European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Anja Radjenovic,

© kamasigns / Fotolia

The unprecedented arrival of refugees and irregular migrants in the EU, which peaked in 2015, exposed a series of deficiencies and gaps in EU policies on external borders. It affected the functioning of the Schengen rules, leading to the re-introduction of border checks by several Member States. In response to these challenges, as well as the surge in terrorist and serious cross-border crime activities, the EU has embarked on a broader process of reform aimed at strengthening its external borders by reinforcing the links between border controls and security.

On the one hand, measures for protecting the EU’s external borders have focused on reinforcing EU border management rules, such as the Schengen Borders Code, and strengthening and upgrading the mandates of relevant EU agencies, such as Frontex, eu-Lisa, Europol and EASO. On the other hand, in connection with a number of key shortcomings in the EU’s information systems, efforts were made to improve use of the opportunities offered by information systems and technologies for security, criminal records, and border and migration management. This included strengthening existing IT systems (SIS II, VIS, Eurodac, ECRIS-TCN), establishing new ones (ETIAS, Entry/Exit System) and improving their interoperability.

The broader mandate and the increase of activities in the area of EU border management is also reflected in the growing amounts, flexibility and diversity of EU funds, inside as well as outside the current and future EU budget.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Protection of EU external borders‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Frontex budget (€ million)
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Main migratory routes into Europe

Written by Nikolina Šajn,

© Davizro Photography / Fotolia

Consumer protection rules have been improving the rights of consumers in the European Union since the 1970s. While the level of protection is today considered to be among the highest in the world, consumers in the EU are still faced with a number of issues. One in five consumers say that they have had a reason to complain in the last 12 months, a level which has remained largely unchanged since 2008.

Since 2014, efforts have been made in a number of areas, including stronger cross-border cooperation between national authorities in charge of consumer protection and market surveillance. Notably, the Commission proposed a ‘new deal for consumers’ in April 2018, to enable representative legal actions for the protection of the collective interests of consumers and to modernise EU consumer protection rules. Sector-specific efforts included: eliminating roaming charges across the EU in 2017; legislation aimed at facilitating consumer participation in the digital single market; reforms on the rules on privacy and data protection; enhancing the rights of energy consumers and passengers; and efforts to address the ‘dual quality’ of branded food products.

The EU budget for consumer protection is relatively small, because although rules in this field are made at the EU level, their implementation and enforcement are carried out by the Member States. The consumer programme has a budget of €188 million for the 2013-2020 period, or roughly €0.05 per citizen per year. This may change in the new multiannual financial framework, as consumer protection becomes part of a wider single market programme, which is expected to create synergies between its various components. Future policies could focus on longer product lifetime, labelling and quality requirements for non-agricultural and industrial products, fairer food labelling and retail financial services.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Protecting European consumers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Estimated breakdown of the single market programme elements

Written by Angelos Delivorias,

© Stockfotos-MG / Fotolia

In the European Union (EU), although economic policy is the remit of each Member State, there is, nevertheless, multilateral coordination of economic policies between individual countries. This framework was put severely to the test during the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis. Partly as a result, recovery in the EU was slower than recovery in the United States, and was not achieved equally by all Member States. Furthermore, it has to a large extent been based on accommodative fiscal and monetary policies that only partly hide underlying signs of fiscal or financial fragility in some countries.

To remedy this, the European institutions began a twofold process in 2011: initiatives were taken to strengthen the current framework for economic governance, and for banking supervision in the euro area while, in parallel, discussion began on possible ways to reduce the economic divergences between Member States, provide incentives for risk reduction and risk-sharing, render the governance process more transparent and ensure democratic accountability. In this latter area, several initiatives – which did not require changes in the EU Treaties – were taken between 2015 and 2017.

In summer 2017, discussions on deepening the policy framework for economic and monetary union (EMU) intensified. This process, which was advocated in the five presidents’ report (by the heads of the relevant EU institutions) and should be completed by 2025, is now being considered at Member State level. The current state of play points towards two main orientations, dividing Member States into two groups: those that prioritise risk-sharing measures (such as France), and those that argue instead for further risk-reduction initiatives (for example, Germany). This lack of consensus has so far meant that the European Council has not been able to reach a breakthrough.

Read this complete briefing on ‘EU policies – Delivering for citizens: Economic policy‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Percentage of respondents who would like the EU to intervene more than at present
• Expectations for more EU action than at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018
• Perception of EU action as adequate at present: percentage points difference between 2016 and 2018

Written by Philip Boucher,

© Dmitry / Fotolia

While we often worry about the acceptance of technology in the face of real and potential public opposition, there are frequently gaps between how regulators, developers and experts conceptualise acceptance and opposition. Here, we examine some prominent conceptualisations and suggest that, rather than responding to public opposition with information campaigns designed to transform citizens into acceptors, strategies for managing public acceptability should include meaningful dialogues that aim to create better technologies, which are not only acceptable to citizens, but can even be actively supported by them.

Taking a simple market perspective, the acceptance of technologies can be measured in sales. Products that are not accepted will simply not survive, while others will have to be modified to react to changing market conditions. This process can be observed live in the mobile phone market, with brands and products entering and leaving the market, sometimes in surprising and dramatic ways.

Frequently, however, technology acceptance goes beyond individual consumer choices. Energy infrastructures, such as power stations or windfarms, can face opposition from citizens that object to the impact of a specific installation on the local environment, economy, sense of place and a wide range of other factors. Opposition may also be more global, on the basis of climate change impacts or even fundamental ethical objections to the use of a given technology by anyone, as observed in the case of stem cell research and genetic modification. In each of these cases, the issue of acceptance cannot be measured with reference to individual consumer choices, and markets do not offer explanations for or responses to opposition.

Potential impacts and developments

People that oppose new and emerging technologies are sometimes characterised as ‘luddites’, dogmatically opposed to any kind of technology development. Others are sometimes characterised as ‘NIMBYs’ (derived from ‘not in my back yard’), who appreciate the benefits of technologies but selfishly object to developments in their local area. These characterisations are often found in popular discourse and, while they do provide a model for understanding opposition, they do not open many avenues for resolving disagreements. A third characterisation suggests that opponents have misunderstood the technology or hold irrational fears of its potential impacts. This is known as the ‘knowledge deficit model’ and it is frequently found in strategies for managing the introduction of new technologies into society. Unlike luddite or NIMBY conceptualisations, the deficit model does indicate a practical means of responding to opposition and fostering public acceptance by informing citizens about the technology, particularly how it works and what benefits it can bring.

For regulators and other stakeholders that are eager to reap the promised social, environmental or economic benefits of technology development, it can be tempting and intuitive to adopt one of these three characterisations. The deficit model is particularly attractive when opposition is expected but there is little appetite to change the development path. This is well illustrated in strategies for responding to potential public opposition to civil drones, which aimed to achieve acceptance through ‘coordinated actions’ to inform citizens about drones and their benefits while downplaying the well-known military applications of the technology, which formed part of the strategic motivation for promoting civil drones in the first place. Later research found that citizens’ informed perspectives on drones were more complex than these strategies assumed.

Indeed, studies of public opposition to technology from energy infrastructure to genetically modified crops have repeatedly highlighted the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of the luddite, NIMBY and knowledge deficit conceptualisations. They tend to misrepresent the often nuanced and sensitive concerns of citizens with simplistic or even pejorative caricatures of opposition. As a result, instead of opening paths to mutual understanding, dialogue and resolution, they are more likely to escalate tensions and lead to entrenched positions. Concepts such as ‘beyond NIMBYism‘, ‘responsible research and innovation‘ and Science with and for Society have provided practical measures for understanding and responding to opposition. These tend to focus on establishing meaningful dialogues among the full range of actors involved, particularly developers and citizens, from the earliest stages of development.

Genuine public acceptance is contingent upon a sound understanding of the technology, including the full range of expected impacts of its development, whether positive or negative, direct or indirect. Information campaigns can backfire when they are imbalanced or incomplete, or the source is insufficiently trusted. Successful strategies for responding to opposition can only be devised once their real reasons are understood. As such, meaningful dialogues should involve listening to and seriously considering the views of citizens, while avoiding assumptions and caricatures about their motives and concerns. These dialogues – which most Europeans believe should take place – should be established early so that their insights can improve the design and implementation of technologies during the crucial formative stages of development, and should continue as developers and citizens develop the mutual understanding and trust that is required to respond to opposition and generate support.

Meaningful dialogues can transform citizens’ role from that of passive opponent or passive acceptor, who has to accommodate new perspectives or technologies, into that of an informed, active agent, who is (co‑)responsible, along with developers, regulators and other actors, for the development of better technologies that are more acceptable to all actors. Indeed, in this light, meaningful early-stage dialogues should not only be seen as a response to real or potential public opposition, but as a proactive tool that is routinely deployed to generate active public support for better technologies.

Anticipatory policy-making

The European Commission’s Eurobarometer programme provides detailed quantitative and qualitative studies of pan-European public perspectives on a wide range of topics – including science, technology and other issues that are relevant in the context of new developments – and can provide useful background information for new initiatives. The Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making calls for open and transparent stakeholder consultations, which allow for the widest possible participation, particularly of SMEs and end-users. Indeed, public consultation should play a key role in the ex-ante impact assessments undertaken by the Commission before new legislation is proposed, including all relevant actors at all stages of the assessment.

A recent STOA study outlined four policy options for strengthening public engagement at all stages of the policy process. While these options were proposed with reference to low-carbon energy technologies, they remain relevant for a wider range of controversial technologies, from drones to artificial intelligence:

1. Engage people in ways that support meaningful dialogue at all levels and scales of development;
2. Understand and accept that outcomes of public engagement can and should have a tangible impact on development plans;
3. Recognise the important role of public trust in developers and regulators;
4. Go beyond engagement as a tool for overcoming opposition, and use it to gather active public support and to develop better technologies.

Read this complete ‘at a glance’ note on ‘What if we could design better technologies through dialogue?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rosamund Shreeves,

© frikota / Fotolia

The European Union is committed to working collectively to eradicate female genital mutilation (FGM) as part of broader efforts to combat all forms of violence against women and girls, and to support the efforts of its Member States in this field. The European Commission has undertaken to assess EU efforts to combat FGM every year, on or around the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation on 6 February.

Facts and figures

Female genital mutilation (FGM) includes all procedures that intentionally alter or cause injury to the female genital organs for non-medical reasons. FGM is carried out for cultural, religious and/or social reasons, mostly on young girls between infancy and the age of 15. It has no health benefits and can have serious immediate and long-term effects on health and wellbeing.

In 2016, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that, worldwide, at least 200 million women and girls are currently living with the consequences of FGM and around 3 million girls are at risk of undergoing FGM every year. The practice, which is most common in 28 African countries, is also prevalent in the Middle East (Yemen, northern Iraq), and Asia (Indonesia), and has been reported to a lesser extent elsewhere. An assessment, issued by the UN Secretary General in December 2018, finds that prevalence has been reduced in some regions, but progress could be cancelled out by population growth, girls undergoing FGM (increasingly performed by medical professionals) at a younger age, and the fact that, as a result of population movement, it is becoming a global issue.

Official EU statistics on the prevalence of FGM in Europe are lacking. However, three studies to map FGM, conducted by the European Institute for Gender Equality (EIGE) between 2012 and 2018, found that there are victims (or potential victims), in at least 16 EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the UK. Around 20 000 women and girls from FGM-practising countries seek asylum in EU Member States every year, with an estimated 1 000 asylum claims directly related to FGM. This number has increased steadily since 2008.

Commitments and action to combat FGM

FGM constitutes a form of child abuse and gender-based violence; recognised internationally as a violation of the human rights of girls and women. The practice also violates a person’s rights to health, security and physical integrity; the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment; and the right to life in cases where the procedure results in death. A range of measures have been adopted at international, EU and national level to prevent FGM and to protect FGM victims.

International instruments

At international level, United Nations and Council of Europe standards are benchmarks in work to combat FGM. Key treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women(CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Geneva Convention, all cover FGM indirectly, with specific guidance on protection and asylum for victims. The Council of Europe’s Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence (‘Istanbul Convention’), is the first treaty to recognise that FGM exists in Europe (Article 38), and sets out a number of specific obligations on preventing and combating the practice, and providing support to victims and those at risk.

International action

The UN’s longstanding efforts to end the practice culminated in its first specific resolution on female genital mutilation in December 2012, calling for the adoption of national action plans and comprehensive, multi-disciplinary strategies to eliminate FGM. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development identifies FGM as a harmful practice which is to be eliminated by 2030 (Goal 5), a priority reaffirmed by the UN in 2018.

The UN named 6 February the International Day of Zero Tolerance for Female Genital Mutilation and the European Commission takes stock annually, around that day, of EU efforts to combat FGM. 

Legislative and policy framework at European level

Although the EU itself currently has no binding instrument designed to protect women from violence, relevant instruments exist in a number of areas. The principles of gender equality and non-discrimination are affirmed in the Treaty on European Union and the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which also guarantees the right to dignity and includes specific provisions on the right to physical and mental integrity. The Directive on Victims’ Rights requires provision of support services to victims of violence, including FGM. In relation to asylum, the Asylum Reception Conditions Directive specifically mentions victims of FGM amongst vulnerable persons who should receive appropriate healthcare during their asylum procedure, while the recast Qualification Directive includes FGM as grounds to consider when granting asylum. The EU also signed the Istanbul Convention on 13 June 2017 and is currently in the accession process. Parliament has urged those Member States that have not yet done so to ratify and implement this Convention.

Combating gender-based violence is a priority in the European Commission’s strategic engagement for gender equality 2016-2019. On FGM, this includes pursuing the measures set out in the action plan adopted in the 2013 communication, ‘Towards the elimination of female genital mutilation’, aiming to ensure that action to combat FGM is mainstreamed across the fields of justice, police, health, social services, child protection, education, immigration and asylum and external action. Areas where the Commission has promised to act include:

• Providing the reliable, comparable EU-level data necessary to establish the prevalence of FGM and provide a solid basis for policy;
• Improving victim support by helping Member States to develop support services for victims, and training and awareness-raising for relevant professionals, focusing on empowering communities;
• Supporting Member States in prosecuting FGM more effectively;
• Ensuring that women at risk are protected more effectively under EU asylum rules through proper transposition and implementation of the EU legislative framework on asylum and victim protection;
• Promoting worldwide elimination of FGM, by ensuring that EU external policy addresses FGM, and that awareness is included in gender and child rights training for EU staff in relevant external delegations.

The Commission has reported on action undertaken to 2018, including the launch of a knowledge platform for professionals who come into contact with (potential) victims, and funding made available under the Rights, Equality and Citizenship Programme 2014‐2020 and the joint EU-United Nations Spotlight initiative.

Instruments against FGM at national level

Many of the actions needed to end FGM lie within the competences of the Member States. FGM is now a prosecutable offence under national laws in all Member States, either as a specific criminal act or as an act of bodily harm or injury. However, very few cases are brought to court. A number of Member States have also developed national action plans on FGM. Continuing issues of concern include barriers to reporting and successful prosecution, support for victims and ensuring long-term, sustainable cultural change.

European Parliament position

The European Parliament has played a particularly important role in raising awareness and pushing for firm action on FGM, including through the work of its Committee on Women’s Rights and Gender Equality (FEMM). Parliament has adopted resolutions on FGM in 2001, 2009, 2012, 2014, and 2018, calling on the Commission and Member States to provide the legal and other means required to raise awareness, protect and support victims and ensure that offenders are prosecuted. In 2016, it urged Member States to recognise FGM as a form of persecution and the Commission to draw up interpretive guidelines on FGM, according appropriate protection to women and girls seeking asylum.

This publication is a further update of an ‘at a glance’ note published in January 2015.

Read this ‘at a glance’ note on ‘Zero tolerance for female genital mutilation‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beatrix Immenkamp, graphic: Samy Chahri,

© elen31 / Fotolia

The US administration announced on 1 February 2019 that it was suspending its obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, with effect from 2 February 2019, and that it was giving Russia six months’ notice of complete withdrawal. Russia reacted by announcing that it was also suspending its obligations under the Treaty. Both parties said they would begin developing new nuclear-capable missiles banned by the treaty. The 1987 INF Treaty is a landmark nuclear-arms-control treaty between the United States (US) and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) that eliminated and prohibited ground-launched intermediate ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5 500 km. The US announcement follows years of allegations that the Russian Federation has acted in breach of the agreement. Russia, for its part, has also accused the US of violating the treaty. Both deny the allegations. Moreover, both parties consider that the agreement puts their countries at a strategic disadvantage vis-à-vis other nuclear powers, especially China. The parties’ announcements undermine a cornerstone of the European security order. The signing of the INF Treaty in 1987 led to the removal and destruction of nearly 3 000 US and Soviet short-, medium- and intermediate-range nuclear-capable missiles stationed in or aimed at Europe. The EU has called on the US to consider the consequences of its possible withdrawal from the INF for its own security, the security of its allies and that of the whole world. The EU has also called on both the US and Russia to remain engaged in constructive dialogue to preserve the INF Treaty, and on Russia to address the serious concerns regarding its compliance with the treaty. NATO considers Russia to be in violation of the INF Treaty, and the alliance has called on Russia to return urgently to full and verifiable compliance with the agreement. Any redeployment of intermediate-range missiles will put Europe once more in the line of fire of strategic nuclear weapons. If the INF Treaty is abrogated, Europeans will be faced with stark choices all carrying inherent security risks, including engaging in a deployment race with Russia, or refusing re-deployment of US missiles on European soil, potentially leaving European countries exposed to Russian intimidation. Efforts over the next six months will focus on preserving the INF Treaty against all odds.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The end of the INF Treaty? A pillar of European security architecture at risk‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

INF timeline

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Riccardo Molinari,

©Photo Landa 2010

A packed Science Week at the European Parliament from 5 to 7 February 2019, organised by the European Parliament’s 2019 Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA), includes:

• the STOA MEP-Scientist Pairing Scheme ‘Brussels Week’;
• the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre ‘Science meets Parliaments’ event, (JRC; 6-7 February, in cooperation with STOA);
• a European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) workshopon ‘Tackling misinformation and disinformation in science’ (6 February); and
• a STOA/ESMH and European Research Council (ERC) Conference entitled ‘Investing in researchers – Shaping Europe’s future’ (7 February).

These events aim to support a structured dialogue between scientists and policy-makers, to raise awareness about politically relevant, cutting-edge scientific issues (such as artificial intelligence, gene technology, or autonomous cars), and the importance of science for evidence-informed policy-making. Here is what will happen at each of the events:

MEP-Scientists Pairing Scheme

During the ‘Brussels Week’ of the seventh edition of the scheme (organised for the first time in 2007 and annually since 2015), paired scientists will have an opportunity to follow their MEP counterparts in their daily political activities, and gain an understanding of the EU science, technology and research policy framework, particularly European Parliament work in this area. In addition, they will attend various meetings with MEPs, Parliament staff and science journalists, presenting their research work and outcomes, and participating in ‘pitching sessions’ between science journalists and scientists, organised by the ESMH.

Science meets Parliaments, 6-7 February 2019

This initiative seeks to build closer links between scientists and policy-makers at EU, national and regional levels and enhance the role of science in policy through regular dialogue. During this year’s edition of the event (held for the first time in 2015), scientists will gain a greater understanding of how the European Parliament works, and the role and working methods of Members and their needs in terms of scientific advice.

ESMH workshop ‘Tackling misinformation and disinformation in science’, 6 February 2019

This workshop aims to exchange good practices in tackling misinformation and disinformation in science, via the presentation of ‘case studies’, illustrating relevant initiatives touching upon different science disciplines. The workshop is participatory, as the audience will be actively involved in debate on the case studies.

STOA/ESMH-ERC conference, Thursday 7 February 2019

The STOA/ESMH-ERC conference ‘Investing in researchers, shaping Europe’s future’ will bring policy-makers and ERC-funded grantees together with the aim of supporting evidence-informed policy-making and underlining how Europe’s future can be shaped by fundamental research on topics ranging from smart agriculture and food, via CRISPR, to migration and demography.

Interested? To keep up to date with the activities of STOA, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

Written by Vitalba Crivello,

© Dallasetta / Shutterstock.com

In the era of fake news, how can we fight disinformation in science effectively? How can scientists and journalists join forces and work together in order to ensure better circulation of sound scientific information? The European Science-Media Hub (ESMH) is organising a workshop, on Wednesday, 6 February 2019, to take a closer look at some initiatives aimed at tackling misinformation and disinformation in science.

According to the Oxford dictionary, misinformation is ‘false or inaccurate information, especially that which is deliberately intended to deceive’, while disinformation is ‘false information which is intended to mislead, especially propaganda issued by a government organisation to a rival power or the media’.

The ESMH workshop will bring together journalists and scientists from several EU countries and will take place in the wider context of the ‘Science Week at the EP’ (5-7 February 2019). Selected experts will be talking to the audience about good practices in sharing quality information, via the presentation of case studies touching upon science disciplines and including some useful tools against disinformation.

Following a welcome address and opening by Eva Kaili, (S&D, Greece and STOA Chair), Scott Brennen (Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism and the Oxford Internet Institute), will open the workshop by giving an overview of the Oxford Martin Programme on Misinformation, Science and Media, from its purpose to the main results obtained so far. The programme examines the impact of the interplay between scientific misinformation, news coverage, and social media platforms on public understanding of science and technological innovation. Since misinformation about basic issues in science and technology often abounds, the programme focuses on better understanding and ways to improve public discussions of science and technology.

Following Brennen’s intervention, it will be Guido Romeo’s turn to take the floor.This data and business journalist will talk about his brand new and ambitious project – Factful – and its focus on employing scientific methods in reporting, integrating data analysis and field work. Through open source intelligence, Factful not only promises to make science accessible to citizens and organisations to counter misinformation, but also to investigate into the working mechanisms of scientific institutions.

The workshop will then move to more concrete examples of initiatives tackling misinformation and disinformation in science.The President of the Science Feedback association Emmanuel Vincent will showcase the ClimateFeedback.org project, an international network of scientists who review influential climate change media coverage and provide feedback to readers, journalists and editors about its scientific credibility. Science Feedback is broadening this approach to other scientific fields prone to misunderstandings or organised campaigns of disinformation (e.g. health, see HealthFeedback.org). One of the primary goals is to help platforms like Facebook, Google and YouTube, which act as gatekeepers of online information, to promote credible sources of information.

Mike Hamilton will then discuss the ‘Factmata approach’ to artificial intelligence (AI), communities and expert knowledge, in identifying and classifying problematic content. Factmata evaluates content quality in a critical way, by using AI-based tools and relying on the knowledge of experts to spot factually incorrect content online.

The workshop will be moderated by a journalist, Tania Rabesandratana, with a participatory format, as the audience will play an active role by taking part into the debate throughout the workshop, via several Q&A sessions and regular opportunities to intervene.

Interested? Register for the workshop and join the debate. To keep up to date with ESMH activities, follow our website, and the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

Written by Cécile Remeur,

© FOTOCROMO / Shutterstock.

Money laundering through real estate transactions integrates black funds into the legal economy while providing a safe investment. It allows criminals to enjoy assets and derived funds having camouflaged the origin of the money used for payment.

A number of techniques are used, namely cash or opaque financing schemes, overvalued or undervalued prices, and non-transparent companies and trusts or third parties that act as legal owners. Among the possible indicators are geographical features (such as the distance between the property and the buyer and their actual geographical centre of interest). In order to assess the existence of a money-laundering risk, concrete assessments of transactions and a customer’s situation provide indications that help raise red flags and trigger reporting obligations.

The anti-money-laundering recommendations set out by the international Financial Action Task Force (FAFT) are implemented in the European Union (EU) by means of coordinated provisions (chiefly the Anti-money-laundering Directive). Customer due diligence and reporting of suspicious transactions are tools to address money laundering. Real estate transactions involve both non-financial and financial sector parties operating under different legal requirements. Yet, reporting of suspicious transactions in real estate is limited, leaving ample room for improvement.

Improvement is all the more necessary inasmuch as money laundering in general, and in the real estate sector in particular, has a major socio-economic impact, the magnitude of which is difficult to quantify. Awareness is however growing as a result not least of high profile examples of money laundering through real estate in a number of EU cities.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Understanding money laundering through real estate transactions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Katarzyna Sochacka and Clare Ferguson,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the January II plenary session included the Future of Europe debate with Juha Sipilä, Finland’s prime minister, and the latest debate on the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Members also debated the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary, and how to combat the climate of hatred and physical violence against democratically elected office-holders. Parliament officially recognised Juan Guaidó, President of the Venezuelan National Assembly, as ‘legitimate interim president’ of Venezuela, as he has proclaimed himself. Debates on EU-US trade, China-Taiwan relations and gender balance were held, and Parliament also amended its Rules of Procedure, aiming to increase transparency on interactions between its Members and representatives of interest groups.

International Holocaust Remembrance Day

During the January II part-session, a formal sitting was held to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day. In remembering the fate of the millions of Europeans who suffered between 1933 and 1945, Parliament has made its position clear that racism and xenophobia are not opinions but crimes. The worrying recent rise in anti-Semitism in Europe adds to the difficult social conditions under which Holocaust survivors live, many of whom suffer physical and psychological consequences of their persecution. To alleviate this situation, the EU has decided on a common approach to protect Jewish communities in Europe.

Implementation and functioning of the .eu top level domain name

Members debated and approved the trilogue agreement on new rules on the .eu top level domain (TLD). It ensures greater promotion of EU data protection rules and values in the proposed revamping of the rules on domain names, as well as encouraging best practice and reorganising the management of domain names in the EU. It makes the registration of such domain names easier for all citizens of the European Union and European Economic Area countries, irrespective of where in the world they live. The new rules, with a few exceptions, will apply from 13 October 2022.

Protection of EU financial interests and the fight against fraud

Parliament debated and adopted a Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) report on the 2017 annual report on the protection of EU financial interests, and the fight against fraud. The European Commission prepares an annual report, based on information provided by the Member States’ authorities, who manage much of the actual expenditure. While the CONT committee acknowledges that irregularities decreased during the period, the amount of money involved actually increased. The report stresses the uneven geographical distribution of fraud, and decries the low average recovery rate.

Overseas countries and territories

Members adopted by an overwhelming majority an opinion on the Commission’s proposal to change the way EU overseas countries and territories are funded. The Development Committee proposed to increase the budget for the (non-UK linked) overseas territories plus Greenland to €669 million, and to include these territories in EU regional dialogues with their immediate neighbours. The measures also seek to reinforce environmental and human rights considerations, as well as the territories’ competitiveness.

Opening of trilogue negotiations

Seven committee decisions (from IMCO, TRAN, JURI, LIBE and PECH) to enter into interinstitutional (trilogue) negotiations were confirmed. There were no requests for votes.

Read this ‘At a glance’ note on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, January II 2019‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© luaeva / Fotolia

Since May 2018, European Union governments and the European Parliament are negotiating the next long-term budget for the bloc, the Multi-annual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-2027, in a bid to secure sufficient resourses for new priorities such as security, defence and migrationm and to respond in a realistic way to the financial consequences of the the UK withdrwal from the EU. In November 2018, the Parliament approved its negotiating position, seeking, among other proposals, more funds for youth, research, growth and jobs, as well as security, migration and tackling climate change. Conditions proposed by the European Commission that would make the availability of EU funds dependent on the respect for the rule of law and EU values are also being discussed.

This note offers links to a selection of recent commentaries, studies and reports from some of the major international think tanks and research institutes, which discuss the EU’s long-term budget and related reforms.  More reports on the topics are available on a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are Thinking’, published in June 2018.

The MFF: Europe’s other ticking clock
European Policy Centre, January 2019

EU budget implications of a no-deal Brexit
Bruegel, January 2019

Reforming the MFF and cohesion policy 2021-27: Pragmatic drift or pragmatic shift?
European Policies Research Centre, January 2019

Financing EU external action: Understanding member state priorities
European Think Tanks Group, December 2018

Budget européen 2021-2027: Doter l’Europe des moyens de nos ambitions
Terra Nova, November 2018

Funding the just transition to a net zero economy in Europe: Opportunities in the next EU budget
E3G, November 2018

Can the V4’s priorities shape ‘Europe’s Priorities’? The multiannual financial framework 2021-2027
EUROPEUM, November 2018

Die Finanzierung der EU nach 2020: Zeit für Reformen
Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft Köln, October 2018

Strengthening cohesion in the EU: How can structural reforms contribute?
European Policy Centre, October 2018

Negotiating the next Multi-Annual Financial Framework in an electoral year: Which consequences?
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, September 2018

Aiming high or falling short? A brief analysis of the proposed future EU budget for external action
European Centre for Development Policy Management, September 2018

More money, fewer problems? How the ‘Migration Crisis’ affected funding under the MFF
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin September 2018

Resources for a prosperous Europe: Redesigning the EU budget in a progressive way
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, September 2018

The EU’s multiannual financial framework and some implications for CESEE countries
Bruegel, September 2018

The EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework: Where should Italy stand?
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

The EU Budget and Common Agricultural Policy beyond 2020: Seven more years of money for nothing?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, August 2018

ESM reform: No need to reinvent the wheel
Jacques Delors Institute, Berlin August 2018

Making better use of public funding: The role of national promotional banks and institutions in the next EU budget
Notre Europe, Jacques Delors Institute, August 2018

Winners or losers? The Baltic States in the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework negotiations
International Centre for Defence and Security, July 2018

EU reform: Does everything have to change for things to remain the same?
Carnegie Europe, July 2018

Le Fonds européen de défense ou l’enfant prodige de la défense européenne
Confrontations Europe, July 2018

Budget de l’Union européenne: Quel compromis possible entre la France et l’Allemagne?
Fondation Robert Schuman, June 2018

Financing sustainability: Triggering investments for the clean economy
European Political Strategy Centre, June 2018

Die EU auf dem Weg in eine Transferunion? Ein Beitrag zur Entdramatisierung
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2018

A stabilization fund can make the euro area more crisis-proof
Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik, June 2018

Read this briefing on ‘The EU’s long-term budget framework‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso, Angelos Delivorias, Magdalena Sapała, Marcin Szczepanski, Ioannis Zachariadis.

Graphics by Giulio Sabbati.

© European Union, 2019

In 2018, the EU and euro-area economies continued their moderate growth (2.1 %). This growth was based on domestic private and public consumption and on strong investment – itself stemming from low interest rates and high business confidence, which is, however, likely to deteriorate slightly going forward. It was also underpinned by the creation of jobs: unemployment is currently at a post‑crisis low and labour market conditions are expected to continue improving over the next two years, albeit more moderately than previously.

The global outlook in which this growth is taking place, however, is less promising than it was a year ago. Indeed, for the first time in almost 30 years, the expansion of trade liberalisation came to a halt in 2018. World merchandise trade volumes grew less in 2018 than in the previous year, and are expected to decrease further in the near future, especially in the event of an escalation in current trade tensions. Partly as a result of the above, EU exports were subdued and are projected to remain so in the near future. In addition to the above, specific risks revolving around private and public finances, financial markets, monetary policies and trade, as well as the gloomier forecast for key emerging economies, such as Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Turkey, Venezuela or South Africa are signs that global expansion has peaked (3.7 %) in 2018, and should begin to decelerate in 2019 and 2020 (3.5 %). In this context, the EU and euro area is expected to continue growing, but at an even lower pace over the next two years (between 1.8 % and 1.9 %).

In this context, while the European Central Bank reduced its purchases under the purchase programmes significantly in 2018, and decided to end them by December, it decided to continue reinvesting the principal payments from maturing securities purchased under those programmes and to keep using its forward guidance. The aforementioned trends, the different pace of monetary policy normalisation in the United States and the United Kingdom on one hand and in the euro area on the other, trade tensions in world markets, but also specific fiscal issues relating to particular Member States, resulted in a mixed picture compared with last year, with the euro appreciating slightly versus emerging market currencies, while at the same time weakening versus the dollar, the yen and the pound sterling.

Following the now established pattern, the study delves into two of the tools and initiatives that European institutions use to contribute to the European response to the aforementioned developments: the European Union budget and the way it is designed to tackle challenges, and EU initiatives aimed at supporting small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs).

The 2019 EU budget amounts to €165.8 billion, representing only 2 % of total public spending in the European Union – approximately 1 % of gross national income (GNI). Despite its volume, the overall impact of the EU budget is amplified by a number of features, including: a higher share of resources devoted to investment than in national budgets; the capacity to leverage additional funding from other sources; and attention to policy areas where the pooling of resources can provide the EU as a whole with added value (e.g. research, innovation and development cooperation).

Agreed by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union, the 2019 budget focuses on priorities such as stimulating investment, growth and research, creating new jobs, especially for young people, as well as addressing migration and security challenges. In 2019, for the fifth year in a row, the budgetary authority had to have recourse to the flexibility provisions available under the EU’s 2014-2020 multiannual financial framework (MFF) in order to finance these persistent policy challenges.

In 2019, the shaping of the next MFF, which should cover the 2021 to 2027 period, is expected to gain momentum. EU institutions and Member States are working on the proposals put forward by the Commission in 2018, which include a number of modifications to the way the EU budget is currently financed and spent. Taking into account the expected withdrawal of the UK from the EU, the proposed allocations for 27 Member States are organised around a new structure reinforcing priorities that emerged during the current MFF, such as research, innovation, digital transformation, climate action, borders, migration, security and defence. The objective is to reach an agreement in autumn 2019, but the start of a new political cycle for several key EU institutions might pose a challenge for this.

The EU budget devotes particular attention to SMEs, supporting them across a wide range of programmes and instruments. SMEs are crucial to European economy since they constitute 99.8 % of all non-financial enterprises in Europe. In 2017, these firms employed close to 95 million people which means that two out of three workers in the EU had a job in this sector. Furthermore, European SMEs generated around €4.16 trillion, amounting to 57 % of total added value. European SMEs were badly affected by the economic and financial crisis starting in 2008 and only since 2014 have employment and value added been increasing. The recovery is also manifested in the fact that between 2008 and 2017, gross value added generated by SMEs increased cumulatively by 14.3 % and employment in these companies increased by 2.5 %. Value added and employment are also expected to grow in 2019.

Sustaining the continued growth of European SMEs relies, not least, on ensuring sufficient access to external finance – an area where they are typically considered to be at a disadvantage relative to larger firms. However, recent evidence indicates that the environment for their access to financing is gradually improving across the EU. In 2018, only 7 % of SMEs reported ‘access to finance’, as their most serious concern. This is a notable improvement when compared with the 17 % reported in 2009. Notwithstanding this positive development, traditional debt finance – whether in the form of credit lines, overdrafts, trade credit or standard bank loans – continues to be the primary source of external funding for the majority of SMEs, with alternative financing instruments remaining among the least preferred options. The heavy reliance on debt finance that has traditionally characterised European SMEs contributed heavily to their increased vulnerability during the recent economic downturn. In view of the persistent challenges, public attention is increasingly drawn to the potential of capital markets to offer alternative sources of financing for SMEs. As such, diversification of sources of funding through the development of deeper and more integrated capital markets is gaining increasing traction. Providing companies, especially smaller ones, with a broader choice of market-based funding at a lower cost, can help stimulate investment, thereby promoting sustainable economic growth and job creation.

Read the complete study on ‘Economic and Budgetary Outlook for the European Union 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

European Union, EP

The first item on the agenda for this week’s part-session is a formal sitting on Wednesday to mark International Holocaust Remembrance Day. In remembering the fate of the millions of Europeans who suffered between 1933 and 1945, Parliament has made its position clear that racism and xenophobia are not opinions but crimes. The worrying recent rise in anti-Semitism in Europe adds to the difficult social conditions under which Holocaust survivors live, many of whom suffer physical and psychological consequences of the persecution. To alleviate this situation, the EU has decided on a common approach to protect Jewish communities in Europe.

A statement by the European Commission on combatting the climate of hatred and physical violence against democratically elected mandate holders is scheduled for Wednesday afternoon, and Members will also debate a report calling to block sites when the domain name is defamatory or racist later on Wednesday evening. The trilogue agreement on new rules on the .eu top level domain (TLD), to be debated on Wednesday, ensures greater promotion of EU data protection rules and values in the proposed revamping of the rules on domain names, as well as encouraging best practice and reorganising the management of domain names in the EU.

Also on Wednesday afternoon, the Council and Commission will make statements on the rule of law and fundamental rights in Hungary. Parliament has made several resolutions on the risks of serious breaches of the EU’s founding principles by the Hungarian state. A proposal currently under consideration seeks to allow for sanctions measures with regard to EU funding.

Parliament will then debate a Committee on Budgetary Control (CONT) report on the 2017 annual report on the protection of EU financial interests, and the fight against fraud. The European Commission prepares the annual report, based on information provided by the Member States’ authorities, who manage the actual expenditure. While the CONT committee acknowledges that irregularities decreased during the period, the amount of money involved actually increased. The report stresses the uneven geographical distribution of fraud, and decries the low average recovery rate.

In the latest, and one of the last, of the current series, a debate will be held with the Prime Minister of Finland, Juha Sipilä, on the Future of Europe on Thursday morning. Perhaps the Prime Minister will touch upon some of the burning issues for the next few years: such as an EU at 27 Member States, trade issues and other geopolitical changes, as well as security, the environment, or the challenges of the digital transformation.

Finally, on Thursday lunchtime, Members will vote on a report on the European Commission proposal to change the way EU overseas countries and territories are funded. Parliament’s Development Committee is proposing to increase the budget for the non-UK linked overseas territories plus Greenland to €669 million, and to include these territories in EU regional dialogues with their immediate neighbours. The measures also seek to reinforce environmental and human rights considerations, as well as the territories’ competitiveness.

Visit the European Parliament homepage on Future of Europe

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© Delphotostock / Fotolia

On 15 January, the House of Commons overwhelmingly rejected the Withdrawal Agreement which the British Prime Minister, Theresa May, had negotiated with the rest of the European Union, throwing into disarray efforts to ensure the country’s orderly exit from the bloc. However, the Prime Minister then survived a no-confidence vote tabled by the Opposition and later proposed tweaking her deal in a bid to win over rebel Conservative law-makers and the Northern Ireland Democratic Unionist Party, on which her government depends for its majority. British and European politicians are weighing various options as to how to proceed.

This note offers links to reports and commentaries from some major international think-tanks and research institutes on Brexit negotiations and related issues. More reports on the topic can be found in a previous edition of ‘What Think Tanks are thinking’, published in December 2018.

The Prime Minister moves an inch on Brexit
Institute for Government, January 2019

After the meaningful vote: What are Theresa May’s options?
Centre for European Reform, January 2019

Brexit and crisis management: No deal and the future relationship
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2019

The EU’s ‘no deal’ strategic headache
European Policy Centre, January 2019

The way forward: Can a protocol to the Withdrawal Agreement save the Prime Minister’s deal?
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2019

Brexit disorder: Corbyn and May
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

We regret and we need more clarity: European reactions to the ‘meaningful vote’
Open Europe, January 2019

We are entering a new phase of Brexit distractions
Institute for Government, January 2019

Failed deal spells uncertainty for Brexit and May’s long-term survival
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

Non-euro countries in the EU after Brexit
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, January 2019

The risks of the ‘Grieve amendment’ to remove precedence for Government business
Policy Exchange, January 2019

By accident or design, a pre-Brexit general election remains the most plausible outcome
The UK in a Changing Europe, January 2019

Bracing for Brexit: Could ‘no deal’ chaos spread to Germany?
European Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

What the Brexit shambles says about the state of British democracy
German Marshall Fund, January 2019

The contest to ‘take control’ of Brexit
Policy Exchange, January 2019

What Brexit means
Council on Foreign Relations, January 2019

The Prime Minister’s negotiation failed: The UK must learn the lessons
European Centre for International Political Economy, January 2019

The need for a People’s Vote
Policy Network, January 2019

Brexit showdown
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

LSE blog: Brexit
London School of Economics, January 2019

Will Jeremy Corbyn rescue Britain from its Brexit disaster?
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2019

Brexit endgame: Parliament votes down Theresa May’s Brexit deal
Brookings Institution, January 2019

EU budget implications of a no-deal Brexit
Bruegel, January 2019

Brexit, Asia and the increased lure of Europe
Friends of Europe, January 2019

What would it take for the EU to extend Article 50?
Institute for Government, January 2019

The UK’s Brexit breakdown
Scottish Centre for European Relations, January 2019

Between amputation and strengthening: What Brexit?
Jacquest Delors Instiute, January 2019

A route out of the Brexit crisis?
Scottish Centre for European Relations, January 2019

The implications of no-deal Brexit: Is the European Union prepared?
Bruegel, January 2019

May survives confidence vote, but now must deliver a new Brexit plan
Atlantic Council, January 2019

Lessons in leadership: Theresa May and Brexit
Atlantic Council, January 2019

Food politics and policies in post-Brexit Britain
Chatham House, January 2019

How a second referendum could be the best way to overcome Brexit impasse
Bruegel, December 2018

The Brexit endgame: Key challenges ahead – Perspectives from Germany, Ireland and Scotland
Kondrad Adenauer Stiftung, December 2019

Brexit: Next steps in UK’s withdrawal from the EU
House of Commons Library, 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Brexit: The lastest impasse‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

© MarekPhotoDesign.com / Fotolia

Every day, citizens from all across the EU and the wider world address the European Parliament to request information, express opinions or suggest ideas on an extensive range of topics. The Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP) provides answers to citizens on the issues they raise. In 2018, citizens put more than 30 000 questions, suggestions and comments to the European Parliament or its President.

Topics of the year

The European Commission’s plans to end seasonal clock changes in the European Union (EU) generated a significant share of mail from citizens in 2018. The European Parliament and Council considered the legislative proposal, which would allow EU countries to decide whether their citizens would live in winter or summer time.

We also received a large number of messages ahead of the European Parliament vote on its position on a legislative proposal updating the copyright directive in September 2018. The proposal was hotly debated, with some arguing that the measures would ensure fair remuneration for journalists and publishers, and others highlighting the risks of filtering and control of the internet.

The environment was also a topic of great interest for citizens, particularly single-use plastics, which are a source of marine litter. To tackle the issue, the European Commission has proposed to ban or restrict certain plastic items commonly found on European beaches. The European Parliament has ensured that the legislation adopted is more ambitious than the initial proposal.

Two individual cases have also generated reactions from citizens: the early termination of the office of Richard Czarnecki, a Vice-President of the European Parliament, and the legal battle regarding Alfie Evans, a toddler who suffered from a neurological degenerative condition.

Frequent themes

The functioning and activities of the European Parliament continued to be, as in previous years, a topic of interest. Many citizens wanted to know about the activities of Members of the European Parliament and how to contact them, as well as how to exercise their right of petition, how to visit the institution, and how to apply for a job or a traineeship in the EU institutions. Citizens also wrote to the European Parliament to comment on and ask questions about the Brexit process.

Civil liberties, justice and home affairs was an important area of interest for citizens addressing the Ask EP unit. Reactions related mainly to the political situation in Catalonia and the visit of Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg to the European Parliament in May 2018. Citizens also wrote to the European Parliament to comment and ask questions on migration and refugee policies, and to comment and request action on the political situation in some EU countries.

Citizens also turned to the European Parliament for answers on the political situation outside the EU, for instance in Kosovo, Palestine, Russia, Syria, Turkey and Ukraine.

Another fundamental area of direct concern frequently shared by citizens writing to our service relates to employment and social affairs, in particular pension schemes, employment policy and working conditions. Citizens also contacted the European Parliament for comments and queries on culture and education, in particular free Interrail passes and Erasmus+.

In 2019, continue to put your questions to the Citizens’ Enquiries Unit (Ask EP)! We reply in the EU language that you use to write to us.

Written by Zsolt G. Pataki with Riccardo Molinari,

© Sergey Nivens

The aim of the event was to examine the opportunities and challenges of moving towards a digital democracy, with well-informed, perceptive contributions from representatives of most EPTA member organisations with a long experience in technology assessment and foresight. In his welcome speech, Ramón Luis VALCÁRCEL SISO, Vice-President of the European Parliament responsible for STOA, argued that assessing the impact of new technologies on our democratic processes and institutions was truly relevant today, when objective facts seem to be less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief. Democratic institutions must therefore face both the positive and the negative side of technological evolution, which, on the one hand, increases transparency and strengthens the democratic processes, but on the other, facilitates the proliferation of illegal activities.

#FutureTechLecture

The EPTA Conference 2018 entitled ‘Towards a digital democracy – Opportunities and challenges’ focused on democratic processes in the era of breakthrough technologies such as quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and blockchain. The conference took place on 4 December 2018 in the framework of the presidency of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network, which STOA held for 2018.

The event included three sessions:

• The first session, on ‘Interactions between Quantum Technology (QT), Block Chain (BC) and Artificial Intelligence (AI)’, was led by Eva KAILI (S&D, Greece), Chair of STOA.
• The second session, entitled ‘Societal and political debate’, was moderated by Mady DELVAUX (ALDE, Luxembourg), member of STOA.
• The third session, on ‘Experiences and outlook’, was chaired by Wolfgang HILLER, Director for Impact Assessment and European Added Value, DG EPRS.

In each session, Members of the European Parliament, members and experts representing their constituents, 17 EPTA member countries and regions from the entire world, as well as the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, shared their experiences with new technologies and their impact on the democratic processes in their geographical area of competence. There was a common understanding among the participants that these technologies have already started to produce effects on democracy by modifying interactions at different levels, from the legislative, to that of relations between the media and the citizens, as well as policy areas from security and defence to the economy.

To understand all the facets of this complex situation, it is essential to examine it from different angles. The different experiences and outlooks presented by the EPTA Members of Parliament, members and experts were therefore very precious contributions to the debate. The outcome was a wide-ranging collection of knowledge that provided the pieces to an elaborate puzzle.

Interested? The complete report can be found on the EPTA website.

How to prepare ourselves for a world using quantum technologies

On the afternoon of the same day, STOA hosted its 17th Annual Lecture, entitled ‘Quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity: Catching up with the future’. The lecture was linked thematically to the EPTA Conference and focused on the opportunities and challenges created by greatly enhanced computing power, as well as other applications of quantum technologies. The lecture touched upon issues of cybersecurity and data protection at a time of widespread use of big data, artificial intelligence and data analytics.

© Plotplot/ Shutterstock

After a warm welcome from Ramón Luis VALCÁRCEL SISO, Vice-President of the European Parliament, responsible for STOA, STOA Chair Eva KAILI introduced the two eminent keynote speakers: Anton ZEILINGER, Professor of Physics and President of the Austrian Academy of Sciences; and Esther WOJCICKI, American technology educator and journalist at the Palo Alto High School Media Arts Program.

In the first talk, entitled ‘From quantum puzzles to quantum communication’, Professor ZEILINGER made a link between the first quantum revolution, which began in the first decades of the twentieth century, (where wave-particle duality, based on the work of such European scientists as Marie Skłodowska Curie, Niels Bohr, Max Planck, Erwin Schrödinger and Albert Einstein allowed a better understanding of the structure of matter (atoms, chemical bonds) and the crucial role they played in the development of new inventions, such as lasers, optical fibres, transistors and integrated circuits.

The speaker argued that we are in the middle of the second quantum revolution, which promises a great deal for the future. As Professor ZEILINGER explained, we are no longer in the world of inandout, of zeroandone, and of onand off. Whereas ordinary computers use ‘bits’ to store and process information, which can only occupy two definite states (0 or 1), a quantum computer would also allow a ‘quantum superposition’ of these two states. These superpositions would vastly speed up computation of certain problems, potentially by several orders of magnitude, making it possible to solve such problems much faster than with classical computers.

In the second keynote speech, entitled ‘Preparing students for a world dominated by quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, computer security and the media’, Esther WOJCICKI pointed out that today’s education is based on a teaching approach where students sit passively just listening to lessons. She believes that students will vastly benefit if they spend 20 % of their time working on collaborative projects, using smartphones, tablets and other modern technology. Esther WOJCICKI highlighted how today’s students need to acquire skills in such areas as collaboration, creativity, critical thinking and communication and through what she calls TRICK, i.e. trust, respect, independence, collaboration and kindness.

According to the speaker, the new generations would be better prepared to face the new reality if we allowed ourselves to change our teaching and education methods. Esther WOJCICKI therefore called for a change of culture, as this is the century of the media, and students to have to learn to use them in an ethical and intelligent way.

Interested? To keep up to date with the activities of STOA, follow our website, the EPRS blog, Twitter and Think Tank pages.

Written by Philip Boucher,

In the context of climate change, we often talk about the need to achieve public support for low-carbon energy technologies. However, new installations frequently face public opposition, and there are gaps between how regulators, developers and experts conceptualise and respond.

Public acceptance of energy infrastructures goes beyond individual consumer choices. While almost all citizens make use of energy from the grid, some may object to the impacts of specific installations on their local environment, economy, sense of place, or a wide range of other factors. Opposition may also be more global, on the basis of climate change impacts. These opponents are sometimes characterised as ‘luddites’, dogmatically opposed to any kind of technology development, or as ‘NIMBYs’ (derived from ‘not in my back yard’), who want to use green energy but object to infrastructural developments in their local area. These characterisations are often found in popular discourse and, while they do provide a model for understanding opposition, they do not open many avenues for resolving disagreements.

A third characterisation suggests that opponents have misunderstood the technology or hold irrational fears of its potential impacts. This is known as the ‘knowledge deficit model’ and it is frequently found in strategies for managing the introduction of new technologies into society. Unlike luddite or NIMBY conceptualisations, the deficit model does indicate a practical means of responding to opposition and fostering public acceptance by informing citizens about the technology, particularly how it works and what benefits it can bring. For regulators, developers and other stakeholders that are eager to reap the promised social, environmental or economic benefits of technologies, it can be tempting and intuitive to adopt one of these three characterisations. The deficit model is particularly attractive when opposition is expected but there is little appetite to change the development path.

However, studies of public opposition to low-carbon energy technologies have repeatedly highlighted the inaccuracy and ineffectiveness of the luddite, NIMBY and knowledge deficit conceptualisations. They tend to misrepresent the often nuanced and sensitive concerns of citizens with simplistic or even pejorative caricatures of opposition. As a result – instead of opening paths to mutual understanding, dialogue and resolution – they are more likely to escalate tensions and lead to entrenched positions. Concepts such as ‘beyond NIMBYism’, ‘responsible research and innovation‘ and Science with and for Society have provided practical measures for understanding and responding to this opposition, usually focusing on establishing meaningful dialogues between the full range of actors involved, particularly developers and citizens, from the earliest stages of development.

STOA is organising a workshop, entitled ‘Responding to public opposition to low-carbon energy technologies’, which will provide an opportunity to discover and discuss several perspectives on understanding and responding to public opposition to low-carbon energy technologies. The workshop will also serve as the launch of a new STOA study, which reviews academic perspectives on these issues. It will open with a welcome address from STOA First Vice-Chair Paul RÜBIG (EPP, Austria), and an introduction to the workshop from the workshop’s chair and moderator JENS GEIER (S&D, Germany). This will be followed by a panel discussion, with presentations from Antonella BATTAGLINI (CEO, Renewables Grid Initiative), Sarah MANDER (Senior Researcher at the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research and lead author of the STOA study, Catharina SIKOW-MAGNY (Head of Unit, DG Energy, European Commission), Rosemary STEEN (Director of External Affairs, EirGrid) and Ilse TANT (Chief Public Acceptance Officer, Elia System Operator). The event will conclude with a Q&A session and debate with all participants.

Register to attend or watch the live webstream on the STOA event page.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© durantelallera / Fotolia

The sexual assault allegations brought against Hollywood producer Harvey Weinstein laid bare the painful reality for scores of women working in the film industry around the world. However, sexual harassment is seemingly just the tip of the iceberg in an industry where gender inequalities relating to biased representation and pay are arguably systematic and pervasive. Europe’s own film industry has not been spared. The weighted average of films directed by women in the 2012-2016 period is just 19.6 %, with country results varying from 5 % (Latvia) to 30 % (Sweden). More worryingly, research shows that the various positions in the film industry appear to be dominated by one or the other gender. Thus, women are over-represented in professions traditionally considered feminine – such as costume design and editing – and under-represented in others viewed as more technical, such as those dealing with sound, music and image.

To start redressing these imbalances, various EU-level initiatives have been introduced in support of female film projects. One such example is the LUX Film Prize, through which over the past 11 years the European Parliament has been consistently encouraging the dissemination of films directed by women and portraying strong, inspiring female characters. For its part, the European Commission has started measuring women’s participation in key positions in projects supported under the Media strand of its Creative Europe programme. Similarly, it is currently considering specific ways for a more gender-balanced provision of support. Yet again, the cultural support fund of the Council of Europe – Eurimages – committed in its 2018-2020 strategy to achieving equal distribution of co‑production funding between women and men by the year 2020; the distribution of funding currently stands at 38 %. Sweden is the EU leader in terms of regulatory policies at national level. The critical acclaim won by Swedish female filmmakers in the past 10 years has shown that by applying a methodical and systematic approach it is possible to achieve gender equality without compromising quality.

Read the complete briefing on ‘The place of women in European film productions: Fighting the celluloid ceiling‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

• Average percentage of films directed by women in the EU, 2012-2016
• Positions of women in fiction film projects receiving Eurimages funding, 2014-2015
• Gender share of overall festival participation and awards
• Types of policies pursued in the EU
• Proportion of fiction films with a woman in a key role, with or without funding from the Swedish Film Institute, 2000-2016

With European elections coming up in May 2019, you probably want to know how the European Union impacts your daily life, before you think about voting. In the latest in a series of posts on what Europe does for you, your family, your business and your wellbeing, we look at what Europe does for pregnant women at work.

Twitter Hashtag #EUandME

© FotoAndalucia / Fotolia

Pregnancy is a special time when you need to take particular care of yourself and the baby inside you. If you are well, you may want to work right up until the day you give birth, in which case you can expect your working conditions to be adjusted to ensure your safety and that of your unborn child. The EU has played an important role in improving protection for pregnant working women. EU legislation sets minimum standards regarding situations that could be risky or dangerous for pregnant employees and in which cases employers are obliged to take action. Depending on the type of work, pregnant women can take advantage of possibilities to reduce working time or refrain from certain types of task that could put their pregnancy at risk. In addition, pregnant workers are not obliged to work night shifts if that would be contrary to medical advice. Without loss of pay, pregnant women are permitted to attend antenatal medical appointments during working hours. At all events, they should not be discriminated against at work or dismissed because of the fact that they are pregnant.

Although there has been significant progress regarding the protection of pregnant workers and those who have recently given birth, the EU is now working on better rules. As part of broader measures to improve people’s work-life balance, the EU has suggested further measures to secure appropriate working conditions for pregnant employees. It is now up to the Member States to discuss them and agree.

Further information

• EPRS publication ‘A new directive on work-life balance’, 2018, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank
• EU legislation on protection of pregnant workers and new mothers, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
• European Parliament resolution concerning labour market conditions favourable for work-life balance, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P8-TA-2016-0338&language=EN

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© assetseller / Fotolia

The European Union will face increasingly serious foreign policy and defence challenges in 2019. The current Administration in the United States seems to be abandoning its traditional role of the ‘benign protector’ of the rules-based international order. Russia, according to many analysts, continues to try to undermine the democratic process in many Western countries and China’s foreign policy is becoming more and more assertive, notably in the economic field. Furthermore, migration, Brexit and cyber-security, as well as a lack of EU unity on certain issues, also feature amongst key challenges.

This note offers links to recent selected commentaries, studies and reports from major international think tanks on EU foreign and defence policies. Links to more reports on President Donald Trump’s policies, Russia, EU-China relations and NATO available in previous items of the series published last year.

President Donald Trump

What Trump means for Europe
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

How Europe will try to dodge the US–China standoff in 2019
Chatham House, December 2018

Europe and Iran: The economic and commercial dimensions of a strained relationship
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2019

Divided at the centre: Germany, Poland, and the troubles of the Trump era
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2018

The Iran nuclear deal and the EU: A strategic awakening?
Clingendael, November 2018

The United States, Russia, and Europe in 2018: Chipping away at four Gordian knots
Russian International Affairs Council, November 2018

Us and U.S.? Not all in Europe want to be a “counterweight” to Donald Trump’s United States
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, September 2018

Trump’s misguided attack on European unity
Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

Russia

Western countries must rethink how to deter Russian aggression against Ukraine
Chatham House, December 2018

Is Russia about to invade Ukraine?
Atlantic Council, December 2018

Beyond borderlands: Ensuring the sovereignty of all nations of Eastern Europe
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Putin’s fourth term: The twilight begins?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2018

Hacks, leaks and disruptions: Russian cyber strategies
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2018

Russia and the Baltics: A testing ground for NATO–EU defence cooperation
Instituto Affari Internazionali, September 2018

Russia’s return to the Middle East: Building sandcastles?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, July 2018

Tailored assurance: Balancing deterrence and disarmament in responding to NATO-Russia tensions
Institut français des relations internationals, July 2018

China

Development through acquisition: The domestic background of China’s Europe policy
Instituto Affari Internazionali, January 2019

EU-India cooperation and China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Clingendael, January 2019

Are China’s trade practices really unfair?
Centre for European Policy Studies, December 2018

The EU and China: Modest signs of convergence?
Egmont, December 2018

Political values in Europe-China relations

Clingendael, December 2018

Les multiples atouts de la stratégie sécuritaire de la Chine en Afrique
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et securite, December 2018

Other reports on defence

1919-2019: How to make peace last? European strategy and the future of the world order
Egmont, January 2019

Eyes tight shut: European attitudes towards nuclear deterrence
European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2018

Permanent deterrence: Enhancements to the US military presence in North Central Europe
Atlantic Council, December 2018

Le Brexit et la défense européenne: Un choix de fond pour l’Union
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et securite, December 2018

Under the gun: Rearmament for arms control in Europe
European Council on Foreign Relations, November 2018

Strategic autonomy: Towards ‘European sovereignty’ in defence?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, November 2018

NATO nuclear sharing and the future of nuclear deterrence in Europe
The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, November 2018

A ‘European’ army? Eminently defensible but not probable for a long time to come
Atlantic Council, November 2018

The erosion of strategic stability and the future of arms control in Europe
Institut français des relations internationales, November 2018

Reinforcing EU-NATO cooperation: Walking the talk?
Beyond the Horizon, November 2018

EU-NATO relations: A long-term perspective
Egmont, November 2018

The civilian CSDP compact: A success story for the EU’s crisis management Cinderella?
European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, October 2018

Confronting an “axis of cyber”? China, Iran, North Korea, Russia in cyberspace
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, October 2018

Global evaluation of the European Union engagement on counter-terrorism
International Centre for Counter-Terrorism – The Hague; Royal United Services Institute, October 2018

The challenges of NATO nuclear policy: Alliance management under the Trump Administration
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 2018

France’s European intervention initiative: Towards a culture of burden sharing
Wilfried Martens Centre, October 2018

NATO after the Brussels summit: Bruised or emboldened?
German Marshall Fund, September 2018

Germany and European defence cooperation: A post-Atlantic turn?
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, September 2018

Debating security plus: Conflict, competition and cooperation in an interconnected world
Friends of Europe, September 2018

The nightmare of the dark: The security fears that keep Europeans awake at night
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2018

Complementarity without competition: How NATO can benefit from stronger European defense cooperation
Atlantic Council, July 2018

EU-NATO cooperation: Distinguishing narrative from substance
Jacques Delors Institute, July 2018

Other reports on foreign policy

The EU’s re-engagement with the Western Balkans: A new chapter long overdue
Centre for European Policy Studies, January 2019

Refugee movements in the Middle East: Old crises, new ideas
Instituto Affari Internazionali, January 2019

How populism spills over into foreign policy
Carnegie Europe, January 2019

Strengthening European commercial diplomacy: Prospects and challenges
Instituto Affari Internazionali, December 2018

Back in control, Syria’s regime tries to build its legitimacy
Chatham House, December 2018

Merkel’s foreign policy footprint
Carnegie Europe, December 2018

Some EU governments leaving the UN Global Compact on Migration: A contradiction in terms?
Centre for European Policy Studies, November 2018

Ein Europäischer Sicherheitsrat: Mehrwert für die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der EU?
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

Die nachrichtendienstlichen Schnittstellen der EU-Sicherheitspolitik
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

New realities in foreign affairs: Diplomacy in the 21st century
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, November 2018

UN migration agreement leads to splits in the European Union
Atlantic Council, November 2018

Crimes sans châtiment ou la dérangeante complaisance des démocraties européennes envers Riyad
Groupe de recherche et d’information sur la paix et securite, October 2018

Regional geopolitical rivalries in the Middle East: Implications for Europe
Instituto Affari Internazionali, October 2018

EU foreign policy in a networked world: Webs against power politics
Finnish Institute of International Affairs, October 2018

EU Grenzpolitiken: Der humanitäre und geopolitische Preis von Externalisierungsstrategien im Grenzschutz
Österreichische Institut für Internationale Politik, October 2018

Halting ambition: EU migration and security policy in the Sahel
European Council on Foreign Relations, September 2018

How a European Security Council could strengthen EU foreign policy: Brussels’ new telephone number?
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, August 2018

The EU’s four strategic challenges
Jacques Delors Institute, July 2018

EU–Japan relations in the age of competitive economic governance
Clingendael, July 2018

De-radicalization in the Mediterranean
Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale, July 2018

Geopolitical outlook for Europe: Confrontation vs cooperation
European Political Strategy Centre, June 2018

Read this briefing on ‘Foreign policy and defence challenges‘ on the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.