perspectives to a more Member State focused observation, the Head of the Brussels office of the Antall József Knowledge Centre, Ildikó Szenci reminded the audience of the legacy of the Iron Curtain in central and eastern Europe, which fell 30 years ago in November this year. Against this backdrop, she gave the example of Hungary, who supports the EU’s defence initiatives but sees NATO as the sole responsible body for collective defence. Nonetheless, given the different threat perceptions among EU Members, the EU and NATO each bring unique added value to the protection of Europe.

During the questions and answers session that followed the debate, the audience asked the speakers for their views on citizens’ perceptions of NATO and defence, about the political concept of a ‘European army’ and whether there is any substance to it, on how the United States sees the EU’s action on defence, the role of the European Parliament in defence matters and about post-Brexit EU-UK defence cooperation. The panellists were unanimous in expressing the need for Europeans’ to start implementing their commitments in the realm of defence. They also emphasised that the EU and the UK share the same threats to their security and thus it is vital to remain in close cooperation. Lastly, fact-based analyses such as the EPRS Public Expectations series also demonstrate citizens’ demand for institutions to do more in defence and security matters.

The second and final part of the event focused on the outlook for European defence, with Suzana Anghel, Policy Analyst in the EPRS European Council Oversight Unit, posing challenging questions to her co-panellist, Sven Biscop, Director of the Europe in the World Programme at the Egmont Institute. Her questions related to the direction in which Europe is heading on defence, to the prospects of EU Member States achieving consensus in future defence actions and to Europe’s soft power, questioning whether there is an impetus to go beyond the EU’s traditional civilian perspective. Starting by describing the use of defence as a foreign policy instrument, Sven Biscop made the case for Europe to become a stronger actor, strong enough to engage other great powers on its own terms. He also emphasised the need for Europe to find its own role and not allow this debate to become polarised due to recent USA-China tensions. Lastly, he also noted that the EU and NATO do share a common purpose and are both founded on the principles of democracy.

Many strategic questions and challenges lie ahead for the EU and NATO in this time of uncertain security realities, but what is certain is that the organisations’ role of maintaining peace on the continent is as important now as ever before.

Click to view slideshow.

Written by Eamonn Noonan,

Europe can no longer take prosperity, stability, or even democracy for granted. Fundamental changes in technology, in relations between and within continents, and not least in climate, demand vigorous responses. Challenges and Choices for Europe, a new report by the EU’s European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), looks closely at the tasks that lie ahead.

The key European institutions, including the Parliament, the Council and the Commission, jointly examine global trends through an informal network, ESPAS. They have now published a major report offering a forensic and fast-moving tour of the future. It does not minimise the challenges ahead – such as the disastrous consequences of a rise of 1.5 degrees in global temperatures. Yet the report is neither despairing nor defeatist.

A three-cornered comparison with the US and China gives a bearing on Europe’s prospects. By economic size, the EU ranks alongside them as part of a G3. Will this still be the case in 2030? If Europe is left behind in the race for breakthrough technologies, many vulnerabilities will arise. Europe will also need to adapt to having a smaller and older population than other continents. At the same time, a new constellation of defence and security threats is emerging; what capacities and capabilities are necessary?

An embedded culture of democracy, underpinned by the rule of law and by codified individual rights, has driven the rise of Europe. Remarkably, these are now contested, even within. As the ESPAS report points out, democratic renewal and stronger social cohesion promise better economic outcomes and greater resilience to external threats.

Europe has advantages – and one of the greatest is the resourcefulness of its people. Talent is distributed evenly – but opportunity is not. More than most, Europe works to overcome this handicap by ensuring that education is for all, not just a privileged few. The ESPAS report stresses the need to go further, to reach a level of education and training suited to the 21st century.

Europe is also remarkable for its diversity of languages, cultures and beliefs. At a time when some seek to demonise diversity, we need to see it as a powerful resource, as Europe rethinks and redesigns its global role.

The ESPAS report was written by Florence Gaub of the EU Institute of Strategic Studies, with input from the EPRS Global Trends Unit and other parts of the ESPAS network.

Read the complete report Global trends to 2030: Challenges and choices for Europe.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© piyaset / Fotolia

The United Nations Secretary General, Antonio Guterres, has urged governments worldwide on March 28 to come to the UN summit on climate in September 2019 with concrete plans to boost action against global warming. The call followed the publication and the annual report on climate change by the World Meteorological Organisation, which warned about dire consequences of the continued rise of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. In the same month, hundreds of thousands of students and pupils in 120 countries have tried to draw politicians’ attention to climate change by walking out of classes to stage street protests.

This note brings together commentaries, analyses and studies by major international think tanks and research institutes on climate talks and wider issues relating to climate change. Earlier publications on the issue can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’ published in November 2018.

Managing climate risk for a safer future: A new resilience agenda for Europe
E3G, April 2019

Raising and strengthening EU climate ambition: Priorities and options for the next five years
IDDRI, SciencesPo, March 2019

Can Europe create strong energy and climate coalitions?
European Council on Foreign Relations, March 2019

Nach dem Klimagipfel in Kattowitz: Wichtige Elemente der EU-Klimaagenda 2019
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, March 2019

What can the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C tell us about a CCS and CCU agenda for Europe?
Centre for European Policy Studies, March 2019

European energy transition 2030: The big picture
Ecologic Institute, March 2019

The geopolitical implications of the global energy transition
Bruegel, March 2019

Sustainability and internationalism: Driving development in the 21st century
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, March 2019

The case for green realism
Bruegel, March 2019

Legislating for a low carbon and climate resilient transition: Learning from international experiences
Real Instituto Elcano, March 2019

A pathway design framework for national low greenhouse gas emission development strategies
IDDRI, March 2019

Climate change and human rights: Can the courts fix it?
Heinrich Böll Stiftung, March 2019

Carbon pricing options for international maritime emissions
New Climate Institute, March 2019

Fighting climate change with disclosure? The real effects of mandatory greenhouse gas emission disclosure
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, February 2019

Reducing climate risk in the post-2020 EU budget
EG3, February 2019

How does climate change affect optimal allocation of variable renewable energy?
Energiewirtschaftliches Institut an der Universität zu Köln, February 2019

Defining green bonds: The danger of neglecting the issuer side
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, February 2019

Fuel to the fire: How geoengineering threatens to entrench fossil fuels and accelerate the climate crisis
Center for International Environmental Law, February 2019

Energie-climat en Europe: pour une excellence écologique
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, February 2019

Climate security: Making it doable
Clingendael, February 2019

This is a crisis: facing up to the age of environmental breakdown
Institute for Public Policy Research, February 2019

Progress on implementing the Hague declaration on climate and security
Clingendael, February 2019

Vers une société post-carbone
Fondation pour l’innovation politique, February 2019

Getting a grip on the climate challenge to build the future of Europe
Fondation Robert Schuman, January 2019

Realizing the promise of Paris: Roadmap to a safer climate
New Climate Institute, January 2019

Agroécologie paysanne: La Via Campesina en action: des solutions pour le climat
Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung, January 2019

Clean energy standards
Resources for the Future, January 2019

CAP 2021-27: Using the eco-scheme to maximise environmental and climate benefits
Institute for European Environmental Policy, January 2019

Sinking to zero: The role of carbon capture and negative emissions in EU climate policy
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

Green bonds: Current development and their future
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Triaging climate change
Rand Corporation, January 2019

Intertemporal emissions trading and market design: An application to the EU ETS
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, January 2019

A just transition of European coal regions
E3G, January 2019

Steering the climate system: An extended comment
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, January 2019

The repatriation of competences in climate and energy policy after Brexit: implications for devolution and multi-level government
UK in a Changing Europe, January 2019

The regional dimension of climate change: Making the case for a just and innovative transition
Friends of Europe, December 2018

De la COP 21 à la COP24: Bilan d’étape
OCP Policy Center, December 2018

The role of sub-state and non-state actors in international climate processes: financial institutions
Chatham House, December 2018

Despite technical progress, COP24 struggles to build political momentum
IDDRI, December 2018

Pigou pushes preferences: Decarbonisation and endogenous values
Oxford Martin School, Grantham Research Institute, Centre for Climate Change Economic and Policy, December 2018

Strategic implications of counter-geoengineering: Clash or cooperation?
Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy, Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, December 2018

Are the G20 economies making enough progress to meet their NDC targets?
Energy Policy, March 2019

Climate change and the just transition: a guide for investor action
Grantham Research Institute on Climate Change and the Environment, December 2018

How poverty is causing deforestation across Africa
Chatham House, December 2018

Making finance consistent with climate goals: Insights for operationalising article 2.1c of the UNFCCC Paris Agreement
ODI, World Resources Institute, Rocky Mountain Institute, E3G, December 2018

Written by Maria Diaz Crego (1st edition),

© Jonathan Stutz / Fotolia

The Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs Committee of the European Parliament is considering the 654 amendments, tabled in February 2019, to the European Commission’s September 2018 proposal to recast the Return Directive. The Directive is the main piece of EU legislation governing the procedures and criteria to be applied by Member States when returning irregularly staying third-country nationals, and a cornerstone of the EU return policy. Taking into account the decrease in the EU return rate (45.8 % in 2016 and 36.6 % in 2017), and following European Council and Council calls to review the 2008 legal text to enhance the effectiveness of the EU return policy, the Commission has proposed a targeted recast of the directive aiming to ‘reduce the length of return procedures, secure a better link between asylum and return procedures and ensure a more effective use of measures to prevent absconding’.

Versions

• April 2019: ‘Recasting the Return Directive‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on disclosures relating to sustainable investments and sustainability risks and amending Directive (EU) 2016/2341 Committee responsible: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) COM(2018) 634 final of 12.9.2018 Rapporteur: Judith Sargentini (Greens/EFA, The Netherlands) 2018/0329(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Anna Maria Corazza Bildt (EPP, Sweden) Sylvie Guillaume (S&D, France) Jussi Halla-aho (ECR, Finland) Sophia in ‘t Veld (ALDE, The Netherlands) Barbara Spinelli (GUE/NGL, Italy) Laura Ferrara (EFDD, Italy) Giancarlo Scottà (ENF, Italy) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Vote in committee