European Parliamentary Research Service Blog

Written by Marcin Szczepanski,

© doidam10 / Fotolia

It has been a decade since the financial crisis erupted and changed the world in 2008. Few at the time guessed what would be its magnitude and long-term consequences. The interconnectedness of the economy and the financial sector facilitated the spread of the crisis from the United States to Europe. First, the EU faced the Great Recession in the 2008-2009 period and then, after a short recovery, several Member States succumbed to the sovereign debt crisis. The combined crises had catastrophic consequences for economic growth, investment, employment and the fiscal position of many Member States. The EU engaged in short-term ‘fire-fighting’ measures such as bailouts to save banks and help stressed sovereigns, while at the same time reforming the inadequate framework. While signs of moderate recovery showed in 2014, the risk of falling into deflation or secular stagnation remained high, and it was only in 2017 that the EU economy returned to a state similar to that of before the crisis. The signs in 2019 are not so promising however.

Many efforts have been made to improve resilience in the EU and the euro area. These have included improving the stability of the financial sector, strengthening economic governance, creating a safety net for sovereigns in distress and carrying out structural reforms, particularly in the countries most affected. In addition, the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken unconventional policy measures. Nonetheless many argue that the pace of the reforms has slowed down considerably since 2013 when the economic situation began to improve.

The legacy of the crisis is still present and many challenges persist. These include the absence of a clear and agreed vision for the future of economic and monetary union (EMU), perennial macroeconomic imbalances and high public deficits in a number of Member States, and the ongoing risk of a doom loop between sovereigns and the banking sector. Post crisis vulnerabilities also include rising inequalities, youth unemployment and high in-work poverty risk levels.

See also our infographic, A decade on from the financial crisis: Key data.

Read the complete briefing on ‘A decade on from the start of the crisis: Main responses and remaining challenges‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ivana Katsarova,

© Ico Maker / Fotolia

Teaching – a profession that dates back through the generations – seems to have lost some of its attractiveness at present. An ageing teacher population, severe teacher shortages, difficulties with retaining younger teachers and a significant gender imbalance in staffing at different levels of education are just some of the serious challenges facing the profession. In the EU, only 7 % of all teachers are under 30 years old, while around 36 % are 50 or older. Also, 72 % of the nearly 6 million people working as school teachers are women, thus confirming the perception that teaching is a ‘woman’s world’. An extensive 2014 survey revealed that over a third of teachers in the EU work in schools with a shortage of qualified staff, and nearly half of school directors report a shortage of teachers for special needs pupils. Perhaps more worryingly, 81 % of teachers in the EU feel teaching is not valued in society. For most EU countries, raising the status and attractiveness of the teaching profession is therefore an urgent necessity. Despite the seriousness of the challenge, only 11 EU countries have taken some policy measures to make teaching more attractive.

EU education systems offer teachers various arrangements in terms of recruitment, career structure, professional development and support, and remuneration. The average starting salary in lower secondary education in the 2016-2017 period was €27 000, with top salaries peaking at €45 000. However, a strong geographical divide is noticeable, with salaries of school teachers in eastern Europe being substantially lower than those in western Europe.

Teachers have access to various mobility schemes through Erasmus, the EU’s flagship programme in the area of education. From 2014 to 2020, the programme has offered mobility opportunities to 800 000 education staff, thus confirming its growing impact and popularity. In March 2019, the European Parliament supported the tripling of the programme’s budget for 2021-2027, to make it more accessible and inclusive and enable more teachers and students to take part in it. Members of the European Parliament also proposed re-allocating the budget to different parts of the programme, as a way to offer pre-school and early education staff more possibilities to participate in mobility schemes.

Read the complete briefing on ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘Teaching careers in the EU: Why boys do not want to be teachers‘ on YouTube.

Written by Tarja Laaninen,

© pogonici / Fotolia

New plant genetic modification techniques, referred to as ‘gene editing’ or ‘genome editing’, have evolved rapidly in recent years, allowing much faster and more precise results than conventional plant-breeding techniques. They are seen as a promising innovative field for the agri-food industry, offering great technical potential.

There is, however, considerable debate as to how these new techniques should be regulated, and whether some or all of them should fall within the scope of EU legislation on genetically modified organisms (GMOs).

Those who take the view that the new techniques should be exempt from GMO legislation generally argue that the end product is very similar to products generated using conventional breeding techniques, or that similar changes could also occur naturally. Those who consider that the new techniques should fall within the scope of GMO legislation contend that the processes used mean that plants bred using the new techniques are in fact genetically modified.

In July 2018, the European Court of Justice gave a judgment ruling that genome-edited organisms fall under the scope of European GMO legislation. While welcomed by some, the judgment has also sparked criticism and calls for the new European Commission to amend EU GMO legislation.

This is an updated edition of a 2016 Briefing.

Read the complete briefing on ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘New plant-breeding techniques: Applicability of EU GMO rules‘ on YouTube.

Written by Marcin Grajewski,

© deepagopi2011 / Fotolia

The rapid development of digital technologies is posing a challenge to the European Union, spurring initiatives to catch up with the US and China in the area, notably in the context of the digital Single Market. Among the dilemmas are how to reconcile Europe’s sensitivity towards protecting private data with the need to use them in many algorithms, and ensure that automation and Artificial Intelligence strengthen rather than weaken labour market participation.

This note offers links to a series of some recent commentaries and reports from major international think tanks and research institutes on digital challenges. Many earlier papers on the issue can be found in a previous item of the series, published in July 2018. Many reports on cybersecuirty are available in a publication from October 2018

The case for intelligent industrial policy
Bruegel, October 2019

5G: What we talk about when we talk about trust, the EU risk assessment process
European Centre for International Political Economy, October 2019

Analytical report: Preparing the armed forces for disruptive technological changes
European Policy Centre, September 2019

On-location client-determined moderately skilled platform work
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

Banking, FinTech, Big Tech: Emerging challenges for financial policymakers
Bruegel, September 2019

Blockchain is the real thing
Centre for European Policy Studies, September 2019

In an era of digitalisation, the Single Market needs a software update
Bruegel, September 2019

Jobs and robots: Europe’s debate over the destiny of the welfare state
Bruegel, September 2019

China’s digital trade success: Two different perspectives
European Centre for International Political Economy, September 2019

The end of techno-utopianism
German Marshall Fund, September 2019

Making the Single Market work: Launching a 2022 masterplan for Europe
European Policy Centre, August 2019

Artificial Intelligence prediction and counterterrorism
Chatham House, August 2019

Machine politics: Europe and the AI revolution
European Council on Foreign Relations, July 2019

How to strengthen Europe’s agenda on digital connectivity
Cligendael, July 2019

Creating a digital roadmap for a circular economy
European Policy Centre, July 2019

Europas nächste Schritte für die erfolgreiche Gestaltung der Digitalisierung
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, July 2019

Digitalisation and European welfare states
Bruegel, July 2019

Europe’s 5G wake-up call
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

The impact of digitalisation on labour market inclusion of people with disabilities
Centre for European Policy Studies, July 2019

Exploring media literacy education as a tool for mitigating truth decay
Rand Corporation, July 2019

Sustainability in the age of platforms
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

The EU’s security union: A bill of health
Centre for European Reform, June 2019

Harnessing artificial intelligence
European Council on Foreign Relations, June 2019

Zeit für ein Update: was die Menschen in Deutschland über Digitalisierung denken
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, June 2019

Europe and the digital arms race: Is winter coming?
Centre for European Policy Studies, June 2019

Digitalization and the future of work: Macroeconomic consequences
Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung, June 2019

Europe’s digital future: United and determined to win
Friends of Europe, June 2019

Why all the Facebook fire? Because it is the most cynical
German Marshall Fund, June 2019

Digitalsteuer in der EU – wo stehen wir?
Bertelsmann Stiftung, Jacques Delors Institute, May 2019

The future of work? Work of the future! On how artificial intelligence, robotics and automation are transforming jobs and the economy in Europe
European Political Strategy Centre, May 2019

Europe: The global centre for excellent research
Bruegel, May 2019

Norm contestation in the digital era: Campaigning for refugee rights
Chatham House, May 2019

Do data policy restrictions impact the productivity performance of firms and industries?
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, April 2019

A roadmap for a fair data economy
Lisbon Council, April 2019

Is this blog post legal (under new EU copyright law)?
Bruegel, April 2019

New digital threats to media pluralism in the information age
European University Institute, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, March 2019

Security first, technology second: Putin tightens his grip on Russia’s Internet, with China’s help
Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik

Users, data, networks: Taxing the digital economy
Jacques Delors Institute , Bertelsmann Stiftung, March 2019

Artificial Intelligence: Ethics, governance and policy challenges
Centre for European Policy Studies, February 2019

Escaping the startup trap: Can policymakers help small companies grow to major employers
Progressive Policy Institute, February 2019

5G, Huawei und die Sicherheit unserer Kommunikationsnetze
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, February 2019

The European Digital Single Market: Delivering economic benefits for citizens and businesses
Bruegel, January 2019

Transformation numérique de l’industrie: L’enjeu franco-allemand
Institut français des relations internationales, January 2019

Four internets: The geopolitics of digital governance
Centre for International Governance Innovation, January 2019

Digital Europe: Next steps, a European Agenda for the Digital-9+
Lisbon Council, November 2019

Read this briefing on ‘Digital challenges for Europe‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Philip Boucher,

© shutterstock

Europeans are ageing. In 2016, there were 3.3 people of working-age for each citizen over 65 years. By 2070, this will fall to only two. As the population lives longer, our care needs grow, but fewer people will be available to deliver them. Could assistive technologies (ATs) help us to meet the challenges of elderly care?

It is important to recognise some key differences between age-related and sudden or lifelong impairments. First, age-related impairments of hearing, vision or mobility tend to be gradual. As such, the adjustment strategies are likely to differ from those that respond to sudden or lifelong impairments. Older individuals may be more likely to have multiple impairments – such as visual, hearing, mobility and cognitive impairments – which could affect the suitability of ATs that rely upon other sensory modalities or capabilities. Contextual differences are of crucial importance, and support for learning, employment and social inclusion may differ for sudden or lifelong and age-related impairments. There may also be differences in the experience of stigma and prejudice, and the relationship with new technologies.

It is also worth noting that all technologies are, to an extent, assistive, in the sense that they help people to achieve things more quickly, easily or effectively than would otherwise be possible. While ATs are designed specifically in response to impairments, people, impaired or not, regularly use all kinds of technologies to augment their personal abilities. As such, many insights that refer to ATs will also be relevant for mainstream technologies, and vice versa. Furthermore, technologies can be disabling in cases where new developments make services less accessible to some users, as can be the case where button-based interfaces are replaced by touchscreens that do not account for the needs of blind users.

Potential impacts and developments

In 2016, the European Parliament’s Panel for the Future of Science and Technology (STOA) conducted a study of ATs for visual and hearing impairments, both of which are particularly prevalent amongst older citizens, and anticipated to increase along with the ageing European population. For visual impairments, ATs are sometimes designed to augment the affected sense, such as traditional reading glasses or screen magnifying applications, while others convey visual information via other senses, such as touch or sound. The latter include traditional low-tech devices such as white canes and Braille texts, as well as embossed or tactile maps and textured surfaces to support navigation. There are also high-tech equivalents, such as smart canes, haptic computer devices and text-to-speech converters. In the future, augmented reality spectacles may help users by magnifying images, filtering colours and providing object and facial recognition assistance by audio. One day, it may even be possible to repair or replace specific body parts, for example with ‘bionic eyes‘, which convert light to electrical impulses that are transmitted directly to the user’s nervous system. For hearing impairments, ATs can also make use of the affected sensory modality, as is the case for hearing aids, which amplify certain sound frequencies, and cochlear implants, which are surgically implanted sensors that convert sound inputs into electrical signals that are directed to the auditory nerve. Other ATs for hearing impairments make use of different senses, for example by alerting the user – via light, vibration or a combination of the two – about specific events that would usually be perceived audibly. Taking this further, text and video technologies can be used as a substitute for verbal communication. In future, advanced versions of many of these technologies, such as advanced auditory brainstem implants, could bypass the ear entirely, stimulating brainstem neurons directly. Augmented reality glasses (already mentioned in the context of visual impairments), could be used to communicate audio signals in the form of text.

Regarding mobility impairments, which are also often associated with old age, ATs such as mobility scooters and home stair lifts have been available for some time, as well as mainstream mobility technologies such as elevators. Future developments may include care robots that help users to move from their bed to their wheelchair and bathtub, and a proliferation of ATs to assist with the independent performance of daily tasks such as personal care, timekeeping, shopping, appliance use, and food preparation and consumption. While many of these ATs may be used by people with disabilities of all ages, other ATs are designed specifically for elderly users. For example the robot seal designed for dementia sufferers as well as other elderly people at risk of social, cognitive or emotional isolation.

Depending upon their implementation, such ATs might support and augment human care and companionship. Perhaps taking care of some of the more difficult tasks would enable elderly people to live with greater autonomy and independence for longer, and free up resources which could be used to enable other meaningful human interactions. However, there are also potential ethical risks. If ATs were to replace human contact, this would carry risks of isolation and alienation. In this sense, the aspiration for independence and autonomy in old age may conflict with the value of social inclusion and integration of elderly citizens. Some vulnerable people may experience illusory relationships with technical artefacts that could never reciprocate their feelings. In extreme cases, reliance on ATs for elderly care could leave vulnerable people with less regular human-to-human contact, which may also have health implications.

Anticipatory policy-making

While future ATs are promising, current ATs are not used to their full potential. A more effective promotion of the distribution and use of existing ATs could provide more immediate benefits than developing more advanced ATs. In this sense, social and regulatory action may be more important than technological development. While ATs offer significant support for some aspects of people’s lives, it is also important to consider social and regulatory action for social inclusion. For example, while ATs may ensure elderly citizens’ functional capability to remain in employment for longer, social change may also be required in order to counteract stigma, as well as organisational changes such as flexitime and working from home.

‘One-size-fits-all’ approaches for technology and policy are not well suited to this domain because everyone has different abilities and individual circumstances. Many people have multiple disabilities, while further differences appear in their social and economic resources, as well as in their personal needs, desires and preferences. Others are subjected to multiple forms of stigma or discrimination, as highlighted in a recent report on the problems facing women with disabilities in the workplace. Each individual’s circumstances can be as important as their impairments, or the AT’s capabilities, in shaping the extent to which the AT can respond to their impairment. Technology development and policy development need to be nuanced and flexible enough to respond to this range of individual circumstances.

Effective change should target all social groups, and it is important that action to achieve inclusivity does not target elderly people exclusively. For example, the problems of discrimination and stigma require attitudinal and organisational change that permeates society. Wider actions are also required in the specific area of ATs. For example, many people will increasingly encounter ATs in their professional and personal lives, perhaps in the form of tools for facilitating communication with citizens with multiple impairments. Understanding how to engage with others effectively through these means is important for health professionals and public services, as well as for designers of digital services and infrastructure.

The establishment of a defined profession of experts in the application of ATs could play an important role in addressing several issues. As well as providing support for individuals in the adoption of ATs that respond to their specific needs and individual circumstances – including old age – they could also help individuals without impairments to interact more effectively and inclusively with people using ATs. Their experience would also be valuable in informing the development of new ATs, as well as mainstream technologies that will be used by people with and without impairments.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Listen to podcast ‘What if technologies replaced humans in elderly care?‘ on YouTube.

Written by Clare Ferguson,

European Parliament (CC BY-NC-ND 2.0)

With momentous political changes occurring on the European scene, the agenda for the second plenary session of October features a number of high-profile issues, encompassing the outcome of the October European Council meeting and the Brexit negotiations, European Union (EU) enlargement, the end of the current Commission’s term, negotiations on the future EU budget and financing the fight against climate change.

A debate on Tuesday morning follows European Council and Commission statements on the outcome of the important European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019. If the United Kingdom House of Commons votes in favour of the deal announced on 17 October, it is likely that Members will then debate giving consent to the Withdrawal Agreement during this session.

Another item discussed at the European Council meeting features on the agenda on Wednesday morning, when Members will hear Council and Commission statements on the situation regarding EU accession negotiations with North Macedonia and Albania. Declared a priority by both outgoing and incoming Commission Presidents, Parliament supports the opening of negotiations with the western Balkan countries. However, Member States have expressed reservations regarding specific issues (regarding Albania in particular), and on the enlargement process in general. At stake is striking the right balance between the EU’s ability to honour its commitments towards third countries, whilst also protecting its own geostrategic and domestic interests.

Although the renewal of the European Commission has been postponed beyond the scheduled date of 1 November, current President of the Commission Jean‑Claude Juncker is expected to present a statement on Tuesday morning, encompassing a review of the Juncker Commission. Whilst facing some challenging situations during the 2014-2019 period, including terrorist attacks and increased refugee movements, analysis of the Juncker Commission’s 10 priorities shows that some two thirds of the Commission’s proposals during the period have resulted in changes to the law. However, progress has been slower on growth, jobs, investment and trade. The vote on the von der Leyen Commission has been postponed until late November, pending the organisation of hearings for new nominees from France, Hungary and Romania.

Members are expected to debate the Council position on all sections of the general budget of the European Union for 2020 on Tuesday afternoon. Once Parliament adopts its amendments, the budget will be the subject of conciliation negotiations between the institutions. However Parliament’s Committee on Budgets proposes to reject the reductions imposed by the Council and instead to increase expenditure on priorities such as the European Pillar of Social Rights, the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals and, in particular, meeting EU climate targets. The topical debate for this session, on Wednesday, will see Members discuss the current climate and ecological emergency in the presence of Council and Commission. While the EU is on track to meet its 2020 greenhouse gas emissions reduction targets, with greater energy efficiency and increased use of renewables already achieved, more effort is needed. However, adapting to new climate measures, including providing mitigation, costs money, and may require a significant outlay of EU public resources.

Continuing on financial matters on Tuesday afternoon, the previous Parliament decided to postpone the decision on granting discharge for the 2017 accounts of the Council/European Council and the European Asylum Support Office (EASO) in March of this year. This now returns to the agenda, with Parliament expected to take a position in both cases. A Budgetary Control Committee report proposes that Parliament again refuse to grant discharge to the Council (which disputes the standing practice that Parliament grants discharge separately for each institution and body), as that institution has again failed to provide requested information, to separate the budget of the European Council from the Council’s budget, and to align with the interinstitutional transparency register. Corporate sponsorship of Council presidencies is also a sticking point. Regarding EASO, irregularities uncovered during the previous directorship led to refusal of that institution’s accounts for 2017. While the CONT committee notes that the new EASO management has committed to reforms, due to the previous problems in public procurement and recruitment procedures underlying payments, it proposes to refuse discharge for 2017.

Written by Jana Titievskaia,

© 9dreamstudio / Fotolia

The EU’s common commercial policy (CCP), or trade policy, has evolved gradually over the years to encompass a range of trade-related areas under the remit of European Union (EU) exclusive competence. The Treaty of Rome established the common market and the customs union with a focus on goods. Later treaties expanded the CCP to services and commercial aspects of intellectual property rights. Trade policy falls under the EU’s exclusive competence, meaning that the EU manages trade policy and trade negotiations on behalf of the Member States. The determination of competence is critical for the procedures needed to conclude trade agreements, as in areas falling under shared competence these need to be ratified by both the EU and Member States. This has led to trade and investment agreements being split into two parts to speed up the ratification process for the trade parts, following European Court of Justice (ECJ) Opinion 2/15 (Singapore).

Whereas trade liberalisation is generally accepted to lead to economic growth, the impact on jobs varies both between and within countries. According to the European Commission, in 2018 trade supported 36 million export-related jobs. Trade can also lead to more inequality, however, in particular by widening the gap between skilled and unskilled workers or in causing the unequal relationship between developed and developing countries to become more entrenched.

Trade liberalisation in its most basic form involves the removal of tariffs, which are taxes or duties to be paid for an import. Tariff rate quotas charge lower rates within a certain quota, jumping to a higher tariff rate after the quota is exhausted. Tariffs are cut under World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements, with the most-favoured nation tariff representing the highest possible tariffs that WTO members can charge each other. In contrast, preferential tariffs are agreed to in trade agreements or customs union arrangements. Rules of origin have been developed in order to determine where goods originate from (or the ‘economic nationality’ of products). These rules are all the more important in the era of global value chains, where a significant proportion of European products’ value comes from foreign sub-components or services.

Trade liberalisation also seeks to remove non-tariff barriers (NTB) to trade, these include protectionist measures to help domestic producers, subsidies, technical barriers to trade, or stringent sanitary and phytosanitary requirements. Lower NTBs can facilitate cross-border trade in services, which play a huge role in overall EU trade. However, data collection and measurement issues complicate efforts to understand the services trade. Trade defence instruments, meanwhile, enable the EU to react, for instance, to dumping or WTO-incompatible subsidies in partner trading countries, and form the protective front of EU trade policy.

The CCP focuses on fostering fair and free trade, furthering market access and supporting the multilateral, rules-based trading system. To achieve these objectives, the EU employs a range of legislative tools and negotiates trade agreements with trade partners. More specifically, over recent decades the EU has aimed to spread open and free trade based on mandates from Member States. After the breakdown of the WTO Doha Round, the EU initiated a period of concentrated focus on free trade agreements, which tackle both tariff liberalisation and NTBs, with a wide range of partner countries from America to Asia.

The EU has concluded trade agreements on multilateral, plurilateral and bilateral bases. EU trade agreements are adopted through a lengthy procedure, which involves distinct stages, namely preparation, a mandate to open talks, negotiations, textual agreement, initialling, signature, provisional application and, finally, entry into force. The EU also offers different types of trade relationship, ranging from deep integration on both regulatory and trade fronts, to simple partnership and cooperation agreements that do not offer preferential treatment. Trade agreements are enforceable through a dedicated dispute settlement mechanism that allows parties to adopt economic remedies in the event of non-compliance. However, certain provisions in trade agreements, such as trade and sustainable development (TSD) clauses, have a different mechanism for settling disagreements that involves government consultations and recommendations issued by a panel of experts. Efforts to make trade policy ‘greener’ include TSD chapters, but also provisions to support sustainable use of natural resources, biodiversity, forestry and fisheries. Trade agreements also include human rights clauses that aim to incentivise trade partners to improve internal governance.

EU trade legislation is adopted under the ordinary legislative procedure, and provides the framework for trade policy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament has played an important role in the CCP. Parliament must give its consent to trade agreements or trade-related legislation, while it also monitors trade policy developments through resolutions, hearings and workshops. The European Commission proposes and negotiates, while the Council authorises the opening of negotiations and decides on the conclusion of trade agreements. Civil society and stakeholders are encouraged to feed into this process on a regular basis.

Where technocratic negotiations were once sufficient, trade policy has undergone intense politicisation in recent years. Where trade policy used to be characterised by material arguments based on numerical simplicity, now it features normative disagreements and regulatory politics. This makes knowledge and understanding of the complex concepts and themes of EU trade policy all the more important.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘EU trade policy: Frequently asked questions‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

 

Written by Marie Lecerf,

Over recent decades, there has been marked progress in reducing poverty worldwide. The research conducted by this year’s Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences laureates, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo and Michael Kremer, has considerably improved the ability to fight global poverty. Nevertheless, despite this progress, the number of people living in extreme poverty remains too high, even in Europe and, in particular, amongst children.

As 2019 also marks the 30th anniversary of the adoption of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC, 20 November 1989), celebration of the International Day for the Eradication of Poverty on 17 October is a great opportunity to take stock of what the European Union is doing to fight against child poverty in its own Member States.

Child poverty in the European Union

In 2017, 112.8 million people in the EU-28 lived in households at risk of poverty or social exclusion (i.e. 22.4 % EU-28, Eurostat, latest data available). With an at-risk-of-poverty or social exclusion rate of 24.9 % in the EU-28, children were at greater risk in 2017 than the total population: almost one in four children in the European Union is at risk of poverty or social exclusion. This situation was mirrored in 19 EU Member States.

Source: Eurostat, 2019

EU contribution to the fight against child poverty

As child poverty in the European Union remains a reality, especially for certain groups (children in single parent, large or migrant families), child poverty has become a major policy concern for the European Union. Precarious living conditions during childhood have a detrimental effect, not only on attainment in school but also on health and on the ability to integrate socially during adolescence and early adulthood. The consequences of poverty experienced in childhood or adolescence can continue into later life and may be passed on from one generation to the next.

EU Charter of Fundamental Rights

The European Union and its Member States are bound to comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 24 of which is entirely dedicated to the rights of the child: ‘1. Children shall have the right to such protection and care as is necessary for their well-being. They may express their views freely. Such views shall be taken into consideration on matters which concern them in accordance with their age and maturity. 2. In all actions relating to children, whether taken by public authorities or private institutions, the child’s best interests must be a primary consideration.’

EU policy responses to child poverty

Fighting child poverty in the EU is primarily the responsibility of the Member States. Nevertheless, at EU level, there is broad consensus that action is needed to lift children out of poverty and to promote children’s wellbeing.

One of the targets of the European 2020 strategy is to reduce the number of people living in poverty by 20 million (compared with 2008). In 2013, the European Commission adopted, and the European Council endorsed, a Recommendation ‘Investing in children – breaking the cycle of disadvantage’. Considering child poverty from a comprehensive perspective, it sets a three pillar structure: employment and adequate income, access to quality services and children’s participation.

In November 2015, Parliament adopted a resolution on reducing inequalities with a specific focus on the most vulnerable children. In 2017, Parliament went a step further, requesting that the Commission implement a preparatory action on establishing a possible child guarantee scheme. This guarantee should ensure that every child in poverty receives free access to quality early childhood education and care, education, healthcare, and access to decent housing and adequate nutrition.

The proclamation of the European Pillar of Social Rights in November 2017 demonstrates an increased willingness to tackle child poverty in the European Union. Article 11 explicitly reflects that the fight against child poverty is a priority under the social Europe approach, while referring to children’s right to be protected from poverty.

EU funds are key in tackling child poverty

Numerous financial instruments provide a framework for Member States to implement measures to address child poverty with the support of the European Union.

• The 2013 Recommendation calls for the opportunities provided by the European Social and Investment Funds during 2014-2020 to be used when possible to help children.
• The Fund for European Aid to the Most Deprived (FEAD) complements EU funding to fight child poverty. Its objectives are to alleviate the worst forms of poverty by providing food and/or basic material assistance as well as social inclusion activities for the most deprived. Children represent almost one-third (30 %) of the total number of people receiving food support.
• The EU’s proposal for the upcoming 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, including the European Social Fund +, highlights the need to strengthen the fight against poverty and social exclusion. On 4 April 2019, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the European Commission’s proposal on the ESF+, proposing that Member States should allocate at least 5 % of their ESF+ resources to targeted actions aimed at implementing the European Child Guarantee. It also recommended that Member States should allocate at least 27 % of their ESF+ resources to specific objectives in the field of social inclusion, and at least 3 % of their resources to the specific objective of the social inclusion of the most deprived and/or material deprivation. On 2 October 2019, the European Parliament’s Committee on Employment and Social Affairs voted on the decision to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, so that the dossier can progress.

Despite all the actions and policies undertaken, the task ahead to eradicate child poverty in the European Union will be a daunting challenge for the next decade. Hopefully, as Esther Duflo recently said, their research could also provide a source of inspiration for the European Union.

Written by Izabela Bacian with Fernando Hortal Foronda,

© Fotolia

The October European Council meeting will represent an important point on the timeline of negotiations on the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the EU, as leaders will be taking stock of the situation heading up to the end of the extension period on 31 October 2019. This Briefing provides an overview of European Council guidelines and decisions taken to provide direction to the negotiations since the UK’s formal notification of withdrawal on 29 March 2017.

1. Background

Following a referendum on 23 June 2016, in which 51.9 per cent of participants voted to leave the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK) submitted the formal notification of its intention to leave to the European Council on 29 March 2017. According to the procedure laid out in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU), this notification triggered a two-year period during which the EU and the UK were to negotiate the terms of the UK’s withdrawal. The European Council, meeting without a UK representative (termed ‘European Council (Article 50)’ meetings), outlined the general direction for the negotiations in a series of sets of guidelines.

Guidelines of 29 April 2017: In its first set of guidelines, the European Council (Article 50) decided that the negotiations would be divided into two phases. The first phase would set the terms of the withdrawal and clarify the impact of UK’s withdrawal on three critical issues: 1) citizens’ rights, 2) finances, and 3) the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland. The second phase would focus on negotiating the EU’s future relationship with the UK as well as agreeing any necessary transitional arrangements. Based on the European Council guidelines of 29 April, the Commission adopted a recommendation and Council (EU-27 format) a decision authorising the opening of negotiations.

Guidelines of 15 December 2017: Informed by a joint report from the EU and UK negotiators of 8 December 2017, the European Council (Article 50) decided at its December meeting that sufficient progress had been made on phase one, and adopted additional guidelines for the second phase of negotiations. All the commitments made during phase one would have to be respected and ‘translated faithfully into legal terms’. A transition period was agreed for a period of two years, during which the UK would ‘no longer participate in or nominate or elect members of the EU institutions, nor participate in the decision-making of the Union bodies, offices and agencies’. It would have to respect the whole body of EU law, including new law, budgetary commitments, and judicial oversight, including the competence of the Court of Justice of the EU. Moreover, the UK would continue to participate in the customs union and the single market (with all four freedoms) as well as comply with EU trade policy until the end of the transition period, but not beyond. The framework for the future relationship would be elaborated in a political declaration accompanying the withdrawal agreement.

On 29 January 2018, the Council (EU-27 format) adopted supplementary negotiating directives concerning a transition period, which would apply from the date of entry into force of the withdrawal agreement, and not last beyond 31 December 2020. Commitments made by both parties in the December 2017 joint report were translated by the Commission into legal terms in a draft withdrawal agreement released on 28 February 2018. By 19 March 2018, full agreement had been reached on many issues, including citizens’ rights, the financial settlement and the transition period.

As regards the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, negotiators agreed that a solution would be found in line with the three scenarios detailed in the December 2017 joint report: 1) first, the UK commits to avoid creating a hard border on the island and proposes a solution in the context of the future EU-UK relationship; 2) if this were not possible, it would then propose a specific solution to address the unique circumstances of the island of Ireland; 3) in the absence of agreed solutions, the UK would continue to ‘maintain full alignment with those rules of the internal market and the customs union which support North-South cooperation, the all-island economy and the protection of the Good Friday Agreement of 10 April 1998’. While discussion on all options continued, scenario three, known as the ‘backstop’, was included in a Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland in the draft agreement.

Guidelines of 23 March 2018: The European Council (Article 50) issued guidelines in March 2018 outlining the EU’s position on the future relationship with the UK. The EU-27 restated the EU’s determination to have ‘as close as possible a partnership with the UK in the future’. Regarding economic cooperation with the UK, the European Council stated its readiness to initiate work on a free trade agreement (FTA) and outlined the issues to be addressed therein. Such an agreement would have to be based on a balance of rights and obligations, ensuring a level playing field, whilst preserving the integrity of the single market. In addition, the guidelines concentrated on several areas where the EU expressed an interest in maintaining strong relations with the UK, in particular the fight against terrorism and international crime, as well as security, defence and foreign policy.

As for the implementation of the backstop, a compromise was reached based on the UK’s June 2018 proposal for a temporary customs partnership. A single customs territory would be established between the EU and the entire UK (not just Northern Ireland) covering all trade in goods except fisheries and aquaculture. While the UK would harmonise its commercial policy with the EU’s to the extent necessary for the functioning of the single customs territory, including alignment with the EU’s common external tariff, Northern Ireland would have to apply EU customs law. In addition, Northern Ireland would remain aligned with EU law related to the internal market in a number of areas, including agriculture and environmental protection and regulation, technical regulations on goods, state aid, EU VAT and excise, and other areas of North-South cooperation.

2. Ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement

On 25 November 2018, at a special meeting of the European Council (Article 50), EU leaders endorsed the withdrawal agreement and approved the political declaration, on the basis of the future relationship. Three protocols, on Ireland/Northern Ireland, on Gibraltar, and on the UK Sovereign Base Areas in Cyprus, are included. The decision to sign the agreement was subsequently adopted by the Council on 11 January 2019, although the signature has not taken place. The Council in the meantime forwarded the decision on the agreement’s conclusion to the European Parliament for its consent.

In accordance with section 13 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, the agreement was submitted to the House of Commons for approval. It was rejected a first time on 15 January 2019, the main concerns revolving around the nature of the backstop. This led then UK Prime Minister, Theresa May, to ask for additional clarifications. A legally binding instrument related to the withdrawal agreement, providing clarification and legal guarantees on the nature of the backstop, was agreed at a meeting in Strasbourg on 11 March 2019, between Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and May, accompanied by a joint statement supplementing the political declaration. The ‘Strasbourg package’ was approved by the March 2019 European Council. The backstop is to serve as an ‘insurance policy’, with the aim being to replace the backstop by 31 December 2020, as previously underlined by the European Council in its conclusions in December 2018. Should the backstop be triggered, this would be on a temporary basis only until such time as an alternative arrangement avoiding a hard border is put in place. The withdrawal agreement allows for a one-time extension of the transition period, for one or two years.

Despite these additional assurances from the EU, the agreement was rejected in the UK Parliament a second time, on 12 March. The House of Commons voted two days later to call for an extension of the two-year period under Article 50. A third vote, before the European Council meeting on 21 March, was not possible, since, as stated by the Speaker, John Bercow, the House of Commons could not vote again on the ‘same proposition or substantially the same proposition’. Consequently, on 20 March, May formally asked the European Council for an extension until 30 June 2019.

Responding to May’s request, the March 2019 European Council (Article 50) adopted a decision extending the period, but not to the date requested. It agreed to an extension until 22 May 2019, on the condition that the UK Parliament were to approve the withdrawal agreement by 29 March. If not, the extension would run until 12 April 2019 and the UK would have to indicate the way forward. By that date, the UK would need to announce the holding of European elections, considering its obligation to do so if it were still a Member State on 23-26 May 2019. On 29 March 2019, the UK Parliament held a third vote on the agreement along with the ‘Strasbourg package’ resulting in a third rejection. Following up on a second request by May for an extension until 30 June 2019, a special meeting of the European Council was held on 10 April 2019, at which EU leaders discussed the feasibility of granting a short or a longer extension. The compromise decision granted the UK a six-month extension of the Article 50 period until 31 October 2019 at the latest.

Following this third rejection and a breakdown in cross-party Brexit negotiations aimed at finding common ground for a deal, Theresa May announced her resignation as party leader on 24 May, with effect from 7 June 2019. On 23 July, Boris Johnson won the Conservative Party leadership, thus replacing Theresa May as Prime Minister. In his first letter to European Council President Donald Tusk, on 19 August 2019, Johnson underlined the UK’s commitment to achieve an agreement with the EU in full respect of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. However, he stressed that ‘the backstop cannot form part of an agreed Withdrawal Agreement’ given that it ‘locks the UK, potentially indefinitely, into an international treaty which will bind us into a customs union and which applies large areas of single market legislation in Northern Ireland’. He added ‘the Government will not put in place infrastructure, checks or controls at the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland’.

Following Johnson’s decision to prorogue the UK Parliament from 9 September until 14 October 2019 (later deemed unlawful by the Supreme Court), on 4 September the House of Commons approved the EU Withdrawal (No 2) Act (known as the Benn Act). This legislation requires the UK government to seek an extension of the Article 50 period until 31 January 2020, unless the House of Commons approves a deal with the EU or agrees to a no-deal Brexit by 19 October 2019.

3. Way forward

Two weeks ahead of the planned Brexit date, the 17-18 October 2019 European Council meeting is expected to be dominated by Brexit. EU-27 leaders will discuss the most recent developments, and notably Johnson’s proposal of 2 October 2019 for a new Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland to replace the backstop (detailed in Table 1), as well as potentially explore the feasibility of a further extension. While the June 2019 European Council stated that the withdrawal agreement was not open for renegotiation, EU leaders remained open for talks regarding the content of the political declaration if the UK position were to evolve. The EU’s reaction to the proposal has been expressed in detailed terms by EU’s chief negotiator Michel Barnier during the European Parliament’s plenary part-session on 9 October 2019. He expressed three main concerns regarding the new proposals.

First, despite a strong commitment from the UK to avoid customs and regulatory checks as well as any physical infrastructure at the border, many questions remain as to the means of implementation, which had not been addressed in the text. Not only would this create uncertainty but would rely on technology not yet developed or tested; it would also require exemptions from the Union Customs Code and changes to the Common Transit Convention. Second, the current Protocol creates a legally operational safety net available immediately, while the new proposal, applicable only as of the transition period, would add uncertainty. In addition, as underlined by the European Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group, the Parliament’s consent would be required in a context where the full implications of the new arrangements could not be known.

The third issue concerned consent for Northern Ireland. While the current text includes a mechanism allowing for Northern Irish representation – which could still be improved – the new proposal would allow Northern Ireland institutions to decide unilaterally not to activate the agreed solution. And, were it to enter into force, it would allow them to review it every four years. As the Northern Ireland Assembly has not sat for almost three years, and its ability to reconvene is questioned, making application conditional on its consent would render an agreed solution hypothetical and provisional. Finally, Barnier added that the UK’s plan to diverge in areas such as social, environmental and tax rules, on which the current political declaration provides for a level playing field, would not be acceptable.

Table 1: Proposals from Prime Minister Boris Johnson of 2 October 2019

Issue Proposal Good Friday Agreement Commitment to uphold the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and avoid a ‘hard border’ between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Regulatory compliance for goods Creation on the island of Ireland of a single regulatory zone. Northern Ireland maintains alignment with EU single market rules on food safety, animal and plant health as well as with rules relevant to the placing on the market of manufactured goods. Regulatory checks will be conducted on goods moving from the UK to Northern Ireland where necessary, but there would be no checks on goods entering Northern Ireland from Ireland. Consent of Northern Ireland Consent of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive to the all-island regulatory zone required every four years. Should consent be withheld, arrangements would default to existing rules. Customs Two differentiated UK and EU customs areas after the transition period. Northern Ireland is part of the UK’s customs territory. The border between Northern Ireland and Ireland will be a customs border, but no customs controls will be performed near or at the border. Instead, movements of goods must be declared to the relevant customs authorities, with provisions made for small traders and with no entry or exit summary declarations. The UK would no longer be subject to EU VAT and excise legislation. Arrangements for level playing field measures (state aid, taxation, social, labour and environmental standards) are no longer needed given that the UK will be leaving the customs union.

The Parliament’s Brexit Steering Group stated in early October that it did not consider the latest proposal ‘a basis for an agreement to which the EP could give consent’, as it did ‘not address the real issues, namely the all-island economy, the full respect of the Good Friday Agreement and the integrity of the Single Market’. In September, the Parliament warned that it could ‘not give consent to a Withdrawal Agreement without a backstop’.

EU-27 unity has endured throughout the three years of negotiations and this is also due in no small part to the role that the European Council President has played at critical times in finding agreement among the 27 leaders and leading the way forward. In recent statements, Donald Tusk has emphasised yet again the seriousness of the issues at stake, although in a rather straightforward manner. He welcomed the positive signals of the meeting between Taoiseach Leo Varadkar and Johnson, and emphasised that ‘a no deal Brexit will never be the choice of the EU’.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the European Council (Article 50) meeting on 17 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Ralf Drachenberg and Suzana Anghel,

© Fotolia

The meeting of Heads of State or Government on 17-18 October is expected to be dominated by Brexit. The EU-27 leaders will probably meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the most recent developments in the negotiations, and deliberate on possible consequences. At its formal meeting, the European Council will discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 and the priorities of the new Commission in the presence of the incumbents as well as the incoming Presidents of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, and of the European Council, Charles Michel (current Prime Minister of Belgium). EU Heads of State or Government will also exchange views on the current state of play on the MFF negotiations in the Council, where differences in opinion remain significant on certain issues, not least on the overall size of the 2021-2027 budget. Finally, the European Council will discuss the external dimension of climate policy and consider the possibility of opening accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia. The meeting could also discuss foreign policy issues, notably the evolution of the situations in Ukraine and Syria, where a Turkish military operation has commenced in the northern part of the country.

1. Implementation: Follow-up on previous European Council commitments

As announced in the June 2019 European Council conclusions, EU Heads of State or Government will return to the issues of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) for 2021-27 and the Strategic Agenda 2019-24, as reflected in the annotated draft agenda.

At the start of the meeting, the President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, will address the European Council meeting for the first time in his mandate. Antti Rinne, Prime Minister of Finland, which currently holds the rotating six-month presidency of the Council of Ministers, will provide an overview on the progress made in implementing previous European Council conclusions.

Policy area Previous commitment Occasion on which the commitment was made MFF The European Council will hold an exchange of views in October 2019, aiming for an agreement before the end of the year June 2019 Strategic Agenda The European Council will discuss the follow-up to the Strategic Agenda in October 2019 June 2019 Climate The European Council will finalise its guidance before the end of the year with a view to the adoption and submission of the EU’s long-term strategy to the UNFCCC in early 2020 June 2019 2. European Council meeting Multiannual Financial Framework

On 17 October 2019, EU Heads of State or Government will hold an exchange of views on the next MFF. The discussion will be based on a paper by the Finnish Presidency informing EU leaders on the state of play in the negotiations. The most recent exchange of views between Member States on the main elements of the MFF took place in the General Affairs Council (GAC) of 16 September. Both the GAC discussions and the content of a draft ‘Negotiating Box’ (i.e. a document indicating the progressive completion of the negotiation, used by successive GAC meetings to prepare the final deliberation in the European Council), show that the differences of opinion on many sensitive aspects remain significant (see EPRS Legislative Train Schedule: MFF – 2021-2027). Some Member States continue for instance to advocate an EU budget equivalent to 1.0 per cent of total EU GNI, while others support a higher figure. Another point of contention is the size of the allocations to the common agriculture policy and cohesion funds.

With a view to its next meeting in December, the European Council is expected to invite the Finnish Council Presidency to update, based on the results of the discussions between EU leaders, the June 2019 Negotiating Box, including numbers. Thus, in December 2019, EU leaders would only for the first time discuss concrete numbers for the MFF, making the aim of ‘reaching an agreement in the European Council before the end of the year’ difficult to achieve.

On 10 October 2019, the new European Parliament adopted a resolution on the MFF reiterating that ‘Parliament will not rubber-stamp a fait accompli from the European Council’ and calling on the European Council to refrain from adopting detailed and purportedly binding conclusions based on the MFF negotiating box, as this would amount to direct interference in the legislative sphere’.

The next institutional cycle

This meeting is the first European Council since EU Heads of State or Government agreed on a package of candidates for the EU high-level positions (see Figure 1), and the subsequent election of the new European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen, on 16 July by the European Parliament. President-elect von der Leyen will outline her priorities for the new Commission, and discuss the recently adopted Strategic Agenda 2019-24 with EU Heads of State or Government.

Figure 1: Overview of high-level office-holders since the 2009 EP elections

The European Council is also expected to adopt a decision appointing Christine Lagarde as President of the European Central Bank, with her nomination part of the package agreed by the European Council on 2 July. Her appointment follows a hearing in the European Parliament and the subsequent positive recommendation. This meeting is the last scheduled European Council to be presided over by Donald Tusk, who will be replaced as European Council President by Charles Michel (currently Prime Minister of Belgium) as of 1 December.

Climate

For the third meeting in a row, the European Council will discuss climate, with a focus on its external dimension. EU leaders are expected to reiterate their support to the implementation of the Paris Agreement on climate change, to discuss the outcome of the United Nations Secretary-General’s Climate Action Summit held in New York in September 2019, and to prepare for the United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP25) to be held in Santiago de Chile in December 2019. They could also discuss the guidelines for the EU’s long-term strategy on climate change that they had committed to finalise by the end of 2019.

A group of eight EU states has recently called ‘to increase the EU’s emissions-cut target from 40 per cent to 55 per cent by 2030’, in line with a Dutch proposal made by Prime Minister Mark Rutte as part of the Future of Europe debate in the European Parliament plenary. Earlier this year, divergent views on the way forward to a carbon-neutral EU economy were particularly noticeable. In June 2019, a group of Member States (initially eight, later expanding to 18) as well as the European Parliament have expressed support for the European Commission’s communication ‘A Clean Planet for all’, pleading for an ambitious and timely climate policy promoting EU carbon-neutrality by 2050. Due to a lack of consensus on the target date for achieving carbon neutrality, the June 2019 European Council conclusions mention the objective of a transition to carbon neutrality, but specify in a footnote that ‘For a large majority of Member States, climate neutrality must be achieved by 2050’. The countries reluctant at that time to commit to a date to achieve climate neutrality were Czechia, Estonia, Hungary and Poland.

External relations

EU leaders are expected to discuss several foreign policy issues, notably the situation in Ukraine and in Syria. As regards Syria, they will most probably consider both the in-country situation, as well as the regional situation, including the ongoing Turkish military operation in the northern part of Syria. Several Member States, including France and Germany, have already expressed their concern about Turkey’s ‘unilateral military operation’ in the northern part of Syria, warned about its possible humanitarian consequences, including a possible increasing influx of migrants on the Eastern Mediterranean route, and urged Turkey to end its offensive. The Foreign Affairs Council on 14 October noted that some Member States have decided to stop arms-exports licensing to Turkey but did not decide on ‘a formal EU-wide arms embargo’.

Enlargement

Although agreement was not reached at the General Affairs Council of 15 October 2019, the European Council will most probably consider whether or not to open accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia.

Whilst the Commission had given a positive recommendation, the decision to open or not accession negotiations with the two countries was postponed from June 2019 to October 2019 at the latest, due to persisting diverging views among the Member States, including France and the Netherlands which oppose the opening of accession negotiations. A possible solution, based on a German proposal, would consist of green-lighting the opening of accession negotiations with both countries whilst only North Macedonia would be given a clear date to start negotiations.

Enlargement gained momentum following the joint letter of the leaders of the EU’s institutions – the European Council President Donald Tusk, the European Parliament President David Sassoli, the European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker, and the European Commission President-elect Ursula Von der Leyen. In their letter, they outlined that the EU ‘stands before a strategic choice’ on whether or not to decide to open accession negotiations with the two Western Balkan countries which have fulfilled their share of the bargain and complied with the requirements set upon them so far. Prior to this, during his September 2019 visit to Albania and North Macedonia, Donald Tusk said that he has ‘always thought that the EU should open accession talks with both Albania and North Macedonia, in line with the positive recommendations from the Commission,’ whilst a similar position was also expressed by the Visegrad Four (V4) group.

Other Items

Standing by their earlier commitment, EU leaders will most probably once again condemn Turkey’s drilling activities in the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone and reaffirm their solidarity with Cyprus.

3. European Council (Article 50) meeting

On Friday 18 October 2019, EU-27 leaders will possibly also meet in a European Council (Article 50) format to discuss the latest developments in the process following the United Kingdom’s notification of its withdrawal under Article 50 TEU.

On 2 October 2019, the UK Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, made a new proposal, including a differentiated EU-UK customs regime with no controls at or near the border which aims to replace the current ‘backstop’. The objective of the backstop, which was agreed upon by the previous UK government, is to prevent the creation of a hard border on the island of Ireland; it envisages that the UK would leave the single market but remain in a single EU-UK customs territory. The President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker confirmed ‘that while the UK has made some progress, a number of problematic points remain in the proposal, on which further work is needed by the UK’. This sentiment was also shared by the President of the European Council, Donald Tusk, whose message to the UK Prime Minister was that the EU ’remains open but [is] still unconvinced’. A meeting between Johnson and his Irish counterpart, Taoiseach Leo Varadkar, on 10 October concluded that both ‘could see a pathway to a possible deal’. Following a meeting between EU and UK negotiators the following day, the Commission announced that ‘the EU and the UK have agreed to intensify discussions over the coming days’.

The EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, informed the General Affairs Council (Article 50) of 15 October, preparing the European Council (Article 50), about the state of play in Brexit negotiations and assessed that an agreement before the summit would be very difficult but still possible.

It is not excluded that the UK Prime Minister could – at the European Council meeting or shortly after – request a further extension to the Article 50 negation period. The recently adopted European Union (Withdrawal) (No 2) Act 2019 requires the UK government to request a three-month extension, if it has not secured the approval of the House of Commons for either: 1) a withdrawal agreement, or 2) leaving the EU without a withdrawal agreement, by the end of 19 October.

Read this briefing on ‘Outlook for the meetings of EU leaders, 17-18 October 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Alessandro D’Alfonso,

© Mediaparts / Fotolia

The European Union (EU) has developed many legislative measures related to climate change, and is on track to meet its 2020 targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, the improvement of energy efficiency and the increased use of renewables. However, analysts estimate that more demanding targets in the medium- and longer-term require significant financial investments in mitigation and adaptation measures. Public resources can play an important role in financing such investment needs, not only directly but also in attracting funding from other sources.

In the broader field of EU finances, three main categories of climate-related initiatives can be identified: relevant projects and activities across a broad range of funding instruments in the EU budget; programmes for the demonstration of innovative technologies, funded by the EU’s Emissions Trading System; and climate finance from the European Investment Bank. While the EU budget represents only 2 % of public spending in the Union, it has features that can amplify its impact and make it particularly relevant for climate-related objectives, including the greater predictability of long-term investments ensured by its Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF).

In the 2014-2020 MFF, the EU decided to step up the contribution that the EU budget makes to action on climate change, by committing to spending 20 % of its financial resources on relevant measures. This political objective sets the broader framework for mainstreaming of climate in the EU budget, which consists of the incorporation of climate considerations and objectives across the major EU funding instruments. Climate mainstreaming takes place at different levels: a political objective and a tracking methodology for the overall budget; the design and implementation of specific funding instruments; and monitoring, reporting and evaluation, both for the overall budget and for specific instruments. Decision-makers and actors involved differ, depending on the phase.

According to the latest data, the EU should almost be able to reach the objective of spending 20 % of its 2014-2020 resources on climate by the end of the programming period. Some of the largest EU programmes under shared management with Member States are also the largest contributors to the climate target in absolute figures: agricultural funds, the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund. However, some smaller instruments have significant climate-relevance.

Assessments of the tracking methodology and of its impact have identified both achievements and shortcomings. The creation of a broad political objective is deemed to have triggered ambitious work and a greater focus on climate. Climate spending in instruments such as the European Regional Development Fund and the Cohesion Fund has increased both quantitatively and qualitatively. However, other areas such as the common agricultural policy have not shown significant progress, despite the emergence of some good practices. Criticisms have included: the absence of a common mechanism to assign sub-targets to individual instruments; some inconsistencies in the methodology with over-estimations in some areas and under-representation in others; and a performance framework more focused on outputs than on results and impact.

The adoption of an overall objective for climate expenditure in the EU budget contributes to the establishment of a general framework against which to assess progress and areas for improvement in climate-related activities. For the post-2020 MFF, the European Commission has proposed to raise the objective to 25 % of the EU budget, while the European Parliament has called for an even more ambitious approach. Elements in the MFF proposals, such as the creation of some links to National Energy and Climate Plans, could reinforce the effectiveness of climate mainstreaming. The revenue side of the EU budget also has the potential to contribute to climate objectives, but its reform is considered extremely difficult due to the requirement for unanimity in the Council.

Read this ‘in-depth analysis’ on ‘Mainstreaming of climate action in the EU budget: Impact of a political objective‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Rafal Manko,

© sebra / Fotolia

In May 2018, the Commission put forward a proposal for amending the existing Regulation on Cross-border Service of Documents in civil proceedings. The proposal aims, above all, to replace the existing mechanisms of paper transmission with an electronic system. National information technology (IT) systems would be connected into one network, and the use of paper transmission would become an exception, available only in the event of a failure of the electronic system. Within Parliament, a draft report was prepared by the Legal Affairs Committee in October 2018, and in February 2019, the institution adopted its first-reading position on the proposal.

Within Council, following an exchange of views between delegations and work at technical level, a policy debate is envisaged. Once Council reaches a general approach, trilogue negotiations will be able to start.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘Reform of the Service of Documents Regulation‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EC) No 1393/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the service in the Member States of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters (service of documents) Committee responsible: Legal Affairs (JURI) COM(2018) 379, 31.5.2018. Rapporteur: Sergio Gaetano Cofferati (S&D, Italy) 2018/0204(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Emil Radev (EPP, Bulgaria);
Angel Dzhambazki (ECR, Bulgaria);
Jean-Marie Cavada (ALDE, France);
Kostas Chrysogonos (EUL/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Adoption of general approach by Council and opening of trilogue negotiations

Written by Klemen Zumer with Paul Anton Kindermann,

Chief Economist of the World Bank (WB), Penny Goldberg, presented an exclusive snapshot of the 2020 World Development Report in the Library Reading Room at the European Parliament on 1 October 2019, discussing the economic challenges and perspectives of global value chains (GVCs) for economic development: what can policy makers do to facilitate sustainable growth through GVCs? This question is particularly pressing in the wake of continuous trade conflicts that dampen expectations for further growth. The high-level event with Penny Goldberg and EP Vice President Pedro Silva Pereira kicked off intensified EPRS cooperation with the World Bank that will spark many follow up initiatives.

GVCs constitute a central layer of today’s unprecedentedly interconnected world economy. In a GVC, countries do not simply trade products. They produce together, as different steps of a single production process are distributed to different locations around the world, and the parts produced in each place are shipped across the globe often crossing borders multiple times. GVCs extend the division of labour to an international scale. In the contemporary world economy, almost all countries participate in GVCs; at different stages of the economic chain, they export raw materials, semi-finished goods, or eventually goods ready for consumption. The steady emergence of these GVCs over four decades has powered an economic revolution that boosted economic growth.

In general, the World Bank finds comprehensive empirical evidence that GVCs facilitate major income growth in manufacturing countries. And in developing countries, GVC firms have contributed to significant poverty reductions. On the other hand, Penny Goldberg identifies two major problems that come as costs of participating in GVCs. First, the economic gains that result from GVCs are distributed unequally across and within countries: participation in GVCs disadvantages unskilled workers, and women and youth are generally placed in lower value-added segments of production. Second, the high transportation costs are a strain on the environment. Thus, policy-makers are called upon to ensure that benefits are shared and the environment protected – e.g. by a carbon tax or stronger regulations on particular industries and polluters. Only then can globalisation ‘work for everyone’.

While these policies are needed urgently, the profound potential of GVCs for further, sustainable economic growth can only be harnessed if the rule-based international trade system is maintained and strengthened. Penny Goldberg warned that the continuation of protectionist measures could push more than 30 million people into poverty and crush global income. In concert with EP Vice President Pereira, she emphasised that international cooperation on trade is critical for the sustainable growth of all countries and suggested several criteria that new deep trade agreements should fulfil – such as stronger rules on subsidies. Vice-President Silva Pereira recalled the problems of trade agreements which lacked public support and came under heavy scrutiny. Here, he said, the EP should, among other things, push for prominent placement of sustainable development chapters in new, comprehensive agreements.

Following a lively question and answer session, Penny Goldberg promised to be back at EPRS soon to discuss the report in more detail.

Written by Suzana Anghel and Ralf Drachenberg,

© Fotolia

The Sibiu Summit of 9 May 2019 and the subsequent adoption of the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda on 20 June 2019 constitute the end of the Future of Europe debate (at least in its current iteration), which was initiated following the June 2016 UK referendum on EU membership. Five milestone moments marked three distinct phases in the Future of Europe debate: 1) diagnostics and reflection (June to mid-September 2016); 2) deliberation and proposals (mid-September 2016 to March 2017); and 3) delivery and vision (April 2017 to June 2019).

One of the main findings of this study is that throughout the Future of Europe process, EU Heads of State or Government reiterated three core messages that also featured prominently in all the milestone documents: the need for unity, priority to EU citizens, and focus on (policy) delivery. Moreover, the three policy priorities – migration, security and the economy – identified in the Bratislava Declaration, have been the focus over the entire period of the Future of Europe process (June 2016 to June 2019), forming the European Council’s ‘rolling agenda’ of policy priorities. Despite developments in the European Council composition in that same period (as a result of the arrival of 16 new Heads of State or Government), the core messages remained almost identical, even though, often, different players were involved in drafting the related declarations and statements.

Another finding of the study is that both the European Council and the European Parliament emerged stronger from the three-year Future of Europe debate. The introduction of the Leaders’ Agenda and of the new working methods allowed EU leaders to ‘take things into their hands’ and to concentrate on solving sensitive issues by debating them well in advance at leaders’ meetings. The Parliament was active throughout the Future of Europe debate. In addition to adopting resolutions and expressing its vision in specific documents, it solidified its role as a forum for open debate by holding a series of plenary debates with EU Heads of State or Government.

An examination of the most recent phase of the Future of Europe debate (April 2018-June 2019) showed that three more or less parallel processes – the activities under the Leaders’ Agenda, the debates in the Parliament, and the citizens’ consultations – lasted throughout that whole phase and shaped the Sibiu Declaration and the subsequent (new) Strategic Agenda 2019-24.

The study identifies strong continuity between the new Strategic Agenda and its predecessor with regard to some policy issues, while also noting that other significant policy issues have been added and there has been a shift in focus within the different policy areas. Both the Sibiu Declaration and the new Strategic Agenda strengthen the policy focus on the EU’s role as a global player in actions related to climate change.

When comparing the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda with other milestone documents that were issued during the Future of Europe debate, a certain degree of continuity on horizontal and institutional issues can be observed. However, the Strategic Agenda envisages that the different EU institutions should revisit their working methods, indicating that some institutional evolution can be expected in the near future. In the case of the European Council, for instance, this could lead to the operationalisation of the 2019-24 Strategic Agenda through a new Leaders’ Agenda under the next President of the European Council.

Read this ‘study’ on ‘Origins of the 2019-24 EU Strategic Agenda: The Future of Europe debate and the Sibiu European Council‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Beata Rojek,

© Julien Eichinger / Fotolia

On 1 July 2018, as part of the work on the EU’s 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, the European Commission proposed a package of three regulations with the aim of reshaping and modernising the common agricultural policy (CAP).

One of these proposals, the Amending Regulation, introduces changes to rules governing the common market organisation (CMO) in agricultural products (including the rules on wine), the EU quality schemes (geographical indications) and the support measures for remote regions. The aim is to equip agricultural markets and support measures to face new challenges, update provisions, simplify procedures and ensure consistency with other regulations on the future CAP.

Versions

• October 2019:  ‘CAP Amending Regulation (CMO): Amending regulations on the CMO for agricultural products, quality schemes and measures for remote regions‘ (1st edition)

Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulations (EU) No 1308/2013 establishing a common organisation of the markets in agricultural products, (EU) No 1151/2012 on quality schemes for agricultural products and foodstuffs, (EU) No 251/2014 on the definition, description, presentation, labelling and the protection of geographical indications of aromatised wine products, (EU) No 228/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in the outermost regions of the Union and (EU) No 229/2013 laying down specific measures for agriculture in favour of the smaller Aegean islands Committee responsible: Agriculture and Rural Development (AGRI) COM(2018) 394, 1.6.2018. Rapporteur: Eric Andrieu (S&D, France) 2018/0218(COD) Shadow rapporteurs: Anne Sander (EPP, France),
Jérémy Decerle (Renew Europe, France),
Maria Bizzotto (Identity and Democracy, Italy),
Petros Kokkalis (GUE/NGL, Greece) Ordinary legislative procedure (COD) (Parliament and Council on equal footing – formerly ‘co-decision’) Next steps expected: Confirmation, under Rule 240, of scheduling of
debate in plenary on trilogue mandate

Written by Clare Ferguson and Katarzyna Sochacka,

© European Union 2019 – Source : EP

Highlights of the October I plenary session included statements and debates on the preparation of the European Council meeting of 17 and 18 October 2019, on greening the European Investment Bank (EIB), in the presence of the Bank’s president, and on how to prevent conflicts of interest in the EU. Parliament also debated statements made by the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR/VP) on the situation in northern Syria and Ukraine. Debates took place on Council and Commission statements on the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 and own resources. Finally, Members discussed Commission statements on United States tariffs on European goods following the World Trade Organization’s Airbus dispute decision, on authorisation of genetically modified organisms, and on the fight against cancer.

Statements by the High Representative

Federica Mogherini, as HR/VP, made statements on northern Syria and on the situation in Ukraine. With the election in Ukraine this year for both a new President and Parliament, increased efforts have been made to relaunch talks on settling the Donbass conflict, under the Normandy format. President Volodomyr Zelenskiy’s room for manoeuvre remains limited, however, with little sign of follow-up on the Minsk Agreements commitments and the conflict in the country’s east continuing.

Post-2020 EU budget

Council and Commission outlined the progress made on narrowing the gaps between Member States’ positions on the post-2020 EU budget; nevertheless it is clear that the European Council is not yet close to finalising its position and thus the subject will remain on the agenda in the months ahead. In advance of EU leaders’ discussions next week, the Parliament adopted its position on both the MFF and the own resources system. The resolution adopted, on a motion tabled by four political groups (EPP, S&D, Renew and Greens/EFA), largely seeks to reiterate the positions adopted by Parliament during the last term.

Euro area employment and social policies

Members debated and adopted a report from the Employment & Social Affairs (EMPL) Committee on the employment and social policies of the euro area, a contribution to the annual European Semester process. Parliament’s position should feed into Council recommendations on euro-area policies, due to be adopted in November 2019. The committee’s report emphasises the need to strengthen social rights, ensure universal coverage, and to develop labour market and education policies to ensure adequate social protection and address skills mismatches more effectively.

Amending the EU budget for 2019

Parliament voted on a report on draft amending budget No 4 (DAB 4/2019), which amends the Council’s position, seeking to redeploy savings to other major EU programmes that currently lack funding. Parliament therefore calls on the Commission to present a new proposal along these lines.

Negotiations ahead of Council’s first reading

The President announced 43 decisions by the ECON, ITRE, TRAN, ENVI, LIBE, REGI, EMPL, CONT, IMCO, AFET and DEVE committees to enter into interinstitutional negotiations, in accordance with Rule 72. Parliament’s positions adopted earlier at first reading will provide the mandates for these negotiations.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Plenary round-up – Brussels, October I 2019‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Naja Bentzen and Ionel Zamfir,

© paparazzza / Shutterstock.com

Thirty years since it was first awarded, the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought retains all its symbolic meaning, as human rights are continually under threat in many parts of the world. By awarding the 2018 Prize to the Ukrainian filmmaker Oleg Sentsov, Parliament aimed to increase the pressure on the Russian government to release him. The award also drew attention to all Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia and the annexed Crimean peninsula. On 7 September 2019, Sentsov was released as part of a major prisoner swap between Russia and Ukraine. He is due to receive the award in person in Strasbourg on 23 October 2019.

This is an updated edition of an ‘at a glance’ note published in December 2018.

Sakharov Prize laureate 2018

Oleg Sentsov, a Ukrainian film-director, convicted in Russia to 20 years in prison for his opposition to the annexation of Crimea, is the 2018 laureate of the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize. Parliament’s Conference of Presidents selected Sentsov (initially proposed by the EPP) from three finalists shortlisted by the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs (AFET) and Development (DEVE) Committees. The two other finalists were Non-governmental organisations protecting human rights and saving migrant lives across the Mediterranean Sea (proposed by S&D and the Greens/EFA Groups), and Nasser Zefzafi, the leader of a mass protest movement in the Rif region of Morocco, sentenced to 20 years in prison (proposed by GUE/NGL Group). The prize was awarded in absentia at a ceremony in the European Parliament during the December 2018 plenary session in Strasbourg, at which Sentsov was represented by a relative and his lawyer. Other laureates of the prize have also been prevented from attending because of detention, most recently Raif Badawi in 2015. Sentsov is the first laureate from eastern Europe since 2009, when the Russian human rights centre, Memorial, received the prize.

Significance of the prize

The European Parliament awards the Sakharov Prize for freedom of thought each year to individuals or organisations for their outstanding achievements in one of the following fields: defence of human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly the right to free expression; safeguarding the rights of minorities; respect for international law; development of democracy and implementation of the rule of law. Created through a 13 December 1985 parliamentary resolution, the prize bears the name of prominent Soviet-era dissident, Andrei Sakharov, joint inventor of the Soviet hydrogen bomb, 1975 Nobel Peace Prize winner and campaigner for human rights and nuclear disarmament in the Soviet Union. The name of the prize illustrates his courageous defence of human rights, including the freedom of thought and expression, to the detriment of his professional career and personal freedom. The prize was awarded for the first time, jointly, in 1988, to Nelson Mandela and (posthumously) to Soviet dissident Anatoli Marchenko. Both Mandela and Marchenko embodied the bravery of the individual who stands up to the discretionary power of an oppressive regime and pays for it with their personal freedom. Mandela’s story is widely known. Marchenko was one of the best-known dissidents in the Soviet Union. He died in 1986 after a three-month-long hunger strike for the release of all Soviet dissidents. The public outcry his death provoked pushed Mikhail Gorbachev to authorise the release of political prisoners from Soviet jails. His courageous action prefigures the similarly brave position of the 2018 laureate.

Oleg Sentsov: Ukrainian filmmaker and symbol for political prisoners

Born on 13 July 1976 in Simferopol (Crimea), Oleg Sentsov studied marketing at Kyiv State Economics University. He did not particularly enjoy these studies, which he said ‘disillusioned’ him. After managing a computer club in Simferopol and playing online video games professionally for years – eventually becoming the Ukrainian champion – Sentsov became the leader of the Crimean gaming movement. This experience of the gaming world served as inspiration for his first feature film Gamer, which was released in 2011 and later screened at a number of international film festivals.

Euromaidan as a turning point for Ukraine — and for Sentsov

Sentsov’s work on his film Rhino, about children of the 1990s, was interrupted in 2013, when he joined the Revolution of Dignity (‘Euromaidan’) that broke out in Ukraine after pro-Russia President Viktor Yanukovich decided to suspend talks on an EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In February 2014, the protests paved the way for a new pro-European government and for Yanukovich’s ousting. When Moscow responded by illegally annexing Crimea and launching a hybrid war against Ukraine, Sentsov helped bring food to Ukrainian soldiers and organised rallies for a united Ukraine in Simferopol. The Russian Federal Security Service arrested Sentsov in Crimea in May 2014, and deported him to Russia. In what Amnesty International called a ‘cynical show trial’, a Russian military court convicted Sentsov to 20 years imprisonment for plotting terrorist acts in August 2015. Sentsov denies the charges, which he and human rights groups call politically motivated. Sentsov said he was beaten for 24 hours in an attempt to force him to confess. Russian authorities refused to investigate the allegations of torture. In May 2018, Sentsov began a hunger strike, demanding the release of all Ukrainians held on political grounds in Russia and annexed Crimea. Sentsov ended the 145-day hunger strike on 6 October 2018. In a handwritten statement, he explained that he had no choice but to halt the hunger strike to avoid being force-fed due to the critical state of his health.

International support, including from the EU and the European Parliament

The European Union, the United States, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, human rights groups, filmmakers’ and writers’ associations and even Russian film-director Nikita Mikhalkov, who has close links to Russian President Vladimir Putin, had all requested Sentsov’s release. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) repeatedly underlined that Sentsov’s detention breached international law, and urged Russia to return Sentsov and fellow activist Oleksandr Kolchenko to Ukraine. In a June 2018 resolution, Parliament requested the immediate release of Sentsov and the 70 other Ukrainian citizens illegally detained in Russia and Crimea. Announcing the Sakharov Prize laureate in Strasbourg on 25 October 2018, then European Parliament President Antonio Tajani stated that Sentsov’s ‘courage and determination’ has made him ‘a symbol of the struggle for the release of political prisoners held in Russia and around the world’. With the award of the Sakharov Prize, Parliament is ‘expressing its solidarity with him and his cause’, Tajani said: ‘We ask that he be released immediately’.

Responses to the 2018 Sakharov Prize

While Russia’s Foreign Ministry criticised Parliament’s award of the prize to Sentsov as ‘absolutely politicised’, others hailed the decision. PEN America called it ‘a powerful statement in defence of writers, artists, political prisoners, and all those … actively fighting for free thought and free expression in a time of creeping – and not so creeping – authoritarianism around the world’. Human Rights Watch said the award would help increase the pressure on Moscow to release Sentsov. European Council President Donald Tusk renewed his call on Moscow to ‘free Sentsov and all other political prisoners following Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea’. Then Prime Minister of Ukraine, Volodymyr Groysman, expressed gratitude to Parliament for the award, which he called ‘a strong message highlighting the necessity of democracy protection in the world’.

Sentsov’s release in a landmark prisoner swap

Moscow rejected Kyiv’s calls to swap Sentsov and Ukrainian journalist Roman Suschenko, arrested in Moscow in 2016 on espionage charges, for Russian prisoners, until 7 September 2019, when Ukrainian prisoners in Russia were exchanged for 35 prisoners held in Ukraine. The other Ukrainian prisoners released include Suschenko, as well as 24 Ukrainian sailors who were detained in November 2018, when Russia seized three Ukrainian Navy vessels off Crimea. Although the prisoner swap – in line with the 2014-2015 Minsk Peace Agreements – sparked questions about some of the prisoners released by Ukraine, the move was generally hailed by European leaders, including by the HR/VP. The President of the European Parliament, David Sassoli, expressed ‘relief and profound joy’ at the release, adding that he looked forward to meeting Sentsov in person in Parliament and handing him the Sakharov Prize.

Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Oleg Sentsov: The 2018 Sakharov Prize laureate‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Mark English and Nicole Scholz,

On 1 October, the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) hosted the European Academies’ Science Advisory Council (EASAC) for a policy roundtable on climate change and human health. EASAC brings together national science academies from across the EU, Norway and Switzerland.

With Greta Thunberg on the front pages worldwide, the urgent need to act on climate change is starting to capture the imagination of the public. Yet the specific threats that climate change poses to human health are less well-known, despite experts such as Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Director-General of the World Health Organization, sounding the alarm.

Drawing inspiration from the main findings of EASAC’s own June 2019 report, the roundtable focused on identifying the major health effects of climate change in Europe, analysing who is most at risk and assessing how EU policy might help. Cristian Bușoi, MEP, Vice-Chair of the Parliament’s Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety (ENVI) – a physician as well as a politician – gave the opening speech.

Speakers (the full list and bios are here) emphasised the gravity and immediacy of the threat and called for urgent action. Climate change will bring about a diverse range of risks for human health, through different pathways. Projections in Europe show a geographical gradient that increases towards southern Europe (Mediterranean region), but also with greater effects at the highest latitudes (Arctic). Extreme heat exposure will be particularly pronounced in cities (‘heat island effect’).

Health effects may be direct – from heatwaves, wildfires, storms or floods. They may also be indirect, resulting in a higher risk of vector-borne diseases (dengue fever, for example), due to the spread of disease-carrying insects into previously temperate zones. Negative health impacts from air pollution are also projected to rise, as are allergies (for instance, to ragweed pollen).

Vulnerable people, such as the elderly, children and marginalised groups, will be at a higher risk. Mental health effects likely to arise from climate change are also of serious concern. Moreover, climate change will potentially affect agriculture, thereby weakening food security. There is also a growing risk of forced migration, with a rise expected in the number of climate refugees.

According to the EASAC report’s findings, the top priority is to stabilise climate and accelerate efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions. Addressing the current and future health effects of climate change can provide substantial economic benefits, and the health co-benefits of decarbonising the European economy are likely to save millions of lives. Recommendations include a ‘health in all policies’ approach.

The need to make better use of existing evidence, invest in research, and base policy more closely on the results was a recurring theme in the discussion. Speakers also stressed the importance of engaging the public in action on climate change and health, and the need to improve communication on health risks, including by doing more to counter misinformation.

The EU-funded INHERIT project (final conference on 10 December) was highlighted during the roundtable. The project explores the close links between climate change and social disadvantage and aims to identify ways of living, moving and consuming that protect the environment and promote health and health equity.

There was also a discussion on how focusing on health issues – which by their nature interest everybody – could help further raise awareness of climate change and widen participation in debate, for instance around the new European Green Deal.

Click to view slideshow. EPRS briefings related to the topic:

• EU policies – Delivering for citizens: briefings and podcasts on Agriculture, Environmental protection and Health and social security, June2019
• Hearings of the Commissioners-designate Frans Timmermans – Vice-President: European Green Deal, Stella Kyriakides – Health and Virginijus Sinkevičius – Environment and Oceans, September 2019
• Living in the EU: Climate change and energy infographic, April 2019
• The concept of ‘climate refugee’: Towards a possible definition, January 2019
• The EU, a world leader in fighting climate change, May 2018

Written by Jana Titievskaia,

© whitcomberd / Fotolia

The recent forest fires in the Amazon highlight the need for greater measures worldwide to attenuate tensions between resource needs, for example mining or grazing, that cause deforestation. European leaders have called for urgent action, including through trade policy. Policy-makers argue, for instance, for leveraging the negotiated European Union (EU)-Mercosur Trade Agreement to achieve compliance with the Paris Agreement. Since the Paris Agreement is binding only in part and aspirational concerning national emissions targets, there are calls to resort to trade policy instead.

Trade agreements as leverage for change?

During the recent massive Amazon fires, on which Parliament held a debate in September 2019, leaders of France and Ireland, as well as a number of civil society petitions, called for the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement to be frozen or rejected, to leverage stronger action to tackle climate and environmental concerns in partner countries. Halting negotiations or opposing the agreement is seen by some as a tool to elicit compliance with climate commitments, or penalise a trade partner that fails to comply. This is a political course of action, possible in the short term, when the EU has not (yet) made bilateral trade commitments vis-à-vis the trade partner. However, pulling out of a trade agreement at an advanced stage has drawbacks. Late-stage blocking of a trade deal can be seen as bowing to interest group influence (e.g. agricultural producers in the case of Mercosur), who rally behind public concerns to stop a deal if they expect competition to increase as a result of the agreement. In the case of a regional trade agreement, the condemnation of climate violations by one partner might also unfairly penalise other sectors or countries. Therefore, the European Commission has called for rapid adoption of trade agreements, as this would allow the EU to foster change through constructive political dialogue under the auspices of a deal. The Commission has defended the Mercosur agreement, arguing that deforestation is already happening and that in the long term, once the agreement applies, the EU could in theory invoke specific clauses of the agreement to challenge such misconduct as it includes ‘commitments to effectively implement the Paris Agreement’, e.g. under the sustainable development provisions.

However, the current form of trade agreements does not necessarily lead to an increase in the level of compliance with climate commitments. Firstly, for mixed agreements, such as the EU-Mercosur Association Agreement, provisional application applies to the trade pillar (which is an exclusive EU competence), while the provisions for political dialogue and cooperation can potentially not be applied for many years, pending ratification by Member States. It may take a long time before the EU can leverage the political dialogue provisions of the agreement to motivate climate action. Secondly, in EU trade agreements, references to climate commitments, including the Paris Agreement and tackling deforestation, are included in the Trade and Sustainable Development (TSD) chapters, which are arguably not enforceable in the same way as other parts of the trade deal. The TSD chapter, as well as competition and trade remedies provisions, is exempt from the general dispute settlement chapter. The general dispute settlement mechanism is modelled on that of the World Trade Organization (WTO), and allows, in case of non-compliance, the EU to take punitive economic measures as temporary remedies, e.g. to suspend trade concessions in case of non-compliance with an arbitration ruling. In contrast, TSD chapters have separate procedures for disputes, which involve a request for consultation and the creation of a panel of experts. The first case of EU TSD dispute settlement is ongoing under the EU-South Korea Free Trade Agreement (on labour issues). If the counterpart fails to comply, the panel will deliver a set of recommendations. The TSD Committee then monitors the situation. While punitive economic measures are not possible, the Commission argues that the consultations focus on finding a mutually acceptable solution and on exerting public pressure, and that this dynamic of political oversight and a risk of reputational damage incentivise the partner country to comply with the recommendations. One explanation for the separate dispute settlement process for environmental issues is the difficulty of establishing a causal link between economic injury and non-compliance with TSD provisions, which makes it difficult to make a fair estimation of remedies.

WTO rules and the climate waiver

EU trade agreements incorporate the general exception derived from WTO rules – Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The general exception lays down the conditions under which members may take trade-restrictive measures which are ‘necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health’, or relating to the exhaustion of natural resources. The measure (e.g. an import restriction or a ban) cannot be applied in a manner that would constitute arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, nor can it be a disguised restriction on international trade (Article XX, chapeau). Recent EU trade deals, including the EU-Mercosur provisions on trade in goods, set out that ‘environmental measures, such as measures taken to implement multilateral environmental agreements’ fall within the general exception. This would suggest that in theory, the EU is not prevented from taking trade-restrictive environmental measures that aim to implement the Paris Agreement. However, the general exception has been successfully invoked only under very specific circumstances and conditions (e.g. US shrimp products). WTO rules also require a strong causal link between the measure and the environmental objective. With measures taken to address highly complex phenomena, such as climate change, the causality can only be assessed with the passage of time, as suggested by the WTO Appellate Body (Brazil retreaded tyre imports). Under current rules, therefore, a trade-restrictive measure to implement a multilateral environmental agreement – such as a carbon border tax, proposed by Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen – could potentially be challenged on several grounds as WTO-incompatible, unless it is deemed to qualify as a border tax adjustment. Due to the growing possibility of a clash between trade rules and climate action, commentators have called for a climate waiver. This could be possible under Article IX: 3 of the WTO Agreement, which allows the Ministerial Conference to waive an obligation in ‘exceptional circumstances’.

Trade preferences

The withdrawal of trade preferences can act as a sanctions-like measure. For some developing countries (not Mercosur countries), the removal of tariff preferences, under the General Scheme of Preferences (GSP) scheme, is possible in case of serious and systemic violations of core conventions relating to human and labour rights (listed in Part A of Annex VIII) of the GSP Regulation.

However, under the GSP, the EU’s ability to influence the beneficiary in the protection of forests or sustainable management of natural resources is limited. Conventions related to the environment, such as the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Part B of Annex VIII of the GSP Regulation) are not included under the provisions allowing for the temporary withdrawal of preferences (Article 19.1.). In practice, threats to withdraw preferences have been linked to labour or human rights concerns. A review of the current GSP Regulation, due to expire in 2023, should begin in 2020. In a March 2019 resolution, the European Parliament called for the addition of the Paris Agreement to the 27 conventions. It did not specify whether environmental conventions should be linked to preference suspension.

The menu of options to elicit climate action from partner countries through trade policy comes with benefits and drawbacks. Outside the trade toolkit, consumer behaviour and corporate social responsibility in companies can help foster climate action in trade partners. The Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) regulation, in combination with the EU Timber Regulation, also seek to ensure that only legally harvested timber is imported into the EU. In July 2019, the European Commission’s communication ‘Stepping up EU Action to Protect and Restore the World’s Forests’ proposed further measures. However, implementation of FLEGT is based on voluntary partnership agreements (VPAs), which to date exist with only a few trade partners, and so far only one country, Indonesia, has begun issuing FLEGT licences. Read this ‘at a glance’ on ‘Using trade policy to tackle climate change‘ in m$the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.

Written by Tania Lațici,

© naypong / Fotolia

Often labelled as one of today’s main disruptive technologies, drones have indeed earned this label by prompting a fundamental rethinking of business models, existing laws, safety and security standards, the future of transport, and modern warfare. The European Union (EU) recognises the opportunities that drones offer and sees them as opening a new chapter in the history of aerospace. The EU aviation strategy provides guidance for exploring new and emerging technologies, and encourages the integration of drones into business and society so as to maintain a competitive EU aviation industry.

Ranging from insect-sized to several tonnes in weight, drones are extremely versatile and can perform a very large variety of functions, from filming to farming, and from medical aid to search and rescue operations. Among the advantages of civil and military drones are their relative low cost, reach, greater work productivity and capacity to reduce risk to human life. These features have led to their mass commercialisation and integration into military planning. Regulatory and oversight challenges remain, however, particularly regarding dual-use drones – civil drones that can be easily turned into armed drones or weaponised for criminal purposes.

At EU level, the European Commission has been empowered to regulate civil drones and the European Aviation Safety Agency to assist with ensuring a harmonised regulatory framework for safe drone operations. The latest EU legislation has achieved the highest ever safety standards for drones. Another challenge remaining for regulators, officials and manufacturers alike is the need to build the trust of citizens and consumers. Given that drones have been in the public eye more often for their misuse than their accomplishments, transparency and effective communication are imperative to prepare citizens for the upcoming drone age.

Read this briefing on ‘Civil and military drones: Navigating a disruptive and dynamic technological ecosystem‘ in the Think Tank pages of the European Parliament.